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A  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL 
HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


VOLUME  II 
1815-1915 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •  BOSTON  •  CHICAGO  •  DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •  SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 


THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


CONTENTS 
VOLUME  II 

PAGE 

Chapter  XVII.    The  Era  of  Metternich,  1815-1830  .      .      .      .  1 

Revolution  or  Reaction  ?         .........  1 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  and  the  Reconstruction  of  Europe  ...  5 

The  Bourbon  Restoration  in  France   14 

The  Bourbon  Restoration  in  Spain   20 

Reaction  in  Portugal   26 

Tory  Reaction  in  Great  Britain   28 

Trial  and  Abandonment  of  Liberal  Administration  in  Russia        .       .  37 

Maintenance  of  Autocracy  in  Central  Europe   41 

Failure  of  Metternich's  Policies  and  Partial  Triumph^  of  Liberalism, 

1822-1830   !      ...  46 

PART  IV 

DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 

Chapter  XVIII.    The  Industrial  Revolution   67 

The  Mechanical  Inventions   69 

Economic  Effects  of  the  Industrial  Revolution       .....  75 

Capitalism  and  the  Factory  System        .......  77 

Immediate  Effects  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  upon  Politics       .       .  88 

Chapter  XIX.    Democratic  Reform  and  Revolution,  1830-1849     .  100 

Democracy  and  the  Industrial  Revolution   100 

Political  and  Social  Reforms  in  Great  Britain   102 

The  Democratic  Revolution  of  1848  in  France   116 

The  Revolutionary  Movements  of  1848-1849  in  Italy,  Germany,  and 

Austria- 1 1  angary   123 

Chapter  XX.    The  Growth  of  Nationalism,  1848-1871     .       .  .149 
Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte  and  the  Erection  of  the  Second  French 

Empire                                                                            .      •  150 

The  Political  Unification  of  Italy   163 

The  Decline  of  the  Second  French  Empire,  1860-1870         .       .  .175 

The  Political  Unification  of  Germany   180 

V 


vi 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Chapter  XXI.    Social  Factors  in  Recent  European  History,  1871- 


1914  .211 

*•  The  Era  of  the  Benevolent  Bourgeoisie,"  1871-1914  .       .       .  .212 

Christianity  and  Politics   223 

The  New  Science   230 

Christianity  and  Science   240 

The  Social  Problem  and  the  Decline  of  Laisser-Faire     ....  252 

Karl  Marx  and  Modern  Socialism   253 

Anarchism  and  SyndicaUsm   265 

Chapter  XXII.    The  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land, 1867-1914    277 

Political  Reforms   278 

The  Government  of  the  United  Kingdom   290 

British  Political  Parties   297 

British  Social  Legislation   307 

The  Irish  Question   319 

Chapter  XXIII.    Latin  Europe,  1870-1914    331 

1.  The  Third  French  RepubHc   331 

The  Making  of  the  Republic   331 

The  Bo«rgeois  Character  of  the  Republic  and  the  Repression 

of  Clerical  and  Military  Opposition   345 

The  Political  Groups  in  France   361 

2.  The  King^dom  of  Italy   367 

3.  Spain   378 

4.  Portugal   385 

5.  The  Kingdom  of  Belgium   389 

Chapter  XXIV.    Teutonic  Europe,  1871-1914    397 

1.  The  German  Empire   397 

The  Constitution  and  Government  of  Germany  ....  397 

The  German  Empire  under  Bismarck,  1871-1890  .  .  .  404 
The  German  Empire  under  William  II,  1890-1914    .  '    .  .415 

2.  The  Dual  Monarchy  of  Austria-Hungary   426 

3.  The  Swiss  Confederation   435 

4.  The  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  (Holland)   439 

5.  The  Scandinavian  States  :  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Norway     .       .  442 

Chapter  XXV.  The  Russian  Empire,  1855-1914  .  .  .  .452 
The  Reign  of  Alexander  II  (1855-1881) :  Reforms,  Reaction,  and  the 

Rise  of  Terrorism   452 

The  Maintenance  of  Autocracy  and  the  Prosecution  of  "  Russification  " 

under  Alexander  III  and  Nicholas  II,  1881-1905  ....  460 
The  Industrial  Revolution  in  Russia  and  the  Revival  of  Opposition  to 

the  Autocracy   473 

The  Revolutionary  Movement  of  1905  and  the  Russian  Duma,  1906- 

1914   478 


CONTENTS  vii 

PAGB 

Chapter  XXVI.   The  Dismemberment  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 

1683-1914    490 

The  Ottoman  Empire  and  its  Decline,  1683-1815    490 

The  Great  Powers  and  the  Dismemberment  of  Turkey  in  Europe,  1815- 

1886    498 

The  Autonomy  of  Crete  and  Loss  of  the  Turkish  Possessions  in  Africa  509 
The  Progress  of  the  Balkan  Nations  and  the  Attempt  to  Rejuvenate 

Turkey,  1832-1912    515 

The  Balkan  Wars,  1912-1913                                          ...  528 

PART  V 

NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

Chapter  XXVII.    The  New  Imperialism  and  the  Spread  o?  Euro- 
pean Civilization  in  Asia   547 

The  Old  Colonial  Movement  and  the  New  Imperialism  .  .  .  547 
The  Partial  Dismemberment  and  the  Political  Regeneration  of  the 

Chinese  Empire   560 

The  Awakening  of  Japan   577 

Russian  Expansion  in  Asia   586 

Survey  of  the  Rival  Empires  in  the  Far  East   592 

Chapter  XXVIII.    The  Spread  of  European  Civilization  in  Amer- 
ica AND  IN  Africa   600 

The  Europeanization  of  America   600 

The  Partition  of  Africa   614 

Chapter  XXIX.    The  British  Empire   640 

Self-governing  Colonies   641 

The  Crown  Colonies   657 

The  Empire  of  India   662 

Conclusion   672 

Chapter  XXX.    International  Relations  (1871-1911)  and  the  Out- 
break of  the  War  of  the  Nations   679 

The  Concert  of  Europe   679 

The  Hegemony  of  Germany,  1871-1890    691 

The  Balance  of  Power,  1890-1914    697 

The  Outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Nations,  1914-1915     .       .       .  .710 

Appendix.    Rulers  of  the  Chief  European  States  since  the  Open- 
ing of  the  Sixteenth  Century   727 

luLEX  (Volumes  I  and  II)   /27 


MAPS 
VOLUME  II 

PRECEDING 
PAGE 

19.  Europe,  181 5   i 

20.  The  Italian  States,  1856   165 

21.  The  Germanies,  1815-1866   181 

22.  Europe,  1871   211 

23.  Central  Europe,  1914  —  Social  and  Economic      .      .  .215 

24.  England  and  Wales  in  the  Nineteenth  Century       .       .  277 

25.  Ireland  in  the  Nineteenth  Century   321 

26.  The  "Nations"  of  Europe  in  the  Nineteenth  Century     .  331 

27.  Germany,  1871-1914   397 

28.  Austria-Hungary,  1914   427 

29.  The  Russian  Empire,  1914   467 

30.  The  Ottoman  Empire,  1683-1800   491 

31.  The  Balkan  States,  1856-1912   507 

32.  The  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  Balkan  States,  1914    .       .  535 

33.  Asia,  1914   561 

34.  South  America,  1914   607 

35.  Africa,  1914   625 

36.  The  British  Empire,  1914   641 

37.  Colonial  Dominions  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  1914  701 

38.  The  Mediterranean  Countries,  1914   717 


ix 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE  ERA  OF  METTERNICH,  1815-1830 
REVOLUTION  OR  REACTION? 

Certain  basic  principles  in  society  and  in  politics  were  pro- 
claimed by  the  French  Revolution.  The  Napoleonic  Era  served 
to  communicate  them  to  Europe.  The  ensuing  period  was 
marked  by  a  bitter  struggle  within  nearly  every  European  state 
for  their  general  acceptance  or  for  their  wholesale  rejection. 

To  all  Frenchmen  Uberty,  equahty,  and  fraternity  already 
meant  definite  facts  or  rights :  those  who  espoused  them  were 
inherently  revolutionaries  —  radicals   or  liberals  continued 
while  those  who  repudiated  them  were  reactionaries  or  Co^^flict^ 
conservatives,  intent  upon  maintaining  or  restoring  Revolution 
the  poHtical  and  social  institutions  of  the  old  regime,  ^d^^e  Old 
The  Bourbon  settlement  of  1814  in  France  was  m 
the  nature  of  a  compromise,  a  nice  balancing  of  the  forces  of 
revolution  and  reaction.    Outside  of  France  the  sovereigns  of 
Europe  were  almost  without  exception  reactionaries,  deter- 
mined to  bolster  up  the  theories  and  practices  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  but  many  of  their  subjects  who,  in  the  years  between 
1789  and  1814,  had  learned  from  the  French  in  one  way  or 
another  the  significance  of  popular  sovereignty,  individual  rights, 
and  national  patriotism,  gave  unmistakable  signs  of  a  contrary 
determination.    The  question  resolved  itself  into  this :  should 
revolutionary  or  reactionary  doctrine  henceforth  shape  the 
society  and  politics  of  the  European  nations?    It  was  a  ques- 
tion fraught  with  the  most  momentous  consequences  to  succeed- 
ing generations.    Another  fifteen  years  would  pass  before  the 
outcome  could  be  indicated  —  the  fifteen  years  (1815-1830)  of 
conflict  between  Uberals  and  conservatives  which  we  shaU  now 
proceed  to  treat  as  the  Era  of  Metternich, 


VOL.  U  — 


2 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Throughout  the  period  the  distinction  between  liberals  and 
conservatives  was  everywhere  based  largely  on  differences  among 
The  Reac  ^^^^^^  classes  and  in  geographical  location.  The 
tionaries  princes  whosc  divine  authority  to  rule  was  questioned  ; 
servat^ves  nobles  whose  lands  and  privileges  were  confiscated 

or  threatened  with  confiscation ;  the  ecclesiastics 
whose  consciences  were  violated  or  activities  abridged :  these 
pillars  of  the  old  regime  were  uniformly  conservative.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  great  bulk  of  the  bourgeoisie,  —  the  professional 
classes,  business  men,  traders,  and  shopkeepers,  —  whose  tradi- 
tional repugnance  to  nobles  and  clergymen  was  sharpened  by 
an  ambition  to  secure  complete  control  of  national  policies  and 
finance ;  the  generality  of  the  Continental  universities  —  pro- 
fessors and  students  —  together  with  other  ''intellectuals" 
drawn  from  many  walks  of  life,  who  were  intensely  patriotic 
The  Revo-  dreamed  of  the  perfectibility  of  mankind ; 

lutionaries  the  workingman  of  the  town  and  many  a  day-laborer 
and  Liberals  ^-^^  fields,  who  felt  that  any  change  might  add  to  the 
contents  of  his  dinner-pail :  these  groups,  restless  under  the  old 
regime,  were  solidly  liberal.  The  peasantry  who  still  con- 
stituted the  majority  of  European  population  were  swayed  be- 
tween the  contending  parties :  still  respectful  of  authority  in 
state  and  church,  sincerely  religious,  and  innately  skeptical  of 
the  fine  phrases  which  were  on  liberal  Hps,  they  could  at  times 
and  in  places  be  reckoned  conservative ;  but  there  was  one  im- 
portant respect  in  which  many  of  them  doggedly  resisted  alli- 
ance with  the  reactionaries,  and  that  was  their  fanatical  attach- 
ment to  the  social  achievements  of  the  Revolution  —  they  were 
done  forever  with  feudalism  and  serfdom,  they  would  own  their 
own  lands.  As  a  general  rule  it  may  be  observed  that  the  further 
west  one  went  and  the  nearer  to  revolutionary  France  one  came, 
the  larger  proportion  of  liberals  one  found,  and  that,  conversely, 
the  further  east  one  went  and  the  more  remote  from  France,  the 
larger  proportion  of  conservatives  one  encountered. 

For  several  years  after  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  the  con- 
Religious  servatives  enjoyed  throughout  Europe  an  influence 
Revival  perhaps  out  of  proportion  to  their  actual  numbers. 
There  was  a  renewed  loyalty  on  the  part  of  patriots  to  the 
monarchs  who  had  headed  the  great  national  uprisings  against 


^'LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  3 


Napoleonic  despotism.  There  was  a  marked  revival  of  devotion 
to  the  Catholic  Church,  whose  supreme  pontiff,  the  venerable 
Pius  VII,  in  the  face  of  insults  and  injuries  from  Napoleon,  had 
set  a  noble  example  of  Christian  charity  and  fortitude.  Above 
all,  there  was  universal  horror  at  the  bloodshed  and  wretchedness 
which  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  wars  had  entailed. 
Thousands  upon  thousands  of  human  beings,  drawn  from  every 
nation  and  from  every  social  class,  had  been  butchered.  Famine, 
pestilence,  crime,  and  indescribable  disease,  —  the  attendant 
miseries  of  war,  —  had  walked  abroad  in  every  land.  Small 
wonder  that  prince,  priest,  and  people  united  in  extoll-  Desire  for 
ing  the  blessings  of  peace !  Even  the  Hberal  bour- 
geoisie  perceived  that  the  revival  of  Continental  industry  and 
trade  was  a  concomitant  of  peace.  With  some  justice  Metter- 
nich  was  able  to  avow  that  "what  the  European  peoples  want  is 
not  liberty  but  peace."  To  prevent  the  recurrence  of  such 
insurrections  as  the  Revolution  had  witnessed  and  of  such  wars 
as  the  career  of  Napoleon  had  involved,  —  in  a  word,  to  preserve 
domestic  and  foreign  peace,  —  became  the  watchword  and 
countersign  of  reactionary  Europe. 

Among  the  host  of  figures  who  crowd  the  stage  from  181 5  to 
1830,  Prince  Metternich  stands  out  most  prominently,  not 
indeed  in  any  such  unique  way  as  did  Napoleon  Bona-  Prince 
parte  from  1799  to  181 5,  but  still  conspicuously  Metternich 
enough  to  justify  the  common  use  of  his  name  in  designating  the 
era.  A  contrast  more  striking  than  that  between  Metternich 
and  Napoleon  can  hardly  be  imagined. 

Count  Clemens  Metternich  was  born  at  Coblenz  on  15  May, 
1773,  of  a  very  distinguished  family  which  ranked  high  among 
the  oldest  nobility  of  the  Rhenish  Germanics  and  which  His  Early 
had  furnished  several  electors  to  the  great  ecclesias-  Career 
tical  sees  of  Trier  and  Cologne  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries.  His  father  had  entered  the  diplomatic  service  of 
the  Holy  Romam  Empire,  and  in  the  social  setting  of  the  old 
regime  and  the  aristocratic  atmosphere  of  the  punctilious  Habs- 
burg  court  young  Clemens  was  reared.  He  was  a  sixteen-year- 
old  student  at  the  University  of  Strassburg  when  the  vigor  of  the 
town  mob  gave  him  his  first  knowledge  of,  and  distaste  for,  the 
French  Revolution,  a  distaste  which  the  seizure  of  his  princely 


4 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


family  estates  by  Napoleon  fourteen  years  later  was  not  likely 
to  counteract.  Following  his  father's  career,  he  soon  attracted 
the  favorable  attention  of  the  veteran  Austrian  chancellor, 
Count  Kaunitz,  whose  grand-daughter  he  married  in  1795.  This 
alliance  not  only  brought  him  large  estates  in  Austria,  but  made 
him  heir  to  the  prestige  of  the  great  diplomat  of  the  eighteenth 
century  and  introduced  him  into  the  most  exclusive  circles  of 
Viennese  society.  Henceforth  his  rise  was  rapid.  He  served 
as  representative  of  the  Habsburg  emperor  successively  at 
Dresden  (1801),  Berlin  (1803),  Petrograd  (1805),  and  Paris 
(1806).  Despite  his  country's  embarrassment  during  the  years 
immediately  following  the  catastrophe  of  Austerlitz,  and  al- 
though he  was  now  pitted  against  Talleyrand,  in  many  ways  as 
great  a  master  of  subtlety  as  himself,  his  remarkable  good  looks, 
his  clever  wit,  and  his  charm  of  manner  won  him  high  favor  at 
Napoleon's  court,  and  gained  for  him  an  extraordinary  diplomatic 
experience.  Although  he  urged  his  sovereign  to  undertake  the 
premature  war  of  1809,  he  was  one  of  the  first  to  counsel  peace 
after  the  defeat  of  Wagram. 

In  1809  Metternich  became  the  actual  head  of  the  Austrian 
government,  under  the  nominal  rule  of  the  well-intentioned  but 
Austrian  procrastinating  Emperor  Francis  I,  a  position  he  was 
Minister  retain  for  nearly  forty  years.    The  statesman 

could  not  but  be  impressed  with  the  need  of  reformation  within 
his  country,  and  he  at  once  made  a  few  proposals  for  national 
betterment.  But  his  detestation  of  revolution  from  below  made 
him  fearful  of  reforms  from  above,  and  he  preferred  to  bring  honor 
and  prestige  to  Austria  by  means  of  successful  foreign  diplomacy 
rather  than  through  what  always  seemed  to  him  the  more  uncer- 
tain means  of  internal  changes  in  society  and  political  organization. 

In  foreign  affairs,  Metternich's  hatred  of  Napoleon  was  con- 
ditioned by  his  fear  of  Russian  aggrandizement  in  the  event  of 
His  Reia-  French  emperor's ,  downfall.    Accordingly,  from 

tions  with  1810  to  1813  his  poKcy  was  to  play  off  Napoleon  and 
Napoleon  Alexander  against  each  other.  He  pressed  forward 
with  alacrity  the  negotiations  for  the  marriage  of  an  Austrian 
archduchess  to  the  Corsican  adventurer.  He  watched  with  glee 
the  herculean  combat  of  1812  between  Napoleon  and  the  tsar, 
promising  to  the  former  the  assistance  of  an  army  corps  of  30,000 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  $ 


men,  while  assuring  the  latter  that  the  Austrian  forces  would 
not  be  employed  on  the  offensive.  All  the  time  he  was  actually 
keeping  the  whole  Austrian  army  on  a  war  footing  and  maintain- 
ing an  armed  neutrality,  ready  to  throw  his  weight  upon  which- 
ever side  might  finally  be  in  a  position  to  bestow  the  greater 
benefits  upon  Austria.  Such  was  the  success  of  his  well-laid 
plans  that  the  intervention  of  Austria  was  the  decisive  factor  in 
the  Battle  of  the  Nations  (October,  1813)  and  in  the  campaign 
of  1 8 14:  Napoleon's  power  collapsed  and  Austria  became  the 
dominant  Power  among  the  victorious  alHes.  Metternich  was 
hailed  as  the  most  astute  statesman  of  his  age  —  he  hobnobbed 
with  the  Russian  and  Prussian  monarchs,  he  was  feted  by  Talley- 
rand and  Louis  XVIII,  he  was  given  a  fulsome  welcome  on  a  visit 
to  England,  he  was  named  a  magnate  of  the  kingdom  of  Hungary 
and  a  count  and  hereditary  prince  of  the  Austrian  Empire. 

THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA  AND  THE  RECONSTRUCTION 

OF  EUROPE 

The  most  important  problem  which  confronted  European 
diplomacy,  after   the   restoration  of   the  French  Bourbons, 
was  that  of  general  territorial  readjustments.  Napo- 
leon had  badly  mutilated  the  ancient  map  of  Europe.  ^o^nS^* 
How  far  could,  or  should,  his  victors  mend  it?    To  Problems 
what  extent  were  they  justified  in  rewarding  them-  Napoleon^ 
selves  territorially  for  their  efforts  and  sacrifices? 
What  punishment  should  they  mete  out  to  his  late  allies?  It 
was  a  recognition  of  the  decisive  part  played  by  Austria  and  of  the 
commanding  personahty  of  Metternich  that  Vienna  was  chosen 
as  the  scene  of  the  great  international  congress  convened 
(September,  18 14)  for  the  purpose  of  answering  these  questions 
and  of  reestablishing  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 

Never  had  Europe  beheld  such  a  galaxy  of  gold  lace  and 
titled  dignitaries  of  the  old  regime  as  gathered  at  Vienna.  Six 
monarchs  attended :  the  Tsar  Alexander,  a  curious  ^,  ^ 

e    ,         ,  ,  .  .  '         ,  .  .       The  Con- 

mixture  01  shrewdness  and  mysticism,  of  ambition  gress  of 
and  compassion;   the  polite  and  cautious  Emperor  ^g^^^jgj^ 
Francis  I  ^  of  Austria ;  King  Frederick  William  III 

^Francis  II,  Holy  Roman  Emperor  from  1792  to  1806,  known  as  Francis  I, 
emperor  of  Austria,  after  1804. 


6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  Prussia,  who  was  at  once  timid  and  obstinate,  and  quite  fas- 
cinated by  the  Christian-like  benevolence  of  the  tsar;  and  the 
kings  of  Denmark,  Bavaria,  and  Wurttemberg.  German  dukes, 
princes,  and  electors  were  present  in  crowds,  while  among  the 
special  envoys  were  two  Irish  noblemen,  the  sagacious  Lord 
Castlereagh  and  the  ''Iron"  Duke  of  Wellington,  who  in  turn 
represented  Great  Britain ;  Hardenberg  and  Baron  von  Hum- 
boldt from  Prussia ;  Nesselrode  from  Russia ;  Stein,  now  a  per- 
sonal agent  of  the  Tsar  Alexander ;  the  insinuating  Talleyrand 
from  France,  with  his  new  discovery  of  "legitimacy";  and  last 
but  not  least  Metternich  himself,  who  discharged  the  obhgations 
that  devolved  upon  him  as  host  of  the  imposing  congress  with 
becoming  grace  and  dignity.  With  the  possible  exception  of 
Alexander,  whose  predilections  for  French  liberalism  and  for  the 
"free"  institutions  of  England  were  still  sincere  if  somewhat 
vague,  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  its  personnel  as  well  as  in  its 
actions  was  one  grand  pageant  in  celebration  of  the  defeat  of 
revolution  and  the  triumph  of  reaction. 

In  conformity  with  the  best  usages  of  eighteenth-century 
diplomacy,  the  divine-right  monarchs  and  their  splendid  repre- 
sentatives who  assembled  at  Vienna  interspersed  their  negotia- 
tions with  a  round  of  banquets  and  balls.  This  fact,  together 
with  the  inherent  difficulty  of  many  of  the  problems  handled, 
protracted  the  deHberations  for  several  months.  Almost  from 
the  outset  differences  in  claims  developed  between  Russia  and 
Prussia  on  one  hand  and  Austria,  backed  by  Great  Britain  and 
France,  on  the  other,  so  that  for  some  time  neither  the  stubborn- 
ness of  the  tsar  nor  the  machinations  of  Metternich  proved  suffi- 
cient to  solve  the  vexatious  problems  of  the  disposition  of  Poland 
and  Saxony.  It  required  the  shock  of  Napoleon's  return  from 
Elba  to  bring  the  statesmen  together,  to  smooth  out  the  rough 
places,  and  to  arrange  a  compromise.  The  Final  Act  of  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  wus  signed  (9  June,  181 5)  only  a  few  days  before 
the  battle  of  Waterloo. 

The  general  principle  underlying  the  Viennese  settlement  was 
the  restoration  so  far  as  practicable  of  the  boundaries  and  of 
the  reigning  families  of  the  several  European  countries  as  they 
had  been  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution  and 
the  advent  of  Napoleoix  Bonaparte.    It  was  the  very  principle 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  7 


of  "legitimacy"  which  Talleyrand  exploited  in  order  to  save 
France  from  further  territorial  spoliation  and  to  enable  his 
vanquished  country  still  to  play  an  influential  role  in  Legiti- 
the  counsels  of  Europe,  and  which  Metternich  adopted  macy  "  and 
from  him  as  a  valuable  asset  of  Austrian  policy  and  Vienna 

.  •ii      i  r  Settlement 

of  general  reaction.    In  accordance  with  the  theory  01 

legitimacy,"  France  was  not  compelled  to  pay  heavily  even  for 
the  Hundred  Days :  the  second  treaty  of  Paris,  concluded  in 
November,  181 5,  guaranteed  her  approximately  the  boundaries 
of  1789  and  obhged  her  only  to  restore  the  art- treasures  which 
Napoleon  had  pilfered  from  other  countries,  to  pay  an  indemnity 
of  700,000,000  francs,  and  to  submit  for  a  term  of  five  years  to  for- 
eign occupation  of  her  chief  fortresses.  Likewise  consonant  with 
the  doctrine  of  ''legitimacy,"  the  treaties  of  Vienna  recognized 
the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  in  Spain  and  in  the  Two  Sicilies, 
of  the  house  of  Orange  in  Holland,  of  the  house  of  Savoy  in 
Sardinia  and  Piedmont,  of  the  pope  to  his  temporal  possessions 
in  central  Italy,  and  of  the  various  German  princes  whose  terri- 
tories had  been  included  in  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine. 
Still  in  the  name  of  "legitimacy,"  Austria  recovered  the 
Tyrol  and  the  Illyrian  provinces ;  the  Swiss  Confederation  was 
restored  under  a  guarantee  of  neutraHty ;  and  Poland  was  again 
dismembered,  much  the  same  as  in  1795,  by  Russia,  Austria, 
and  Prussia,  although  the  tsar  promised  to  treat  his  Hon's  share 
as  a  separate  kingdom  with  its  own  constitution. 

The  principle  of  ''legitimacy"  was  somewhat  compromised  by 
the  necessity  of  providing  more  or  less  arbitrary  "compensa- 
tions."   In  the  course  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  Great  ^ 

T»  •     •  •11  Compen- 

Britain,  as  we  have  already  seen,  appropriated,  along  sations "  in 
with  Malta,  Mauritius,  Tobago,  St.  Lucia,  Trinidad,  y^enna. 

1  r  XT      1  1      •  -i-^      1       1     •  Settlement 

and  part  of  Honduras,  the  important  Dutch  colonies 
of  Ceylon,  South  Africa,  and  Guiana.^  These  colonies  were  now 
confirmed  to  the  British,  but  as  compensation  to  the  Dutch,  and 
also  in  order  to  erect  a  strong  state  on  the  northern  frontier  of 
France,  the  Austrian  Netherlands  —  what  is  present-day  Bel- 
gium —  were  joined  with  Holland,  to  form  the  United  Kingdom 
of  the  Netherlands  under  the  rule  of  the  Dutch  king,  despite  the 
fact  that  nearly  two  and  a  half  centuries  of  political  separation 

*  A  part  of  Guiana  was  retained  by  the  Dutch. 


s 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


had  augmented  the  racial  and  rehgious  antipathies  between  the 
two  regions.  To  compensate  Austria  for  the  surrender  of  her 
claims  on  the  Belgian  Netherlands,  she  was  given  a  commanding 
position  in  Italy  :  the  territories  of  the  ancient  republic  of  Venice 
and  of  the  duchy  of  Milan  were  transferred  to  her  outright,  and 
members  of  the  Habsburg  family  were  seated  upon  the  thrones  of 
the  small  central  states  of  Tuscany,  Parma,  and  Modena. 
Sweden,  as  compensation  for  the  cession  of  Finland  to  Russia 
and  of  Pomerania  to  Prussia,  secured  Norway  from  Denmark, 
whose  protracted  alliance  with  Napoleon  seemed  to  merit  a 
severe  punishment.  Prussia  was  similarly  allowed  to  annex 
two-fifths  of  Saxony  and,  as  a  further  safeguard  against  France, 
to  enlarge  her  former  provinces  in  the  lower  Rhine  valley.  On 
the  southeastern  frontier  of  France,  the  king  of  Sardinia  was 
permitted  to  possess  himself  of  the  former  repubHc  of  Genoa. 

In  the  territorial  and  constitutional  settlement  of  the  Ger- 
manies neither  Austria  nor  Prussia  found  it  advantageous  to 
Reconstruc-  ii^sist  too  rigorously  upon  ''legitimacy."  There  was 
tion  of  the  no  thought  of  reviving  the  two-hundred-odd  ecclesias- 
Germanies  ^-^^j  states  and  petty  principalities  which  had  been 
suppressed  in  1803.  There  was  no  serious  intention  of  restoring 
to  hfe  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  which  had  expired  in  1806. 
There  was  certainly  no  favor  shown  by  the  German  kings  and 
diplomats  to  the  popular  agitation  for  a  strongly  knit  national 
state.  Baron  vom  Stein,  it  is  true,  proposed  the  unification  of 
all  Germany  under  the  supremacy  of  a  single  Power,  but  King 
Frederick  William  III  displayed  no  ambition  to  assume  the  leader- 
ship, and  Metternich  had  already  promised  the  princes  of  south 
Germany  that  Austria  would  respect  their  sovereign  rights. 
Instead  of  adopting  a  frankly  national  poHcy,  the  governments 
of  Prussia  and  Austria,  as  well  as  the  smaller  German  states,  were 
bent  on  safeguarding  their  respective  interests  against  possible 
encroachments  by  others.  The  outcome  of  this  particularist,  or 
states-rights,  feeling  was  the  creation  of  the  Germanic  Confedera- 
tion, a  loose  organization  of  the  remaining  thirty-eight  states, 
with  a  Diet  consisting  of  delegates  of  the  reigning  princes, 
presided  over  by  Austria.  The  members  might  not  enter  into 
alHance  with  a  foreign  Power  either  against  the  Confederation 
as  a  whole  or  against  a  fellow-member.    The  constitution  was 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY" 


9 


placed  under  the  guarantee  of  Europe,  and,  by  means  of  the  tradi- 
tional and  interested  support  wliich  the  lesser  princes  gave  to 
Austria,  the  Confederation  soon  came  to  be  directed  from  Vienna. 

Thus  did  the  foremost  reactionaries  of  Europe  refashion  their 
map.  Thus  in  the  name  of  legitimacy  was  France  saved  and 
at  the  same  time  so  hemmed  in  that  she  would  not  be  command- 
able  again  to  dictate  to  the  Continent.  Thus,  too,  were  ing  Position 
the  alHes  rewarded  who  had  certainly  overthrown 
Napoleon  and  had  possibly  stayed  the  Revolution.  Thus, 
finally,  under  Metternich,  had  the  leadership  of  Europe  passed 
from  France  to  Austria.  Great  indeed  was  the  power  and  pres- 
tige of  Austria  at  the  close  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  Metter- 
nich now  found  himself  in  charge  of  the  affairs  of  an  enormous 
state.  With  the  exception  of  the  distant  Belgian  Netherlands, 
which  had  always  been  a  source  of  weakness,  the  Habsburg 
dominions  of  1763  were  again  intact,  and  to  them  had  been 
added  the  richest  and  most  prosperous  districts  of  neighboring 
Italy.  In  fact,  throughout  the  entire  Italian  peninsula,  French 
influence  was  replaced  by  Austrian.  Then,  too,  within  the  Diet 
of  the  new  Germanic  Confederation  the  Austrian  emperor,  backed 
by  the  weight  of  the  Habsburg  power  beyond  the  borders  of 
Germany,  exercised  a  greater  influence  than  had  ever  the  Holy 
Roman  Emperor. 

In  all  these  territorial  readjustments  there  was  little  that  was 
permanent  and  much  that  was  temporary.  The  union  of  Sweden 
and  Norway  lasted  ninety  years  ;  that  of  Holland  and  Disregard  of 
Belgium,  fifteen ;  and  the  ItaHan  and  German  settle-  Nationalism 
ments  survived  but  fifty  years.  The  fatal  mistake  of  the  Con- 
gress was  the  willful  disregard  of  the  principle  of  nationahty. 
Howsoever  the  reactionary  monarchs  and  diplomats  might  com- 
bat liberty  and  equahty ,  they  could  ill  afford  to  be  oblivious  of  the 
patriotic,  nationalistic  movements  that  had  recently  stirred  the 
French,  the  Poles,  the  Portuguese,  the  Spaniards,  the  Italians, 
and  the  Germans.  Yet  they  calmly  set  aside  all  national  con- 
siderations, and,  true  to  the  international  usages  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  they  proceeded  once  more  to 
treat  the  European  peoples  as  so  many  pawns  in  the  game  of 
dynastic  aggrandizement.  That  was  why  the  princes  were  left 
all-powerful  in  the  Germanics,  why  the  Italian  states  passed 


10 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


under  the  domination  of  Austria,  why  the  Belgians  as  well  as  the 
Dutch  were  handed  over  to  the  house  of  Orange,  why  Swedes  and 
Norwegians  were  given  a  joint  sovereign.  The  longing  for 
nationality  was  already  a  very  real  fact  throughout  Europe; 
failure  to  satisfy  it  was  the  chief  defect  in  the  work  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna. 

The  harking  back  of  the  plenipotentiaries  at  Vienna  to  the 
days  of  territorial  rivalry  among  the  Great  Powers  also  prevented 
Paucity  of  them  from  fulfilling  the  expectations  which  the  Tsar 
other  Alexander  and  enlightened  public  opinion  had  enter- 
mentTof  the  tained  of  a  wider  and  more  fundamental  scope  for  the 
Congress  of  labors  of  the  Congress.  To  these  altruistic  souls,  the 
Vienna  termination  of  a  terrible  period  of  revolution  and  war- 
fare, of  bloodshed  and  misery,  and  the  rapid  development  of  a 
sense  of  solidarity  among  all  European  princes  and  peoples  seemed 
a  particularly  auspicious  opportunity  for  effecting  a  permanent 
settlement  of  the  balance  of  power,  for  the  discovery  of  safeguards 
against  its  future  disturbance,  for  general  disarmament  and 
assurance  of  international  peace,  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave 
trade  and  of  piracy,  and  for  the  solution  of  social  problems.  Such 
subjects  were  actually  broached  at  Vienna  by  the  tsar,  but  their 
reception,  though  poHte,  was  essentially  chilly  and  most  of  them 
were  suffered  to  drop  quite  out  of  sight :  even  Alexander  was  soon 
absorbed  in  the  ambition  of  securing  Finland  and  Poland  for  the 
Romanov  dynasty.  Largely  through  British  representations,  a 
declaration  was  appended  to  the  final  treaty  to  the  effect  that  the 
slave  trade  should  be  aboHshed,  although  each  Power  was  left 
free  to  fix  such  a  date  as  best  suited  its  own  convenience.  Provi- 
sions respecting  the  free  navigation  of  international  rivers  and 
regulating  the  rights  of  precedence  among  diplomatists,  —  minor 
modifications  in  the  recognized  content  of  international  law,  — 
were  also  adopted.  But  the  more  serious  questions  of  the  future 
Metter-  wevQ  not  perceived  or  were  left  unheeded.  . 
nich's  Metternich  was  certainly  desirous  of  rendering  the 

Mainte-  Viennese  settlement  permanent.  He  was  henceforth 
nance  of  the  a  stanch  advocate  of  the  maintenance  of  international 
status  Quo    pgQ^(.g  believed  that  the  peace  of  Europe 

could  best  be  maintained  not  by  a  central  tribunal  resting  upon 
the  consent  of  the  European  peoples,  which  would  recognize  the 


^'LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  ii 


hateful  principle  of  democracy  and  which  might  seriously  in- 
terfere with  the  hegemony  of  Austria,  but  rather  by  the  vigi- 
lant benevolence  of^alhed  sovereigns.    The  treaty  of  Paris  (20 
November,  181 5),  \^mich  formally  renewed  the  treaty  r^^^ 
of   Chaumont,   bound   the   Quadruple  AlHance  —  Quadruple 
Austria,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Great  Britain  —  to 
the  future  convocation  of  diplomatic  congresses  for  the  preser- 
vation of  peace  and  of  the  status  quo,  and  this  was  sufficient 
for  Metternich. 

But  the  Tsar  Alexander,  in  his  dreamy,  mystical  way,  had 
already  gone  further.  While  loyally  adhering  to  the  Quadruple 
AlHance  as  an  effective  means  of  maintaining  the  jg^^^^^ 
treaties  of  Vienna  by  physical  force,  he  had  felt  that  ander  and 
the  great  Christian  principles  of  peace,  forbearance,  ^^^^fj 
and  mutual  good  will,  solemnly  subscribed  to  by  all  the 
European  monarchs,  would  supply  the  underlying  and  sacred  spirit- 
ual motives  for  preserving  modern  society  as  well  as  boundaries 
and  governments.  Accordingly  he  had  induced  the  pious  king  of 
Prussia  and  the  obliging  emperor  of  Austria  to  join  with  him  in 
forming  (26  September,  181 5)  the  celebrated  Holy  Alliance,  by 
which  the  three  sovereigns  solemnly  declared  their  ''fixed  resolu- 
tion, both  in  the  administration  of  their  respective  states,  and  in 
their  poHtical  relations  with  every  other  government,  to  take  for 
their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of  that  Holy  Religion,  namely,  the 
precepts  of  Justice,  Christian  Charity,  and  Peace,  which,  far 
from  being  applicable  only  to  private  concerns,  must  have  an 
immediate  influence  on  the  councils  of  Princes,  and  guide  all  their 
steps,  as  being  the  only  means  of  consolidating  human  institutions 
and  remedying  their  imperfections."  They  mutually  promised 
to  "remain  united  by  the  bonds  of  a  true  and  indissoluble  frater- 
nity, and,  considering  each  other  as  fellow-countrymen,  they  will, 
on  all  occasions  and  in  all  places,  lend  each  other  aid  and  assist- 
ance ;  and,  regarding  themselves  towards  their  subjects  and 
armies  as  fathers  of  families,  they  will  lead  them,  in  the  same  spirit 
of  fraternity  with  which  they  are  animated,  to  protect  Religion, 
Peace,  and  Justice."  Their  Majesties  consequently  recom- 
mended to  their  people,  "with  the  most  tender  solicitude,  as  the 
sole  means  of  enjoying  that  Peace  which  arises  from  a  good 
conscience^  and  which  alone  is  durable,  to  strengthen  them- 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


selves  every  day  more  and  more  in  the  principles  and  exercise  oi 
the  duties  which  the  Divine  Saviour  has  taught  to  mankind." 

Alexander  was  the  only  sovereign  who  took  the  Holy  Alliance 
very  seriously.  The  pope  upbraided  the  Catholic  emperor  of 
Weakness  Austria  for  making  a  Christian  declaration  in  union 
of  the  Holy  with  a  schismatic  Russian  and  an  heretical  Protestant. 
Aiuance  ^  brilHant  CathoHc  apologist  discovered  in  the  docu- 
ment the  ^'  spirit  of  visionaries  who  opposed  religiosity  to  religion." 
The  CathoUc  emperor  of  Austria  frankly  told  Alexander  that  he 
did  not  know  what  it  meant:  *'if  it  was  a  question  of  poUtics, 
he  must  refer  it  to  his  chancellor,  if  of  religion,  to  his  confessor." 
Metternich  scornfully  called  it  ''verbiage,"  and  Lord  Castlereagh 
pronounced  it  "a  piece  of  sublime  mysticism  and  nonsense." 
Nevertheless,  with  the  exception  of  the  sultan,  the  pope,  and  the 
prince-regent  of  Great  Britain,  all  the  European  rulers  out  of 
deference  to  the  tsar  and  doubtless  influenced  in  many  instances 
by  the  reHgious  revival  of  the  time,  signed  the  treaty  and  were 
duly  admitted  to  the  Holy  Alliance.  The  British  prince-regent 
in  his  letter  announcing  his  inabihty  to  become  a  signatory 
hypocritically  expressed  his  ''entire  concurrence  with  the  princi- 
ples laid  down  by  the  august  sovereigns"  and  stated  that  it 
would  always  be  his  endeavor  to  regulate  his  conduct  "by  their 
sacred  maxims." 

To  the  Hberals  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  Holy  AlHance 
became  the  embodiment  of  a  diabolical  conspiracy  to  stamp  out 
democracy,  nationaHsm,  and  social  justice.  But  such  an  estimate 
of  its  significance  is  derived  from  a  confusion  of  terms  and  is 
quite  mistaken.  The  eventual  failure  of  the  Holy  AlHance  to 
ameliorate  poHtical  and  social  conditions  was  not  due  to  a  want  of 
sincerity  in  its  author  or  to  any  criminal  character  in  its  purposes, 
but  rather  to  the  very  fact  that  few  of  its  signatories  made  any 
serious  attempt  to  Hve  up  to  it.  It  is  a  fact  that  the  poKtical 
ideas  of  the  tsar  underwent  a  profound  change,  but  from  the 
outset  Alexander's  Holy  Alliance,  with  its  lofty  ideahsm,  was 
confused  in  the  popular  mind  with  the  actual  workings  of  the 
more  worldly  and  selfish  Quadruple  AlHance  under  the  master- 
ful direction  of  Metternich. 

So  far  we  have  dealt  with  the  general  European  situation  in 
1815.    We  have  seen  that  immediately  after  the  overthrow  of 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY" 

Napoleon  the  population  of  every  country  was  roughly  divisible 
on  poHtical  and  social  questions  into  the  two  camps  of  Kberals 
and  conservatives,  that  territorial  settlements  were 
made  at  Vienna  by  conservatives  on  the  basis  of  Jich-rkoie 
legitimacy "  and  "compensations,"  a  more  or  less  in  the  New 
actual  return  to  pre-revolutionary  times,  and,  finally,  fg^^ 
that  a  powerful  Quadruple  Alliance  existed  for  the 
maintenance  of  treaty  engagements  and  the  preservation  of 
peace.    Incidentally,  we  have  witnessed  the  exaltation  of  Austria 
paralleled  by  the  rise  of  Metternich.    From  1815  to  1830  this 
faithful  chancellor  of  the  Habsburg  emperor  was  at  once  the  con- 
servative patriot  of  Austria  and  the  reactionary  genius  of  Europe. 
He  employed  the  influence  and  might  of  Austria  to  control  Eu- 
rope ;  he  sought  to  control  Europe  in  order  that  the  old  regime 
might  not  be  disturbed  in  Austria.    And  peace  and  quiet  were 
always  his  goal  in  domestic  and  foreign  affairs. 

During  the  period  of  Metternich's  mastery,  it  was  by  no 
means  the  rivalries  of  rulers  that  endangered  the  peace  of  Europe, 
but  rather  the  unrest  of  Kberals  who  threatened  their  „ 

.  .     .     ,  Systematic 

reactionary  sovereigns  with  revolution  or  incited  op-  Repres- 
pressed  nationahties  to  insurrection.    The  career  of  LU)er^sin 
peace-loving  Metternich  became  a  ceaseless  warfare  on 
liberalism.    Throughout  the  first  seven  years  of  his  predominance 
he  was  completely  successful.    It  was  in  the  years  from  181 5  to 
1822  that  under  the  auspices  of  the  Quadruple  Al-  ^ 

T         11  T     1   1     r  r  A  .    1      The  Concert 

hance  ^  he  convoked  the  four  great  congresses  of  Aix-la-  of  the  Great 
Chapelle  (1818),  Troppau  (1820),  Laibach  (1821),  and  ^'^i^^er^'''^ 
Verona  (1822),  and  prevailed  upon  the  plenipoten-  national 
tiaries  of  Europe  thus  assembled  to  authorize  what  ^gj^^jl^r* 
amounted  to  the  poHcing  of  the  whole  Continent  for  ^  ^ 
the  suppression  of  hberalism.    So  far  did  he  realize  his  ambition 
that  even  Alexander  was  won  to  the  cause  of  reaction  and  signed 
with  the  other  Holy  AUies  the  memorable  protocol  of  Protocol 
Troppau:   ''States  which  have  undergone  a  change  of  Troppau 

^  The  Quadruple  Alliance,  strictly  speaking,  included  Austria,  Russia,  Prussia, 
and  Great  Britain.  Frequently  after  1818,  however,  the  Concert  of  the  Great 
Powers  is  referred  to  as  the  Quintuple  Alliance  from  the  fact  that  from  the  Con- 
gress of  Aix-la-Chapelle  was  supposed  to  date  the  formal  restoration  of  France 
to  her  position  as  a  legitimate  member  of  the  European  family.  French  represent- 
atives were  admitted  to  the  congresses  of  the  allied  Powers. 


14  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  government  due  to  revolution,  the  results  of  which  threaten 
other  states,  ipso  facto  cease  to  be  members  of  the  European 
Alliance  and  remain  excluded  from  it  until  their  situation  gives 
guarantees  for  legal  order  and  stability.  ...  If,  owing  to  such 
alterations,  immediate  danger  threatens  other  states,  the  Powers 
bind  themselves,  by  peaceful  means,  or  if  need  be  by  arms,  to 
bring  back  the  guilty  State  into  the  bosom  of  the  Great  Alliance." 
Under  Metternich  it  thus  became  the  duty  of  the  Powers  to 
stamp  out  revolution,  even  to  the  extent  of  intervention  in  the 
domestic  concerns  of  a  friendly  state.  During  the  last  seven 
years  of  his  supremacy,  Metternich  was  obHged,  through  force 
of  circumstances,  to  recede  from  the  rigorous  execution  of  the 
protocol  of  Troppau,  but  not  until  the  stirring  events  of  the  year 
1830  was  his  commanding  influence  in  central  Europe  shaken, 
and  not  until  the  more  momentous  events  of  1848  did  he  lose 
his  hold  on  Austria. 

Some  idea  of  the  politics  of  the  Era  of  Metternich  may  now 
be  gathered  from  a  review  of  the  principal  public  happenings 

within  the  chief  European  states.  In  every  country 
Poirticai  conservatives  will  be  found  in  control  of  the  govern- 
Character-  ment ;  liberals  will  be  in  opposition  and  sometimes  in 
the^  Era :  rebelKon ;  and  Metternich  will  be  noticed  concerting 
Liberals  vs.  measures  of  repression  with  the  Quadruple  Alliance, 
tiver^^*'  time,  however,  the  number  of  liberals  will  be 

steadily  growing,  until,  by  1830,  they  will  be  in  posses- 
sion of  several  governments  in  western  Europe ;  the  Quadruple 
Alliance  will  be  dissolved ;  Metternich,  shorn  of  his  weapons  of 
offense,  will  be  on  the  defensive ;  and  the  principles  of  liberty, 
equality,  and  fraternity  will  finally  be  in  the  ascendant. 

THE  BOURBON  RESTORATION  IN  FRANCE 

It  will  be  illuminating  to  begin  the  review  with  France  —  the 
nation  of  the  most  striking  political  contrasts.  France  in  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  afforded  the  typical  illustration 
of  the  old  regime ;  at  the  close  of  that  century  she  was  the  storm- 
center  of  revolution ;  and  during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  conservatives  and  liberals  —  heirs  respectively  of  the 
old  regime  and  of  the  Revolution  —  were  more  evenly  balanced 
in  France  than  in  any  other  European  country. 


''LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  15 


Waterloo  put  the  Conservatives  definitely  into  office.  Only 
twenty  days  after  that  battle  Louis  XVIII  reentered  his  capital 
and  resumed  the  reins  of  government.  France  was  not  Restoration 
in  such  unfortunate  condition  as  one  who  has  followed  of  Louis 
in  detail  the  last  great  campaigns  of  Napoleon  might  ^^'^ 
imagine.  She  was  defeated  but  not  crushed.  The  economic 
advantage  of  having  millions  of  sturdy,  thrifty  peasants  as  small 
landed  proprietors  was  already  displapng  itself.  The  emperor, 
too,  had  waged  his  wars  almost  to  the  last  at  the  expense  of  his 
conquered  foes,  and  it  was  certainly  a  tribute  to  his  foresight  and 
to  his  genius  for  finance  that  the  French  national  debt  in  18 15 
was  only  one-sixth  as  large  as  that  of  Great  Britain.  The  middle 
class  took  immediate  advantage  of  the  return  of  peace  to  extend 
their  trade  and  to  expand  their  business-interests.  For  these 
reasons,  France  rapidly  rose  under  the  restored  Bourbons  to  a 
position  of  strength  and  prosperity  hardly  equaled  in  all  Europe, 
despite  bad  harvests,  pohtical  unrest,  and  foreign  miHtary 
occupation  which  continued  three  years  after  Waterloo. 

Louis  XVIII  was  confronted  upon  his  restoration  by  two 
bitterly  irreconcilable  political  parties.    On  one  hand  were  the 
Liberals,  comprising  not  merely  theorists  of  the  rights  French 
of  man,  but  close-fisted  peasants  and  businesslike  I'^^^rais 
bourgeois  who  had  been  beneficiaries  of  the  abolition  of  serfdom 
and  the  confiscation  of  church  lands,  together  with  numerous 
old  soldiers  who  had  fought  gloriously  under  the  tricolor  and  the 
''Little  Corporal, "  all  of  them  now  stung  by  defeat  and  obstinate 
in  their  principles.    On  the  other  hand  were  the  reactionaries,  or 
Ultra-RoyaHsts,  nobles  and  clergy,  and  old-fashioned  French 
folks  in  the  southern  and  western  provinces  who,  uitra- 
in  loving  remembrance  of  the  old  regime,  had  fought 
stubbornly  against  the  Revolution  from  its  very  inception,  dis- 
possessed of  their  goods  and  expelled  from  their  father- 
land, or  silenced  by  oppression,  now  brought  back  in  ^j^^lo^J^s™*^* 
victory  by  the  turn  of  events,  eager  for  vengeance  xviii  with 
and  retaliation.    Between  these  two  extreme  factions  1^^^^^^^^° ' 
Louis  XVIII  counted  upon  the  bulk  of  the  French  ideas 
people  to  aid  him  in  steering  a  middle  course. 
Although  he  clung  tenaciously  to  the  forms  of  the  ancient  mon- 
archy and  the  white  flag  of  his  family,  he  had  common  sense 


i6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


enough  to  retain  Napoleon's  legal  and  administrative  reforms  and 
the  Napoleonic  institutions  of  the  Legion  of  Honor,  the  Bank  of 
France,  the  Concordat,  and  the  University.  He  recognized  the 
imperial  nobihty  as  on  an  equal  footing  with  that  of  the  old 
regime.  He  confirmed  the  charter  which  the  year  before  he  had 
granted  to  France. 

The  royal  charter  of  1814  made  provision  for  a  constitutional 
government,  modeled  in  part  after  that  of  Great  Britain.  There 
was  to  be  a  parliament  of  two  chambers  :  the  upper,  composed  of 
peers  nominated  by  the  king ;  and  the  lower,  elected  by  French- 
men paying  a  heavy  direct  tax.  The  Chambers  could  not  initiate 
legislation,  but  could  approve  or  reject  measures  proposed  by  the 
crown,  and  no  measure  could  be  promulgated  without  their 
consent.  The  king  was  to  govern  by  means  of  ministers,  but 
the  relation  of  the  ministry  to  parKament  was  left  vague.  The 
charter  also  recognized  liberty  of  worship  and  of  the  press,  and  the 
inviolability  of  sales  of  land  made  during  the  Revolution.  Surely 
this  was  unlooked-for  clemency  and  concession  from  the  brother 
of  Louis  XVI,  but  France  had  traveled  a  long  way  since  1793, 
and  Louis  XVIII  never  dreamed  of  suffering  martyrdom  for 
his  principles. 

A  fierce  complaint  went  up  at  once  from  the  Ultra-Royalists. 
They  besought  the  king,  now  that  his  very  clemency  had  proved 
Ultra-  incapable  of  preventing  the  wretched  episode  of  the 
Royalist       Hundred  Days,  to  revoke  the  charter,  and  when  he 

Reaction:  i      i     /  i         i  i     i   i  • 

the  "  White  turned  a  dear  ear  to  them  they  wreaked  their  vengeance 
Terror  "  what  Liberals  they  could.    For  several  months  in 

181 5  there  was  a  good  deal  of  rioting  and  bloodshed,  which, 
instigated  by  the  enraged  RoyaHsts,  has  passed  into  history 
under  the  designation  of  the  "White  Terror. "  The  reactionaries 
prevailed  upon  Louis  XVIII,  in  spite  of  his  promise  to  punish 
only  those  who  were  declared  by  the  Chambers  to  be  traitors, 
to  proscribe  nearly  sixty  persons  who  had  deserted  to  Napoleon 
during  the  Hundred  Days.  It  was  the  irony  of  fate  that  the 
Hst  was  drawn  up  by  the  same  crafty  Fouche  who  had  voted 
for  the  death  of  Louis  XVI  and  had  subsequently  been  the  right- 
hand  man  of  Napoleon  in  ferreting  out  Royalist  conspiracies. 
Thirty-eight  of  the  proscribed  were  banished  and  a  few  were 
shot,  among  the  latter  being  the  illustrious  Marshal  Ney.  In 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  17 


southern  France  hundreds  of  Liberals  fell  \dctims  to  reac- 
tionary  mobs.  At  Nimes,  where  Protestants  had  espoused 
the  cause  of  Napoleon,  the  murders  took  the  form  of  a  cru- 
sade  for  the  extirpation  of  heresy.  The  dispatch  of  an  army 
into  the  affected  regions  was  required  to'  reestabhsh  order  and 
security. 

^  In  the  midst  of  the  White  Terror,  elections  for  the  new  Chamber 
were  conducted  :  the  terrified  Liberals  absented  themselves  from 
the  polls,  and  the  result  was  the  return  of  a  parliament  of  Ultra- 
RoyaHsts,  more  conservative  than  the  king  himself.  The  ques- 
«~  tionable  Talleyrand  and  Fouche  were  at  once  turned  out  of  their 
2  ministerial  posts,  and  for  a  year  the  so-called  chambre  introuvable 
directed  affairs  of  state  in  a  bitterly  reactionary'  -sptnT.  Law's 
were  passed  shackling  the  press,  excepting  several  classes  from 
amnesty,  creating  special  arbitrary  courts  for  trying  cases  of 
treason,  and  repealing  the  divorce  provisions  of  the  Code  Napoleon. 
In  18 1 6  Louis  XVIII,  fearing  the  effect  of  his  furious  friends  upon 
the  country  at  large,  dissolved  the  chambre  introuvable,  and 
ordered  new  elections.  This  time  the  bulk  of  the  representatives 
were  Moderate  RoyaHsts,  loyal  to  the  charter  and  the  settlement 
of  18 1 5  and  in  full  sympathy  with  the  conciliatory  efforts  of  the 
king,  while  Ultra-Royalists  and  Liberals  constituted  two  small 
but  warring  minorities. 

The  years  of  the  Moderate  RoyaHsts'  control,  from  18 16  to 
1820,  were  marked  by  consistent  progress.  Reorganization  of 
the  public  finances  was  effected.    The  preparation  of  , 

,  ,     ,  r        •  1  T  1  •  Moderate 

an  annual  budget  of  estimated  expenditure  and  in-  Royalists  in 

come,  which  had  been  largely  farcical  under  the 

.  ,  .      ^  r  ^  '  1816-1820 

empire,  now  became  an  important  part  of  the  routine 

work  of  the  Chambers.  Large  loans  were  floated  in  order  more 
rapidly  to  pay  off  the  indemnity  to  the  allied  conquerors  of 
France,  with  such  success  that,  in  accordance  with  arrangements 
made  at  the  European  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  the  last 
^  foreign  troops  were  withdrawn  from  French  soil  in  18 18,  and 
France  was  once  more  recognized  as  a  Great  Power  with  a  stable 
O  government.  A  new  electoral  law  assured  the  preponderance 
of  the  bourgeoisie  in  the  Lower  Chamber  by  instituting  a  com- 
paratively simple  system  of  elections  and  requiring  the  payment 
of  a  sum  of  at  least  three  hundred  francs  a  year  in  direct  taxes 

VOL.  II  —  c 


i8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


as  a  qualification  for  the  exercise  of  the  suffrage.  Another 
measure  based  the  recruiting  of  the  French  army  for  the  ensuing 
fifty  years  upon  the  principle  of  national  conscription.  Finally, 
a  generous  press  law,  modeled  after  that  in  vogue  in  England, 
was  enacted.  Such  legislation  and  the  concurrent  maintenance 
of  peace  were  gradually  winning  the  business  classes  to  the 
support  of  the  Bourbon  dynasty. 

The  period  of  Hberal  legislation  was  rudely  interrupted  early 
in  1820  by  the  assassination  of  the  king's  nephew  by  a  fanatical 
^j^^^  Liberal.    The  Ultra-Royahsts,  who  were  swept  into 

Royalists  power  on  the  wave  of  popular  indignation  at  this  out- 
fsa^o^^^^'  ^^S^'  promptly  returned,  as  might  have  been  expected, 
to  a  policy  of  reaction  and  repression.  They  sus- 
pended the  charter  guarantees  of  individual  liberty  :  they  reestab-  p) 
lished  a  strict  censorship  of  the  press  ;  they  intrusted  the  whole 
educational  system  to  the  Catholic  clergy;  and,  in  order  to 
retain  their  majority  in  the  Chamber,  they  modified  the  electoral 
law,  by  introducing  a  highly  complicated  scheme  of  election,  by 
giving  double  suffrage  to  citizens  who  paid  1000  francs  annually  in 
direct  taxes,  and  by  lengthening  the  duration  of  a  parliament 
to  seven  years.  They  elaborated  a  system  of  espionage  and 
employed  the  army  to  crush  opposition  and  to  root  out  such 
secret  revolutionary  societies  as  that  of  the  Charcoal-Burners" 
which  was  spreading  from  Italy  among  the  French  Liberals. 
With  the  approval  of  Metternich  and  the  Continental  Powers 
they  went  to  the  length  in  1823  of  sending  a  French  mihtary  ex- 
pedition into  Spain  under  command  of  the  king's  nephew  to 
restore  the  tyrannical  government  of  the  Bourbon  king  of  that 
country.  Strange  irony  of  fate  that  French  arms,  which  had  so 
recently  carried  the  message  of  liberty,  equahty,  and  fraternity 
to  the  peoples  of  Europe,  should  now  be  the  weapon  of  divine- 
right  monarchs  against  the  Hberties  of  a  nation !  Yet  so  un- 
reasoning was  the  patriotic  emotion  that  accompanied  military 
success  that  the  Spanish  expedition  actually  strengthened  the 
hold  of  the  Ultra-Royahsts  upon  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the 
French  nation.  When  Louis  XVIII  died  in  1824  the  Bourbon 
dynasty  seemed  firmly  reestabHshed  upon  the  throne  of 
France  and  reaction  the  permanent  rule  of  French  society 
and  politics. 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY" 


19 


The  leader  of  the  Ultra-Royalists  ever  since  the  restoration 
had  been  the  count  of  Artois,  the  late  king's  brother,  who  now,  as 
next  of  kin,  succeeded  to  the  throne  under  the  title  of  Accession  of 
Charles  X.  No  family  history  can  be  more  interest-  the  uitra- 
ing  or  instructive  than  that  of  the  three  Bourbon  ]^ng^^* 
brothers  who  at  different  times  and  under  varying  Charles  x, 
circumstances  were  obHged  to  deal  with  revolutionary  '^^^ 
forces  in  France  —  Louis  XVI,  Louis  XVIII,  and  Charles  X. 
The  first-named  was  well-intentioned,  reHgious,  but  fatally 
weak  and  influenced  by  others,  so  that  he  lost  his  life  by  the 
guillotine.  The  second  was  hard-hearted,  unprincipled,  but  so 
clever  and  astute  a  poHtician  that  in  the  midst  of  the  struggles  of 
irreconcilable  factions  he  rounded  out  a  not  inglorious  reign  of 
ten  years.  The  last-named  had  the  political  misfortune  to 
resemble  more  closely  the  first  than  the  second,  save  only  that  he 
possessed  great  strength  of  will  and  a  dogged  determination  quite 
distinctive  of  himself.  It  had  been  the  count  of  Artois  who,  with 
Marie  Antoinette,  had  engineered  the  court  intrigues  against  the 
Revolution  in  its  earhest  stages.  It  had  been  he  who  had  headed 
the  emigration  of  the  nobles  and  clergy  when  their  privileges  were 
threatened  by  the  Revolution.  He  it  was  who  never  tired  of 
agitation  against  the  revolutionaries  and  against  Napoleon ;  and 
he  it  was  who,  on  the  triumphant  return  of  his  family  and  of  the 
emigres,  encouraged  the  Ultra-Royalists  in  acts  of  retaUation. 
Yet  personally  he  was  courteous  and  kindly,  a  loyal  friend,  and 
sincerely  devoted  to  the  cause  of  rehgion.  Principles  he  had 
and  cherished  :  union  of  the  altar  and  the  throne ;  revival  of  the 
institutions  of  the  old  regime,  pohtical,  reHgious,  social,  and  in- 
tellectual;  detestation  of  revolutionary  doctrines.  ''It  is  only 
Lafayette  and  I,"  he  said,  ''who  have  not  changed  since  1789." 

With  ostentatious  pomp  becoming  the  dignity  of  a  divine- 
right  monarch,  Charles  X  was  solemnly  crowned.    With  the 
assistance  of  the  Ultra-Royahst  majority  in  the 
Chambers  he  set  to  work  to  achieve  his  purposes.  Reac«ontn 
Further  restrictions  were  imposed  upon  the  freedom  Favor  of 
of  the  press.    Many  privileges  were  restored  to  the  Nobmty*^** 
clergy.    The  Jesuits  were  allowed  to  return  to  France. 
The  penalties  for  sacrilege  and  blasphemy  were  increased.  An 
indemnity  amounting  to  a  billion  francs  was  guaranteed  to  the 


20 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


emigres  for  the  Revolutionary  confiscation  of  their  lands  and 
privileges.  Even  a  bill  tending  to  undermine  equality  of  in- 
heritance and  to  reestablish  the  practice  of  primogeniture  was 
debated.  Certainly,  in  France,  during  the  Era  of  Metternich, 
the  Ultra-Royalists  appeared  to  be  taking  long  strides  toward  the 
complete  realization  of  the  reactionary  program  which  was 
defined  by  a  faithful  minister  of  Charles  X  as  the  reorganization 
of  society,  the  restoration  to  the  clergy  of  their  weight  in  state 
affairs,  and  the  creation  of  a  powerful  aristocracy  surrounded 
with  privileges." 

THE  BOURBON  RESTORATION  IN  SPAIN 

In  Spain  during  the  same  period  neither  the  reaction  nor  the 
opposition  to  it  was  so  veiled.  When  Ferdinand  VII  was  restored 
to  his  throne  in  1814,  not  through  any  efforts  on  his  part  but 
The  Liberal  rather  through  the  efforts  of  WelHngton  and  the 
Constitution  British  and  of  his  own  loyal  and  heroic  subjects,  he 
of  1812  found  a  robust  sense  of  nationalism  and  a  constitu- 
tional government.  It  will  be  recalled  that  in  181 2  the  provi- 
sional junta,  which  was  directing  the  national  revolt  against 
Joseph  Bonaparte,  adopted  a  written  constitution  that  resembled 
the  French  instrument  of  1791  both  in  its  arrangements  for  limit- 
ing the  power  of  the  king  and  in  those  for  aboKshing  feudal  rights 
and  privileges  and  class  distinctions.  This  constitution,  which  was 
largely  the  work  of  middle-class  business-men,  scholars,  theorists, 
and  army  officers  —  of  the  classes  particularly  influenced  by  the 
French  R-evolution  and  inclined  toward  anti-clericalism  —  had 
been  tolerated  by  the  other  classes  in  the  community  so  long  as 
it  was  necessary  for  the  whole  nation  to  present  a  united  front 
against  the  French.  But  as  soon  as  peace  was  restored  and  the 
national  independence  of  the  country  assured,  the  nobles  and 
clergy  protested  vehemently  against  the  constitution.  Taking 
advantage  of  these  protests  and  of  the  ignorance  or  indifference 
of  the  mass  of  the  peasantry,  Ferdinand  VII  immediately  de- 
clared the  Constitution  of  181 2  null  and  void,  and  aboKshed  the 
Cortes. 

Surrounding  himself  with  advisers  drawn  exclusively  from 
officials  of  the  old  regime,  the  king  at  once  instituted  a  thorough 


-LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  21 


reactionary  policy.    With  him  there  would  be  no  compromise 
with  revolutionary  principles.     The  old  system  of  absolute 
government  was  restored  with  all  its  inequahties  and  pgj.jj.jj^jj^j 
injustices.     The  privileges  of  the  clergy  and  no-  vii(i8i4- 
bility,  including  exemption  from  taxation,  were  re-  ^^^^^^^^^j^^^ 
affirmed.    Monasteries  were  reopened.    The  Jesuits 
were  allowed  to  return.    The  Inquisition  was  reestabHshed. 
Individual  Hberties  were  taken  away,  and  the  press  was  placed 
under  the  strictest  censorship.    Liberals  who  had  assisted  in 
making  the  royal  restoration  possible  were  now  arbitrarily 
arrested  and  banished  or  thrown  into  prison.    That  not  much 
blood  was  shed  was  due  partly  to  the  urgent  entreaties  of 
Wellington. 

The  sordidness  of  the  Spanish  reaction  in  18 14  is  traceable 
largely  to  the  character  of  the  king  himself.  Ferdinand  VII  was 
rancorous,  cruel,  ungrateful,  and  unscrupulous.  Moreover,  he 
did  not  possess  the  compensating  qualities  of  abiHty  or  foresight. 
Instead  of  steering  a  middle  course  between  extremist  factions 
and  seeking  to  consolidate  the  whole  nation,  he  threw  all  his 
weight  on  the  side  of  the  reactionaries,  while  against  the  Liberals 
he  continued  to  take  such  harsh  measures  that  even  Metternich 
in  far-away  Vienna,  apprehensive  of  consequences,  urged  modera- 
tion. Instead  of  striving  to  repair  the  injuries  inflicted  by  the 
Peninsular  War  and  to  husband  his  country's  resources,  he  actu- 
ally hampered  trade  and  industry  and,  in  addition,  squandered 
enormous  sums  of  money  upon  himself  and  his  favorites.  Instead 
of  adopting  a  conciliatory  attitude  toward  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America,  which  already  were  maintaining  governments  prac- 
tically of  their  own  making,  instead  of  redressing  their  grievances, 
and  bringing  them  once  more  into  the  bond  of  a  great  national 
empire,  he  sorely  neglected  them  at  the  outset,  and,  when  it  was 
too  late,  he  endeavored  to  subjugate  them  by  force  of  arms.  The 
results  of  Ferdinand's  mistaken  policies  were  apparent  within 
five  years  of  his  restoration :  a  Spain  hopelessly  divided  into 
the  two  camps  of  Conservatives  and  Liberals,  each  with  its 
group  of  irreconcilables,  respectively  reactionaries  and  revolu- 
tionaries ;  grave  scandals  and  abuses  in  administration ;  an  army 
honeycombed  with  disaffection ;  a  bankrupt  treasury ;  and  the 
American  colonies  in  open,  and  apparently  successful,  revolt. 


22 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Throughout  these  five  years,  Liberal  agitation  against  the 
royal  tyrannies  grew  apace.  Deprived  of  a  free  press  and  of  the 
Liberal  ^^8^^  public  meeting,  the  agitators  gradually  gravi- 
Opposition  tated  to  such  secret  societies  as  the  Carbonari  and  the 
to  the  King  pj-gcmasons.  The  lodges  were  convenient  centers  of 
revolutionary  propaganda,  and  their  close  affiliation  and  nation- 
wide extent  enabled  the  Liberals,  by  means  of  signs  and  grips 
and  mysterious  passwords,  to  communicate  the  teachings  of 
liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity  to  all  the  brethren.  Among  the 
irreligious  or  anti-clerical  element  of  the  middle  class,  the  move- 
ment spread,  —  and  likewise  among  the  army  officers,  —  until 
Spain  faced  civil  war. 

In  1 819  a  mutiny  in  the  army  which  the  king  had  assembled 
at  Cadiz  for  the  subjugation  of  the  American  colonies  was  the 
Revolt  in  signal  for  a  general  insurrection  which  in  the  first  two 
Spain,  1820  months  of  1820  broke  out  in  such  distant  places 
as  Seville,  Barcelona,  Saragossa,  and  the  Asturias.  In  March, 
1820,  Ferdinand,  quaking  with  fear,  gave  his  royal  oath  to  sup- 
port the  Constitution  of  181 2  and  appealed  to  the  Liberals  in  a 
pompous  declaration:  'Xet  us  advance  frankly,  myself  leading 
the  way,  along  the  constitutional  path."  The  insurgents  took 
him  at  his  word  and  laid  down  their  arms. 

The  king's  conversion  was  merely  the  reaction  of  cringing  fear 
upon  a  thoroughly  cowardly  and  hypocritical  nature.  Ferdinand 
had  no  serious  intention  of  keeping  his  pledges,  and,  although  for 
two  years  (18 20-1 82 2)  he  was  obliged  to  rule  in  accordance  with 
the  statutes  of  the  newly  convened  Cortes  and  under  the  direction 
of  Liberal  ministers,  he  was  busied,  almost  from  the  outset,  in 
countenancing  reactionary  revolts  against  the  new  regime  and  in 
inditing  confidential  letters  to  the  Great  Powers,  especially  to  his 
Bourbon  cousin,  the  king  of  France,  imploring  foreign  aid  against 
the  very  government  which  he  had  solemnly  sworn  to  uphold. 
Success  soon  crowned  his  intrigues.  The  Liberals  fell  to  quarrel- 
ing among  themselves ;  the  clergy  and  nobles  resisted  the  execu- 
tion of  reform  legislation ;  the  sincere  and  ardent  CathoHcs  —  in 
Spain  a  goodly  number  and  well  disciplined  —  treated  as  sacrilege 
and  blasphemy  the  anti-clerical  tendencies  of  the  new  Cortes. 
In  many  districts  spasmodic  riots  became  chronic  and  anarchy 
prevailed,  betokening  the  advent  within  Spain  of  a  counter- 
revolution against  liberalism. 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY*'  23 


In  the  Spanish  revolt  of  1820,  the  reactionary  Powers  of  Europe 
perceived  the  haunting  specter  of  revolution.  Despite  the 
fact  that  they  had  been  disgusted  with  Ferdinand's 
impolitic  behavior,  they  were  now  terrified  by  the  e^^©^ 
thought  of  what  the  success  of  the  king's  enemies  might  toward  the 
mean  to  the  whole  Continent.  The  Tsar  Alexander,  Rgy^i^^ 
whom  Metternich  had  just  won  over  to  the  policy  of 
international  suppression  of  Hberalism,  volunteered,  with  that 
sudden  and  quixotic  zeal  which  characterized  his  attachment 
to  every  newly  found  principle,  to  lead  a  great  Russian  army 
across  Europe  in  order  to  reinstate  Bourbon  absolutism  in  Spain. 
But  the  French  king  at  once  conceived  a  most  violent  distaste 
for  the  employment  of  Russian  troops  even  in  his  own  cousin's 
cause,  for  he  rightly  feared  the  effect  on  the  French  nation  of  the 
reappearance  of  foreign  troops.  Metternich,  too,  was  loath  to 
allow  Russian  soldiers  to  cross  Austrian  territories,  and  he  at  once 
sought  to  moderate  the  tsar's  enthusiasm.  Nevertheless,  some- 
thing must  be  done.  Consequently,  in  1822,  after  protracted 
international  negotiations,  the  members  of  the  Quadruple 
AlKance,  together  with  France,  held  the  Congress  of  Verona.  It 
was  the  opportunity  of  the  reactionaries  then  in  power  in  France  : 
they  proposed  that  a  French  army,  acting  on  a  general  European 
mandate,  should  intervene  in  Spain.  Thus  by  a  single  stroke 
France  would  be  spared  the  humiliation  of  seeing  foreign  troops 
cross  her  borders ;  a  Bourbon  king  would  be  reinstated  in  absolu- 
tism ;  the  cause  of  reaction  would  triumph  in  Spain ;  and  what- 
ever glory  might  attend  French  arms  would  redound  to  the  credit 
of  reaction  in  France.  Metternich  gladly  accepted  the  pro- 
posal.   Great  Britain  alone  objected. 

Early  in  1823,  acting  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Congress 
of  Verona,  the  governments  of  France,  Austria,  Russia,  and 
Prussia  presented  separate  notes  to  the  Liberal  minis-  „ 

r  o     .  1     •  1  1  •     1  T  French 

try  of  Spam,  expos  tula  tmg  on  the  anarchical  condi-  intervention 
tions,  which  they  greatly  exaggerated,  and  demand- 
ing  the  abolition  of  the  Constitution  of  181 2  and 
the  liberation  of  the  king  from  the  restraints  that  had  been 
imposed  upon  him.  The  Spanish  Liberals  naturally  refused 
and  protested  against  what  they  deemed  an  unwarranted  inter- 
ference with  the  purely  domestic  affairs  of  their  country ;  and 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  French  army,  under  the  duke  of  Angouleme,  promptl); 
crossed  the  Pyrenees. 

The  French  invaders  encountered  no  such  difficulties  in  1823 
as  had  faced  them  in  1808.  No  united  nation  now  opposed  them. 
Indeed,  the  majority  of  the  Spaniards  actually  abetted  or  ap- 
plauded them,  so  great  was  the  popular  distrust  of,  or  indiffer- 
ence toward,  the  Liberal  regime.  In  May,  Angouleme  was  in 
possession  of  Madrid,  and  the  Liberal  ministry  and  Cortes  had 
fled  to  Cadiz,  taking  Ferdinand  with  them  as  a  hostage.  From 
June  to  October  Cadiz  was  closely  besieged  by  the  French.  On 
I  October,  the  Liberals  released  the  king  on  the  understanding 
that  he  should  grant  a  general  pardon  and  guarantee  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  ''moderate  government."  Of  course  Ferdinand 
promised  —  no  man  was  ever  more  facile  with  promises  than  he 
—  and  Cadiz  immediately  capitulated  and  the  Liberals  again 
laid  down  their  arms. 

No  sooner  was  the  king  safe  within  the  French  lines  than  he 
characteristically  annulled  his  promises  and  pronounced  sentence 

of  death  upon  all  constitutionalists.  In  vain  Angou- 
tion^of*"  leme  counseled  moderation  and  concihation :  the 
Ferdinand  representatives  of  Metternich,  of  the  Tsar  Alexander, 
Absolutism  timid  Frederick  William  of  Prussia  urged  vigor 

to  the  royal  arm,  and  in  cruelty  Ferdinand  could 
always  be  vigorous.  There  followed  in  1824  a  reaction  through- 
out Spain  far  more  blind  and  bitter  than  that  of  18 14.  Not  only 
were  the  recent  Liberal  measures  abrogated  and  the  old  regime 
again  restored  in  its  entirety,  but  the  revolutionaries  and  the 
sympathizers  with  constitutional  government  were  sought  out 
with  cunning  ingenuity ;  hundreds  were  arbitrarily  put  to  death ; 
hundreds  more  were  exiled  or  confined  in  noisome  dungeons. 
By  the  time  the  French  expedition  withdrew  from  the  country, 
Ferdinand  VII  had  mercilessly  broken  the  back  of  Spanish 
Liberalism. 

From  that  time  till  his  death  in  1833,  Ferdinand  ruled  Spain 
as  sovereign  autocrat,  irresponsible  apparently  either  to  man  or 
to  God.  Abuses  which  had  disfigured  the  earlier  part  of  his  reign 
now  increased  ten-fold,  until  general  corruption  prevailed  at 
home  and  disgrace  abroad.  It  was  a  sorry  legacy  that  the  con- 
temptible Ferdinand  VII  bequeathed  to  his  successor. 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  25 


The  decisive  reason  why  the  British  government  did  not  sup- 
port the  intervention  of  its  Continental  allies  in  Spain  was  not 
any  lack  of  sympathy  with  reaction,  for,  as  we  shall  Revolt 
presently  see,  the  Tories  then  in  authority  in  Great  in  the 
Britain  were  themselves  sufficiently  reactionary  in  cojQiues  • 
internal  policies  to  satisfy  the  fastidious  taste  of  a  British 
Metternich :  it  was  rather  a  consideration  of  trade.  So 
long  as  Spain  owned  and  controlled  the  bulk  of  South  America, 
Central  America,  and  Mexico,  she  attempted  to  monopolize 
commerce  with  those  territories  to  the  exclusion  of  the  British.  As 
soon,  however,  as  the  Spanish  colonies  set  up  governments  of  their 
own,  they  opened  their  ports  to  British  merchantmen.  The 
British  government  rightly  argued  that  European  intervention 
in  Spain  in  1823  might  serve  not  only  to  restore  Ferdinand  VII 
but  to  enable  him  to  recover  the  Spanish  colonies  and  thereby  to 
close  to  Great  Britain  a  lucrative  trade.    In  the  United  States 
Great  Britain  found  a  valuable  ally.    Of  course  the  purpose  of 
the  United  States  was  different  from  Great  Britain's,  for  the 
former  was  actuated  not  so  much  by  commercial  consid-  Attitude  of 
erations  as  by  apprehension  lest  the  extension  of  the  g^^^J^^^^^^g 
system  of  Metternich  should  endanger  American  polit-  Monroe 
ical  and  social  institutions,  but  both  desired  the  ?ame  i^octrine 
object :  the  freedom  of  the  Spanish  colonies.    In  182 1  the  United 
States  had  purchased  the  Spanish  claims  to  Florida.    In  1822 
she  recognized  the  national  independence  of  Colombia,  Chile, 
Argentina,  and  Mexico.    And  on  2  December,  1823,  at  the  very 
time  when  French  troops  at  the  behest  of  the  allied  Powers  were 
in  possession  of  Spain,  President  James  Monroe,  acting  with  the 
foreknowledge  and  friendly  assurances  of  the  British  govern- 
ment, made  to  the  American  Congress  a  celebrated  pronounce- 
ment, which  has  since  been  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  ''In 
the  wars  of  the  European  powers,"  he  said,  "in  matters  relating 
to  themselves  we  have  never  taken  any  part,  nor  does  it  comport 
with  our  policy  so  to  do.    It  is  only  when  our  rights  are  invaded 
or  seriously  menaced  that  we  resent  injuries  or  make  preparations 
for  our  defence.    With  the  movements  in  this  hemisphere  we 
are  of  necessity  more  immediately  connected,  and  by  causes  which 
must  be  obvious  to  all  enlightened  and  impartial  observers.  The 
political  system  of  the  alHed  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this 


26 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


respect  from  that  of  America.  .  .  .  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to 
candor,  and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the 
United  States  and  those  powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  con- 
sider any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any 
portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety. 
With  the  existing  colonies  and  dependencies  of  any  European 
power  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with 
the  governments  who  have  declared  their  independence  and 
maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have  on  great  con- 
sideration and  on  just  principles  acknowledged,  we  could  not 
view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them  or 
controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny  by  any  European 
power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly 
disposition  towards  the  United  States.  ...  It  is  impossible 
that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their  political  system  to 
any  portion  of  either  [American]  continent  without  endangering 
our  peace  and  happiness ;  nor  can  anyone  believe  that  our  South- 
ern brethren,  if  left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own 
accord.  It  is  equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should 
behold  such  interposition  in  any  form  with  indifference."  The 
year  following  this  remarkable  declaration.  Great  Britain  formally 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  Mexico  and  Colombia ;  and 
her  recognition  of  the  other  Spanish  American  states  was  only 
postponed  until  they  should  have  given  proof  of  their  stabiHty. 
Failure  of  ^^^^     these  facts,  Metternich  abandoned  any 

Metter-  hope  he  might  have  cherished  of  employing  the  Quad- 
Proje^ct  of  ruple  Alliance  for  the  suppression  of  liberalism  beyond 
Intervention  the  seas,  and  Spain  made  no  further  efforts  to  subdue 
in  America  j^^^.  colonies,  although  she  long  withheld  formal  recogni- 
tion of  their  freedom.  The  ambition  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte, 
the  fatuity  of  Ferdinand  VII,  the  commercial  interests  of  Great 
Britain,  and  the  political  principles  of  the  United  States,  lost  to 
Spain  forever  her  continental  empire  in  America. 


REACTION  IN  PORTUGAL 

A  similar  combination  of  circumstances  vitally  affected  Por- 
tuguese history  during  the  Era  of  Metternich.  The  Napoleonic 
incursion  of  1807  sent  the  royal  family  of  Portugal  fleeing  across 


''LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  27 


the  Atlantic  to  their  distant  colonial  dependency  of  Brazil. 
Gr^at  Britain,  whose  trade  relations  with  Portugal  had  long  been 
intimate,  avenged  the  insult,  chased  out  the  French,  and  erected 
a  provisional  government  at  Lisbon. 

When  finally  in  181 5  peace  settled  down  upon  Europe  and  the 
period  of  Metternich's  predominance  began,  the  British,  in  view 
of  the  protracted  residence  of  Portuguese  royalty  in  Brazil, 
found  it  of  great  advantage  to  their  own  economic  Revolution 
interests  to  prolong  their  military  occupation  of  the  of  1820  and 
mother-country.  It  was  soon  obvious  that  Portugal  R^y^^ 
was  being  treated  as  a  mere  appendage  to  Great  Family  from 
Britain;  and  patriotic  reactionaries,  who  demanded 
the  return  of  the  king  and  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners,  com- 
menced to  make  common  cause  with  the  Liberal  faction,  which 
was  recruited  from  much  the  same  classes  as  that  in  Spain  and 
which  had  learned  the  revolutionary  doctrines  of  liberty, 
equality,  and  fraternity  in  much  the  same  way.  Lord  Beresford, 
the  British  governor,  crushed  several  incipient  rebellions,  but  in 
1820,  during  his  absence  from  the  country,  the  Portuguese  army, 
following  the  example  of  their  Spanish  neighbors,  overthrew  the 
regency,  and  the  Liberals,  who  thereupon  gained  the  upper 
hand,  promulgated  a  radical  constitution  similar  in  almost 
every  respect  to  the  Spanish  Constitution  of  181 2.  The  next 
year  King  John  VI,  intrusting  the  government  of  Brazil  to  his 
elder  son,  Dom  Pedro,  returned  to  Portugal  and  in  1822  swore 
obedience  to  the  constitution. 

The  BraziHans,  on  their  side,  incensed  by  the  departure  of  the 
king,  now  rebelled  and,  finding  themselves  supported  by  the 
regent,  proclaimed  him  Emperor  Pedro  I  of  the  inde-  jndepend- 
pendent  Empire  of  Brazil  (1822).    In  Portugal,  the  ence  of 
reactionaries  who  opposed  constitutional  government 
found  a  leader  in  Dom  Miguel,  the  king's  younger  son,  whose 
cause  received  additional  popular  support  as  a  protest  pactional 
against  the  loss  of  Brazil.    For  twelve  years  after  strife  in 
1822  Portugal  was  a  prey  to  constant  factional  strife. 

In  1823  King  John,  relying  upon  the  presence  of  a  reactionary 
French  army  in  Spain,  revoked  the  constitution,  but  even  this 
concession  did  not  stay  Dom  Miguel's  followers  from  attacking 
him,  so  that  the  united  action  of  the  European  Powers  was  re- 


28  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


quired  to  restore  the  king.  On  the  death  of  John  VI  in  1826, 
Pedro  I  of  Brazil,  who  now  became  Pedro  IV  of  Portugal,  granted 
to  the  Portuguese  people  a  charter  which  provided  for  moderate 
parliamentary  government  on  the  model  of  the  French  charter 
of  1 8 14,  and  then  surrendered  his  Portuguese  crown  to  his 
daughter  Maria,  a  little  girl  seven  years  of  age,  on  the  understand- 
ing that  she  should  become  the  wife  of  her  uncle,  Dom  Miguel. 
Accordingly  Miguel  swore  allegiance  to  Pedro,  to  Maria,  and  to 
the  constitutional  charter,  but  on  his  arrival  at  Lisbon  in  1828 
he  promptly  repudiated  his  promises  and,  with  the  support  of  the 
clerical  and  reactionary  majority  in  the  country,  he  reigned  as 
sole  and  absolute  king  until  1834.  Miguel  was  dissipated,  illiter- 
ate, and  cruel,  and  the  admiration  for  Metternich,  which  he 
had  conceived  during  a  three  years'  residence  in  Vienna,  gave  a 
particularly  rigid  character  to  his  warfare  against  liberaHsm. 

In  the  family  struggle  between  the  absolutist  Miguel  and  the 
more  liberal-minded  Pedro,  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia 
naturally  sympathized  with  the  former,  while  Great  Britain, 
again  not  through  any  excess  of  enthusiasm  for  the  cause  of 
liberalism  but  rather  for  the  sake  of  trade,  abetted  the  latter. 
Sentiment  in  the  United  States  was  undoubtedly  unanimous  in 
favoring  the  separation  of  Brazil  from  Portugal,  and  British  war- 
ships actually  intervened  to  prevent  Portuguese  troops  from  at- 
tempting to  subjugate  the  Brazilians  by  force  of  arms.  Thus  the 
Portuguese  colonial  empire  was  disrupted,  and  though  still  under 
monarchical  institutions,  Brazil  became,  like  the  United  States 
and  the  neighboring  Spanish  colonies,  an  independent  American 
nation. 

TORY  REACTION  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 

The  Power  which  above  all  others  was  to  profit  by  the  reac- 
tionary regimes  in  Spain  and  in  Portugal  was  Great  Britain  — 
The  British  Power  which  to  contemporary  Continental  states- 
Government  men  seemed  the  least  reactionary  in  Europe.  But  if. 
Abroad  and  ^^^^^i^^g  the  Era  of  Metternich,  the  British  government 
Conserva-  appeared  repeatedly  to  check  the  efforts  of  Continental 
tive  at  Home  j-gac^jonaries  to  suppress  liberalism,  it  was  due  rather 
to  commercial  considerations  or  fortuitous  circumstances  than 
to  love  of  democracy  and  devotion  to  the  "rights  of  man/' 


^'LIBERTY,  EQUx\LITY,  FRATERNITY"  29 


Certainly  at  home  British  statesmen  were  just  as  insistent  upon 
maintaining  the  eighteenth-century  institutions  of  their  country 
as  was  Metternich  in  preserving  the  Austrian,  or  Charles  X  in 
restoring  the  French.  Whatever  else  they  may  have  been,  the 
Tory  leaders  who  dominated  Great  Britain  throughout  the 
period  were  neither  revolutionaries  nor  liberals. 

Some  confusion  is  likely  to  arise  from  the  fact  that  in  the 
eighteenth  century  British  poHtical  institutions  differed  from 
those  on  the  Continent.  To  a  Montesquieu  or  a  Voltaire  they 
seemed  ''Hberal"  and  therefore  worthy  of  praise.  Naturally,  in 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  term  "liberal"  was 
still  applied  to  them  even  by  Metternich.  But  that  they  were 
not  liberal  in  our  present-day  sense  will  be  obvious  to  anyone  who 
takes  the  trouble  to  peruse  again  the  account  of  them  as  given 
in  a  preceding  chapter.^  It  will  be  seen  that  Great  Britain 
was  then  ruled  nominally  by  a  king  and  by  a  representative 
Parliament,  but  that  the  king's  actual  power  had  been  transferred 
to  a  ministry  or  cabinet  and  that  the  Parliament,  powerful  though 
it  was,  really  represented  only  the  merest  fraction  of  British 
citizens,  a  fraction  composed  largely  of  great  landowning  aris- 
tocrats and  of  clergymen  of  the  Anglican  Church. 

On  the  eve  of  the  French  Revolution,  an  agitation  to  reform 
ParHament  in  a  democratic  direction  had  been  fostered  by 
British  statesmen  of  such  divergent  characters  and  ^^^^^ 
views  as  the  Younger  Pitt  and  Charles  James  Fox.  Britain 
But  the  memory  of  Blackstone's  laudation  of  the  ?®®^^^siy 

Unaffected 

ancient,  self-developing  British  constitution  and  the  by  the 
scathing  strictures  passed  by  Edmund  Burke  on  liberty,  ^g^^^^^^j^^ 
equality,  and  fraternity  as  exemplified  by  the  French 
radicals,  combined  with  the  long,  weary,  revolutionary  and 
Napoleonic  wars  between  France  and  Great  Britain  to  create 
in  the  minds  of  British  statesmen  a  most  lively  distrust  of 
French  political  and  social  experiments.    Reform  was  indefinitely 
shelved  in  England.    Everything  was  subordinated  to  the  ex- 
igencies of  conducting  a  vast  foreign  war.    The  only  note- 
worthy and  permanent  acts  of  Parliament  from  1793  to  181 5 
were  the  Union  of  Ireland  (1800)  and  the  abolition  of  the 
slave-trade  (1807). 

*  See  Vol.  I,  ch.  xiv. 


30 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Attempts  on  the  part  of  small  groups  of  more  or  less  unpractical 
philosophers  and  poor  workingmen  to  keep  alive  the  demand  for 
parliamentary  and  social  reform  by  means  of  revolu- 

Reactionary    ^.  .       .        t,       i  i  i. 

Character  of  tionary  Organizations  like  the  London  Corresponding 
the  British    Society"  were  sternly  discountenanced  by  the  govern- 

Government  .        ,  i  t 

ing  classes ;  and  the  very  titles  of  such  parliamentary 
acts  as  those  on  Treasonable  Practices  (1795),  Seditious  Meetings 
(1795),  and  Corresponding  Societies  (1799),  are  unmistakable 
indications  of  the  government's  determination  to  abridge  all 
those  rights  of  public  meeting,  free  speech,  and  free  press,  which 
might  serve  to  acquaint  Englishmen  with  hateful  novelties  from 
across  the  Channel.  And  the  results  of  the  long  war  seemed  to 
enhance  the  reputation  and  prestige  of  the  Tory  government. 
The  United  Kingdom  almost  alone  of  all  European  states  suf- 
fered no  French  invasion.  A  series  of  brilliant  naval  victories 
confirmed  English  maritime  supremacy.  The  actual  operation 
of  the  Continental  System  was  less  disadvantageous  to  the 
British  than  to  the  Continental  peoples.  The  conduct  of  the 
Peninsular  campaign  and  the  crowning  triumph  at  Waterloo 
attested  the  bravery  of  British  armies  and  the  genius  of  British 
generals.  Finally,  the  diplomatic  successes  of  British  statesmen 
at  Vienna  added  materially  to  the  extent  and  importance  of  the 
British  colonial  empire.  The  British  governing  classes  could 
afford  to  be  proud  and  boastful.  Not  only  was  England  practi- 
cally exempt  during  the  Napoleonic  Era  from  the  infiltration  of 
French  revolutionary  ideas,  but  the  political  and  social  institu- 
tions of  a  country  which  had  been  instrumental  in  humiliating  a 
Napoleon  appeared  to  deserve  hearty  commendation  and  loyal 
preservation. 

It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  in  181 5  the  Tory  ministers  and 
the  Tory  majority  in  Parliament  should  set  their  faces  resolutely 

against  any  reform  in  politics  or  society.  Represent- 
Reactionary  ing,  as  they  did,  the  aristocratic  agricultural  and 
Leaders       ecclesiastical  interests,  and  standing  for  the  patriotic 

instincts  of  the  kingdom,  they  would  conserve  existing 
institutions.  In  this  sense  they  were  conservatives  and  reac- 
tionaries. Head  and  shoulders  above  their  fellow-Tories  in 
championing  such  a  policy  stood  Castlereagh,  Wellington,  and 
the  Prince  Regent.    From  181 1  when  hopeless  insanity  finally 


^'LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY 


ove.  ;ook  the  narrow-minded  King  George  III,  the  influence  of  the 
crown  was  exercised  by  his  son,  the  Prince  Regent,  an  unpopular 
fop  whose  rigid  support  of  conservatism  was  as  unwavering  as 
his  father's,  but  whose  cynical,  sensual  immorality  was  in  glaring 
contrast  to  his  father's  simple  domestic  virtues.  The  acces- 
sion of  the  prince  regent  to  the  throne  on  his  father's  George  iv, 
death  in  1820  changed  the  form  but  not  the  fact:  1820-1830 
George  IV  remained  until  his  death  in  1830  the  stout  advocate 
of  reaction.  In  Castlereagh  and  Wellington,  two  (jj^gtigj-g^gjj 
Irish  noblemen  and  landowners,  he  possessed  powerful 
allies.  Castlereagh  (1769-1822),^  though  never  technically 
prime  minister,  wielded  from  181 2  till  his  suicide  in  1822  an 
influence  such  as  few  ministers  have  ever  exercised :  gifted  and 
affable,  he  directed  the  foreign  policy  and  controlled  the  House 
of  Commons.  Wellington  (1769-1852),^  though  not  in  conspicu- 
ous civil  employment  until  after  Castlereagh's  death,  „. 

1    ,  .  1  .  n    ,  Wellington 

contributed  the  renown  of  his  military  exploits  and  the 
prestige  of  his  soldierly,  blunt,  outspoken  personaHty  to  upholding 
as  far  as  possible  in  England  the  reactionary  cause  he  had  so 
ably  headed  on  the  Continent.  Such  were  the  men  who  guided 
the  destinies  of  Great  Britain  during  the  greater  part  of  the  Era 
of  Metternich. 

How  deserving  they  were  of  the  epithet  of  ''reactionary" 
becomes  clear  when  one  considers  the  twofold  character  of  thei' 
domestic  policies  :  first,  the  legislation  in  behalf  of  the  British 
landed  aristocracy  which  they  themselves  directly  Reaction 
represented;   and  secondly,  the  stern  measures  of  ^^the*^^* 
repression  which  they  directed  against  every  attack  Landed 

upon  that  aristocracy.  Aristocracy 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  process  of  ' Enclosure"  reached  its 
culmination.  Long  ago  the  process  had  begun  of  depriving  the 
British  peasants  of  their  common  arable-,  pasture-,  jjj^jjjgyj.gg 
and  wood-lands  and  of  reducing  large  numbers  to  the 
position  of  agricultural  tenants  on  great  "inclosed"  estates  of 
noblemen.  The  chief  purpose  of  these  inclosures,  as  we  have 
seen,  had  been  to  enable  the  landowners  to  raise  sheep  and  thereby 
to  engage  on  a  large  scale  in  the  wool  business.    Now  at  the  close 

^  Robert  Stewart,  Lord  Castlereagh,  second  marquess  of  Londonderry. 
*  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  first  duke  of  Wellington. 


32 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  the  eighteenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  system  advanced  by  leaps  and  bounds.  During  the  single 
reign  of  George  III,  Parliament  passed  as  many  as  3209  private 
inclosure  acts,  affecting  over  six  and  a  quarter  million  acres.  Of 
course  the  avowed  object  was  now  not  to  reinvigorate  the  expir- 
ing trade  in  wool  but  to  put  the  country  under  closer  cultivation. 
The  general  result,  however,  was  the  same.  The  number  of  land- 
owners was  greatly  diminished  and  the  wealth  and  influence  of 
the  landed  aristocracy  were  perceptibly  increased. 

Also,  despite  the  fact  that  the  war  already  had  raised  the  cost 
of  living,  Parliament  persevered  in  its  policy  of  subsidizing  the 
c«rnL»ws  l^^ndholding  class  by  maintaining  and  strengthening 
the  Corn  Laws,  which  levied  high  import  duties  on 
foreign  foodstuffs.  A  new  corn  law  in  181 5  actually  forbade  the 
importation  of  grain  into  the  country  so  long  as  the  price  for 
home-grown  wheat  was  under  80  shillings  a  quarter  (twenty 
dollars  for  eight  bushels) . 

Against  this  narrow  class  legislation  and  against  the  political 
and  social  circumstances  that  rendered  it  possible,  a 

Sources  of  .11  •  •  i        •      i  ^ 

Opposition    many-sided  opposition  arose  and  gained  strength 
ReStiwi*^^    between  181 5  and  1830.    The  resultant  conflict  was 
the  parallel  in  Great  Britain  to  the  struggle  between 
liberals  and  conservatives  on  the  Continent. 

Several  factions  or  classes,  for  one  reason  or  another,  and  in 
this  or  that  respect,  opposed  the  Tory  regime.  There  was  first 
The  "Intel-  group  of  ''Intellectual  Radicals"  who,  like 

lectuai"  William  Godwin  (1756-1836),^  entertained  elaborate 
Radicals  theories  of  a  complete  social  readjustment,  or,  like 
Thomas  Paine,  were  indoctrinated  with  the  somewhat  more 
practicable  teaching  of  the  French  revolutionaries.  This  group 
lived  on,  despite  governmental  attempts  to  suppress  it,  recruited 
mainly  from  middle-class  theorists,  small  shopkeepers,  and  self- 
educated  artisans  :  at  one  extreme  its  radicalism  appeared  in  the 

^Godwin's  chief  writing — The  Inquiry  Concerning  Political  Justice  (1793)  — 
taught  the  perfectibility  of  man,  the  inherent  evil  in  every  form  of  government, 
and  the  right  of  every  man  to  the  use  of  the  soil.  He  has  been  hailed  as  an  early 
Socialist,  and,  more  justly,  as  the  father  of  modern  anarchism.  His  wife  was 
Mary  Wollstonecraft  (i 759-1 797),  one  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  feminism. 
His  influence  was  noteworthy  on  such  men-of- letters  as  Shelley,  Byron,,  and 
Bulwer-Lytton. 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  33 


passionate  pleas  for  liberty  and  freedom  of  a  Shelley  and  a  Byron, 
and  at  the  other  in  the  coarse  invective  of  a  pugnacious,  egotis- 
tical pamphleteer  like  WilHam  Cobbett.  Of  these  ''Intellectual 
Radicals"  hardly  any  two  were  exactly  agreed  upon  a  full  scheme 
of  reform,  but  all  were  of  one  mind  in  assaihng  existing  institu- 
tions. Many  of  them  advocated  a  few  simple  measures  in  the 
direction  of  poHtical  democracy  such  as  would  seem  common- 
place if  not  antiquated  to  present-day  Englishmen  and  Americans. 
But  by  the  governing  classes  and  patriotic  masses  of  Great  Britain 
during  the  Era  of  Metternich,  the  Radicals  were  deemed  un- 
patriotic and  dangerous,  and  radicalism  became  almost  synony- 
mous with  treason.  RadicaHsm  is  a  ''spirit,"  wrote  the  vicar  of 
Harrow  in  1820,  "of  which  the  first  elements  are  a  rejection  of 
Scripture,  and  a  contempt  of  all  the  institutions  of  your  country ; 
and  of  which  the  results,  unless  averted  by  a  merciful  Providence, 
must  be  anarchy,  atheism,  and  universal  ruin." 

A  second  British  faction  arrayed  against  the  Tory  regirrre  was 
that  of  the  Roman  Catholics,  who  for  centuries  had  been  the 
victims  of  bigotry  and  persecution.  Reduced  to  a  Roman 
small  minority  in  England  and  Scotland,  they  still  CathoUcs 
constituted  a  large  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  Ireland, 
yet  throughout  the  kingdom  they  were  denied  poHtical  and 
civil  rights.  Few  Roman  CathoHcs  entertained  any  sympathy 
for  the  doctrines  of  the  French  Revolution,  but  in  agitating  for 
their  own  emancipation  they  found  themselves  in  temporary 
alliance  with  the  Radicals.    The  Protestant  Dissenters  ^. 

Dissenters 

too,  although  by  no  means  m  such  a  phght  as  the 
CathoHcs,  protested  vigorously  against  a  government  which 
forced  them  to  pay  tithes  for  the  support  of  the  AngHcan 
Church  and  which  not  only  discriminated  against  them  in  office- 
holding  but,  always  in  the  interests  of  the  same  AngHcan  Church, 
refused  them  a  university  education. 

It  might  have  been  possible  for  Castlereagh,  Wei-  andUn-^ 
lington,  the  Prince  Regent,  and  their  friends  to  have  represented 
maintained  indefinitely  the  cause  of  reaction  in  Great  Qass^es 
Britain  against  the  intellectual  protestations  of  a 
handful  of  "Radicals"  and  against  the  religious  opposition  of 
disorganized  Catholics  and  Dissenters,  but  in  the  face  of  amaz- 
ing economic  transformations  the  Tories  might  have  perceived 

VOL.  II  —  D 


34 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


their  eventual  doom.  It  was  during  the  Revolutionary  and 
Napoleonic  periods  that  the  Industrial  Revolution  produced 
its  first  great  results  in  England :  the  mechanical  inventions 
in  weaving  and  spinning,  the  development  of  new  motive 
power,  the  building  of  factories,  the  marvelously  increased 
production,  the  shift  of  population  from  the  country  to  the  towns. 
These  phenomena  speedily  substituted  industry  and  trade  in 
the  place  of  agriculture  as  the  chief  source  of  Great  Britain's 
wealth,  and  enhanced  the  numbers,  the  prosperity,  and  the 
ambition  of  the  new  ''business  man," — in  fact,  of  the  whole 
middle  class.  Yet  not  the  middle  class  but  the  landed  aristoc- 
racy controlled  Parliament  and  determined  the  policies  of  the 
realm.  The  interests  of  these  two  groups  were  quite  incom- 
patible :  a  struggle  was  inevitable ;  and  the  final  outcome,  in 
view  of  the  fateful  circumstances,  could  not  admit  of  doubt. 

From  1815  to  1822  the  Tory  ministers  maintained  their  system 
in  seemingly  undiminished  strength.  Reaction  was  supreme. 
^  .  ,  ,     The  noble  landholders  continued  to  ''inclose"  the 

Period  of 

Extreme  commons  by  leave  of  the  Tory  Parliament,  and  to 
Reaction,  j-gg^p  large  profits  from  the  Corn  Laws.  The  Anglican 
clergy  continued  to  enjoy  ecclesiastical  supremacy :  no 
redress  of  Nonconformist  grievances  was  forthcoming,  and  the 
depraved  Prince  Regent  mouthed  "the  principles  of  his  revered 
and  excellent  father"  in  order  to  justify  his  resistance  to  Catholic 
emancipation.  Parliament  in  18 18  took  five  miUion  dollars  from 
the  public  funds  to  build  Anglican  churches.  Parliamentary  re- 
form seemed  dead  and  individual  liberties  appeared  to  be  dying. 

Yet  throughout  England  there  was  the  liveKest  economic 
distress.  The  use  of  machinery  in  industry  had  already  thrown 
Economic  many  hand-laborers  out  of  employment.  Now  in  1 8 1 5 
Distress  the  Conclusion  of  foreign  war,  by  breaking  the  trading 
and  Riots  monopoly  of  Great  Britain,  seriously  decreased  the 
market  for  British  manufactures  and  thereby  threw  thousands 
of  British  wage-earners  out  of  work.  The  poorest  classes,  thus 
condemned  to  forced  idleness,  avenged  themselves  by  destroying 
the  machinery  to  which  they  naturally  attributed  their  unemploy- 
ment.   These  so-called  Luddite  ^  riots,  which  had  begun  as 

1  "The  name  [Luddite]  had  a  curious  origin.  More  than  thirty  years  before 
there  lived  in  Leicestershire  one  Ned  Ludd,  a  man  of  weak  intellect,  the  village 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY  35 


early  as  181 1,  reached  their  climax  in  1816  when  social  disturb- 
ances and  wanton  destruction  of  property  occurred  in  every  part 
of  the  country.  The  riots  were  economic  rather  than  poHtical 
in  character,  and,  being  precipitated  by  poor,  ignorant,  and 
unorganized  people  in  the  frenzy  and  despair  of  the  moment, 
they  were  in  every  case  suppressed  by  the  middle-class  factory- 
owners  acting  in  harmony  with  the  Tory  government,  and  leading 
rioters  were  put  to  death.  Not  in  the  severity,  however,  with 
which  they  suppressed  these  riots,  was  to  be  discovered  the  chief 
fault  of  the  British  reactionaries,  but  rather  in  their  willful 
blindness  to  the  true  causes  which  produced  economic  distress. 

Economic  distress  was  at  once  utilized  by  the  Radicals  to 
attract  the  lowest  working  class  to  the  support  of  their  political 
programs  —  and  with  considerable  success.  For  a  number 
of  years  after  181 6,  workingmen  gave  numerical  strength  to 
intellectual  radicalism.  An  attack  made  on  the  Prince  Regent 
at  the  opening  of  ParKament  in  181 7  led  to  an  official  inquiry 
which  revealed  the  existence  of  an  elaborate  secret  organization 
for  the  overthrow  of  the  existing  order.  EarHer  repressive  meas- 
ures were  at  once  revived  and  extended,  and,  in  the  midst  of  the 
aristocratic  alarm,  a  bill  suspending  for  a  year  the  venerable 
right  of  Habeas  Corpus  was  passed  through  both  Houses  by 
large  majorities.  Arbitrary  arrest  and  arbitrary  punishment  were 
restored  in  England,  at  least  temporarily.  At  the  same  time  the 
government  opened  a  campaign  against  the  traditional  freedom 
of  the  press  by  instructing  the  justices  of  the  peace  to  issue 
warrants  for  the  arrest  of  any  person  charged  on  oath  with  pub- 
lishing blasphemous  or  seditious  libels.  Prosecutions  followed 
so  thick  and  fast  that  William  Cobbett,  now  the  most  in- 
fluential of  the  Radicals,  in  order  to  avoid  arbitrary  im- 
prisonment, suspended  his  newspaper  —  the  fiery,  twopenny 
Political  Register  —  and,  ''deprived  of  pen,  ink,  and  paper," 
sailed  for  America. 

butt.  Irritated  by  his  tormentors,  the  unhappy  fellow  one  day  pursued  one  of 
them  into  an  adjoining  house.  He  could  not  find  the  lad  who  had  been  mocking 
him ;  but  in  his  fury  he  broke  a  couple  of  stocking  frames  which  were  on  the  prem- 
ises. When  frames  were  afterwards  broken,  it  was  the  common  saying  that  Ludd 
had  broken  them ;  and  thus  Ned  Ludd,  the  village  idiot,  gave  a  name  to  one  of 
the  most  formidable  series  of  riots  of  the  [nineteenth]  century."  (Sir  Spencer 
Walpole.) 


36  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


In  demanding  parliamentary  reform  the  Radicals  found 
interested  supporters  not  only  in  Roman  Catholics  and  in  work- 
"  Man  ingmen,  but  in  the  middle  class,  who  in  the  rapidly 
Chester  growing  manufacturing  towns  of  northern  and  central 
Massacre,"  England  were  without  any  representation  in  the 
House  of  Commons.  Monster  mass  meetings  were 
held  at  Smithfield,  at  Leeds,  at  Stockport,  and  at  Birmingham, 
and  in  the  last-named  city  a  "legislatorial  attorney  and  repre- 
sentative" was  duly  elected.  A  similar  mass  meeting,  convened 
on  St.  Peter's  Field  at  Manchester,  in  August,  1819,  was 
charged  by  royal  troops  with  drawn  swords  and  broken  up  after 
six  bystanders  had  been  killed  and  many  injured.  The  ''Man- 
chester Massacre"  showed  the  determination  of  the  governing 
classes  of  Great  Britain  to  employ  soldiery  for  the  suppression  of 
hberty  of  speech,  in  the  true  spirit  of  Metternich  and  of  the 
other  Continental  reactionaries. 

The  Tories  quickly  followed  up  the  lamentable  scene  at  Man- 
chester with  Six  Acts  of  ParKament  (November,  181 9)  —  the 
Repressive  ^^P^^^^^  crown  of  reaction  in  Great  Britain. 
Measures:  The  first  prohibited  unauthorized  persons  from  prac- 
Acts^^8i9  dicing  military  exercises.  The  second  provided  for 
the  speedy  trial  of  offenders.  The  third  empowered 
magistrates  to  issue  warrants  to  search  private  houses  for  arms. 
The  fourth  authorized  the  seizure  of  every  seditious  and  blas- 
phemous Kbel  and  the  banishment  of  the  author  for  a  second 
offense.  The  fifth  regulated  and  restricted  the  right  of  public 
meeting.  And  the  sixth  subjected  all  pubHcations  below  a 
certain  size  to  the  heavy  stamp  duty  on  newspapers.  With 
the  exception  of  the  third  and  fifth,  the  whole  six  were  designed 
as  permanent  acts. 

Now  that  every  peaceful  demonstration  against  the  reac- 
tionary regime  was  prohibited,  a  handful  of  violent  Radicals 
formed  in  London  the  Cato  Street  conspiracy  (1820)  to  massacre 
the  whole  Tory  cabinet.  The  plot  was  discovered  and  five  of  the 
conspirators  were  hanged.  Force  had  failed  to  shake  conserva- 
tism, and  for  the  moment  Great  Britain  settled  down  into  a  state 
of  external  calm. 

Reaction  continued  to  hold  sway  in  Great  Britain  throughout 
the  remainder  of  the  Era  of  Metternich,  although  after  1822  its 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  37 


foundations  were  slowly  but  surely  undermined.    All  the  forces  of 
opposition  took  breath  and  renewed  the  attack.  WilHam  Cobbett 
(i 766-1835)  returned  to  England  and  injected  new 
energy  into  the  Radicals.     The  Catholics  found  ^ess^^  °^ ' 
an  heroic  and  gifted  champion  in  Daniel  O'Connell  Rigorous 
(i 775-1847).    Everywhere  the  middle  classes  were  ^^22^1^32 
clamoring  for  parHamentary  representation  and  for 
legislation  favorable  to  the  new  industry,  and  in  their  clamors 
they  were  drawing  assistance  from  the  British  working  classes. 
On  the  other  side,  the  scandalous  domestic  difficulties,  culminat- 
ing in  attempted  divorce,  between  George  IV  and  the  unhappy 
Queen  CaroHne  cost  the  king  whatever  patriotic  devotion  he 
might  otherwise  have  been  able  to  inspire  for  reactionary  prin- 
ciples; and  the  death  of  Castlereagh  in  1822  transferred  the 
actual  management  of  the  Tory  regime  to  younger  colleagues 
who  soon  came  to  differ  from  the  master  in  essential  ^ 

Canning 

matters.  Through  the  foreign  poHcy  of  George  Can- 
ning (1770-1827),  Great  Britain  formally  repudiated  the  Quad- 
ruple AlUance  and  definitely  opposed  the  intervention  of  any 
government  in  the  internal  affairs  of  another  state  for  the  sup- 
pression of  HberaHsm.  Through  the  efforts  of  men  like  William 
Huskisson  (i 770-1830)  and  Sir  Robert  Peel  (i 788-1850),  who 
were  identified  with  industrial  and  commercial  interests  rather 
than  with  those  of  the  unprogressive  landed  aristocracy,  new 
remedial  legislation  was  gradually  inaugurated  toward  the  close 
of  the  decade  of  the  'twenties.  Even  the  reactionary  Tories 
were  eventually  pushed  by  an  inexorable  fate  upon  the  highway 
of  Hberal  reform.  The  inexorableness  of  this  fate,  which  by  1832 
rendered  old-fashioned  reaction  no  longer  possible  in  Great 
Britain  and  estabHshed  in  its  place  the  real  political  supremacy  of 
the  business  middle  class,  will  be  comprehended  later  when  we 
study  in  some  detail  the  genesis  and  course  of  the  Industrial 
Revolution. 


TRIAL  AND  ABANDONMENT  OF  LIBERAL  ADMINISTRATION 

IN  RUSSIA 

Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  European  Power  which  in  181 5 
supported  the  cause  of  reaction  least  loyally  was  not  England  but 


38 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Russia.  It  was  with  the  tsar  that  Metternich  had  at  first  his 
most  serious  difficulties. 

Of  the  character  of  Alexander  I  (1801-1825)  enough  has  al- 
ready been  said  to  make  clear  that  it  was  paradoxical.  Carefully 
Tsar  Alex-  trained  under  the  auspices  of  his  despotic  grandmother, 
ander  I,  the  Tsarina  Catherine  the  Great,  in  the  traditions  of 
1801-1825  Russian  autocracy,  he  had  also  imbibed  from  a  Swiss 
tutor  many  of  the  democratic  ideas  of  the  time.  Convinced  that 
he  was  truly  a  ''little  father"  to  the  Russian  people,  he  had 
meditated  the  introduction  of  English  political  and  social  institu- 
tions. A  lover  of  peace,  he  had  been  the  chief  instrument  in 
effecting  Napoleon's  military  downfall.  Sincerely  religious,  he 
had  dreamed  of  federating  all  Europe  into  one  Christian  family. 

During  the  early  part  of  his  reign  Alexander  gave  repeated 
proofs   of   his   attachment   to    Hberalism.     He  surrounded 

himself  with  reforming  advisers.^  He  seemed  to 
Attachment  ^esire  that  Russia  should  supplant  France  as  the 
of  Alex-  champion  of  constitutional  liberties,  for  he  was  in 
liberalism    P^^^  responsible  for  the  charter  which  Louis  XVIII 

granted  to  the  French  people  in  18 14 ;  he  confirmed  the 
independent  constitution  of  Finland ;  and  to  the  Poles  he  freely 
accorded  a  constitution  which  established  a  form  of  representa- 
tive government  and  guaranteed  individual  liberties.  At  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  he  endeavored,  with  the  aid  of  Baron  vom 
Stein,  to  further  German  regeneration ;  he  strongly  favored  the 
immediate  abolition  of  the  slave-trade ;  and  in  the  Holy  Alliance 
he  provided  what  he  thought  would  be  a  most  beneficent  agent 
in  securing  the  triumph  of  his  own  generous  and  humane  aims 
throughout  Europe. 

In  the  meantime  Alexander  was  planning  reforms  for  Russia 
in  the  time-honored  manner  of  a  benevolent  despot  rather  than 
Experiments  after  the  fashion  of  the  French  revolutionaries.  Some 
of  Alexander  Qf  ^j^g  earlier  and  more  rigid  restrictions  on  personal 
freedom  were  removed ;  the  clergy,  the  nobles,  and  the  middle- 
class  merchants  were  exempted  from  corporal  punishment; 
the  bureaucratic  system  of  administration  was  reorganized;  an 
advisory  Council  of  the  Empire  was  created ;  a  reform  ministry 

1  Notably,  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski  (1770-1861)  and  Count  Mikhail  Speransk^ 
(1772-1839). 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  39 


was  established,  responsible,  however,  to  the  tsar ;  and  the  idea 
of  granting  a  written  constitution  for  all  Russia  was  seriously 
discussed.  Moreover,  great  schemes  for  promoting  popular 
education  were  entertained ;  parish  schools,  normal  schools,  and 
ecclesiastical  seminaries  were  founded ;  the  existing  universities 
of  Moscow,  Vilna,  and  Dorpat  were  reorganized  and  new  ones 
were  erected  in  Petrograd,  Kazan,  and  Kharkov.  Elaborate 
reports  were  prepared  on  the  ways  and  means  of  abolishing 
serfdom  throughout  the  Russian  Empire,  and  a  small  begin- 
ning of  the  vast  work  of  emancipation  was  actually  made  in  the 
Baltic  provinces. 

Almost  all  ol  these  liberal  schemes  were  conceived  prior  to 
181 5.    That  few  of  them  were  fully  realized  was  due  to  the  dis- 
tractions of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  and  to  ignorance  Gradual 
or  downright  hostility  on  the  part  of  the  bulk  of  the  Conversion 
Russian  people.    After  181 5  Alexander  continued  for  ander^rom 
some  time  to  cherish  his  reforming  plans,  but  gradually  Liberalism 
his  ardor  cooled.    He  perceived  the  glaring  lack  of  *°  R^^^tion 
education  among  his  subjects  and  how  unfitted  they  were  for 
a  democratic  regime.    Little  by  Uttle  he  shifted  his  enthusiasm 
from  poHtical  reform  to  religious  revival.    And  most  portentous 
of  all  developments,  he  eventually  came  under  the  influence  of 
Metternich. 

The  Austrian  chancellor  never  neglected  an  opportunity  to 
impress  upon  the  kind-hearted  tsar  the  dangers  of  abetting 
liberalism  :  that  the  more  concessions  Liberals  and  Alexander 
Radicals  received,  the  more  they  would  demand ;  the  and 
more  they  were  allowed  to  agitate,  the  greater  violence 
and  disorder  they  would  incite ;  and  that,  therefore,  the  only  sure 
means  of  maintaining  Christian  peace  and  charity  would  be  the 
stern,  unrelenting  suppression  of  liberalism.  A  series  of  events 
soon  alarmed  Alexander  and  played  into  the  hands  of  Metternich  : 
a  revolutionary  conspiracy  among  the  officers  of  the  tsar's  guard 
(1818) ;  the  murder  of  a  Russian  agent,  Kotzebue,  by  a  German 
Liberal  (1819) ;  the  assassination  of  a  nephew  of  the  French 
king  (1820) ;  and  the  ensuing  uprisings  in  Italy  and  Spain. 
At  the  Congress  of  Troppau  (1820),  Alexander  confessed  to 
Metternich  his  full  and  complete  conversion.  ''Today,"  said  the 
repentant  tsar,  *'I  deplore  all  that  I  said  and  did  between  the 


40 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


years  1815  and  1818.  I  regret  the  waste  of  time,  which  we  must 
try  to  retrieve.  You  have  correctly  judged  the  state  of  affairs. 
Tell  me  what  you  desire  and  what  you  wish  me  to  do,  and  1 
will  do  it." 

Thenceforth  Alexander  was  a  steadfast  ally  of  Metternich 
in  devising  and  executing  reactionary  measures  against  the 
,        revolutionary  movements  in  Germany,  Italy,  and 

Abandon-       ^     .  ,  .  i, 

mentof  Spam.  Ihc  Holy  Alliance  was  practically  trans- 
Lq^ussS^  formed  into  an  organization  for  policing  Europe  in  the 
interest  of  a  most  worldly  conservatism.  In  the 
affairs  of  his  own  country  Alexander  henceforth  refrained  from 
extending  or  perfecting  the  liberal  institutions  which  he  had 
already  called  into  being. 

The  immediate  result  in  Russia  of  the  tsar's  conversion  was  a 
feeling  of  profound  disappointment  in  the  Liberal  section  of 
Opposition  cultured  classes  and  especially  among  young  army 
of  Russian  officers  who  had  learned  a  good  deal  of  French  revolu- 
Liberais  tionary  doctrine  during  their  campaigns  in  western 
Europe.  Secret  societies  sprang  up  and  Liberal  agitation  as- 
sumed a  character  strikingly  similar  to  that  in  Spain  and 
Italy. 

When  Alexander  died  suddenly  in  December,  1825,  the  new 
revolutionary  societies  made  an  attempt  to  halt  the  reaction, 
^jjg  They  opposed  the  late  tsar's  directions  that  he  be  suc- 

Decembrist  ceeded  by  his  second  brother  Nicholas  in  preference 
Revolt,  1825  j^-^  ^^^^  brother,  the  erratic  but  liberal-minded 
Grand  Duke  Cons  tan  tine,  and  organized  a  mutiny  among  the 
troops  quartered  in  Petrograd.  ''Cons  tan  tine  and  Con- 
stitution" became  the  motto  of  the  revolt,  but  Constantine 
speedily  repudiated  his  friends,  and  Nicholas  encountered  no 
great  trouble  in  restoring  order  and  obtaining  general  recogni- 
tion for  himself.  How  superficial  as  yet  was  the  Liberal  propa- 
ganda in  Russia  may  be  inferred  from  the  well-attested  fact 
that  many  of  the  mutinous  soldiers  beHeved  that  Constitution" 
was  Constantine's  wife !  The  ringleaders  of  this  December 
revolt,  who  were  subsequently  known  as  Decembrists,  were 
severely  punished  by  the  new  tsar. 

Nicholas  I  (182 5- 1855)  had  never  entertained  any  sympathy 
for  liberalism,  and  the  unfortunate  circumstances  of  his  acces- 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  41 


sion  could  but  strengthen  his  conservatism.    Of  all  opponents 
of  revolution  and  reform,  Nicholas  was  the  most  determined,  the 
boldest,  and  the  most  successful.    During  the  thirty 
years  of  his  reign  he  employed  the  most  rigorous  Reaction*^ 
measures  to  prevent  liberal  ideas  from  germinating  under 
spontaneously  among  his  own  people  and  from  being  j  825-1 855* 
transplanted  from  abroad.    For  this  purpose  he  estab- 
lished an  extremely  strict  censorship  of  the  press,  an  expensive 
system  of  passports,  which  made  it  very  difficult  for  Russians 
to  visit  foreign  countries  or  for  aliens  to  enter  Russia,  and  an 
elaborate  secret  police  in  order  to  discover  and  punish  sedition. 
If,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Era  of  Metternich,  Russia  had  seemed 
a  noxious  and  dangerous  bog  of  liberal  enthusiasms,  it  was  no 
longer  such  at  the  close  of  the  period :  to  thoroughgoing  reaction- 
aries it  had  become  a  political  paradise. 

MAINTENANCE  OF  AUTOCRACY  IN  CENTRAL  EUROPE 

Between  the  countries  of  western  Europe,  where  liberals 
struggled  most  valiantly  and  most  hopefully  against  conserva- 
tives, and  the  huge  eastern  empire  of  Russia,  in  which  „ 

.        1^.1        .11,        1  .  strategic 

conservatism  definitely  triumphed,  lay  the  extensive  position  of 
lands  that  were  owned  or  controlled  by  Austria,  the  Metternich 

.    1,11  .  .  in  Austria 

veritable  lodestone  of  reaction. 

Metternich's  first  and  greatest  care  was  to  employ  the  whole 
force  of  the  Habsburg  government  to  keep  things  precisely  as 
they  were  within  the  Austrian  dominions.  He 
would  have  no  change,  not  even  a  compromise  with  SieTAusMan 
reform.    To  check  the  bitter  racial  rivalries  which  Dominions 
perpetually   threatened   the   disintegration   of   his  Mettemich 
hodge-podge  state,  he  relied  upon  a  large  and  well- 
trained  army,  advantageously  scattered :  Hungarian  regiments 
garrisoned  Italy ;  Italian  regiments  guarded  Austrian  Poland ; 
Germans  occupied  Bohemia;  Czechs  defended  Austria  proper; 
and  southern  Slavs  restrained  Hungary.    To  combat  the  danger 
of  the  infiltration  of  revolutionary  ideas  from  abroad,  a  wall  of 
tariffs  and  censors  was  erected  around  the  Austrian  lands.  To 
guard  against  the  peril  of  incipient  liberalism  at  home,  the  press 
was  rigidly  supervised,  clerical  control  of  education  was  reestab- 


42 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


lished,  and  only  music  escaped  governmental  interference.  This 
administrative  policy  was  accompanied,  as  might  have  been 
expected,  by  economic  stagnation.  Agriculture,  still  by  far  the 
most  important  pursuit  of  all  the  Habsburg  peoples,  was  ham- 
pered, as  in  France  before  the  Revolution,  by  the  surviving  feudal 
privileges  of  a  proud  landed  aristocracy  which  no  longer  gave 
any  equivalent  service  to  the  public  weal ;  trade  languished  on 
account  of  the  system  of  high  tariffs  at  the  frontier  and  of  special 
customs  at  interior  points ;  and  inequality  of  assessment,  waste 
in  collection,  and  extravagance  in  expenditure  made  the  imperial 
taxes  positively  crushing.  Yet  such  a  regime  Metternich  was 
able  to  maintain  within  the  Austrian  lands  until  his  own  downfall 
in  1848. 

Next  to  his  solicitude  for  the  immediate  dominions  of  the 
Matter  Habsburg  crown  was  his  anxiety  so  to  dominate  Italy 
nich's  Policy  and  Germany  as  to  stamp  out  any  political  or  social 
andRa^^^^  movements  which  might  spread  into  Austria  and  tend 
to  subvert  the  institutions  which  he  worshiped.  And 
the  territorial  settlements  of  181 5  were  such  as  to  enable  him 
to  exercise  the  desired  domination. 

Particularly  in  his  relations  with  the  Germanics,  Metternich 
encountered  little  trouble.  Austria  had  the  presidency  of  the  new 
Germanic  Confederation  and  could  always  count  upon 
Germanic  the  support  of  the  princcs  of  the  smaller  states  who 
tion^^^^^*  were  instinctively  jealous  of  Prussia.  By  this  means 
Metternich  effectively  blocked  repeated  attempts  to 
fulfill  the  promise  of  article  XIII  of  the  Confederation's  constitu- 
tion that  "a  representative  form  of  government  shall  be  adopted 
in  the  federative  states."  In  several  states  of  southern  Germany, 
where  the  tradition  of  alliance  with  France  kept  liberalism 
very  much  alive,  the  princes,  it  is  true,  deemed  it  expedient  to 
grant  charters  ^  somewhat  like  that  accorded  by  Louis  XVIII  of 
France,  and  they  continued  the  Napoleonic  code  of  laws,  but  in 
almost  every  case  harsh  game-laws,  restrictions  on  the  press,  and 
maintenance  of  many  social  ills  kept  up  a  smoldering  discontent ; 
and  Metternich  used  his  influence  to  prevent  further  reforms. 
In  northern  and  central  Germany  affairs  were  more  reactionary : 

1  Notably  in  Bavaria  (1818),  Baden  (1818),  Wiirttemberg  (1817,  but  soon 
suspended),  and  in  the  small  Thuringian  states  of  central  Germany. 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY 


with  the  exception  of  the  high-minded  duke  of  Saxe- Weimar, 
every  prince  in  those  regions  now  evaded  whatever  promises  of 
constitutional  government  he  had  made  during  the  patriotic 
period  of  the  War  of  Liberation.  An  often-cited  case  was  that  of 
the  old  elector  of  Hesse-Cassel,  who,  after  spending  eight  years  in 
banishment,  returned  with  the  phrase,  ''I  have  been  sleeping 
these  years,"  and,  with  the  aid  of  his  soldiers  in  their  old-fashioned 
powder  and  pigtails,  proceeded  to  restore  all  the  antique  abuses. 
Perhaps  King  Frederick  William  III  of  Prussia  was  quite  sincere 
in  his  promise  to  grant  a  charter  to  his  people,  but  he  was  a  timid 
soul,  easily  frightened  by  the  slightest  difficulties,'  and  always 
considered  it  an  honor  to  defer  to  the  superior  judgment 
of  Metternich  or  of  the  tsar.  Besides,  Prussia  had  immediately 
to  deal  with  the  task  of  improving  her  finances,  bettering  her 
military  system,  and  welding  together  the  new  territories  which 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  had  secured  her. 

Nevertheless,  within  all  the  Germanics  the  spirit  of  liberalism 
evoked  by  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  storms  was  still 
alive.    The  bourgeoisie  desired  to  participate  in  the 
government.    The  lower  classes  wanted  social  reform.  o^LTberS*^* 
Patriots  in  every  walk  of  life  yearned  for  a  great  Agitation 
and  glorious,  united  Germany.   No  coercion  availed  to  oennanies 
stamp  out  the  embers  of  unrest.    Especially  in  the  uni- 
versities radicalism  throve.    Students  formed  secret  societies, 
which,  under  the  names  of  Tugendhund  Sind  Bur schenschaft,  made 
noisy  demonstrations  that  caused  uneasiness  alike  in  Berlin  and  in 
Vienna.    Thus  the  Wartburg  festival  in  October,  1817,^  which 
was  attended  by  nothing  more  dangerous  than  undergraduate 
hilarity  and  a  solemn  burning,  in  imitation  of  Martin  Luther,  of 
various  odd  emblems  of  the  old  regime,  was  magnified  by  Metter- 
nich into  a  rebellion  and  drew  down  upon  the  grand-duke  of 
Saxe- Weimar  the  joint  protest  of  the  reactionary  Powers.  Two 
years  later,  the  assassination  of  the  dramatist  Kotzebue,  a 
prominent  reactionary  and  spy  in  the  service  of  Russia,  by 
a  fanatical  student  named  Karl  Sand,  clinched  the  matter. 
Metternich,  assured  of  Prussian  aid,  convoked  an  extraordinary 

*The  300th  anniversary  of  the  publication  of  Luther's  theses  against  indul- 
gences (see  Vol.  I,  p.  131),  and  the  fourth  anniversary  of  the  Battle  of  the  Nations 
(see  Vol.  I,  p.  564). 


44 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


meeting  of  German  statesmen  at  Carlsbad  to  take  steps  to 
crush  Liberal  agitation. 

The  result  was  the  promulgation  of  the  famous  Carlsbad 
Decrees  by  the  German  federal  Diet  (September,  1819).  These 
Att  ted  contained  detailed  provisions  for  supervising  univer- 
Repression  sity  professors  and  students  and  muzzling  the  press, 
ism^^the^  declaring  that  no  constitution  ''inconsistent  with  the 
Carlsbad  monarchical  principle"  should  be  granted,  and  estab- 
^g^cjees,  lishing  a  central  committee  at  Mainz  to  investigate 
"the  origin  and  manifold  ramifications  of  the  revolu- 
tionary plots  and  demagogical  associations  directed  against  the 
existing  constitution  and  the  internal  peace  both  of  the  union 
and  of  the  individual  states." 

The  years  that  directly  followed  the  Carlsbad  Decrees  were 
uneventful  in  Germany.  The  Mainz  Committee,  though  ham- 
pered by  the  mutual  jealousies  of  some  of  the  princes,  proved 
effective  enough  in  preventing  all  free  expression  of  opinion,  and 
the  official  curators"  of  the  universities  kept  Liberal  enthusiasts 
in  order.    Metternich's  hold  on  the  Germanics  was  complete. 

Hardly  less  complete  was  Metternich's  influence  in  the  Italian 
states.  Not  only  were  Venetia  and  Lombardy  administered  as 
integral  parts  of  the  Habsburg  Empire  but  Austrian 
nich'rinflu-  P^inccs  ruled  in  the  duchies  of  Tuscany,  Parma,  and 
ence  in  the  Modena ;  the  Austrian  chancellor  was  on  intimate 
states  terms  with  the  pope ;  and  Ferdinand,  the  despicable 
king  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  reinstated  in  Naples  by  an 
Austrian  army,  had  bound  himself  by  a  secret  article  in  the  treaty 
of  181 5  not  to  introduce  methods  of  government  incompatible 
with  those  in  force  in  Austria's  Italian  possessions.  In  all  these 
states,  throughout  the  whole  Era  of  Metternich,  the  conduct  of 
pubKc  business,  thoroughly  reactionary,  gave  rise  to  abuses. 
A  system  which  was  burdensome  when  applied  in  Austria  by 
natives  to  a  traditionally  contented  populace,  was  well-nigh 
intolerable  when  exercised  in  Italy  by  foreigners  over  a  people 
who  had  drunk  deeply  of  an  effervescent  revolutionary  stimulant 
imported  from  France.  Victor  Emmanuel  I,  the  king  of  Sar- 
dinia, was  the  only  ruler  in  the  peninsula  with  exclusively  Italian 
interests.  But  although  he  was  joyfully  acclaimed  upon  his  resto- 
ration in  Turin,  he  speedily  yielded  to  his  own  inclinations  and  to 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY*'  45 


the  menacing  representations  of  Metternich:  he  disavowed 
French  reforms,  and  restored,  as  far  as  possible,  conditions  as 
they  had  been  prior  to  1789.    Officially  all  Italy  was  reactionary. 

Yet  here,  too,  beneath  the  surface,  liberalism  seethed.  The 
peasantry,  ignorant  and  influenced  by  the  clergy,  were  generally 
indifferent,  but  among  the  educated  classes,  the  pro-  Lj|jgj.^gjjj 
fessional  and  business  men,  and  many  day-laborers,  in  the 
the  double  demand  for  constitutional  government  and  g^^^^ 
for  national  independence  grew  ever  louder.    As  in  so 
many  other  countries,  the  Radicals  employed  underground  means 
of  agitation,  and  various  secret  societies  like  the  Carbonari 
(Charcoal-Burners)  and  the  Freemasons  found  fertile  soil  in 
Italy  for  revolutionary  propaganda.    The  Carbonari  in  Naples 
alone  numbered  thousands.    Against  the  nationalist  and  con- 
stitutionalist aspirations  of  these  Italians,  Metternich  was 
always  able  to  use  powerful  Austrian  armies.    The  history  of 
his  Italian  domination  is  in  fact  but  an  alternation  of  popular 
riots  and  military  suppression. 

The  seeming  success  of  the  Spanish  revolution  of  1820  was  the 
signal  for  a  Liberal  uprising  in  Naples  against  the  tyrannical 
Ferdinand  I.^    The  kiner,  deserted  by  his  army,  sub-  „ 

•11  .      .  1  1    1      r         1      o       •  1  Suppression 

scnbed  to  a  constitution  modeled  after  the  Spanish  of  Uprising 
instrument  of  181 2.    But  hardly  had  he  taken  the  '^3^^*^^®^' 
oath  with  gratuitous  solemnity,  when  Metternich 
assembled  the  Congress  of  Troppau  and  prevailed  upon  the 
Prussian  king  and  the  Russian  tsar  to  sanction  the  principle  of 
intervention,^  to  denounce  revolution,  and  to  summon  Ferdinand 
to  appear  before  them ;  the  next  year,  at  the  Congress  of  Laibach, 
King  Ferdinand  dishonorably  repudiated  his  oath  and  formally 
invited"  an  Austrian  army  to  march  into  Naples  ''to  restore 
order."    The  campaign  that  followed  was  eminently  satisfactory 
to  Metternich.    Neapolitan  opposition  collapsed ;   the  consti- 
tution was  abrogated ;   and  Ferdinand,  protected  by  Austrian 
bayonets,  inaugurated  an  era  of  savage  persecution.    The  Two 
Sicilies  long  maintained  the  reputation  of  being  the  worst 
governed  state  in  Christian  Europe. 

1  Ferdinand  (1751-1825)  IV  of  Naples,  III  of  Sicily,  I  of  the  Two  Sicilies;  the 
third  son  of  Charles  III  of  Si)ain,  , 

2  See  Troppau  Protocol,  pp.  13  f.,  above. 


46 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Following  closely  upon  the  heels  of  the  Neapolitan  revolt  came 
a  Liberal  uprising  in  Piedmont.    In  182 1  soldiers  mutinied  and 

seized  Turin;  King  Victor  Emmanuel  abdicated  in 
of^uprisfig^  favor  of  his  brother  Charles  Felix,  and  named  Pririb^ 
in  Piedmont,  Charles  Albert,  next  in  line  of  royal  succession,  as 

regent.  Charles  Albert,  who  was  in  open  sympathy 
with  liberalism  and  a  bitter  opponent  of  Austria,  at  once  pro- 
claimed a  constitution  similar  to  the  Spanish  document  of  181 2, 
but  the  speedy  intervention  of  Austrian  troops  enabled  Charles 
Felix  to  expel  the  liberal-minded  regent  and  to  reestablish 
absolutist  government.  Metternich  endeavored  at  the  Congress 
of  Verona  (1822)  to  punish  Charles  Albert  by  depriving  him  of  the 
right  of  succession  to  the  throne  of  Piedmont,  but  Charles  Felix 
successfully  interposed  the  doctrine  of  ''legitimacy,"  and  Charles 
Albert  soon  manifested  conversion  to  orthodox  Metternichian 
reaction  by  enlisting  in  the  French  expedition  to  restore  the  im- 
possible Ferdinand  VII  to  the  throne  of  Spain.  Italy  like  Ger- 
many was  bound  hand  and  foot  to  the  triumphant  reactionary 
chariot  of  Austria. 


FAILURE  OF  METTERNICH'S  POLICIES  AND  PARTIAL 
TRIUMPH  OF  LIBERALISM,  1822-1830 

From  1815  to  1822  Metternich's  supremacy  throughout 
Europe  was  unquestioned.  After  1822  several  factors  contrib- 
uted to  weaken  his  position,  so  that  by  1830  the 
Metter^-  cause  of  reaction  was  definitely  doomed,  at  least  in  the 
nich's  western  countries.  For  another  eighteen  years  the 
1822-1830  Austrian  chancellor  continued  to  dominate  Germany 
and  Italy,  but  his  efforts  to  unite  all  sovereigns  for  the 
extirpation  of  liberalism  were  already  in  1830  marked  with  failure. 

Three  main  elements  in  the  decline  of  Metternich's  fortunes 
were  (i)  the  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain,  (2)  the  Greek  insur- 
rection, and  (3)  a  wave  of  revolutionary  movements  in  the  year 
1830.    A  few  words  must  be  said  about  each  one  of  these. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  in  1822  George  Canning  succeeded 
Castlereagh  as  British  foreign  secretary.  Canning  felt  no  per- 
sonal horror  of  liberaKsm;  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  quite 
willing  to  cooperate  with  Liberals  if  it  would  promote  the  eco- 


''LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  47 


nomic  interests  of  Great  Britain.    Hence  against  the  activities 
of  Metternich  he  urged  a  policy  of  non-intervention.    To  the 
international  congress  assembled  at  Verona  in  1822,  ^j^^  p^y^^y 
he  sent  word  that  "while  England  was  no  friend  to  of  Canning: 
revolution,  she  did  emphatically  insist  on  the  right  of 
nations  to  set  up  for  themselves  whatever  form  of  gov- 
ernment they  thought  best,  and  to  be  left  free  to  manage  their 
own  affairs,  so  long  as  they  left  other  nations  to  manage  theirs." 
The  cooperation  of  Canning  with  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  as  has  already  been  explained,  checkmated  every  plan  to 
reimpose  autocracy  on  the  rebellious  Spanish  colonies.  Canning, 
in  the  words  of  his  own  proud  boast,  had  "called  the  New  World 
into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old.''    Such  an  atti- 
tude on  the  part  of  a  British  foreign  secretary  meant  the  defection 
of  Great  Britain  from  the  Quadruple  Alliance  and  serious  damage 
to  Metternich's  chief  instrument  for  the  suppression  of  HberaHsm. 
Within  a  few  years  public  opinion  in  France  forced  the  govern- 
ment of  that  country  to  concur  with  Great  Britain  in  the  policy 
of  non-intervention.    Thenceforth  the  Concert  of  Europe  was  a 
mere  fiction. 

Metternich  might  still  have  been  able  to  count  on  a  powerful 
triple  alHance  —  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia  —  to  uphold  the 
noble  cause  of  "legitimacy,"  had  not  a  more  disconcert-  _ 

.1        1  1      r  ^1    •    •      ^      1      The  Greek 

mg  event  transpired  —  the  revolt  of  Christian  Greeks  insurrec- 
against  their  "legitimate"  but  Moham.medan  masters,  yp^jj^^ 
the  Ottoman  Turks.    While  the  European  diplomats 
were  assembled  at  Laibach  in  1821,  news  came  that  a  Greek, 
Prince  Alexander  Ypsilanti,  had  raised  the  standard  of  revolt 
among  his  countrymen  in  Moldavia  and  was  confidently  expect- 
ing aid  from  Russia.    Metternich  at  once  perceived  the  danger 
and  prevailed  upon  the  Tsar  Alexander  to  disown  Ypsilanti. 
The  rising  in  Moldavia  was  easily  put  down  by  the  Turks ;  and 
Metternich  had  the  pleasure  of  confining  the  Greek  leader  in  an 
Austrian  prison  for  seven  years. 

But  this  was  not  the  end  of  the  Greek  revolt  —  it  was  only  a 
premature  beginning.  The  Greeks,  though  long  deprived  by  the 
Turks  of  their  independence  as  a  nation,  had  never  been  oblit- 
erated as  a  people.  The  Greek  Orthodox  Church  had  been  a 
strong  bond  of  union ;  and  the  seafaring  and  business  propensi- 


48 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ties  of  the  Greeks  had  given  them  an  important  commercial 
and  financial  position  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Traditionally 
democratic  and  patriotic  they  had  recently  been 
National  aroused  to  action  by  the  example  of  the  French 
Greece^  revolutionaries.  A  secret  society  —  the  Ilelairia 
Philike — founded  in  1815,  now  numbered  200,000 
members,  pledged  to  labor  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Moslems 
and  the  restoration  of  the  Greek  Empire  at  Constantinople. 
What  had  been  a  theatrical  display  of  an  adventurer  in  Moldavia 
was  now  rapidly  succeeded  by  a  national  uprising  in  the  Morea 
and  in  the  ^gean  Islands  (1821).  The  Turks,  this  time  taken 
unprepared  and  badly  beaten,  had  recourse  to  savage  reprisals. 
The  Orthodox  patriarch  of  Constantinople  was  murdered,  and 
a  wholesale  massacre  of  Christians  was  ordered  in  Macedonia 
and  Asia  Minor.  The  utmost  ferocity  marked  the  struggle  on 
both  sides.  Metternich  remained  obdurate,  cynically  remark- 
ing that  the  revolt  should  be  allowed  ''to  burn  itself  out 
beyond  the  pale  of  civiKzation." 

Yet  the  Greek  revolt  proved  too  serious  even  for  Metternich.  It 
appealed  to  the  enthusiasm  and  imagination  of  Europe  as  nothing 
else  could.  The  educated  saw  in  it  a  revival  of  the 
European  ancient  glories  of  Hellas.  Patriots  perceived  in  it  a 
Sympathy  war  for  national  independence.  Liberals  beheld  in  it  a 
Greeks  Struggle  for  Hberty  and  democracy.  Pious  Christians 
of  every  creed  witnessed  with  deepest  sympathy  a 
modern  crusade.  Volunteers  flocked  to  the  Greek  standard 
from  every  country  of  Europe.  Victor  Hugo  praised  the  rebels 
in  martial  poems,  and  Lord  Byron  gave  pen,  fortune,  and  Hfe 
for  Greek  independence. 

Popular  sentiment  was  unanimously  in  favor  of  the  Greek 
insurgents  not  only  in  France  and  Great  Britain,  but,  omen  even 
Concern  of  more  portentous,  in  Russia  also.  PoHtical  ambition 
Russia  q{  tsars  and  a  succession  of  wars  had  made  Russians 
and  Turks  hereditary  enemies,  while  community  of  reHgion  and 
culture  Knked  the  Russian  and  Greek  nations  together.  Con- 
sequently, it  was  with  some  difficulty  that  Alexander,  now  a 
faithful  henchman  of  Metternich,  restrained  his  own  subjects 
from  giving  aid  to  revolutionaries ;  yet  until  the  tsar's  death  in 
1825,  Russia  was  steered  in  "legitimist"  channels. 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY'^  49 


Meanwhile  the  Greeks,  contrary  to  foreign  expectation  and 
despite  chronic  domestic  feuds,  were  more  than  holding  their 
own  against  the  Turks.    But  just  about  the  time  of 

*  t         1    »     1      1      1         1  1  •  r     ^  The  War  of 

Alexander  s  death,  the  sultan,  resolvmg  upon  a  nnal  Greek  inde- 
drastic  effort  to  subjugate  his  rebellious  subjects,  called  Jl^i-^si 
to  his  assistance  Ibrahim  Pasha,  the  son  of  his  vassal, 
Mehemet  AH  of  Egypt.    Then  for  three  years  Ibrahim  operated 
in  the  Morea  with  energy  and  ferocity.    He  easily  defeated  the 
Greeks  in  the  open  field,  and,  when  hostile  bands  harassed  his 
army,  he  took  revenge  by  desolating  the  country  and  sending 
thousands  of  the  Christian  inhabitants  into  slavery  in  Egypt. 
The  resulting  indignation  throughout  Europe  decided  the  new 
Tsar  Nicholas  to  close  his  ear  to  the  counsels  of  Metternich  :  in 
July,  1827,  representatives  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia 
signed  the  treaty  of  London,  agreeing  to  demand  an  armistice 
as  preHminary  to  settlement  of  the  Greek  question ;  ^^^^^ 
and  in  October,  after  the  sultan  had  refused  to  accept  Navarino, 
mediation,  the  combined  fleets  of  the  new  allies  de-  ^^^^ 
stroyed  the  Turco-Egyptian  squadron  in  the  harbor  of  Navarino. 
The  battle  of  Navarino  was  decisive  in  that  it  rendered  hopeless 
any  further  efforts  of  the  Turks  to  suppress  the  Greek  revolt  and 
also  in  that  it  dealt  a  hard  blow  to  Metternich's  European  system. 
Even  the  Russian  tsar  was  openly  backing  rebels  against  "legit- 
imately" constituted  authority. 

Tsar  Nicholas  now  gave  free  rein  to  the  sympathies  and  patri- 
otism of  his  subjects.    In  1828  he  formally  declared  war  against 
Turkey,  and  the  next  year  a  Russian  army  fought  its  ^^^^^ 
way  almost  to  Constantinople,  and  obliged  the  Porte  Turkish 
to  sign  the  treaty  of  Adrianople  —  a  treaty  of  first-  ^^Ligjp 
rate  importance  in  the  history  of  the  dismemberment 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire.    By  the  settlement,  Turkey  virtually 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  Greece ;  granted  practical 
autonomy  to  Serbia  ^  and  to  the  principahties  of  Moldavia  and 

^  The  fame  of  the  Greek  War  of  Independence  should  not  obscure  the  impor- 
tance of  the  parallel  Serbian  War  of  Independence.  From  1804  the  Serbs  under 
the  leadership  successively  of  two  patriots  —  Karageorge  and  Milosh  Obre- 
novich  —  waged  almost  constant  war  with  their  Turkish  overlords  until  1817, 
when  they  finally  won  autonomy,  though  still  nominally  under  the  suzerainty  of 
the  sultan.  This  autonomy  was  placed  on  an  international  basis  by  the  treaty  of 
Adrianople  (1829). 

VOL.  n  —  E 


50 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Wallachia  (modern  Rumania) ;  surrendered  claims  on  Georgia 
and  other  provinces  of  the  Caucasus  to  Russia ;  and  recognized 
the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Russian  consuls  over  Russian 
traders  in  Turkey. 

An  international  conference  in  London  subsequently  fixed 
the  Greek  frontier  at  a  line  running  from  the  Gulf  of  Volo  ^  on 
The  Greek  the  east  to  Arta  on  the  west,  and  in  1832  Prince  Otto 
Kingdom  Bavaria  became  the  first  constitutional  king  of 

Greece.  The  new  kingdom  embraced  a  comparatively  small 
minority  of  the  Greek-speaking  people,  but  in  spite  of  its  diminu- 
tive size  and  of  the  poverty  and  political  feuds  which  long  after- 
wards distracted  it,  it  was  a  very  real  example  of  how,  even 
despite  Metternich's  fulminations,  nationalism  and  liberalism 
might  bear  fruit.  It  was  an  ironical  aftermath  of  the  Greek 
revolt,  which  might  have  appealed  to  the  cynical  nature  of 
Metternich,  that  the  Tsar  Nicholas  should  join  in  1832  in  forming 
a  league  of  the  three  eastern  monarchies  —  Russia,  Austria,  and 
Prussia  —  for  the  support  of  '^divine-right"  against  the  two 
Powers  —  France  and  Great  Britain  —  which  had  "the  courage 
to  profess  aloud  rebellion  and  the  overthrow  of  all  stability." 

The  definite  triumph  of  liberalism  in  France,  the  resulting 
cleavage  in  political  principles  between  the  govern- 
Revohi-^  ments  of  western  Europe  and  those  of  the  east,  and 
tionary  the  narrowing  of  Metternich's  influence,  were  the 
^°i83?^^*^  achievements  of  the  revolutionary  movements  of 
1830. 

In  France  the  reactionary  rule  of  Charles  X  was  becoming 
more  and  more  unpopular.  As  it  became  increasingly  obvious 
Middle  ^^^^  ^^^^  hent  upon  being  an  absolute  sover- 
ciass  eign  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name  and  that  Ultra-Royalist 

S^France^  Control  meant  additional  class  legislation  in  behalf  of 
to  the  the  clergy  and  the  nobility,  the  bourgeoisie  and  many 
S^^ChSies  X  workingmen  gave  louder  utterance  to  grumbling 

and  fault-finding.  The  less  well-to-do  bourgeois  were 
excluded  from  participation  in  government  by  the  heavy  property 
qualifications ;  the  numerous  irreligious  bourgeois  were  angered 
by  the  exaltation  of  the  Catholic  Church ;  and,  to  cap  the  climax, 

^  In  1832  the  frontier  was  pushed  still  further  south,  to  a  line  drawn  from  the 
Gulf  of  Arta  to  the  Gulf  of  Lamia. 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  51 


the  wealthy  bourgeois  had  a  most  galling  economic  grievance 
against  the  Ultra-Royalists.  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Cham- 
bers had  authorized  in  1825  the  indemnifying  of  the  emigres  to 
the  amount  of  one  billion  francs  for  the  losses  which  they  had 
sustained  during  the  Revolution.  The  means  employed  for 
paying  the  indemnity  were  amazing.  Knowing  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  restore  such  a  huge  capital  sum  to  the  nobles,  the 
government  hit  upon  the  plan  of  funding  the  entire  public  debt 
of  the  nation  at  a  materially  lower  rate  of  interest  and  of  paying 
the  amount  thereby  saved  in  the  form  of  annuities  to  the  emigres. 
In  other  words,  the  middle-class  holders  of  government  bonds 
suddenly  found  their  annual  income  reduced  by  a  third  for  the 
benefit  of  a  crowd  of  grasping  and  traitorous  aristocrats."  It 
was  this  financial  transaction  more  than  any  other  fact  which 
sealed  the  doom  of  divine-right  monarchy  in  France.  Men  of 
business  were  henceforth  arrayed  with  Napoleonic  veterans  and 
Liberal  idealists  against  the  regime  of  Charles  X. 

After  the  elections  of  1827  had  reflected  the  pubHc  feeling  by 
depriving  the  Ultra-Royalists  of  their  majority  in  the  Lower 
Chamber,  the  king  temporarily  made  personal  concessions  by 
appointing  moderates  to  office.  But  that  he  was  steadfast 
against  making  any  concession  of  principle  was  fully  apparent  in 
1829  when,  in  the  face  of  an  adverse  vote  of  the  Chambers,  he 
intrusted  the  premiership  to  Prince  de  Polignac,  one  of  the 
emigres,  a  person  as  obstinate  as  he  was  ignorant  and  visionary. 

The  issue  was  clear :  it  was  a  conflict  between  the  king  and 
his  reactionary  minister  on  one  side,  and  the  Chambers,  sup- 
ported by  the  bourgeoisie,  on  the  other.  In  vain  did  the  govern- 
ment endeavor  to  make  the  nation  forget  the  domestic  conflict 
by  intervening  in  behalf  of  Greek  independence  and  by  sending 
an  expedition  to  seize  Algiers  and  to  chastise  the  Barbary  pirates. 
The  Chamber  simply  persisted  in  voting  ''lack  of  confidence" 
in  the  ministry  and  in  referring  to  the  rights  guaranteed  by  the 
Charter  of  1814;  Liberal  newspapers  applauded  the  Chamber 
and  openly  criticized  the  king. 

In  the  spring  of  1830  Charles  X  dissolved  the  Chamber  which 
still  demanded  the  dismissal  of  the  Polignac  ministry,  but  the 
new  elections  returned  a  Chamber  even  more  hostile  to  reaction 
than  its  predecessor.    The  king,  thoroughly  incensed  that  the 


U.  OF  ILL  LIB. 

9 


52 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


nation  could  have  and  express  a  will  different  from  his  own,  re- 
plied  on  26  July,  1830,  with  the  publication  of  four  arbitrary 
The  July  ordinances :  (i)  the  rights  of  the  press  were  to  be 
Ordinances  niost  Carefully  restricted ;  (2)  the  newly  elected 
Chamber,  which  had  not  as  yet  assembled,  was  dissolved; 
(3)  a  new  electoral  law  was  promulgated  which  disfranchised 
at  least  three-fourths  of  the  electors,  mostly  troublesome 
bourgeois;  and  (4)  new  elections  were  called  for  September. 

On  the  very  day  of  publication  of  these  ordinances,  the  Liberal 
printers  and  journaHsts,  eager  to  reassert  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people  against  that  of  the  Bourbons,  incited  all  classes 
(1830^)"^^  of  Paris  to  armed  insurrection.  After  three  days  of 
Revoiu-  street-fighting  against  a  mere  handful  of  royalist  troops 
Paris^  who  were  ill-prepared  and  feebly  led,  the  Parisian 
workingmen,  driven  to  the  barricades  by  the  deliberate 
closing  of  Liberal  workshops,  gained  the  victory:  Charles  X 
abdicated  in  favor  of  his  ten-year-old  grandson,  the  count  of 
Chambord,  and  took  refuge  in  England. 

The  "July  Days"  of  1830,  with  sHght  bloodshed,  put  an  end 
to  divine-right  monarchy  in  France.  What  political  system 
Overthrow  should  take  its  place  became  at  once  a  subject  of  heated 
of  Charles  X  debate.  On  the  one  hand  there  still  survived  a  Repub- 
Hcan  party,  recruited  chiefly  from  among  the  students  and  the 
Parisian  workingmen,  led  by  Godefroi  Cavaignac,  and  desirous  of 
reestabHshing  the  repubUc  of  1795;  they  had  small  support  in 
the  country  districts  or  among  persons  of  prominence  in  Paris. 
On  the  other  hand  were  the  Liberal  bourgeoisie,  admirably  led  by 
the  journalist  Thiers  and  the  great  banker  Laffitte  (i 767-1 844), 
quite  wilHng  to  accept  royalty,  provided  it  should  be  constitu- 
tional rather  than  divine-right  and  should  permit  them  actually 
to  rule  the  country,  and  counting  on  the  sympathy  of  all  French- 
men who  desired  ''order"  as  well  as  "Hberty."  An  armed  con- 
Louis  between  the  two  parties  was  at  one  time  im- 
PhiUppe,  minent,  but  was  averted  by  the  aged  Lafayette,  who 
th?"^  once  more  appeared  on  the  scene  and  exerted  his  in- 
French,"  fluence  with  the  RepubKcans  to  have  them  accept 
1830-1848  ^-^^  system  which  the  Liberal  Monarchists  had  al- 
ready formulated.  The  plan  was  the  accession  to  the  throne  by 
popular  acclaim  of  Louis  Phihppe,  duke  of  Orleans,  a  member, 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY**  53 


of  course,  of  the  Bourbon  family,  but,  as  the  son  of  that  Philippe 
Egalite  who  had  voted  in  Convention  for  the  death  of  Louis  XVI, 
far  removed  from  Bourbon  political  principles.  Louis  Philippe 
had  taken  an  eager  part  in  the  Revolution  of  1789 ;  he  had  been 
present  at  the  capture  of  the  Bastille ;  he  had  been  enrolled  in  the 
Jacobin  Club  and  had  held  mihtary  office  under  the  repubhc ;  he 
had  fought  at  Valmy  and  in  the  Netherlands ;  he  had  learned  les- 
sons of  sturdy  self-reliance  during  a  long  and  adventurous  exile  in 
Europe  and  America ;  more  recently  he  had  made  himself  popu- 
lar with  the  middle  class  by  sending  his  sons  to  middle-class 
schools  and  by  avowing  his  own  faith  in  the  opinions  of  Voltaire 
and  Rousseau. 

Early  in  August,  1830,  Louis  Philippe  accepted  the  invitation 
of  the  Chamber  to  become  "King  of  the  French."  The  revolu- 
tionary tricolor  at  once  replaced  the  white  flag  of  the  Bourbons, 
and  popular  sovereignty  supplanted  the  theory  of  monarchical 
absolutism.  But  the  most  momentous  result  of  the  July  Revolu- 
tion in  France  was  the  triumph  of  the  bourgeoisie :  it  was  that 
class  which  had  shaped  the  course  of  the  great  revolution  of 
1789,  which  had  saved  its  conquests  from  the  lower  classes  in 
1794,  and  which  had  been  again  endangered  by  the  privileged 
orders  from  181 5  to  1830 ;  it  was  the  same  class  which  now  put  a 
reactionary  king  to  ffight,  which  stilled  a  revolutionary  prole- 
tariat, and  which  definitely  seized  the  reins  of  government  itself. 
To  the  question  asked  in  18 14  whether  French  political  and  social 
institutions  were  to  be  restored  as  they  had  been  before  the 
Revolution,  the  movement  of  1830  constituted  a  categorical 
answer  in  the  negative. 

The  suddenness  and  success  of  the  July  Revolution  in  France 

sent  an  immediate  tremor  throughout  Europe :  reactionaries 

were  alarmed,  and  liberals  took  heart.    In  Belgium,  in  „^ 

•      •Ti.-r^i      1        1.0.11    Effects  of 
the  Germames,  m  Italy,  m  Poland,  and  m  Switzerland,  the  July 

the  shock  of  the  movement  was  felt.    Confronted  ^^^^^^ 
with  such  widespread  disturbances,  Metternich  had  to 
abandon  all  thought  of  uniting  Europe  and  forcing  ''legiti- 
macy" once  more  upon  France. 

Friction  between  Belgians  and  Dutch  had  been  acute  since 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  had  arbitrarily  joined  them  into  one  state. 
They  had  divergent  interests,  they  spoke  different  languages,  and 


54 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


they  were  proudly  conscious  of  separate  nationality.  The  Dutch 
were  traditionally  hostile  to  the  French,  mainly  Protestant,  and 
Situation  in  largely  engaged  in  agriculture  and  commerce,  while 
Belgium  ^\yQ  Belgians  were  French  in  sympathy,  overwhelm- 
ingly Catholic  in  religion,  and  industrial  in  occupation.  The 
pig-headed  Dutch  king,  William  I,  contrived  to  annoy  all  classes 
of  his  Belgian  subjects.  He  outraged  their  patriotism  by  impos- 
ing upon  them  Dutch  law,  Dutch  language,  and  Dutch  officials. 
He  irritated  the  Catholics  by  placing  education  under  the  control 
of  Protestant  inspectors.  He  alienated  the  Liberals  by  restrict- 
ing the  freedom  of  the  press.  He  angered  the  business  men  by 
forcing  them  to  contribute  a  disproportionately  large  amount  of 
taxes  towards  the  interest  on  the  heavy  Dutch  debt.  ^ 

Matters  came  to  a  crisis  in  Brussels  when  the  success  of  the 
Parisian  insurrection  was  appreciated.  Barricades  were  thrown 
The  Belgian  Streets,  Unpopular  ministers  were  assailed, 

insurrec-  and  a  national  guard  was  formed.  At  first  the  rioters 
demanded  only  a  separate  legislature  under  the  com- 
mon king,  but,  when  they  found  WiUiam  stubbornly  determined 
to  subdue  them,  they  proclaimed  the  complete  independence  of 
Belgium  (October,  1830). 

International  politics  at  the  time  favored  the  Belgian  cause. 
Palmerston,  the  new  British  foreign  secretary,  who  followed  in 
independ-  Steps  of  Canning  as  a  promoter  of  advantageous 

ence  of  commercial  treaties  and  consequently  as  a  champion  of 
Belgium  s^iall  nationalities,  recommended  to  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives in  London  that  Belgian  freedom  be  promptly  confirmed. 
The  government  of  Louis  Philippe,  itself  reposing  on  a  revo- 
lutionary basis,  was  naturally  quite  favorable  to  such  a  course ; 
Metternich  was  so  occupied  with  disorders  in  Italy  and  in  the 
Germanies,  and  the  Tsar  Nicholas  with  a  formidable  Polish 
uprising,  that  neither  could  interpose  any  serious  objection, 
while  the  Prussian  king  was  duly  intimidated  by  French  threats. 
Under  these  circumstances  an  international  agreement  was 
reached  at  London  in  1831,  whereby  Belgium  was  erected  into  an 
independent  state,  with  a  constitutional  king  in  the  person  of 
Leopold  of  Saxe-Coburg.  It  still  required  a  naval  blockade  of 
Dutch  ports  by  the  British  fleet  and  the  capture  of  Antwerp  by 
a  French  military  expedition  before  the  House  of  Orange  could 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY'^  55 


be  induced  to  evacuate  Belgium,  and  it  was  not  until  1839  that 
King  William  I  assented  to  the  final  treaty  of  peace  and  amity. 
In  that  year  the  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  were 
guaranteed  by  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Austria,  and 
Prussia. 

In  the  Germanics,  neither  Austria  nor  Prussia  was  directly 
affected  by  the  revolutionary  wave  of  1830.    In  several  of  the 
lesser  states,  however,  —  Hanover,  Brunswick,  Sax- 
ony,  and  Hesse-Cassel,  —  popular  movements  in  imi-  Germanies 
tation  of  the  French  and  Belgian  insurrections  led  *°  ^^^^ 
to  the  grant  of  moderate  constitutions,  and  in  states  which 
already  enjoyed  constitutional  government  further  Liberal  con- 
cessions were  made  or  promised. 

Of  the  Italian  states,  both  Naples  and  Piedmont,  which  had 
suffered  the  discomfiture  from  Austrian  intervention  in  182 1, 
now  remained  quiet,  but  the  Liberals  in  the  central  ^^^^  Italian 
states,  counting  on  the  support  of  the  new  French  king,  states  in 
rebelled  against  their  autocratic  and  foreign  rulers. 
In  the  Papal  States  they  raised  a  new  tricolor  of  Italian  unity  and 
democracy  (the  red,  white,  and  green,  which  subsequently  be- 
came the  flag  of  the  kingdom  of  Italy)  and  readily  shook  off 
(1831)  the  temporal  rule  of  the  newly  elected  Pope  Gregory  XVI, 
an  ardent  reactionary  and  friend  of  Austria.  There  were  similar 
outbreaks  in  Parma  and  Modena  against  the  Habsburg  sovereigns 
who,  thinking  discretion  the  better  part  of  valor,  betook  them- 
selves hurriedly  to  Vienna.  Under  Metternich's  auspices  Aus- 
trian troops  were  promptly  rushed  into  Italy :  the  old  govern- 
ments were  easily  reestablished,  and  many  patriots  were  hanged. 
Louis  Philippe,  who  had  grandly  declared  that  not  only  would  he 
refrain  from  meddling  in  the  affairs  of  other  countries,  but  he 
would  not  permit  other  Powers  to  intervene,  limited  his  protec- 
tion of  Italy  against  Metternich  to  stationing  a  French  garrison 
in  the  papal  town  of  Ancona.^ 

Thus  the  revolutionary  movements  of  1830  in  Germany  and 
in  Italy  were  not  very  fruitful.^    As  soon  as  the  storm  had  sub- 

^  This  French  force,  which  gave  umbrage  to  the  pope  as  well  as  to  the  Liberals, 
was  not  withdrawn  until  1838. 

'  Otherwise  was  the  result  in  Switzerland.  The  July  Revolution  in  Paris  gave 
a  marked  impetus  to  the  tendency,  already  apparent,  of  small  towns  and  villages 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


sided  a  little,  Metternich  was  able,  in  one  case  with  the  aid  oi 
the  Federal  Diet,  and  in  the  other  with  Austrian  bayonets, 
Continued  resume  his  task  of  holding  the  revolutionaries  in 
Predom-  check.  Yet  the  movements  were  not  without  sig- 
Austria^in  nificance :  they  showed  a  slow  but  steady  growth 
Germany  of  liberalism  in  central  Europe,  and  they  served 
and  Italy  prevent  Metternich  from  arresting  the  victory 

of  bourgeois  liberalism  in  western  Europe. 

A  particularly  tragic  aspect  of  the  revolutionary  movement 
of  1830  was  its  communication  to  Poland.  It  was  almost  incon- 
Futiie  ceivable  that  a  Russian  autocrat  could  be  a  Polish  con- 
Revolt  of  stitutional  king,  and  since  the  accession  of  Nicholas  I 
Poland,  1831  (jif][iculties  had  increased.  The  long-standing  sym- 
pathy between  Poles  and  Frenchmen,  and  the  spread  of  a  rumor 
that  the  tsar  intended  to  use  his  Polish  regiments  to  coerce  Louis 
Philippe  and  the  Belgian  insurgents,  inspired  a  mutiny  in  Warsaw 
(November,  1830),  accompanied  by  the  murder  of  a  number  of 
objectionable  Russian  officials  and  the  expulsion  of  the  viceroy, 
Grand  Duke  Constantine.  The  resulting  war  lasted  from  Janu- 
ary till  September,  1831.  The  Poles  fought  gallantly,  but  their 
defense  was  paralyzed  as  usual  by  the  entire  lack  of  natural 
means  of  fortification  and  by  bitter  intestine  feuds.  They  were 
overwhelmed  by  numbers,  moreover,  and  no  foreign  assistance 
was  forthcoming :  the  fact  that  both  Prussia  and  Austria  had 
Polish  subjects  rendered  those  Powers  hostile  to  an  independent 
Poland,  and  neither  Louis  Philippe  nor  the  British  government 
did  anything  more  than  to  expostulate  with  the  tsar  concerning 
alleged  ''cruelties." 

As  soon  as  the  revolt  was  crushed,  Nicholas  proceeded  to 
inflict  exemplary  punishment  upon  the  unfortunate  Poles.  He 
abrogated  the  constitution  which  his  brother  had  granted  in  181 5 
and  incorporated  the  PoHsh  kingdom  as  a  conquered  province 
into  the  Russian  Empire.  He  put  hundreds  of  patriots  to  death 
and  exiled  other  hundreds.  He  filled  the  land  with  Russian 
soldiers  and  sought  in  every  way  to  extirpate  Polish  nationality. 

to  rise  against  the  somewhat  oppressive  rule  of  the  head-cities  and  to  establish  new 
cantonal  institutions  on  a  more  democratic  basis.  The  Swiss  cantons,  whose 
political  differences  were  embittered  by  religious  disputes,  remained  in  almost 
constant  commotion  until  1848. 


LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  57 


No  remnant  of  Poland's  separate  political  existence  henceforth 
remained.^ 

At  this  point  the  era  of  Metternich's  European  supremacy 
closes.    Ever  since  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  he  had  given 
masterful  support  by  subtlety  of  diplomacy  and  by  g^gj^jg^^^^^^g 
force  of  arms  to  every  effort  of  divine-right  monarchs,  of  the 
of  clergy,  and  of  nobiHty,  to  restore  antique  institu-       °^  .  , 

.  .  ,  .  ,  •        r  Metternich 

tions  m  society  and  in  government ;  but  a  series  01 
recent  eyents,  —  the  disruption  of  the  Spanish  colonial  empire, 
the  Greek  revolt,  the  successful  uprisings  in  France  and  Belgium, 
and  increasing  unrest  in  Germany  and  Italy,  —  clearly  indicated 
that  he  had  been  fighting  for  a  lost  cause.  The  old  regime  was 
doomed.  Already  in  western  Europe  the  victorious  bourgeoisie 
were  trampling  on  its  ruins ;  and,  in  order  to  preserve  its  fabric 
In  central  and  eastern  Europe,  Metternich  with  his  Russian  and 
Prussian  allies  was  reduced  to  a  strictly  defensive  policy. 

The  real  significance  of  this  Era  of  Metternich  was  the  assured 
triumph  of  the  principles  of  the  French  Revolution,  the  perma- 
nence of  the  ideas  of  ''liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity,"  and  the 
substitution,  at  least  in  western  Europe,  of  the  political  and 
economic  supremacy  of  the  bourgeoisie  for  that  of  the  older  privi- 
leged classes.  Until  1848  Metternich  managed  to  keep  his  grasp 
on  central  Europe,  but  the  struggles  of  those  last  years  were 
everywhere  fundamentally  different  from  those  which  marked  the 
era  that  we  have  reviewed  in  this  chapter.  After  1830  social 
and  political  conflicts  were  waged  not  only  between  the  bourgeoisie 
and  the  old  privileged  orders  but  also  between  the  bourgeoisie 
and  the  workingmen.  If  Metternich  may  serve  as  a  fitting  close 
to  the  period  of  noblemen's  privileges,  the  Industrial  Revolution 
will  provide  a  convenient  starting-point  for  the  story  of  the 
workingmen's  slow  and  painful  emancipation. 


ADDITIONAL  READING 


jrfrief  Texts  on  the  History  of  the  Nineteenth  Century.  In  addition  to 
the  textbooks  and  manuals  on  the  general  history  of  modern  times  men- 
tioned in  the  preceding  volume  (pp.  xxiii  f .) ,  the  following  are  specially  valuable 

^  Except  the  minute  republic  of  Cracow  which  continued  to  be  a  center  of 
Pohsh  national  agitation  until  1846,  when  it  was  annexed  by  Austria. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


to  college  students  for  the  whole,  or  greater  part,  of  the  nineteenth  century: 
C.  D.  Hazen,  Eiiropc  since  1815  (1910),  reliable  and  very  readable,  largely 
political,  and  provided  with  excellent  bibliographies;  Charles  Seignobos, 
A  Political  History  of  Europe  since  1814,  Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  S.  M.  Macvane 
(1900),  dealing  with  events  country  by  country,  burdened  with  excessive 
political  detail,  more  an  encyclopedia  than  a  textbook  though  containing 
good  chapters  on  social  conditions  and  international  relations;  C.  M. 
Andrews,  The  Historical  Devclopmeni  of  Modern  Europe,  iSij-iSg/,  2  vols, 
in  I  (1900),  interesting  and  informing,  particularly  on  the  political  aspects 
of  the  conflict  between  revolutionaries  and  reactionaries;  C.  A.  Fyffe, 
A  History  of  Modern  Europe,  lygz-iSyS,  popular  ed.  (1896),  almost  wholly 
political;  Oscar  Browning,  History  of  the  Modern  World,  1815-igio,  2  vols. 
(191 2),  a  well-written  narrative  displaying  much  knowledge  but  marred 
by  lack  of  proper  proportion ;  C.  E.  M.  Hawkesworth,  The  Last  Century 
in  Europe,  1814-1910  (1913),  political  and  military,  with  glimpses  of  eco- 
nomic phenomena;  R.  W.  Jeffery,  The  New  Europe,  1789-1889  (191 1), 
devoted  almost  exclusively  to  wars  and  rumors  of  war;  W.  A.  Phillips, 
Modern  Europe,  1815-1899,  2d  ed.  (1902),  useful  for  the  diplomatic  history 
of  Europe  prior  to  1878,  very  weak  on  the  period  after  that  date ;  Wilhelm 
Miiller,  Political  History  of  Recent  Times,  1816-1875,  with  special  reference 
to  Germany,  Eng.  trans,  by  J.  P.  Peters  (1882),  breezy  and  suggestive  as 
showing  Germany's  relation  to  the  general  European  history  of  the  period ; 
F.  A.  Kirkpatrick  (editor).  Lectures  on  the  History  of  the  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury (1902),  comprising  seventeen  brief  resumes  by  such  scholars  as  Man- 
toux  on  France,  Marcks  on  Germany,  and  Vinogradoff  on  Russia;  E.  H. 
Sears,  An  Outline  of  Political  Growth  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1900), 
concerned  chiefly  with  the  development  of  representative  government 
throughout  the  world,  already  somewhat  out-of-date;  L.  C.  Jane,  From 
Metternich  to  Bismarck,  181 5-1878  (1910),  a  dry  summary  of  political, 
diplomatic,  and  military  happenings ;  Edouard  Driault  and  Gabriel  Monod, 
Evolution  du  monde  moderne:  histoire  politique  et  sociale,  181 5-1909  (1910), 
an  excellent  French  manual;  Paul  Feyel,  Histoire  politique  du  XIX^ 
siecle,  2  vols.  (1913-1914),  a  suggestive  manual  written  in  French  and 
from  a  Roman  Catholic  standpoint.  A  convenient  and  inexpensive  atlas 
of  the  nineteenth  century  is  C.  G.  Robertson  and  J.  G.  Bartholomew,  An 
Historical  Atlas  of  Modern  Europe  from  1789  to  1914  (1915). 

General  Works  on  the  Era  of  Metternich.  Brief  summaries :  C.  D, 
Hazen,  Europe  since  18 15  (1910),  ch.  i-v,  xviii,  xix;  J.  H.  Robinson  and 
C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe  (1907),  Vol.  I,  ch.  xvi, 
and  Vol.  II,  ch.  xvii ;  C.  E.  M.  Hawkesworth,  The  Last  Century  in  Europe, 

1814-  1910  (1913),  ch.  i-xiii;  Oscar  Browning,  A  History  of  the  Modern 
World,  1815-1910,  Vol.  I  (1912),  Book  I;  W.  A.  Phillips,  Modern  Europe, 

181 5-  1899  (1902),  ch.  i-ix;  Charles  Seignobos,  A  Political  History  of 
Europe  since  1814,  Eng.  trans.  (1900),  ch.  i,  xxv;  C.  A.  Fyffe,  A  History 
of  Modern  Europe,  1792-1878  (1896),  ch.  xiii-xvii;  Wilhelm  Miiller,  Polit- 
ical History  of  Receftt  Times,  1816-1875,  Eng.  trans.  (1882),  ch.  i-xiv 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY'*  59 


More  detailed  treatises :  History  of  All  Nations,  Vol.  XVIII,  by  Theodor 
Flathe,  Restoration  ajid  Revolution;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  IX, 
Napoleon  (1906),  ch.  xix,  and  Vol.  X,  The  Restoration  (1907);  -Histoire 
generale,  Vol.  X,  ch.  i-ix,  xv,  xvii,  xxiii ;  Alfred  Stern,  Geschichte  Europas 
seit  den  Vertrdgen  von  1815  his  zum  Frankfurter  Frieden  von  i8yi,  Vols. 
I-IV  (1894-1905),  the  most  exhaustive  and  undoubtedly  the  best  single 
work  on  the  period,  should  be  translated  into  English ;  Constantin  Bulle, 
Geschichte  der  neuesten  Zeit,  181 5-1885,  4  vols,  (i 886-1 887) ;  Antonin 
Debidour,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  1' Europe,  18 14-187 8,  2  vols.  (1891), 
Vol.  I  on  the  Holy  Alliance,  Vol.  II  on  the  revolutionary  movements; 
Emile  Bourgeois,  Manuel  historique  de  politique  etrangere.  Vol.  II,  Les 
revolutiotts,  i/8g-i8jo,  4th  ed.  (1909) ;  Sir  Edward  Hertslet,  The  Map 
of  Europe  by  Treaty,  Vol.  I  (1875),  an  indispensable  collection  of  docu- 
ments relating  to  the  Congress  of  Vienna;  Baron  Descamps  and  Louis 
Renault,  Recueil  international  des  traites  du  XIX^  siecle,  Vol.  I,  1801- 
1825  (1914) ;  W.  A.  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe  (1914),  a  valu- 
able study  of  the  European  alliances,  18 13-1823,  as  an  experiment  in  in- 
ternational pacifism;  Claude  Roget  (pseud.  E.  Muhlenbeck),  Etude  sur 
les  origines  de  la  Sainte- Alliance  (1888).  On  Metternich :  G.  B.  Malleson, 
Life  of  Prince  Metternich  (1895);  Memoirs  of  Prince  Clemens  Metternich, 
ed.  by  Prince  Richard  Metternich  and  in  part  trans,  into  English  by  Mrs. 
Alexander  Napier,  4  parts  in  5  vols.  (1881-1882) ;  Charles  de  Mazade, 
Un  chancelier  d'ancien  regime:  le  regne  diplomatique  de  M.  de  Metternich 
(1889).  On  Talleyrand  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna:  his  Memoirs,  Eng. 
trans.,  5  vols.  (1891-1892) ;  and  Correspondance  inedite  de  Talleyrand  et 
du  roi  Louis  XVIII  pendant  le  congres  de  Vienne,  ed.  by  G.  PoUain,  3d 
ed.  (1881),  also  in  English  translation.  Likewise,  for  both  Metternich  and 
Talleyrand,  see  the  justly  celebrated  Albert  Sorel,  Essais  d'histoire  et  de 
critique,  12th  ed.  (1884). 

The  Restoration  in  France,  1815-1830.  Cambridge  Modern  History, 
Vol.  X,  ch.  ii,  iii ;  J.  R.  Hall,  The  Bourbon  Restoration  (1910) ;  G.  L.  Dickin- 
son, Revolution  and  Reaction  in  Modern  France  (1892),  essays  on  the  various 
schools  of  political  thought  in  France  from  1789  to  1871;  Georges  Weill, 
La  France  sous  la  monarchic  constitutionclle,  1814-1848,  rev.  ed.  (19 12), 
topical,  not  narrowly  political,  but  social  and  economic  as  well;  Emile 
Levasseur,  Histoire  des  classes  ouvribres  et  de  Vindustrie  en  France  de  iy8g 
d  1870,  Vol.  I  (1903),  Book  III,  excellent  on  social  conditions;  Jean  Jaures 
(editor),  Histoire  socialiste,  Vol.  VII,  by  Rene  Viviani,  La  restaur alion, 
1814-18^0  (1906) ;  Pierre  Rain,  U Europe  et  la  restauration  des  Bourbons 
(1908),  an  intensive  study  of  the  years  1814-1818;  Henry  Houssaye,  1815, 
3  vols.  ( 1 896-1 905),  an  able  detailed  account  of  the  troublous  year  of  transi- 
tion, especially  valuable  Vol.  Ill,  La  seconde  abdication,  la  terreur  blanche; 
Louis  Michon,  Le  gouvcrnement  parlementaire  sous  la  restauration  (1905), 
a  study  in  constitutional  government  under  the  Charter  of  18 14;  Paul 
Thureau-Dangin,  Le  parti  liberal  sous  la  restauration,  2d  ed.  (1888),  useful 
for  a  proper  understanding  of  the  opposition  to  the  restored  divine-right 
Bourbons. 


6o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Spain  and  Portugal.  The  Revolt  of  the  Spanish  Colonies,  Cambridge 
Modern  History,  Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  vii-x;  Butler  Clarke,  Modern  Spain, 
1815-1898  (1906),  ch.  i-iii,  full  but  jejune;  M.  A.  S.  Hume,  Modern  Spain, 
1788-1898  (1900),  ch.  V,  briefer  but  more  interesting  than  Clarke's  narra- 
tive; Gustave  Hubbard,  Histoire  conlemporaine  de  VEspagne,  6  vols. 
(1869-1883),  of  which  Vols.  I,  II  treat  of  the  reign  of  Ferdinand  VII,  ex- 
haustive and  scholarly;  Hermann  Baumgarten,  Geschichte  Spaniens  vom 
Ausbruch  der  franzosischen  Revolution  bis  auf  unsere  Tage,  3  vols.  (1865- 
1871),  especially  Vol.  II.  On  the  revolt  of  the  American  colonies:  W.  R. 
Shepherd,  Latin  America  (1914),  pp.  69-80,  a  very  biief  but  clear  intro- 
duction ;  Bernard  Moses,  South  America  on  the  Eve  of  Emancipation  (1908) ; 

F.  L.  Paxson,  The  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  a  Study 
in  Recognition  and  Foreign  Policy  (1903),  valuable  for  the  policies  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States;  Bartolome  Mitre,  The  Emancipation  of 
South  America  (1893),  the  condensed  Eng.  trans,  of  an  important  work 
by  a  former  president  of  Argentina;  F.  L.  Petre,  Simon  Bolivar  (1910), 
a  good  biography ;  A.  H.  Noll  and  A.  P.  McMahon,  The  Life  and  Times 
of  Miguel  Hidalgo  y  Costilla  (19 10),  an  account  of  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment in  Mexico;  W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine  (1898),  the  work 
of  an  English  scholar ;  F.  J.  Turner,  Rise  of  the  New  West,  1819-1829  (1906), 
ch.  xii,  the  best  brief  statement  of  the  genesis  and  early  application  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine;  J.  H.  Latane,  The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spanish  America  (1900),  ch.  i,  ii,  a  valuable  contribution. 

Great  Britain  under  the  Tories,  1800-1830.  Textbook  summaries: 
Gilbert  Slater,  The  Making  of  Modern  England,  new  rev.  ed.  (191 5),  ch.  i-iv; 
A.  L.  Cross,  History  of  England  and  Greater  Britain  (1914),  ch.  xlvi-xlix; 
C,  W.  Oman,  England  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1900),  ch.  i-iv.  Some- 
what longer  political  narratives :  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  X  (1907), 
ch.  xviii ;  A.  D.  Innes,  History  of  England  and  the  British  Empire,  Vol.  IV 
(1914),  ch.  i,  ii;  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  England  since  Waterloo  (1913),  ch. 
iii;  Sir  Herbert  Maxwell,  A  Century  of  Empire,  Vol.  I,  i8oi-i8j2  (1909) ; 

G.  C.  Brodrick  and  J.  K.  Fotheringham,  Political  History  of  England, 
1 801-18 ^y;  J.  F.  Bright,  History  of  England,  Vol.  Ill,  Constitutional  Mon- 
archy, 1 689-1 8 jy;  Sir  Spencer  Walpole,  History  of  England  since  181 5, 
rev.  ed.,  6  vols.  (1902-1905),  a  standard  work,  reaching  down  to  1858,  by  a 
famous  Whig-Liberal;  Harriet  Martineau,  History  of  the  Peace:  being  a 
History  of  England  from  1816  to  1854,  with  an  Introduction,  1800-1815, 
4  vols.,  treats  of  the  period  through  most  of  which  the  authoress  lived, 
thus  an  important  original  source.  On  special  phases  of  the  period  in 
English  history:  H.  D.  Traill  and  J.  S.  Mann  (editors).  Social  England, 
illus.  ed.  (1909),  Vol.  VI,  for  the  ordinary  life  of  the  times;  C.  G.  Greville, 
Journal  of  the  Reigns  of  George  IV  and  William  IV,  ed.  by  Henry  Reeve 
(1888),  an  illuminating  source  compiled  by  an  influential  clerk  of  the  Privy 
Council;  W.  O'C.  Morris,  Wellington,  Soldier  and  Statesman  (1904);  Sir 
Herbert  Maxwell,  The  Life  of  Wellington,  2  vols.  (1899);  E.  and  A.  G. 
Porritt,  The  Unreformed  House  of  Commons,  new  ed.,  2  vols.  (1909) ;  T.  E. 


"LIBERTY,  EQUALITY,  FRATERNITY"  6i 


Kebbel,  History  of  Toryism  (1886),  covering  the  years  1783-1881 ;  Gilbert 
Slater,  The  English  Peasantry  and  the  Enclosure  of  the  Common  Fields 

(1907)  ;  John  Ashton,  Social  Life  under  the  Regency,  2  vols.  (1890),  dealing 
with  the  years  1810-1820;  R.  M.  Garnier,  History  of  the  English  Landed 
Gentry  (1893),  and,  by  the  same  author,  Annals  of  the  British  Peasantry 
(1895);  E.  C.  K.  Gonner,  Common  Lands  and  Inclosure  (1912);  J.  S. 
Nicholson,  The  History  of  the  English  Corn  Laws  (1904) ;  C.  B.  R.  Kent, 
The  English  Radicals  (1899) ;  Oliver  Elton,  A  Survey  of  English  Literature, 
iy8o-i8jo,  2  vols.  (191 2) ;  and,  on  the  career  of  Canning,  the  biographies 
by  J.  A.  R.  Marriott  (1903)  and  H.  W.  V.  Temperley  (1905),  and  George 
Canning  and  his  Friends,  ed.  by  J.  F.  Bagot,  2  vols.  (1909). 

Russia,  1801-1831.  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  xiii, 
xiv,  a  good  account,  by  S.  Askenazy,  of  Alexander  I  and  of  the  Polish  re- 
volt of  1831 ;  Alfred  Rambaud,  Histoire  de  la  Russie  depuis  les  origines 
jusqu'd  nos  jours,  6th  rev.  ed.  (1914),  ch.  xxxiii-xxxvi,  perhaps  the  best 
brief  narrative,  also  in  English  translation;  W.  R,  A.  Morfill,  History  of 
Russia  from  the  Birth  of  Peter  the  Great  to  the"  Death  of  Alexander  II  (1902), 
a  dry  account,  and,  by  the  same  author,  Poland  (1893) ;  C.  JoyneviHe, 
Life  and  Times  of  Alexander  I,  3  vols.  (1875),  a  standard  detailed  work, 
now  superseded  in  large  part  by  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Mikhailovitch, 
U Empereur  Alexandre  I^,  2  vols.  (1913) ;  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski, 
Memoirs  and  his  Correspondence  with  Alexander  I,  ed.  by  A.  Gielgud,  in 
Eng.  trans.,  2  vols.  (1888) ;  Theodor  Schiemann,  Geschichte  Russlands 
unter  Nikolaus  I,  Vol.  I  (1904),  deals  with  the  reign  of  Alexander  I,  Vol.  II 

(1908)  with  the  years  182 5-1 830,  and  Vol.  Ill  (1913)  with  the  Polish  in- 
surrection of  1830-1831 ;  W.  A.  Phillips,  Poland  (1915),  ch.  vii,  viii,  a 
useful  synopsis  of  Polish  history,  1801-1846,  in  the  "  Home  University 
Library." 

Central  Europe  during  the  Era  of  Mettemich.  On  the  Germanics: 
G.  M.  Priest,  Germany  since  1740  (1915),  ch.  viii;  Cambridge  Modertt  His- 
tory, Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  xi;  E.  F.  Henderson,  A  Short  History  of  Germany, 
Vol.  II,  ch.  viii ;  Ferdinand  Schevill,  The  Making  of  Modern  Germany  (1916), 
ch.  iv ;  Heinrich  von  Sybel,  The  Founding  of  the  German  Empire,  Eng. 
trans.,  7  vols.  (1890-1898),  a  famous  ''national"  history,  of  which 
Vol.  I  treats  of  the  period  of  Mettemich  ;  Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  History 
of  Germany  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  trans,  by  Eden  and  Adar  Paul,  Vol.  I 
(1915),  strongly  Prussian,  a  full  account  of  political  happenings  to  1819; 
Karl  Biedermann,  Geschichte  Deutschlands,  1815-1871  (1891) ;  M.  L. 
Deventer,  Cinquante  annees  de  Vhistoire  federate  de  VAllemagne  (1870),  a 
history  of  the  German  Confederation  from  181 5  to  1866;  Louis  Lcger, 
History  of  A  ustro-  H ungary  from  the  Earliest  Times  to  the  Year  i88g,  trans, 
by  Mrs.  B.  Hill  (1889) ;  Anton  Springer,  Geschichte  Oesterreichs  seit  dem 
Wienerfrieden  i8og,  Vol.  I  (1863) ;  C.  M.  Knatchbull-Hugessen,  The 
Political  Evolution  of  the  Hungarian  Nation,  Vol.  I  (1908),  ch.  ix-xi.  On 
the  Italian  States:  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  iv; 
R.  M.  Johnston,  The  Napoleonic  Empire  in  Southern  Italy  and  the  Rise 


62 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


oj  the  Secret  Societies,  2  vols.  (1904);  Bollon  King,  A  History  of  Italian 
Unity,  Vol.  I  (1899);  W.  J.  Slillman,  The  Union  of  Italy,  1815-18QS 
(1898) ;  W.  R.  Thayer,  Dawn  of  Italian  Independence,  Vol.  I  (1893). 

Greek  Independence.  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  X  (1907), 
ch.  vi,  an  excellent  account  by  W.  A.  Phillips,  and,  by  the  same  writer, 
Greek  War  of  Independence  (1897);  Lewis  Sergeant,  Greece  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century :  a  Record  of  Hellenic  Emancipation  and  Progress,  iSzi-iSgy 
(1897) ;  Sir  Richard  C.  Jebb,  Modern  Greece,  2d  ed.  (1901) ;  George  Finlay, 
History  of  the  Greek  Revolution,  being  Vols.  VI  and  VII  of  his  History  of 
Greece,  rev.  ed.  by  H.  F.  Tozer,  7  vols.  (1877),  the  standard  work  by  a 
scholarly  contemporary;  Letters  and  Journals  of  Samuel  Gridley  Howe, 
Vol.  I,  The  Greek  Revolution,  ed.  by  Laura  E.  Richards  (1906),  interesting 
memoirs  of  an  American  college  student  who  served  as  a  volunteer  in  the 
War  of  Greek  Independence ;  Lord  Byron,  Letters  and  Journals,  Vol.  VI, 
ed.  by  R.  E.  Prothero  (1904). 

On  the  revolt  of  the  Serbs  against  the  Ottoman  Empire,  see  Prince  and 
Princess  Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich,  The  Servian  People,  their  Past  Glory 
and  their  Destiny,  Vol.  II  (1910),  and  Gregoire  Yakschitch,  U Europe  et  la 
resurrection  de  la  Serbie,  1804-18 J4  (1907). 

For  the  revolt  of  the  Belgians  against  the  Dutch,  see  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  xvi,  and  P.  J.  Blok,  History  of  the  People  of 
the  Netherlands,  Vol.  V,  Eng.  trans,  by  Ruth  Putnam  (191 2). 


PART  IV 
DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


PART  IV 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 

Within  the  eighty  years  from  1750  to  1830  a  new  Europe 
had  been  in  process  of  creation.  It  was  a  Europe  which  laid 
violent  hands  upon  the  traditions  and  institutions  of  the  past. 
Ancient  privileges  of  churchmen  and  of  titled  landowners  tended 
to  disappear  before  the  onrush  of  a  wealthy,  intelligent  bour- 
geoisie. Doctrines  of  popular  sovereignty  and  of  the  rights  of 
man  were  supplanting  the  practices  and  precepts  of  divine-right 
monarchy.  Allegiance  to  dynasties  was  waning,  and  nations 
were  becoming  acutely  self-conscious. 

What  finally  determined  the  issue  of  the  conflict  between 
revolutionaries  and  reactionaries  and  the  triumph  of  the  ideas  of 
Liberty,  EquaHty,  and  Fraternity,  was  not  a  little  revolutionary 
wave  in  politics,  such  as  that  of  1830,  but  a  great  revolution  in 
industry  —  a  revolution  which  threw  all  its  strength  and  weight 
into  the  balance  against  the  reactionaries. 

Within  the  eighty-odd  years  from  1830  to  1914,  the  Industrial 
Revolution  worked  wonders  for  the  new  Europe.  It  afforded  all 
men  —  priests,  and  noblemen,  and  bourgeois,  and  workingmcn, 
and  peasants — marvelous  and  novel  ways  of  living,  and  working, 
and  travehng.  It  made  democracy  the  dominant  and  all-powerful 
political  ideal  in  Europe.  It  rendered  nationalism  a  widely  con- 
tagious and  fiercely  effective  force  in  European  society,  whether 
in  the  British  Empire,  or  in  Latin  Europe,  or  in  the  countries  of 
Teutons  and  Slavs.  It  stimulated  science  and  most  variant  spec- 
ulation. It  caused  Europe  to  reach  out  faster  and  farther  than 
ever  before  to  colonize  the  uttermost  parts  of  the  world  or  to  im- 
press upon  them  the  stamp  of  her  own  peculiar  civilization.  It 
created  the  gravest  problems  both  in  domestic  affairs  and  in  in- 
ternational relations.  With  all  these  matters  Parts  IV  and  V  of 
this  volume  attempt  to  deal. 

VOL.  n— F  6s 


V 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


THE  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTION 

The  collapse  of  divine-right  monarchy  and  of  feudal  privilege 
had  been  foreshadowed  by  the  French  Revolution;  and  new- 
ideals  had  been  estabUshed  of  poHtical  democracy 
and  civil  equality.    Yet  after  all,  such  a  revolution  ^ttie^^^* 
made  little  direct  change  in  everyday  life.     The  Altered  by 
taxes  might  be  borne  by  all  alike ;  all  might  obey  the  Revolution 
same  laws ;  one  might  not  fear  the  lord  of  the  castle 
as  formerly ;  and  a  far-away  legislative  assembly  might  debate 
ever  so  eloquently ;  —  but  the  farmer  still  goaded  on  the  slow- 
moving  oxen  before  the  wooden  plow ;   the  cobbler  still  pegged 
away  at  his  shoes ;  the  thrifty  housewife  still  sat  by  her  spinning 
wheel.    Manners  had  changed  shghtly  :  in  France  men  wore  long 
trousers  instead  of  satin  knee-breeches.    But  the  peasant  ate  the 
same  food,  the  artisan  worked  at  the  same  rough  bench,  the 
traveler  execrated  the  same  lumbering  stage-coach,  and  the 
same  small  sailing  vessel  took  weeks  to  cross  the  Atlantic.  That 
was  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Since  then  the  world  has  changed  !  The  farmer  now  possesses 
a  sharp  steel  plow  and  he  has  thrown  his  hand-flail  away ;  our 
clothes  and  shoes  are  turned  out  by  whirring  machines  in  great 
factories.  In  his  evening  paper,  the  tired  business-man  reads 
how  his  wares  are  selling  in  far-away  China.  The  artisan  now 
trudges,  dinner-pail  in  hand,  to  the  noisy  factory ;  the  traveler 
leans  back  in  a  luxurious  chair  as  his  train  speeds  through  the 
country ;  and  tourists  play  tennis  on  deck  during  their  five-day 
passage  of  the  Atlantic. 

All  this  has  been  brought  about  by  a  great  change  in  industry, 
a  transformation  so  sudden  and  so  complete  that  we  call  it  the 
^'Industrial  Revolution."    Its  two  basic  elements  were  :  (i)  the 

67 


68 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


invention  and  application  of  machines  and  engines  to  facilitate 
mining,  manufacturing,  agriculture,  and  transportation,  (2)  the 
jj^g  building  of  factories.    This  revolution  took  place  in 

"Industrial  Great  Britain  approximately  between  1770  and  1825. 
iL^Grear"  Since  181 5  it  has  spread  throughout  Europe,  to  the 
Britain,  Ncw  World,  and  to  the  Old.  Everywhere  it 
1770-1825  j^^g  brought  machines,  engines,  factories,  rich  men, 
trade-unions,  slums ;  it  has  planted  sky-scrapers  where  apple- 
trees  grew,  and  put  pounding  locomotives  where  the  creaking 
stage-coach  used  to  roll. 

Before  we  narrate  the  story,  let  us  pause  to  ask  ourselves  why 
it  was  in  eighteenth-century  England  that  the  revolution  first 
England  occurred.  We  cannot  tell  surely  why  machines  had 
Prepared  never  been  made  before  —  perhaps  the  people  of  the 
in  the         middle  ages  Were  too    old-fashioned,"  too  conserva- 

Eighteenth       .  ^         .    ,  i  ,         m  i  •    •  i 

Century  for  tivc,  too  much  bound  by  gild  restrictions,  and  too 
Industrial     little  occupicd  with  thinking  out  better  ways  of  doing 

Revolution       ,  .  J:^  ,    ,  ,     ^        i     i     i  i 

things.  Nevertheless  the  French  had  made  many 
improvements  in  method  long  before  1770.  But  in  the  Eng- 
land of  the  eighteenth  century  conditions  were  ripe  for  the 
great  change.  The  newer  industries  were  not  shackled  by  gild 
regulations;  manufacturers  were  relatively  free  to  apply  new 
methods.  Not  only  was  England  fortunate  in  possessing  the 
damp  climate  requisite  to  textile  manufacture,  but  her  swift 
streams  would  offer  an  abundant  supply  of  water  power  for 
the  new  machinery  and  beneath  her  soil  lay  rich  stores  of  coal 
and  iron,  which  would  prove  indispensable  to  the  growth  of 
modern  industry.  Moreover,  England  had  come  out  of  the  com- 
mercial and  colonial  struggles  of  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth,  and 
eighteenth  centuries  with  a  thriving  commerce  and  promising  in- 
dustries. Even  after  the  seeming  set-back  of  the  War  of  Amer- 
ican Independence,  Englishmen  had  continued  to  increase  their 
trade  and  industry,  and  during  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic 
Wars  their  country  might  have  been  called  justly  the  "work- 
shop of  the  world."  England's  merchants  could  sell  all  the  goods 
that  her  manufacturers  could  make.  Every  one  wanted  to  be 
rich,  and  the  surest  way  to  gain  wealth  was  to  make  things  more 
cheaply  and  rapidly  than  other  manufacturers.  CapitaHsts 
were  ready  to  spend  fortunes  for  inventions,  in  the  hope  of  reap- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


69 


ing  still  greater  fortunes.  The  smiths,  and  carpenters,  and 
metal-workers,  more  skillful  than  before,  were  able  to  construct 
the  machines  which  the  inventors  devised.  And  many  thought- 
ful men  were  busy  thinking  how  the  science  of  the  century  might 
be  turned  to  practical  use.    England  was  ready  for  inventions. 


THE  MECHANICAL  INVENTIONS 


Not  a  few  great  geniuses,  but  hundreds  of  obscure  workers, 
were  responsible  for  the  inventions.  Where  thousands  of  active 
minds  were  searching  for  easier  and  better  ways  of  doing  things, 
there  were  sure  to  be  many  inventors  and  many  inventions. 
And  the  number  of  inventions  has  steadily  increased  since  the 
Industrial  Revolution,  until  nowadays  machines  get  out  of  date 
within  a  few  years.  Among  the  many,  a  few  inventors  stand 
out,  whose  names  have  become  connected  with  revolutionary 
changes :  Kay,  Hargreaves,  Arkwright,  Crompton,  Cartwright, 
Whitney,  Watt,  Fulton,  and  Stephenson. 

The  first  six  of  these  men  introduced  improvements  in  the 
making  of  cotton  cloth.    At  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  most  cloth  was  made  of  wool,  although  j^^^^^^^^.^ 
cotton  cloth  was  much  in  demand.    A  few  English  for  Spinning 
manufacturers  had  beerun  to  make  cloth  of  the  down  —  . 
''cotton  wool,'^  it  was  called  —  which  grew  on  the 
cotton  bushes  of  Asia  and  the  West  Indies.    The  work  was  still 
done  in  a  very  simple  and  painfully  slow  manner.    First  the  seeds 
had  to  be  picked  out  of  the  cotton  by  hand.    Then  the  tangled 
fibers  had  to  be  brushed  out  straight  (i.e.,  "carded")  with  a  wire 
brush,  and  spun  into  thread  on  a  spinning-wheel  such  as  our 
grandmothers  used.    It  took  all  day  to  spin  the  thread  which  we 
can  now  buy  for  a  few  cents. 

Weaving  was  done  on  a  wooden  frame  called  a  ''loom."  Par- 
allel threads  were  strung  across  the  loom,  and  then  the  "shuttle," 
an  enlarged  wooden  needle  attached  to  the  end  of  a  j^^in  Kay's 
ball  of  thread,  was  woven  back  and  forth  between  the  Fiy-Shuttie, 
parallel  threads  (the  "warp").  At  first  a  man  could  ^^^^ 
make  cloth  only  as  wide  as  he  could  reach  across  to  weave  the 
shuttle  back  and  forth  ;  but  in  1738  a  certain  John  Kay  invented 
a  simple  device  —  the  "fly-shuttle"  —  by  which  the  weaver 


70 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


had  only  to  pull  a  string  in  order  to  push  the  shuttle  back  and 
forth,  and  could  make  his  cloth  as  wide  as  desired. 

With  the  aid  of  the  fly-shuttle  weavers  could  now  work  twice  as 
fast  as  before,  and  they,  therefore,  called  for  twice  as  much  thread. 
But  the  old  hand-spinners  and  spinning-wheels  were  as  slow  as 
ever,  and  could  not  supply  the  demand  for  cotton  thread.  Prizes 
were  offered  for  an  invention  that  would  make  spinning  easier. 

More  than  thirty  years  went  by,  but  at  last  in  1770  a  weaver 
in  Lancashire  by  the  name  of  James  Hargreaves  patented  a  spin- 
jj^^  ning    jenny."    In  the  jenny  eight  spinning  wheels 

greaves's  wcrc  Combined  and  turned  by  one  crank,  so  that  in 
jermy^fyro  ^^^^^  person  could  spin  eight  threads  simultane- 
ously. The  device  was  so  cheaply  made  and  easily 
operated  that  by  1788  some  20,000  were  in  use  in  England,  the 
largest  forming  eighty  threads  at  once,  and  even  the  smallest 
doing  the  work  of  six  or  eight  spinning-wheels. 

Almost  at  the  same  time,  Richard  Arkwright,  a  shrewd, 
ambitious  business-man,  patented  a  ''water-frame,"  or  water- 
Ark  power  machine,  for  spinning.  The  water-frame  con- 
wright's  sisted  of  four  pairs  of  rollers,  between  which  the 
Water-        thread  was  drawn  out,  all  rotated  by  a  belt  from  a 

Frame,  1709 

water-wheel.  A  few  years  later  Arkwright  patented 
machines  which  brushed  out  the  raw  cotton  ready  to  be  spun. 

Arkwright's  machines  were  so  heavy,  costly,  and  compli- 
cated that  special  buildings  had  to  be  erected  for  them.  But 
Arkwright  worth  while,  for  once  the  machines  were  set  up 

Father  of  and  Connected  with  a  water-wheel,  water-power  did 
the  Factory  ^^^^  q£  ^^iq  work  and  less  money  had  to  be  paid  out 
in  wages.  Arkwright's  spinning-mills  soon  made  him  a  million- 
aire, and  he  became  so  famous  that  King  George  III  made  him 
Sir  Richard  Arkwright. 

The  third  great  improvement  in  spinning  was  made  by  Samuel 
Crompton  in  1779.  Crompton  combined  certain  features  of  the 
Crompton's  jenny  with  Arkwright's  water-frame  in  such  an  in- 
Mule,  1779  genious  way  that  the  new  machine,  the  spinning 
''mule,"  not  only  made  fine  and  strong  thread,  but  produced  it 
more  rapidly  than  had  hitherto  been  possible.  By  181 2  Cromp- 
ton estimated  that  there  were  spinning  mules  in  several  hundred 
estabHshments,  with  a  total  of  5,000,000  spindles. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  71 


With  the  help  of  these  inventions,  the  spinners  were  now 
producing  more  thread  than  the  weavers  could  make  into  cloth, 
and  it  was  now  the  turn  of  the  weavers  to  improve 
their  methods.    The  great  invention  which  revolu-  wright's 
tionized  weaving  was  made  by  a  clergyman,  Edmund  Lorm'^  iySs 
Cartwright,  in  1785.    Although  at  the  outset  he  knew 
almost  nothing  about  weaving,  Cartwright  managed  to  con- 
struct a  loom  which  worked  itself  and  received  its  motion  from 
water-power.    Three  of  these  power-looms,  with  a  boy  of  fifteen 
to  mend  broken  threads,  could  do  the  work  of  four  skillful  hand- 
loom  weavers. 

The  spirit  of  invention  made  itself  felt  in  all  branches  of  the 
cotton  industry.    In  1792  Eli  Whitney,  an  American,  made  the 
first  cotton  gin,  a  machine  which  would  pick  the  seeds 
out  of  raw  cotton  more  rapidly  than  fifty  negroes  could  ^tton^ofn 
do  it.    Another  invention  made  it  possible  to  bleach  (1792)  and 
cloth  in  a  day  or  two  by  chemicals  instead  of  in  a  ventions  for 
month  by  the  sun  and  to  dye  it  a  hundred  times  more  Cotton 
speedily  than  before.    The  spinning  mule  and  the  ^c*^c 
power-loom  were  improved  and  improved;   until  in 
1913  the  machines  of  Great  Britain  were  producing  for  ex- 
port alone  some  7,000,000,000  yards  of  cotton  cloth  every 
year  —  enough  to  make  175  yard-wide  belts  for  the  earth. 

The  great  value  of  machines  is  not  that  they  enable  a  man 
to  do  work  more  expeditiously  but  that  they  enable  man  to 
make  horses,  or  water-wheels,  or  steam-endnes  do  . 

,  ,         '  .        '  °  Motive 

the  work,    r  or  steam-engmes  are  stronger  than  men.  Power  for 
and  work  without  asking  wages,  and  without  fatigue.  5^^^.^^jJ^j.y 
Our  machines  are  Kke  so  many  black,  iron  slaves, 
eating  coal  and  performing  our  work.    Long  before  the  Indus- 
trial Revolution  windmills  had  been  in  use,  but  too  often  the 
wind  was  lazy.    Water-power  also  was  utiHzed,  and  many  a 
turbulent  stream  turned  the  water-wheel  which  moved  the  mill 
which  ground  the  grain.    Water-power,  indeed,  worked  Ark- 
wright's  first  spinning-mills,  and  between  1780  and  1800  numer- 
ous mills  were  built  along  the  swift  streams  of  western  England. 

But  where  rivers  were  slow,  it  was  necessary  to  make  artificial 
rapids  by  building  a  high  reservoir  from  which  the  water  would 
fall  with  some  force  upon  the  water-wheel.    To  fill  the  reser- 


72 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


voir  a  powerful  pump  was  needed.  Pumps  were  also  needed 
in  the  mines  to  drain  out  the  water  which  flowed  in  from  un- 
The  steam-  dcrground  springs.  It  was  to  satisfy  these  demands 
Engine  f^j.  pumps  that  the  steam-engine  was  invented.  The 
first  steam-engines  were  simply  pumps;  the  application  of 
steam-power  to  machinery  came  later. 

Crude  steam-engines  had  been  constructed  as  early  as  1698 
by  Captain  James  Savery,  and  even  earher  (1690)  by  a  French- 
Early  man,  Denys  Papin.  A  much  better  engine  was  pa- 
Attempts  tented  in  1705  by  Thomas  Newcomen.  Improved 
Newcomen  "fire-engines,"  as  they  were  called,  doing  the  work 
of  fifty  horses  at  one-sixth  the  cost,  were  used  extensively  to 
pump  water  from  English  mines  in  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  but  the  engine  was  not  yet  a  complete  success.  At  every 
stroke  of  the  piston  the  steam  cyhnder  had  to  be  heated  and 
chilled,  and  this  alternate  heating  and  chilling  consumed  too 
much  coal  and  too  much  time. 

The  steam-engine  first  became  worth  while  in  the  hands  of 
the  Scotchman  James  Watt,  whom,  therefore,  we  call  the  inventor 
James  Steam-engine.    Watt  was  a  philosopher,  scien- 

Watt's  tist,  engineer,  mechanic,  and  born  inventor,  all  in  one. 
EiT^ne  1769  ^^^^  employed  to  make  astronomical  instruments  for 
the  University  of  Glasgow,  he  was  asked  to  repair 
an  exhibition  model  of  Newcomen's  engine.  Observing  how 
wasteful  the  engine  was,  he  soon  hit  upon  a  remarkable  improve- 
ment which  he  patented  in  1769.  The  steam  was  condensed  in  a 
separate  condenser,  always  kept  cold,  while  the  cylinder  remained 
hot,  instead  of  being  chilled  and  heated  alternately;  by  this 
means  three-fourths  of  the  coal  was  saved.  But  the  steam- 
engine  was  still  only  a  pump.  Watt  next  invented  devices  by 
which  the  back-and-forth  motion  of  the  piston  could  be  made 
to  turn  machine  wheels,  as  the  piston  of  a  locomotive  turns  the 
driving  wheels.  The  improved  steam-engine  could  then  be 
applied  to  Cartwright's  loom  and  to  Arkwright's  spinning-ma- 
chines. Watt's  work  was  (i)  to  make  the  steam-engine  more 
efficient,  and  (2)  to  apply  it  directly  to  machinery. 

To  invent  steam-engines  is  one  thing,  to  construct  them  for  the 
market  is  another.  Iron  was  expensive ;  only  the  most  skillful 
workmen  could  be  trusted  to  do  the  work ;  and  it  required  con- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  73 


siderable  capital  as  well  as  business  ability.  Fortunately,  Watt 
was  able  to  induce  a  wealthy  manufacturer  by  the  name  of 
Matthew  Boulton  to  finance  the  enterprise,  and  the  steam- 
engine  was  thereby  made  a  paying  proposition.  After  1775,  mine- 
owners  began  to  buy  Watt  engines  for  pumping;  mill-owners 
installed  steam-engines  to  run  their  looms,  spinning-mules,  or 
grindstones ;  purchasers  came  to  Watt's  factory  even  from  France 
and  Germany.  The  first  steam  spinning-mill  was  estabhshed 
in  1785  ;  in  1790  Arkwright  used  the  steam-engine  for  his  cotton- 
mills  ;  and  the  application  of  steam  to  industry  went  on  until  a 
foreigner,  traveling  through  England  in  1802,  could  write: 
*'It  is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  in  England  these  ma- 
chines are  as  common  as  water-wheels  and  wind-mills  in  our 
country." 

Since  a  great  deal  of  iron  and  coal  was  needed  to  make  steam- 
engines,  and  since  the  steam-engine  facihtated  mining,  coal 
and  iron  were  produced  in  unprecedented  quantities,  iron 
New  methods  of  smelting  iron  ore  were  discovered,  i^^d^stry 
James  Watt  in  1783  constructed  a  steam-hammer  weighing  750 
pounds  and  striking  300  blows  a  minute.  Great  blast  furnaces 
then  began  to  appear,  fighting  up  the  sky  by  night,  while  in  the 
foundries  titanic  steam-hammers  beat  the  iron  into  shape.  En- 
gines, looms,  and  even  ships  were  constructed  of  iron.  The 
^'iron  age"  had  dawned. 

Of  the  many  uses  to  which  the  steam-engine  was  put,  three 
in  particular  deserve  mention :  the  steamboat,  the  steam  loco- 
motive, and  the  steam  printing  press.  Robert  Fulton,  The  steam- 
an  American,  although  not  the  first  to  construct  a 
steamboat,  was  the  first  to  make  the  steamboat  pay.  His  side- 
wheeler,  the  Clermont,  equipped  with  a  Watt  engine,  in  1807  made 
the  trip  up  the  Hudson  River  from  New  York  to  Albany  (150 
miles)  in  32  hours,  startling  the  farmers  by  its  noise,  and  seeming 
to  them  ''a  monster  moving  upon  the  waters,  defying  wind  and 
tide,  and  breathing  flames  and  smoke."    In  1838  the  first 

ocean  greyhound,"  the  Great  Western,  steamed  across  the 
Atlantic  from  Bristol  to  New  York  in  15  days  —  half  the  time 
usually  demanded  by  sailing  packets. 

Land  travel  also  felt  the  influence  of  the  steam-engine.  In 
1808  Richard  Trevithick  built  a  railway  in  London  on  which 


74 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  Catch-me-who-can,  one  of  the  first  steam  locomotives  ever 
built,  made  from  twelve  to  fifteen  miles  an  hour.  A  miner's  son, 
The  steam  George  Stephenson,  became  interested  in  the  idea,  ex- 
Locomotive  perimented  with  it,  and  in  1825  turned  out  an  engine 
capable  of  drawing  ninety  tons  at  twelve  miles  an  hour.  Rail- 
ways were  opened  —  the  railway  from  Stockton  to  Darlington 
in  1825,  and  the  Liverpool-Manchester  Railway  a  few  years  later. 

It  was  long  considered  dangerous  to  ride  on  the  steam- 
waggons,"  and  many  preferred  the  good  old  stage-coach. 
The  steam  But  even  the  timid  could  profit  by  the  steam-engine 
Press  another  way,  for  newspapers  were  now  printed 

by  steam-power.  The  first  steam  printing  press  was  installed 
by  the  London  Times  in  18 14.  Benjamin  Franklin,  with  his 
old  hand-press,  might  have  turned  out  with  great  effort  some 
2000  printed  sheets  in  one  day.  The  new  press  of  the  Times  in 
1 8 14  could  print  the  same  numiber  in  less  than  two  hours. ^ 
The  rapidity  and  cheapness  of  printing  enabled  publishers  to 
sell  books,  pamphlets,  and  newspapers  so  cheaply  that  even  the 
poorer  classes  could  buy  reading  matter.  Had  there  been  no 
Industrial  Revolution  it  would  have  been  useless  to  teach  the 
poor  to  read,  for  they  could  not  have  afforded  to  buy  books. 
Cheap  newspapers,  moreover,  informed  the  workingman  on  polit- 
ical questions.  In  this  way  the  steam  printing  press  became  the 
invaluable  ally  of  universal  education  and  of  democracy. 

The  steam  printing  press,  the  steam  locomotive,  and  the 
steamboat  were  only  a  few  of  the  children  of  Watt's  steam-engine. 
Continuity  ^^^^  every  new  generation,  new  uses  for  machin- 

of  the  ery  and  new  applications  for  power  were  discovered. 
Revoiut^n    '^^^  nineteenth  century  was  indeed  the  age  of  steam. 

But  the  age  of  steam  is  passing,  and  a  more  powerful 
force  which  we  call  electricity  is  being  harnessed  to  our  street- 
cars and  trains,  is  turning  our  machines  and  printing  our  news- 
papers. This  new  servant  of  man,  since  the  invention  of  the 
telegraph  (1832),  the  telephone  (1876),  and  the  wireless  (1895), 
will  carry  messages  for  him  with  lightning  speed  across  conti- 
nents and  over  wide  oceans. 


1  So  great  has  been  the  advance  of  printing  during  the  last  hundred  years  that 
in  1914  a  sextuple  Hoe  Perfecting  Press,  run  by  electricity,  would  print,  fold,  and 
count  24,000  twenty-four-page  newspapers  per  hour. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


75 


Flying-machines,  submarines,  sky-scrapers,  —  the  unreal 
dreams  of  a  century  ago,  —  are  the  common  realities  of  to-day. 
When  in  the  thirteenth  century  Roger  Bacon  talked  The  Spirit 
about  the  possibility  of  flying-machines,  he  was  °^  invention 
laughed  at.  But  his  fancy  has  become  fact.  The  ''Little  Lame 
Prince"  flying  through  the  air  on  his  enchanted  carpet,  once 
existed  only  in  the  land  of  fairy-tales,  but  to-day  one  does  not 
have  to  be  a  prince  to  possess  an  aeroplane  as  good  as  any  en- 
chanted carpet.  It  is  the  spirit  of  invention  which  has  made 
dreams  and  fairy-tales  come  true.  And  it  is  the  spirit  of  in- 
vention which  marks  us  off  from  the  savages.  The  Aus- 
tralian aborigine  has  used  his  boomerang  for  many  centuries, 
but  the  American  sportsman  may  buy  an  improved  rifle  every 
year.  Ever  since  the  Industrial  Revolution  we  have  gone  on, 
inventing  machines  to  wash  our  clothes,  to  churn  our  milk,  to 
play  our  pianos,  steam-shovels  to  dig  our  canals,  and  vacuum 
cleaners  to  sweep  our  floors.  Mechanical  invention  ^s  the  order 
of  the  day. 

ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTION 

Direct  results  of  the  mechanical  inventions  appeared  in  an 
expansion  of  industry  and  commerce,  in  a  growth  of  cities,  and  in 
an  increase  of  wealth. 

Machines  made  it  possible  to  manufacture,  to  mine,  and 
to  farm  on  an  enormous  scale.  For  example,  only  17,350  tons 
of  iron  were  taken  from  English  mines  in  1 740 ;  but  Expansion 
in  1 9 10  the  iron  produced  amounted  to  more  than  of  industry 
10,000,000  tons.  The  value  of  British  cotton  manufactures 
increased  from  $1,000,000  in  1760  to  $600,000,000  in  19 10.  If 
every  man  and  woman  in  the  New  World  were  set  to  work  at  an 
old-fashioned  spinning-wheel,  all  together  could  not  make  as 
much  thread  as  is  now  made  by  machinery.  Even  agriculture 
has  become  more  fruitful  —  with  scientific  methods  and  with 
improved  plows,  self-binders,  and  automatic  churns.  More- 
over, entirely  new  industries  have  grown  up.  Canned  fruit, 
phonographs,  photographs,  automobiles,  torpedoes,  telephones, 
matches,  patent-medicine,  —  these  are  a  few  of  the  new  manu- 
factures. 


76 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Commerce  has  expanded  with  industry,  for  there  are  now 
more  commodities  to  sell  than  ever  before.  And  it  is  easier 
Increase  of  to  sell  them.  Ocean-liners,  railways,  macadamized 
Commerce  roads,  telegraphs,  telephones,  and  cheap  postal  service 
make  the  world  seem  very  small  and  very  compact.  Transporta- 
tion is  now  so  cheap  and  rapid  that  fruit  can  be  shipped  without 
spoiling  from  South  America  to  Europe.  Easy  communication 
enables  different  countries  to  specialize  in  particular  products  — 
enables  Great  Britain  to  make  cloth  and  cutlery  for  other  nations, 
while  relying  upon  Russia  and  Canada  for  its  wheat  supply. 
The  increase  in  commerce  can  perhaps  best  be  expressed  in 
figures.  For  instance,  the  cotton  trade  trebled  in  fifteen  years 
( 1 788-1803).  The  United  States  exported  275  bales  of  cotton 
in  1792,  and  9,256,000  bales  in  1913.  The  commerce  of  the 
United  States  and  Europe  increased  800  per  cent  in  half  a  century 
( I 830-1 880). 

The  development  of  commerce  and  industry  has  been  at- 
tended by  remarkable  increases  of  population  —  for  clothes 
Growth  of  could  be  made  and  food  produced  more  easily  than 
Population  gygj-  before  in  the  world's  history.  In  the  first  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  the  population  of  England  was  doubled. 
During  the  nineteenth  century  the  population  of  Europe, 
roughly  speaking,  grew  from  175,000,000  to  392,000,000. 

This  increased  population  has  been  largely  concentrated  in 
cities.  The  tendency  of  alHed  industries  to  locate  in  the  same 
Growth  of  place,  the  demands  of  commerce,  and  the  natural  at- 
Cities  tractiveness  and  conveniences  of  urban  life,  may  be 
ascribed  as  causes  for  the  growth  of  cities.  Most  of  the  people 
of  Europe  once  Hved  in  the  country,  but  now  three-fourths  of  the 
population  of  England  is  urban.  The  London  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  with  its  half  a  million  inhabitants,  has  become  the 
metropoHs  of  the  world  with  some  seven  millions  of  human 
beings.  At  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth  century  Europe  pos- 
sessed fourteen  cities  of  more  than  100,000  inhabitants ;  at  the 
close  of  the  century  there  were  140  such  cities. 

Rapid  as  the  increase  in  population  has  been,  the  multiplica- 
tion of  wealth  has  been  more  phenomenal.  The  myriad  iron 
fingers  of  machinery  are  able  to  produce  much  more  than  enough 
wealth  to  support  the  added  milHons  of  people.    That  is  why 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


77 


the  savings  banks'  deposits  mount  up  in  the  United  States  alone 
to  five  bnUons  of  dollars.  Surplus  wealth  would  be  sufficient  to 
support  more  milHons  of  people,  or  to  give  comforts  increase  of 
and  even  luxuries  to  the  present  population.  But  in  Wealth 
large  part,  it  is  accumulated  in  the  hands  of  relatively  few 
very  rich  men,  whose  mansions,  yachts,  and  touring  cars  put 
to  shame  the  palaces  and  coaches  of  a  Louis  XIV.  At  first 
sight  it  seems  strange  that  the  greatest  benefits  of  the  Industrial 
Revolution  should  be  monopolized  by  a  minority.  The  reason 
is  not  to  be  discovered  in  the  mechanical  inventions  themselves, 
but  in  a  second  aspect  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  —  the  forma- 
tion of  the  factory  system. 

CAPITALISM  AND  THE  FACTORY  SYSTEM 

Up  to  this  point  we  have  been  studying  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution as  a  transition  from  hand-labor  to  machine-labor;  we 
now  regard  it  as  a  transformation  of  the  independent  ^^^^^ 
home-laborer  into  the  wage-paid  factory  laborer,  capital 
Before  the  Industrial  Revolution,  most  work  had  been  ^^^^^j^J^^ 
done  in  the  home  of  the  worker :   the  cobbler  Uved 
over  his  shop,  the  weaver  had  his  loom  in  his  own  attic,  the 
spinning-wheel  stood  by  the  cradle.    The  shoemaker  bought 
his  leather  from  the  tanner,  and  with  his  own  tools  made  it  into 
shoes,  which  he  sold  directly  to  his  customers. 

Even  before  the  invention  of  machinery  this  medieval  system 
began  to  give  way,  and  the  independent  workman  became  par- 
tially dependent  on  the  capitalist.  The  richer  master-shoe- 
makers ceased  working  themselves  and  hired  more  journeymen ; 
the  journeymen  practically  became  day-laborers.  In  the  woolen 
industry  there  were  arising  rich  merchants  who  paid  weavers 
so  much  a  yard  for  converting  the  yam  into  cloth.  The 
beginnings  of  the  factory-system  were  already  to  be  seen, 
where  the  merchant  manufacturer  had  gathered  half  a  dozen 
looms  in  a  shed  or  attic,  and  hired  weavers  to  work  therein  for 
wages. 

Thus  the  separation  of  labor  and  capital,  of  worker  and  em- 
ployer, had  already  begun  before  the  invention  of  machinery. 
But  the  true  revolution  did  not  come  until  the  adoption  of 


78 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


power-machinery  —  and  then  factories  sprang  up  like  mush- 
rooms For  heavy  machinery  has  to  be  set  up  in  special 
Factories  buildings,  and  it  does  not  pay  to  erect  a  water-wheel 
and  or  to  purchasc  a  costly  steam-engine,  unless  its  power 

Machines  transmitted  to  a  large  number  of  machines. 

In  order  to  run  a  number  of  machines,  there  must  be  many  at- 
tendants who  will  work  at  regular  hours,  for  the  machine  must 
not  be  left  to  rust  whenever  the  workman  feels  lazy  or  tired. 
The  result  is  the  erection  of  great  factories,  into  which  hundreds 
and  thousands  of  workmen  file  every  morning  at  the  sound  of 
the  whistle,  to  work  until  the  whistle  shall  blow  again  at  the 
close  of  the  day.  And  as  machines  are  grouped  together  in 
factories,  so  factories  are  collected  in  factory-cities,  the  cloth- 
mill  beside  the  thread-factory,  the  gun-shop  beside  the  blast- 
furnace. The  weaver  now  spends  his  days  in  the  factory,  and 
goes  home  to  sleep  in  the  tenement  house.  Home  labor  and  the 
cottage  have  largely  disappeared  before  the  factory-city. 

Wherever  the  factory  has  appeared,  it  has  brought  with  it 
two  new  social  classes  —  the  capitalist  and  the  wage-earner, 
jjg^  The  old  regime  had  its  nobles  and  serfs,  its  gild- 

Divisions  of  masters  and  journeymen,  its  merchants,  shopkeepers. 
Society  clerks  ;   but  the  factory-city  knows  neither  gild- 

masters  nor  journeymen,  nobles  nor  serfs,  but  only  capitalists 
and  wage-earners.  The  wage-earning  class  we  call  the  proleta- 
riat ;  the  factory-owners  form  a  new  subdivision  of  the  bourgeoisie, 
which  now  consists  of  industrial  capitalists,  bankers,  merchants, 
shopkeepers,  and  professional  men. 

The  first  industrial  capitalists  were  men  like  Arkwright 
—  Sir  Richard  Arkwright,  inventor  of  the  water-frame  and 
Capitalists  ^'^^.ther  of  the  factory-system."  He  was  what  we 
might  now  call  a  ''promoter,"  a  man  who  pushes 
new  business  enterprises.  It  was  his  part  to  erect  factories,  to 
install  machines,  to  hire  workers,  to  organize  the  business.  In 
addition,  he  acted  as  superintendent  of  his  factories.  Speeding 
along  from  mill  to  mill  in  his  "coach  and  four,"  he  saw  that  each 
mill  was  running  properly,  that  the  workmen  were  not  idle,  that 
the  machines  were  in  good  order.  And  finally,  he  purchased  the 
raw  cotton  and  disposed  of  the  finished  thread. 

These  three  functions  of  promoter,  superintendent,  and  sales- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


79 


man  were  at  first  fulfilled  by  most  factory-owners.  But  as  the 
factory-system  became  more  complex,  the  factory-owner  or  capi- 
tahst  became  less  and  less  active.  Especially  as  larger  business 
enterprises  were  undertaken,  the  capitalist  often  became  a  mere 
investor :  he  furnished  the  money  to  start  with,  but  salaried 
employees,  acting  as  superintendents  and  salesmen,  did  the 
organizing,  the  directing,  and  the  buying  and  selling.  Never- 
theless, the  capitaKst  still  claimed  the  major  share  of  the  prof- 
its, which  he  called  the  "interest"  or  "return  on  his  capital." 
A  man  who  had  money  to  spare  would  deliver  it  to  a  broker  for 
investment  in  some  business  and  would  thenceforth  receive  an- 
nual dividends  without  serious  expenditure  of  mental  or  physical 
energy.  In  this  manner  shrewd  investors  —  the  new  capitalists 
—  easily  acquired  great  wealth,  which  in  turn  gave  them  weight 
in  politics,  exalted  them  in  popular  appraisal  as  well  as  in  their 
own  self-esteem,  and  enabled  them  to  purchase  the  chateaux 
of  the  old  feudal  nobility. 

While  the  factory  raised  the  capitalist  to  a  position  of  wealth 
and  power,  it  reduced  the  worker  to  dependence  and  poverty. 
After  the  invention  of  the  power-loom,  cloth  could  wage- 
be  made  so  rapidly  and  cheaply  by  machine  ^  that  Earners 
the  price  of  cloth  fell  and  the  hand-loom  weaver  could  no  longer 
make  a  Hving.  He  was  too  poor  to  buy  expensive  machinery, 
and,  in  order  to  escape  starvation,  he  found  himself  obliged 
to  work  in  some  capitaKst 's  factory.  In  the  factory,  the  weaver 
became  merely  a  human  machine  —  he  neither  bought  his  raw 
materials  nor  sold  his  finished  product.  Experience  and  skill 
counted  for  little,  when  one  had  simply  to  pull  levers  on  a 
machine,  to  brush  away  dirt,  and  to  mend  broken  threads.  All 
he  could  sell  was  his  labor.  And  that  had  to  be  sold  cheaply. 
For  there  were  always  plenty  of  poor  people  ready  to  work  for 
almost  nothing,  and  naturally  no  employer  would  pay  high 
wages  when  he  could  avoid  it. 

Nor  was  factory-work  as  pleasant  as  home-work.    The  old 

*  "A  very  good  hand- weaver  25  or  30  years  of  age  will  weave  two  pieces  of 
shirting  per  week.  In  1823  a  steam-loom  weaver  about  fifteen  years  of  age  attend- 
ing 2  looms  could  weave  9  similar  pieces.  In  1826  a  steam-loom  weaver  about 
fifteen  could  weave  12  similar  pieces  in  a  week,  some  15.  In  1833  a  stcam-loom 
weaver  from  fifteen  to  twenty,  assisted  by  a  girl  of  twelve,  attending  to  four  looms 
could  weave  18  pieces  "  (Porter,  p.  183). 


8o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


hand-weaver  had  been  able  to  hear  his  children  laugh  as 
he  plied  the  shuttle  ;  he  could  choose  his  own  hours,  and 
divide  his  time  between  the  garden  and  the  loom.  The  fac- 
tory-worker heard  the  buzz  and  hum  of  machinery,  instead 
of  children's  laughter ;  he  came  and  went  at  the  sound  of  the 
whistle ;  his  work  was  monotonous,  repeating  the  same  trivial 
operation  for  ten,  twelve,  or  even  eighteen  hours  a  day.  More- 
over, he  had  to  keep  pace  with  the  machine,  no  matter  how 
tired  he  might  be,  for  the  machine  never  slackened  its  speed. 
It  was  nervous  unhealthy  work,  and  it  made  nervous  un- 
healthy men. 

Yet  it  was  not  the  grown  man  who  suffered  most,  but  rather 
the  woman  and  child.  Machines  could  be  tended  by  weak  hands 
Labor  of  ^^^^         Strong,  and  broken  threads  were  mended 

Women  and  more  deftly  by  the  nimble  fingers  of  children.  So  the 
Children  women  left  their  homes,  and  the  children  left  their 
play,  to  work  in  the  factories  and  mines.  They  did  not  earn 
much  —  wife  and  children  together  could  hardly  earn  enough  to 
support  the  family,  even  though  they  worked  from  six  in  the 
morning  till  ten  at  night.  Meanwhile  the  grown  man  could 
seldom  find  any  work  to  do. 

"No  work  to  do"  —  that  indeed  has  been  the  bitter  and  con- 
stant complaint  of  workingmen  ever  since  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution  first  began,  and  the  unemployment  problem 
Problems:  is  Still  One  of  the  gravest  problems  resulting  from  the 
Unempioy-  factory-systcm.  The  first  machines  were  looked  upon 
with  fear  and  hatred  by  the  hand-worker  —  it  seemed 
as  if  the  machine  was  taking  away  his  work.  And  often  ma- 
chines were  smashed  by  jealous  artisans.  But  machines  were 
made  faster  than  they  could  be  smashed,  and  the  riots  against 
machinery  gradually  ceased.  The  problem  of  unemployment 
remained,  however,  not  that  there  was  less  work  to  do  than  be- 
fore, —  there  was  on  the  contrary  much  more ;  but  the  women 
and  children  were  doing  the  work,  while  many  men  stood  idle, 
unable  to  find  employment.  Moreover,  ''hard-times"  were 
frequent,  when  factories  were  closed  down  for  months,  and  the 
factory-hands  left  without  work  or  food. 

A  second  great  problem  was  the  draining  of  sturdy  farmers  into 
city  slums.    English  statesmen  were  deeply  perturbed  when 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  8i 


they  beheld  the  disappearance  of  the  independent  farmer-class 
—  the  ^'yeomen"  —  before  whose  valor  foreign  armies  anciently 
had  fled.    The  process  of  inclosure,  by  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  rich  farmers  in  the  eighteenth  and  early  problems: 
nineteenth  centuries  were  buying  up  the  land  for  Disappear- 
large-scale  cultivation,  led,  in  connection  with  the  ^^omamy^ 
Industrial  Revolution,  to  the  general  removal  of  the 
yeomen  from  the  land  to  the  factories,  there  to  become  wage- 
earners  with  hardly  a  spark  of  their  old  independent  spirit. 

The  greatest  problem  was  the  deterioration  of  the  working- 
class  under  the  capitahstic  system.    Hours  were  too  long,  wages 
too  small,  and  conditions  unhealthful  and  insanitary,  j^^^ 
The  once  independent  and  home-loving  yeoman  had  Problems: 
lost  home  and  independence.    His  shoulders  stooped  S^p^ctory^^ 
from  bending  long  hours  over  machines.    Constant  Hands  and 
indoor  work  had  driven  the  ruddiness  from  his  cheeks.  -^"^^'^ 
Worst  of  all,  the  employment  of  women  and  children  seemed  to 
have  the  most  terrible  results.    The  babies  of  factory-women, 
weak  and  without  proper  care,  died  in  alarming  numbers.  The 
children,  breathing  the  close  air  of  the  mill,  were  pale  and  sickly, 
and  developed  into  stunted  and  deformed  men  and  women.  And 
to  cap  the  climax,  there  seemed  to  be  a  shocking  increase  of  vice 
in  the  great  factory  and  mining  towns.    Men  who  had  spent 
their  days  in  the  dark,  damp  mines  spent  their  hours  of  rest  in 
the  saloon  instead  of  in  their  cheerless  homes.    Young  boys  be- 
came drunkards,  and  working- women,  who  had  no  homes  to 
enjoy,  and  who  were  separated  from  their  children  by  the  fac- 
tory, easily  fell  into  immorality  and  vice. 

What  would  become  of  the  nation  whose  workers  were  in  such 
condition?  Of  what  good  were  schools  if  the  children  were  in 
the  factories  ?  Of  what  good  was  democracy  if  the  voters  were 
ignorant  and  depraved  ?  Never  had  statesmen  been  confronted 
with  such  problems,  never  had  they  been  forced  to  answer  such 
questions.    Let  us  see  how  they  responded. 

The  first  impulse  was  to  make  laws  restraining  the  undesir- 
able tendencies  of  factory-industry,  or,  rather,  to  enforce  the 
old  laws.  It  will  be  remembered  that  mercantilist  statesmen  of 
the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  (like  Colbert)  had  is- 
sued elaborate  regulations  for  industry.     France  in  1789  had 

VOL.  II  —  G 


82 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


eight  bulky  volumes  of  rules,  prescribing  just  how  work  should 
be  done,  with  what  tools,  with  what  materials,  how  wide  cloth 

should  be  woven,  how  large  buttons  should  be.  In 
Govern^  England  the  rules  were  not  so  elaborate,  but  the  gov- 
ment:  Era  ernmeut  had  felt  the  same  impulse  to  regulate  in- 
sion^^^^^'    dustry.     Queen  Ehzabeth,  for  instance,  had  a  law 

passed  limiting  the  number  of  iron-furnaces,  because 
the  furnaces  burned  too  much  wood  and  destroyed  the  forests. 
Then,  there  was  the  celebrated  Elizabethan  Statute  of  Ar- 
tificers, of  1563,  which  decreed  that  workmen  should  serve  an 
apprenticeship  of  seven  years.  Moreover,  the  number  of  ap- 
prentices was  limited,  it  being  provided  in  some  industries  that 
there  must  be  at  least  one  grown  workman  to  every  three  ap- 
prentices. This  last  measure,  if  enforced,  would  have  checked 
child  labor ;  and  the  other  laws  would  have  rendered  factory 
industry  practically  impossible. 

In  addition  to  these  royal  laws  in  restraint  of  industry,  there 
were  gild  regulations  to  be  obeyed,  especially  on  the  Continent,  — 
regulations  which  made  innovation  next  to  impossible.  And, 
finally,  there  were  many  restrictions  on  trade,  chartered  compa- 
nies which  hampered  commerce,  customs  duties  on  raw  materials, 
and  tariffs  on  imported  grain,  all  of  which  rendered  it  more  diffi- 
cult for  manufacturers  to  procure  cheap  materials  and  cheap 
food  for  their  workmen. 

We  have  already  observed  how  the  theory  and  practice  of  in- 
dustrial regulation  came  to  be  denounced  as  ruinous  by  numerous 

progressive  philosophers  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
fnferfer^^^'  In  France  Turgot  and  the  other  advocates  of  the 
ence:  ncw  "political  economy"  cried  laissez-faire^^  —  or 
^'^Laissez-     ^^^^^^^  -^^  ^^^^       British  citizen,  Adam 

Smith,  published  his  learned  treatise  on  the  Wealth 
of  Nations,  in  which  he  held  that  industry  and  commerce  should 
be  largely  free  of  restrictions  and  taxes.  The  true  strength  of  a 
nation  lies  in  the  wealth  of  its  citizens,  Adam  Smith  argued,  and 
individual  wealth  is  promoted  best  by  Hberty.  Restrictions  are 
useless  and  even  harmful.  Each  man  knows  best  how  to  make 
himself  rich,  and  if  each  man  in  the  nation  were  rich,  the  nation 
would  be  rich.  Therefore,  each  individual  should  be  allowed 
freedom  in  business,  unhampered  by  laws  or  restrictions. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  83 


Other  philosophers  went  even  further,  to  show  that  inter- 
ference with  industry  was  not  only  unwise,  but  positively  im- 
moral and  contrary  to  man's  "natural  rights."  The  "Economic 
idea  that  there  were  certain  natural  rights  of  man  individuai- 
had  become  a  favorite  one  with  eighteenth-century 
philosophers ;  and  had  not  only  exercised  an  influence  over 
philosophical  speculation  but  had  found  its  way  even  into  docu- 
ments of  state,  such  as  the  American  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence and  the  French  "Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man." 
From  the  dogma  enshrined  in  the  latter,  that  "private  property 
is  an  inviolable  and  sacred  right,"  it  was  an  easy  step  to  the 
conviction  that  each  human  being  had  a  sacred  and  inviolable 
"right"  to  make  money  in  whatever  way  he  chose.  The  "hb- 
erty"  of  the  French  Revolution  was  promptly  and  successfully 
appHed  to  economics.  Manufacturers  and  capitahsts  must  be 
"free." 

This  beHef  in  "natural  rights"  was  fortified  by  another 
product  of  eighteenth-century  philosophy  —  the  popularity  of 
"natural  laws."  Since  physical  laws  had  been  for-  "Economic 
mulated  for  the  movements  of  the  stars,  why  could  not  " 
"laws"  be  found  which  would  explain  why  a  nation  is  pros- 
perous, or  why  some  people  are  rich  while  others  are  poor  ?  The 
problem  seemed  fairly  simple,  and  many  political  economists, 
especially  in  Great  Britain,  came  forward  with  solutions.  There 
must  always  be  poverty,  said  one,^  because  there  is  not  enough 
wealth  to  go  around.  If  the  poor  men  were  given  larger  wages, 
they  would  have  larger  families  and  so  there  would  be  more 
mouths  to  feed,  and  as  much  poverty  as  before.  Rent,  said  an- 
other, is  not  determined  by  the  greed  of  the  landlord,  but 
by  a  natural  law.  Government  can  do  nothing  to  relieve 
misery,  vice,  and  suffering,  which  are  referable  in  last  in- 
stance to  the  inexorable  operation  of  the  eternal  natural  laws  of 
sound  political  economy.  The  best  results  and  the  greatest  pros- 
perity, therefore,  are  not  to  be  obtained  by  man-made  laws. 
But  how  then?  By  "enlightened  self-interest."  According  to 
the  political  economists  of  the  time,  each  man  should  be  con- 
cerned only  with  his  own  gain,  and  should  let  others  shift 
for  themselves,  for  each  man  knows  best  how  to  take  care  of 

1  Malthus. 


84 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


himself,  and  if  all  are  well  taken  care  of  (by  themselves  individ- 
ually), the  state  will  be  prosperous.  The  golden  rule  and  the 
command  to  love  one's  neighbor  appeared  now  as  pretty  senti- 
ments which  it  would  be  folly  to  practice.  "He  helps  others  who 
helps  himself."  Private  interest  is  the  great  source  of  public 
good." 

Such  a  justification  of  selfishness  found  ready  acceptance  as 
the  Industrial  Revolution  progressed.  The  old  interpretation 
of  Christianity  which  taught  unselfishness  and  humility  seemed 
to  be  passing  away  before  the  rise  of  a  new  school  of  moral 
philosophers,  who  beUeved,  in  the  words  of  Emerson,  that  "a 
man  contains  all  that  is  needful  to  his  government  within  him- 
self ...  all  real  good  or  evil  that  can  befall  him,  must  be  from 
himself."  And  as  the  prosperous  mill-owner  looked  back  on  his 
own  Hfe,  it  seemed  to  him  indeed  as  if  his  success  had  been  won 
simply  by  his  own  thrift,  enterprise,  and  brains.  If  others  had 
been  as  sober,  industrious,  and  intelligent  as  himself,  they,  too, 
would  have  been  wealthy,  respected,  and  good  citizens.  And  so  it 
came  to  be  asserted  in  many  so-called  Christian  countries  that 
each  man  should  fight  for  himself,  and  "the  devil  take  the 
hindermost." 

The  application  of  the  new  theories  of  individualism  and 
liberty  demanded  three  things,  (i)  The  aboKtion  of  all  govern- 
Demands  of  i^^ntal  restrictions  on  industry.  The  state  should 
the  New  be  merely  a  big  policeman  to  prevent  robbery, 
Econonucs  j^^j-jej-^  ^i^id  sedition.  (2)  The  abolition  of  all  gilds, 
chartered  companies,  and  monopoKes,  which  might  obstruct 
free  competition.  (3)  The  prohibition  of  workingmen's  unions. 
Each  individual  workingman  should  be  allowed  to  make  his  own 
bargain  or  "free  contract"  with  the  employer.  Unions,  in  at- 
tempting to  compel  employers  to  raise  wages  or  to  shorten  hours, 
interfered  with  this  right  of  "free  contract."  It  was  rank  tyr- 
anny, said  the  champions  of  industrial  liberty,  to  interfere  with 
any  workingman's  sacred  right  freely  to  sell  his  labor  as  cheaply 
as  he  pleased.  Let  each  wage-earner  make  his  separate  bargain 
with  his  employer,  and  if  the  worker  wants  more  wages  than  the 
employer  will  pay,  let  him  be  free  to  seek  employment  else- 
where or  to  go  without  work. 

The  demands  of  economic  "liberty"  were  achieved  in  most 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  85 


countries  during  the  nineteenth  century,  as  the  influence  of  the 
in^iustrial  capitalists  became  strong  in  politics.    In  Great  Britain 
d'iring  the  first  thirty  or  forty  years  of  the  century,  Emancipa- 
industry  and  commerce  were  rendered  almost  en-  tion  of 
tirely  free  of  restriction.    Similarly  in  France  and  in 
the  United  States  manufacturers  were  allowed  great  freedom. 
For  example,  in  France  in  1791  and  in  Great  Britain  in  1800, 
combinations  of  workingmen  were  forbidden.    Industrial  liberty 
became  the  order  of  the  day  in  every  industrial  state. 

It  was  expected  that  with  the  achievement  of  hberty,  happi- 
ness and  prosperity  would  be  attained.    And  truly  Great  Britain, 
whose  industry  was  most  completely  emancipated,  Liberty" 
grew  very  wealthy ;    her  capitalists  were  more  pros-  and  the 
perous,  and  her  factories  and  ships  more  numerous  ^^p^*^^*® 
than  those  of  any  other  nation.    The  fruits  of  Hberty  seemed 
to  be  as  precious  as  the  golden  apples  of  ancient  fable. 

Yet  along  with  the  golden  apples,  the  tree  of  hberty  brought 
forth  bitter  and  unsightly  fruit  for  the  workers.    The  early  fac- 
tories were  ugly,  ill- ventilated,  poorly  hghted,  and  in-    j^^^^^y  „ 
sanitary  buildings,  hastily  and  cheaply  built.     ''In  and  the 
these  dingy  buildings,  choked  with  dust  and  worn  with  ^|®^g 
overwork,  the  Enghsh  freemen  enjoyed  to  the  utmost 
the  blessed  privilege  of  freedom  of  contract."    In  the  mines,  too, 
women  and  children  worked  along  with  the  men.    Women  and 
girls  were  harnessed  to  coal-carts,  creeping  on  all  fours  through 
the  low-roofed  galleries  of  the  coal  mines. 

In  the  early  nineteenth  century  a  great  crusade  was  preached 
in  England  against  negro  slavery,  and  slave  owners  in  British 
colonies  were  forbidden  to  work  their  slaves  more  than  nine  hours 
a  day,  or  six  hours  for  children.  But  the  white  citizens  of  Great 
Britain  received  no  such  protection.  There  was  a  law  by  which 
pauper  children  could  be  forced  to  work,  and  under  this  law 
thousands  of  poor  children,  five  and  six  years  old,  were  taken 
from  their  homes,  sent  from  parish  to  parish  to  work  in  factories, 
and  bought  and  sold  in  gangs  like  slaves.  In  the  factories  they 
were  set  to  work  without  pay,  the  cheapest  of  food  being  all  they 
could  earn.  If  they  refused  to  work,  irons  were  put  around  their 
ankles,  and  they  were  chained  to  the  machine,  and  at  night  they 
were  locked  up  in  the  sleeping-huts.    The  working  day  was 


86 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


long  —  from  five  or  six  in  the  morning  till  nine  or  ten  at  night 
Often  the  children  felt  their  arms  ache  with  fatigue  and  theii 
eyelids  grow  heavy  with  sleep,  but  they  were  kept  awake  by  the 
whip  of  the  overseer.  Many  of  the  little  children  died  of  over- 
work, and  others  were  carried  off  by  the  diseases  which  were 
bred  by  filth,  fatigue,  and  insufficient  food. 

When  the  attention  of  factory-owners  was  drawn  to  these 
conditions,  they  replied  that  business  would  not  pay  if  employees 
worked  less  or  received  larger  wages,  that  no  employer  would 
intentionally  misuse  his  employees,  and  that  anyway  it  was 
wrong  for  government  to  meddle  with  a  man's  private  business. 
With  this  answer  they  dismissed  the  problem,  and  would  do 
nothing  to  reHeve  the  suffering  of  the  workers  in  factory  or 
mine.  What  few  measures  were  enacted  to  restrict  child  labor 
and  to  improve  factory  conditions  in  the  first  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  were  the  work  of  Tory  landowners,  not  of  Liberal 
factory-owners.  The  reforms  were  trifling,  however,  and  the 
working  classes  everywhere  seemed  to  be  sinking  into  abject 
poverty.  Instead  of  a  boon  to  mankind,  machinery  appeared 
to  be  but  a  cruel  instrument  of  oppression  in  the  hands  of  con- 
scienceless capitalists. 

Bourgeois  economists  might  explain  that  poverty  resulted 
from  inexorable  economic  laws;  but  during  the  nineteenth  century 
a  new  class  of  theorists  was  arising  to  predict  better 
to^Economic  things  for  the  workingman.  The  economists  had 
Individual-  emphasized  the  rights  of  the  individual;  the  new 
SociaUst^s  theorists  thought  more  about  the  betterment  of  so- 
ciety than  about  the  enrichment  of  a  few  individuals ; 
they  exhorted  men  to  be  social,  not  selfish.  It  was  quite  natural, 
then,  that  such  reformers  should  be  styled  SociaHsts: 

Robert  Owen  (i 771-1858)  was  one  of  the  best-known  early 
Socialists.  As  manager  and  part  owner  of  large  cotton  mills 
at  New  Lanark  in  Scotland,  Owen  was  well  acquainted  with  the 
evils  of  the  factory-system.  He  first  tried  to  make  New  Lanark 
a  model  community.  How  well  he  succeeded  may  be  judged 
from  his  own  words:  "For  29  years  we  did  without  the  neces- 
sity for  magistrates  or  lawyers ;  without  a  single  legal  punish- 
ment ;  without  any  known  poor  rates ;  without  intemperance  or 
rehgious  animosities.    We  reduced  the  hours  of  labour,  well 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  87 


educated  all  the  children  from  infancy,  greatly  improved  the  con- 
dition of  the  adults,  diminished  their  daily  labour,  paid  interest 
on  capital,  and  cleared  upwards  of  £300,000  of  profit."  The 
success  of  the  New  Lanark  experiment  made  Owen  famous  as  a 
social  reformer.  He  believed  that  communities  like  New 
Lanark  should  be  formed  all  over  the  world  and  federated  in  a 
great  world-repubHc.  Each  community  should  consist  of  about 
1200  people,  combining  farm  and  factory  Hfe,  all  living  in  one 
large  building,  and  sharing  the  profits  of  their  work.  Many 
people  were  antagonized  by  Owen's  attacks  on  Christianity,  and 
by  his  loose  views  on  the  question  of  marriage.  Moreover, 
several  attempts  to  set  up  Owenite  communities  ^  met  with  dis- 
couraging failure.  When  Owen  died  in  1858,  it  was  already  clear 
that  society  would  not  be  reorganized  according  to  his  scheme.^ 

While  Owen  was  attempting  to  reform  society  in  Great  Britain, 
Saint-Simon  and  Fourier  were  advocating  visionary  schemes  in 
France.  Comte  Henri  de  Saint-Simon  (1760-1825)  saint-Simon 
appealed  to  Louis  XVIII  to  establish  a  new  regime  Fourier 
in  which  men  of  science  would  rule  in  the  interests  of  industry. 
Francois  Marie  Fourier  (i 772-1837),  on  the  other  hand,  elabo- 
rated a  system  more  Uke  that  of  Robert  Owen,  based  upon  inde- 
pendent industrial  communities  {phalanges)  of  1800  persons,  in 
which  earnings  should  be  distributed  labor,  y%  to  capital, 

and  ^2  to  talent.  For  ten  years  Fourier  waited  in  his  rooms  at 
noon  every  day,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  some  wealthy  man  who 
might  take  up  his  scheme.  Needless  to  say,  he  was  disap- 
pointed. After  his  death  a  phalange  was  instituted  at  Brook 
Farm  in  Massachusetts,  but  without  permanent  success. 

Saint-Simon  and  Fourier  were  prominent  in  the  first  quarter 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  In  the  next  generation  Socialism  was 
represented  in  France  by  Louis  Blanc  (1811-1882),  ,   .  _ 

,    .„.  .  .        .  ,         .  ,  Louis  Blanc 

a  brilliant  Parisian  journahst,  who  vigorously  con- 
demned industrial  competition  and  proposed  that  the  state  should 

^  At  Orbiston  (Scotland) ;  at  New  Harmony  (Indiana,  U.  S.  A.) ;  at  Ralahine 
(Ireland);  and  at  Tytherly  (England). 

2  One  important  result  of  Owen's  work  was  the  establishment  of  cooperative 
stores,  in  which  the  profits  were  divided  among  the  members  of  the  cooperative 
society.  There  were  more  than  1400  such  stores  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  1906, 
with  about  2,250,000  members.  Owen  is  likewise  remembered  as  an  early  and 
vigorous  advocate  of  trade-unionism. 


88 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


create  social  workshops."  Each  of  these  social  workshops  was 
to  be  independent  and  the  workingmen  themselves  were  to  choose 
managers  and  divide  the  profits. 

Louis  Blanc's  ideas  appealed  directly  to  many  of  the  working- 
men,  whereas  Fourier  and  Saint-Simon  had  been  able  to  interest 
only  a  few  philanthropists  or  faddists  of  the  upper  classes.  But 
Louis  Blanc  was  hardly  more  successful  in  regenerating  society.^ 
Owen,  Saint-Simon,  Fourier,  Blanc,  —  all  dreamed  of  ideal  sys- 
tems which  were  never  realized.  It  was  not  until  1848  that  the 
Socialist  movement  appeared  as  an  organized  party,  with  a 
political  program.^ 

Although  the  early  Socialists  —  Owen,  Saint-Simon,  Fourier, 
Blanc  —  failed  to  organize  permanent  sociahstic  parties,  and 
failed  to  realize  their  dreams,  they  at  least  forced  people  to 
think  about  social  problems,  and  to  react  against  the  laisser- 
faire  philosophy.  The  socialistic  theories  of  Robert  Owen  in 
England,  and  of  Louis  Blanc  in  France,  were  reflected  in  the  be- 
lief of  many  workingmen  that  the  capitalist  made  large  profits  at 
the  wage-earner's  expense.^  Hoping  to  obtain  justice,  the  work- 
ingmen turned  to  trade-unions  and  to  democratic  agitation  and  to 
all  sorts  of  visionary  schemes.  This  growing  unrest  on  the  part 
of  the  lower  classes  in  the  cities,  with  the  demand  for  democracy 
and  for  economic  equahty,  was  destined  to  exercise  a  profound 
influence  upon  the  history  of  the  later  nineteenth  century. 

IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTION 
UPON  POLITICS 

During  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  problems 
of  the  working  classes  were  overshadowed  by  the  rise  of  the 
middle  classes.    For  the  immediate  effect  of  the  In- 

The 

Bourgeoisie  dustrial  Revolution  was  to  weaken  and  impoverish 
aud  its  the  lower  classes  while  it  strengthened  and  enriched 
Ambit^ns  bourgeoisie  or  middle  classes.    The  expansion  of 

industry,  the  growth  of  commerce,  the  increase  of 
wealth,  and  the  rise  of  cities,  which  we  have  just  reviewed,  meant 

^  See  below,  p.  255.  2  See  below,  p.  257. 

^  Making  toward  much  the  same  end  was  the  agitation  in  England  of  the  group 
of  so-called  "Christian  Socialists,"  including  such  distinguished  clergymen  and 
writers  as  J.  F.  D.  Maurice  (1805-1872)  and  Charles  Kingsley  (1819-1875). 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  89 


that  thousands  of  wholesale  merchants,  bankers,  and  promoters 
were  acquiring  wealth,  and  that  thousands  of  shops  were  being 
opened  up  to  supply  food,  clothing,  shoes,  and  luxuries  to  the  new 
urban  population.  The  financial  and  commercial  bourgeoisie, 
and  the  shop-keeping  class  (which  was  between  the  bourgeoisie 
and  the  lower  class),  were,  therefore,  more  important  and  more 
powerful  than  ever  before.  Allied  with  these  older  middle  classes, 
there  was  a  new  class  —  the  class  of  industrial  capitalists  created 
by  the  Industrial  Revolution.  To  the  industrial  bourgeoi- 
sie belonged  the  men  who  owned  factories,  mines,  foundries, 
machine-shops,  mills,  and  railways. 

It  was  inevitable  that  these  men  of  the  middle  classes,  the 
favored  children  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  should  exercise 
a  powerful  influence  upon  politics.  Men  who  by  their  energy 
and  determination  had  forced  themselves  ahead  in  the  world 
of  business  were  not  Hkely  to  rest  until  they  had  won  a  place  for 
themselves  in  poHtics.  They  were  the  ''captains  of  industry," 
and  they  were  more  important  to  the  nation  than  old-fashioned 
feudal  nobles.  Why  then  should  they  not  be  given  positions  of 
power  and  dignity  in  the  government  ?  Why  should  not  they  be 
the  trusted  advisers  of  the  king  ?  Why  should  they  not  be  the 
upper  class  instead  of  the  middle  class  ? 

Over  and  above  natural  ambition,  the  middle  class,  and  es- 
pecially the  factory-owners,  had  economic  motives  for  poHtical 
activity,  (i)  The  burdensome  royal  regulations,  Economic 
inherited  from  mercantihst  legislators,  interfered  Motives  for 
with  the  new  methods  of  machine-production  and  Activity 
must  be  abohshed.  Cloth  must  be  made  in  the  of  the 
cheapest  way  possible,  not  as  some  ancient  statute  ^°"^seoisie 
prescribed.  Industry  must  be  set  free.  (2)  In  the  second 
place,  the  factory-owners  wanted  poUtical  power  in  order  to 
prevent  the  factory-hands  from  forming  trade-unions  or  de- 
manding higher  wages.  (3)  Moreover,  there  were  customs 
duties  on  grain,  which  increased  the  cost  of  living,  and  thus 
made  it  necessary  to  pay  higher  wages  ;  there  were  often  customs 
duties  on  the  raw  materials  for  manufacture ;  and  there  were 
many  vexatious  hindrances  to  commerce,  such  as  tolls,  interior 
customs  lines,  etc.  All  of  these  must  be  done  away  with.  In 
making  their  demands,  the  middle  class  reUcd  not  so  much  on 


90  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE  ) 

numerical  strength  as  on  other  sources  of  influence.  After 
all,  the  bankers,  factory-owners,  and  merchants  were  few  com- 
pared with  the  great  mass  of  the  population.  But  they  were 
wealthy  and  could  afford  to  buy  votes  or  seats  in  Parliament. 
PoUticai  They  were  energetic,  domineering,  and  self-reliant. 
Influence  They  claimed,  moreover,  to  represent  ''industry"; 
^       .  .    since  the  greatness  of  a  nation  depended  upon  the 

Bourgeoisie  .        ,  ^    .  ^ 

prosperity  of  its  industries,  these  men  who  represented 
industry  had  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  It  was  felt  that  if 
business  were  prosperous,  the  government  would  have  plentiful 
resources.  The  rate  of  wages  was  also  said  to  depend  upon  pros- 
perity, and  capitahsts,  then  as  now,  could  say  that  if  business 
was  disturbed,  many  would  be  thrown  out  of  work.  By  dwelHng 
upon  this  argument  the  bourgeoisie  could  usually  obtain  the 
support  of  the  workingmen  and  of  the  shopkeepers  in  times  of 
stress,  and  threaten  revolution  in  order  to  enforce  bourgeois 
demands. 

The  effect  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  strengthening  the 
poHtical  influence  of  the  middle  classes  can  be  seen  most  clearly 
Middle  England.    Parhament,  as  we  have  noticed  in  an 

class  earHer  chapter,^  had  come  under  the  control  of  a 

Achieve^  small  group  of  Tory  landlords  and  Whig  nobles,  and 
ments  in  therefore  afforded  practically  no  direct  representation 
England:  ^^iQ  middle  classes.    Great  industrial  towns  Hke 

Repre- 
sentation in   Manchester  and  Birmingham  were  without  repre- 

ParUament,  sentatives  in  the  House  of  Commons,  while  scores  of 
1832 

Httle  villages  sent  two  members  each  to  Parhament. 
Reform  had  often  been  talked  of  before,  but  in  1832  the  bour- 
geoisie had  become  strong  enough  to  carry  a  Reform  Bill  which 
gave  representation  to  the  larger  factory  towns  and  enfran- 
chised the  richer  classes  in  town  and  country. 

Of  this  Reform  Bill  of  1832  we  shall  speak  at  greater  length 
in  the  following  chapter ;  for  the  present  we  are  interested  in  it 
only  as  a  political  result  of  the  Industrial  Revolution.  We  shall 
be  content  at  this  point  to  observe  (i)  that  the  towns  enfran- 
chised were  predominantly  factory- towns,  (2)  that  the  people 
who  demanded  parHamentary  reform  most  zealously,  and 
profited  most  by  it,  were  the  members  of  the  industrial  bour- 

^  See  Vol.  I,  ch.  xiv. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  .  91 

geoisie.  In  Manchester,  for  instance,  the  reform  gave  votes  to 
6726  'Hen-pound"  householders  out  of  a  total  population  of 
187,022  persons ;  that  is,  the  well-to-do  business  men,  \Vho  could 
afford  to  Hve  in  fine  houses,  were  enfranchised.  The  middle  class 
had  gained  a  voice  in  the  House  of  Commons. 

When  the  factory-owners  tried  to  use  their  new  power,  how- 
ever, they  discovered  that  Parhament  was  only  half -reformed. 
The  House  of  Lords,  aristocratic  in  its  very  constitu-  ^      ,  , 

11  111  1      r    1      Tx  Control  of 

tion,  could  set  at  naught  the  demands  of  the  House  Municipal 
of  Commons.    A  test  case  came  up  in  1835.    The  ^g^^"Vg^g 
men  who  had   championed  parHamentary  reform 
were  then  advocating  a  reform  of  municipal  corporations,  and 
had  a  majority  for  the  reform  in  the  Lower  House,  but  encountered 
stubborn  opposition  in  the  House  of  Lords.    In  their  anger  some 
of  the  Reformers  even  threatened  to  abohsh  that  ancient  and 
honorable  institution.    Finally,  the  bill  was  passed,  doing  away 
with  the  oligarchic  town  corporations  which  had  tyrannized  over 
many  of  the  cities,  and  allowing  all  ratepayers  to  vote  for  alder- 
men and  mayor.    This  was  a  second  triumph  for  the  middle 
class,  and  allowed  the  newly-rich  factory-owners  to  supplant  the 
old  cHques  in  municipal  pohtics.    It  also  dealt  a  blow  at  the 
prestige  of  the  aristocratic  House  of  Lords. 

The  greatest  achievement  of  the  middle  class  in  England 
was  the  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  in  1846.    The  ''Corn  Laws"  ^ 
were  parliamentary  statutes  forbidding  the  importa- 
tion of  foreign  wheat  unless  the  average  price  of  ^^^s^^' 
wheat  in  the  United  Kingdom  was  705.  per  quarter.-  Opposition 
If  wheat  was  scarce  and  vSold  for  over  705.,  foreign  corn\aws 
wheat  was  admitted  under  a  heavy  duty,  which  be- 
came lighter  as  the  price  of  wheat  rose.    The  effect  of  this 
duty  was  to  make  bread  very  expensive  and  in  hard  times  to 
cause  untold  misery  to  the  poor.    Nevertheless,  the  landowners 
defended  the  Corn  Laws,  because  high  prices  meant  high  rents, 
and  because  they  thought  that  England  ought  to  raise  her  own 
grain.    The  new  manufacturing  class,  however,  believing  in  the 
theories  which  Adam  Smith  had  formulated,  complained  that  the 


^  "Corn"  meant  grain,  not  simply  maize. 
2  In  1 81 5,  the  normal  price  had  been  fixed  at  805.  per  quarter, 
to  70J.  in  1822. 


It  was  changed 


92  .     HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Corn  Laws  increased  the  cost  of  living,  and  thus  not  only  caused 
much  suffering  but  made  it  necessary  for  manufacturers  to  pay 
higher  Wages.  Many  of  the  bourgeoisie  were  opposed  to  any 
kind  of  a  protective  tariff.  They  thought  the  duty  of  ()d.  a 
pound  on  raw  wool  handicapped  the  British  textile  industries. 
Such  duties,  it  was  claimed,  prevented  free  exchange  between 
nations,  and,  if  other  nations  were  not  free  to  sell  their  products 
to  England,  how  could  England  expect  other  nations  to  buy  her 
manufactures?  For  these  reasons  the  leading  merchants  of 
London  as  early  as  1820  asked  Parliament  to  repeal  the  protec- 
tive tariff.  The  protective  system  gave  way  little  by  little : 
duties  on  silk  were  reduced  in  1824;  on  raw  wool,  in  1825. 
But  the  landlords  would  not  surrender  the  Corn  Laws  without 
a  severe  struggle. 

The  agitation  against  the  Corn  Laws  was  determined,  per- 
sistent, and  well-organized.  In  1838  the  Anti-Corn  Law  League 
was  formed  to  work  for  the  free  importation  of  wheat,  and 
found  gifted  leaders  in  Richard  Cobden  and  John  Bright,  two 
remarkable  manufacturers.  Richard  Cobden  owned  cotton- 
printing  works  at  Manchester  and  at  Sabden.  John  Bright  was 
the  son  and  partner  of  a  Rochdale  mill-owner.  Cobden  supplied 
the  arguments.  Bright  the  passionate  oratory.  They  well  knew 
that  cheaper  flour  would  benefit  their  own  class,  the  factory- 
owners,  and  they  eloquently  demonstrated  to  the  workmen  that 
the  Corn  Laws  were  responsible  for  the  sufferings  of  the  poor. 
Other  factory-owners  generously  contributed  to  the  campaign 
funds,  while  Cobden,  Bright,  and  others  harangued  mass- 
meetings  throughout  the  country,  and  pamphlets  were  given  out 
by  the  million. 

Nature  assisted  the  Free  Traders.  The  harvest  of  1845  was 
seriously  injured  by  rain,  and  the  potato  crop,  upon  which 
Repeal  of  Ireland  depended,  was  ruined  by  the  bhght.  Thou- 
the  Com  sands  died  of  starvation.  To  prevent  thousands  more 
Laws,  1846  fj-Qj^  falling  victims  to  famine,  the  Corn  Laws  had  to 
be  repealed.  Although  a  majority  of  the  Conservatives,  rep- 
resenting the  landed  interests,  were  anxious  to  maintain  the 
tariff,  a  Corn  Law  Repeal  Bill  was  proposed  by  Sir  Robert 
Peel,  the  Conservative  prime  minister,  whose  father,  by  the  way, 
owned  a  cotton  mill.    The  bill  was  carried  by  a  combination  of 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


the  223  Liberals  with  104  Conservatives  against  129  Conserva- 
tives. By  its  provisions  all  duties  on  grain  were  to  be  abolished 
within  three  years ;  and  in  the  same  year  duties  on  foreign 
manufactures  were  greatly  reduced.  Soon  after  the  Corn  Laws 
were  repealed,  Sir  Robert  Peel  had  to  resign  the  leadership  of 
the  Conservatives,  since  he  had  defied  his  party  in  advocating 
the  repeal.  Richard  Cobden,  it  is  interesting  to  notice,  received 
nearly  £80,000  as  a  spontaneous  and  grateful  tribute  from  his 
friends  and  followers. 

The  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  in  1846  marks  the  triumph  of  the 
middle  classes  in  England  over  the  old  aristocracy.  By  the 
Reform  Act  of  1832  they  had  secured  representation  in  ParHa- 
ment ;  by  the  Municipal  Reform  of  1835  they  had  gained  control 
of  municipal  politics ;  and  they  had  defeated  the  landowners 
on  the  tariff  issue.  The  next  phase  of  the  struggle  in  England 
was  to  be  characterized  by  the  attempts  of  the  workingmen  to 
gain  political  power  and  to  better  themselves. 

In  France  the  Industrial  Revolution  did  not  get  thoroughly 
under  way  until  after  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  and  in- 
deed not  until  1825,  when  the  prohibition  on  the  ex-  xhe  New 
port  of  machinery  from  England  was  removed.  France,  industry 
moreover,  had  a  larger  number  of  small  farmers  than 
England,  who  represented  the  agricultural  interests  as  over 
against  the  industrial  classes  of  the  cities.    Throughout  the 
greater  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  majority  of  the 
French  people  lived  entirely  by  agriculture. 

French  industry,  though  less  important  than  English,  never- 
theless grew  rapidly.  In  1789  only  250,000  tons  of  coal  were 
mined  in  France;  in  1830,  1,800,000  tons  were  produced.  In 
1822  France  exported  to  the  United  States  and  England  99,000,- 
000  francs'  worth  of  silk ;  in  1847  the  figure  had  risen  to  165,000,- 
000  francs.  In  1788  the  value  of  woolen  exports  was  24,000,000 
francs;  in  1838,  80,000,000.  The  cotton  industry  tripled  m  the 
25  years  from  181 5  to  1840. 

This  industrial  expansion  was  partly  the  cause  and  partly 
the  result  of  the  increasing  political  power  of  the  French  middle 
classes.  During  the  reign  of  Charles  X  the  bourgeoisie  had  been 
offended  by  the  rcassertion  of  the  old  aristocratic  spirit,  and  had 
suffered  financial  injuries.    For  instance,  the  interest  on  govern- 


94 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


mcnt  bonds  was  cut  down  from  5  per  cent  to  3  per  cent  in  1825  ; 
in  the  following  year,  moreover,  the  duty  on  wool  was  raised  to  30 
j)er  cent  and  that  on  steel  to  100  per  cent,  while  the  tariff  on  grain 
remained  at  a  high  level.  The  manufacturers  thus  were  forced 
to  pay  dearly  for  the  steel  of  which  their  machines  were  made, 
for  the  raw  wool  of  which  they  made  cloth,  and  for  their  food. 

All  this  was  changed,  however,  by  the  Revolution  of  1830, 
which  put  Louis  Philippe  on  the  throne  as  a  constitutional  mon- 
arch. The  aristocratic  Chamber  of  Peers  was  now 
Bourgeoisie  weakened  and  subordinated  to  the  middle-class 
and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  elected  by  200  franc  tax- 
^iiS^o^^^  payers.  From  1830  to  1848  France  was  a  middle- 
class  monarchy.  Yet  the  king  and  the  bourgeoisie 
were  not  completely  in  harmony.  While  on  the  one  hand  the 
The  Middle-  ^^i^dle  classes  defended  Louis  Philippe  against  the 
class  supporters  of  the  old  regime,  against  the  working- 

of  LouS*^  class  Republicans,  against  any  kind  of  social  revolu- 
Phiiippe,  tion ;  on  the  other  hand  jealousy  betrayed  them  into 
1830-1848    j^any  quarrels  with  the  king  and  with  each  other. 

During  the  first  part  of  Louis  Philippe's  reign  the  bourgeoisie 
feared  that  the  "Legitimists,"  as  the  supporters  of  Charles  X 
were  called,  would  dethrone  Louis  Philippe,  and  that  the  Re- 
publican agitators  would  incite  the  people  of  Paris  to  revolt 
against  the  monarchy.  Consequently  newspapers  were  forbid- 
den to  print  attacks  upon  the  existing  government,  and  fines 
were  imposed  on  journals  which  sympathized  too  strongly  either 
with  Legitimist  or  Republican  views.  The  business  men  de- 
manded peace  and  order  :  they  were  satisfied  with  things  as  they 
were,  and  became  a  ''party  of  resistance"  to  further  change. 
When  the  danger  from  Legitimists  and  Republicans  passed,  the 
ruling  party  itself  split  up.  One  faction  under  Thiers  held  that 
the  ministry  should  be  responsible  to  the  Chamber,  not  to  the 
king.  ''The  king  reigns  and  does  not  govern."  This  group 
would  have  made  the  king  a  figurehead  for  the  rule  of  the  middle 
classes.  Thiers  was  prime  minister  in  1840,  but  he  lost  his  pop- 
ularity because,  by  appealing  to  the  Napoleonic  tradition  of  mili- 
tary glory,  he  almost  involved  France  in  war.  The  business 
men  were  afraid  war  would  disturb  industry,  and  Guizot,  the 
chief  of  the  rival  faction,  who  succeeded  Thiers,  and  was  min- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  95 


ister  from  1840  to  1848,  steadfastly  endeavored  to  maintain 
peace  abroad  and  order  at  home.  He  made  sure  of  a  majority 
in  the  Chamber  by  purchasing  the  support  both  of  electors  and 
deputies  with  government  offices,  tobacco  licenses,  and  other 
pecuniary  favors.  When  a  newspaper  censured  the  government, 
he  brought  suit  against  the  editor.  When  Radicals  demanded 
that  the  number  of  voters  should  be  increased,  Guizot  retorted  : 
''Work  and  grow  rich,  and  you  will  become  voters." 

What  reforms  were  made  during  the  ''July  Monarchy"  were 
essentially  middle-class  reforms,  and  strongly  resembled  the 
contemporaneous  reforms  in  England.    There  was  a 
municipal  reform  in  1831,  by  which  the  municipal  ^^^g^®" 
councils  were  made  elective,  only  the  largest  taxpayers  Political 
and  professional  men  being  allowed  to  vote.    There  Achieve- 

.  ,        .  .    ,  ments  in 

was  a  tariri  reform,  moderating  some  of  the  most  France 
burdensome  duties,  though  little  was  done  along  this  ^^^^ 
line  till  after  1848.    There  was  an  educational  reform  phUippe 
(1^33)?  providing  primary  schools  in  the  communes; 
the  number  of  pupils  increased  75  per  cent  during  the  reign  of 
Louis  Philippe. 

The  immediate  political  results  of  the  Industrial  Revolution 
were  strikingly  similar  in  France  to  those  in  England.  In  both 
countries  the  middle  classes  became  rich,  and  obtained  an  influ- 
ence in  the  legislature  under  a  constitutional  monarchy.  In 
France  it  was  by  the  Revolution  of  1830.  In  England  it  was  by 
the  almost  revolutionary  reform  agitation  of  1832.  In  both 
countries,  the  middle  class,  having  acquired  power,  supported 
middle-class  reforms,  and  refused  to  extend  political  rights  to  the 
lower  classes.  In  both  countries,  the  lower  classes  were  restless, 
and  many  workmen  listened  readily  to  democratic  and  socialistic 
agitators. 

In  Germany,  or  rather  in  the  Germanics,  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution was  even  more  backward  than  in  France.    While  the 
Continent  had  been  disturbed  by  wars  (1793-1815),  ^^^-^^^ 
English  manufacturers   had  been  perfecting  their  industry 
machinery  until  now  they  could  undersell  German 
producers.    The  first  political  result  of  the  Industrial 
Revolution  in  Germany  was,  therefore,  a  demand  for  a  protective 
tariff.    Each  little  state  placed  duties  on  imported  manufactures, 


96 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


in  order  to  encourage  domestic  industry.  There  were  so  many 
German  states,  however,  that  this  multipHcity  of  customs  duties 
seriously  interfered  with  commerce.  Hoping  to  overcome  this 
difficulty,  Prussia  in  1818  established  a  uniform  tariff  for  all  parts 
of  the  Prussian  kingdom,  with  a  10  per  cent  duty  on  manufactured 
goods,  and  20  per  cent  on  colonial  products.  Prussia  then 
invited  other  German  states  to  adopt  the  same  regulations  and 
to  unite  their  customs  administrations  with  hers.  After  much 
The  hesitation  most  of  the  German  states  joined  with 

ZoUverein  Prussia,  and  on  i  January,  1834,  the  Zollverein,  or 
Customs  Union,  went  into  effect  between  Prussia,  Saxony,  Bava- 
ria, and  fourteen  other  German  states.  Hanover,  Baden,  Nassau, 
Brunswick,  Luxemburg,  and  Frankfort-on-Main  entered  the 
union  later;  Austria  remained  outside.  German  merchants 
might  now  trade  as  freely  within  the  Zollverein  as  though  Ger- 
many were  a  united  nation,  and  still  German  manufacturers  were 
protected  against  their  British  and  French  competitors  by  the 
common  customs  tariff. 

This  economic  union,  brought  about  in  the  interests  of  mer- 
chants and  manufacturers,  with  Prussia  at  its  head,  paved  the 
way  for  political  union.  The  business  men  learned  to  disregard 
state  boundaries  and  to  think  of  the  Zollverein  as  a  nation. 
Railways  were  built  —  400  miles  between  1835  and  1840  —  and 
bound  the  country  more  closely  together.  The  rulers  and  the 
nobility  of  each  petty  principality  might  resent  any  attack  upon 
the  independence  of  their  realm,  and  the  quarrels  between  Austria 
and  Prussia  might  disturb  the  German  Confederation ;  but  be- 
hind the  scenes,  the  Industrial  Revolution  was  preparing  the 
stage-setting  for  the  political  unification  of  Germany. 

Under  the  auspices  of  the  Zollverein,  German  industry  increased 
by  leaps  and  bounds,  and  machine-production  rapidly  took  the 
place  of  hand-labor.  In  the  years  1 836-1 840  the  raw  cotton  an- 
nually used  by  German  manufacturers  amounted  only  to  185,000 
cwts. ;  fifteen  years  later  more  than  500,000  cwts.  were  being 
spun  every  year.  And  the  spinning  machines  were  so  improved 
that  in  1852  each  spindle  was  working  twice  as  rapidly  as  in  1836. 
The  industrial  class  increased  in  numbers ;  the  bourgeoisie  grew 
richer  and  more  powerful;  and  by  1848  the  middle  class  in 
Germany  was  following  the  example  of  the  middle  class  in 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


France  and  England,  in  demanding  a  voice  in  the  government. 
The  effect  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  Germany  was  pri- 
marily to  unify  the  country,  and  then  to  bring  about  political 
reform. 

ADDITIONAL  READING 

General.  Brief  accounts:  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  De- 
velopment of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch.  xviii;  Archibald  Weir, 
An  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Modern  Europe  (1907),  ch.  vii-ix ;  Gilbert 
Slater,  The  Making  of  Modern  England,  new  rev.  ed.  (191 5),  introductory 
chapter;  A.  D.  Innes,  England'' s  Industrial  Development  (191 2),  Book  III; 
G.  H.  Perris,  The  Industrial  History  of  Modern  England  (19 14),  ch.  ii-v; 
E.  P.  Cheyney,  An  Introductio7i  to  the  Industrial  and  Social  History  of 
England  (1901),  ch.  vii,  viii;  G.  T.  Warner,  Landmarks  in  English  In- 
dustrial History,  nth  ed.  (1912),  ch.  xv-xvii;  William  Cunningham,  An 
Essay  on  Western  Civilization  in  its  Economic  Aspects,  Vol.  II  (1910), 
pp.  225-267;  W.  J.  Ashley,  The  Economic  Organization  of  England:  an 
Outline  History  (1914),  lect.  vii,  viii.  More  detailed  treatments:  Paul 
Mantoux,  La  revolution  industrielle  au  XV IIP  siecle  (1906),  probably  the 
best  general  work,  unfortunately  not  translated  into  English;  H.  de  B. 
Gibbins,  Industry  in  England,  6th  ed.  (1910),  ch.  xx-xxvi,  and,  by  the  same 
author.  Economic  and  Industrial  Progress  of  the  Century  (1903),  containing 
chapters  on  France  and  Germany  as  well  as  England,  perhaps  the  best 
general  narrative  in  English ;  William  Cunningham,  The  Growth  of  English 
Industry  and  Commerce  in  Modern  Times,  5th  ed.,  3  vols.  (1910-1912), 
Vol.  Ill  covering  the  years  1 776-1850;  Arnold  Toynbee,  Lectures  on  the 
Industrial  Revolution  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  in  England,  new  ed.  (1913), 
fugitive  lectures,  originally  published  in  1884,  by  the  scholar  who  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  phrase  "  Industrial  Revolution  " ;  Carnbridge  Modern 
History,  Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  xxiii  on  economic  changes  at  the  opening  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  and  ch.  xxiv  on  the  early  British  economists; 
R.  H.  I.  Palgrave,  Dictionary  of  Political  Ecofiomy,  5  vols.  (1910-1913),  a 
reference  work  on  topics  connected  with  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  Great 
Britain,  and  Johannes  Conrad,  Handworterbuch  der  Staatswissenschaft, 
3d  rev.  ed.,  8  vols,  (i 909-191 1),  a  similar  work,  valuable  for  its  scholarly 
articles  on  German  industry. 

Inventions  and  Inventors.  C.  H.  Cochrane,  Modern  Industrial  Progress 
(1904),  a  popular  description;  E.  W.  Byrn,  The  Progress  of  Invention  in 
the  Nineteenth  Century  (1900) ;  Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  for  lives 
of  such  famous  inventors  as  Kay,  Arkwright,  Hargreaves,  Cartwright, 
Crompton,  Newcomen,  Watt,  Stephenson,  etc. ;  Sir  Edward  Baines,  His- 
tory of  the  Cotton  Manufacture  in  Great  Britain  (1835),  a  celebrated  old 
history  of  the  subject;  M.  S.  Woolman  and  E.  B.  McGowan,  Textiles:  a 
Handbook  for  the  Student  and  the  Consumer  (1913),  affording  up-to-date 
illustrations  of  technical  processes ;  R.  H.  Thurston,  History  of  the  Growth 
yoL.  1}  —  H 


98 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


oj  the  Steam  Engine,  new  ed.  (1902),  in  the  "  International  Scientific  Series," 
an  admirable  popular  account ;  Samuel  Smiles,  Lives  of  the  Engineers 
Boulton  and  Watt  (1904),  and,  by  the  same  author,  George  and  Robert  Stephen- 
son (1904) ;  R.  L.  Galloway,  History  of  Coal  Mining  iji  Great  Britain  (1882), 
and,  by  the  same  author.  Annals  of  Coal  Mining  and  the  Coal  Trade  (1898) ; 
H.  W.  Dickinson,  Robert  Fulton,  Engineer  and  Artist:  his  Life  and  Works 
(1913),  an  excellent  study;  E.  A.  Pratt,  A  History  of  Inland  Transporta- 
tion and  Communication  in  England  (191 2) ;  A.  T.  Hadley,  Railroad  Trans- 
portation, its  History  and  its  Laws  (1903) ;  A,  W.  Kirkaldy  and  A.  D. 
Evans,  The  History  and.  Economics  of  Transport  (191 5),  an  admirable 
work;  Henry  Fry,  History  of  North  Atlantic  Steam  Navigation,  with 
Some  Account  of  Early  Ships  and  Shipowners  (1896) ;  G.  R.  Porter,  Progress 
of  the  Nation  in  its  Various  Social  and  Industrial  Relations,  ed.  by  F.  W. 
Hirst  (191 2),  a  new  and  convenient  edition  of  a  well-known  work  first  pub- 
lished in  1851 ;  Arthur  von  Mayer,  Geschichte  und  Geographic  der  deutschen 
Eisenbahnen  von  ihrer  Entstehung  bis  .  .  .  18 go,  2  vols.  (1891),  an  ex- 
haustive study  of  the  history  of  railway  construction  in  the  Germanics. 
Popular  treatments  of  more  recent  inventions  are  to  be  found  in  the 
"  Romance  of  Reality  "  Series. 

Social  and  Economic  Effects  of  the  Industrial  Revolution.  D.  H. 
Macgregor,  The  Evolution  of  Industry  (191 2),  a  handy  little  volume  in  the 
"  Home  University  Library  " ;  J.  A.  Hobson,  The  Evolution  of  Modern 
Capitalism:  a  Study  of  Machine  Production,  new  rev.  ed.  (191 2),  excellent, 
especially  ch.  i,  v,  xvi,  xvii;  Leone  Levi,  History  of  British  Commerce 
and  of  the  Economic  Progress  of  the  British  Nation,  1763-1870  (1872),  a 
standard  treatise;  A.  F.  Weber,  The  Growth  of  Cities  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  (1899),  a  valuable  statistical  survey;  M.  G.  Mulhall,  The  Dic- 
tionary of  Statistics,  4th  rev.  ed.  (1899),  together  with  the  supplementary 
volume  of  A.  D.  Webb,  The  New  Dictionary  of  Statistics  (191 1),  an  indis- 
pensable work  of  reference;  J.  L.  and  Barbara  Hammond,  The  Village 
Laborer,  1760-18 32:  a  Study  in  the  Government  of  England  before  the  Re- 
form Bill  (191 1);  R.  W.  C.  Taylor,  The  Modern  Factory  System  (1891), 
uncritical  but  still  useful ;  Allen  Clarke,  The  Effects  of  the  Factory  System 
(1899) ;  Charles  Watney  and  J.  A.  Little,  Industrial  Warfare,  the  Aims 
and  Claims  of  Capital  and  Labour  (191 2);  A.  L.  Bowley,  Wages  in  the 
United  Kingdom  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1900);  A.  C.  Pigou,  Unem- 
ployment (1914),  a  brief  sketch  of  one  of  the  gravest  problems  intensified 
by  the  Industrial  Revolution,  in  the  Home  University  Library."  Famous 
contemporary  pictures  of  the  life  of  the  industrial  proletariat :  Friedrich 
Engels,  The  Condition  of  the  Working-Class  in  England  in  1844;  Benjamin 
Disraeli,  Sybil,  or.  The  Two  Nations;  Charles  Kingsley,  Alton  Locke; 
Charles  Dickens,  Oliver  Twist;  and  for  French  factory-life  the  painstaking 
study  of  L.  R.  Villerme,  Tableau  de  Tetat  physique  et  moral  des  ouvriers 
employes  dans  les  manufactures  de  colon,  de  laine  et  de  soie,  2  vols.  (1840). 
Later  studies  of  the  condition  of  the  working  class  in  France :  M.  R.  L. 
Reybaud,  Rapport  sur  la  condition  morale,  intellectuelle  et  materielle  de^ 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


ouvriers  qui  vivent  de  Vindustrie  de  la  soie  (i860),  le  colon  (1862),  la  laine 
(1865),  le  fer  et  la  houille  (1872),  all  in  the  Memoir es  de  Vacademie  des  sciences 
morales  et  poHHques;  Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu,  La  question  ouvribre  au  XIX^ 
siecle,  2d  ed.  (1881),  and,  by  the  same  author,  Le  travail  des  femmes  au 
XIX*  siecle  (1888) ;  Emile  Levasseur,  La  population  frangaise,  3  vols. 
(1889-1892) ;  Octave  Festy,  Le  mouvement  ouvricr  au  debut  de  la  monarchie 
dejuillet,  2  vols.  (1908).  With  special  reference  to  the  rise  of  the  factory- 
system  in  the  Germanics:  Werner  Sombart,  Der  moderne  Capitalismus, 
2  vols.  (1902),  and,  by  the  same  author.  Die  deutsche  Volkswirtschaft  im 
neunzehnten  Jahrhundert  (1903). 

Economic  Individualism.  The  best  guide  for  the  study  of  the  classical 
economists  —  the  laisser-faire  advocates  of  the  time  —  is  Charles  Gide 
and  Charles  Rist,  A  History  of  Economic  Doctrines  from  the  Time  of  the 
Physiocrats^  Eng.  trans.  (191 5),  Book  I,  ch.  iii,  Books  II-IV.  Strong 
pleas  for  individualism  are  made  by  Herbert  Spencer  in  several  of  his  works, 
especially  in  Man  versus  the  State  (1884),  and  by  Wordsworth  Donisthorpe, 
Individualism,  a  System  of  Politics  (1889). 

Beginnings  of  Modern  Socialism.  John  Spargo,  Socialism :  a  Summary 
and  Interpretation  of  Socialist  Principles,  new  rev.  ed.  (1909) ;  Thomas 
Kirkup,  A  History  of  Socialism,  5th  rev.  ed.  (1913) ;  Werner  Sombart, 
Socialism  and  the  Social  Movement  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  ly^o-iSgO, 
trans,  by  A.  P.  Atterbury  (1898) ;  W.  D.  Guthrie,  Socialism  before  the  French 
Revolution:  a  History  (1907) ;  Frank  Podmore,  Robert  Owen,  a  Biography, 
2  vols.  (1906);  Robert  Owen,  Life,  written  by  himself,  2  vols.  (1857);  J. 
Tchernoff,  Louis  Blanc  (1904),  a  French  biography  in  the  "  Bibliotheque 
socialiste  " ;  Gaston  Isambert,  Les  idSes  socialistes  en  France  de  181 5  d, 
1848:  le  social isme  fond S  sur  la  fraternity  et  Vunion  des  classes  (1905). 

Immediate  Political  Effects.  For  the  establishment  of  free  trade  in 
Great  Britain,  see  Gilbert  Slater,  The  Making  of  Modern  England,  new 
rev.  ed.  (1915),  ch.  xi;  Bernard  Holland,  The  Fall  of  Protection,  1840- 
1850  (1913) ;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  i;  John 
(Viscount)  Morley,  Life  of  Richard  Cobden,  2  vols.  (1881) ;  G.  M.  Trevelyan, 
The  Life  of  John  Bright  (1914) ;  Lord  Rosebery,  Sir  Robert  Peel  (1899) ; 
C.  S.  Parker,  Life  of  Sir  Robert  Peel,  3  vols.  (1891-1899) ;  Memoirs  of  Sir 
Robert  Peel,  2  vols.  (1856-1857).  For  the  establishment  of  the  Zollverein 
in  Germany :  W.  H.  Dawson,  Protection  in  Germany,  a  History  of  German 
Fiscal  Policy  during  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1904),  ch.  i,  ii;  Benjamin 
Rand,  Selections  illustrating  Economic  History  since  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
5th  ed.  (1911),  ch,  viii;  Wilhelm  Oncken,  Das  Zeitalter  des  Kaisers  Wil- 
helm.  Vol.  I  (1890),  Book  I,  Das  deutsche  Biirgerthum  und  sein  Eintritt  ins 
Staatsleben.  For  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe  in  France,  and  for  additional 
results  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  western  and  central  Europe,  con- 
sult the  bibliography  appended  to  Chapter  XIX. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


DEMOCRATIC  REFORM  AND  REVOLUTION,  1830-1848 

DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTION 

Had  the  social  influence  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  stopped 
short  with  the  exaltation  of  the  moneyed  class,  the  lot  of  the 
working  classes  to-day  would  have  been  wholly  miserable ;  but 
while  with  one  hand  the  Industrial  Revolution  dealt  the  masses 
untold  injury,  with  the  other  it  held  out  a  bright  promise  of  the 
future.  To  offset  the  evils  of  the  factory-system  it  offered  a 
political  remedy,  a  remedy  which  had  never  before  been  seriously 
tried,  —  democracy. 

Inasmuch  as  political  democracy  is  both  a  novel  experiment 
and  a  fundamental  principle  of  modern  government,  it  is  well 
Meaning  of  worth  while  to  make  sure  of  its  meaning.  ''Democ- 
Poiiticai  racy"  is  derived  from  a  Greek  word  meaning  the 
Democracy  ^^^^  ^-^q  people.  The  Greeks,  however,  meant  not 
the  rule  of  all  the  people,  but  only  of  the  free  citizens :  the 
slaves  who  constituted  a  considerable  part  of  the  population  in 
ancient  times  were  absolutely  deprived  of  pohtical  power,  and 
were  not  accounted  among  ''the  people."  Modern  times  have 
given  to  democracy  a  wider  signification,  and  to  the  conception 
of  "the  people"  a  larger  scope,  including  all  men,  rich  and  poor 
alike,  and  perhaps  even  women.  How  to  give  practical  effect 
to  the  will  of  the  people  was  discovered  neither  in  the  nineteenth 
nor  completely  as  yet  in  the  twentieth  century;  but  pohtical 
democracy  has  come  to  mean  a  fairly  definite  thing :  obedience 
in  pohtical  affairs  to  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  people,  as 
that  will  is  manifested  through  regular  pohtical  channels. 

Real  political  democracy  in  Europe  was  first  made  possible, 
as  we  hope  presently  to  demonstrate,  and  first  made  imperative, 
by  the  Industrial  Revolution.  Spasmodic  gropings  after  demo- 
cratic government  appeared  during  the  period  from  1830  to 

100 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  loi 


1848,  in  Great  Britain,  France,  Belgium,  Germany,  Austria, 
Italy,  Hungary,  in  turn  as  these  countries  felt  the  influence 
of  the  Industrial  Revolution.  Those  years  might  be  called  the 
period  of  democracy's  infar.cy.  Ever  since,  the  peoples  of 
Europe  have  gone  on,  experimenting  with  the  ballot,  the 
pUhiscite,  electoral  reform,  and  all  the  machinery  of  majority 
rule,  and  have  discovered  hitherto  unsuspected  possibiHties  as 
well  as  perils  in  popular  sovereignty. 

PoUtical  democracy  has  a  very  definite  meaning  as  an  ideal 
of  government  and  it  is  possible  to  trace  its  development  step 
by  step.  But  back  of  poUtical  democracy  there  is  a  -p^Q 
certain  faith  in  human  nature,  a  spirit  commanding  Democratic 
^Hhe  rights  of  the  people  to  be  observed,"  a  pro- 
found  belief  that  all  men  should  have,  so  far  as  possible,  equal 
opportunities  and  equal  privileges,  a  feeling  which  for  lack  of  a 
better  name  we  call  the  democratic  spirit.  In  this  democratic 
spirit  may  be  detected,  perhaps,  several  diverse  elements.  First 
of  all  we  must  acknowledge  its  debt  to  Christianity.  By  placing 
emphasis  on  the  equahty  of  all  men  in  the  sight  of  God,  re- 
gardless of  rank  or  wealth,  and  by  enjoining  all  Christians  to 
love  their  neighbors  as  themselves,  Christianity  gave  Europe  a 
great  and  lasting  lesson  —  a  lesson  however  slowly  learned  —  in 
true  democracy.  In  the  second  place,  the  French  Revolution  had 
given  to  the  world  the  ringing  watchwords  of  ''liberty,  equahty, 
fraternity,"  with  the  ideas  of  economic  liberty,  equahty  before 
the  law,  and  denial  of  titled  aristocracy,  although  few  outside 
the  middle  classes  were  immediately  admitted  to  a  full  share 
in  those  blessings.  Finally,  the  democratic  movement  received 
its  great  impetus,  and  bitterness,  from  the  economic  grievances 
created  by  the  Industrial  Revolution.  The  horrifying  con- 
ditions in  mine,  in  factory,  and  in  sweatshop  aroused  the  pity 
of  the  philanthropist,  while  the  workmen  were  goaded  to  des- 
peration. With  more  or  less  cooperation,  the  philanthropist 
on  one  hand,  and  the  more  intelligent  workmen  on  the  other, 
set  about  to  end  the  economic  oppression  of  the  masses,  some- 
times by  factory  laws,  sometimes  by  bloody  and  futile  insurrec- 
tions. Since  the  middle  class  had  won  liberty,  why  should  not 
the  working  classes  go  one  step  farther  and  demand  that  all 
men  should  be  truly  free  and  equal,  and  brothers  indeed !  The 


> 


I02 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


democratic  spirit  speedily  expressed  itself  (i)  in  the  agitation 
for  political  democracy,  (2)  in  the  anti-slavery  movement,  (3)  in 
various  attempts  to  relieve  the  distress  of  the  lower  classes, 
(4)  in  various  reforms  in  the  direction  of  rehgious  toleration, 
universal  education,  and  the  reform  of  the  criminal  law. 

If  democracy  was  needed  as  never  before  to  modify  the  re- 
sults of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  it  was  also  more  easy  of 
attainment  than  ever  before.  Feudalism  and  divine-right 
monarchy  had  practically  ceased  to  be  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
poHtical  democracy,  having  been  seriously  impaired  by  the 
bourgeoisie.  The  working  classes  were  congregated  in  great  cities, 
where  they  were  easily  swayed  by  pubhc  opinion  and  easily 
collected  into  mobs.  A  hundred  workers  in  one  factory  were 
more  conscious  of  their  common  interests  than  a  hundred  men 
working  independently  at  home.  Newspapers  could  be  printed 
so  cheaply,  since  the  invention  of  the  steam  printing  press, 
that  poHtical  news  might  circulate  rapidly;  pamphlets  sold  at 
a  penny  apiece  or  were  distributed  gratis,  and  reached  thousands 
who  would  not  have  been  influenced  by  speeches.  Most  impor- 
tant of  all,  during  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  educa- 
tion began  to  make  its  way  among  the  masses,  enabling  work- 
men to  read  their  newspapers  and  to  learn  strange  new  poUtical 
doctrines  from  the  pamphlets  of  radical  philosophers.  By  all 
these  circumstances  the  democratic  movement  profited.  We 
shall  now  study  the  fruits  of  that  movement,  from  1830  to  1848, 
in  political  reform  and  social  legislation  in  Great  Britain,  and  in 
the  revolutionary  movements  of  1848  throughout  the  Continent. 

POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  REFORMS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 

At  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  government  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  conflicted  violently  with  the  demo- 
Lack  of  cratic  principle  in  three  ways.  In  the  first  place. 
Democracy  large  classes  of  the  population  were  excluded  from 
Bri?in^at  Political  rights  on  account  of  rehgion;  secondly,  the 
Opening  of  majority  of  the  people  had  no  voice  in  electing  the 
Centuxy^*^  members  of  ParHament ;  and  thirdly,  ParHament  was 
badly  in  need  of  reform.  In  this  section  we  shall  see 
how  the  first  of  these  defects  was  almost  completely  remedied 
before  1830  and  how  a  start  was  made  on  the  other  two  in  1832. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


Religious  toleration  made  slow  progress  among  the  English 
people.  True,  since  the  Toleration  Act  of  1689,  the  Dissenters 
were  no  longer  imprisoned  for  their  theological  con-  Religious 
victions.  Even  the  Roman  Catholics  were  not  per-  Disabilities 
secuted  as  fiercely  as  two  centuries  before.  But  on  the  statute- 
books  remained  laws  which,  had  the  authorities  executed  them 
rigorously,  would  have  doomed  all  Roman  Cathohc  priests  to 
perpetual  imprisonment,  would  have  fined  Cathohcs  (and 
actually  did  fine  them  as  late  as  1782)  for  not  attending  the 
AngHcan  Church,  would  have  forced  CathoHc  laymen  to  pay 
double  land-taxes,  and  prevented  them  from  inheriting  land. 
Dissenters  and  Cathohcs  aUke  hated  the  Corporation  Act 
(1661),  which  aimed  to  exclude  all  but  Church  of  England  men 
from  the  municipal  corporations,  and  the  Test  Act  (1673), 
which  prevented  Roman  Cathohcs  who  refused  to  renounce 
the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  and  any  who  had  scruples 
against  receiving  communion  as  administered  by  the  Church  of 
England,  from  holding  office  under  the  government  j^^p^^j 
either  in  the  ci\il  service,  in  the  army,  or  in  the  the  Test  ani 
navy.    After  long  agitation,  the  Test  and  Corporation  Corporation 

A  1  1      1    •  r>     n  Acts,  Io2o 

Acts  were  at  last  repealed  m  1828. 

The  Catholics  were  not  yet  satisfied,  for  they  were  still  ex- 
cluded from  Parliament  by  an  act  of  1678  which  obliged  the  mem- 
bers of  both  Houses  to  subscribe  to  a  declaration  that  Roman 
Cathohc  worship  was  idolatrous.  In  Ireland  a  determined 
and  well-organized  movement  to  obtain  equal  polit-  Daniel 
ical  rights  for  Roman  Catholics  was  conducted  under  O'ConneU 
the  leadership  of  Daniel  O'Connell,  a  lawyer  whose  boisterous 
enthusiasm  and  ready  wit  won  him  the  whole-hearted  support 
of  the  Irish  peasantry.  The  serious  character  of  this  propa- 
ganda was  demonstrated  by  the  Clare  election  of  1828,  when 
O'Connell  was  put  forward  against  the  governmental  candidate 
for  the  House  of  Commons.  Between  forty  and  fifty  thousand 
excited  Catholic  peasants,  in  defiance  of  their  angry  Protes- 
tant landlords,  marched  to  the  polls  behind  green  banners. 
Priests  and  pohticians  helped  to  keep  the  rank  and  file 
sober  and  law-abiding.  O'Connell  received  an  overwhelming 
majority,  but  was  excluded  from  Parhament  because  he  re- 
fused to  take  the  required  oath.    The  Clare  election  convinced 


I04 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  Tory  ministry,  however,  that  Ireland  was  not  in  a  mood  to 
be  dalUed  with,  and  Sir  Robert  Peel,  the  [)rime  minister,  was 
about  to  yield  to  O'Connell's  demands  when  King  George  IV 
was  seized  with  obstinacy,  and  dismissed  the  ministry  after  a 
six-hour  harangue,  in  which  brandy  and  passion  prevailed  over 
royal  discretion.  But  on  second  thought  the  king  gave  way, 
and  that  very  night  recalled  his  ministry.  Peel  then  proceeded 
Catholic  P^t  through  Parhament  a  Catholic  Emancipation 

Emancipa-  Bill,  which  rcccivcd  the  royal  assent  on  13  April,  1829, 
tion,  1829  ^j^^  Roman  Catholics  were  admitted  to  all  offices, 
excepting  those  of  Guardian  or  Justice  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
Lord  Lieutenant  or  Lord  Deputy  in  Ireland,  Lord  High  Chancellor, 
Lord  Keeper  of  the  Great  Seal,  and  all  those  of  ecclesiastical  and 
collegiate  establishment.  The  jubilation  of  the  Catholics  over 
this  victory  was  chastened  by  the  simultaneous  disfranchise- 
ment of  almost  200,000  ''forty-shilHng  freeholders"  in  Ireland. 

The  first  step  was  taken  toward  the  accomplishment  of  the 
other  reforms,  —  ix.,  the  enlargement  of  the  suffrage  and  the 
Pariia-  reform  of  Parliament,  — in  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832. 
mentary  With  that  bill,  as  exempHfying  the  triumph  of  the 
Reform  bourgeoisie,  we  already  have  made  some  sHght  ac- 
quaintance; in  the  present  chapter  the  bill  receives  more 
extended  treatment  as  an  important  incident  in  the  struggle  for 
pohtical  democracy.  The  Reform  of  1832  dealt  chiefly  with 
two  great  evils :  the  unrepresentative  character  of  Parliament, 
and  the  narrowness  of  the  franchise. 

These  evils,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  existed  in  Great 
Britain  throughout  the  eighteenth  century.^  Efforts  to  eradi- 
cate them  had  been  frustrated  by  the  hostile  reaction  of  English 
public  opinion  against  the  French  Revolution,  and,  yet,  simul- 
taneously the  Industrial  Revolution  had  brought  them  into 
most  glaring  Hght.  The  Industrial  Revolution  gradually  did 
for  democracy  in  Great  Britain  what  the  French  Revolution 
was  prevented  from  doing.  That  the  Parliament  was  reformed 
in  1832  and  the  franchise  broadened,  was  due  to  a  tremendous 
agitation  on  the  part  of  the  industrial  middle  class. 

^  From  the  "Glorious  Revolution"  of  1689  to  the  Reform  Act  of  1832,  the  Brit- 
ish state  was  essentially  aristocratic  rather  than  democratic.  For  the  nature  of 
the  "  unref ormed "  Parliament,  see  Vol.  I,  pp.  292  f.,  433  ff. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  105 


From  a  review  of  the  facts  of  British  history  recorded  in  the 
two  preceding  chapters,  it  is  obvious  (i)  that  the  Industrial 
Revolution  greatly  increased  the  numbers,  wealth, 
and  prestige  of  the  middle  classes,  (2)  that  these  middle  T?®  Reform 

111-        1    1    •    r  •  11       r  Championed 

classes  beueved  their  future  prosperity,  and,  therefore,  by  the  whig 
the  general  welfare  of  the  whole  country,  depended  upon  ^g^^^f^J^^J^ 
their  abihty  to  remove  mercantilist  restraints  on  classes 
trade  and  industry,  to  destroy  the  special  privileges 
of  the  land-owning  aristocracy,  and  to  estabhsh  complete 
laisser-faire,  (3)  that  the  same  classes,  largely  unrepresented  in 
Parliament,  demanded  the  ballot  for  themselves  in  order  to 
realize  their  economic  and  political  program.  While  the  Tory 
reaction,  headed  by  the  duke  of  Wellington,  was  in  full  swing 
against  ^'Revolution,"  Lord  John  Russell,  a  Whig,  came  forward 
in  18 19  as  the  champion  of  moderate  middle-class  reform. 
Lord  Macaulay,  though  prophesying  that  universal  suffrage 
would  ruin  the  nation,  wrote  magazine  articles  to  prove  that 
a  httle  parliamentary  reform  would  do  much  good.  Earl  Grey, 
leader  of  the  Whig  party,  stately  aristocrat  as  he  was,  used 
parliamentary  reform  as  a  war-cry  against  the  Tory  ministry 
and  as  a  means  of  consolidating  his  own  party  and  attract- 
ing the  middle  classes  to  the  support  of  the  Whigs.  Despite 
the  fact  that  a  small  group  of  Radicals  won  some  favor  with 
workingmen  by  advocating  thorough  political  democracy,  — 
universal  manhood  suffrage,  —  the  reform  advocated  by  the 
Whigs  was  of  distinctly  moderate  character  and  never  embraced 
any  proposal  more  radical  than  the  extension  of  the  suffrage 
to  the  fairly  well-to-do  middle  class.  It  is  interesting  to  note, 
however,  that  many  of  the  more  ignorant  workingmen  joined 
with  their  employers  in  shouting  for  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832, 
stupidly  believing  that  it  contained  provision  for  universal 
manhood  suffrage,  or  would  lead  directly  to  it. 

The  Reform  controversy  began  its  acute  stage  in  the  midst 
of  the  excitement  occasioned  by  the  news  of  the  successful 
revolt  of  the  French  middle  classes  in  1830.  With  heroism 
worthy  of  Waterloo,  the  duke  of  Wellington,  who  was  then 
premier,  declared  emphatically  that  the  old  scheme  of  represen- 
tation was  not  only  without  flaw,  but  perfectly  ''satisfactory" 
to  the  country  at  large.    The  duke's  declaration  caused  his  fall, 


io6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


however,  and  Earl  Grey  formed  a  Whig  ministry  pledged  to 
Reform.  The  first  Reform  Bill  proposed  by  the  Whigs  was 
defeated  early  in  1831.  Strengthened  by  the  elections  of  that 
year,  the  Whigs  in  the  House  of  Commons,  now  a  majority, 
proceeded  to  pass  a  second  Reform  Bill.  The  House  of  Lords, 
stanchly  Tory,  rejected  it.  After  a  short  recess  the  Commons 
passed  a  third  Reform  Bill,  somewhat  altered  from  the  others 
in  detail ;  but  the  Lords  were  still  opposed.  The  ministry  de- 
cided to  resort  to  an  extreme  measure,  the  creation  of  enough 
Coercion  of  new  peers,  pledged  to  support  the  bill,  to  outvote  the 
the  Lords  obstinate  Tory  peers.  But  King  William  IV,  who  had 
been  willing  to  consider  Reform  until  it  had  become  associated 
with  popular  violence,  refused  to  create  the  peers,  accepted 
the  resignations  of  his  angry  Whig  ministers,  and  invited  Well- 
ington again  to  take  command.  The  people  knew  what  brand 
of  Reform  that  battle-scarred  veteran  was  likely  to  give  them, 
and  would  have  none  of  it.  In  Birmingham  a  monster  mass- 
meeting  was  held,  and  the  Reformers  declared  their  dogged 
determination  to  pay  no  more  taxes  until  the  bill  was  passed 
—  a  threat  which  was  repeated  throughout  the  realm.  In 
London,  Francis  Place,  a  philosophical  tailor  who  by  his  own 
efforts  had  made  a  fortune  and  educated  himself,  and  who  stood 
midway  between  the  whole-souled  democrats  of  the  lower  class 
and  the  middle-class  Reformers,  now  exerted  himself  on  the 
one  hand  to  keep  the  masses  from  actual  insurrection,  while  on 
the  other  he  threatened  the  government  with  revolution  and 
urged  middle-class  bank-depositors  to  create  a  financial  panic 
by  withdrawing  their  gold  from  the  banks.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
Whigs  were  ready  to  precipitate  a  civil  war,  and  the  victor  of 
Waterloo,  unable  to  command  the  support  of  his  more  timid 
fellow  Tories  in  further  opposing  the  bill,  reluctantly  informed 
the  king  that  it  was  impossible  to  form  a  Tory  ministry.  Even 
more  reluctantly  the  king  then  sent  for  Earl  Grey  (15  May, 
1832)  and  promised,  as  the  Whig  leader  demanded,  to  create 
enough  new  peers  to  assure  the  passage  of  the  biU  through  the 
Passage  of  House  of  Lords.  The  threat  proved  sufficient,  for 
the  Reform  thereupon  the  Lords  yielded,  *.liough  somewhat  un- 
Biu,  1832  graciously,  and  the  Refo^  BiU  received  royal  assent 
on  7  June,  1832. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


The  precise  manner  in  which  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832  ap- 
proached the  poUtical  evils  in  the  old  regime  of  Great  Britain 
was  as  follows,  (i)  Redistribution  of  seats.  Certain  pj.^^g.Qj^g 
boroughs  containing  less  than  2000  inhabitants  were  of  the 
entirely  disfranchised ;  and  boroughs  containing  be-  ^^^^g^^ 
tween  2000  and  4000  inhabitants  lost  one  of  their 
two  seats.  Of  the  143  seats  thus  set  free,  65  were  given  to  the 
larger  EngHsh  counties,  8  to  Scotland,  5  to  Ireland,  and  65  to 
large  towns,  some  of  which,  including  Manchester,  Birmingham, 
Sheffield,  and  Leeds,  had  never  before  been  represented.  (2)  Re- 
form of  the  franchise.  In  the  counties,  copyholders  and  lease- 
holders of  lands  worth  £10  a  year,  and  tenants-at-will  of  lands 
worth  £50  a  year,  were  entitled  to  vote.  In  the  boroughs,  the 
old  irregularities  were  abolished,  and  a  uniform  requirement 
established,  namely,  that  of  owning  or  renting  a  building  worth 
£10  a  year.  By  this  means  the  number  of  county  electors  in 
England  was  increased  from  247,000  to  370,000,  and  the  borough 
electors  from  188,000  to  286,000 ;  but  the  proportion  of  electors 
to  the  population  was  still  only  i  to  22,  whereas  it  had  been  i  to 
32.  The  workmen  in  the  city  and  the  laborers  in  the  country 
were  still  unenfranchised.  (3)  A  third  reform  was  effected  by 
the  Reform  Bill  of  1832,  in  the  manner  of  voting.  Hitherto  the 
voting  had  occupied  as  many  as  fifteen  days,  and  the  prolonged 
excitement  had  been  responsible  for  scandalous  bribery,  rioting, 
and  drunkenness.  Henceforth  polling  was  to  be  limited  in 
each  constituency  to  two  days. 

In  the  Reformed  Parliament  elected  at  the  close  of  1832,  the 
Whigs  appeared  with  a  triumphant  majority;  the  Tories  were 
sadly  beaten.    Both  parties  were  profoundly  affected 
by  the  Reform.    During  the  recent  conflict,  the  Whig  of^Liberar 
aristocrats  —  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  old  and  Con- 
Whigs  were  quite  as  aristocratic  as  the  Tories,  being  ^l"^^^^^ 
dominated  by  a  group  of  wealthy  peers  —  had  won 
the  allegiance  of  the  iron  and  cotton  princes  of  Birmingham, 
Manchester,  and  London,  by  posing  as  the  liberal,  reform- 
ing element.    The  pose  became  permanent,  and  the  Whigs, 
continuing  to  pride  themselves  upon  their  advocacy  of  whatever 
''liberal"  ideas  might  be  current  among  the  bourgeoisie,  began 
to  call  themselves  Liberals,    The  Tories,  for  their  part,  recog- 


io8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


nized  the  altered  situation  by  rallying  around  the  new  standard 
of  ''Conservatism"  erected  by  Sir  Robert  Peel,  who  accepted 
the  Reform,  but  wished  to  proceed  in  future  in  a  conservative 
manner.  The  new  principles  won  the  adherence  of  many  traders 
and  manufacturers  whose  loyalty  to  the  Anglican  Church,  or 
to  the  protective  tariff,  inspired  them  with  distrust  of  LiberaHsm. 
Only  the  more  obstinate  champions  of  the  old  regime  were  still 
branded  as  ''Tories." 

Besides  Liberals  and  Conservatives  there  sat  a  score  or  more 
of  Radicals,  for  whom  neither  Liberals  nor  Conservatives  were 
The  progressive  enough,  —  men  who  had  borne  a  leading 

Radicals  po^rt  in  the  Reform  struggle,  and  who  were  now  come 
into  their  reward  as  Members  of  Parliament.  Their  ideas  of 
what  constituted  true  progress  they  had  learned  in  large  part 
Jeremy  from  Jeremy  Bentham,  who  died  at  the  age  of  84  in 
Bentham  ygj-y  y^^j.  q{       Reform  Act.    From  his  father, 

a  successful  lawyer,  Bentham  had  inherited  a  fortune  sufficient 
to  enable  him  to  gratify  the  taste  for  study  which  he  had  ac- 
quired when  he  began  to  read  history  and  to  study  Latin  at 
three  years  of  age.  In  his  great  work.  Principles  of  Morals  and 
Legislation  (1789),  Bentham  declared  that  existing  institutions 
should  be  valued,  not  for  their  antiquity,  but  simply  for  their 
utiHty  in  promoting  "the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number."  Few  institutions  satisfied  this  utiUtarian  test,  and 
Bentham's  vigorous  denunciation  of  the  old  regime  so  pleased 
the  French  people  that  they  conferred  upon  him  the  honor  of 
French  citizenship  in  1792.  To  him  is  due  much  of  the  credit 
for  having  destroyed  the  complacent  self-satisfaction  with  which 
most  Englishmen  regarded  themselves  and  their  "matchless 
Constitution."  The  Utilitarian  philosophy,  as  Bentham's  sys- 
tem was  called,  was  less  successful  on  its  constructive  side. 
Although  he  himself  was  a  very  pleasant  gentleman,  who  de- 
lighted in  entertaining  his  many  friends  at  dinner,  and  who  spent 
a  good  deal  of  his  time  at  the  piano  —  he  had  a  piano  in  each 
room  of  his  house  —  Bentham  believed  the  average  man  to  be 
actuated  by  purely  selfish  motives.  Since  each  man  acted  for 
himself  alone,  and  since  the  good  of  the  majority  was  to  be  at- 
tained, Bentham  would  say,  the  majority  must  be  supreme  in 
politics.    Political  democracy,  therefore,  was  justifiable  and 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


desirable.  These  views  led  him  to  advocate  such  radical  meas- 
ures as  the  establishment  of  universal  suffrage,  vote  by  ballot, 
and  annual  ParHaments.  Similar  Radical  Reforms  had  been 
advocated  in  1780  by  Charles  James  Fox  and  in  1776  by  John 
Wilkes ;  but  the  philosophic  justification  of  Radicalism  was 
provided  by  Bentham.  His  Catechism  of  Parliamentary  Re- 
form (181 7)  provided  Radical  Reformers  with  a  wealth  of  argu- 
ment. Many  other  ideas  teemed  within  his  brain  —  schemes 
for  revising  the  criminal  law,  for  codifying  the  civil  law,  for 
prison  reform,  and  for  a  Panama  Canal,  many  of  which  have 
since  been  reahzed.  Yet  at  heart  Bentham  was  not  demo- 
cratic. In  him,  as  in  his  disciples,  the  Philosophic  Radicals, 
there  was  a  strange  paradox.  While  arguing  for  democracy,  he 
had  little  faith  in  men.  Furthermore,  the  man  who  accepted 
from  ParHament  £23,000  for  inventing  a  scheme. of  prison 
construction  which  was  never  used,  the  man  who  leased  a  fine 
mansion  and  deer  park  for  his  own  use,  could  hardly  be  accused 
of  an  inordinate  love  of  democratic  simplicity. 

Among  the  political  reformers  who  came  under  Bentham's 
influence,  and  adopted  the  Benthamite  paradox,  Francis  Place 
(i 771-1854)  was  the  most  interesting  figure.  By  his  Francis 
own  superlative  perseverance  and  sagacity  he  had  ^^^^^ 
fought  his  way  up  from  the  poverty  of  a  journeyman  tailor  to 
a  comfortable  position  as  a  small  capitaHst.  While  starving  in 
a  garret,  he  had  painfully  deciphered  EucHd's  geometry,  and  by 
other  difficult  studies  had  prepared  his  mind  for  Benthamite 
radicalism.  Theoretically  he  beheved  in  complete  democracy; 
but  in  the  great  Reform  agitation  of  1830-183  2  his  tailor  shop 
became  the  rendezvous,  not  of  the  champions  of  universal 
suffrage,  but  of  the  middle-class  reformers  who  were  backing 
the  utterly  inadequate  Reform  Bill.  In  his  endeavor  to  thwart 
the  demand  for  universal  suffrage,  he  counseled  his  lieutenants 
to  speak  at  mass-meetings  as  if  in  favor  of  universal  suffrage, 
but  to  persuade  the  ignorant  people  to  vote  resolutions  in  favor 
of  the  bill. 

Francis  Place  was  one  of  the  few  Radicals  not  to  enter  Parlia- 
ment after  the  Reform.  Once  represented  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  Radicalism  rapidly  revealed  its  inherent  weakness. 
Many  laudable  reforms  were  suggested,  such  as  free  trade,  com- 


no 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


pulsory  education,  disestablishment  of  the  Anglican  Church  in 
Ireland,  land  reform,  milder  game  laws,  abolition  of  flogging  in 
the  army ;  and  weak  pleas  were  still  made  for  a  wider 
^the"^^^  electoral  franchise,  for  the  secret  ballot,  for  restriction 
PhUosophic  of  the  legislative  power  of  the  House  of  Lords.  But 
ParUament  Radicals  did  little  to  accompHsh  the  reforms  they 
planned.  The  veteran  Radical  William  Cobbett  was 
laughed  at  in  the  House  of  Commons  when  he  proposed  the 
immediate  withdrawal  of  all  paper  money  and  the  cessation 
of  interest  payments  on  the  national  debt.  After  1837  the 
Radical  group  was  no  longer  in  evidence.  Some  of  the  Radical 
ideas,  such  as  free  trade,  the  extension  of  education,  the  dis- 
estabHshment  of  the  Irish  Church,  and  abolition  of  flogging  in 
the  army,  were  taken  up  by  the  progressive  wing  of  the  Liberal 
party.  But  the  Liberals  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
extension  of  the  suffrage,  introduction  of  the  secret  ballot,  or 
curtailment  of  the  prerogatives  of  the  Upper  House.  Had  not 
Lord  John  Russell,  the  sponsor  of  the  Reform  of  1832,  declared 
(1837)  that  that  Reform  was  ''final"? 

The  people  were  by  no  means  satisfied.  The  promises  made 
in  1832  had  not  been  fulfilled.  The  middle  classes,  now  com- 
fortably fortified  in  the  House  of  Commons,  showed  no  sign  of 
extending  the  benefits  of  political  enfranchisement  to  the  lower 
classes.  The  Reformed  Parliament  had  done  httle  to  better 
the  lot  of  the  workingman ;  worse  than  that,  it  had  devised  a 
new  Poor  Law,  by  which  indigent  workmen  were  no  longer 
aided  by  the  parish,  but  bundled  off  to  workhouses.  The  pic- 
ture drawn  in  Dickens's  Oliver  Twist  was  no  exaggeration  of  the 
bitter  misery  endured  in  those  workhouses.  Workmen  were 
supposed  to  have  no  human  f  eehngs ;  the  sexes  had  to  be  separated, 
even  if  a  couple  had  lived  together  for  half  a  century.  To 
add  to  the  despair  of  the  poor,  the  price  of  bread  rose  in  1837. 
What  could  be  done?  Robert  Owen's  schemes  of  voluntary 
associations  among  workingmen  had  been  tried  on  a  small 
scale  in  1834  and  seemingly  had  failed.  ParHament  was  deaf 
to  entreaty.  Perhaps  if  workmen  could  sit  in  ParHament,  there 
would  be  some  hope  of  relief. 

So  the  workmen  turned  to  a  movement  for  political  democracy 
as  a  step  towards  economic  relief.    This  was  the  Chartist  move- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  iii 


ment,  which  appeared  in  England  from  1838  to  1848.  The 
Chartists  derived  their  name  from  a  charter  of  Hberties  which  they 
proposed  to  obtain  :  just  as  Magna  Carta  had  been  for  (,jj^j.^jgjjj 
the  barons,  the  Bill  of  Rights  for  the  merchants,  and 
the  Reform  Bill  for  the  factory-owners,  so  now  there  should  be  a 
Charter  guaranteeing  six  points  for  the  workingmen.  The  famous 
Six  Points  had  been  demanded  before  by  Radicals,    The  Six 
but  never  so  earnestly.    They  were :   (i)  universal  Joints " 
manhood  suffrage,  (2)  annual  ParHaments,  (3)  equal  electoral 
districts,  (4)  vote  by  ballot,  (5)  removal  of  property  qualifica- 
tion for  members  of  Parliament,  (6)  payment  of  members. 

The  movement  gathered  rapid  headway.  It  appealed  to 
half -fed  and  overworked  men,  as  the  only  way  to  save  them- 
selves and  their  children  from  the  terrible  life  in  the  tenements. 
In  1839  a  National  Convention  or  Workingmen's  ParKament" 
met  in  London  to  present  ParKament  with  a  petition  for  uni- 
versal suffrage.  ParUament  refused  the  petition.  Another 
petition  was  presented  in  1842,  after  a  season  of  falling  wages, 
with  the  same  outcome.  Discouragement  increased  internal 
divisions  within  the  Chartist  ranks.  The  better  organized  and 
more  prosperous  artisans,  who  had  all  along  insisted  on  legal 
methods,  now  seceded,^  leaving  the  more  violent  element,  ''the 
party  of  physical  force,"  in  command.  Feargus  O'Connor,  a 
giant  Irishman  with  a  powerful  voice  and  violent  temper  kept 
up  the  enthusiasm  of  the  party  by  heated  oratory.  The  high 
prices  of  1847,  ^  season  of  slack  work,  and  news  of  a  revolu- 
tionary movement  in  France  in  February,  1848,  excited  the 
Chartists  to  a  final  effort.  They  planned  to  form  an  enormous 
army  to  carry  a  third  petition  to  Parliament;  and  whispered 
threats  bespoke  the  determination  of  some  to  use  force,  if  the 
petition  failed.  In  alarm,  the  government  called  upon  ^j^^^g^ 
the  aged  but  still  courageous  Wellington.  In  addi-  Demonstra- 
tion to  regular  troops  he  armed  170,000  shop-keepers'  jg"g^^"^' 
sons  as  special  constables,  to  shoot  down  any  unruly 
Chartists.  10  April,  1848,  the  appointed  day,  arrived  at  last, 
and  with  it  a  heavy  rain  which  dampened  the  spirits  of  the 

^  Many  were  diverted  from  the  charter  by  the  promise  which  the  middle-class 
Anti-Corn  Law  agitators  were  making  at  about  this  time,  of  "cheap  bread  for 
the  workingmen." 


112 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


scantily  clad  demonstrators.  The  parade  was  called  off; 
O'Connor  bundled  the  monster  petition  into  five  cabs  and 
hurried  it  to  Parliament,  where  it  was  discovered  not  to  contain 
the  boasted  five  miUion  signatures  but  less  then  two  millions, 
including  such  remarkable  ones  as  ''the  Queen,"  ''Wellington," 
and  "Pug  Nose."  Chartism  was  worse  than  a  failure, — it 
was  a  joke. 

After  the  final  fiasco,  many  Chartists  relapsed  into  sullen 
despair,  others  threw  themselves  into  the  trade-union  move- 
Failure  of  ment,  still  others  turned  to  cooperative  enterprises, 
an  Orgaii  ^  Anglican  clergymen,  while  they  disapproved  of 
ized  Move-  Chartism  as  too  bitter  and  too  revolutionary,  were 
ment.  but     ^^j-y  anxious  to  help  the  ex-Chartists  to  establish  vol- 

Persistence  •  i    i  a  ^ 

of  its  untary  cooperative  workshops.    Of  such  clergymen. 

Principles  Charles  Kingsley  was  an  eminent  example,  and  of  their 
intentions  a  fair  sample  is  afforded  in  Kingsley 's  book  Alton 
Locke.  As  Carlyle  said,  in  his  essay  on  Chartism,  the  workman 
failed  to  gain  "one  ten- thousandth  part  of  a  speaker  in  the 
national  palaver  at  Westminster,"  but  it  was  the  strength  and 
selfishness  of  the  middle  classes  rather  than  falsity  of  principle 
which  made  the  charter  a  failure.  For  we  shall  see  in  subse- 
quent chapters  that  a  majority  of  the  Six  Points  have  since 
been  recognized  as  desirable,  and  in  large  part  they  have  been 
incorporated  into  the  British  Constitution. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  demand  for  political  democracy  springs 
more  from  social  unrest  than  from  abstract  philosophical  con- 
Sociai  viction.  Votes  are  worth  while  only  because  they 
Legislation  change  laws.  In  the  England  of  the  early  nineteenth 
Bri?^^*  century  this  was  certainly  true :  the  middle  class 
obtained  political  power  because  it  had  middle-class 
social  reforms  to  effect,  and  the  Chartist  movement  meant  that 
millions  of  workingmen  desired  Parliament  to  relieve  their  misery. 
Accompanying  the  movement  for  democracy  there  was  a  move- 
ment for  social  reform,  and  the  social  legislation  enacted  during 
jQj.y  the  period,  we  shall  now  consider. 

Reforms,  Eveu  before  the  Reform  Act,  three  great  reforms 
1820-1829  j^^^  been  accomplished  under  the  Tory  ministry  of 
Lord  Liverpool  (1812-1827),  in  which  Sir  Robert  Peel,  George 
Canning,  and  William  Huskisson  formed  a  trio  of  progress. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  113 


Canning,  it  will  be  recalled,  revolted  against  a  reactionary 
foreign  policy.  Peel  was"  the  son  of  a  cotton  manufacturer, 
who  owed  his  fortune  to  Hargreaves's  spinning- jenny.  Hus- 
kisson  had  married  a  fortune  of  £100,000.  Both  Huskisson 
and  Peel  were  interested  in  the  new  economic  doctrine  of  laisser- 
faire,  and  inclined  towards  free  trade. 

The  three  reforms  achieved  under  the  auspices  of  these  Tories 
were  as  follows,    (i)  The  criminal  code  was  revised  (182 1)  in 
an  humanitarian  spirit,  and  in  about  100  cases  (such  Revision  of 
as  shoplifting,  picking  pockets,  poaching)  the  death  Criminal 
penalty  was    replaced    by  a  milder  punishment. 
(2)  Under  a  law  of  1800,  workingmen's  combinations  had  been 
prohibited.    This  law  was  repealed  in  1824,^  and  in  Trade 
1825  a  new  law  was  framed  allowing  workmen  to  com-  ^^^^^ 
bine  ''to  determine  the  scale  of  wages  or  hours  of  labour,"  but 
not  to  organize  strikes.    Trade  unions  were  thus  recognized, 
although  restricted  in  their  operations.    (3)  The  third  measure 
has  already  been  mentioned  — ■  the  removal  of  re-  Removal  of 
ligious  disabihties  in  1828-1829.    Besides  introducing  Religious 
these  reforms,  the  Tory  administration  had  made  a 
start  in  the  direction  of  free  trade  and  of  factory  legislation. 
About  the  latter  we  shall  speak  presently.    The  former  was  the 
outcome  of  the  laisser-faire  doctrines  held  by  Peel  and  Huskisson, 
who  secured  a  modification  of  the  old  customs  tariff,  and  a  lower- 
ing of  the  import  duties  on  wheat. 

When  the  liberal  industrial  bourgeoisie  found  itself  enfran- 
chised by  the  Reform  Act  of  1832,  it  set  about  accompHshing 
two  class  measures,  —  municipal  reform  and  the  -^^^.j^  ^Yle 
emancipation  of  industry.  The  former  meant  that  Reformed 
they  gained  control  of  local  politics  in  cities  like  Liver-  ^""^^^^^^^ 
pool  and  Leeds ;  the  latter  signified  chiefly  the  abolition  of  the 
old  protective  tariff,  especially  of  the  Corn  Laws.  How  the 
former  was  achieved  in  1835,  and  how  the  Corn  Laws  were 
repealed  in  1846,  has  been  set  forth  in  Chapter  XVIII.  Suffice 
it  here  to  repeat  that  although  the  Liberals  carried  on  the  agita- 
tion, the  actual  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  was  the  work  of  Sir 
Robert  Peel,  who,  though  a  Conservative  in  politics,  was  the 
son  of  a  cotton-manufacturer  and  was  personally  identified 

'  Largely  through  the  efforts  of  Francis  Place. 
VOL.  u  — I 


114  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

with  the  industrial  bourgeoisie  rather  than  with  the  landed 
aristocracy. 

A  great  part  of  the  minor  legislation  of  the  Reformed  Parlia- 
ment was  dedicated  to  the  twofold  ideal  of  bourgeois  thrift 
Bourgeois  business  efhciency.    A  central  Highways  Bureau 

Thrift  and  was  established  to  improve  the  roads,  over  which 
Efficiency  merchandise  had  to  be  transported.  Boards  of 
health  were  nominated  in  the  interest  of  public  cleanliness. 
The  county  registrar,  a  new  civil  officer,  took  over  from  the 
clergy  the  registration  of  births,  marriages,  and  deaths.  Be- 
fore the  postal  reform  of  1839,  one  paid  the  postman  a  money 
fee  for  delivering  a  letter,  the  fee  varying  with  the  distance ; 
after  1840  a  penny  stamp  would  carry  a  letter  anywhere  in  the 
Poor  Law  United  Kingdom.  But  the  greatest  economy  was 
Reform,  effected  by  the  revision  of  the  Poor  Law  in  1834,  under 
^^^^  the  ministry  of  Earl  Grey.    Under  the  old  regime 

justices  of  the  peace  and  church  wardens  had  been  empowered 
to  impose  rates  (taxes)  on  the  parish  in  order  to  dole  out  al- 
lowances to  the  aged  or  infirm,  and  even  to  those  able-bodied 
laborers  whose  earnings  were  below  a  certain  standard.  It  had 
cost  England  £8,600,000  in  1833.  Under  the  new  Poor  Law, 
however,  (i)  no  help  was  given  to  people  living  at  home,  except  to 
sick  and  aged ;  (2)  able-bodied  paupers  were  put  to  work  in  the 
work-house;  (3)  several  parishes  might  form  a  union,  with  a 
single  ''board  of  guardians"  and  a  uniform  poor-rate.  The 
poor  people  detested  the  grim  work-houses,  and  with  good 
reason ;  and  many  families,  which  had  relied  on  their  few  shil- 
lings a  week  from  the  poor-rates,  were  now  destitute.  But  the 
new  system  was  less  extravagant  than  the  old,  and  the  middle 
class  was  satisfied. 

Another  group  of  Liberal  laws  was  the  outcropping  of  bour- 
geois idealism.  Education  had  always  been  one  of  the  ideals 
Bourgeois  of  the  middle  classes.  Prior  to  1833  the  mass  of  Eng- 
ideaUsm  lishmen  were  uneducated,  and  schools  were  private 
affairs.  In  that  year  Parliament  granted  £20,000  to  private 
Education  societies  for  schools,  and,  after  investigating  the  sub- 
ject thoroughly,  appointed  a  committee  of  bishops  to 
name  school  inspectors;  by  18 51  the  appropriation  amounted  to 
£164,000,  and  by  1861  to  £800,000.    Bourgeois  idealism  again 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  115 


found  vent  in  prison  reform,  in  the  abolition  of  whipping-post 
and  pillory,  but  most  of  all  in  the  anti-slavery  campaign.  To 
English  business  men  of  liberal  views  it  seemed  in-  Prison 
comprehensible  that  one  man  should  own  another.    It  Reform 
was  downright  immoral.    The  dignity  of  man  forbade  it.  Wil- 
liam Wilberforce,  a  business  man's  son  and  a  clergyman,  was 
chief  of  the  anti-slavery  orators,  and  as  long  ago  as  Anti-siavery 
1807  he  had  prevailed  upon  Parliament  to  abolish  the  Agitation 
slave  traffic.    In  1833  the  Reformed  Parhament  completed  the 
work  by  ordaining  that  negro  slavery  should  gradually  cease 
in  the  British  colonies,  and  that  £20,000,000  should  be  paid 
as  compensation  to  the  slave-owners. 

It  was  wrong  that  white  men  should  own  negroes ;  yet  a  more 
cruel  evil  existed  in  the  factories  of  some  of  the  anti-slavery 
orators,  where,  as  Sir  Robert  Peel  said  in  18 16,  industrial 
white  children,  "torn  from  their  beds,  were  com-  Legislation 
pelled  to  work,  at  the  age  of  six  years,  from  early  morn  till  late 
at  night,  a  space  of  perhaps  fifteen  to  sixteen  hours."  Audiences 
wept  at  hearing  how  cruel  masters  lashed  their  cowering  negro 
slaves  in  Jamaica ;  but  in  their  own  England  little  Englishmen 
and  Englishwomen  ten  years  old  were  being  whipped  to  their 
work.  The  righting  of  this  wrong  was  not  inaugurated  by 
Liberal  factory-owners,  but  by  Tories.  As  early  as  1802  the 
Tory  Parliament  passed  a  well-meant  but  ineffectual  law  for- 
bidding cotton  manufacturers  to  work  their  apprentices  (as  the 
pauper  children  were  called  who  had  been  taken  by  the  parish 
authorities  and  bound  over  to  the  factory-owner)  more  than 
twelve  hours  a  day.  After  a  parHamentary  inquiry  into  factory 
conditions,  a  Tory  reformer.  Lord  Ashley,  subsequently  known 
as  the  earl  of  Shaftesbury,  induced  Parliament  to  pass  the 
Factory  Act  of  1833  limiting  the  working-day  to  nine  hours  for 
children  and  twelve  hours  for  young  persons.^  The  Mines  Act 
of  1842  prohibited  underground  labor  for  children  under  ten 
years  and  for  women.  Incomplete  and  inadequate  as  these 
acts  were,  they  constituted  the  first  attack  on  the  old  Liberalism 
—  the  Liberalism  that  demanded  the  vote  for  factory-owners 
and  denied  it  to  factory  workers,  the  Liberalism  that  freed  the 
negro  and  allowed  white  children  to  endure  a  blacker  slavery, 

*  In  1844  these  hours  were  still  further  restricted. 


ii6  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  Liberalism  which  gave  the  poor  man  liberty  to  slave  or 
starve  and  called  it  ''freedom  of  contract." 

The  old  Liberalism,  in  its  first  tentative  efforts  to  clear  away 
the  mass  of  hoary  political  abuses  in  Great  Britain,  had  sadly 
neglected  to  care  for  the  welfare  of  the  working  classes.  Never- 
theless, the  men  who  abolished  slavery  and  wiped  out  the  rotten 
boroughs  must  not  be  too  severely  censured  for  their  disregard 
of  the  new  social  problems;  as  yet  they  were  but  groping 
blindly  in  the  path  of  political  democracy. 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REVOLUTION  OF  1848  IN  FRANCE 

Louis  Philippe  reigned  as  ''king  of  the  French"  from  1830  to 
1848.  In  theory  his  government  was  based  upon  the  doctrine 
of  popular  sovereignty  —  of  democracy.  But  in 
Opposition  practice,  both  through  the  close  restriction  of  the 
to  Louis  parliamentary  franchise  and  through  the  paramount 
1830-1848  influence  which  the  middle  class  exerted  upon  legis- 
lation and  administration,  it  was  far  from  democratic. 
As  the  years  progressed,  the  king  and  his  advisers  became  in- 
creasingly cautious  and  conservative,  and  the  opposition  grew 
correspondingly  more  numerous  and  more  determined,  until 
by  the  year  1848  nearly  all  classes  in  France  were  arrayed  soHdly 
against  the  bourgeois  compromise  monarchy  of  Louis  Philippe, 
and  a  considerable  number  were  resolved  to  attempt  the  estab- 
lishment of  real  poKtical  democracy. 

Between  1830  and  1848  one  group  after  another  was  alienated 
by  Louis  Philippe.  From  the  outset,  he  was  hated  by  the  Legit- 
^       .  ,     imists,  who  still  adhered  to  Charles  X,  and  later  to  his 

Legitimists 

grandson,  the  count  of  Chambord,  as  the  rightful  king  of 
France  and  as  the  natural  champion  of  the  privileges  of  the  ancient 
aristocracy  and  Church.    In  the  second  place,  he  was  held  in  even 

greater  detestation  by  the  Republicans,  who  had  en- 

Republicans    °.  ii-ri/         \T^       i.  1 

gmeered  the  July  (1830)  Revolution,  and  to  whom, 
therefore,  he  indirectly  owed  his  crown.  At  the  beginning,  Louis 
Philippe  had  curried  favor  with  the  common  people,  but,  as  time 
went  on,  he  appeared  more  and  more  clearly  as  the  enemy  of 
popular  Republican  principles.  An  anarchist's  unsuccessful  at- 
tempt to  abolish  the  monarchy  by  bomb  (1835)  was  followed  by 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  117 


repressive  laws  which  placed  the  press  under  as  severe  surveillance 
as  in  the  worst  days  of  Charles  X,  with  10,000  francs  as  the  min- 
imum fine  for  insulting  the  king.  This,  and  the  stern  punishment 
of  RepubHcan  rioters,  earned  the  July  Monarchy  its  most  active 
enemies. 

Then,  too,  all  patriots  who  wished  to  see  France  great  and 
glorious  were  disgusted  with  the  pusillanimous  foreign  policy 
of  Louis  Philippe.  The  merchants  who  were  interested  „   .  , 

1       •  1  vT  ...    1       11.  1  Patriots 

m  trade  with  Great  Britain  induced  him  constantly  to 
adopt  a  cringing  attitude  toward  that  nation.  Because  Britain 
objected,  he  refused  to  allow  his  son  to  assume  the  crown  of 
Belgium.  French  Liberals  sympathized  strongly  with  the 
struggle  of  the  Poles  against  Russia,  but  Louis  Philippe  would 
not  forcibly  intervene.  And  he  sat  calmly  by  while  Austria 
suppressed  revolution  in  Italy,  although  his  minister,  Lafhtte, 
had  declared  that  France  would  not  tolerate  Austrian  inter- 
vention in  Italy.  It  was  much  the  same  with  intervention  in 
Spain.  Adolphe  Thiers,  the  journalist  and  Liberal  Monarchist, 
who  had  played  a  prominent  part  in  the  Revolution  of  1830,  and 
who  was  the  partisan  of  a  vigorous  foreign  poHcy,  was  head  of 
the  cabinet  in  1840  long  enough  to  commit  France  to  the  support 
of  Mehemet  Ah,  pasha  of  Egypt,  who  had  victoriously  rebelled 
against  the  Turkish  sultan.  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Prussia, 
and  Austria  took  the  other  side,  and  Louis  Philippe,  ever  fearful, 
discharged  his  belHcose  Thiers  and  abandoned  Mehemet  Ali. 
For  the  remaining  eight  years  of  the  July  Monarchy,  1840- 1848, 
Francois  Guizot,  bourgeois  and  Huguenot,  a  minister  after  the 
king's  own  heart,  devoted  himself  to  "the  preservation  of  peace, 
in  all  places,  at  all  times,"  and  advised  his  countrymen 
to  turn  their  attention  from  the  glory  of  France  to  her  pros- 
perity. "Business  before  honor  ! "  Guizot  lent  himself  to  Louis 
PhiUppe's  disgraceful  intrigue,  by  which  the  king  sought  to 
secure  the  Spanish  crown  for  his  family.  The  middle-class 
monarchy  had  humiliated  France,  and  well  might  the  patriot 
ask:  "Where  are  our  friends?  What  positions  remain  to 
us  in  Europe?  Poland  is  in  exile,  we  have  frustrated  Italy, 
and  oppressed  Switzerland ;  Russia  menaces  us,  Holland  hates 
us,  Belgium  despises  us,  Germany  shuns  us,  Portugal  ignores  us, 
Spain  escapes  us.  Great  Britain  dominates  us,  and  the  con- 
juration of  the  powers  has  barred  us  from  the  Orient." 


ii8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Hardly  less  scandalous  was  the  domestic  policy  of  the  bour- 
geois king.  At  first,  while  the  Revolution  of  1830  was  still  in 
^  the  air,  he  had  intimated  that  universal  suffrage 

Democrats 

would  be  granted.  The  electoral  quahfication  was  in- 
deed lowered  so  that  voters  had  to  pay  only  200  francs  instead  of 
300  francs  a  year  in  taxes,  and  only  100  francs  if  they  were  magis- 
trates, lawyers,  doctors,  or  professors ;  but  behevers  in  democ- 
racy could  hardly  be  satisfied  with  a  law  which  debarred  all 
but  200,000  Frenchmen  from  the  polls.  All  the  lower  middle 
classes,  the  shop-keepers,  bakers,  and  plumbers,  were  at  one 
with  the  masses  in  condemning  the  July  plutocracy.  Even  the 
moneyed  aristocracy  itself  was  offended  when  in  the  last  eight 
years  Guizot  reduced  bribery  to  a  fine  art  and  converted  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  into  an  employment  bureau  for  dishonest 
politicians.  At  the  outset  the  middle  class  had  pretty  unani- 
mously supported  Louis  PhiHppe,  but  now  it  was  sharply  di- 
vided against  itself  as  rival  factions  formed  about  the  persons 
of  those  two  bitterly  antagonistic  historians  and  politicians 
—  Guizot  and  Thiers.  And  meanwhile  the  king,  good  busi- 
ness man  that  he  was,  realized  that  he  must  '^make  hay  while 
the  sun  shone,"  and  bent  every  effort  to  enrich  his  family 
while  he  had  the  opportunity.  This  was  not  constitutional 
monarchy,  it  was  cynical  mockery  of  government;  and  even 
peace  and  prosperity  seemed  to  have  been  purchased  too 
dearly  at  such  a  price. 

In  the  old  days,  Bourbon  monarchs  had  often  counted  on  the 
support  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  but  Louis  Philippe  could 
Catholics      ^^^^  favor  in  that  quarter.    Since  the  great 

French  Revolution,  there  had  been  a  remarkable  re- 
ligious revival  in  France,  with  noticeably  democratic  tendencies. 
The  rehgious  phase  of  the  movement  was  inaugurated  by 
Chateaubriand  (i 768-1848),  who  maintained  that  CathoKc  Chris- 
tianity alone  satisfied  man's  romantic,  artistic,  and  rational 
natures,  and  by  Joseph  de  Maistre  (i 754-1821),  who  defended 
the  authority  of  the  pope.  And  the  Democratic  tendencies  of 
this  so-called  Neo-CathoUc  "  movement  were  manifest  when 
the  brilHant  leader  Antoine  Frederic  Ozanam  (1813-1853) 
founded  the  Society  of  St.  Vincent  de  Paul  to  reheve  the 
poor,  when  Alphonse  de  Lamartine  (i 790-1869),  abandoning 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  119 

liberal-royalist  for  democratic  sentiments,  wrote  a  history  to 
glorify  the  Girondists  of  1792,  and  when  Robert  de  Larnennais 
(1782-1854)  insisted  that  from  Catholic  Christianity  must  be 
learned  the  spirit  of  true  democracy  —  Christian  democracy. 
Permeated  by  democratic  doctrine,  scandalized  by  the  corrupt 
practices  of  Guizot,  incensed  by  the  favor  which  that  Huguenot 
minister  showed  to  the  anti-clerical  university,  and  determined 
to  secure  liberty  of  Christian  education,  the  Catholic  party 
denounced  the  July  Monarchy. 

And  finally,  the  Socialists  and  other  extremists  raised  their  voices 
in  protest.  When  the  Lyons  silk-weavers,  rather  than  work  at 
the  starvation  wages  of  1 1  sous  for  a  day  of  15  to  16  gQj..^j.g^g 
hours,  rebelliously  raised  the  battle-cry  ''Live  working 
or  die  fighting!"  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  society  needed 
reform.  As  to  the  nature  of  that  social  reform  no  unanimity 
of  opinion  existed  between  the  Socialist  disciples  of  Saint-Simon's 
doctrines,  of  Fourier's  communistic  scheme,  or  of  Louis  Blanc's 
cooperative  associations,  and  the  anarchistic  followers  of  Prou- 
dhon,  who  condemned  all  government ;  but  as  to  the  necessity  of 
reform  all  were  agreed.  Louis  Blanc,  the  most  influential  of  the 
Socialists,  and  editor  of  The  Reform,  declared  in  ringing  words : 
**To  the  able-bodied  citizen  the  state  owes  work;  to  the  aged 
and  infirm  it  owes  aid  and  protection.  This  result  cannot  be 
obtained  unless  by  the  action  of  a  democratic  power.  A 
democratic  power  is  that  which  has  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people  for  its  principle,  universal  suffrage  for  its  origin,  and 
for  its  goal  the  realization  of  this  formula  :  '  Liberty,  Equality, 
Fraternity.'" 

By  the  year  1847       these  factions  were  at  odds  with  the 
government,  and  most  of  them  could  agree  in  demanding  elec- 
toral reform.    In  that  year  the  party  of  constitutional  r^^ie 
monarchy,  the  dynastic  Left,  i.e.,  the  Liberal  and  Roy-  Banquets, 
alist  middle  class,  began  to  hold  public  banquets  to  ^^^7  1848 
promote  the  cause  of  electoral  reform.    A  more  revolutionary 
tone  was  gradually  imparted  to  the  banquets  by  Republicans 
and  Socialists.    Banqueters  in  Paris  raised  their  glasses  ''to  the 
amelioration  of  the  lot  of  the  working  classes."    Lamartine  pre- 
dicted the  fall  of  the  monarchy.   In  alarm  the  government  prohib- 
ited an  unusually  large  banquet  which  was  to  be  held  in  Paris  on 


I20 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


22  February,  1848.  But  it  was  too  late.  On  the  appointed 
day,  angry  workingmen  and  reckless  students  crowded  the  Place 
de  la  Concorde,  shouting  for  Reform.  There  was  nothing  alarm- 
ing in  this,  or  in  the  bonfires  that  evening,  and  the  Marseillaise 
was  as  yet  sung  only  half  in  earnest.  On  the  next  day,  however, 
the  middle-class  National  Guards  joined  in  the  cry,  ''Down 
with  Guizot,"  and  Guizot  resigned  from  the  ministry.  The 
^,   ^  ,       insurrection  miorht  have  stopped  there,  had  not  a 

The  Febru-  r      i  i  •  t       ^    •       ?  •  i 

ary  (1848)  detachment  of  soldiers,  guardmg  Guizot  s  residence, 
Revolution    rashly  fired  on  a  crowd  of  boisterous  demonstrators. 

Twenty-three  French  citizens  lay  dead  on  the  street 
and  thirty  wounded,  some  of  them  women  and  children.  For  a 
moment  the  crowd  was  stunned.  Then  in  rage  it  bore  the 
bodies  on  a  wagon,  blood-stained  and  ghastly  in  the  glaring 
torch-light,  for  all  Paris  to  behold.  Reform  could  not  now  suffice. 
The  dawning  day  of  24  February  showed  barricades  blocking 
the  narrow  streets  of  the  slums,  and  behind  them  workmen  who 
shouted  "Long  Live  the  RepubHc!"  Everywhere  were  the 
placards:  "Louis  Philippe  massacres  us  as  did  Charles  X; 
let  him  go  join  Charles  X."  Like  the  prudent  man  he  had 
always  been,  Louis  PhiKppe  tarried  only  long  enough  to  abdicate 
in  favor  of  his  grandson,  the  count  of  Paris,  and  then  drove  off 
as  "Mr.  Smith"  in  a  closed  carriage  to  follow  Charles  X  to 
England,  the  asylum  of  superfluous  French  royalty. 

The  count  of  Paris  was  forgotten,  however,  while  the  republic 
was  proclaimed  simultaneously  in  two  places :  in  the  Chamber 
r,      ^  of  Deputies  at  the  Palais-Bourbon  in  the  western  part 

The  Second         .  -r^       >  ^  i        tta       1     1      ttmi      >         ^  *  1 

French  of  Pans,  and  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville  m  the  east.  At  the 
fsTs^-^Ss^  P^l^is  Bourbon  were  the  bourgeois  RepubHcans,  whose 
flag  was  the  tricolor,  and  whose  aim  was  political  de- 
mocracy ;  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville  were  the  working-class  Republi- 
cans whose  banner  was  the  red  flag,  and  whose  aim  was  poHtical 
and  social  democracy.  Those  at  the  Palais-Bourbon  set  up  a 
government  representing  middle-class  Liberalism;  those  at  the 
Hotel  de  Ville  nomina  ted  men  who  intended  to  bring  about  a 
social  revolution  in  the  interests  of  the  working  classes.  Tem- 
porarily the  two  governments  combined;  the  one  at  the  Palais 
Bourbon  joined  the  other  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  and  Louis  Blanc 
himself  was  given  a  voice  in  the  fusion  government. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


121 


The  provisional  government  thus  established  was  composed 
of  two  irreconcilable  elements,  the  middle  class  and  the  working 
class.    At  first,  under  the  terror  of  the  armies  of  the  ^.  ^, 

-  ....  .        First  Phase: 

slums,  the  bourgeois  faction  gave  unwilnng  attention  Problems  of 
to  the  problems  of  the  poor  and  to  Louis  Blanc's  Q^g^^^^^^ 
sociaHstic  remedies.  On  25  February,  while  a  mob 
waited  in  the  hall,  the  provisional  gevernment  assented  to 
Louis  Blanc's  decree:  that  'Hhe  Government  of  the  French 
Repubhc  undertakes  to  guarantee  the  existence  of  the  work- 
ingman  by  labor  and  to  provide  labor  for  all  citizens."  As  a 
first  installment  on  its  promise,  the  government  established 
^'national  workshops"  for  the  unemployed.  Louis  Blanc  had 
advocated  "national  workshops"  or  cooperative  industrial  as- 
sociations established  by  the  aid  of  the  state  and  managed  by 
the  workingmen  themselves;  the  ''national  workshops"  created 
by  the  Second  Republic  were  a  pitiable  parody  on  the  idea,  pre- 
destined to  failure  by  the  minister  who  had  them  in  charge,  a 
bourgeois  who  detested  Louis  Blanc's  theories.  The  riff-raff 
of  the  town  and  the  thousands  of  skilled  artisans  who  had  been 
deprived  of  work  by  the  business  crisis  attending  the  Revolution, 
were  herded  together  and  set  to  work  digging  trenches.  For 
such  work,  the  state  was  paying,  in  May,  an  army  of  100,000 
men  at  the  rate  of  2  francs  a  day.  Meanwhile  Louis  Blanc 
with  his  fellow-SociaHst  Albert  had  been  delegated  by  the  provi- 
sional government  as  a  committee  to  hear  the  workingmen's 
grievances  at  the  Luxembourg.  The  two  worked  faithfully  at 
their  task :  they  ordered  the  reduction  of  the  working  day  from 
eleven  to  ten  hours  in  Paris,  and  from  twelve  to  eleven  in  the 
country ;  they  proposed  other  desirable  reforms ;  they  held 
conferences  and  estabHshed  a  committee  of  labor-delegates ; 
but  they  had  no  power  to  enforce  their  decrees,  and  the  middle- 
class  members  of  the  government  were  congratulating  them- 
selves upon  having  found  so  harmless  an  occupation  for  their 
Socialist  colleagues. 

The  repubhc  entered  its  second  phase,  its  middle-class  phase, 
on  23  April,  the  date  set  for  the  election  by  universal  suffrage 
of  a  Constituent  Assembly  to  formulate  a  constitution  for  the 
republic.  Louis  Blanc  and  his  party  could  hope  for  little  weight 
in  the  new  body ;  their  subversive  principles  were  distru  sted  by 


122 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  clergy,  their  working-class  sympathies  were  repellant  to 
business  and  professional  men,  and  an  increase  in  taxes  helped 

to  persuade  the  parsimonious  peasant  that  Louis  Blanc 
Phase^  The  ^''^^^  Wasted  the  nation's  funds  employing  Parisian 
Republic  of  nc'cr-do-wells  in  the  ''national  workshops."  In  the 
ciasses^^^^    new  Assembly  there  were  but  few  Socialists,  a  great 

number  of  middle-class  Republicans,  and  a  consider- 
able group  of  reactionaries.  The  ''abomination  of  abominations," 

—  the  institution  of  national  workshops,  —  was  first  attacked  by 
the  Assembly.  The  workshops  were  abolished  and  the  workmen 
were  ofTered  their  choice  of  service  in  the  army,  or  earth-work 
construction  in  the  country.  But  the  workmen  had  tasted  power 
too  recently,  and  were  too  fiercely  inflamed  with  revolutionary 
ideas  to  submit  tamely.  They  again  tore  up  the  pavement  to 
build  barricades  in  the  slums  of  Saint-Antoine.  General 
Cavaignac,  intrusted  with  dictatorial  power  by  the  Assembly, 
directed  the  bourgeois  National  Guards  and  the  regular  troops 

—  an  overwhelming  force  —  to  crush  the  working-class  rebellion. 
The  "  June  The  archbishop  of  Paris  lost  his  life  in  a  futile  but 
Days,"  1848  noble  attempt  to  avert  bloodshed.  Three  days  the 
sanguinary  street-fighting  lasted,  —  the  terrible  "June  Days" 
(24-26  June,  1848).  There  could  be  but  one  result:  the  armies 
of  "order"  triumphed,  some  of  the  revolutionaries  were  shot,  and 
4000  were  transported  to  the  colonies.  The  memories  of  the 
June  Days,  rankling  in  the  breast  of  the  Parisian  workingman, 
made  him  hate  the  "bourgeois"  republic;  the  peasant,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  confirmed  in  his  distrust  of  repubhcanism, 
which  always  seemed  to  bring  bloodshed  in  its  train. 

In  the  Constituent  Assembly  the  middle-class  Republicans 
now  had  things  all  their  own  way.    By  insisting  on  "the  family, 

rights  of  property,  and  public  order"  as  the  "founda- 
Constituent  tions"  of  the  republic,  they  repudiated  Socialism  and 
^84!"^^^^'     Anarchism ;  but  at  the  same  time  they  favored  social 

reforms,  and  even  declared  that  the  state  must  "with 
fraternal  aid,  assure  the  existence  of  needy  citizens  either  by 
procuring  them  work  ...  or  by  assisting  those  who  are  unable 
to  work."  Slavery,  the  censorship  of  the  press,  and  capital 
punishment  for  poKtical  offenses,  they  declared  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  principles  of  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


Free  primary  education,  they  warmly  espoused.    After  promis- 
ing these  typical  bourgeois  reforms,  they  drew  up  a  constitu- 
tion closely  modeled  after  that  of  the  United  States, 
with  a  president  elected  by  universal  suffrage  for  stitution  of 
four  years,  and  a  cabinet  chosen  by  him,  but  with  a  the  Second 
Council  of  State  chosen  by  the  Assembly  instead  of  Republic 
a  separately  elected  Senate. 

In  the  presidential  election  which  took  place  on  lo  December, 
1848,  the  factions  which  had  combined  to  effect  the  February 
Revolution  were  arrayed  against  one  another,  —  and  in  that 
disunion  was  the  weakness  of  the  democratic  republic.  The 
Socialist  Ledru-Rollin,  the  Catholic  Lamartine,  and  the  bour- 
geois Republican  Cavaignac,  defeated  each  other  ;  while  a  fourth 
candidate,  an  adventurer  with  a  great  name,  profiting  by  the 
confusion  of  the  democratic  parties,  carried  the  day  by  appeal- 
ing to  nationalism.  The  career  of  this  adventurer  —  a  new 
Bonaparte  —  we  must  leave  to  the  next  chapter. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  MOVEMENTS  OF  1S4S  IN  ITALY, 
GERMANY,  AND  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

In  the  French  Revolution  of  1848  we  have  seen  three  elements 
—  patriotic  shame  at  a  disgraceful  foreign  policy,  economic 
unrest  resulting  from  the  Industrial  Revolution,  and  Three 
bourgeois  aspirations  after  political  democracy  —  Elements 
combining  in  February  to  establish  the  republic,  conflicting 
in  the  tragic  days  of  June,  and  eventually  by  their  disagreement 
bringing  an  adventurer  to  the  presidency  of  the  repubhc. 
Throughout  the  rest  of  Europe  the  same  three  ingredients  of 
revolution  were  present  in  varying  degree,  according  as  national 
sentiment  had  been  violated  by  the  settlements  of  Vienna,  or 
the  working  classes  degraded  by  the  Industrial  Revolution,  or 
the  Liberal  class  infuriated  by  the  reactionary  policies  of  Metter- 
nich.  As  the  match  to  the  powder,  the  sudden  news  of  Louis 
Philippe's  deposition  came  to  touch  off  the  Revolution  in  Italy, 
in  the  Germanies,  and  in  Austria-Hungary.  Within  a  few 
months  half  the  monarchs  of  Europe  had  been  either  deposed 
or  forced  to  concede  constitutions.  Even  across  the  English 
Channel,  the  revolutionary  uproar  awakened  a  faint  response 


124 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


among  the  Chartists  and  gave  them  heart  to  shout  more  loudly, 
if  unsuccessfully,  for  their  charter.  We  shall  first  discover  the 
elements  of  unrest  —  national,  democratic,  economic  —  in  Italy, 
in  the  Germanics,  and  in  Austria-Hungary,  which  made  possible 
in  those  countries  the  revolutionary  movements  of  1848. 

What  national  patriotism  the  Itahans  possessed  rebelled 
against  the  presence  of  the  domineering  Austrians,  and  dreamed 
Nationalism  of  Uniting  all  the  petty  principalities  of  the  penin- 
in  Italy  g^lg^  jj^  Order  to  expel  the  foreigner.  The  Lombardo- 
Venetian  kingdom,  as  we  know,  was  directly  subject  to  Austria ; 
the  duchies  of  Tuscany,  Modena,  and  Parma  were  ruled  by  Habs- 
burg  sovereigns,  and  the  remainder  of  Italy  was  fearful  of  Aus- 
trian intervention.  Patriots  in  Lombardy-Venetia  longed  to 
drive  out  the  hated  Austrian  soldiery;  patriots  in  the  other 
Italian  states  strove  to  weld  into  a  nation  the  kingdom  of  Sar- 
dinia, the  kingdom  of  Lombardy-Venetia,  the  duchies  of  Parma 
and  Modena,  the  grand-duchy  of  Tuscany,^  the  Papal  States, 
and  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  SiciHes.  Already  three  strong 
movements  were  on  foot.  The  anti-clerical  secret  society 
founded  by  Mazzini,  a  Genoese  lawyer,  cherished  the  idea  of 
an  Italian  republic  based  on  Jacobin  principles.  The  Clericals 
hoped  to  form  a  federation  under  the  headship  of  the  liberal- 
minded  Pope  Pius  IX,  whose  name  was  cheered  all  over  Italy. 
Thirdly,  many  looked  to  Charles  Albert,  the  Liberal  king  of 
Sardinia,  as  the  strongest  and  safest  leader.  All  talked  of  the 
Risorgimento,  the  "resurrection"  of  Italy. 

Liberalism  in  Italy  meant*  a  return  to  such  a  constitution  as 
had  been  framed  by  the  Spanish  revolutionaries  in  181 2.  Only 
Liberalism  the  boldest  Spirits  of  the  middle  class  —  the  Young 
in  Italy  Italy  society  —  desired  a  repubhc ;  most  Liberals 
would  content  themselves  with  constitutional  monarchy.  Be- 
ginning with  the  Liberal  concessions  of  Pius  IX  in  1 846-1 847, 
—  political  amnesty,  freedom  of  the  press,  a  national  guard, 
and  a  council  of  state,  —  Liberalism  made  rapid  headway.  The 
grand-duke  of  Tuscany  granted  identical  reforms.  Charles 
Albert  of  Sardinia  not  only  granted  his  people  the  privilege  of 
parliamentary  government,  by  the  Fundamental  Statute  {Statuto) 
of  4  March,  1848,  but  suppressed  feudal  jurisdictions,  constructed 

^  The  duchy  of  Lucca  was  incorporated  into  Tuscany  in  1847. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  125 


railways,  founded  agricultural  societies,  organized  a  customs 
union  with  Tuscany  and  Rome,  and  provided  for  an  army  of 
61,400  men,  —  for  he  knew  that  Liberalism  involved  also  a 
struggle  with  Metternich. 

Very  much  the  same  situation  prevailed  in  the  Germanics. 
There  was  strong  popular  feeling  that  the  various  states  must 
be  firmly  federated  into  one  Fatherland  ;  that  Austria-  Nationalism 
Hungary  must  be  expelled ;  and  that  Liberal  con-  Germany 
stitutions  must  be  obtained.  The  Germanic  Confederation  of 
181 5  was  a  loose  alUance  of  some  thirty-eight  sovereigns,  in 
which  the  king  of  Prussia  and  the  Austrian  emperor  disputed 
for  precedence  among  a  motley  host  of  potentates :  kings  of 
Bavaria,  Hanover,  Saxony,  and  Wiirttemberg ;  grand-dukes, 
dukes,  princes,  and  even  burgomasters  of  the  free  towns  of 
Hamburg,  Liibeck,  and  Bremen.  The  emperor  of  Austria  had 
ItaHan  and  Slavic  subjects,  as  well  as  Germans;  the  king  of 
Prussia  had  Polish  possessions,  and  the  king  of  Denmark  (as 
duke  of  Holstein)  and  the  king  of  the  Netherlands  (as  duke  of 
Luxemburg)  boasted  membership  in  the  ''Germanic"  Confedera- 
tion. To  construct  a  national  state  out  of  such  a  hodge-podge 
seemed  a  prodigious  task.  Nevertheless  German  professors  in 
the  universities  clung  to  their  patriotic  ideals.  And  an  eco- 
nomic foundation  for  German  unity  had  been  laid  in  1833  when 
the  Zollverein  was  estabhshed  under  the  leadership  of  Prussia. 
A  common  customs  administration,  the  beginnings  of  a  railway 
system,  and  the  relationships  of  commerce,  were  physically 
unifying  the  country.  Merchants  with  commercial  interests  at 
stake  were  even  more  eloquent  nationalists  than  the  professors. 

Notwithstanding  repressive  laws,  a  powerful  Liberal  senti- 
ment had  developed  among  the  bourgeoisie  and  was  reflected  by 
the  lower  classes.  It  demanded,  on  the  one  hand.  Liberalism 
constitutional  Hberties  in  the  separate  states,  and,  on  Germany 
the  other,  a  federal  parliament  more  democratic  than  that 
assembly  of  reactionary  diplomats  —  the  Diet  of  the  Germanic 
Confederation.  The  Liberals  counted  much  on  Frederick 
William  IV,  who  succeeded  to  the  throne  of  Prussia  in  1840; 
but,  by  criticizing  his  tardiness  in  effecting  reforms,  the  Liberals 
so  irritated  the  monarch  that  he  insisted  the  more  firmly  upon 
the  fullness  of  his  royal  prerogative,  and  refused  to  yield  an  inch 


126 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


to  the  United  Landtag  or  Estates-General  of  the  whole  Prussian 
Kingdom,  which  he  had  created  by  a  decree  of  3  February, 
1847.  ^ 

Besides  the  bourgeois  advocates  of  constitutional  government 
and  national  unification,  the  king  of  Prussia  had  now  to  reckon 
The  Berlin  with  the  Berlin  proletariat  —  the  mob  of  discontented 
Proletariat  workingmen,  underpaid  or  unemployed,  some  of 
them  Poles,  ready  to  support  any  democratic  movement,  even 
to  the  length  of  violence. 

In  Austria-Hungary,  nationalism  tended  not  to  union,  as  in 
Italy  and  in  Germany,  but  to  disunion.  The  realms  of  the  Habs- 
burg  emperor  were  truly  a  curious  complex  of  nation- 
Natbni^-^  alities,  held  together  only  by  allegiance  to  the  sover- 
ties  in  cigu.  The  majority  of  the  population  was  made  up  of 
Hungiy  Slavic  nations :  (i)  the  Czechs  in  Bohemia  and 

Moravia,  and  their  neighbors,  the  Slovaks,  in  north- 
western Hungary ;  (2)  the  Poles  in  northwestern  Galicia ;  (3)  the 
Ruthenians  in  eastern  Galicia ;  (4)  the  Slovenes  in  Carniola  and 
southern  Styria;  (5)  and  the  Serbo-Croats  in  Croatia  and 
Slavonia.  Dominating  the  Slavic  groups  were  (i)  the  German 
population,  soKd  in  the  Austrian  provinces,  a  strong  minority 
in  Bohemia,  and  scattering  colonies  throughout  Hungary;  and 
(2)  the  Magyars  —  the  predominant  people  of  Hungary.  To 
add  to  the  confusion  of  nations,  there  were  Italians  in  Lombardy- 
Venetia  and  in  the  southern  cities  of  Croatia-Slavonia,  and 
Rumans  in  Transylvania  and  Bukowina.  It  is  easy  to  perceive 
what  havoc  the  spirit  of  nationalism  would  play  with  the  Habs- 
burg  dominions,  especially  when  we  remember  that  many  of 
the  subject  peoples  still  cherished  traditions  of  former  inde- 
pendence. 

During  the  reign  of  Ferdinand  I  (1835-1848),  five  different 
nationaUst  movements  menaced  the  empire,  (i)  With  the 
NationaUst  Italian  movement,  we  are  famiHar.  (2)  The  deter- 
Movements  mination  of  the  Poles  to  restore  their  ancient  king- 
Ernperor  ^om  caused  simultaneous  conspiracies  in  Prussian 
Ferdinand  Posen,  in  the  diminutive  repubKc  of  Cracow,  and  in 
1,1835-1848  Qaii^^ia  jg45  Xhe  rebelKous  Polish  nationalists 
were  in  turn  confronted  with  a  counter-revolution  in  eastern 
Galicia  of  the  Ruthenian  serfs  who  had  both  nationalist  and 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  127 

economic  reasons  to  revolt  against  their  Polish  landlords.  The 
Ruthenians  gained  nothing  by  their  insurrection,  but  simply 
helped  the  Austrians  to  crush  the  Pohsh  revolt  so  effectually  that 
PoUsh  patriotism  was  practically  paralyzed  for  the  next  dozen 
years. ^  (3)  The  Czechs  in  Bohemia,  remembering  the  national 
independence  and  the  free  constitution  which  had  been  theirs 
until  1627,  were  stirred  in  the  'forties  by  a  revival  of  Bohemian 
(Czech)  hterature,  by  a  campaign  to  introduce  the  Bohemian 
language  in  the  schools,  and  by  a  demand  for  reunion  with 
Moravia  and  Silesia.  In  1845  the  Diet  of  Bohemia  appealed 
to  national  sentiments  by  asserting  its  tax-voting  power  against 
the  Vienna  bureaucracy,  and  to  Liberahsm  by  proposing  that 
the  towns  be  better  represented  in  the  Diet.  But  the  Czechs, 
in  asserting  their  own  nationahsm,  naturally  came  into  violent 
conflict  with  the  nationahsm  of  the  numerous  Germans  who 
were  settled  among  them.  (4)  The  most  formidable  national 
movement  was  that  of  the  Magyars  or  Hungarians,  descendants 
of  the  savage  Asiatic  invaders  who  in  the  ninth  century  had 
crossed  the  Carpathians  into  the  valley  of  the  Danube  and  had 
reduced  the  adjacent  Slavs  to  the  position  of  subject  peoples. 
Magyar  patriotism  had  two  phases :  first,  a  fierce  resentment  of 
Austrian  attempts  to  override  Hungary's  right  to  be  ruled 
through  an  Hungarian  Diet;  and  secondly,  an  ardent  de- 
sire to  force  the  Magyar  language  and  nationaHty  upon  the 
Slovaks,  upon  the  Rumans  of  Transylvania,  and  upon  the  Slavs  of 
Croatia-Slavonia.  (5)  The  attempt  of  the  Magyars  to  force  their 
language  upon  the  Serbo-Croats  inflamed  the  latter  people  with  a 
nationahstic  hatred  of  Hungary.  Hitherto  the  Croats  had  been 
governed  by  a  Hungarian  ''ban"  or  viceroy,  and  an  elected  Diet. 
Now  they  began  to  agitate  for  the  erection  of  Dalmatia,  Croatia, 
and  Slavonia  into  a  Triune  Illyrian  kingdom,  subject  to  the 
Austrian  emperor  but  independent  of  Hungary.  (6)  Finally, 
the  most  powerful  national  group  of  all,  the  Germans,  although 
at  present  occupied  mostly  with  Liberalism,  might,  by  the  success 
of  any  of  the  foregoing  movements,  be  galvanized  into  patriotic 
energy. 

Sometimes  identical,  and  sometimes  at  odds  with  these  na- 
tionalist aspirations.  Liberal  demands  for  more  or  less  radical 

*  Cracow  was  inr()r[K)ratc(l  in  ihc  Ausli  iaii  Ilnipirc  in  1846. 


128 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


democratic  institutions  were  attracting  the  attention  of  the 
middle  and  lower  classes.  In  Hungary,  for  instance,  while 
Liberalism  Istvan  Szechenyi,  an  aristocrat  of  exceptional  fore- 
in  Austria-  sight,  sought  to  make  Hungary  great  and  prosperous 
Hungary  without  introducing  political  democracy,  the  more 
famous  Louis  Kossuth  (1802- 1894),  a  popular  journaUst  and 
an  eloquent  orator,  though  of  noble  rank,  had  already  spent 
some  three  years  in  prison  for  passionate  preaching  of  Liber- 
alism and  of  such  democratic  reforms  as  that  the  feudal 
nobles  should  be  stripped  of  their  privileges  and  forced 
to  pay  their  share  of  taxes,  that  the  criminal  code  should  be 
revised,  and  trial  by  jury  introduced.  But  these  democratic 
demands  occupied  only  half  of  Louis  Kossuth's  attention ;  with 
the  other  he  was  planning  to  exalt  his  nation.  He  was  both  a 
Liberal  and  a  nationaHst.  Similarly  in  Bohemia  were  to  be 
found  patriots  no  less  desirous  of  Liberal  than  of  national  prog- 
ress —  men  who  insisted  that  the  Bohemian  Diet  should  be 
made  at  once  more  representative  of  the  people  and  more  inde- 
pendent of  Vienna.  In  Croatia  much  the  same  connection  be- 
tween Liberalism  and  nationalism  obtained.  Among  the  Ger- 
mans in  the  Austrian  provinces,  however,  the  Liberal  propaganda 
was  both  more  advanced  and  less  entangled  with  nationalism. 
Even  the  Assembly  of  Estates  in  Lower  Austria — organ  of  the 
nobility  as  it  was  ^ —  favored  moderate  reforms  in  repre- 
sentation, legislation,  and  taxation.  The  bourgeoisie  of  the 
cities,  and  preeminently  the  bourgeoisie  of  Vienna,  went  further 
and  demanded  Hberty  to  pubhsh  revolutionary  doctrines  bor- 
rowed from  French  or  English  writers,  and  a  constitution 
guaranteeing  a  representative  legislature.  The  university 
students,  almost  two  thousand  in  number,  were  probably  the 
most  radical  as  well  as  the  most  reckless  of  Liberals. 

NationaHst  and  Liberal  ideas  no  doubt  exercised  a  powerful 
influence  upon  the  minds  of  the  lower  classes,  but  keener  still 
was  the  economic  motive.    In  Vienna  were  thou- 

The 

Industrial  sands  of  artisans  who  had  been  thrown  out  of  work 
Revolution  machinery,  for  the  Industrial  Revolution  was 

in  Atistns, 

beginning  to  make  itself  felt  even  in  the  stronghold  of 
"reaction";  other  thousands  starved  on  insufficient  wages. 
In  the  rural  districts  hard-driven  serfs  longed  to  blot  out  the 


I 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


feudal  and  manorial  system  —  the  system  by  which  the  bulk 
of  their  labor  went  to  support  some  nobleman.  The  artisans 
of  the  city  and  the  serfs  of  the  country  needed  but  an  excuse 
to  rise  in  rebelUon  against  the  economic  system  which  ground 
them  down. 

That  everywhere  the  people  were  murmuring  against  the 
established  order,  even  Metternich,  the  main  prop  of  that  order, 
could  not  deny.    For  the  very  reason  that  the  discon-  ^,  ^ 

,  /  ,     .  .       The  Last 

tent  was  everywhere  prevalent,  revolution,  once  in-  Years  of 
flamed,  was  bound  to  spread  Uke  wildfire.    The  ''inter-  ^^^jj^g'"' 
national  police"  would  find  it  more  difficult  to  keep  Regime  in 
the  peace  of  the  Continent  than  in  1830,  for  now  each  ^g^^^^j^g^g 
Power  would  be  occupied  at  home.    In  two  other 
respects  the  situation  by  1848  was  far  more  perilous  than  in 
1830.    First  of  all,  since  1830  numerous  railways  had  been 
constructed,  —  one  from  Paris  to  Vienna,  for  example,  —  and 
by  rail  the  news  of  revolutionary  successes  traveled  from  one 
country  to  another  in  hours  instead  of  weeks.    In  the  second 
place,  commerce  and  the  infant  industrial  revolution  had  in- 
creased the  number  of  prosperous  and  ambitious  business  men, 
who  were  the  middle-class  Liberals ;  and  at  the  same  time  the 
ranks  of  discontented  workingmen  had  been  swelled.    Both  of 
these  classes,  congregated  in  the  cities,  continually  agitated 
by  radical  clubs  and  secret  societies,  ra^lKed  to  revolution  more 
readily  than  the  slow  peasants  in  their  scattered  villages. 

The  white-haired  old  gentleman  of  Vienna,  Prince  Clemens 
Metternich,  now  in  his  seventies,  felt  the  reins  slipping  from 
his  hands.    In  spite  of  a  nominal  censorship,  revolu- 
tionary doctrines  were  being  printed  and  published  ;     ^^le  Revo- 
notwithstanding  his  precautions,  the  universities  were  tionary 
becoming  hotbeds  of  Liberalism.    Peace  could  not  ^^g^^^^*^ 
much  longer  be  preserved.    There  was  the  Polish 
revolution  of  1846.    That  had  fortunately  been  suppressed.  So 
had  short-lived  insurrections  in  Sicily  and  Naples  during  1847. 
But  in  Switzerland,  Metternich  had  failed  to  prevent  a  revolu- 
tionary upheaval  of  the  Radicals  in  the  northern  cantons  from 
overwhelming  the  defensive  alliance  (the  Sonderbund)  of  the 
seven  Catholic  cantons  (1847),  ^^^^^  although  the  democratic 
principle  was  disregarded  in  coercing  the  cantons  of  the  Sonder- 

VOL.  II  —  K 


I30 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


bund,  the  Radicals  professed  to  believe  in  republicanism,  uni- 
versal suffrage,  and  other  dangerous  novelties."  The  year  1848 
opened  ominously  with  a  desperate  uprising  in  Palermo,  on 
12  January,  which  soon  mastered  the  entire  island  of  Sicily  and 
led  to  the  restoration  of  the  Constitution  of  181 2.  To  ward  off 
a  like  revolution  in  Naples,  King  Ferdinand  voluntarily  granted 
a  constitution  on  29  January.  Meanwhile  in  Lombardy- 
Venetia,  the  Italians,  having  resolved  to  consume  no  more 
cigars  while  the  Austrian  government  derived  a  profit  from  the 
sale  of  tobacco,  stoned  the  Austrian  soldiers  who  dared  to  smoke 
in  the  streets,  and  thereby  precipitated  ''smoking  riots"  in 
Milan  and  Padua.  Perhaps  the  rest  of  Europe  would  have 
revolted,  even  had  France  not  given  a  spectacular  example  by 
her  February  Revolution. 

The  news  of  the  proclamation  of  the  Second  French  RepubHc 
(24  February,  1848),  traveling  through  Europe,  gave  a  clear 

signal  for  widespread  revolution.  In  the  train  of  the 
Se  Febm-  tidings  from  France,  came  information  that  the  grand- 
ary  (1848)  duke  of  Baden  had  granted  reforms ;  that  Charles 
^^Franco^    Albert  of  Sardinia  had  promulgated  a  constitution 

{Statuto) ;  that  the  Frankfort  Diet  had  appealed  to 
the  German  nation;  that  Louis  I  had  convoked  the  Bavarian 
Estates ;  that  Pope  Pius  IX  had  appointed  a  Liberal  ministry. 
Already,  Metternich  was  beginning  to  fear  that  these  rumbhngs 
portended  the  collapse  of  the  old  structure  of  absolutism.  His 
forebodings  were  confirmed  when  Louis  Kossuth,  in  a  furious 
speech  before  the  Hungarian  Diet  on  3  March,  demanded  a 
separate  responsible  ministry  for  Hungary.  On  12  March  a 
popular  petition  was  presented  to  the  emperor  by  two  Viennese 
professors.  On  the  following  day  a  turbulent  mob  of  students 
and  workingmen  in  Vienna  clashed  with  the  troops.  Later 
that  day  the  middle-class  civic  guard,  called  out  by  Metternich, 
Downfall  of  refused  to  suppress  the  riots,  and  great  crowds  col- 
Metternich,  lected  about  the  imperial  palace.  A  civic  deputation 
^^^^  demanded  the  dismissal  of  the  detested  chief  minister. 

Assured  that  his  hour  had  at  last  arrived,  the  white-haired  old 
gentleman,  still  very  courtly  in  his  blue  swallow-tail  coat,  and 
still  suavely  ironical,  requested  of  the  emperor  that,  since  his 
presence  was  no  longer  required,  he  ''might  be  allowed"  to 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  131 


resign.  His  palace  was  already  sacked  and  burning.  On 
14  March  an  elderly  ''Englishman"  and  his  wife  departed 
quietly  for  London.  Metternich,  the  veteran  foe  of  revolution, 
was  fleeing  for  his  life  before  a  revolution. 

When  Metternich  reached  London  a  little  more  than  a  month 
later,  he  learned  that  insurrections  had  broken  out  in  Berlin  and 
Milan;  that  Venice  was  a  repubHc ;  that  Sardinia  was  at 
war  with  Austria,  that  written  constitutions  had  been  s^reaJor 
exacted  from  the  rulers  of  Tuscany,  Sardinia,  the  Papal  the  Revo- 
States,  Austria,  and  Holland ;  and  that  the  grand-duke  Movement 
of  Baden,  the  king  of  Bavaria,  the  king  of  Saxony,  the 
king  of  Prussia,  and  the  king  of  Hanover  had  either  convoked  par- 
liaments, or  appointed  Liberal  ministries,  or  decreed  other  reforms. 

In  the  independent  ItaHan  states,  the  revolutionary  movement 
was  at  first  chiefly  Liberal  in  character,  and  was  devoted  to  the 
acquisition  of  constitutions.    In  Lombardy-Venetia,     „  ^ 

,  ,  ,     .  .  1  1         .  I.  March 

however,  the  revolution  was  violent  and  nationalist.  (1848) 
Transported  with  joy  by  news  of  the  flight  of  Met-  ^7tdy*'°"^ 
ternich,  Milan  began  on  18  March  a  bloody  five-days 
street-battle  with  General  Radetzky's  18,000  Austrian  troops.  On 
22  March,  while  Radetzky  was  retiring  from  Milan  to  his  strong- 
hold in  Venetia,  —  the  Quadrilateral,  —  the  Venetians  rebelled 
and  proclaimed  their  independence  as  the  repubHc  of  St.  Mark. 
The  Sardinian  army  of  23,000  under  Charles  Albert,  and  con- 
tingents of  troops  from  Tuscany,  from  the  Papal  States,  and 
from  Naples,  marched  to  emancipate  all  Italy  from  the  Austrians. 

Almost  all  of  the  German  states  experienced  disturbances 
during  March,  1848,  and  in  almost  all  the  demand  was  for  hmited 
monarchy,  free  press,  and  the  unification  of  Germany. 
In  Baden  an  extremist  attempt  to  set  up  a  republic 
was  thwarted  by  timely  concessions  on  the  part  of  the  Revolutions 
grand-duke.    In  Bavaria,  King  Louis,  having  failed  Germanies 
to  stay  the  revolt  by  promises,  abdicated  in  favor  of 
his  son,  Maximilian  II,  who  swore  to  observe  a  constitution.  In 
Hesse-Cassel,  freedom  of  the  press  and  constitutional  govern- 
ment were  gained.    Saxony  and  Wiirttemberg  were  pacified  by 
the  nomination  of  Liberal  ministries.    The  duke  of  Nassau  was 
forced  by  a  powerful  peasant  uprising  to  cede  his  private  domains 
to  the  public.    In  Hanover,  a  public  demonstration  was  followed 


132 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


by  a  change  of  ministry  and  a  constitutional  revision.  In  the 
petty  Thuringian  states  the  rulers  retained  their  popularity  by 
granting  reforms.  In  Mecklenburg-Schwerin,  freedom  of  the 
press  and  equal  electoral  rights  were  secured.  In  the  three 
Hanse  towns  —  Bremen,  Hamburg,  and  Liibeck, —  disturbances 
emphasized  the  demand  for  democratic  reform. 

In  Prussia  the  king  was  so  panic-stricken  at  the  disloyalty  of 
his  people  that  he  resisted  the  revolution  but  weakly.  Dis- 

March  Quieted  by  the  rioting  and  the  erection  of  barricades  in 
(1848)  Berhn  (13-16  March,  1848),  Frederick  William  IV  con- 
Revoiution    scntcd  to  Call  the  combined  Prussian  Diet  and  to  press 

m  Prussia  .  •      •      <-       n  tt  • 

for  a  national  constitution  for  all  Germany.  Hearing 
of  these  royal  concessions,  crowds  of  workingmen  and  foreigners 
flocked  to  the  palace-square,  where  they  were  received  by  musket- 
shots  from  the  Royal  Guards.  Again  barricades  were  erected 
and  during  that  night  upwards  of  two  hundred  were  killed  in  the 
street-fighting ;  but  on  the  morrow  the  king  called  off  the  troops, 
and  completed  his  surrender  by  appointing  a  Liberal  ministry. 

Taking  advantage  of  the  almost  universal  sentiment  in  favor 
of  German  unification,  a  Vorparlament,  or  preliminary  parlia- 
Nationaiist  Hient,  supposed  to  represent  all  German  states,  met 
Movement  at  Frankfort  on  31  March,  and  exercised  so  powerful 
m  Germany  influence  upon  the  German  Diet  that  the  latter 
body  regularly  convoked  a  parliament,  or  rather  a  Constitu- 
tiona^l  Convention,  composed  of  one  deputy  for  every  50,000 
inhabitants  throughout  the  Germanic  Confederation.  This 
was  the  famous  Frankfort  Assembly  which  was  solemnly  opened 
in  St.  Paul's  Church,  Frankfort,  on  13  May,  1848. 

Meanwhile  the  revolution  had  so  altered  the  aspect  of  the 
Habsburg  Empire  that  Prince  Metternich,  now  leading  a  re- 
tired life  in  Brighton  (England),  would  not  easily 
Revolution  have  recognized  his  country.  On  the  very  day  after 
in  Austria,  Mettcrnich's  flight  {i.e.,  on  15  March,  1848)  an  im- 
^848^^"^*^'  perial  manifesto  had  recognized  freedom  of  the  press, 
had  authorized  the  formation  of  a  National  Guard,  had 
called  the  Austrian  Estates  to  meet  on  3  July,  and  had  promised 
a  constitution  for  Austria.  The  new  National  Guard,  the 
students,  and  a  committee  of  24  citizens,  were  thenceforward 
the  real  rulers  of  Vienna.     On  25  April  the  emperor  promul- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


153 


gated  the  promised  constitution  for  all  of  his  dominions,  except 
Hmigary  and  Lombardy-Venetia,  granting  civil  and  reHgious 
liberty,  a  National  Guard,  and  a  bicameral  Diet.  Even  this  was 
not  fully  satisfactory  to  the  revolutionaries  ;  a  Constitutional  As- 
sembly, based  on  universal  suffrage,  must  needs  be  convoked. 
The  emperor  again  yielded,  and  then,  terrified  by  fresh  demonstra- 
tions in  Vienna,  fled  to  Innsbruck.  In  his  absence,  the  ministry, 
by  attempting  to  dissolve  the  students'  organization,  brought 
on  a  new  popular  revolt  (26  May),  and  Vienna  became  a  city 
of  barricades,  governed  by  a  revolutionary  Committee  of  Safety. 

While  the  imperial  government  was  paralyzed  by  the  turmoil 
in  Vienna,  the  Hungarians  secured  their  autonomy  by  estab- 
'  lishing  a  separate,  responsible,  Hungarian  ministry,  j^arch 
with  a  Liberal-Nationalist  at  its  head.    The  Liberal  (1848) 
character  of  the  Magyar  movement  displayed  itself  ?^g^^g°J^y 
in  reforms  of  the  Liberal  type,  effected  in  March  and 
April,  1848.    The  press  was  freed,  a  National  Guard  was  or- 
ganized, feudal  ser\dtudes  and  titles  were  abolished,  nobles  were 
forced  to  share  in  the  tax-burdens.  Diets  were  to  be  held  an- 
nually at  Budapest  and  to  be  elected  by  the  nobility  plus  the 
newly  enfranchised  middle  classes  ($150  property-holders). 

The  revolutionary  wave  of  March- April,  1848,  mildly  nation- 
alist, moderately  Liberal,  and  widely  successful,  having  over- 
whelmed Metternich  and  gained  constitutional  hb- 
erties  for    almost    every    central-European    state,  phasTof 
began  to  break  up  in  the  summer  of  1848,  as  nation-  AU  the 
alist  sentiments  emerged  more  prominently.    By  its  ary^Move^ 
fatal  entanglement  with  discordant  nationahst  am-  ments  of 
bitions,   the  democratic-nationalist  revolution  was 
doomed  to  destroy  itself  in  a  conflict  of  nations. 

It  was  this  nationalist  element  which  made  the  new  consti- 
tutional settlement  impracticable  for  Austria-Hungary.  Had 
Magyars,   Slavs,   and   Germans  harmoniously  de-  ^j^^  j^^^^ 
manded  constitutional  government,   their  demand  Austrian 
could  not    have  been    gainsaid.     Unhappily,   the  ^en^stuiti- 
Liberals,  who  desired  democracy,  were  at  the  same  fied  by 
time,  and  even  more  strenuously,  insisting  upon  the 
separate  national  claims  of  their  own  people,  and  these  national 
claims  could  not  be  satisfied  for  the  Slavs  without  hurting  the 


134 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


pride  of  Germans  and  Magyars,  or  for  the  Magyars  without 
arousing  the  jealousy  of  the  Slavs  and  Germans,  or  for  the 
Germans  without  incurring  the  resentment  of  the  Slavs. 

For  this  very  reason  the  Austria;i  Constitution  of  25  April, 
1848,  was  unsatisfactory:  it  left  Hungary  entirely  out  of  con- 
I.  National-  sideration,  and  at  the  same  time  fell  short  of  the  de- 
ism in  the  sircs  of  the  other  nationalities.  To  prepare  a  better 
Reichstag  constitution,  a  Reichstag  (Imperial  Diet)  representing 
by  universal  suffrage  all  of  the  Habsburg  territories  except 
Lombardy-Venetia  and  Hungary,  assembled  at  Vienna  on  22  July, 
1848.  Racial  animosities  divided  the  deputies,  less  than  half 
of  whom  were  Germans,  into  distinct  and  discordant  groups, 
and  stultified  the  deliberations.  One  great  reform  was  ac- 
complished, however,  at  the  instance  of  the  peasants,  who  com- 
posed a  fourth  of  the  Assembly,  and  by  the  acquiescence  of  the 
middle-class  majority,  —  namely,  the  abolition  of  the  peasants' 
servile  obhgations  to  their  feudal  lords. 

Shortly  before  the  meeting  of  the  Reichstag,  the  Slavs  had 
held  a  congress  of  their  own  in  June,  1848,  in  Prague,  where  the 
3  The  Pan-  Liberal  movement  had  already  secured  a  National 
Slav  Con-  Guard,  the  convocation  of  the  Provincial  Estates, 
^^^^  and  a  responsible  government.    Czech,  Polish,  Rus- 

sian, and  Serbian  delegates  here  met  as  brother  Slavs,  and 
sounded  the  praises  of  their  great  and  valorous  race  in  unity 
of  spirit  but  with  a  Babel  of  dissonant  tongues.  Eloquent 
manifestoes,  proclaiming  loyalty  to  the  Habsburgs,  appealing 
to  all  branches  of  the  Slav  race,  and  calling  for  a  general  con- 
gress of  all  the  nations,  were  the  only  achievements  of  the  un- 
practical congress.  But  the  excitement  of  the  Czech  populace 
of  Prague  led  to  more  tangible,  if  less  desirable,  results,  —  rioting 
on  13  June,  the  erection  of  barricades,  anA  an  assault  upon 
the  residence  of  Prince  Windischgratz,  the  Austrian  commander, 
and  the  shooting  of  his  wife  as  she  stood  at  the  window.  Fight- 
ing ensued,  from  which  Prince  Windischgratz  emerged  as  the 
victor  on  17  June,  1848.  The  Liberal  reforms  were  hastily 
withdrawn,  Bohemia  was  put  under  martial  law,  and  the  Czech 
movement  expired. 

Not  so  the  movement  of  the  southern  Slavs.  The  Serbo- 
Croats  of  Croatia  and  Slavonia,  fearing  rather  the  domineering 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


Magyars  than  the  German  Austrians,  had  secured  the  appoint- 
ment as  han  (viceroy  of  Croatia)  of  Count  Joseph  Jellachich  von 
Buzim,  a  Croatian  nobleman  who  had  inherited  from 

.3.  Jcl- 

his  father,  a  veteran  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  and  lachich, 
manifested  in  border  warfare  against  the  Turks,  the 

'  '       f  •  ^      r        r  ^  t  Croatia 

spirit  of  a  patriot  and  of  a  lighter.  Ihe  new  ban 
alarmed  the  imperial  court  and  angered  the  Magyars  by  con- 
voking a  Croatio-Slavonic  Diet  (June,  1848).  The  presence 
of  Slovenes  from  Styria  and  Carniola,  Slovaks  from  northern 
Hungary,  and  Czechs  from  Bohemia  made  the  Diet  virtually 
a  pan-Slavic  congress,  like  the  one  simultaneously  sitting  at 
Prague.  Mistrusting  that  Jellachich  purposed  to  set  up  a 
Croatio-Slavonic  kingdom,  the  imperial  government  suspended 
him  from  office.  Thereupon  he  hastened  to  visit  the  emperor 
at  Innsbruck  with  assurances  that  his  innocent  intent  was 
loyally  to  serve  the  house  of  Habsburg,  and  to  overcome  the 
rebellious  Magyars.  He  was  given  a  hearty  welcome,  for  the 
imperial  government  was  daily  becoming  more  hostile  to  the 
Magyars,  who  had  made  Hungary  practically  independent,  with 
separate  national  flag,  army,  ambassadors,  and  ministry.  More- 
over, Austrian  financiers  were  frenzied  by  the  emission  of  Hun- 
garian paper  money,  which  supplanted  the  notes  of  the  National 
Bank  of  Vienna.  Austria  might  very  well  encourage  the  Croa- 
tian movement  so  long  as  that  movement  was  directed  against 
the  troublesome  Magyars.  So  thougjht  the  emperor  when  early 
in  September,  1848,  he  reinstated  Count  Jellachich  as  ha7i  of 
Croatia.  The  armed  conflict  of  nations  in  Austria-Hungary 
was  at  hand. 

During  the  same  eventful  summer  of  1848,  all  eyes  in  Ger- 
many, and  in  the  German  provinces  of  Austria,  were  focussed 
on  the   Frankfort  National   Assembly,  the  living  ^  jj^^ 
embodiment  of  German  national  aspirations.    Here  Frankfort 
again,  there  was.  woeful  lack  of  unanimity.  Although 
the  Assembly,  after  long  deliberation,  announced^  equality  be- 
fore the  law,  freedom  of  person,  of  press,  of  petition,  of  meeting, 
to  be  the  rights  of  Germans,  it  came  to  grief  in  attempting 
to  construct  a  national  government.    The  first  essential,  a 
central  executive,  it  hoped  to  secure  by  electing  Archduke 

1  27  December,  1848. 


136 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


John  of  Austria,  a  prince  who  had  openly  derided  Metternich's 
conservatism,  to  be  Reichsverweser  (Vicar  of  the  Empire).  By 
this  step  offense  was  given  aUke  to  the  Republicans,  who  de- 
tested princes,  to  the  jealous  state  governments,  which  feared 
eclipse,  and  to  the  Prussian  nationalists,  who  hoped  to  build  up 
the  Fatherland  around  Prussia.  The  Reichsverweser  was  to 
govern  through  a  ministry  responsible  to  a  democratic  assembly. 
The  extent  of  the  new  empire  was  a  still  more  delicate  question ; 
for  it  would  not  be  a  German  Empire  if  Prussia  brought  in  her 
unwilling  Polish  subjects,  and  Austria-Hungary  her  rebellious 
Czechs,  Poles,  Magyars,  Slovaks,  etc.,  On  the  other  hand,  the 
empire  would  be  sadly  mutilated  if  the  German  population  of 
either  Prussia  or  Austria  should  be  excluded.  There  was,  more- 
over, the  problem  of  the  Schleswig-Holsteiners  whose  German 
nationality  Denmark  was  attempting  to  override,  and  Prussia 
was  fighting  to  defend.  Prussia's  inglorious  discontinuation 
of  the  Schleswig-Holstein  War  in  September,  1848,  provoked 
nationalist  riots  and  outrages  in  Frankfort,  which  served  only 
to  incense  the  partisans  of  law  and  order. 

In  the  Swiss  cantons  alone  was  the  federating  movement 
entirely  successful.  The  Federal  Constitution  of  1848,  on  the 
Success  of  hand,  gave  to  Switzerland  at  large  a  permanent 

Federalism  federal  unity,  and,  on  the  other,  accorded  to  the 
land^^*^^^  people  of  the  several  cantons  democratic-republi- 
can governments. 

We  left  Italy  in  April,  1848,  with  the  troops  of  Sardinia, 
Tuscany,  the  Papal  States,  and  Naples  hastening  to  emancipate 
FaUure  of  peninsula  from  Austrian  domination,  and  with  con- 

FederaUsm  stitutional  governments  in  all  the  states  except  Venice 
in  Italy  republic  of  St.  Mark.    Patriots  believed  the 

resurrection  of  Italy  —  the  Risorgimento  —  to  be  at  hand  :  Italy 
would  become  a  free  federation  of  constitutional  monarchies. 
To  that  glorious  promise  of  freedom,  facts  soon  gave  the  lie.  On 
29  April  the  pope  repudiated  the  War  of  Liberation.  In  May, 
after  a  wild  Republican  outbreak  in  Naples,  the  king  of  the  Two 
Sicilies  dissolved  his  Chamber,  abrogated  the  constitutional 
regime,  and  recalled  the  Neapolitan  troops  from  the  north. 
Thus  abandoned,  the  northern  nationalists,  nevertheless,  per- 
sisted in  proclaiming  the  annexation  of  Lombardy-Venetia, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


137 


Parma,  and  Modena  to  the  constitutional  monarchy  of  Sardinia. 
The  union  was  short-lived,  however,  for  the  poorly  generaled, 
ill-organized  forces  of  the  Italians,  unable  to  prevent  a  fresh 
Austrian  army  from  reenforcing  Radetzky,  were  defeated  at 
Custozza  (24  July,  1848) ;  and  the  victorious  Radetzky  re- 
stored the  former  status  quo.  Only  the  city  of  Venice,  defiantly 
Republican,  refused  to  submit. 

The  summer  of  1848  had  been  encouraging  for  the  imperial 
Austrian  government.    The  pan-Slav  propaganda  of  the  Czechs 
had  evaporated  before  General  Windischgratz's  mus- 
ketry (Tune) ;  General  Radetzky  had  crushed  the  S!°^®J?^ 

1'        ,^  ,      .  N      1      ^  .  First  Period 

rebelhon  m  Italy  (July-August) ;  the  German  situa-  ©f  the  Revo- 
tion  was  not  threatening;  and  the  still  successfully  Jutionary 

IT  i»  11  11  Movements 

msubordinate  Magyar  state  was  menaced  by  rebel-  of  1848; 
Hous  Rumans  in  Transylvania,  and  by  truculent  ^"Jj^^j" 
Serbo-Croats  in  the  southwest.    It  was  a  favorable  (August) 
opportunity.     In  September,  1848,  Jellachich  was  ^^J^^Jj^^^^ 
allowed  to  cross  the  Drave  River  into  Hungary  at  the  Hungary 
head  of  an  army  of  invasion.    At  first  he  was  repelled. 
Then  the  Austrian  government  dissolved  the  Hungarian  Diet, 
declared  Hungary  in  a  state  of  war,  made  Jellachich  commander 
of  the  troops  in  Hungary,  and  attempted  to  send  part  of  the 
Viennese  garrison  to  his  aid. 

Just  at  this  point  the  populace  of  Vienna  asserted  itself,  and 
initiated  the  next  phase  of  the  revolution,  the  popular  Repub- 
lican phase.    By  this  time  many  bourgeois  Liberals,  g^^^^^^ 
having  lost  business  by  the  turmoil,  and  many  liberal-  Period  of 
minded  country-gentlemen,  having   lost  their  in-  Jhe  Revo- 

f  -11  111  i«r  lutionary 

come  from  manorial  dues,  and  the  clergy,  longmg  for  Movement: 
peace,  had  abandoned  the  revolution  to  the  more  Repubii- 

1*1  •         1  1  Phase, 

radical  masses,  the  emancipated  peasants,  the  Re-  October, 

pubhcan  clubs,  and  the  discontented  workingmen,  J^^s-  ^^^^ 

who  had  only  their  lives  to  lose.    The  bloody  June 

Days  in  Paris  fitly  prefaced  the  series  of  tragedies  which  now 

ensued. 

For  three  reasons  the  masses  in  Vienna  opposed  the  coercion 
of  Hungary,  (i)  As  democrats,  they  felt  a  noble  sympathy  with 
Kossuth's  heroic  efforts  to  democratize  Hungary.  (2)  As  Ger- 
man nationalists,  they  would  gladly  have  allowed  the  Magyars 


138  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


to  go  their  way,  so  that  German  Austria  might  be  free  to  join 
the  new  Germany  —  perhaps  the  repubUc  of  Germany.  (3)  As 
The  Prole-  revolutionaries,  they  made  common  cause  with  the 
tarianinsur-  Magyars  as  enemies  of  reaction.  When,  therefore, 
Vienna,  Viennese  troops  were  ordered  out  against  Hungary, 

October,  the  Viennese  mob  hanged  the  minister  of  war  from 
^^'^^  a  lantern  post,  6  October,  1848.    Next  day  Vienna 

was  a  city  of  barricades,  manned  by  desperate  proletarians,  who 
had  stormed  and  despoiled  the  armory.  The  garrison,  expelled 
from  the  city,  joined  Jellachich,  who  now,  in  concert  with  Win- 
dischgratz  (from  Prague),  moved  on  Vienna.  On  26  October 
Windischgratz  began  the  attack.  In  their  extremity,  the 
Viennese  looked  for  help  to  the  Magyar  army ;  but  on  30  Oc- 
tober from  the  spire  of  St.  Stephen's  they^  beheld  with  sinking 
hearts  the  defeat  of  that  army  by  Jellachich,  at  Schwechat. 
On  31  October  Windischgratz  took  possession  of  Vienna.  A 
score  or  so  expiated  their  revolutionary  attempt  with  their  lives. 

Reaction  triumphant  now  assumed  the  reins  of  government 
in  the  person  of  Prince  Felix  Schwarzenberg,  soldier,  diplomat, 
„  ,     .      cynic,  aristocrat,  and  brother-in-law  of  Windisch- 

Restoration  '  1.1 

of  Law  and  gratz.  A  strong  and  united  monarchy  was  to  him, 
YiennsL^      as  to  Prince  Metternich  before  him,  the  mainstay 

of  the  moral  order.  In  his  task  of  rejuvenating  the 
monarchy,  he  had  a  young  sovereign  as  master;  for  on  2 
Schwarzen-   December,  1848,  the  Emperor  Ferdinand  had  ab- 

dicated  in  favor  of  his  eighteen-year-old  nephew 
Francis  Joseph.  That  distasteful  legacy  of  revolution,  the 
Francis  Reichstdg,  was  transferred  to  Kremsier,  and  there 
Joseph  allowed  to  elaborate  a  theoretical  constitution,  until 
on  4  March,  1849,  Schwarzenberg  suddenly  proclaimed  an 
entirely  different  constitution,  based  on  the  idea  of  welding  all 
the  Habsburg  dominions  into  a  strong  and  undivided  monarchy. 

The  strong  and  united  monarchy  did  not  yet  exist  in  fact. 
Hungary,  having  declared  Francis  Joseph's  accession  illegal, 
Tjjg  was  at  war  with  Austria.    At  first,  the  Magy^ars  had 

Hungarian  been  thrown  into  a  panic  by  Jellachich 's  rapid  advance 
Republic  .^^^  Hungary  and  by  his  occupation  of  Budapest 
(5  January,  1849).  Windischgratz,  the  conqueror  of  Prague 
and  of  Vienna,  who  was  likewise  now  invading  Hungary, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


139 


inflicted  a  serious  defeat  on  the  revolutionary  Magyar  army. 
All  western  Hungary  was  at  his  mercy.  With  indomitable  and 
reckless  courage,  Louis  Kossuth  raUied  the  lesser  nobility,  the 
lower  middle  classes,  and  the  Magyar  peasantry  to  the  national 
cause,  issued  banknotes,  and  searched  for  competent  generals. 
Encouraged  by  timely  triumphs  in  Transylvania,  Croatia,  and 
Slavonia,  and  by  news  that  the  main  Magyar  army  had  out- 
maneuvered  Windischgratz,  Kossuth  in  an  exultant  oration  pro- 
posed a  Hungarian  Declaration  of  Independence.  On  14  April, 
1849,       independence  of  Hungary  was  proclaimed. 

It  was  the  high  tide  of  Republican  Revolution  in  the  spring  of 
1849,  with  Republican  triumphs  in  Italy  and  Germany  as  well 
as  in  Hungary.    Mazzini's  ^' Young  Italy party  was  j^^p^^^jj^^jj 
responsible  for  outbreaks  in  Rome  and  in  Leghorn  Revolts 
which  replaced  the  pope  and  the  grand-duke  of  |^  Germany 
Tuscany  by  republican  forms  of  government  in  the 
Papal  States  and  Tuscany  respectively  (February,  1849). 
the  democratic  party  in  Sardinia   reopened  the  war  against 
Austria.    In  Germany,  too,  RepubHcan  clubs,  disgusted  with 
the  futile  federative  efforts  of  the  Frankfort  Assembly,  fomented 
revolution  early  in  1849.    The  month  of  May,  1849,  witnessed 
the  establishment  of  provisional  republican  governments  in  the 
Rhenish  Palatinate  and  in  the  kingdom  of  Saxony,  the  erection 
of  barricades  at  Breslau  (Prussia),  and  the  outbreak  of  a  revolu- 
tion in  Baden,  where  the  provisional  government,  set  up  in  June, 
was  soon  able  to  muster  more  than  30,000  troops.    For  a  moment 
it  seemed  as  if  this  second  spring  contagion  of  revolution  would 
plant  republics  as  widely  as  the  first  had  spread  constitutions. 

The  Republican  Revolution  had  hardly  begun  before  it  failed, 
and  the  tide  of  Restoration  set  in.  In  March,  1849,  the  king 
of  Naples  suppressed  his  Parliament,  and  two  months  „ 

1  1  1  1     •         •        r  o-  -1  11   Failure  of 

later  the  ragged  revolutionaries  of  Sicily  were  crushed  Repubiifan 
by  his  royal  army  :  absolutism  was  restored  in  south-  ^g^^°^"*^°"' 
ern  Italy.    The  republic  of  Rome  was  extinguished  at 
the  end  of  June;  and  Pius  IX  returned,  supported  by  French 
arms,  converted  to  Conservatism  by  the  excesses  of  the  anti- 
clerical Republicans.    In  Tuscany,  as  early  as  1 1  April,  i.  Restora- 
1849,  upper  classes  and  peasantry  had  united  to 
restore  the  grand-duke.    In  the  north,  Austrian  arms  again 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


triumphed.  Hopelessly  defeated  by  Radetzky  (23  March, 
1849),  Charles  Albert  abandoned  the  throne  of  Sardinia  to  his 
son  Victor  Emmanuel  II,  and  fled  to  Portugal,  there  to  die  a 
year  later.  In  May  Austrian  troops  entered  Florence ;  and  the 
Austrian  general  Haynau  so  cruelly  punished  the  Lombard  city 
of  Brescia  for  its  revolution,  that  he  earned  the  unenviable 
nickname  of  General  Hyena."  Finally,  the  city-republic  of 
Venice,  besieged  and  bombarded,  starving  and  cholera-stricken, 
surrendered  to  the  Austrians  at  the  end  of  August,  1849.  With 
the  exception  of  the  liberal  monarchical  constitution  which 
Sardinia  retained,  Restoration  was  complete :  pope  and  princes 
in  peaceful  possession  of  their  thrones,  and  Austrian  soldiers 
insolently  swaggering  in  the  streets  of  Venice,  Milan,  and 
Florence. 

The  end  of  the  Hungarian  RepubHc  was  no  less  tragic.  The 
climax  of  Kossuth's  career  was  reached  on  6  June,  1849,  when 
2  The  End  joyously  returned  to  Budapest  just  after  that  city 
of  the  had  been  recaptured  from  the  Austrian  invaders. 
RepubUc^^  Then  quickly  the  catastrophe  came.  Jellachich 
moved  north  from  Croatia  with  almost  40,000 
men;  Baron  von  Haynau  approached  with  the  main  body  of 
60,000  Austrian  troops;  while  from  across  the  Carpathians 
advanced  an  army  of  80,000  Russians,  sent  by  the  Tsar  Nicholas 
I,  that  stern  autocrat,  to  aid  his  young  brother-monarch,  Francis 
Joseph,  to  reestablish  absolutism,  in  Austria-Hungary.  In 
July,  Budapest  again  surrendered  to  Austrian  captors.  By  the 
middle  of  August  one  Magyar  army  had  been  routed  by  General 
Haynau,  while  the  other,  facing  overwhelming  odds,  had  sur- 
rendered to  the  Russians.  Thirteen  revolutionary  generals 
and  more  than  one  hundred  civiHans  were  executed,  and  two 
thousand  were  imprisoned.  Louis  Kossuth  escaped  to  Turkey, 
whence,  after  two  years'  imprisonment,  he  journeyed  to  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  finally  setthng  in  Turin,  ever 
piteously  pleading  for  a  cause  that  was  dead. 

To  restore  order,  to  consolidate  the  monarchy,  and  to  fortify 
the  crown  against  future  attacks,  the  young  emperor  and  his 
loyal  Schwarzenberg  now  bent  all  their  energies ;  and  their  pohcy 
received  the  hearty  assent  of  the  revolution-weary  church,  the  out- 
raged court,  and  the  exultant  army.    The  Hungarian  Constitu.- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


tion,  and  the  Austrian  Constitution  of  March,  1849,  were  now 
abrogated,  in  the  name  of  "the  unity  of  the  empire  and  mo- 
narchical principles."    The  Transylvanian,  Croatian,  Restora 
and  Serbian  territories  which  Hungary  had  annexed  tion  in 
were  again  detached.    Hungary  lost  its  last  vestiges  g^^j^^g^^jTy 
of  independence,  and  submitted,  together  with  the 
other  provinces  of  the  monarchy,  to  German  officials  sent  out 
from  Vienna.    The  revolutionary  reforms  were  all  undone, 
excepting  only  that  the  nobles  never  regained  their  former 
power  in  local  poHtics  or  their  exemption  from  taxation  or  their 
seigniorial  rights.    Serfdom  was  a  thing  of  the  past  in  the  Habs- 
burg  dominions.^ 

Meanwhile,  Republicanism  had  fared  no  better  in  Germany 
than  in  Italy  or  Hungary.  The  Prussian  government,  having 
restored  order  at  Breslau,  felt  sufficiently  secure  to 

1       T» «-        T-«       1     •        •     4-  Suppres- 

send  troops  to  suppress  the  May  Revolution  in  sion  of  Re- 
Saxony,  to  restore  order  in  the  Palatinate,  and,  with  pubiicanism 

1  ^'rr     ^  ^  r  i  in  Germany 

somewhat  greater  dimculty,  to  deieat  the  revolu- 
tionaries in  Baden  (June- July,  1849).  Their  dreams  of  a  united 
republican  Germany  shattered,  many  of  the  revolutionaries 
emigrated  to  the  republic  across  the  Atlantic,  —  the  United 
States,  —  a  republic  which  they  were  soon  called  upon  to 
defend  from  disintegration. 

The  RepubKcan  outbreaks  in  Germany  had  followed  upon  the 
failure  of  the  Frankfort  Assembly.    That  body,  after  deeply 
offending  Austria-Hungary  by  resolving  to  exclude 
all  non-German  lands  from  the  proposed  German 
Empire,  had  completed  the  draft  constitution,  and  Frankfort 
early  in  April  had  offered  the  title  of  hereditary  fl^^"^^^^' 
German  Emperor  to  Frederick  WiHiam  IV,  the  king 
of  Prussia.    That  weak-minded  monarch,  undecided  as  usual, 
was  both  reluctant  to  accept  a  ''crown  of  shame"  from  a  revolu- 
tionary assembly  of  his  social  inferiors,  and  fearful  of  offending 
Austria  or  Russia ;  nevertheless  he  evaded  a  point-blank  refusal 
by  asking  the  acquiescence  of  the  other  German  governments. 
Twenty-eight  smaller  states  approved  the  creation  of  the  em- 
pire, but  the  four  kings  of  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg,  Saxony,  and 
Hanover  dissented,  and  Austria  vigorously  disapproved.  Frcd- 

^  Except  in  Galicia. 


142 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


erick  William  thereupon  refused  the  imperial  crown,  28  April, 

1849,  Finding  its  plans  obstinately  blocked  by  Austria  and 
Prussia,  the  discouraged  Frankfort  Assembly  gradually  melted 
away.    Its  work  was  a  failure. 

After  the  collapse  of  the  National  Assembly,  and  the  extinc- 
tion of  the  Republican  Revolutions,  rival  plans  for  the  reorgani- 
zation  of  Germany  were  propounded  by  Prussia  and 
Preponder-    Austria.    The  Prussian  plan  was  due  to  Radowitz,  the 
anceof  Aus-  friend  and  ad viscr  of  Frederick  William  IV.  Radowitz, 

tna,  and  the  /^itit        i-         r  i«  r 

Humiliation  a  dcvout  Catholic,  bclicved  m  a  free  church  m  a  free 
18^^"^^^*'  latter  half  of  his  program,  he  believed, 

could  be  realized  by  the  establishment  of  a  German 
Union  which  would  exclude  Austria-Hungary.  To  this  end, 
he  drafted  a  constitution,  startlingly  similar  to  that  of  the 
present  German  Empire,  providing  for  Prussian  hegeinony, 
an  administrative  council,  and  a  popular  assembly.  Seventeen 
states  joined  the  Union,  and  a  Parliament  was  elected  early  in 

1850.  The  failure  of  the  plan  was  due  to  Frederick  William's 
timid  apprehension  of  Austrian  or  Russian  displeasure,  as  much 
as  to  the  determined  efforts  of  the  Austrian  minister,  Schwar- 
zenberg.  Prince  Schwarzenberg  proposed  to  reorganize  the  old 
Germanic  Confederation,  which  should  include  ^e  entire  Aus- 
trian monarchy,  Hungary  and  all,  and  should  be  provided  with 
a  directory  of  seven  members,  alternately  presided  over  by 
Austria  and  Prussia.  After  the  defeat  of  the  Hungarians, 
Schwarzenberg  was  able  to  press  his  plans  with  redoubled  vigor, 
making  no  secret  of  his  hatred  for  Prussia.  When  he  called  a 
conference  at  Frankfort  to  reorganize  the  Confederation,  Prussia 
convoked  a  rival  congress  at  Berlin,  and  then,  menaced  by  a 
truculent  coalition  of  Austria,  Wiirttemberg,  and  Bavaria,  and 
fearing  that  the  conservative  Nicholas  of  Russia  would  again 
come  to  Francis  Joseph's  assistance,  Frederick  William  wavered 

.  and  weakly  gave  way.  Even  Schwarzenberg's  plan 
oAhe^Ger^  of  reorganization  was  now  discarded,  so  complete 
manic  Con-  was  the  reactionary  triumph ;  and  the  old  Germanic 
1851^**^**°'    Confederation,  as  organized  in  1 8 1 5 ,  was  reestabhshed. 

The  Diet  proceeded  to  undo  the  work  of  the  revo- 
lution, by  repealing  ''the  fundamental  rights  of  German  citi- 
zens," and  by  appointing  a  committee,  popularly  called  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


''reactionary  committee,"  to  eliminate  such  dangerous  prin- 
ciples as  universal  suffrage  from  the  constitutions  of  1848.  Under 
Schwarzenberg's  influence,  as  formerly  under  Metter-  Reaction 
nich's  domination,  the   German  governments  after  in  the 
1850  rigorously  repressed  Liberalism,  and  stamped 
their  hatred  of  progress  upon  courts,  chambers,  schools,  and 
clergy. 

Ardent  German  patriots  were  deeply  disappointed  in  King 
Frederick  WilHam  IV  of  Prussia,  who  had  miserably  failed  to 
cooperate  with  the  Frankfort  Assembly  or  to  withstand  Austria 
or  to  become  a  great  national  leader.  Likewise,  German 
Liberals  were  chagrined  at  his  obstinate  opposition  to  the 
establishment  of  real  political  democracy  in  Prussia.  The  sup- 
posedly Liberal  constitution,  which  had  been  granted  in  Decem- 
ber, 1848,  was  subsequently  revised  by  royal  com- 
missions and  reactionary  statesmen,  until,  as  finally  Jjonaf Gov- 
promulgated  by  the  king  on  31  January,  1850,  it  was  ernment  in 
a  thoroughly  Conservative  document.  However,  it  ^nserva-^^ 
proved  to  be  the  one  permanent  result  of  the  Revolu-  tive  Docu- 
tion  of  1848  in  Prussia ;  and,  with  changes  only  of  °^ 
detail,  it  has  remained  the  constitution  of  Prussia  from 
1850  to  the  present  and  throughout  these  years  has  preserved 
the  form,  if  not  the  spirit,  of  representative,  constitutional 
government.  The  Prussian  Constitution  of  1850  was  decreed 
by  royal  authority,  like  the  French  Charter  of  1814;  it  em- 
bodied an  elaborate  declaration  of  individual  rights  and  liberties, 
though  without  adequate  provision  for  rendering  them  effective'; 
it  asserted  the  divine  right "  of  the  monarch  to  reign  and 
intrusted  wide  powers  to  the  king.  The  king  is  head  of  the 
army,  of  the  church,  and  of  the  whole  civil  service.  The  upper 
legislative  chamber  {Herrenhaus)  is  recruited  almost  exclusively 
by  royal  appointment.  And  all  measures,  before  they  become 
law,  require  the  king's  assent ;  though,  by  reason  of  the  monarch's 
control  of  the  Herrenhaus,  no  measure  of  which  he  disapproves 
is  likely  to  be  enacted.  Even  the  lower  chamber  {Ahgeord- 
netenhaus),  while  nominally  chosen  by  universal  manhood  suf- 
frage, represents  plutocracy  rather  than  democracy,  for,  by  a 
peculiar  three-class  system  of  indirect  elections,  equal  represen- 
tation is  accorded  to  the  few  rich  men  whose  fortunes  aggregate 


144 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


one-third  of  the  total  taxable  wealth  of  the  community,  to  the 
middle  class  whose  moderate  possessions  comprise  another  third, 
and  to  the  masses  whose  combined  savings  constitute  the  last 
third  of  the  total  wealth.  And  finally,  in  Prussia  the  ministry 
is  responsible  not  to  the  parliament  but  to  the  king. 

The  revolutionary  movements  which  had  so  shaken  the 
foundations  of  European  poHtics  had  seemingly  accomplished 

but  little.  Switzerland,  Holland,  Denmark,  Prussia, 
oMiie  Revo-  Sardinia,  and  a  few  other  states  had  secured  con- 
lutionary  stitutional  government ;  servile  dues  had  been  abol- 
of  184^^1849  ished  in  Austria;  but,  for  the  rest,  the  democratic 

innovations  of  the  revolution  had  vanished  before  the 
victorious  armies  of  Conservatism.  In  Austria-Hungary,  in  the 
Italian  and  German  states,  autocracy  again  wielded  the  censor- 
ship ;  in  Great  Britain  the  Chartist  fiasco  had  left  democracy  dis- 
graced and  disheartened ;  in  France  the  fierce  June  Days  augured 
ill  for  the  new  republic.  Despite  its  defeat,  the  political  demo- 
cratic movement  was  not  destroyed :  it  lived  on  in  the  des- 
perate dreams  of  the  workingmen  who  had  beheld,  even  if  only 
for  a  moment,  democracy  triumphant  in  Europe.  For  the 
present,  however,  nationalism,  which,  by  its  conflicting  claims, 
had  defeated  the  revolution,  still  dwarfed  all  other  considerations, 
refusing  to  be  downed  while  Italy  remained  divided,  Germany 
disunited,  and  Hungary  subject  to  Austrian  rule. 


ADDITIONAL  READING 


Growth  of  Democracy  in  Great  Britain.  Brief  general  narratives :  Gil- 
bert Slater,  The  Maki?tg  of  Modern  England,  new  rev.  ed.  (191 5),  ch.  v-x, 
xii-xiv;  A.  L.  Cross,  History  of  England  and  Greater  Britain  (1914),  ch. 
1,  li;  Justin  McCarthy,  The  Epoch  of  Reform,  1830-1850  (1897);  J.  H. 
Rose,  The  Rise  arid  Growth  of  Democracy  in  Great  Britain  (1898) ;  A.  D. 
Innes,  History  of  England  and  the  British  Empire,  Vol.  IV  (1914),  ch.  iv,  v ; 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  xviii-xx.  Much  general 
information  may  be  derived  from  the  series  of  biographical  sketches  The 
Prime  Ministers  of  Queen  Victoria,  ed.  by  S.  J.  Reid.  On  the  removal  of 
religious  disabilities:  W.  J.  Amherst,  The  History  of  Catholic  E7na7tcipation, 
177 1- 1 8 20,  2  vols.  (1886) ;  Bernard  Ward,  The  Dawn  of  the  Catholic  Re- 
vival, 1781-1803  (1909),  The  Eve  of  Catholic  Emancipation,  i8oj~i82Q,  3 
vols.  (191 2),  The  Sequel  to  Catholic  Emancipation,  i8jo~i8jo,  2  vols.  (1915) ; 
G.  J.  Shaw-Lefevre,  Peel  and  O'Connell:  a  Review  of  the  Irish  Policy  of 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  145 


Parliament  from  the  Union  to  the  Death  of  Sir  Robert  Peel  (1887) ;  Robert 
Dunlop,  Daniel  O^Connell  (1900)  in  the  "  Heroes  of  the  Nations  "  Series; 
W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  Leaders  of  Public  Opinion  in  Ireland,  new  ed.,  2  vols. 
(1903),  especially  Vol.  II  which  is  a  biography  of  Daniel  O'Connell ;  H.  W. 
Clark,  History  of  English  Nonconformity,  Vol.  II  (1913),  Book  IV,  ch.  ii, 
iii.  On  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832  :  J.  R.  M.  Butler,  The  Passing  of  the  Great 
Reform  Bill  (1914),  the  most  important  single  work  on  the  subject;  G.  L. 
Dickinson,  The  Development  of  Parliament  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1895) ; 
Spencer  Walpole,  Life  of  Lord  John  Russell,  2  vols.  (1889) ;  S.  J.  Reid, 
Lord  John  Russell  (1895) ;  W.  N.  Molesworth,  The  History  of  England, 
i8jo-i8/4,  3  vols.  (1874),  is  particularly  valuable  for  the  reform  of  1832. 
On  humanitarian  legislation  :  Edward  Jenks,  A  Short  History  of  the  English 
Law  (191 2),  an  able  summary;  Sir  J.  F.  Stephens,  History  of  the  Criminal 
Law  of  England,  3  vols.  (1883),  a  standard  work;  L.  O.  Pike,  A  History 
of  Crime  in  England,  Vol.  II  (1876) ;  Sidney  and  Beatrice  Webb,  The 
State  and  the  Doctor  (1910),  concerning  the  campaign  for  public  health, 
1 83  2-1 8  54.  Of  the  English  Poor  Law  the  classical  treatment  is  Sir  George 
Nicholls,  A  History  of  the  English  Poor  Law  in  connection  with  the  State 
of  the  Country  and  the  Condition  of  the  People,  new  ed.,  2  vols.  (1898),  with 
a  third  and  supplementary  volume  —  1834  to  date  —  by  Thomas  Mackay 
(1899).  On  the  rise  of  philosophical  and  political  Radicalism  in  England: 
Sir  Leslie  Stephen,  The  English  Utilitarians  (1900);  C.  B.  R.  Kent,  The 
English  Radicals  (1899) ;  William  Harris,  History  of  the  Radical  Party 
in  Parliament  [to  i86y]  (1885) ;  W.  L.  Davidson,  Political  Thought  in 
England:  the  Utilitarians  from  Bentham  to  J.  S.  Mill  (1915),  in  the  "Home 
University  Library " ;  Elie  Halevy,  La  formation  du  radicalisme  phi- 
losophique,  3  vols.  (1901-1904),  exhaustive  and  scholarly;  A.  V.  Dicey, 
Lectures  on  the  Relation  between  Law  and  Public  Opinion  in  England  during 
the  Ninetee7ith  Century,  2d  ed.  (1914),  illuminating  throughout,  especially 
valuable  for  the  influence  of  Bentham;  C.  M.  Atkinson,  Life  of  Jeremy 
Bentham  (1905) ;  L.  S.  Benjamin  (pseud.  Lewis  Melville),  The  Life  and 
Letters  of  William  Cobbett  in  England  and  America  (1913);  E.  I.  Carlyle, 
William  Cobbett,  a  Study  of  his  Life  as  Shown  in  his  Writings  (1904) ;  Gra- 
ham Wallas,  Life  of  Francis  Place,  1771-1854  (1898).  On  various  social 
reformers  of  the  time:  H.  de  B.  Gibbins,  English  Social  Reformers  (1902), 
brief  sketches  of  such  men  as  Wesley,  Wilberforce,  Kingsley,  Carlyle, 
Ruskin,  and  the  factory  reformers;  and  Edwin  Hodder,  Life  and  Work 
of  the  yth  Earl  of  Shaftesbury,  3  vols.  (1888),  an  exhaustive  study  of  the 
career  of  the  greatest  of  the  factory  reformers.  On  the  Chartist  move- 
ment :  R.  G.  Gammage,  History  of  Chartism,  new  ed.  (1894),  a  sympathetic 
treatment  by  a  leader  of  the  movement,  first  published  in  1854;  Thomas 
Carlyle,  Chartism  (1839),  a  brilliant  pamphlet ;  Edouard  Dolleans,  Le  char- 
tisme,  2  vols.  (1912-1913),  full  but  without  indication  of  sources  used  ;  P.  W. 
Slosson,  The  Decline  of  the  Chartist  Movement  (1916),  a  valuable  monograph. 

Revolutionary  Movements,  1848-1849.  Brief  General  Narratives. 
C.  M.  Andrews,  The  Historical  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol,  I 


VOL.  II  —  L 


146  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


(1896),  ch.  ix,  x;  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  0) 
Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (7907),  ch.  xix,  xx;  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since 
181 5  (1910),  ch.  vi-ix ;  C.  E.  M.  Hawkcsworth,  The  Last  Century  in  Europe, 
1814-1^10  (1913),  ch.  xiv-xviii;  W.  A.  Phillips,  Modern  Europe,  181 
i8qq  (1901),  ch.  x-xiii;  C.  A.  Fyffe,  A  History  of  Modern  Europe,  lygz- 
1878  (1896),  ch.  xviii-xx;  Oscar  Browning,  A  History  of  the  Modern  World, 
Vol.  I  (1912),  Book  II,  ch.  vii-ix;  History  of  All  Nations,  Vol.  XVIII, 
Restoration  and  Revolution,  by  Theodor  Flathe,  ch.  viii-xvi ;  H.  T.  Dyer,  A 
History  of  Modern  Europe  from  the  Fall  of  Constantinople,  3d  ed.  rev.  by 
Arthur  Hassall  (1901),  ch.  Ixix,  Ixx;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vo].  XI 
(1909),  ch.  ii-viii;  Histoire  generate.  Vol.  X,  ch.  x,  xvi.  Vol.  XI,  ch.  i-iv; 
H.  A.  L.  Fisher,  The  Republican  Tradition  in  Europe  (191 1),  ch.  vii-x. 

France  under  Louis  Philippe  and  the  Second  Republic,  1830-1850. 
Paul  Thureau-Dangin,  Histoire  de  la  monarchic  de  juillet,  2d  ed.,  7  vols. 
(1888-189 2),  the  most  elaborate  French  history  on  the  reign  of  Louis 
Philippe,  Roman  Catholic  and  Conservative  in  tone;  Jean  Jaures  (editor), 
Histoire  socialiste.  Vol.  VIII  by  J.  E.  Fourniere,  Le  regne  de  Louis  Philippe 
(1906),  and  Vol.  IX  by  Georges  Renard,  La  republique  de  1848  (1848- 
1852),  a  social  history  by  prominent  French  Socialists;  Georges  Weill, 
La  France  sous  la  monarchic  constitutionelle,  1814-1848,  new  rev.  ed.  (191 2), 
and,  by  the  same  author,  Histoire  du  parti  republicain  en  France  de  18 14  d 
iSyo  (1900),  scholarly  and  valuable;  J.  Tchernojfif,  Le  parti  republicain 
sous  la  monarchic  de  juillet:  formation  et  evolution  de  la  doctrine  republicaine 
(1901),  well  documented;  Eugene  Spuller,  Histoire  parlementaire  de  la 
seconde  republique  (1891),  an  important  political  work;  Emile  Levasseur, 
Histoire  dcs  classes  ouvrieres  et  de  Vindustrie  en  France  de  I78g  d  1870, 
Vol.  II  (1904),  Books  IV,  V,  indispensable  for  French  social  history;  Louis 
Blanc,  History  of  Ten  Years,  18 30-1 840,  Eng.  trans.,  2  vols,  (i 844-1 845), 
a  famous  early  attempt  to  furnish  an  economic  interpretation  of  the  July 
Monarchy;  Lorenz  von  Stein,  Geschichte  der  sozialen  Bewegung  in  Frank- 
reich,  3  vols.  (1850),  covering  in  the  last  two  volumes  the  years  1830-1850, 
an  extremely  suggestive  contemporary  account.  Side-lights  on  important 
persons  of  the  time  are  given  in  the  French  biographies  of  Guizot  by  Agenor 
Bardoux  (1894),  of  Thiers  by  Charles  de  Mazade  (1884)  and  by  Edgar 
Zevort  (1892),  and  of  Lamartine  by  Pierre  Quentin-Bauchart  (1903). 

With  Special  Reference  to  the  Revolution  of  1848  in  France.  Albert 
Cremieux,  La  revolution  de  fevrier:  etude  critique  sur  les  journees  des  21, 
22,  23  et  24  fevrier,  1848  (1912),  the  most  scholarly  and  impartial  account 
of  the  February  Revolution;  Pierre  de  La  Gorce,  Histoire  de  la  seconde 
republique  franqaise,  7th  ed.,  2  vols.  (1914),  anti-Republican  and  anti- 
Socialist  in  tone ;  Victor  Pierre,  Histoire  de  la  republique  de  1848,  2d  ed., 
2  vols.  (1878),  Conservative  and  anti-Bonapartist ;  Louis  Blanc,  Historical 
Revelations,  Eng.  trans.  (1858),  an  account  of  the  February  Revolution 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Socialist  leader ;  Adolphe  Blanqui,  Des  classes 
ouvrieres  en  France  pendant  Vannee  1848,  2  vols.  (1849),  another  contemporary 
and  sympathetic  narrative  ;  Ferdinand  Dreyfus,  U assistance  sous  la  seconde 
republique,  1848-1851  (1907),  useful  for  social  legislation;  J.  A.  R.  Marriott 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


(editor),  The  French  Revolution  in  1848  in  its  Economic  Aspects,  2  vols. 
(1913),  containing  a  critical  introduction  and  reprints  in  French  of  Louis 
Blanc's  Organisation  du  travail  and  Emile  Thomas's  Histoire  des  ateliers 
nationaux,  the  latter  first  published  in  1848 ;  N.  W.  Senior,  Journals  kept 
in  France  and  Italy  from  1848  to  1852,  with  a  Sketch  of  the  Revolution  of 
1848,  the  contemporary  diary  of  a  celebrated  English  economist  and  pub- 
licist, ed.  by  his  daughter,  M.  C.  M.  Simpson,  2d  ed.,  2  vols.  (1871). 

The  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe,  1848-1849.  General  account : 
C.  E.  Maurice,  The  Revolutiojtary  Movement  of  i848~i84g  in  Italy,  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  Germany  (1887),  full  of  facts,  but  dry  and  poorly  organized. 
Volumes  V  and  VI  of  Alfred  Stern's  monumental  and  authoritative  Ge- 
schichte  Europas  (191 1)  treat  of  the  years  from  1835  to  1848  in  their  social 
and  economic  aspects  as  well  as  the  political.  On  the  Austrian  Empire : 
R.  P.  Mahaffy,  Francis  Joseph  I, ''his  Life  and  Times,  an  Essay  in  Politics, 
new  ed.  (1915),  pp.  1-36,  a  brief  introduction;  Louis  Leger,  A  History  of 
Austro- Hungary  from  the  Earliest  Time  to  the  Year  i88g,  Eng.  trans,  by 
Mrs.  B.  Hill  (1889),  ch.  xxvii-xxxiii,  the  most  satisfactory  account;  Hein- 
rich  Fricdjung,  Oesterreich  von  1848  his  i860,  2  vols.  (1908-1912),  an  ex- 
haustive study;  J.  A.  von  Helfert,  Geschichte  Oesterreichs  vom  Ausgange 
des  Wiener  October- A ufstandes,  1848,  4  vols,  in  '5  (i 869-1 886) ;  Anton 
Springer,  Geschichte  Oesterreichs  seit  dem  Wienerfrieden  1809,  Vol.  II  (1865) ; 
Heinrich  Reschauer  and  Moritz  Smets,  Das  Jahr  1848:  Geschichte  der 
Wiener  Revolution,  2  vols,  in  i  (1872),  and,  by  the  former  author,  Geschichte 
des  Kampfes  der  Handwerkerziinfte  und  der  Kaufmannsgremien  mit  der 
oesterreichischen  Bureaukratie  (1882) ;  Maximilian  Bach,  Ge^c/w'c/f/g  der  Wiener 
Revolution  im  Jahre  1848  (1898) ;  E.  V.  Zenker,  Die  Wiener  Revolution, 
1848,  in  ihren  socialen  Voraussetzungen  und  Beziehungen  (1897) ;  Johann 
Slokar,  Geschichte  der  oesterreichischen  Industrie  und  ihrer  Forderung  unter 
Kaiser  Franz  I  (1914),  for  the  beginnings  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  in 
Austria;  C.  M.  Knatchbull-Hugcssen,  The  Political  Evolution  of  the  Hun- 
garian Nation,  Vol.  II  (1908),  ch.  xii-xvi,  a  readable  account  of  the  Magyar 
insurrection  and  of  its  suppression;  Kossuth's  Speeches  in  America,  ed.  by 
F.  W.  Newman  (1854),  a  defense  of  the  Hungarian  insurrection;  Louis 
Eisenmann,  Le  compromis  austro-hongrois  de  1867,  etude  sur  le  dualisme 
(1904),  pp.  1-71,  an  admirable  French  account  of  the  ''old  regime"  in 
Hungary  and  of  the  rise  of  the  spirit  of  Magyar  nationalism.  On  the 
revolutionary  movement  of  1848-1849  in  the  Germanics:  G.  M.  Priest, 
Germany  since  1740  (1915),  ch.  viii,  ix,  very  brief  but  clear;  The  Reminis- 
cences of  Carl  Schurz,  ed.  by  Frederic  Bancroft  and  W.  A.  Dunning,  Vol.  I 
(1907),  a  lively  account  of  the  revolutionary  movement  by  a  famous  Liberal 
sympathizer ;  Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  Deutsche  Geschichte  im  neunzehnlen 
Jahrhundert,  Vol.  V,  1840-1848  (1896),  Eng.  trans,  in  preparation  (1916), 
hostile  to  the  democratic  Liberals;  Hans  Blum,  Die  deutsche  Revolution, 
1848-1849  (1897),  the  best  treatment  in  German;  Karl  Marx,  Revolution 
and  Counter  Revolution,  or,  Germatiy  in  1848,  2(i  ed.  (1904),  a  collection  of 
papers  originally  published  in  the  New  York  Tribune,  1851-1852,  and  setting 
forth  in  somewhat  disjointed  manner  a  Socialistic  interpretation  of  the 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


revolutionary  movement;  Thcodor  von  Bcrnhardi,  Unter  Nikolaus  und 
Friedrich  Wilhelm  IV,  in  collected  works,  ed,  by  Friedrich  von  Bernhardi, 
Vol.  II  (1894) ;  Gustav  Liiders,  Die  demokratische  Bewcgung  in  Berlin  im 
Oktoher  1848  (1909),  a  painstaking  monograph;  Paul  Matter,  La  Prusse 
et  la  revolution  de  1848  (1903);  Franz  Wigard  (editor),  Stenographischer 
Bericht  Ubcr  die  V erhandlungen  der  ersten  Konstituiionale  Nationalver- 
sammlung,  9  vols.  (1849),  official  documents  relating  to  the  Frankfort 
Assembly.  On  the  revolutionary  movements  of  1848-1849  in  the  Italian 
states :  W.  R.  Thayer,  The  Dawn  of  Italian  Independence,  1814-184Q, 
Vol.  II  (1893),  an  excellent  narrative ;  Bolton  King,  Joseph  Mazzini  (1902), 
an  admirable  biography;  Mrs.  Hamilton  King,  Letters  and  Recollections 
of  Mazzini  (191 2),  containing  some  very  characteristic  letters  and  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  last  imprisonment  and  the  death  of  Mazzini ;  G.  M.  Trevelyan, 
Garibaldi's  Defence  of  the  Roman  Republic  (1907),  useful  for  the  whole 
Italian  situation ;  R.  M.  Johnston,  The  Roman  Theocracy  and  the  Republic, 
1846-184Q  (1901) ;  Guglielmo  Pepe,  Histoire  des  revolutions  et  des  guerres 
d' Italic,  i84j-4g  (1850),  and  L.  C.  Farini,  The  Roman  State,  from  181 5 
to  1850,  Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  W.  E.  Gladstone,  4  vols.  (1851-1854),  both 
contemporary  accounts  by  Italian  revolutionaries  opposed  to  the  Church ; 
H.  R.  Whitehouse,  Collapse  of  the  Kingdom  of  Naples  (1899). 


CHAPTER  XX 


THE  GROWTH  OF  NATIONALISM,  ia48-lS71 

Between  1830  and  1848  the  idea  of  political  democracy  had 
made  steady  progress  throughout  Europe  among  both  the 
workingmen  and  the  middle  class  until  in  the  eventful 
days  of  1848  it  had  thrown  the  whole  Continent  into  xhwarte^d^ 
turmoil.    That  it  had  not  produced  immediate  results  in  1848- 
commensurate  with  its  aims  and  purposes  was  due  in  NationaUsm 
part  to  the  fact  that  certain  peoples  of  Europe  divided 
their  allegiance  between  the  idea  of  political  democracy  and  the 
notion  of  patriotic  nationalism.    A  little  reflection  upon  the  na- 
tional and  racial  movements  in  the  Habsburg  dominions,  which 
have  been  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter,  will  furnish  con- 
crete examples  of  the  way  in  which  a  sense  of  nationality  could 
fatally  choke  an  aspiration  for  democratic  government.  It 
appeared  as  if  the  patriotic  instinct  was  more  primitive  and  more 
powerful  than  the  democratic  ideal,  and  that  in  many  instances 
the  forces  of  reaction  might  rely  upon  the  former  to  thwart 
the  latter.    The  point  was,  of  course,  that  in  most  countries 
democracy  was  the  program  of  but  particular  classes,  while 
patriotism  provided  a  spacious  platform  on  which  an  entire 
nation  could  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder. 

Consequently,  in  the  period  from  1848  to  1870,  the  bulk  of 
Europeans  seemed  to  rest  from  agitation  for  liberal  constitu- 
tions and  other  paraphernalia  of  democracy,  ex-  pj.gjj^jjj. 
hausted,  as  it  were,  by  the  chronic  factional  tumults  nance  of 
which,  throughout  the  Era  of  Metternich,  and  down  fg^g^jgy^™' 
to  the  domestic  upheavals  of  1848,  had  stirred  every 
state,  and  to  expend  their  energies  more  unitedly  upon  colossal 
attempts  at  nation-building.    To  be  sure,  democracy  continued 
to  make  some  headway  between  1848  and  1870,  but  it  was 

149 


HISTORY  OF  MODKRNT  EUROPE 


dwarfed  in  historical  significance  by  such  achievements  as  the 
national  unifications  of  Italy  and  Germany. 

As  the  nineteenth-century  theory  of  political  democracy  was 
derived  mainly  from  the  revolutionary  French  doctrines  of 
liberty"  and  equality,"  so  contemporaneous  na- 
ism^'^^a"^^  tionalism  drew  its  inspiration  from  fraternity."  And 
Heritage  of  as  ''fraternity"  under  the  great  Napoleon  had  meant 
Revolution  natiohs  in  arms,  —  the  marshaling  and  fighting  of 
hosts  of  men,  —  so  now,  in  the  cause  of  national  uni- 
fications, the  international  peace  which  had  attended  the  suprem- 
acy of  Metternich  gave  place  to  a  new  series  of  wars. 

One  other  mark  of  the  period  from  1848  to  1870  was  the  fitting 
fact  that  its  most  conspicuous  personage  was  another  Napoleon 
qpj^g  Bonaparte,  who,  as  politician  and  adventurer,  rivaled 

Bonapartist  evcn  the  first  emperor  of  the  French.  The  picturesque 
Heritage  career  of  this  second  Bonaparte  merits  somewhat 
detailed  consideration  on  account  of  the  enduring  influence 
which  it  has  exerted  upon  the  fortunes  of  present-day  France, 
Italy,  Germany,  and  Austria-Hungary. 


LOUIS  NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND  THE  ERECTION 
OF  THE  SECOND  FRENCH  EMPIRE 

Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  the  son  of  Louis  Bonaparte, 
erstwhile  king  ai  Holland,  and  of  Hortense  Beauharnais,  was 
,    .  born  in  the  palace  of  the  Tuileries  at  Paris  in  1808. 

Louis  . 

Napoleon  His  uncle,  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  then  at  the  very 
Bonaparte  height  of  his  powcr,  stood  sponsor  for  him  at  baptism 
(1808-1873)       J .       .11..  •    Ti,    4-     -1         •  ^  '^l. 

and  mscribed  his  name  in  the  family  register  with  a 

right  of  succession.^  Exiled  from  France,  along  with  all  Bona- 
partes,  by  the  Ultra-Royalists  in  181 6,  he  passed  his  youth  in 
Switzerland,  Savoy,  and  southern  Germany.  He  attended  a 
gymnasium  at  Augsburg  and  was  put  through  a  thorough  course 
in  mihtary  science  under  an  able  Swiss  general,  but  the  credit 
for  his  excellent  hberal  education  was  due  primarily  to  the 

1  The  Bonapartist  princes  who  intervened  in  the  recognized  line  of  succession 
between  Napoleon  I  and  Louis  Napoleon  Bonaparte  were  (i)  the  son  of  Napoleon  I 
—  the  king  of  Rome,  titular  Napoleon  II,  who  died  in  1832;  (2)  the  brother  ct 
Napoleon  I  —  Louis,  who  died  in  1846 ;  (3)  the  older  son  of  Louis  and  brother  of 
Louis  Napoleon  —  Napoleon  Louis,  who  died  in  1831. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


devotion  of  his  intellectually  gifted  mother;  and  it  was  from 
her  also  that  he  learned  his  pet  axioms  :  ''With  a  name  Hke  his, 
he  would  always  be  something";  "He  ought  to  know  how  to 
amuse  the  royalist  and  republican  crowds";  ''All  means  of 
ruling  are  good,  legitimate,  and  sufficient,  provided  only  that 
material  prosperity  is  ensured." 

Brought  up  to  regard  the  tradition  of  his  family  as  identical 
with  that  of  the  Revolution,  Prince  Louis  Napoleon  accounted 
himself  from  the  outset  a  born  leader  of  Liberalism,  a  Lo^jg 
predestined  custodian  of  the  principles  of  liberty.  Napoleon's 
equality,  and  fraternity.  Had  not  the  bourgeois  gov- 
ernment  of  Louis  Philippe  been  formed  too  quickly,  he  would 
have  gone  straight  to  Paris  in  1830  and  there  claimed  the  fruits 
of  the  overthrow  of  Charles  X  and  the  other  reactionaries.  As 
it  was,  he  joined  in  Italy  the  revolutionary  society  of  the  Car- 
bonari and  participated  in  "the  insurrection  of  1831  against 
the  pope,  but  he  soon  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Austrians,  and 
was  released  only  through  his  mother's  tears.  Then  he  intrigued 
simultaneously  with  French  republicans  and  with  Polish  rebels, 
but  the  watchfulness  of  Louis  Philippe  on  one  hand,  and  the 
firm  action  of  the  Russian  tsar  on  the  other,  reduced  the  Bona- 
partist  prince  to  the  necessity  of  wielding  the  pen  rather  than 
the  sword. 

In  a  series  of  writings  which  culminated  in  the  Napoleonic 
Ideas  (1839),  he  set  forth  his  poKtical  theories.    The  French 
Empire,  he  maintained,  had  been  the  perfect  realiza-  ^^^^.^ 
tion  of  the  principles  of  1789.    It  had  rested  upon  a  Napoleon's 
foundation  of  national  sovereignty ;  it  had  recognized  !'  Caesar- 
universal  manhood  suffrage  in  its  domestic  affairs, 
and  in  its  foreign  relations  it  had  upheld  the  cause  of  separate 
nationalities;   it  had  been  solidified,  directed,  and  rendered 
glorious  by  its  Caisarism,  that  is,  by  intrusting  power  to  an 
emperor  whose  absolutism  was  conditioned  only  by  his  abiHty 
to  promote  pubHc  prosperity  and  to  retain  popular  support. 
Such,  according  to  Louis  Napoleon,  had  been  the  aims  of  the 
first  Napoleon  and  such  would  be  his  aims  in  endeavoring  to 
reestabhsh  the  empire  in  France. 

We  know  now  that  these  writings  of  Louis  Napoleon  presented 
a  very  falsely  idealized  picture  of  the  First  Empire,  but  they 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


fitted  in  very  nicely  with  the  ''Napoleonic  Legend,"^  which, 
spun  on  sea-girt  St.  Helena  by  the  great  Napoleon  himself,  al- 
^  ready  had  obtained  sentimental  credence  in  many  a 

Influence  of  *     i     •  i  • 

the  "  Na-  French  cottage.  And  circumstances  of  the  reign  of 
h'egend"      ^^^^^  Philippe  (1830-1848)  tended  to  exalt  the  legend 

and  incidentally  to  feed  the  ambition  of  Prince  Louis 
Napoleon.  The  French  monarchy  which  owed  its  erection  to 
the  July  Revolution  was,  as  we  have  seen,  a  bourgeois  compromise 
between  Bourbon  reaction  and  RepubUcan  liberalism,  and  the 
very  concessions  which  it  was  obhged  to  make  to  the  latter  were 
fuel  to  the  Bonapartist  flame.  Thus  the  tricolor  again  supplanted 
the  white  flag  as  the  national  ensign,  and  had  not  the  tricolor 
been  the  banner  of  Napoleon?  Thus,,  too,  the  detested  fleur-de- 
hs  atop  the  Vendome  column  was  replaced  by  an  iron  statue 
of  the  Little  Corporal,  and  had  not  that  column  been  cast  from 
cannon  which  Napoleon  himself  had  captured  from  the  Austrian  s  ? 
The  completion  of  the  monumental  arch  of  triumph  in  Paris 
(1836)  in  commemoration  of  the  mihtary  exploits  of  Napoleon 
brought  the  ignominious  foreign  poHcy  of  the  bourgeois  king- 
into  glaring  contrast  with  the  glorious  victories  of  the  emperor ; 
and  Louis  Philippe  paid  the  crowning  tribute  to  Bonapartism 
when  he  had  the  bones  of  the  emperor  brought  back  from  St. 
Helena  (1840)  to  repose  under  the  stately  dome  of  the  Inva- 
lides,  just  as  the  exile  had  willed,  "on  the  banks  of  the  Seine 
among  the  people  whom  he  had  so  dearly  loved." 

Twice  during  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe,  Louis  Napoleon 
made  premature  attempts  to  take  advantage  of  the  growing 

Bonapartist  sentiment  in  France  and  to  reestabhsh  the 
Premature  empire.  The  first  time,  in  1836,  raising  his  standard 
LouS^^^^^  at  Strassburg  and  being  speedily  arrested,  he  was 
Napoleon  released  on  condition  that  he  emigrate  to  America. 
Frfnch^  The  sccond  time,  in  1840,  landing  at  Boulogne  with 
Government  the  declaration  that  the  emperor's  bones  should  rest 

only  in  a  "regenerated  France,"  he  was  condemned 
to  imprisonment  for  hfe,  and  the  next  six  years  he  spent  in  the 
fortress  of  Ham.  It  was  during  this  period  of  captivity  that 
Louis  Napoleon  added  a  mild  variety  of  Sociahsm  to  his  other 
pohtical  theories.    He  readily  perceived  that  the  government  of 

^ee  Vol.  I,  Dp-  572  f. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  153 


Louis  Philippe  existed  primarily  in  the  interests  of  the  bour- 
geoisie and  that  the  body  of  French  workingmen,  whose  numbers 
and  misery  the  Industrial  Revolution  was  then  rapidly  gQ^.j^g^j. 
increasing,  were  its  most  natural  enemies.  His  hu-  Leanings  of 
manitarian  impulses  and  his  sense  of  ^'  good  poHtics"  Jj^p^^j^^j^ 
led  him  forthwith  to  espouse  the  cause  of  the  work- 
ingmen. From  prison  he  corresponded  with  Louis  Blanc,  the 
Socialist,  and  with  Proudhon,  the  Anarchist,  and  he  wrote 
another  book,  the  Extinction  of  Pauperism,  that  promised,  as 
the  cornerstone  of  his  projected  regime,  the  material  prosperity 
of  all  classes.  It  would  be  his  business,  he  said,  to  assist  the  capi- 
tahsts  by  opening  up  new  fields  of  industry;  the  peasants,  by 
stimulating  the  cultivation  of  the  land  through  the  aid  of  gov- 
ernmental grants ;  and  the  industrial  proletarians,  by  providing 
work  in  abundance  and  so  increasing  their  power  of  purchase. 
In  this  way  work  would  be  found  for  the  unemployed,  a  demand 
would  be  created  for  every  product,  and  poverty  would  even- 
tually disappear.  "The  triumph  of  Christianity  aboHshed 
slavery;  the  triumph  of  the  French  Revolution  aboHshed  serf- 
dom ;  the  triumph  of  democracy  will  aboHsh  pauperism."  And, 
of  course,  democracy,  so  far  as  France  was  concerned,  was  a 
cryptogram,  to  which  Prince  Louis  Napoleon  alone  had  the  key. 

Louis  Napoleon  was  lucky.  In  1846  he  managed  to  escape 
from  the  prison  of  Ham,  in  the  guise  of  a  workingman,  curiously 
enough,  and  to  make  his  way  to  England.  Two  years  elapsed 
and  he  was  recalled  with  open  arms  by  all  France.  The  year 
1848  marked  the  first  success  in  the  Great  Adventure. 

As  soon  as  news  reached  him  in  February,  1848,  that  a  joint 
uprising  of  bourgeois  Republicans  and  Socialist  workiilgmen  had 
effected  the  deposition  of  Louis  PhiUppe,  Louis  Na- 
poleon crossed  over  to  Paris.    The  radicals  welcomed 

I'll  1  r     1  Napoleon 

mm,  but  the  more  moderate  members  of  the  pro-  and  the 
visional  government  were  insistent  that  he  should  leave  ^^^^^^^^ 
the  country  forthwith.    It  was  wonderfully  fortunate  Revolution 
for  him  that  he  obeyed  instructions  and  again  with- 
drew to  England,  because  in  that  way  he  was  absent  from  France 
when  the  bourgeois  Republicans  and  the  Socialist  workingmen 
fell  to  fighting,  and  thus  he  escapes!  the  oppro])rium  which  the 
latter  heaped  upon  the  former. for  the  horrible  bloodshed  of  the 


154 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


June  Days.  At  the  same  time,  the  offer  of  his  services  to  the 
aged  duke  of  Wellington,  then  gallantly  overawing  the  British 
Chartists,  gave  guarantees  to  the  middle  class  of  France,  the 
lovers  of  law  and  order,  that  his  radicalism  was  not  of  the  dan- 
gerous sort. 

It  was  thus  that  the  name  of  a  Bonaparte  presented  itself 
to  all  Frenchmen  as  a  pledge  of  peace  and  security.    In  the 

midst  of  most  unseemly  quarrels  between  Socialists, 
o?Law^and  bouigcois  Radicals,  Moderate  Republicans,  and  Cath- 
Orderand  oHcs,  —  cach  faction  interpreting  ''liberty"  and 
ism^^*^°^*^      equality  "  after  the  desires  of  its  own  heart,  —  Louis 

Napoleon  stepped  in  and  with  the  charming  word 
^'fraternity"  stilled  the  tumult,  — fraternity,"  the  memory 
of  the  proudest  achievements  of  French  nationality,  the  single 
foundation  on  which  all  factions  might  unite.  In  June,  1848, 
Prince  Louis  Napoleon  was  elected  to  the  Assembly,  and  in 
December  he  was  raised  to  the  presidency  of  the  repubhc  by 
an  overwhelming  popular  majority.^  At  the  close  of  1848  he 
took  the  oath  ''to  remain  faithful  to  the  democratic  republic; 
...  to  regard  as  enemies  of  the  nation  all  those  who  may  attempt 
by  illegal  means  to  change  the  form  of  the  estabHshed  govern- 
ment." Henceforth,  for  twenty- two  years  the  history  of  Louis 
Napoleon  is  the  history  of  France. 

As  president  of  the  second  republic  (1848-185  2),  Louis 
Napoleon  proved  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  as  well  as  first  of 

democratic  politicians  in  Europe.  *'Pohticians,"  in 
Prince  Louis  the  more  recent  American  sense  of  the  word  —  per- 
Pr^e^sident  of  ^^^^  ^ho  can  influence  voters  and  control  elections  — 
the  Second  have  been  everywhere  an  essential  by-product  of 
Republic  democracy ;  and  it  was  no  oddity  that  the  establish- 
1848-1852     ment  of  universal  manhood  suffrage  in  France  by  the 

revolution  of  1848  was  attended  by  the  rise  of  a  "poli- 
tician." From  the  outset  of  his  administration  Louis  Napoleon 
consciously  set  about  enHsting  the  support  of  all  political  and 


1  That  Louis  Napoleon  received  hearty  support  from  all  factions  is  attested 
by  the  fact  that  while  he  received  5,434,226  votes,  General  Cavaignac,  the  candi- 
date of  the  moderate  bourgeois  Republicans,  received  only  1,448,107,  while  the 
Socialist  workingmen's  candidate,  Ledru-Rollin,  received  but  370,000,  and  the 
clerical  Lamartine  a  paltry  i$.,ooo. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  155 


social  groups  in  the  state,  "  making  himself,"  in  the  American 
phrase,  ''soKd  with  the  country."  While  he  patted  and  praised 
the  workingmen  and  threw  them  a  sop  in  the  form  of  a  volun- 
tary old-age  insurance  (1850)  which  should  be  guaranteed  by 
the  state,  he  was  craftily  utilizing  the  bourgeois  and  Catholic 
majority  in  the  Assembly  to  pass  such  legislation  as  would  win 
him  the  favor  of  these  groups.  On  one  hand,  business  was 
protected  and  encouraged,  and  domestic  order  was  strictly 
enforced ;  and,  on  the  other,  a  French  military  expedition  was 
dispatched  to  Rome  (1849)  to  reinstate  Pope  Pius  IX  in  the 
temporal  sovereignty  from  which  the  revolutionary  movement 
of  the  preceding  year  had  deposed  him,  and  a  sweeping  measure 
in  1850  restored  the  great  privileges  which  the  Catholic  clergy 
had  exercised  in  the  days  of  Charles  X  over  the  education  of 
French  children.  Thus,  ardent  Catholics,  whose  consciences 
had  been  outraged  by  the  irreligious  poHcies  of  the  bourgeois 
government  of  Louis  Philippe,  now  found  themselves  favored 
by  Louis  Napoleon;  and  the  bourgeois  themselves  discovered 
that  their  particular  economic  interests  were  safeguarded  as 
jealously  by  the  Bonapartist  president  as  by  the  "king  of  the 
green  umbrella"  (Louis  Philippe). 

The  close  alliance  between  Louis  Napoleon  and  the  Clericals, 
many  of  whom  in  pohtics  were  outspoken  reactionaries,  might 
have  cost  the  president  the  support  of  the  radical  and 
revolutionary  elements  on  which,  during  his  earlier  p^^jfj^* 
years,  he  had  chiefly  relied,  had  not  a  constitutional  between 
question  arisen  between  the  president  and  the  Assembly 
which  gave  the  former  an  opportunity  to  show  his  Assembly 
loyalty  to  democracy.    It  will  be  recalled  that  both 
the  president  and  the  Assembly  had  been  elected  in  1848  by 
universal  manhood  suffrage.    The  Assembly,  however,  com- 
posed largely  of  middle-class  persons  who  were  fearful  of  the 
results  of  the  exercise  of  the  franchise  by  the  working  classes, 
passed  an  electoral  law  in  1850,  depriving  of  the  suffrage  those 
who  had  not  lived  and  paid  taxes  three  years  in  the  commune 
in  which  they  voted.    In  effect  this  statute  disfranchised 
the  ever-moving  artisans  of  the  large  towns  and  deprived 
three  million  adult  males,  out  of  a  total  of  nine  millions,  of  the 
ballot.    In  this  situation,  Louis  Napoleon  perceived  his  chance 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


not  only  to  win  the  workingmen  but  to  ruin  the  Assembly.  He 
at  once  declared  that  as  the  elected  representative  of  the  entire 
nation  he  was  under  obligation  to  prevent  the  Assembly  from 
disfranchising  Frenchmen.  In  November,  185 1,  he  formally 
proposed  the  reestablishment  of  universal  manhood  suffrage, 

and  upon  the  refusal  of  the  Assembly,  he  executed 
Napoleon's  December  a  coup  ductal  that  in  its  general  purposes 
Coup  d'etat,  and  results  resembled  the  celebrated  coup  d'etat  of  the 
fssT"^^^^'    ^^^^  ^9^^  Brumaire   (1799),  when  the  first 

Bonapartist  adventurer  had  overthrown  the  govern- 
ment of  the  First  Republic. 

On  2  December,  1851,  the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Auster- 
litz.  Prince  Louis  Napoleon  issued  a  manifesto,  proclaiming  a 
temporary  dictatorship,  the  dissolution  of  the  hated  Assembly, 
the  restoration  of  universal  suffrage,  and  the  submission  to 
popular  vote  (plebiscite)  of  a  proposal  to  intrust  the  Prince- 
President  with  the  task  of  revising  the  constitution.  Louis 
Napoleon  had  counted  shrewdly  upon  the  acquiescence  of  most 
Frenchmen;  a  careful  disposition  of  loyal  troops  overawed  the 
minority ;  a  few  riots  were  quelled  with  some  bloodshed ;  prompt 
stifling  of  the  press  and  activity  on  the  part  of  the  faithful 
secret  police  prevented  the  spread  of  counter-agitation ;  and  the 
most  dangerous  leaders  of  the  opposition,  such  as  the  Liberal 
Monarchist  Thiers  and  the  Republicans  Cavaignac  and  Victor 
Hugo,  were  seized  and  hustled  out  of  the  country.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  French  people  decided,  on  21  December, 
185 1,  by  7,500,000  votes  against  640,000,  to  delegate  to  Louis 
Napoleon  the  right  of  drawing  up  a  new  constitution  for  the 
Second  Republic. 

In  January,  1852,  the  new  constitution  was  promulgated. 
It  was  a  travesty  of  republicanism.  To  be  sure,  provision 
was  made  for  a  popularly  elected  Legislative  Body  of  250 
members,  but  the  president  might  rearrange  electoral  districts 
at  will,  and  the  powers  of  the  Body  were  carefully  restricted: 
it  might  not  initiate  legislation  or  amend  bills  submitted  by 
the  government ;  it  might  not  control  the  ministry  or  question 
the  policy  of  the  administration;  it  might  not  determine  the 
details  of  the  budget  which  it  voted ;  it  might  not  publish  its 
proceedings  or  even  elect  its  own  presiding  officer.    The  presi- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM^-p"^  ^157 

dent,  whose  term  of  office  was  lengthened  to  ten  years,  became 
a  kind  of  legitimate  dictator :  the  Ministry  no  longer  constituted 
a  parliamentary  cabinet,  but  was  appointed  by  him  and  re- 
movable at  his  pleasure  alone ;  a  Council  of  State,  chosen  by 
him,  drafted  bills  for  submission  to  the  Legislative  Body ;  and 
a  Senate,  the  members  of  which  were  named  and  salaried  by 
the  president,  might  re\dse  the  laws,  propose  new  ones,  and 
interpret  the  constitution.  The  president  himself  commanded 
the  army  and  navy ;  he  could  make  war  and  peace ;  he  appointed 
local  officials,  judicial  and  administrative ;  he  possessed  the  right 
of  pardon;  and  he  subjected  the  press  to  rigid  surveillance. 
By  means  of  the  coup  d'etat  of  1851  and  the  ensuing  promulga- 
tion of  this  remarkable  constitution,  —  always  in  the  name  of 
democracy,  —  Louis  Napoleon,  the  adventurer,  had  taken  a 
long  step  toward  the  destruction  of  democracy. 

The  year  1852  in  France  was  one  of  transition  from  repub- 
lican to  imperial  institutions.    Louis  Napoleon,  now  president 
nominally  for  ten  years,  put  his  own  effigy  upon  the 
coins  and  restored  the  gilt  eagles  in  the  army.    He  kept  ni^E^°° 
up  a  show  of  universal  suffrage.    He  made  state  perorofthe 
processions  throughout  the  country,  accompanied  by  a  ^852-^870 
subservient  staff  of  newspaper  reporters  and  by  a  paid 
group  of  shouters,  who,  stationed  at  strategic  points  in  the 
audiences,  led  the  applause  and  opportunely  cried  vive  Vempercur. 
He  spoke  honeyed  words  to  peasants,  to  artisans,  to  capitaHsts, 
to  rich  and  poor,  to  reactionaries  and  revolutionaries,  to  agnostics 
and  those  religiously  inchned.    And  his  reward  was  speedy  and 
complete.    On  2  December,  1852,  he  became  in  name  what  he 
was  already  in  fact,  and  was  solemnly  proclaimed,  with  the 
approval  of  eight  million  votes.  Napoleon  IH,  emperor  of  the 
French.^    The  imperial  constitution  was  simply  an  adaptation 
of  the    repubHcan  "  constitution  of  January,  1852. 

The  new  regime,  according  to  Napoleon's  pompous  declara- 
tion, was  to  be  the  final  flower  of  the  Revolution,  and  the  emperor 

'His  title  of  "Napoleon  III"  implied  the  right  to  reign  of  "Napoleon  II," 
that  unfortunate  son  of  Napoleon  I,  VAiglon  (the  Eaglet),  who,  styled  in  his  cradle 
king  of  Rome,  had  been  reared  at  the  Austrian  court  as  a  Ilabsburg  prince  under 
the  title  of  duke  of  Reichstadt,  and  who  had  closed  a  brief  feeble  life  at  Vienna  in 
1832. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


himself  was  to  be  ''the  beneficent  motive  force  of  the  whole 
social  order."  For  eight  years  (1852-1860),  in  truth,  Napoleon 
III  preserved  his  popularity  virtually  unimpaired  and  the 
government  of  the  Second  Empire  appeared  to  be  the  most 
stable  that  France  had  enjoyed  since  the  Revolution. 

The  reason  for  the  seeming  stability  of  the  Second  Empire 
was  the  support  which  various  classes,  formerly  hostile  to  each 
Seeming  Other,  now  Unitedly  accorded  it.  While  Napoleon  III 
stability  of  carefully  maintained  the  centralized  administration 
Emp^e°"^  and  the  subordination  of  the  elected  Assemblies  to  his 
own  will,^  and  sternly  repressed  distinctively  Republi- 
can or  Radical  agitation,^  he  retained  the  loyalty  of  Liberals  by 
Liberals  preserving  universal  manhood  suffrage,  however  il- 
lusory it  was  in  practice,  as  the  underlying  theory  of 
his  governmental  system.  He  was  perpetually  rolhng  revolu- 
tionary phrases  upon  his  tongue  and  was  proud  to  confess  that 
his  empire  rested  on  the  suffrages  of  all  France. 

At  the  same  time,  the  brilliance  of  his  imperial  court  could 
fascinate  many  Conservatives.  In  the  drawing-room  or  over 
Conserva-  the  teacups,  Napoleon  III  was  infinitely  more  at  home 
tives  than  his  uncle ;  and  his  marriage  in  1853  v/ith  Eugenie, 

countess  of  Montijo,  a  Spanish  princess,  gave  him  a  helpmate, 
whose  beauty,  elegance,  and  charm  of  manner  were  of  the  utmost 
service  in  making  the  French  court  once  more  the  center  of 
European  styles  and  fashions.  The  Empress  Eugenie,  more- 
over, by  her  pious  attachment  to  the  Catholic  Church  and  by 
her  famed  charities  was  recognized  both  as  the  champion  of 
Clerical  policies  and  as  the  friend  of  the  poor. 

To  the  workingmen  Napoleon  III  addressed  words  of  cheer 
and  encouragement.  He  assured  them  he  was  one  of  them.  He 
Working  ^^^^  engine  cabs  with  locomotive  engineers;  he 
men  talked  familiarly  with  artisans  upon  the  boulevards; 

1  The  election  expenses  of  "official  candidates"  —  those  approved  by  the 
emperor  —  were  paid  from  the  state  treasury,  while  other  candidates  were  obliged 
to  defray  their  own  expenses.  Moreover  the  electoral  machinery  was  almost 
completely  in  the  emperor's  hands,  and  by  act  of  1858  every  candidate  had  to 
take  an  oath  of  fidelity  to  Napoleon. 

2  The  freedom  of  the  press  continued  to  be  greatly  abridged,  and  a  law  of  1858 
allowed  the  government  to  intern  political  oflfenders  in  France  or  in  Algeria  or 
to  exile  them  without  trial. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  159 


he  drank  healths  to  masons,  carpenters,  and  plumbers.  He 
subsidized  their  unions,  and  he  and  the  empress  endowed  charita- 
ble institutions  for  their  betterment.  It  was  for  the  working  class, 
he  affirmed,  that  his  government  of  cheap  bread,  great  pubHc 
works,  and  holidays  primarily  existed.  He  gloried  in  the  appel- 
lation, ''emperor  of  the  workmen."  Nevertheless,  when  one 
turns  from  promises  to  achievements,  from  words  to  deeds,  one 
is  astonished  to  find  how  Httle  Napoleon  III  deserved  the  appel- 
lation. Only  the  mildest  beginnings  of  social  legislation  were 
discoverable  in  the  permission  extended  to  laborers  to  form 
cooperative  societies,  as  in  England,  for  collective  buying  and 
selHng  (1863) ;  in  the  legahzation  of  trade  unions  and  the  recog- 
nition for  the  first  time  of  the  right  of  strikes  and  lockouts 
(1864) ;  and  in  the  extension  of  state  guarantees  to  workmen's 
voluntary  insurance  against  death  and  industrial  accidents 
(1868).  Perhaps,  however,  it  was  worth  while  to  have  inaugu- 
rated social  poHtics  in  France. 

It  was  to  the  capitalists  and  business  men,  however,  that  Na- 
poleon III  made  his  most  constant  appeal.  While  he  restricted 
liberty  in  political  matters,  he  increased  it  in  economic  kiddie- 
affairs.  Governmental  regulation  of  industry  was  class 
lessened  ;  the  organization  of  commercial  corporations  ^*p***^*^*^ 
was  facilitated  ;  the  merchant  marine  was  subsidized ;  a  system 
of  savings  banks  was  established ;  a  pohcy  of  free  trade,  borrowed 
from  England,  was  gradually  introduced;  and  both  industry 
and  trade  were  stimulated  by  a  series  of  remarkable  public  works. 
Not  only  were  harbors  improved,  swamps  drained,  canals  dug, 
and  roads  repaired,  but  the  Second  Empire  was  the  period  of 
railway  construction  throughout  France.  It  was  Kkewise  dur- 
ing this  period  that  Paris  was  beautified  and  adorned  under 
the  supervision  of  the  emperor's  great  friend,  Baron  Haussmann, 
and  became  the  pleasure  city  of  the  world. ^  Many  were  the 
fortunes  made  or  swelled  during  the  Second  Empire.  And  the 
bourgeoisie,  who  were  the  chief  beneficiaries,  were  loyal  to 
Napoleon  III  for  many  years. 

For  generations  the  bourgeoisie  had  been  of  all  classes  in 
France  the  one  most  affected  by  hostility  to  the  Catholic 

'The  international  expositions  held  in  Paris  in  1855  and  in  1867  attested  the 
magnificence  of  the  city  and  the  growth  of  material  comfort  throughout  the  nation. 


i6o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Church,  and  bourgeois  Radicals  had  been  most  zealously  com- 
bated by  Clericals.  It  was  a  tribute  to  Napoleon's  art  as  a  poli- 
tician that  he  was  able  to  yoke  these  two  unruly 
simuitane-  parties  together  for  his  own  use.  From  one  hand  he 
atioif  of ^^^^  fed  the  bourgeoisie  with  material  nutriment ;  from 
Catholics  the  Other  he  fed  the  churchmen  with  spiritual  and 
Bourgeois  intellectual  pabulum.  While  he  was  showering  eco- 
Radicais  nomic  blessings  upon  the  middle  class,  he  was  strength- 
ening the  hold  of  the  clergy  upon  the  universities  and 
the  public  schools,  maintaining  French  troops  at  Rome  for 
the  protection  of  the  pope,  and  posing  as  the  international 
champion  of  Roman  CathoKcism. 

In  one  important  respect  —  in  the  furtherance  of  a  vigorous 
colonial  poKcy  —  Napoleon  found  an  identity  of  interests 
New  French  between  Clcricals  and  business  men.  The  latter 
Imperialism  desired  ncw  markets  for  their  goods  and  favorable 
places  for  the  investment  of  surplus  capital;  the  former  were 
bent  on  missionary  enterprise,  the  conversion  of  distant  peoples 
to  Christianity;  both  asked  state  protection  for  their  under- 
takings. Such  a  request  the  emperor  was  sure  to  heed.  Under 
his  direction  the  conquest  of  Algeria  was  speedily  completed 

(1857)  ;  a  permanent  civil  government  was  estabHshed  in  Al- 
geria in  1858;  and  the  administration  of  Marshal  MacMahon 
(1864-18 70)  consolidated  French  influence  in  northern  Africa. 
Islands  were  peacefully  acquired  in  the  Pacific,  notably  New 
Caledonia  (1853).  A  brief  war  wrested  favorable  commercial 
concessions  from  China  (i860) ;  and  the  murder  of  missionaries 
was  avenged  by  expeditions  into  Cochin  China  and  Annam 

(1858)  and  by  the  erection  of  a  French  protectorate  over  Cam- 
bodia (1863).  Despite  the  disastrous  termination  of  the  Mexican 
enterprise  (i  863-1 866),  which  had  been  undertaken  alike  for 
commercial  and  rehgious  motives,  the  Second  Empire  witnessed 
the  rehabilitation  of  the  French  as  colonizers  and  traders  on  a 
scale  second  only  to  the  British. 

It  seemed  as  though  the  words  which  Napoleon  addressed  to 
the  French  people  on  one  of  his  trips  across  France,  just  prior  to 
his  assumption  of  the  imperial  dignity,  had  been  prophetic  of 
his  greatest  achievements.  "I  would  conquer,"  he  said,  "for 
the  sake  of  religion,  morality,  and  material  ease,  that  portion 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  i6i 


of  the  population,  still  very  numerous,  which,  in  the  midst  of  a 
country  of  faith  and  beHef ,  hardly  knows  the  precepts  of  Christ ; 
which,  in  the  midst  of  the  most  fertile  country  of  the 
world,  is  hardly  able  to  enjoy  the  primary  necessities  ^cWeve^ 
of  hfe.    We  have  immense  uncultivated  districts  to  ments 
bring  under  cultivation,  roads  to  open,  harbors  to  J^eon  m' 
construct,  rivers  to  render  navigable,  canals  to  finish, 
and  our  network  of  railways  to  bring  to  completion,  .  .  .  This 
is  what  I  understand  by  the  empire,  if  the  empire  is  to  be  rees- 
tablished.   These  are  the  conquests  which  I  contemplate,  and 
all  of  you  who  surround  me,  who,  Hke  myself,  wish  the  good  of 
our  common  country,  you  are  my  soldiers."  ^ 

In  another  part  of  the  same  speech  the  prospective  emperor 
had  sought  to  allay  a  fear  which  might  haunt  equally  the  busi- 
ness man  and  the  pious  Christian.  ''There  is,  nevertheless, 
one  apprehension,  and  that  I  shall  set  at  rest.  A  spirit  of  dis- 
trust leads  certain  persons  to  say  that  the  empire  means  war.  I 
say  the  empire  means  peace.  France  longs  for  peace,  and  if 
France  is  satisfied,  the  world  is  tranquil.  Glory  is  rightly  handed 
down  hereditarily,  but  not  war."  If  Napoleon  III  had  fulfilled 
this  prophecy  as  earnestly  and  truthfully  as  he  fulfilled  the  other, 
the  subsequent  history  of  France  and  of  the  world  might  have 
been  quite  different. 

From  the  outset,  the  empire  did  not  mean  peace;  it  meant 
war.    It  was  based  —  and  Napoleon  III  knew  it  was  based  —  on 
nationalism,  on  patriotism,  on  the  memory  of  the 
glory  of  French  military  success.    The  emperor's  JJe  Weak^ 
peaceful  protestations  were  mainly  for  foreign  edi-  ness  of  the 
fication ;   at  home  he  was  prepared  to  embark  the  Empii-g 
entire  nation  upon  warlike  enterprises  whenever  an 
outburst  of  martial  enthusiasm  might  serve  to  mollify  the  rival- 
ries of  partisan  politics  or  to  unite  conflicting  social  classes. 
It  was  the  inherent  weakness  of  a  governmental  structure  which 
was  founded  rather  upon  the  traditions  of  the  First  Empire 
than  upon  the  less  spectacular  l)ut  more  imperishable  ideals  of 
liberty  and  equality  that  inspired  the  First  Republic. 

The  very  year  of  his  accession  to  the  throne  —  the  very 
year  of  the  address  quoted  above  —  Napoleon  III  plunged  into 

^  The  Bordeaux  Address,  9  October,  1852. 
VOL.  n  —  M 


l62 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


preparations  for  a  war  with  Russia.  Quarrels  at  the  holy  places 
in  Palestine  between  monks  of  the  Roman  Catholic  communion 
and  those  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  faith  were  seized 
with  Russia  ^pon  by  the  Tsar  Nicholas  as  the  pretext  for  claim- 
Concerning  ing  a  protectorate  over  all  Christians  in  the  Ottoman 
Piac^s^^  Empire  and  by  the  Emperor  Napoleon  as  the  oc- 
casion for  reasserting  the  ancient  protective  priv- 
ileges of  France  in  the  Levant.  Napoleon  was  doubtless  piqued 
by  the  grudging  recognition  which  the  tsar  accorded  his  title  and 
aware  that  the  preservation  of  Turkey  against  Russian  aggres- 
sion would  find  favor  alike  with  ecclesiastical  and  with  commer- 
cial interests  in  France ;  he  felt  certain,  moreover,  that  a  defeat 
of  Russia  would  avenge  the  first  Napoleon's  Russian  campaign 
and  would  redound  to  the  eternal  prestige  of  the  Bonaparte 
family  and  of  the  French  nation. 

Fortune  kindly  suppHed  Napoleon  III  with  allies.  The 
British  government  feared  that  a  Russian  protectorate  over  all 
Eastern  Christians  would  be  speedily  followed  by  Rus- 
Affali?  ^i^^  annexation  of  European  Turkey,  and  that  Russia, 
Favorable  ensconced  at  Constantinople,  would  be  an  infinitely 
to^ Napoleon  ^^^y^^  menace  than  the  Turks  to  British  communica- 
tion with  India  and  to  British  trade  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean.  Great  Britain  accordingly  backed  Napoleon 
in  the  demand  for  the  preservation  of  the  integrity  of  the  sul- 
tan's sovereignty.  The  little  kingdom  of  Sardinia,  for  reasons 
of  its  own  which  will  be  later  indicated,  Hkewise  joined  the 
alliance.  The  Austrian  government  preserved  a  troubled  neu- 
trality, wavering  between  apprehension  of  Russian  territorial 
expansion  at  Austrian  expense  and  desire  to  befriend  reactionary 
Russia,  which,  as  recently  as  1849,  had  assisted  it  in  putting 
down  the  Hungarian  revolt.  The  king  of  Prussia  alone  was 
really  "benevolent"  toward  Russia;  but  he  was  too  timid  to 
assist  the  tsar  openly. 

The  war  began  between  Turkey  and  Russia  in  1853,  and  in 
the  following  year  France  and  Great  Britain  formally  joined 
Turkey.  With  the  alhes  Sardinia  joined  in  1855.  The  struggle, 
confined  mainly  to  military  operations  in  the  peninsula  of  the 
Crimea,  and  notably  to  a  protracted  siege  of  Sevastopol,  has 
been  known  in  history  as  the  Crimean  War.    The  allies  met 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  163 


with  such  unexpectedly  stubborn  resistance  that  it  was  not 
until  1856  that  Russia  was  forced  to  sue  for  peace.    The  losses, 
too,  were  enormous  :  among  all  the  combatants,  more 
than  half  a  milKon  Hves  were  sacrificed  and  at  least  Crimean 
two  bilhon  dollars  were  spent.    It  seemed  a  very  dear  ^^•_jggg 
price  to  pay  for  a  treaty  which  merely  bolstered  up 
the  Ottoman  Empire  for  a  few  years  longer,  abolished  the  Rus- 
sian protectorate  over  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  established  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Danube,  and  neutralized  the  Black  Sea 
by  forbidding  warships  to  enter  it.    Great  Britain,  it  is  true, 
had  her  commercial  supremacy  guaranteed  in  the  eastern  Medi- 
terranean, but  what  had  Napoleon  III  secured  as  compensation 
for  his  own  expenditure  of  75,000  French  lives  and  two  billion 
francs?    He  had  the  satisfaction  of  holding  the  peace  congress 
in  his  own  capital ;  .he  heard  the  plaudits  of  surviving  soldiers ; 
he  beheld  signs  of  his  increasing  popularity  among  the  Clericals 
and  among  the  sentimentally-minded ;  but  these  rewards  were 
temporary.    On  the  other  hand,  he  had  won  the  undying  enmity 
of  Russia  and  had  paved  the  way  for  a  fateful  intervention  in 
the  Italian  peninsula. 


THE  POLITICAL  UNIFICATION  OF  ITALY 

At  the  time  of  the  Congress  of  Paris  (1856),  the  agitation 
for  the  pohtical  unification  of  the  various  Itahan  states  had  al- 
ready reached  an  acute  stage.  Ever  since  the  Con-  jj^^-Qjj^jjgj^ 
gress  of  Vienna  (181 5),  the  sentiment  of  nationalism  in  the  Italian 
had  been  steadily  growing  throughout  the  peninsula,  jg^^^^^^g^g 
Everywhere  patriots  protested  against  Austrian  pre- 
dominance :  in  the  provinces  of  Lombardy  and  Venetia,  actually 
owned  by  Austria;  in  the  three  small  duchies  of  Tuscany,^ 
Parma,  and  Modena,  ruled  by  members  of  the  Habsburg  family ; 
in  the  Papal  States,  governed  by  the  pope  with  the  aid  of  foreign 
soldiers;  in  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  whose  despicable 
sovereigns  one  after  another  were  kept  at  their  post  by  the  aid 
of  Austrian  bayonets ;  and  in  the  kingdom  of  Sardinia,^  buUied 
by  Austrian  diplomacy  and  beaten  by  Austrian  troops. 

^  Lucca  had  been  incorporated  into  Tuscany  in  1847. 

'  It  must  be  l)orne  in  mind  throughout  this  section  that  the  names  "Sardinia" 
and  "Piedmont"  have  Ijccn  often  used  interchangeably  to  designate  the  state  in 


164 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


For  many  years  the  efforts  of  Italian  patriots  had  been  nulli- 
fied by  divergent  views  as  to  the  best  method  of  realizing  their 
common  aspiration.  These  divergencies  represented 
Factions  political  idcals  of  three  different  factions.  It 

in  Italy  with  will  be  remembered  that  one  faction,  headed  by 
View?  as*  to  Mazzini  and  composed  of  extreme  Radicals,  desired 
the  Method  that  the  new  Italy  should  be  a  republic  with  Liberal 
fication  institutions  and  laws.  A  second  faction,  which  was 
Clerical  and  Conservative  and  tended  to  be  reaction- 
ary, favored  a  federal  government  for  Italy  preferably  under  the 
presidency  of  the  pope.  The  third  faction  —  moderate  and 
bourgeois  —  looked  to  an  annexation  of  the  other  states  by 
Sardinia  and  the  consequent  erection  of  a  constitutional  kingdom 
of  Italy  under  the  House  of  Savoy. 

By  1856  the  third  faction  was  in  process  of  absorbing  the  other 
two.  Republicanism  was  too  radical  to  attract  at  once  the 
Weakness  ^^^^  ItaHans,  who  had  long  been  steeped  in  mo- 
of  Repubii-  narchical  traditions ;  and  Mazzini's  efforts  in  Rome  in 
Qeric^a^s  •  scrvcd  Only  to  disgust  the  order-loving  middle 

strength  of  class  and  the  religiously-inclined  peasantry  and  to 
Liberal        transform  Pope  Pius  IX  from  a  Liberal  patriot  into  a 

Monarchists  .  ^  ,  .  ,         i  *  • 

reactionary  supported  by  French  and  Austrian  troops. 
This  transformation  on  the  part  of  a  pope  who  had  once  aroused 
the  liveliest  expectations  of  the  Italian  people,  cost  the  federal 
party  in  Italy  its  leader,  but  it  was  perfectly  natural.  What 
Pius  IX  saw  of  Mazzini's  repubHc  convinced  him  that  Radi- 
cahsm  was  inimical  to  peace  and  justice  and  essentially  irreli- 
gious. He  also  began  to  fear,  as  his  predecessors  for  centuries 
had  feared,  that  the  political  unification  of  Italy,  with  the  attend- 
ant establishment  of  a  strong  secular  government,  would  decrease 
his  own  spiritual  influence,  would  cause  non-Italian  nations 
to  look  upon  him  merely  as  a  kind  of  chaplain  for  Italy  rather 
than  aa  Christ's  vicar  for  the  whole  world.  From  1849  until  his 
own  death  in  1878,  therefore.  Pope  Pius  IX  made  every  possible 
effort  to  combat  ItaUan  unity.  But  in  summoning  good  Catho- 
lics to  side  with  him,  he  found  in  many  instances  that  he  had  to 

northwestern  Italy  ruled  by  princes  of  the  House  of  Savoy.  Technically,  Sardinia 
and  Piedmont  were  different  parts  of  one  state  —  the  former  an  island  and  the 
latter  the  mainland  about  Turin. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  165 


deal  with  patriots  as  well  as  with  Christians,  and  as  time  went 
on  it  became  increasingly  evident  that  a  great  number  of  Italian 
Catholics  who  loyally  confessed  the  spiritual  supremacy  of  the 
bishop  of  Rome  were  bent  on  disregarding  the  pontiff's  incur- 
sions into  poUtics  and  on  cooperating,  against  his  instructions, 
even  with  his  enemies,  for  the  unification  of  their  country.  At 
last  the  opposition  of  the  head  of  the  CathoKc  Church  to  the 
growth  of  nationaHsm  was  a  losing  cause. 

There  were  various  reasons  why  ItaHan  nationaKsts  who 
had  formerly  pinned  their  faith  to  republicanism  or  to  the  papacy 
ejradually  transferred  it  to  the  kinsrdom  of  Sardinia.  ^      .  , 

X^,      1  .      1  r  o      1-   .     •     1    1    1  T^-    1  Sardinia  the 

The  kmgdom  of  Sardima  mcluded  Piedmont,  a  par-  Leading 
ticularly  fertile  and  progressive  district,  the  industrial  ^^^^ 
development  of  which  was  stimulating  the  growth  of  a 
wealthy  and  educated  middle  class.  Then,  too,  Sardinia  was 
the  only  Italian  state  which  since  181 5  had  not  been  controlled 
by  Austria;  in  fact,  it  was  Sardinia  which  in  1 848-1 849  had 
undertaken  to  achieve  single-handed  the  herculean  task  of 
driving  the  hated  Austrians  from  the  peninsula.  Despite  re- 
verses, the  leadership  of  Sardinia  seemed  to  practical  patriots 
to  offer  a  more  promising  means  of  achieving  national  independ- 
ence and  unity  than  ideahstic  repubhcanism  or  cosmopoHtan 
religion.  Moreover,  the  grant  of  a  constitution  by  the  Sar- 
dinian king,  Charles  Albert,  in  1848,  attracted  the  favorable 
attention  of  ItaHan  Liberals.  And,  finally,  it  was  Sardinia  that 
supplied  three  most  striking  personahties  to  the  national  move- 
ment, —  Victor  Emmanuel,  Garibaldi,  and  Cavour. 

King  Victor  Emmanuel  II,  who  succeeded  to  the  throne  of 
Sardinia  upon  the  abdication  of  his  father,  Charles  Albert,  in 
the  disastrous  days  of  1849,  endeared  himself  to  Lib- 
erals by  retaining,  alone  of  all  the  ItaHan  princes,  the  Emmanuel 
constitution  which  had  been  granted  in  1848;  and  11,  King  of 
in  the  eyes  of  all  patriots  he  gained  favor  by  doing  so  ig^^^ig^g 
in  spite  of  persistent  Austrian  protests.    Victor  Em- 
manuel, moreover,  had  several  quaHtics  which  won  him  wide 
popularity  :  his  sobering  common  sense  in  great  crises,  his  powers 
of  military  organization,  his  loyal  support  of  his  ministers,  his 
straightforward  truthfulness  that  earned  him  the  title  of  "the 
honest  king,"  and,  last  but  not  least,  his  simple,  blufi  manners 


i66 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


and  his  commanding  figure  which  confirmed  his  reputation  as 
a  hero.  The  recognized  piety  of  the  royal  family,  too,  concili- 
ated many  Catholics;  and  Victor  Emmanuel  was  himself  the 
sort  of  king  whom  Republicans  would  respect. 

An  even  greater  inspirer  of  emotional  patriotism  than  the 
king  was  Giuseppe  Garibaldi  (1807-1882),  the  brave,  handsome 
_  soldier  whose  breast  perpetually  burned,  through  ex- 

Garibaldi         i  .       i  i      r    i  r  n 

ploits  that  partook  01  the  nature  of  romance  rather 
than  of  prosaic  fact,  with  a  consuming  devotion  to  liberty  and 
a  devouring  love  of  Italy.  A  native  of  Nice,  he  had  early  entered 
the  Sardinian  navy,  but  participation  in  a  republican  plot  of 
Mazzini  had  obliged  him  to  quit  Sardinia.  Then  for  ten  years 
he  had  fought  in  South  America  for  the  freedom  of  the  Portu- 
guese and  Spanish  colonies.^  Returning  to  Italy,  he  had  been 
wilHng  to  give  assistance  to  any  person  or  faction  that  might 
hasten  his  country's  liberation :  he  had  vainly  offered  his  serv- 
ices to  Pope  Pius  IX  in  1847 ;  in  1848  he  had  raised  a  volun- 
teer army  of  3000  men  to  aid  the  king  of  Sardinia  against  the 
Austrians;  in  1849  he  had  gallantly  but  hopelessly  defended 
Mazzini's  Roman  Republic.  Following  the  dismal  failure 
of  this  last  venture.  Garibaldi  had  fled  to  New  York,  where, 
first  as  a  candle-maker  and  afterwards  as  a  trading  skipper,  he 
had  managed  to  amass  a  small  fortune.  In  1854  he  had  returned 
once  more  to  Italy  and  purchased  the  island  of  Caprera,  on 
which  thenceforth  he  made  his  home.  By  the  year  1856  Gari- 
baldi, at  heart  a  radical  republican,  perceived  that  the  hope  of 
uniting  Italy  lay  in  Victor  Emmanuel,  and,  for  the  sake  of  his 
country,  he  was  prepared  to  sacrifice  his  personal  political 
preferences  and  to  accept  a  constitutional  monarchy.  Like 
many  other  Italian  republicans.  Garibaldi  was  developing  a 
sincere  admiration  for  the  Sardinian  king. 

Less  popular  than  Garibaldi  or  Victor  Emmanuel,  but  easily 
the  most  potent  single  factor  in  the  unification  of  Italy,  was 
Cavour  Count  Camillo  di  Cavour  (1810-1861).  Born  in 
the  very  year  that  Metternich  became  chancellor 
of  Austria,  and  belonging  to  a  noble  family  which  conserved  the 
traditions  of  the  old  regime,  Cavour  was  destined  to  become 
a  greater,  at  least  a  more  permanently  successful,  diplomat 

1  Victories  of  Garibaldi  in  1846  helped  to  assure  the  independence  of  Uruguay. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


167 


than  Metternich,  and  to  acquire  fame  as  the  foremost  Liberal 
nation-builder  of  the  nineteenth  century.  It  was  in  his  teens, 
while  serving  in  the  army,  that  he  imbibed  his  strongly  marked 
Liberal  notions  and  his  uncompromising  dislike  of  absolutism 
and  Clericahsm,  ideas  which  an  extensive  reading  of  Enghsh 
authors  and  a  subsequent  sojourn  in  Great  Britain  confirmed. 
In  fact,  the  Liberahsm  which  Cavour  espoused  was  that  of 
contemporary  England :  a  king  who  would  reign  without  rul- 
ing; and  a  parKament  which  would  represent  primarily  the 
middle  class  and  which  would  insure  to  the  nation  the  greatest 
amount  of  liberty  in  political,  ecclesiastical,  intellectual,  and 
economic  afifairs. 

During  the  reign  of  Charles  Albert,  whose  unsteady  waverings 
between  Liberahsm  and  Conservatism  were  the  despair  of  rational 
beings,  Cavour  had  taken  no  important  part  in  government. 
He  had  helped  to  manage  his  family  estates;  he  had  traveled 
and  studied;  and  latterly  he  had  edited,  in  conjunction  with 
other  Itahan  patriots,  a  celebrated  journal,  //  Risorgimento, 
which  advocated  constitutional  reform  in  Piedmont  and  the 
preparation  of  that  country  for  leadership  in  the  cause  of 
national  unification.  After  the  grant  of  the  constitution  {Statnto) 
and  the  accession  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  Cavour  came  rapidly  to  the 
fore.  Entering  the  cabinet  in  1850,  he  became  prime  minister 
in  1852  and  at  that  post  he  remained,  with  but  one  brief 
interruption,  until  his  death  in  1861. 

As  premier,  Cavour  labored  dihgently  for  several  years  to 
promote  the  material  welfare  of  his  country  so  that  in  the  forth- 
coming struggle  Sardinia  might  be  better  able  to  cope 
with  Austria.     To  realize  this  part  of  his  program  Liberal 
he  rehed  upon  the  parliamentary  and  popular  support  Reform  in 
of  moderate  Constitutionalists,  as  opposed  to  extrem-  ^850-^859 
ists,  whether  revolutionary  Republicans  or  reactionary 
Clericals :    and,  inasmuch  as  the  moderate  Constitutionalists 
were  essentially  a  bourgeois  party,  the  reforms  which  they 
effected  were  naturally  such  as  the  middle  class  everywhere 
then  favored.    Free  trade  was  adopted.    Shipping  was  sub- 
sidized.   The  building  of  factories  was  encouraged.  Waste 
land  was  brought  under  cuUivation.    Railway  construction  was 
begun.    Education  was  stimulated.    The  pubhc  budget  was 


i68 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


reorganized,  and  the  taxes,  though  increased,  were  more  equi- 
tably distributed.  To  lessen  the  influence  of  the  Clericals  who. 
in  conformity  to  the  admonitions  of  the  pope,  were  now  be- 
coming more  openly  hostile  to  the  unification  of  Italy  under 
Sardinian  auspices,  many  monasteries  were  suppressed  and  the 
Jesuits  were  expelled  from  the  country.  In  this  action  Cavour 
professed  to  inaugurate  a  new  policy  of  divorcing  religion  and 
poHtics,  a  ''free  Church  in  a  free  state,"  as  he  phrased  it,  but 
in  fact  it  was  the  beginning  of  a  rancorous  conflict  in  Italy  be- 
tween Church  and  state.  For  the  time  being,  tljanks  to  the 
fact  that  his  party  was  the  party  of  patriotism  and  nationalism, 
Cavour  commanded  the  unquestioned  support  of  the  bulk  of 
his  fellow-citizens. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  reforms  were  made  in 
Sardinia  at  the  very  time  when  every  other  Italian  state  was 
Cavour  and  ^^^^^^^S  from  the  worst  oppressions  of  petty  princes 
the  Uni-  backed  by  powerful  Austria  :  no  wonder  that  the  eyes 
itdy°^  patriots  and  of  Liberals  were  turned  towards  Sar- 

dinia as  towards  a  messiah.  Yet  Sardinia  seemed  at 
best  but  an  insignificant  state :  twice  it  had  dismally  failed  to 
emancipate  Italy,  and  its  population  still  aggregated  less  than 
five  millions.  Cavour,  however,  was  not  easily  disheartened : 
reforms  within  Sardinia  were  but  a  prelude  to  a  far  more  ambi- 
tious scheme,  —  the  political  union  of  the  entire  peninsula  under 
the  House  of  Savoy,  —  and  the  greater  the  obstacles,  the  more 
dogged  was  his  determination  to  surmount  them.  He  cooper- 
ated with  Victor  Emmanuel  in  reorganizing  the  army  and  im- 
proving its  discipline.  He  had  mysterious  interviews  with  the 
arch-rebel.  Garibaldi.  He  patronized  secret  societies  which 
had  been  formed  throughout  Italy  in  order  to  bind  together 
the  scattered  elements  of  resistance  to  Austrian  control.  But 
most  significant  of  all  was  the  masterful  diplomacy  with  which 
Cavour  conducted  foreign  affairs.  In  fact,  just  as  the  successful 
maintenance  of  constitutional  government  was  his  monumental 
achievement  in  Sardinia,  so  decisive  diplomacy  was  his  great 
contribution  to  the  cause  of  Itahan  unification. 

Cavour's  first  diplomatic  step  of  importance  was  to  cause 
diminutive  Sardinia  in  1855  to  join  France  and  Great  Britain  in 
the  Crimean  War  against  Russia.    His  primary  purpose  in  this 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  169 


seemingly  visionary  procedure  was  to  take  advantage  of  the  ex- 
pected alliance  of  Austria  with  Russia  in  order  to  secure  the 
immediate  support  of  Great  Britain  and  France 
against  Austria.    Although  the  persistent  neutrahty  pa^^pa^ 
of  Austria  rendered  this  part  of  his  scheme  abortive,  tion  in  the 
Cavour  had  the  satisfaction  of  reaping  other  rewards  war^^^° 
which  he  had  foreseen.    Sardinia  gained  two  power- 
ful friends  in  western  Europe  and  was  recognized  as  the  leading 
state  in  Italy,  and  Cavour  was  afforded  an  opportunity,  in  the 
presence  of  the  staid  diplomats  assembled  in  the  Congress  of 
Paris  (1856),  to  expose,  in  the  angry  tones  of  which  he  could  be 
master,  the  horrors  of  Austrian  rule. 

His  next  step  was  to  draw  closer  the  friendship  between 
Sardinia  and  France,  for  he  had  made  up  his  mind  that  French 
assistance  would  be  required  to  expel  the  Austrians  „  , 

f  XI  mi«  1  -w^      ^      ^  1^  NapolCOn 

from  Italy.    I  his  task  was  not  an  easy  one.    Probably  m  and  the 
-Napoleon  III  was  personally  sincerely  desirous  of  aid-  ^/^^^y*^°" 
ing  the  Itahans.    The  Bonaparte  family  had  not  yet 
forgotten  its  ItaHan  origin.    Napoleon  I  had  erected  a  "kingdom 
of  Italy."    Napoleon  III  himself  had  been  a  Carbonaro.    At  this 
very  time  he  was  championing  the  cause  of  Rumanian  nationahty 
by  urging  the  union  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia;  why  should 
he  not  champion  the  cause  of  Italian  nationality?    All  these 
considerations  were  constantly  dinned  into  the  ear  of  Napoleon 
by  the  calculating  Cavour. 

But  the  emperor's  personal  enthusiasm  was  somewhat  cooled 
by  the  reflection  that  for  centuries  it  had  been  the  part  of  French 
foreign  policy  to  foster  political  disunion  beyond  the  northern 
and  eastern  frontiers  —  in  the  Germanics  and  in  Italy  —  with 
a  view  to  checking  the  growth  of  too  powerful  neighbors.  If, 
therefore,  he  were  to  decide  on  intervention,  it  should  be  only 
partial  and  productive  of  French,  rather  than  Sarch'nian,  advan- 
tage. One  vital  consideration,  however,  made  Napoleon  wary 
about  interfering  in  Italy  at  all,  —  that  was  a  consideration  of 
practical  French  politics,  — •  the  danger  that  such  a  move 
would  split  wide  apart  the  important  factions  of  Clericals  and 
bourgeois  Liberals  on  whose  united  support  his  cont  rol  of  France 
depended.  Were  he  to  intervene  sufTiciently  to  be  of  real  service 
to  Italian  nationalism,  he  would  augment  the  prestige  of  Sar- 


170 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


dinia,  whose  recent  anti-Clerical  legislation  had  aroused  the 
enmity  of  ardent  Catholics  in  France,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
would  dangerously  weaken  the  position  of  the  pope  :  the  French 
Clericals,  in  sympathy  with  Pope  Pius  IX,  therefore,  opposed 
French  intervention  in  Italy.  On  the  other  hand,  were  Napo- 
leon not  actively  to  countenance  Italian  aspirations,  he  would 
alienate  French  Liberals  by  playing  into  the  hands  of  reaction- 
ary Austria,  and  he  would  so  anger  Sardinia  that  she  might 
adopt  retaliatory  measures  against  French  industry  and  trade : 
the  bourgeois  Liberals  of  France,  therefore,  seconded  Cavour 
in  urging  Napoleon  to  fight  Austria. 

Napoleon  III  was  indeed  between  the  devil  and  the  deep  sea. 
Good  politician  as  he  was,  he  temporized  and  put  off  the  decision 
as  long  as  possible.  The  situation  was  an  ironical  commentary 
upon  the  desperate  political  game  that  he  was  playing  in  France. 
The  suspense  might  have  continued  indefinitely  had  not  an  Ital- 
ian fanatic,  Orsini,  by  name,  made  an  attempt  upon  Napoleon's 
life  in  January,  1858,  and  thereby  touched  the  Httle  chord  of 
cowardice  which  was  usually  concealed  beneath  the  emperor's 
sphinx-like  features.  Napoleon  was  terrified  into  action ; 
he  feared  lest  longer  delay  might  invite  other  ItaHan  fanatics 
to  make  more  successful  attempts  upon  his  Hfe ;  and  within  a 
month  of  the  outrage  he  laid  before  Cavour  a  proposal  for  a 
Franco-Sardinian  alHance.  He  would  temporarily  risk  the 
reproaches  of  the  Clericals. 

At  an  "accidental"  meeting  between  Napoleon  and  Cavour 
at  Plombieres  in  July,  1858,  an  informal  agreement  was  reached, 
whereby  France  was  to  assist  Sardinia  in  driving  the 
between  Austrians  from  Lombardy  and  Venetia  and  to  allow 
Sardinia  the  formation  of  a  single  north  ItaUan  state,  and,  in 
1858^^*^*^^'  ^^eturn,  France  was  to  receive  the  Alpine  duchy  of 
Savoy  and  the  Mediterranean  port  of  Nice :  Prince 
Victor  Napoleon,  the  emperor's  worthless  cousin,  was  to  marry 
Victor  Emmanuel's  daughter.  The  emperor  still  hesitated  to 
assume  responsibility  for  opening  the  war  himself;  and  it  re- 
quired a  nice  exercise  of  Cavour's  diplomatic  talents  to  pick  a 
quarrel  with  Austria. 

At  length  in  April,  1859,  the  Austrian  government  was  led 
to  present  an  ultimatum  to  Sardinia,  demanding  immediate 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


171 


demobilization.    The  prompt  rejection  of  the  ultimatum  was 
the  signal  for  the  outbreak  of  the  war  which,  with  Austria  on 
one  side  and  France  and  Sardinia  on  the  other,  ^^^^^^ 
lasted  only  from  April  to  July,  1859,  and  constituted  tervention 
the  first  successful  step  toward  Italian  Hberation.  i?,^*^^- 

1  11  1    T»  ^      1    1  War  of  1859 

French  troops  under  the  emperor  and  Marshal 
MacMahon  entered  Piedmont,  where  they  were  received  with 
enthusiasm  and  were  joined  by  the  Sardinians  under  King 
Victor  Emmanuel  and  General  La  Marmora.  The  allies  then 
advanced  into  Lombardy :  the  victory  of  Magenta  early  in 
June,  which  opened  the  gates  of  Milan  to  them,  was  shortly 
followed  by  that  of  .Solferino  ;  and  the  Austrians  fell  back  upon 
their  strong  fortresses  in  Venetia. 

Meanwhile  the  hurried  withdrawal  of  the  Austrian  garrisons 
from  other  parts  of  the  peninsula  had  enabled  the  Italian  people 
everywhere  to  display  their  real  feelings.    From  the 
three  duchies  of  Tuscany,  Parma,  and  Modena,  the  Revolutions 
Habsburg  princes  were  unceremoniously  expelled ;  in  the 
and  throughout  that  part  of  the  Papal  States  known  JJuc^es 
as  the  Romagna,  including  the  important  city  of 
Bologna,  the  temporal  sovereignty  of  the  pope  was  formally 
repudiated ;   all  these  regions  of  north-central  Italy  clamored 
for  annexation  to  Sardinia,  and  Cavour  responded  by  sending 
special  commissioners  to  take  charge  of  them  in  the  name  of 
Victor  Emmanuel. 

This  was  more  than  Napoleon  III  had  bargained  for.  In 

attempting  to  enable  Sardinia  to  annex  Lombardy  and  Venetia, 

he  seemed  unwittingly  to  have  inspired  such  an  out-  Hesitation 

burst  of  nationalism  as  could  result  only  in  unification  of  Napoleon 

III 

of  the  whole  peninsula  and  in  serious  danger  to  France. 
Moreover,  the  uprising  in  the  Papal  States  was  naturally  re- 
ferred by  French  Clericals  to  the  emperor's  sacrilegious  inter- 
vention, and  the  eloquent  Bishop  Dupanloup  from  his  cathedral 
pulpit  branded  Napoleon  as  the  ''modern  Judas  Iscariot." 
Then,  too,  the  threatening  attitude  of  Prussia  along  the  Rhenish 
frontier  heralded  a  greater  danger  to  France  in  the  Germanics 
than  in  Italy.  Besides,  the  Austrian  forces  were  now  well 
intrenched  in  Venetia,  from  which  it  might  prove  difficult  to 
dislodge  them.    And,  quite  unUke  his  illustrious  uncle,  Napoleon 


172 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


III  was  troubled  by  the  spectacle  of  the  dead  and  wounded  upon 
battlefields,  and  it  was  an  open  secret  that  he  did  not  enjoy  the 
rattle  of  musketry  or  the  smell  of  powder. 

For  these  and  possibly  other  reasons  the  emperor  of  the 
French,  without  previously  informing  Cavour,  hastened  to 
Viiiafranca  concludc  an  armisticc  with  Emperor  Francis  Joseph 
(1859):       of  Austria  at  Viiiafranca  in  Tuly,  i8so,  whereby  Lom- 

Cessionof      ,       .  ,  ,    ,  .  ^ 

Lombardy  bardy  was  to  be  ceded  to  bardmia,  Venetia  to  remam 
to  Sardinia  Austrian,  the  deposed  princes  to  be  reinstated,  and  the 
pope  made  president  of  an  Italian  confederation.  It  was  now 
the  turn  of  the  Italian  patriots  and  of  the  French  Liberals 
to  assail  Napoleon  as  a  traitor.  Loud  were  the  protests.  King 
Victor  Emmanuel,  left  in  the  lurch  by  his  powerful  ally,  could 
do  nothing  but  accede  to  the  truce,  but  Cavour  denounced 
it  and  resigned  his  ofhce  in  disgust.  The  terms  of  the  truce  of 
Viiiafranca  were  ratified  by  the  treaty  of  Zurich  in  the  following 
November. 

Napoleon,  however,  had  not  reckoned  with  the  resolution 
of  the  ItaHans  themselves.  The  inhabitants  of  the  duchies 
incorpora-  and  of  most  of  the  Papal  States  would  not  hear  of  a 
DucWes^^  papal  federation  or  of  the  restoration  of  their  several 
with  Sar-  former  rulers  :  they  held  plebiscites  and  voted  well- 
Cession  of  ^^S^  unanimously  for  incorporation  into  the  kingdom 
Savoy  and  of  Sardinia.  Napoleon  at  first  positively  refused  to 
France*  allow  such  incorporation.  From  the  seeming  impasse^ 
i860  Cavour,  who  had  swallowed  his  pride  and  returned 

to  his  post,  negotiated  an  escape.  By  the  treaty  of  Turin, 
signed  in  March,  i860,  between  Napoleon  III  and  Victor 
Emmanuel  II,  the  latter  ceded  both  Savoy  and  Nice  to  France, 
just  as  if  Napoleon  had  carried  out  the  original  bargain  and 
had  freed  Italy  ''from  the  Alps  to  the  Adriatic";  and,  in 
return,  France  recognized  the  annexation  to  Sardinia  not 
only  of  Lombardy  but  of  the  duchies  of  Tuscany,  Parma, 
and  Modena,  and  of  the  former  papal  possession  of  the 
Romagna. 

Close  upon  the  heels  of  this  unifying  tendency  in  the  North 
there  came  in  the  southern  part  of  the  peninsula  a  similar  move- 
ment, the  credit  for  whose  inception  and  guidance  belongs,  how- 
ever, not  to  Cavour  nor  to  Victor  Emmanuel  but  to  Garibaldi,  \ 

s 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


The  tyranny  of  the  Bourbon  kings  of  the  Two  Sicilies  had  al- 
ready reached  a  point  which  was  unendurable.    Ferdinand  II, 
the  infamous  ''Bomba,"  had  been  succeeded  in  1859  oanbaid' 
by  Francis  II,  but  the  change  of  sovereign  meant  and  the 
no  change  of  system.    The  very  next  year  the  Sicil-  Annexation 

J  u  ^-    •  /•  AT  of  the  Two 

lans,  encouraged  by  the  stirrmg  events  m  the  North  siciUes  to 
and  incited  by  Mazzini,  rose  in  revolt.     At  this 
juncture  Garibaldi  assembled  *  at  Genoa  his  com- 
pact volunteer  army  —  the  thousand  famous  ''Redshirts"  — 
in  preparation  for  a  filibustering  expedition  to  support  the 
SiciHan  rebels.    As  the  governments  of  Sardinia  and  the  Two 
SiciHes  were  theoretically  on  amicable  terms  with  each  other, 
it  was  the  duty  of  Cavour  as  the  responsible  minister  of  the 
former  to  prevent  the  use  of  the  Sardinian  port  of  Genoa  as 
a  base  of  attack  against  the  latter.    But  Cavour  beUeved  that 
in  this  case  the  obHgations  of  international  law  should  be  subor- 
dinated to  the  expediencies  of  Italian  nationaHsm ;  while  openly 
he  threatened  the  ^'Redshirts"  with  arrest,  secretly  he  intimated 
to  Garibaldi  that  the  expedition  might  depart. 

Garibaldi  left  Genoa  with  his  valiant  volunteers  in  May, 

1860,  and  was  received  by  the  SiciHans  with  enthusiasm.  Within 
three  months  he  was  master  of  the  island.  Thence  he  crossed 
over  to  the  mainland  and  in  September  took  possession  of  the 
city  of  Naples.  Such  a  marvelous  feat  exalted  Garibaldi  to 
the  position  of  a  popular  idol  and  he  might  easily  have  made 
himself  a  sort  of  Sicilian  dictator  for  the  rest  of  his  Hfe.  Gari- 
baldi was  not  merely  bold  and  brave ;  he  was  noble  and  self- 
sacrificing,  and  although  he  would  have  preferred  to  see  Italy 
a  republic,  he  felt  that  for  many  years  to  come  his  country  would 
prosper  most  under  Hberal  monarchical  institutions.  He  loved 
his  country  more  than  he  loved  himself.  In  November,  i860, 
of  his  own  accord,  he  turned  over  the  government  of  the  Two 
Sicilies  to  King  Victor  Emmanuel  of  Sardinia,  and  king  and 
liberator  rode  through  the  streets  of  Naples  side  by  side,  amid 
the  bravos  of  the  populace.  A  plebiscite  had  already  ratified 
the  annexation  of  the  state  to  Sardinia,  and  the  surrender  of 
Francis  II  at  Gaeta,  whither  he  had  taken  refuge  under  protec- 
tion of  French  warshii)s,  to  King  Victor  Emmanuel  in  February, 

1861,  completed  the  work.    In  order  to  insure  communication 


174 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


by  land  between  Victor  Emmanuel's  northern  provinces  and  his 
new  provinces  in  the  South,  Cavour  had  directed  in  September, 

1860,  an  attack  upon  the  Papal  States  and  had  appropriated 
the  town  of  Ancona  and  the  eastern  districts  known  as  Umbria 
and  the  Marches. 

Thus  within  the  incredibly  brief  space  of  two  years,  1859- 

186 1,  through  the  determination  of  the  Italian  people,  the 
The  King-  intervention  of  Napoleon  III,  the  diplomacy  of 
dom  of  Italy,  Cavour,  and  the  campaign  of  Garibaldi,  the  greater 
'^^^  part  of  Italy  was  united.  On  18  February,  1861, 
a  parliament  met  in  Turin,  representing  a  newly  united  nation 
of  more  than  twenty-two  millions;  and  on  17  March,  Victor 
Emmanuel  assumed  the  title  of  king  of  Italy.  Less  than  three 
months  later  Cavour  died,  a  victim  of  his  own  restless  energy,  but 
his  great  task  was  done  :  Italy  was  united,  and  Italy  was  Liberal. 

In  saying  that  Italy  was  united,  qualifications  must,  of  course, 
be  made  in  respect  of  Venetia,  which  still  remained  in  Austrian 
hands,  and  of  the  territory  of  Rome,  where  the  pope  was  pro- 
tected by  French  troops,  but  before  his  death  Cavour  had  made 
clear  the  diplomatic  means  by  which  both  regions  were  to  be 
secured.  It  was  only  a  question  of  time,  for  every  patriot  was 
determined  that  two  such  glorious  Italian  cities  as  Rome  and 
Venice  should  belong  to  the  new  Italy. 

The  story  of  the  consummation  of  ItaKan  aspirations  is 
bound  up  with  another  momentous  movement  of  nationahsm  — 
the  unification  of  Germany,  which,  as  we  shall  pres- 
Venet^^to^  ently  see,  was  achieved  between  1866  and  1871.  It 
the  Italian  was  in  1 866,  in  the  course  of  the  Seven  Weeks'  War 
iQngdom,  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  that  Italy  allied  herself 
with  the  latter  and  endeavored  by  force  of  arms  to 
wrest  Venetia  from  the  former.  Although  the  Italians  suffered 
defeat  on  land  and  water,  Prussia  was  so  successful  that  Austria 
was  obliged  to  cede  Venetia  to  Italy.  At  the  Venetian  plebiscite 
held  in  October,  1866,  there  were  647,246  votes  recorded  in 
favor  of  union  with  Italy,  only  69  against  it. 

Repeated  attempts  of  Garibaldi  and  other  Italian  patriots 
to  capture  Rome  were  frustrated  by  French  and  papal  troops.^ 

^Thus,  Garibaldi's  "Redshirts"  were  defeated  with  heavy  loss  at  Mentana  in 
the  Papal  States  in  November,  1867. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM. 


175 


But  in  1870  the  outbreak  of  war  between  Prussia  and  France 
and  the  defeat  of  Napoleon  III  led  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
French  garrison;  and  on  20  September,  in  face  of 
the  protests  of  Pope  Pius  IX  and  notwithstanding  a  Ro^e  to  the 
show  of  force  on  the  part  of  the  papal  guards,  itaUan 
Italian  regulars  occupied  Rome.     The  city  voted 
overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  annexation  to  the  mon- 
archy and,  in  July,  187 1,  was  proclaimed  the  capital  of  Italy. 
Italy  was  at  last  a  united  and  independent  nation. 


THE  DECLINE  OF  THE  SECOND  FRENCH  EMPIRE, 
1860-1870 

The  unification  of  Italy  had  important  consequences  for  the 
career  of  Napoleon  III.    Until  1859  surprising  success  had 
attended  his  astute  appeals  to  all  Frenchmen  —  rich  j^^^^^^^^ 
and  poor,  liberal  and  conservative,  clerical  and  irreli-  Italian  in- 
gious  —  to  unite  in  "one  great  national  party"  to  tervention 

rii        T«i      1      !•  1        !•  i         r       upon  the 

follow  his  leadership  along  the  glorious  paths  of  a  Empire  of 
"new  nationaHsm."    But  his  intervention  in  Italy  Napoleon 
suddenly   dispelled    the   dream.    French  Clericals 
blamed  him  for  going  too  far ;  French  Liberals  abused  him  for 
not  going  far  enough.    After  1859  the  breach  between  these 
two  influential  factions  ever  widened,  and  the  emperor's  efforts 
to  keep  his  grasp  on  both,  at  first  grotesque,  ended  in  tragedy. 

In  i860,  to  appease  the  Liberals,  Napoleon  made  a  pretense 
of  liberalizing  his  empire :  he  permitted  the  Legislative  Cham- 
ber to  discuss  his  policies  and  to  criticize  his  ministers ;  , 

r     ^  •      •  1        r  1  r  LlbcrallZ- 

he  removed  some  of  the  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  ing  "  the 
speech  both  inside  and  outside  of  the  parhament ;  and 
he  permitted  the  full  publication  of  the  parHamentary 
debates. '  At  the  same  time,  to  appease  the  Clericals,  he  re- 
affirmed his  determination  never  to  allow  the  Italian  govern- 
ment to  deprive  the  pope  of  the  temporal  power.    But  on  both 
sides  these  concessions  were  far  from  satisfactory :  Liberals 
and  Clericals  were  henceforth  united  on  one  ominous  point,  — 
opposition  to  the  emperor. 

For  a  brief  space  in  1863,  an  opportunity  seemed  to  present 
itself  to  Napoleon  of  regaining  the  support  of  both  Clericals  and 


176  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Liberals.  The  period  since  1848,  so  rich  in  national  aspirations 
throughout  Europe,  had  witnessed  a  notable  revival  of  national- 
The  Polish  ^^^^^  among  the  Polish  people,  who,  after  a  secret  agita- 
insurrec-  tion  extending  over  several  years,  at  length  rose 
tion  of  1863  revolt  in  1863  against  their  reactionary  Russian 
masters.  France  was  the  traditional  ally  of  Poland,  and  Poles 
had  fought  desperately  for  the  first  Napoleon ;  why  should  not 
the  third  Napoleon,  the  friend  of  oppressed  nationahties,  assist 
the  Poles?  French  Liberals  urged  him  to  do  so  because  the 
Attitude  of  Polish  rcvolt  was  directed  by  Liberals.  French  Cleri- 
Napoieon  cals  bcsought  him  to  do  so  because  the  Poles,  ever  a 
most  devoted  Catholic  people,  were  struggling  for 
independence  against  schismatics  and  heretics.  The  appeal 
was  urgent,  but  Napoleon  turned  a  deaf  ear.  He  feared  that 
intervention  on  behalf  of  the  insurgents  would  bring  both  Prussia 
and  Austria,  because  of  their  own  Polish  populations,  to  the 
support  of  Russia  and  thereby  precipitate  a  war  which  would 
prove  disastrous  to  France.  He  was  also  maturing  another,  and 
to  him  a  grander,  scheme  to  recover  the  poHtical  favor  of  the 
influential  factions  in  France.  Consequently  the  French  govern- 
ment contented  itself  with  filing  a  feeble  protest  with  the  tsar ; 
Great  Britain  did  likewise;  and  the  Poles,  unfriended  and 
desperate,  were  left  to  carry  on  the  most  hopeless  and  yet 
most  heroic  struggle  of  modern  times.  The  insurrection  really 
never  had  the  remotest  chance  of  success,  and  in  the  end  it  was 
relentlessly  suppressed,  and  every  remnant  of  Polish  autonomy 
which  had  survived  the  revolt  of  1831,  was  obliterated.  And 
as  Napoleon  III  stood  calmly  by,  reproaches  were  heaped  upon 
him  in  France  by  Clericals  and  Liberals  ahke. 

But  the  emperor  of  the  French  was  already  disclosing  his 
grander,  if  somewhat  easier,  plan  to  win  anew  the  affections  of 
Napoleon's  Clericals  and  bourgeois  Liberals.  It  was  a  dream  as 
Interest  in  fantastic  as  any  that  had  obsessed  the  mind  of  Na- 
Mexico  poleon  1.  It  was  none  other  than  to  reestabhsh  a 
French  colonial  empire  in  America.  The  chance  was  afforded 
Ldm  by  troubled  conditions  in  the  republic  of  Mexico  and  by 
the  Civil  War  (1861-1865)  which  distracted  the  attention  of  the 
United  States.  In  the  former  country,  chronic  struggles  between 
the  poor  half-breed  or  Indian  peasantry  on  one  hand  and  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  177 


wealthy  landowning  Spanish-Mexicans  on  the  other  had  become 
identified  with  a  divergence  on  political  and  ecclesiastical  ques- 
tions, the  landlords  inclining  to  monarchical  and  clerical  prin- 
ciples, and  the  peasants  to  a  republican  and  anti-clerical  pro- 
gram. In  1 86 1,  after  a  protracted  conflict,  the  republican 
leader,  Benito  Juarez  (1806-1872),^  overthrew  a  conservative 
government  and  appHed  a  series  of  radical  measures  against  the 
Catholic  Church  in  Mexico :  monastic  orders  were  suppressed, 
all  ecclesiastical  property  ^  was  confiscated,  civil  marriage  was 
estabhshed,  cemeteries  were  transferred  to  secular  control, 
and,  in  short,  the  Church  was  not  only  disestabhshed  but  perse- 
cuted. The  Juarez  government  hkewise  repudiated  the  pubKc 
debts  which  its  predecessor  had  contracted. 

Then  it  was  that  Napoleon  III  turned  towards  Mexico.  At 
first  he  merely  engineered  an  agreement  with  Spain  and  Great 
Britain,  —  countries  affected  by  the  Juarist  repudia-  „ 

,  r      .  •         •  1  .        ri,T  French 

tion  of  debts,  —  for  jomt  seizure  and  retention  of  Mex-  intervention 

ican  customs  houses  until  satisfaction  of  the  debts  in  Mexico, 

1862 

should  have  been  obtained.  Within  four  months 
financial  adjustments  were  made  satisfactory  to  Great  Britain 
and  Spain,  and  the  forces  of  these  Powers  were  withdrawn,  but 
the  French  still  tarried.  In  the  autumn  of  1862  Napoleon 
dispatched  30,000  veteran  troops  to  Mexico,  who,  with  the 
aid  of  constant  reenforcements  from  France,  captured  Mexico 
City  in  June,  1863,  and  drove  Juarez  into  the  mountain  fast- 
nesses of  the  North.  Instead  of  annexing  the  country  outright 
to  France,  Napoleon  preferred  to  control  it  indirectly.  By 
prevailinsr  upon  the  Archduke  Maximilian,  brother  of       ,  .,. 

•     T  c    A         '  Maximilian, 

the  Emperor  r  rancis  Joseph  of  Austria,  to  become  Emperor  of 
emperor  of  Mexico  (1864),  Napoleon  sought  to  mollify 
the  Austrian  Habsburgs  for  their  losses  at  his  hands  in 
Italy;  and  by  supporting  Maximilian  with  French  troops,  he 
was  assured  that  the  Mexican  emperor  would  not  act  contrary 
to  French  interests.    He  counted  on  the  well-known  loyalty  of 
the  Habsburgs  to  the  Catholic  Church  to  undo  the  anti-clerical 
work  of  Juarez  and  to  please  the  French  Clericals ;  and  he  be- 
lieved that  a  sense  of  obligation  would  lead  Maximilian  to  grant 
many  favorable  industrial  and  commercial  concessions  to  French 

'  Juarez  was  of  unmixed  Indian  blood.  2  Valued  at  $45,000,000. 

VOL.  II  —  N 


178 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


business  men,  a  policy  which  could  not  but  please  the  French 
bourgeoisie,  whose  devotion  to  Liberal  poHtics  was  secondary 
only  to  their  anxiety  for  liberal  profits. 

But  ''the  great  idea  of  his  reign,"  as  Napoleon  termed  it, 
proved  singularly  disastrous.  From  the  outset,  Maximilian's 
Failure  of  Position  in  Mexico  was  precarious ;  to  the  formerly 
French  partisan  force  of  Juarez  was  now  added  the  strength 
Intervention  national  patriotism  of  the  great  bulk  of  Mexi- 

in  Mexico  .  r      •        •        <•  i     i       •  • 

cans  agamst  foreign  interference  and  domination. 
The  French  troops  had  a  sorry  task  in  accustoming  themselves 
to  the  necessary  methods  of  guerrilla  warfare.  And  the  close 
of  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States  (1865)  enabled  the  Ameri- 
can government  to  reassert  the  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  no  uncertain  tones.  Against  a  million  veterans  of  a  great 
war  Napoleon  could  not  hope  to  pit  his  slender  expedition  in  the 
New  World.  Accordingly  he  faced  about,  and  in  February, 
1867,  completed  the  French  evacuation  of  Mexico.  Maximilian, 
who  bravely  remained  at  his  post,  was  soon  captured  and 
shot,  and  the  victorious  Juarez  was  universally  recognized  as 
president. 

The  Mexican  enterprise  was  not  only  disastrous  in  itself; 
it  was  a  veritable  boomerang  against  Napoleon.  The  sacrifice 
of  Maximilian  embittered  the  relations  between  Aus- 
Opposkion  ^^^^  France.  The  restoration  of  Juarez  meant 
in  France  at  once  the  enforcement  of  all  the  Mexican  anti-cleri- 
to^  Napoleon  legislation  and  the  annulment  of  numerous  profit- 
able franchises  of  French  financiers.  Thus,  instead 
of  improving  French  foreign  relations,  the  expedition  had  posi- 
tively impaired  them.  Instead  of  conciliating  his  Clerical  and 
Liberal  subjects,  the  emperor  of  the  French  had  significantly 
wounded  them  in  conscience  or  in  purse.  Not  even  ''glory" 
had  been  secured. 

Henceforth  the  opposition  to  the  Second  Empire  was  less 
veiled.  Ardent  French  Catholics  among  the  bishops  and  priests. 
Clerical  in  the  Universities,  among  the  nobility  and  peasantry, 
opposition  spoke  out  against  the  emperor  with  boldness,  and 
many  of  them  quite  openly  urged  another  Bourbon  restoration. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  defection  of  many  business  and  pro- 
fessional men  —  the  middle  class  —  tended  to  give  leaders  and 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  179 


material  strength  to  the  RepubHcan  party  which  had  hitherto 
been  struggling  along  against  Napoleon  III  with  the  aid  only 
of  a  few  doctrinaire  radicals  and  of  groups  of  ill-  Republican 
organized  workingmen.  From  the  disintegration  of  opposition 
the  curious  Bonapartist  combination,  were  now  emerging  once 
more  the  parties  of  Monarchists  and  Republicans,  based,  as 
before  the  adventurer's  appearance,  on  class  distinctions  and 
ecclesiastical  predilections. 

The  insidious  danger  to  the  Empire  was  unmistakably  mani- 
fested to  Napoleon  by  the  parliamentary  elections  of  1869,  which, 
despite  governmental  manipulation,  returned  fifty  j^j^^^^ 
Liberal  Monarchists  and  forty  Republicans.  At  once  Reforms 
the  emperor  sought  to  maintain  his  throne  by  dint  jg^^*°*^®' 
of  Liberal  concessions.  He  submitted  to  ministerial 
responsibility.  He  authorized  the  public  sale  of  newspapers. 
He  promised  to  do  away  with  the  custom  of  arbitrarily  reshaping 
electoral  districts  and  of  supporting  official  candidates.  He 
called  Liberal  Monarchists  to  office.  He  agreed  to  a  revision 
of  the  constitution  whereby  the  Senate  should  become  an  Upper 
House  sharing  legislative  power  with  the  elected  Chamber,  and 
the  constituent  authority  should  henceforth  rest  with  the  na- 
tion. These  reforms  might  partially  conciliate  Orleanists  ^  and 
other  Liberal  Monarchists,  who  admired  the  parliamentary 
system  of  Great  Britain,  but  they  could  not  prevent  the  growth 
of  Republicanism  nor  really  consoHdate  the  Empire.  Against 
the  Republican  and  Socialist  propaganda,  the  audacity  of 
which  increased  day  by  day,  even  Ollivier  and  the  other  new 
Liberal  ministers  of  Napoleon  found  themselves  constrained  to 
apply  the  methods  of  absolutism.  Even  they  suppressed  news- 
papers and  kept  their  opponents  under  police  surveillance. 

Uneasiness  still  prevailed  in  imperial  circles.  The  plebiscite 
of  May,  1870,  on  the  new  constitution,  was  not  thoroughly 
satisfactory.  Although  over  seven  million  votes  were  cast  in 
its  favor,  not  all  of  them  could  be  reckoned  as  indorsements  of 
the  Empire ;  besides,  a  million  and  a  half  votes  were  cast  against 
the  constitution,  and  nearly  two  million  qualified  voters  ab- 
sented themselves  from  the  polls. 

*The  Liberal  Monarchists  who  supported  the  claims  of  the  count  of  Paris, 
grandson  of  that  duke  of  Orleans  who  had  been  King  Louis  Phili[)pe. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


One  means  of  saving  the  Empire  from  destruction  was  still  un- 
tried —  the  familiar  one  of  uniting  domestic  factions  against  a 

foreign  foe,  of  cloaking  interior  troubles  in  the  exterior 
Attempt  to  glamour  of  succcssful  war.  Napoleon  himself  was 
Preserve  already  broken  in  health,  but  he  cherished  the  father's 
Emp^re?"^  pride  in  his  young  son,  the  Prince  Imperial,  and  the 
War  with  Napoleonic  ambition  that  his  family  might  retain  the 
^870°^"^'     throne  of  France.    The  Empress  Eugenie,  moreover, 

strong,  loyal,  ambitious,  turned  even  more  willingly 
to  the  mihtary  expedient.  In  1870  the  imperial  family  of 
France  were  ready  to  gamble  heavily ;  in  offering  armed  opposi- 
tion to  the  political  unification  of  Germany  they  were  playing 
their  last  trump  card,  and  they  were  beaten. 


THE  POLITICAL  UNIFICATION  OF  GERMANY 

The  period  from  1848  to  1871  was  quite  as  significant  in  the 
history  of  the  Germanics  as  in  that  of  Italy  or  France,  for  it 
was  during  these  years  that  the  aspirations  of  the  German  people 
for  poHtical  unification,  long  thwarted,  at  last  reached  fruition. 
It  was  then  that  powerful  Prussia  first  vigorously  essayed  to 
play  the  role  of  leader. 

Several  factors  contributed  to  the  growing  faith  of  patriotic 
Germans,  whether  Conservative  or  Liberal,  in  the  destiny  of 
The  German  .Prussia,  Until  in  time  German  unification  became 
Problem,  synonymous  with  Prussian  success.  It  was  obvious 
1815-1866  ^Yom  history  since  181 5  that  the  Germanic  Confedera- 
tion which  had  been  created  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  and  which 
at  best  was  but  a  feeble  aUiance  of  princes,  could  never  be  trans- 
formed into  a  compact  national  state.  It  was  likewise  obvious 
that  Austria,  with  her  dependent  Hungarians,  Croats,  Czechs, 
Slovaks,  Poles,  Rumans,  and  Italians,  could  never  honestly 
espouse  the  cause  of  any  one  nationahty,  certainly  not  that  of 
German  nationaHty.  It  was  also  obvious  that  the  princes  of 
the  southern  and  central.  German  states  —  the  states  which 
in  the  Confederation  held  a  kind  of  balance  of  power  between 
Austria  and  Prussia  —  could  not  be  expected  to  favor  a  national- 
ism which  endangered  their  own  positions.  And,  finally,  it  was 
obvious  from  the  failure  of  the  revolutionary  Frankfort  Assembly 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


i8i 


of  1848  that  the  new  Germany  was  not  to  be  founded  on  demo- 
crq.tic  principles  or  by  a  popular  movement  undirected  by 
princes.    To  express  these  lessons  of  experience  in  another  way, 
it  may  be  said  that  by  i860  the  conviction  was  growing  p^.^^.^^^ 
among  German  patriots  that  as  prehminary  steps  to  sites  of  Ger- 
the  poHtical  unification  of  their  country,  the  Germanic 
Confederation  would  have  to  be  dissolved ;  a  stop 
would  have  to  be  put  to  the  meddhng  of  Austria  in  German 
affairs ;  and  compromises  would  have  to  be  found,  on  one  hand, 
between  the  princes  and  the  nation,  and,  on  the  other,  between 
reactionary  Conservatism  and  revolutionary  Liberalism. 

For  the  achievement  of  these  arduous  steps  the  kingdom  of 
Prussia  alone  seemed  fitted.  Prussia  was  the  home  of  that 
patriotic  thought  and  emotion,  which,  centered  in  the  prussia  the 
University  of  Berlin  and  expressed  in  the  days  of  the  Natural 
Regeneration,  had  stimulated  the  national  resistance 
to  Napoleon  I  and  had  survived  the  repressive  regime  of  Metter- 
nich.  Prussia,  moreover,  was,  in  contrast  with  Austria,  a  real 
German  state :  with  the  exception  of  an  impotent  minority  of 
Poles,  all  her  subjects  spoke  the  German  language  and  shared 
German  culture.  Prussia,  likewise,  had  already  succeeded, 
where  Austria  had  failed,  in  effecting  an  important  measure  of 
economic  unification  by  means  of  the  Zollverein.  Prussia,  too, 
was  the  only  German  state  which,  by  reason  of  its  size  and  re- 
sources, could  hope  to  meet  Austria  on  the  battlefield  on  any- 
thing Hke  equal  terms.  Besides,  the  distrust  that  German 
Liberals  entertained  of  Prussia,  whose  earlier  traditions  had 
been  peculiarly  miHtaristic  and  reactionary,  was  partially  allayed 
by  the  promulgation  in  1850  of  a  constitution,  which,  if  not 
radical,  was  at  least  indicative  of  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  king 
to  effect  a  compromise  with  Liberal  principles. 

For  seventy  years  since  the  death  of  Frederick  the  Great 
(1786)  the  Hohenzollern  kings  of  Prussia  had  been  poor  cringing 
creatures,  utterly  unfit  to  lead  any  movement,  except  ^yy^^j^  j 
possibly  one  of  pietistic  religion.    But  the  insanity  King  of 
and  death  of  Frederick  William  IV  called  to  the  Prussia, 
helm  a  different  kind  of  person  in  his  brother  William, 
who  became  regent  in  1858  and  king  in  1861.    William  I,  like 
his  immediate  predecessors,  was  rigidly  conservative,  deeply 


l82 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


religious,  and  fully  convinced  of  the  divine  right  of  kingship, 
but,  unlike  them,  he  had  a  mind  of  his  own  and  an  almost 
inordinate  pride  in  military  affairs  that  recalls  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  of  the  eighteenth  century.  In  intellectual  matters  he 
was  not  briUiant,  but  he  was  remarkable  enough  to  know  his 
limitations.  Besides,  he  was  conscientious,  industrious,  benev- 
olent, and  absolutely  trustworthy  in  his  dealings.  And,  as  he  had 
the  faculty  of  appointing  capable  men  to  governmental  posts  and 
of  reposing  the  fullest  confidence  in  them,  he  was  enabled  by  their 
help  to  do  a  greater  work  than  had  even  Frederick  the  Great. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  his  regency,  WilHam  appointed  as 
chief  of  the  general  staff  of  the  army  Hellmuth  von  Moltke 
Moitkeand  (1800-1891)  who  was  later  to  achieve  fame  as  the 
Roon  greatest  strategist  of  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  next  year  WilHam  named  as  war  minister  Al- 
brecht  von  Roon  (1803-1879),  a  remarkable  organizer,  without 
whose  help  it  is  probable  that  the  struggle  to  subdue  and  unite 
Germany  would  have  been  vain.  Both  appointees,  especially 
the  latter,  were  extremely  conservative  in  politics,  despising 
popular  government,  and  both  gave  zealous  encouragement  to 
WilHam's  natural  proclivities  in  the  direction  of  paternalism 
and  militarism.  The  new  Germany,  according  to  king  and 
ministers  alike,  was  to  be  builded  by  a  divinely  authorized 
fatherly  monarch  with  the  aid  of  a  loyal,  disciplined  soldiery. 

In  one  domain  —  that  of  the  military  —  William  was  himself 
an  expert.  He  was  a  soldier  to  the  core.  He  knew  the  faults 
Prussian  Prussian  mihtary  system,  which  had  not  been 

Militarism  corrected  since  18 14,  and  he  was  resolved  on  its  radical 
sfan^p^uT-"  reorganization  so  that  the  Prussian  army  should 
ment,  i86i-  become  the  strongest  force  in  Europe.  In  improving 
^^^^  the  equipment  and  discipline  of  the  army  already 

existing,  he  relied  largely  upon  the  ability  of  Moltke  and  Roon, 
but  the  king  took  the  initiative  himself  in  urging  upon  the 
Prussian  parliament  the  authorization  of  military  increases. 
He  desired  compulsory  service  for  all  able-bodied  males  in  fact 
as  well  as  in  theory  —  the  enrollment  every  year  of  63,000  instead 
of  40,000  new  recruits ;  he  desired  the  extension  of  the  term  of 
reservists  from  two  to  four  years  ;  and  he  demanded  such  increased 
appropriations  as  would  render  these  military  reforms  immediate. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


183 


On  the  whole,  the  parhament  was  hostile  to  the  new  mih- 
tary  policy.  Many  extreme  Conservatives,  who  did  not  relish 
additional  taxation  for  the  sake  of  a  fight  with  reactionary 
Austria,  made  common  cause  with  the  Liberals,  who  feared  lest 
miUtary  exaltation  would  be  detrimental  to  Liberalism.  At 
first,  the  parhament  consented  to  lengthen  the  term  of  serv- 
ice in  the  regular  army  to  three  years,  but  in  1861  positively 
refused  to  authorize  increased  financial  expenditures  or  the 
enrollment  of  additional  regiments  without  a  compensatory 
diminution  of  the  term  of  service.  New  elections  in  1862 
tightened  the  deadlock  between  king  and  parliament :  in  the 
new  Lower  Chamber  there  were  now  100  Conservatives,  23 
Moderate  Liberals,  and  235  Progressives,  —  the  last  a  new  party 
which  was  resolved  to  compel  the  king  to  abandon  his  military 
projects  and  to  submit  to  real  parhamentary  government. 

In  this  struggle  the  very  character  of  the  future  institutions 
of  Germany  was  at  stake.  King  William  knew  that  his  pet 
scheme  for  the  unification  of  the  country  could  not  be  realized 
without  a  large  and  efficient  army.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Progressive  Opposition  perceived  that  the  realization  of  the 
king's  scheme  would  fix  militarism  as  a  mighty  prop  of  divine- 
right  monarchy  and  would  accordingly  imperil  individual  lib- 
erties and  the  triumph  of  constitutional  government.  Should 
the  future  united  Germany  be  militaristic?  Should  it  be 
Liberal ? 

It  was  neither  the  king  nor  the  parliament  that  gave  the 
decisive  answer.  It  was  Bismarck,  with  the  momentous  words : 
''Not  by  speeches  and  resolutions  of  majorities  are  the  great 
questions  of  the  time  decided  —  that  was  the  mistake  of  1848 
and  1849  —  but  by  iron  and  blood."  And  Bismarck  was  a 
Conservative  of  the  Conservatives. 

Otto  von  Bismarck  (181 5-1898)  ^  belonged  to  the  most  influ- 
ential social  class  in  Prussia  —  the  Junkerthum  or  country  gentry, 
who  for  centuries  had  divided  their  attention  between 

.  .  Bismarck 

the  supervision  of  numerous  peasant  tenants  upon 

their  large  agricultural  estates  and  the  public  service,  military- 

or  bureaucratic,  of  their  HohenzoUern  sovereigns.    Born  in 

^  Otto  Eduarrl  Leopold  von  Bismarck  was  created  count  in  1865,  prince  in 
1870,  and  duke  of  Lauenburg  in  1890. 


i84 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  comfortable  ancestral  manor-house  at  Schonhausen,  some 
forty  miles  west  of  Berlin,  in  1815,  the  year  of  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  he  was  brought  up  to  combine  the  traditions  of  the 
Prussian  squirearchy  with  the  patriotic  enthusiasm  of  the  Ger- 
man Regeneration.''  As  a  student  at  the  universities  of 
Gottingen  and  Berlin  he  acquired  a  reputation  not  as  a  scholar 
but  as  a  dashing  fraternity-member  and  a  leader  in  beer-drink- 
ing bouts,  a  reputation  which  was  subsequently  enhanced  by  his 
dismissal  from  the  public  service  because  of  ''deficiency  in 
regularity  and  discipHne"  and  by  the  stories  which  came  up  to 
Berlin  of  the  furious  hunts  and  nocturnal  carousals  of  the  young 
squire  of  Schonhausen.  His  happy  marriage  in  1847  with  the 
pious  daughter  of  a  neighboring  landowner  worked  a  great 
change  in  Bismarck.  He  became  deeply  religious  and  attached 
to  the  Evangelical  State  Church,  and  very  serious  in  the  expres- 
sion of  poUtical  ideas  which  harmonized  nicely  with  those  of  his 
social  class.  He  began  to  insist  that  the  Christian  state  is  the 
ideal  political  organization  and  that  a  true  Christian  state  is 
impossible  without  monarchical  absolutism. 

Throughout  the  revolutionary  movements  of  1848- 1849 
Bismarck  consistently  defended  divine-right  monarchy  against 
Conserva-  Liberals.    He  offered  to  bring  his  peasants  to 

tism  of  Bis-  Berlin  to  protect  Frederick  William,  and,  when  the 
marck  Prussian  Idng  promised  to  grant  a  constitution,  Bis- 
marck voted  in  a  minority  of  two  against  returning  thanks. 
He  scoffed  at  the  efforts  of  the  Frankfort  Assembly  to  unify 
Germany  on  a  platform  of  constitutional  liberties  and  backed 
Frederick  WilKam  in  declining  to  take  a  crown  "  from  the  gutter." 

Obliged  to  accept  the  constitution  of  1850,  Bismarck  at  once 
sought  practical  means  of  preventing  its  further  Hberalization. 
He  was  one  of  the  founders  of  the  famous  newspaper,  the  Kreiiz- 
zeitung,  which  speedily  crystallized  a  definite  Conservative  party. 
This  Conservative  party  was  recruited  almost  exclusively  from 
the  agricultural  classes;  it  was  distinctively  Prussian  and  be- 
lieved that  the  unification  of  Germany,  if  effected  at  all,  should 
'signify  the  Prussianization  of  Germany ;  it  strenuously  opposed 
any  extension  of  the  suffrage  or  legislation  inimical  to  landed 
interests ;  it  championed  the  royal  prerogative,  the  army,  and 
the  Lutheran  ^Church.  


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  185 

It  was  in  the  realm  of  diplomacy,  however,  that  Bismarck 
was  to  win  his  first  great  title  to  fame,  and  the  years  from  185 1 
to  1862  were  important  in  affording  him  valuable 
diplomatic  experience.    As  Prussian  representative  E^^erience 
in  the  revived  Diet  of  the  Germanic  Confederation  of  Bismarck, 
from  185 1  to  1859,  he  not  only  acquired  an  unrivaled  '^^'"'^^^ 
knowledge  of  German  politics  but  a  deep-seated  distrust  and 
dislike  of  Austria.     As  ambassador  at  Petrograd  for  three 
years,  he  learned  Russian  and  gained  the  warm  regard  of  the 
tsar.    A  few  months'  residence  as  Prussian  ambassador  at  Paris 
in  1862  gave  him  a  pretty  accurate  insight  into  the  curious  com- 
plexities of  Napoleon's  character. 

"ow,  in  the  autumn  of  1862,  Bismarck  was  summoned  to 
in  by  King  WilKam,  chiefly  on  the  advice  of  Roon,  in  order 
'o  'Hame"  the  self-willed  parHament.    It  was  a  task 
after  Bisnmrck's  own  heart.    With  the  king's  mih-  ^xTme?'*^ 
tary  poHcy,  he  was  in  hearty  sympathy  :  he  felt  it  was  of  th^^"^ 
essential  to  the  role  which  he  hoped  Prussia  would  p^ya^" 
play  in  the  unification  of  Germany.    And  both  his 
political  principles  and  his  class  consciousness  gave  added  zest 
to  the  prospect  of  an  encounter  with  the  obstructionist  Progres- 
sives, for  the  Progressive  party  {Fortschrittspartei)  represented 
many  university  professors  ^  and  other  members  of  the  middle 
class  who  defended  individual  rights,  idealized  the  limited  mon- 
archy of  Great  Britain,  and,  in  general,  stood  for  all  those  prin- 
ciples which  everywhere  throughout  western  Europe  the  bulk 
of  the  bourgeoisie  championed. 

From  the  Progressive  majority  in  the  Lower  Chamber,  Bis- 
marck, as  president  of  the  ministry,  tried  to  win  the  desired 
military  increases  successively  by  compromise,  by  cajolery,  by 
entreaty,  and  by  threats,  but  always  in  vain.  The  Progressives 
stubbornly  insisted  that  militia  was  preferable  to  a  professional 
army,  and  in  1863  they  refused  to  vote  the  appropriations 
necessary  for  the  conduct  of  government. 

Thereupon  Bismarck,  with  the  king's  consent,  proceeded  to 
govern  the  country  without  a  budget  and  without  a  parliament. 
In  flat  violation  of  the  constitution  of  1850,  taxes  were  arbi- 
trarily levied  and  collected,  the  military  reforms  were  fully 
*  Their  leader  was  the  distinguished  scientist  Rudolf  Virchow  (1821-1902). 


i86 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


carried  out,  and  Prussia  was  duly  prepared  to  wage  a  decisive 
war  with  Austria  for  the  hegemony  of  the  Germanies.  For  this 
unprincipled  and  high-handed  procedure,  Bismarck  was  cordially 
hated  by  sincere  Liberals,  but  unpopularity  and  insults  did  not 
change  his  course.  For  nearly  four  years  he  maintained  the 
unconstitutional  regime  under  the  questionable  maxim  that 
the  end  justifies  the  means.  He  went  ahead  on  the  assump- 
tion that  in  the  long  run  the  generality  of  Prussians  would 
not  care  how  German  unity  was  achieved  so  long  as  it  was 
achieved.  The  assumption  was  correct.  To  the  undoing  of 
his  Progressive  opponents,  patriotism  was  a  more  basic  attribute 
of  most  Germans  than  Liberalism,  and  the  reformed  army  — 
splendid  machine  as  it  was  —  proved  a  powerful  stimulus 
to  Prussian  patriotism  and  a  potent  preventive  of  radical  or 
revolutionary  novelties.  Militarism  had  already  begun  in 
Germany  its  twofold  mission  of  exalting  nationalism  and  curb- 
ing Liberalism. 

Bismarck's  immediate  purpose  in  perfecting  the  army  was, 
of  course,  in  order  to  use  it  with  such  deadly  effect  against 
Austria  that  that  Power  would  cease  to  be  a  factor  in 

Bismarck  as  . 

Promoter  of  German  pontics  and  that  a  new  Germany  would  be 
German       buildcd  about  Prussia.    To  wage  war  against  Austria, 

Nationalism  ir        ii  iii  ii 

an  excuse  had  to  be  found  that  would  be  popularly 
justifiable.  And  the  possibility  of  such  an  excuse  Bismarck 
cleverly  detected  in  the  so-called  Schleswig-Holstein  question. 

In  the  peninsula  between  Denmark  and  the  Elbe  River  were 
three  duchies,  —  Holstein^Schieswig,  and  Lauenburg,  —  which. 
The  Ques  t^c>ugh  peopled  largely  by  Germans,  were  joined  in 
tionof  a  personal  union  under  the  king  of  Denmark.  Since 
Hoistein^'    "'•^^5'  nfiC)i"^over,  Holstciu  had  been  a  state  of  the 

Germanic  Confederation,  and  Schleswig  was  indis- 
solubly  linked  to  Holstein.  Danish  sovereigns  had  long  been 
anxious  for  the  complete  incorporation  of  the  duchies  into 
their  monarchy,  but  this  was  opposed  both  by  the  national 
feeling  throughout  the  Germanies  and  by  the  Duke  Frederick 
of  Augustenburg  who  had  strong  claims  upon  the  duchies  though 
none  upon  Denmark.  A  conference  of  the  Great  Powers  at 
London  in  1852  had  attempted  to  compromise  the  issues  at 
stake  by  buying  off  the  claims  of  the  duke  of  Augustenburg 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  187 


and  by  confirming  the  succession  in  the  duchies  to  the  Danish 
kings,  while  providing  that  the  union  between  Denmark  and  the 
duchies  should  be  purely  personal. 

Now  in  1863,  upon  the  death  of  Frederick  VII  of  Denmark, 
his  successor.  Christian  IX,  stirred  by  an  overwhelming  enthu- 
siasm on  the  part  of  his  Danish  suciects,  signed  a  con-  ^  .  , 

1  .  ,  -       '      .  '     °  Damsh 

stitution  which,  contrary  to  the  London  agreement,  Nationalism 
unified  the  poHtical  institutions  of  Denmark  and  the  Yf-  German 

^  .  Nationalism 

duchies.    The  German  response  was  an  opposing  wave 
of  national  patriotism  and  combined  threats  from  Austria  and 
Prussia,  neither  of  which  would  be  outdone  by  the  other  in  this 
bid  for  the  leadership  of  a  national  cause.  Christian 
IX  refused  to  budge.    And  in  1864  followed  a  brief  TJie  War  of,, 
war  between  Denmark  on  one  side  and  Austria  and  mark  De- 
Prussia  on  the  other.    The  Danes  fought  furiously,  {f^ted  by 

1T1         Prussia  and 

but,  overcome  by  force  of  numbers,  were  obliged  to  Austria 
submit  in  October,  1864,  to  the  treaty  of  Vienna, 
whereby  their  king  renounced  all  his  rights  in  the  duchies  in 
favor  of  the  emperor  of  Austria  and  the  king  of  Prussia. 

The  sequel  to  the  Danish  War  of  1864  was,  as  Bismarck  antic- 
ipated, a  bitter  quarrel  between  Austria  and  Prussia  over  the 
disposition  of  the  spoils.    Austria  at  once  proposed  ^.    ^  ^ 

11      IT-       Till!  Ill       <•  Dispute  be- 

that  the  duchies  should  be  handed  over  to  the  duke  of  tween 

Augustenburg,  and,  under  her  influence,  the  Diet  of  Prussia 

,   °  .  '  .    ,        .        ,  „         .     .       and  Austria 

the  Germanic  Confederation  by  a  small  majority  over 
indorsed  the  proposal.    Bismarck's  reply  was  to  deny  ^^Jjg^g^^" 
the  right  of  the  Diet  to  interfere  and  to  press  forward 
ostentatious  preparations  for  the  transformation  of  the  port  of 
Kiel  into  a  great  Prussian  war-harbor.    An  angry  correspondence 
ensued ;  but  as  neither  Power  was  quite  ready  for  war  a  tem- 
porary adjustment  was  made  by  the  convention  of  Gastein 

(August,  1865),  whereby,  pending  a  final  settlement,  Schleswig  

was  to  be  occupied  and  administered  by  Prussia,  JIol-  convention 
stein  Jby._Austria,  while  Laucnburg  was  made  over  of  Gastein, 
absolutely  to  Prussia  in  return  for  a  money  payment.  ^^^^ 
The  convention  of  Gastein  was  a  diplomatic  triumph  for  Bis- 
marck :  it  temporarily  put  the  duke  of  Augustenburg  out  of  the 
way,  and  by  surrendering  to  Austria  the  duchy  of  Holstein, 
encircled  by  Prussian  territories,  it  provided  a  splendid  field 


i88 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


in  which  Bismarck  could  engineer  exasperating  plots  against 
Austrian  rule. 

Before  precipitating  the  inevitable  struggle,  Bismarck  was 
anxious  to  insure  Prussia  against  the  danger  of  foreign  inter- 
inter  vention  in  behalf  of  Austria.    He  knew  that  defeat 

national  of  Austria  would  involve  the  dissolution  of  the  Ger- 
Situation      manic  Confederation;  yet  the  Germanic  Confedera- 

Favorable  . 

to  Prussia  tion  had  been  created  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  and 
to  Austria^   existed  under  guarantee  of  the  Great  Powers.  Would 

the  Great  Powers  sit  tamely  by  and  allow  Prussia  to 
tear  up  the  treaties  of  Vienna  and  to  revolutionize  the  political 
Diplomacy  organization  of  the  Germanics?  The  diplomatic 
of  Bismarck  craft  of  Bismarck  was  equal  to  the  danger.  From 
Great  Britain  he  rightly  expected  no  opposition,  for  British 
Great  Sympathy  unmistakably  was  veering  toward  Prussia, 
Britain  partly  by  reason  of  the  favorable  low-tariff  relations 
between  England  and  the  Prussian  Zolherein,  and  partly  because 
of  the  contemporary  development  of  a  theory  among  certain  fa- 
mous Enghsh  historians  and  pubHcists  and  its  diffusion  among 
the  English  masses  to  the  effect  that  Englishmen  and  Germans 
belonged  to  a  single  and  noble  Teutonic  race,  whose  superiority 
over  all  other  races  would  be  further  attested  by  the  political 
unification  of  Germany. 

But  neither  France  nor  Russia  could  be  expected  to  view 
German  unification  with  perfect  equanimity.  It  had  been  the 
Russia        weakness  and  disunion  of  the  Germanics  that  had 

enabled  Russia  to  expand  westward  and  France  to 
seize  cities  along  the  Rhine.  Yet  in  disarming  the  traditional 
fears  of  his  French  and  Russian  neighbors,  Bismarck  was  aided 
by  curious  domestic  situations  that  then  perplexed  both  states. 
In  the  case  of  Russia,  it  was  the  PoHsh  insurrection  of  1863  : 
Bismarck  had  promptly  offered  Prussian  armed  assistance  to 
his  personal  friend,  the  tsar,  and  now,  without  base  ingratitude, 
France  ^^^^  could  not  turn  against  Prussia.    In  the  case 

of  France,  it  was  the  personal  character  and  political 
exigencies  of  Napoleon  III :  Bismarck  knew  how  to  work  upon 
Napoleon's  vague  sentimental  attachment  to  the  principle  of 
nationalism,  upon  his  vanity,  and  upon  his  desperate  readiness 
to  clutch  at  any  chance  to  secure  a  httle  additional  territory  for 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


189 


France  in  order  to  win  national  glory  among  the  French  for  him- 
self and  for  his  dynasty.  In  October,  1865,  Bismarck  paid  a 
visit  to  the  French  emperor  at  Biarritz :  exactly  what  occurred 
there  has  been  a  subject  of  fruitless  speculation  ever  since,  but 
it  appears  certain  that  at  least  Napoleon  was  induced  to  give  his 
assent  to  a  joint  attack  of  Prussia  and  Italy  upon  Austria  on 
an  oral  understanding  that  no  objection  would  be  raised  to  the 
acquisition  of  territorial  "compensations"  by  France.  Refer- 
ence may  have  been  made  to  a  possible  French  annexation  of 
Belgium  or  of  part  of  the  Rhine  province  of  Prussia.  Probably 
Napoleon  thought  that  the  parties  to  the  impending  struggle 
would  be  so  evenly  balanced  as  to  render  subsequent  French 
intervention  easy,  decisive,  and  highly  gainful. 

Bismarck  was  certain  that  the  smaller  German  states  would 
side  with  Austria :  the  pride  of  their  princes,  the  fear  of  mili- 
tarism on  the  part  of  their  Liberal  citizens,  the  sym- 
pathy of  Catholics  in  Bavaria  and  Wiirttemberg  with  German 
Cathohc  Austria,  —  all  these  facts  gave  strength  to  states 
the  opposition  of  the  governing  classes  in  those  states  Austria^^*^ 
to  any  close  union  of  Germany  under  Prussian  aus- 
pices.   To  offset  this  opposition,  Bismarck  negotiated  in  April, 
1866,  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Italy,  providing  that,  itaiyAUied 
if  war  broke  out  within  three  months,  Prussia  and  with 
Italy  should  cooperate  against  Austria,  and  the  latter  ^^^^^^^ 
should  be  indemnified  by  the  cession  of  Venetia. 

By  means  of  diplomacy  as  astute  and  unscrupulous  as  that 
with  which  he  had  isolated  Austria  from  foreign  support,  he  next 
proceeded  to  provoke  a  war  with  her.    He  complained 
that  the  Austrian  government  was  violating  the  con-  oL^ute^ 
vention  of  Gastein  by  continuing  to  encourage  the  between 
claims  of  Frederick  of  Angus tenburg  to  the  duchies.  Austria 
Both  powers  mobiHzed  their  armies.    The  crisis  was 
reached  in  June,  1866,  when  Austria  brought  the  quarrel  into 
the.  Diet  of iiln^'^eTmanic  Confederation,  and  Prussia,  declaring 
that  as  a  result  of  Austria's  action  the  Convention  of  Gastein 
had  ceased  to  exist,  sent  troops  intq^JIolstein,  and  dispossessed 
the  Austrians.    Almost  simultaneously,  Prussia  submitted  to 
the  Diet  a  scheme  for  the  complete  reformation  of  the  Con- 
federation, involving  the  exclusion  of  Austria.    Thus  Bismarck 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


made  Prussia  appear  not  simply  as  the  aggrieved  party  in  a 
petty  territorial  dispute  but  also  as  the  undaunted  champion  of 
national  unification.  Austria,  however,  prevailed  upon  a  ma- 
jority of  the  Diet  to  reject  Prussia's  reform  proposal,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  order  a  mobilization  of  the  federal  forces  to 
punish  Prussia  for  the  infraction  of  Austrian  rights  in  Holstein. 
This  action  of  the  Diet  was  interpreted  by  Bismarck  as  tanta- 
mount to  an  attack  upon  Prussia,  amply  justifying  that  state's 
indignant  secession  from  the  Germanic  Confederation.  Prussia 
appeared  to  be  fighting  a  defensive  war. 

This  war  between  Prussia  and  Italy,  on  one  side,  and  Austria 
and  the  lesser  German  states,  on  the  other,  was  of  such  surpris- 
The  Seven  i^gty  brief  duration  as  to  earn  it  the  popular  designa- 
Weeks'  tion  of  the  Seven  Weeks'  War.  Within  two  weeks 
War,  1866  Prussian  expeditions  had  overcome  all  resistance  in 
the  smaller  states,  and  the  detachment  of  a  large  Austrian  army 
for  the  defense  of  Venetia  against  the  Italians  afforded  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  main  Prussian  army  to  fall  with  superior  numbers 
as  well  as  with  superior  discipline  and  equipment  upon  the 
remaining  Austrian  forces  in  Bohemia.  The  battle  of  Sadowa 
(Koniggratz),  on  3  ]u\y,  1866,  was  the  decisive  engagement  of 
the  war  :  the  victory  of  the  Prussians  not  only  fixed  their  reputa- 
tion for  military  preeminence  in  Europe  but  it  had  important 
effects  on  the  national  movements  both  in  Germany  and  in 
Italy  ^  and  on  the  internal  politics  of  Prussia,  of  the  South  Ger- 
man states,  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  and  of  France. 

By  the  treaty  of  Prague  (23  August,  1866),  which  concluded 
the  Seven  Weeks'  War,  Austria  lost  no  territory,  except  Venetia 
to  Italy  and  her  claims  upon  Holstein  to  Prussia,  and 
o/the?Ger^  was  obHged  to  pay  only  a  light  war  indemnity,  but 
manic  Con-  she  was  forced  to  consent  to  the  dissolution  of  the 
186?^^^°^'  Germanic  Confederation  after  its  inglorious  existence 
of  half  a  century,  and  to  acknowledge  the  right  of 
Prussia  to  assume  the  leadership  of  the  Germanics.  Thus 
the  first  actual  steps  toward  real  German  unity  were  achieved : 
the  heterogeneous  Habsburg  dominions  were  excluded  and  the 
absurd  Confederation  was  dissolved. 

The  next  steps  toward  national  union  Hkewise  came  imme- 

^  For  its  effect  on  the  national  movement  in  Italy,  see  above,  p.  174. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  191 


diately  out  of  the  Seven  Weeks'  War.  They  were,  first,  the 
Prussian  annexations,  and  secondly,  the  formation  of  the  North 
German  Confederation. 

For  diplomatic  reasons  Bismarck  had  deprived  Austria  of 
very  Httle  territory;  he  correctly  perceived  that  leniency  of 
treatment  would  be  most  Hable  to  secure  needed  Aus-  pnissian 
trian  friendship  in  the  future.  At  the  same  time,  the  Annexations, 
Prussian  premier  was  anxious  to  round  out  his  state's  ^^^^ 
somewhat  misshapen  territories,  to  increase  its  population  and 
economic  resources,  and  to  obtain  for  it  a  number  of  strategic 
points.  Accordingly  Prussia  formally  annexed  the  duchies 
of  Schleswig  and  Holstein,  affording  her  the  site  of  her  subse- 
quent important  naval  base  of  Kiel  and  of  her  invaluable  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  ship  canal  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Baltic.  She 
also  took  advantage  of  her  military  triumph  over  the  lesser 
German  states  to  annex  the  kingdom  of  Hanover,  the  electorate 
of  Hesse-Cassel,  the  duchy  of  Nassau,  and  the  free  city  of 
Frankfort-on-Main.  These  annexations  were  of  immense  sig- 
nificance. For  the  first  time  the  Hohenzollerns  were  lords  of 
continuous  lands  stretching  from  Poland  and  the  Baltic  to  the 
River  Main  and  the  French  frontier ;  they  gained  more  than 
27,000  square  miles  of  territory  and  almost  five  million  subjects. 
Henceforth,  excluding  Austria,  two-thirds  of  the  area  and  two- 
thirds  of  the  population  of  all  the  Germanics  were  comprised 
within  the  kingdom  of  Prussia. 

All  the  lesser  German  states  north  of  the  River  Main  that 
were  not  annexed  by  Prussia  —  twenty-one  in  number  —  were 
constrained  to  join  her  in  the  North  German  Confed-       X  ^ 

T  .      .  ,  1.0^  The  North 

eration,  whose  constitution,  adopted  in  1867,  was  German 
another  sample  of  Bismarck's  handiwork.    The  execu-  Confedera- 

,      .  1  •       1      1  •         r  •  under 

tive  authority  was  vested  in  the  king  of  Prussia  as  Prussia's 
hereditary  president,  assisted  by  a  federal  chancellor ;  ^^if^^g^^' 
the  legislature  was  to  consist  of  (i)  a  federal  council 
(Bundesrat)  of  representatives  of  the  princes  of  the  several 
states,  and  (2)  a  diet  {Reichsiag)  elected  by  universal  manhood 
suffrage.  The  local  princes  retained  certain  sovereign  rights : 
they  still  might  summon  local  parliaments  and  levy  taxes,  but 
the  whole  conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  the  control  of  the  army,  and 
the  declaration  of  defensive  war  were  intrusted  to  the  president. 


192 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


The  North  German  Confederation  differed  from  the  older  Ger- 
manic Confederation  in  that  it  was  dominated  by  Prussia  rather 
than  by  Austria  and  the  lesser  princes,  that  it  was  more  compact 
in  extent  and  infinitely  more  unified  and  influential,  and  that  it 
recognized  the  principle  of  popular  participation  in  government. 
Likewise,  Prussian  militarism  was  extended  throughout  the 
Confederation,  for  it  was  provided  that  every  constituent  state 
should  maintain  compulsory  military  service  on  the  Prussian 
model. 

The  only  strictly  German  states  that  remained  outside  the 
North  German  Confederation  were  the  four  states  south  of  the 
Independent  River  Main  ^  —  the  kingdoms  of  Bavaria  and  Wiirt- 
Position  of  tcmbcrg  and  the  grand-duchies  of  Baden  and  Hesse- 
South^Ger-  Darmstadt.  In  these  states,  with  the  exception  of 
man  States,  Baden,  where  the  French  were  particularly  distrusted, 
1866-1871  -[^QiY^  princes  and  people  at  first  opposed  a  close  polit- 
ical union  with  Prussia,  the  princes  fearing  a  diminution  of 
their  own  powers  and  prestige,  and  the  people  dreading  the  cer- 
tain imposition  of  compulsory  military  ser\dce  and  the  prob- 
able enactment  of  anti-Catholic  and  anti-Liberal  legislation. 
Toward  these  south  German  states  Bismarck  adopted  a  most 
concihatory  attitude.  He  did  not  penalize  them  for  assisting 
Austria  in  the  Seven  Weeks'  War.  He  did  not  force  them  into 
his  new  North  German  Confederation.  He  scrupulously  re- 
spected their  independent  position.  Meanwhile,  he  missed  no 
chance  to  fill  them  with  alarm  at  the  possibility  of  French 
aggression ;  he  drew  closer  with  them  the  economic  bonds  of 
the  Zolherein;  and  he  cunningly  concluded  secret  treaties  of 
defensive  alliance  with  them,  whereby  if  Prussia  or  one  of  them 
should  be  attacked  by  a  foreign  Power  the  others  should  come  to 
the  assistance  of  the  party  attacked.  Bismarck  trusted  to  the 
growth  of  the  sentiment  of  nationalism  in  south  Germany  in 
order  to  bring  the  four  states  naturally  into  political  union  with 
Prussia  ;  and  in  order  to  stimulate  that  sentiment,  he  relied  chiefly 
upon  provoking  an  armed  conflict  wdth  France. 

One  thing  that  aided  Bismarck  in  gaining  a  considerable 

^  Hesse-Darmstadt,  one  of  the  four,  was  a  member  of  the  North  German  Con- 
federation for  its  territories  north  of  the  Main,  while  its  lands  south  of  that  river 
were  accounted  outside  the  Confederation. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


amount  of  popular  support  in  south  Germany  as  well  as  in  the 
North  was  the  change  in  his  pohtical  views  which  the  Seven 
Weeks'  War  seemingly  produced.    The  brilHant  sue-  gigj^^^ji^.g 
cess  of  his  diplomatic  and  military  policies  put  him  on  Conces- 
better  terms  mth  the  Prussian  Liberals  :  the  Liberals  f.?^^^  *° 

1  1.  1  T-k-  -r^^-  ^   .  1  Liberalism 

no  longer  distrusted  Bismarck  s  patriotism,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  Bismarck  no  longer  feared  Liberal  obstruction 
to  his  plans ;    the  former  arch-Conservative,  still  retaining 
ultra-Conservatism  as  the  ideal  of  his  innermost  strivings,  per- 
ceived a  practical  need  of  effecting  a  compromise  with  the 
Liberals  preliminary  to  utilizing  them  in  his  ov/n  future  causes. 
Bismarck  was  nothing  if  not  practical.    Accordingly,  he  promptly 
restored  the  full  operation  of  the  Prussian  constitution  and 
asked  a  bill  of  indemnity  from  the  Diet  for  the  illegahties  of 
which  he  had  been  wantonly  guilty  during  the  preceding  four 
years,  and  the  bill  was  passed  with  unanimity  and  enthusiasm. 
Likewise,  in  the  constitution  of  the  new  North  German  Con- 
federation he  secured  the  incorporation  of  a  provision  for  the 
election  of  the  Reichstag  by  direct  and  universal  manhood 
suffrage,  assuring,  as  he  did  so,  certain  Conservative  critics 
that  the  German  masses  bade  fair  to  be  more  conservative  than 
the  middle  class,  and  to  prove  more  patriotic  supporters  of  a 
militaristic  state.    As  a  result  of  these  Liberal  concessions, 
soon  after  the  Seven  Weeks'  War  a  new  political  party 
took  shape  known  as  the  National  Liberal  party,  re-  Nationa/^^ 
cruited  largely  from  the  industrial  classes  and  in  many  Liberal 
instances  from  former  Progressives.    The  main  ob-  oemany 
ject  of  the  new  party  was  to  uphold  Bismarck  in  his 
national  endeavors  and  for  this  purpose  to  subordinate,  though 
not  to  surrender,  the  struggle  after  constitutional  development. 
Incidentally,  it  favored  a  strongly  centralized  government,  mili- 
tarism, and  free  trade,  and  was  inclined  to  be  anti-Cleri- 
cal as  regarded  both  the  Lutheran  and  the  Roman  Catholic 
churches.    The  National  Liberals,  essentially  a  German,  not 
a  Prussian  party,  became  valuable  missionaries  in  south  Ger- 
many in  the  cause  of  German  nationalism,  alike  for  its  own  sake 
and  as  a  bulwark  against  France. 

Before  tracing  the  stormy  course  of  Franco-German  rela- 
tions from  i866  to  187 1,  which  were  to  culminate  in  the  complc- 

VOL.  u  —  o 


194 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


tion  of  German  unification  under  Prussian  hegemony,  it  will  be 
Effects  of  convenient  to  point  out  certain  momentous  conse- 
the  Seven  qucnccs  of  the  period  to  the  chief  combatant  defeated 
weeks| War      the  Seven  Weeks'  War  —  Austria. 

For  Austria  the  war  of  1866  was  a  final  blow  at  all 
those  fine  policies  which  Metternich  had  ably  maintained  through- 
out the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  —  absolute 
Destruction  authority  vested  in  the  Habsburg  monarch,  centralized 
of  the  administration  of  all  the  varied  territories  of  the 
Metteniich  empire,  chronic  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
all  the  Germanics  and  of  all  the  Italian  states,  com- 
plete defiance  of  the  forces  of  democracy  and  nationalism.  The 
cause  of  democracy  had  been  continually  abetted  within  Austria- 
Hungary  by  the  growing  demands  for  participation  in  govern- 
ment not  only  of  the  old  landed  nobility  but  also  of  the 
bourgeoisie  and  urban  proletariat  whom  the  recent  Industrial 
Revolution  had  been  producing.  At  the  same  time  a  keen  sense 
of  nationalism  had  been  stimulated  by  the  reviving  Hteratures 
and  political  aspirations  of  the  numerous  subject  populations, 
particularly  of  the  four  chief  nationalities  —  Germans,  Magyars, 
Slavs,  and  ItaHans. 

What  the  revolutionary  movements  of  1 848-1 849  had  failed 
to  do  —  utterly  to  destroy  the  system  of  Metternich  —  was 
Exclusion  of  achieved  by  means  of  the  disastrous  foreign  wars  of 
the  Habs-  1859  and  1866.  These  two  wars  obliged  the  Emperor 
German  a^d  Francis  Joseph  to  renounce  the  right  of  Austrian  in- 
itaiian  tcrfercnce  alike  in  Italy  and  in  Germany,  and  to  center 
Affau-s  q^iiqj^i[qj^  upon  the  Germans  of  Austria  proper, 

upon  the  Magyars  of  the  ancient  kingdom  of  Hungary,  and 
upon  the  Slavic  peoples  who  were  directly  dependent  upon 
the  crowns  either  of  Austria  or  of  Hungary.  In  other  words, 
the  racial  problems  confronting  the  empire  were  somewhat 
simplified  by  the  exclusion  of  the  Habsburgs  from  German 
and  Italian  affairs ;  and  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  Habsburg 
monarchy  gradually  shifted  eastward  in  the  direction  of  Magyars 
and  Slavs. 

Then,  too,  the  decHne  of  Austrian  prestige  which  marked  each 
war's  reverses  was  utilized  now  by  Liberals  and  now  by  nation- 
alists to  wring  concessions  from  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  195 


Thus  in  i860,  immediately  after  the  loss  of  Lombardy,  addi- 
tional powers  of  local  self-government  were  accorded  to  provin- 
cial diets,  and  Hungarian  political  institutions  were  Austrian 
restored  as  they  had  existed  prior  to  the  revolt  of  1849  ;  Constitu- 
and  in  the  following  year  (1861),  a  formal  constitu- 
tion  made  provision  for  a  united  parliament  for  the  whole  em- 
pire, to  be  elected  by  the  provincial  diets,  to  sit  at  Vienna,  and 
to  perform  functions  of  legislation  and  taxation. 

The  constitution  of  1861,  fairly  Hberal  though  it  was,  was  far 
from  satisfying  the  Magyar  longing  for  nationalism.  From 
his  exile,  Louis  Kossuth  (i  802-1 894)  still  preached  Deakand 
rebelHon  against  the  Habsburg  dynasty,  while  a  more  Hungarian 
practical  Magyar,  Francis  Beak  (1803-1876),  worked  Nationalism 
out  a  plan  by  which  the  Habsburg  dominions  should  be  divided 
into  two  parts  —  Austria  and  Hungary  —  each  managing  its 
own  internal  affairs  by  means  of  separate  parliamentary  in- 
stitutions and  united  only  by  a  common  sovereign,  ^he  Aus- 
a  common  army,  and  common  foreign  relations,  gieich 
Thanks  to  Deak's  efforts  the  Magyars  remained  loyal  taWiJhment' 
to  Francis  Joseph  during  the  trying  days  of  1866,  and,  of  the 
as  a  fitting  reward,  the  political  dualism,  for  which  Monarchy" 
Deak  had  labored,  was  formally  estabHshed  in  1867.  of  Austria- 
This  settlement,  known  as  the  Ausgleich,  or  Compro-  ^^^^^^ 
mise,  fixed  the  general  character  of  government  in  the  Habsburg 
dominions  as  it  has  existed  ever  since.    The  Seven  Weeks'  War 
may  be  said,  therefore,  to  have  won  national  independence  for 
Hungary  as  well  as  for  Germany  and  to  have  established  the  pres- 
ent-day government  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  of  Austria-Hungary 
just  as  it  foreshadowed  the  erection  of  the  present  German  Empire. 

Worse  than  Austria  fared  France  as  a  result  of  the  Seven 
Weeks'  War.    The  lightning  rapidity  of  the  campaign  upset 
entirely  the  calculations  of  Napoleon  III,  and  the  ^^^^^^^^f 
giant  stride  of  Prussia  toward  the  unification  of  Ger-  the  Seven 
many  filled  him  with  consternation.    His  army  was  Weeks' War 

, .  .       .  1 .      1  .        .         on  France 

m  no  condition  immediately  to  combat  the  victorious 
Prussians  and  his  best  troops  were  still  in  Mexico,  in  Algeria,  or 
at  Rome.    Instead  of  stepping  in  as  a  well-compensated  arbiter 
at  the  close  of  a  long  civil  war  in  the  Germanics,  he  now  found 
himself  actually  begging  from  Bismarck  some  trifling  territorial 


196 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


''compensation"  —  anything,  in  fact,  that  would  save  his  face 
with  the  French  people. 

With  appropriate  reminders  of  the  interview  at  Biarritz,  Na- 
poleon in  1866  asked  that  the  Rhenish  Palatinate  be  ceded  to 
France.  Bismarck  shrugged  his  shoulders  and  showed 
Napoleon^  the  cmpcror's  note  to  the  king  of  Bavaria,  to  whom 
III  to  Secure  the  Palatinate  belonged :  the  result  was  merely  to 
sations'"^  strengthen  the  defensive  alKance  between  Prussia  and 
Bavaria.  Napoleon  next  demanded  leave  to  annex 
Belgium ;  again  he  was  put  off,  and  later,  in  1870,  his  demand 
was  artfully  communicated  by  Bismarck  to  the  British  govern- 
ment, which  was  anxious  to  maintain  Belgium's  integrity.  Mean- 
while, Napoleon  made  a  strenuous  effort  to  secure  Luxemburg. 

The  grand-duchy  of  Luxemburg,  a  small  state  on  the  northern 
frontier  of  France,  adjacent  to  Belgium,  occupied  a  curious  in- 
ternational situation  in  Europe.  Ruled  by  the  king  of  the 
Netherlands,  it  had  been  a  member  of  the  Germanic  Confedera- 
tion, and  was  garrisoned  by  Prussia.  Early  in  1867  Napoleon 
negotiated  with  the  Dutch  king  for  the  purchase  of  the  grand- 
duchy.  The  king  was  willing  but  Bismarck  again  interposed, 
and,  as  Napoleon  was  not  ready  for  war,  the  anomalous  question 
of  Luxemburg  was  submitted  to  a  conference  of  the  Powers 
in  London  (May,  1867).  By  the  resultant  treaty  of  London 
the  grand-duchy  was  neutralized  under  European  guarantee; 
the  king  of  the  Netherlands  retained  the  sovereignty ;  the  forti- 
fications of  Luxemburg  were  demohshed,  and  the  Prussian  garri- 
son was  withdrawn.  Bismarck  thereby  shrewdly  exposed  to 
Europe  a  seemingly  conciliatory  attitude  on  the  part  of  Prussia 
and  a  land-grabbing  ambition  on  the  part  of  France;  and 
Napoleon  had  obtained  not  even  Luxemburg. 

Thrice  thwarted  in  his  efforts  to  secure  ''compensation" 
for  France,  Napoleon  at  length  perceived  what  Bismarck  had 
strained  appreciated  all  the  time,  that  the  Seven  Weeks'  War 
Relations  was  but  the  forerunner  of  a  great  war  between  France 
France^  and  the  new  Germany.  From  1868,  preparations 
and  were  made  on  both  sides.    Elaborate  plans  for  an 

Germany  offensive  campaign  were  set  on  foot  by  Moltke,  the 
Prussian  commander;  and  some  reforms  were  instituted  in 
the  French  army.    Both  Bismarck  and  Napoleon  resorted 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  197 


to  diplomacy,  the  former  to  insure  foreign  neutrality,  the  latter 
to  gain  allies.  In  the  diplomatic  as  well  as  in  the  military  game 
advantage  was  on  the  German  side.  Thanks  to  Napoleon's 
earlier  actions  and  to  Bismarck's  recent  negotiations,  France 
was  internationally  isolated.  TvUssia  had  not  for-  ^^^^^ 
gotten  Napoleon's  part  in  the  Crimean  War  nor  Bis-  national 
marck's  kind  offers  of  assistance  against  rebeUious  isolation 

TVT       T       5     T  1  ®^  France 

Poles.  Italy  could  not  forget  Napoleon  s  betrayal 
of  her  cause  in  1859  or  the  subsequent  compensatory  aid  ob- 
tained from  Bismarck.  Austria  contrasted  Napoleon's  harsh 
treatment  of  her  in  1859  with  Bismarck's  lenient  conduct  in 
1866.  Great  Britain  and  the  south  German  states  aHke  resented 
Napoleon's  ambition  for  territoral  aggrandizement :  the  former 
sympathized  with  Prussia ;  the  latter  signed  military  conven- 
tions with  Prussia.  For  a  while  the  emperor  of  the  French 
thought  he  would  be  able  to  form  a  triple  alliance  between 
Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  and  France;  but  his  unwillingness, 
in  view  of  Clerical  opposition  in  France,  to  withdraw  the  French 
troops  from  Rome  caused  the  complete  failure  of  his  negotia- 
tions with  King  Victor  Emmanuel ;  and  veiled  threats  from  the 
tsar  were  enough  to  induce  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  to  await 
actual  French  victories  before  casting  in  his  lot  with  Napoleon. 
To  the  very  last.  Napoleon  deluded  himself  with  the  idea  that 
the  south  German  states  would  join  France  rather  than  Prussia. 

War  fever  was  the  inevitable  effect  of  the  rising  nationalist 
temperature  in  Germany  and  in  France.  It  was  most  remark- 
able how  every  class  in  each  of  the  two  countries  felt  „ 

1       •  •  1  1     •   n«    •  French 

that  its  own  interests  would  best  be  seryed  by  inmctmg  Nationalism 
injury  upon  the  corresponding  class  in  the  other  coun-  J^j^^^^^^^g^ 
try,  and  how,  in  each  country,  over  all  social  classes 
and  all  political  parties,  welding  them  together  and,  as  it  were, 
hypnotizing  them,  was  the  genius  of  nationalism  —  the  firm, 
mutual  conviction  of  a  superiority  of  blood  and  of  destiny.  Only 
small  groups  sought  to  allay  the  fever  —  the  advanced  Repub- 
licans in  France  who  feared  lest  the  results  of  war  should  accrue 
to  the  advantage  of  the  Second  Empire,  and  in  Germany  a  hand- 
ful of  Socialists  who  splendidly  but  vainly  preached  the  brother- 
hood of  all  the  world's  workingmen.  The  governments  of  both 
countries  fed  the  popular  fever,  for  both  Bismarck  and  Napoleon 


198 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


had  ambitions  that  could  not  be  readily  realized  by  any  other 
means.  Bismarck  desired  war  with  France  because  he  would 
be  able  in  the  enthusiasm  engendered  by  military  prowess  to 
complete  German  unification  and  to  place  the  seal  of  triumph 
upon  the  achievements  of  the  German  people.  Napoleon 
was  willing  to  undertake  a  war  with  Prussia  because  a  victory 
for  his  arms  would  reunite  his  subjects  and  preserve  his  throne 
and  dynasty. 

As  both  sides  expected  war,  a  pretext  was  not  long  lacking. 
It  was  supphed  by  the  Hohenzollern  candidature  for  the  throne 
Pretext  for  Spain.  Having  expelled  the  absolutist  Queen 
War:  The  Isabella  II,  the  Spanish  Liberals  in  1869  proclaimed  a 
Hohenzoi-    constitutional  monarchy  and  offered  the  crown  to 

lern  Candi-  . 

dature  for  Princc  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen,  a  Catho- 
the  Spanish  \[q  cousin  of  Kin^  William  of  Prussia.    Prince  Leopold 

Throne  r  •  ■,        ^  ^  r 

was  not  eager  for  Spanish  adventures  and  at  first  re- 
fused the  offer;  but  Bismarck,  who  scented  the  possibilities  of 
the  situation,  procured  a  renewal  of  the  request  and,  2  July, 
1870,  its  acceptance  by  the  Prussian  prince.  Napoleon,  who  at 
once  professed  to  see  an  attempt  to  join  the  German  and  Spanish 
crowns  and  thereby  to  revive  the  sixteenth-century  empire  of 
Charles  V,  to  the  eternal  detriment  of  France,  informed  ELing 
William  that  he  would  regard  the  accession  of  a  Hohenzollern 
to  the  throne  of  Spain  as  a  sufficient  ground  for  war;  and  on 
12  July  it  was  announced  in  Madrid  that  Prince  Leopold  of  his 
own  accord  had  revoked  his  acceptance  of  the  crown.  Here 
the  business  might  have  ended,  had  not  Napoleon  bfindly  sought 
an  additional  rebuff  for  Prussian  diplomacy.  Accordingly, 
acting  upon  instructions  from  his  emperor,  the  French  ambas- 
sador ^  to  Prussia  approached  King  William  on  the  promenade 
at  the  famous  watering-place  of  Ems  and  demanded  that  the 
king  should  pledge  himself  never  to  permit  a  Hohenzollern  prince 
to  become  a  candidate  for  the  Spanish  throne.  This  WilHam 
refused  to  do,  and,  when  the  persistent  ambassador  requested 
yet  another  interview,  the  king  politely  informed  him  that  he 
was  leaving  Ems  that  night  and  could  not  receive  him.  The 
news  of  this  indecisive  interview  was  telegraphed  by  the  king 
to  Bismarck,  who,  after  consulting  the  military  heads  and  as- 

^  Count  Vincent  Benedetti  (181 7-1900). 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


suring  himself  that  Prussia  was  prepared  for  war,  communicated 
the  dispatch  to  the  pubHc  press ;  not,  however,  in  the  original 
form  in  which  he  had  received  it  from  the  king,  but  g^gj^^j^j^^g 
in  a  form  so  cleverly  and  unscrupulously  abbreviated  utilization 
as  to  convey  the  impression  to  Germans  that  the  Prus-  ^^^^^ 
sian  king  had  been  insulted  by  the  French  ambas- 
sador and  to  Frenchmen  that  their  ambassador  had  been  in- 
sulted by  the  Prussian  king.    The  edited  dispatch  was  rightly 
calculated  to  have  the  effect,  in  Bismarck's  own  cynical  words, 
"of  a  red  rag  upon  the  Gallic  bull." 

The  distorted  report  of  the  Ems  interview,  received  in  Paris 
on  14  July,  1870,  the  anniversary  of  the  fall  of  the  Bastille  and 
the  French  national  holiday,  threw  France  into  a 
ferment.    That  very  night  Napoleon  III  and  his  p^anco- 
Council  decided  upon  war;  the  next  day  the  French  German 
Chambers,  with  but  ten  dissenting  votes,  sanctioned 
a  formal  declaration  of  war,  and  mobilization  began 
on  either  side  of  the  Rhine.    To  the  chagrin  of  Napoleon  and 
the  dehght  of  Bismarck  the  south  German  states,  believing  that 
Prussia  was  attacked,  promptly  took  her  part  and  that  of  the 
North  German  Confederation  in  accordance  with  the  treaties 
of  defensive  alliance. 

The  Franco-German  War  of  1 870-1 871  brought  into  sharp 
contrast  the  real  rottenness  of  the  Napoleonic  regime  in  France 
and  the  efficiency  of  the  German  governmental  machine  under 
Bismarck.  On  the  German  side,  the  campaign  was  conducted 
like  clock-work,  all  departments,  —  finance,  commissary,  strategy, 
supply,  movement  of  troops,  conduct  of  military  operations, 
offensive  and  defensive,  civil  administration,  diplomacy,  —  work- 
ing together  with  perfect  precision.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
French  soldiers,  although  they  displayed  wonderful  courage  and 
dash,  were  badly  led  and  hopelessly  outnumbered ;  they 
lacked  organization,  plans,  supplies.  Napoleon,  who  was 
suffering  from  an  incurable  malady,  was  himself  excessively 
timid,  and  his  entire  military  establishment  was  overrun  by 
dishonest  officials  and  corrupt  contractors.  The  outcome  could 
not  long  remain  in  doubt. 

Early  in  Au^^ust,  1870,  Marshal  MacMahon,  who  had  been 
hurriedly  recalled  from  Algeria  to  command  the  French  army 


200 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


near  Strassburg,  suffered  such  serious  reverses  at  the  hands  of 
the  Crown  Prince  Frederick  of  Prussia  that  he  was  obHged  to 
Battle  of  evacuate  the  greater  part  of  Alsace  and  to  fall  back  upon 
Sedan,  Sep-  Chalons.  On  1 8  August,  another  German  army  under 
18^0  Moltke  defeated  the  French  army  of  the  Rhine  under 

Marshal  Bazaine  in  the  bloody  battle  of  Gravelotte 
in  Lorraine  and  shut  it  up  in  the  fortress  of  Metz.  Marshal 
MacMahon,  whom  the  Emperor  Napoleon  now  joined,  and  to 
whom  the  French  pinned  their  faith,  counseled  a  rapid  retreat 
to  Paris  in  order  to  afford  time  to  raise  new  armies  and  retake 
the  field  with  some  chance  of  ultimate  success,  but  the  Empress 
Eugenie,  who  knew  that  such  an  acknowledgment  of  defeat 
would  spell  the  ruin  of  the  dynasty,  wired  him  to  go  forward  at  once 
to  the  reHef  of  Metz.  With  heavy  hearts  Marshal  MacMahon 
and  the  Emperor  Napoleon  moved  their  inferior  forces  down 
the  River  Meuse,  endeavoring  to  find  a  place  where  they  might 
cross  and  thence  drive  back  the  Germans.  At  Sedan,  almost 
down  to  the  Belgian  border,  they  made  the  despairing  attempt, 
1-2  September,  1870.  Outnumbered  and  finally  surrounded, 
they  surrendered  themselves  with  81,000  men,  having  lost  in 
killed  and  wounded  about  25,000.  The  first  phase  of  the 
Franco-German  War  was  over ;  it  had  lasted  barely  six  weeks. 

When  on  4  September,  1870,  it  became  generally  known  in 
Paris  that  Napoleon  III,  together  with  the  last  important  French 
army  in  the  field,  was  a  prisoner  of  the  Germans,  what 
Napoleon might  easily  have  been  foreseen  actually  happened. 
Ill  and  A  group  of  self-appointed  RepubKcans,  among  whom 
^{Qj^QfliiQ  Leon  Gambetta  was  conspicuous,  solemnly  proclaimed 
Third  in  the  city-hall  the  deposition  of  the  Bonapartes  and 
Republic  estabKshment  of  the  Third  Republic.    The  Em- 

press Eugenie  fled  to  England,  and  a  ''Government 
of  National  Defense"  was  hastily  formed  to  rule  the  country 
until  peace  could  be  restored  and  the  nation  consulted  on  the 
nature  of  the  permanent  government  for  France. 

Now  that  Napoleon  III  was  deposed  and  the  RepubKcans  in 
power,  peace  might  have  been  promptly  concluded  had  not 
Bismarck  been  bent  on  ''regaining"  Alsace  and  Lorraine  for 
Germany  and  reducing  France  to  such  a  desperate  pHght  that 
she  could  never  again  seriously  interfere  with  the  German  na- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  201 


tion.  In  view  of  this  fact,  the  patriotic  assertion  of  the  new 
revolutionary  foreign  minister  of  France  that  he  would  not 
''cede  an  inch  of  French  soil  nor  a  stone  of  French  fortresses" 
rendered  the  prolongation  of  the  war  inevitable. 

The  second  part  of  the  Franco- German  War  —  the  part  with 
which  the  government  of  the  Third  French  RepubKc  was  con- 
cerned —  was  longer  and  more  compHcated  than  the  first  part 
in  which  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III  had  been  impKcated,  but 
it  was  less  important  from  a  mihtary  or  poHtical  standpoint. 
The  new  Government  of  National  Defense,  dominated  by  the 
inspiring  personaKty  of  Leon  Gambetta,  improvised  armies 
out  of  surviving  remnants  of  regiments,  and  proclaimed  a  levee 
en  masse  of  all  men  from  twenty-one  to  forty  years  of  age.  This 
unforeseen  resistance  astonished  the  invading  Germans,  but  the 
outcome  was  never  in  doubt.  The  struggle  reduced  itself  on 
one  side  to  a  siege  of  Paris  and  on  the  other  to  repeated  but  hope- 
less efforts  to  raise  the  siege. 

Paris  held  out  against  the  Germans  from  the  middle  of  Sep- 
tember, 1870,  to  28  January,  187 1,  and  then  surrendered  only 
because  its  population  were  freezing  and  starving.  g^j.j.gjj^jgj. 
Already,  late  in  September,  Strassburg  had  capitu-  of  Paris, 

lated,  and,  in  October,  Marshal  Bazaine,  with  shameful  January, 

...  1871 
pusillanimity  if  not  positive  treachery,  had  dehvered 

the  great  fortress  of  Metz,  together  with  a  well-equipped  army 

of  150,000  men,  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.    Four  days 

after  the  surrender  of  Paris,  an  armistice  was  arranged  in  order 

to  admit  of  the  election  of  a  French  National  Assembly  which 

would  have  authority  to  ratify  a  peace.    The  preHminaries, 

concluded  at  Versailles,  between  Bismarck  and  Thiers,  were 

most  reluctantly  ratified  by  the  Assembly  on  i  March ;  and  the 

final  treaty  was  signed  at  Frankfort  on  10  May,  1871. 

By  the  treaty  of  Frankfort,  France  ceded  to  Germany  the 

whole  of  Alsace,  excepting  Belfort,  and  eastern  Lorraine,  together 

with  the  great  fortresses  of  Metz  and  Strassburg,  and  Treaty  of 

agreed  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  five  milliards  of  francs  Frankfort, 

(one  billion  dollars).    German  troops  were  to  be  left  ^^^^ 

in  occupation  of  northern  France  until  the  indemnity  was 

wholly  paid.    Of  the  numerous  and  far-reaching  results  of  the 

Franco-German  War,  perhaps  the  most  striking  was  the  comple- 


202 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


lion  of  German  unification  and  the  establishment  of  the  present- 
day  German  Empire.    Just  as  Bismarck  had  expected,  the  fact 

that  South  Germans  had  fought  shoulder  to  shoulder 
thTf^ur  ^^^h  North  Germans  and  that  the  great  triumph  of 
South  Ger-  German  arms  had  been  achieved  by  Bavarians  and 
whh  fhe*^^  Wiirttembergers  as  well  as  by  Prussians  sent  through- 
North  Ger-  out  the  Germanics  a  patriotic  thrill  potent  enough  to 
federation     Overcome  princely  ambition  or  academic  distrust  of 

conservatism  and  mihtarism,  and  by  November,  1870, 
treaties  of  union  had  been  concluded  between  Bismarck,  rep- 
resenting the  North  German  Confederation,  and  the  govern- 
ments of  the  four  south  German  states  —  Bavaria,  Wiirttem- 
berg,  Baden,  and  Hesse-Darmstadt.  These  treaties,  as  ratified 
by  the  several  diets  and  sovereigns,  simply  extended  the  North 
German  Confederation  so  as  to  include  the  southern  states  and 
changed  its  name  to  the  "German  Empire."  The  king  of 
Prussia  was  henceforth  to  be  called  German  emperor  instead 
of  president  of  the  Confederation.  By  a  curious  irony  of  fate, 
it  was  in  the  palace  of  Louis  XIV  at  Versailles,^  "  in  the  ancient 
center  of  a  hostile  power  which  for  centuries  had  striven  to 
divide  and  humihate  Germany,"  that  the  solemn  proclamation 
Prociama-  German  Empire  was  made  on  18  January,  1871, 

tion  of  the  exactly  one  hundred  and  seventy  years  after  the  as- 
Empire^  sumption  by  the  Prussian  Hohenzollerns  of  the  title 
January,  of  king.  There,  surrounded  by  sovereigns,  generals, 
^^^^  and  soldiers,  Bismarck  read  the  imperial  decree  which 

sealed  the  first  part  of  his  Hfe-work,  and  the  grand-duke  of  Baden 
led  the  cheers  for  King  WilKam  of  Prussia,  now,  by  the  grace  of 
God  and  the  will  of  his  fellow-princes,  German  emperor. 

Not  only  did  the  Franco- German  War  hasten  the  completion 
of  German  unification,  but  it  served  to  remove  every  foreign 
danger  of  its  early  undoing.  The  war  confirmed  beyond  the 
peradventure  of  a  doubt  the  preeminence  of  the  German  mihtary 
machine;  henceforth,  Austria  must  abandon  every  thought  of 
avenging  Sadowa,  and  France,  for  many  a  year  to  come,  would 
be  unequal  to  the  task  of  avenging  Sedan. 

In  the  internal  affairs  of  France  the  war  had  the  utmost 
significance.    The  gigantic  imposture  of  the  Napoleonic  Empire 

^  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Germans  were  still  besieging  Paris. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


perished  in  the  midst  of  national  disaster,  and  with  the  most 
bitter  travail  was  born  the  Third  Repubhc.    From  1789  to  1870 
the  poHtical  history  of  France  had  been  marked  by 
more  or  less  chaotic  attempts  to  realize  now  one  and  pi-anco- 
now  another  of  the  great  revolutionary  principles  of  Prussian 
liberty,  equahty,  and  fraternity;  and  in  particular  J^anc? 
under  Napoleon  III  the  first  had  been  foolishly  sacri- 
ficed to  the  third.    Sedan  and  the  cession  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
were  terrible  blows  to  French  national  self-esteem,  but  the  Third 
Republic,  as  it  gradually  settled  down  after  1870,  and  attained  to 
a  permanence  not  equaled  since  the  pre-revolutionary  Bour- 
bon monarchy,  taught  that  democracy  has  its  blessings  no  less 
than  nationalism.    In  a  way,  it  may  be  said,  the  Franco-German 
War  recalled  France  to  her  European  mission  of  pointing  all 
three  paths  of  hberty,  equahty,  and  fraternity. 

A  less  certain  good  derived  from  the  war  was  the  continued 
bitterness  between  France  and  Germany.    In  sharp  contrast 
to  the  lenient  treatment  which  Bismarck  had  ac- 
corded to  Austria  in  1866  were  the  harsh  and  humiliat-  Prussian 
ing  terms  which  the  German  chancellor  imposed  on  War  of  1870 
France  in  187 1 ;   and  the  results  displayed  a  corre-  to^tife^War 


sponding  discrepancy.    In  the  case  of  Austria,  the  of  the  Na- 
tions ' 
1914 


soreness  of  defeat  soon  disappeared  and  within  a  com-  °^ 


paratively  short  time  the  emperors  William  and 
Francis  Joseph  were  sworn  friends  and  allies.  On  the  other 
side,  the  French  remained  painfully  aware  of  their  disgrace 
and  fully  resolved  as  soon  as  possible  to  recover  Alsace-Lorraine. 
The  war  fanned,  rather  than  banked,  the  fire  of  mutually  vindic- 
tive patriotism  on  either  side  of  the  Franco-German  frontier. 
And  it  was  this  war,  more  than  any  other  single  event,  which 
throughout  the  next  forty  years  gave  complexion  to  international 
politics,  saddled  Europe  with  enormous  crushing  armaments, 
and  constituted  the  first  link  in  that  causal  chain  of  circum- 
stances that  led  straight  on  to  another  and  vaster  European  war. 
Perhaps  in  punishing  the  French,  Bismarck  allowed  himself  for 
the  first  time  in  his  career  to  be  influenced  by  emotion  and  took 
a  false  step. 

The  Franco-German  War  had  important  consequences  for 
the  temporal  power  of  the  papacy  and  for  the  new  kingdom  of 


/ 


204  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Italy.  Military  need  obliged  Napoleon  III  to  withdraw  (19 
August,  1870)  the  last  of  the  French  troops  who,  since  1849, 

upheld  the  temporal  sovereignty  of  Pope  Pius  IX  in 
F?nco°^  Rome.  And  when  the  collapse  of  the  French  Empire 
Prussian  at  Sedan  made  it  clear  that  Napoleon  III  would  never 
JJ^y°^       be  able  to  return  the  expedition,  the  government  of 

Victor  Emmanuel,  with  Bismarck's  approval,  sent  a 
royal  army  of  60,000  men  into  the  remaining  Papal  State. 
Force,  however,  had  to  be  used  against  the  pontiff;  a  breach 
End  of  the  made  in  the  walls  of  Porta  Pia ;  but  at  the 

Temporal  first  tidings  of  bloodshcd,  Pope  Pius  ordered  his  Uttle 
Pope^Sep-^  papal  army  to  cease  firing,  and  on  20  September,  1870, 
tember,  —  less  than  three  weeks  after  Sedan,  —  the  troops  of 
1870  Victor  Emmanuel  held  Rome.    Thus  did  the  tem- 

poral power  of  the  bishops  of  Rome  come  to  an  end  after  a  dura- 
tion of  more  than  twelve  centuries,  and  thus  was  the  political 
unification  of  the  Italian  people,  begun  as  recently  as  1859, 
successfully  consummated. 

One  other  result  of  the  Franco-German  War  merits  passing 
attention.    The  fall  of  Napoleon  III  permitted  the  reversal 

of  another  part  of  his  work.  In  this  instance,  the  Rus- 
Fmnco-^*^^  sian  government,  again  with  Bismarck's  approval, 
Prussian  denounced  (31  October,  1870)  the  articles  of  the  treaty 
Rus^siT  Paris  of  1856  which  hmited  Russian  naval  forces 

and  armaments  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  a  conference  of 
the  Powers  in  London  in  March,  1871,  formally  ratified  the  ac- 
complished fact.  It  was  the  sign  of  the  resumption  of  the  Rus- 
sian policy  of  vigorous  interference  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  and 
among  the  Balkan  nationalities. 

The  Franco- German  War  affords  a  convenient  point  at  which 
to  halt  temporarily  the  story  of  the  growth  of  nationaHsm.  The 
Nationalism,  years  from  1848  to  187 1  witnessed  some  striking 
1848-1871  achievements  of  national  patriotism  throughout  cen- 
tral Europe.  Every  popular  Hterature  was  affected.  Scholars 
came  under  the  racial  spell.  Individuals  were  acutely  conscious 
of  their  nationaHty.  In  the  name  of  nationalism,  an  adven- 
turer ruled  France  for  twenty- two  years.  Because  of  national- 
ism the  Habsburg  dominions  were  tumultuously  shaken.  PoKt- 
ical  independence  was  assured  to  the  Magyars,  and  political 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  205 


unification,  after  the  aspirations  of  centuries,  was  secured  to 
Germans  and  Italians. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  throughout  this  era  of  nation- 
alism the  growth  of  democracy  was  suspended.  On  the  contrary, 
a  review  of  the  present  chapter  will  show  (i)  that  in  Democracy, 
France  poKtical  Liberalism  was  steadily  gaining  1848-1871 
strength,  despite  Napoleon  III,  until  by  1870  it  was  embodied  in 
the  Third  Repubhc;  (2)  that  in  Italy  Cavour  was  quite  as 
ambitious  to  estabhsh  constitutional  government  as  to  effect 
poUtical  unification ;  (3)  that  both  in  Austria  and  in  Hungary 
the  emperor-king  Francis  Joseph  was  constrained  to  declare 
his  conversion  to  constitutionalism ;  and  (4)  that  in  Germany 
even  Bismarck  at  last  consented  to  play  with  parliaments  and 
with  universal  manhood  suffrage.  From  following  chapters, 
moreover,  it  will  be  possible  to  learn  that  it  was  between 
1848  and  1 87 1  (5)  that  in  Great  Britain  the  elective  franchise 
was  radically  extended ;  (6)  that  in  Spain  another  revolution 
paved  the  way  for  the  final  establishment  of  parHamentary 
government ;  and  (7)  that  even  in  Russia  important  steps  were 
taken  looking  toward  the  grant  of  local  self-government  and 
toward  the  complete  abolition  of  serfdom.  It  was  not  that 
these  democratic  advances  were  unimportant;  it  was  simply 
that  they  were  outweighed  in  contemporary  interest  by  the  spirit 
of  nation-making. 

Nor  must  it  be  supposed  that  the  growth  of  nationalism 
stopped  or  even  lagged  after  187 1.    Combined  henceforth  more 
inextricably  with  the  growth  of  democracy,  the  prog-  (^^j^^jj^^g^j 
gress  of  nationalism,  if  somewhat  more  subtle,  was  Growth  of 
nevertheless  a  continuously  moving  force  in  the  world's  ^f^g  ^jg^^^j"^ 
history.    For  forty-three  years  of  peace  throughout 
western  and  central  Europe  it  was  a  potent  factor  in  shaping 
the  internal  development  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  and  Italy.    During  an  equal  term  of  unrest 
in  eastern  Europe,  it  affected  the  relations  of  the  Russian  Empire 
with  subject  nationalities  and  it  hastened  the  dismemberment  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire.    In  the  most  remote  places  and  among 
the  most  diverse  peoples  nationahsm  throve, — in  Ireland,  in 
Norway,  in  Finland,  in  Poland,  in  Greece,  in  Latin  America, 
in  India,  in  Japan.    Not  only  literatures  and  the  other  blessings 


2o6  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  peaceful  patriotic  rivalries  was  nationalism  destined  to  bring 
forth  in  future  years  but  many  bloody  rebellions  as  well  and  the 
calamitous  War  of  the  Nations. 

ADDITIONAL  READING 

Brief  General  Accounts.  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815  (1910), 
ch.  ix-xiii ;  Charles  Seignobos,  A  Political  History  of  Europe  since  1H14, 
trans,  ed.  by  S.  M.  Macvane  (1900),  ch.  vi,  xi,  xv,  xvii,  xxvii;  J.  H.Robin- 
son and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907), 
ch.  xxi,  xxii ;  C.  E.  M.  Hawkesworth,  The  Last  Century  in  Europe,  1814- 
igio  (1913),  ch.  xix-xxiv;  C.  A.  Fyffe,  A  History  of  Modern  Europe,  lygz- 
i8y8  (1896),  ch.  xxi-xxiv;  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  The  Remaking  of  Modern 
Europe,  i'/8g~i8'/8  (1910),  ch.  xiv-xx;  W.  A.  Phillips,  Modern  Europe, 
i8i5~i8gg  (1901),  ch.  xiv-xviii;  Oscar  Browning,  A  History  of  the  Modern 
World,  Vol.  I  (1912),  Book  II,  ch.  vi,  x,  xii-xiv,  Vol.  II  (1912),  Book  III; 
History  of  All  Nations,  Vol.  XIX  by  Theodor  Flathe,  The  Reconstruction 
of  Europe,  ch.  i-ix;  Harold  Murdock,  The  Reconstruction  of  Europe:  a 
Sketch  of  the  Diplomatic  and  Political  History  of  Continental  Europe  from 
the  Rise  to  the  Fall  of  the  Second  French  Empire  (1898) ;  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  Vol.  "Xl,  Growth  of  Nationalities  (1909) ;  Histoire  generate.  Vol.  XI, 
ch.  v-viii,  xiii,  xxi,  xxii ;  Constantin  BuUe,  Geschichte  des  zweiten  Kaiser- 
reiches  und  des  Konigreiches  Italien  (1890) ;  Sir  Edward  Hertslet,  The 
Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  Vol.  II,  1 828-1863,  and  Vol.  Ill,  1864-18^5  (1875), 
the  standard  collection  of  the  principal  treaties  and  conventions,  translated 
into  English.    See  also  J.  H.  Rose,  Nationality  in  Modern  History  (1916). 

Louis  Napoleon  and  the  Second  French  Empire.  There  is  no  convenient 
adequate  biography  of  Napoleon  III,  but  the  following  may  provide  material 
for  a  good  understanding  of  his  character  and  policies:  F.  A.  Simpson, 
The  Rise  of  Louis  Napoleon  (1909) ;  H.  A.  L.  Fisher,  Bonapartism  (1908), 
six  brilliant  lectures,  suggestive  rather  than  informing;  F.  H.  Cheetham, 
Louis  Napoleon  and  the  Genesis  of  the  Second  Republic :  being  a  Life  of  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  III  to  the  Time  of  his  Election  to  the  Presidency  of  the 
French  Republic  (1908),  readable  but  not  profound;  Archibald  Forbes, 
The  Life  of  Napoleon  the  Third  (1897),  very  superficial;  Memoirs  of  Dr. 
Thomas  IF.  Evans:  the  Second  French  Empire,  ed.  by  E.  A.  Crane  (1905),  a 
warm  appreciation  of  the  emperor  by  his  American  dentist ;  Blanchard 
Jerrold,  The  Life  of  Napoleon  III  derived  from  State  Records,  from  Un- 
published Family  Correspondence,  and  from  Personal  Testimony,  4  vols. 
(1874-1882),  the  best  and  fullest  apology  in  English;  Victor  Hugo,  The 
History  of  a  Crime,  and  Napoleon  the  Little,  English  translations  in  several 
editions,  bitter  arraignments  of  Louis  Napoleon ;  N.  W.  Senior,  Conversa- 
tions with  Distinguished  Persons  during  the  2nd  Empire  from  i860  to  1863, 
2  vols.  (1880),  interesting  side-lights  afforded  by  the  associations  of  an 
eminent  English  economist;  Life  and  Works  of  Louis  Napoleon,  2  vols. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  207 


(1852),  an  Eng.  trans,  of  some  of  his  most  important  writings;  H.  Thirria, 
Napoleon  III  avant  V empire,  2  vols,  (189 5-1 896),  apologetic  and  ill-bal- 
anced, but  containing  numerous  extracts  from  contemporary  newspaper 
comments;  A.  L.  Guerard,  French  Prophets  of  Yesterday:  a  Study  of 
Religious  Thought  luider  the  Second  Empire  (1913),  well-written  and  scholarly. 
The  most  exhaustive  histories  of  the  reign  of  Napoleon  III  are  Pierre  de 
La  Gorce,  Eistoire  du  second  empire,  4th  ed.,  7  vols.  (1896-1905),  the  chief 
secondary  authority,  marked  by  Clerical  leanings,  and  Taxtile  Delord, 
Eistoire  '  du  second  einpire,  6  vols.  (1869-1876),  scholarly  and  strongly 
opposed  to  the  empire.  On  social  and  economic  aspects  of  the  Second 
Empire:  Georges  Weill,  Eistoire  du  mouvement  social  en  France,  1852- 
igio,  2d  ed.  (1911),  ch.  i-vi;  P.  L.  Fournier,  Le  second  empire  et  la  legisla- 
tion ouvriere  (19 11);  Emile  Levasseur,  Eistoire  des  classes  ouvrihes  et  de 
Vindustrie  en  France  de  lySg  a  i8'/o,  Vol.  II  (1904),  Book  VI;  Jean  Jaures 
(editor),  Eistoire  socialiste,  Vol.  X  by  Albert  Thomas,  Le  second  empire 
(1907) ;  and  Maurice  (Comte)  Fleury,  La  societe  dti  second  empire,  3  vols. 
(191 1).  On  the  coup  d'etat  of  1851  and  the  continuance  of  Republican 
opposition :  Eugene  Tenot,  Paris  in  December,  1851,  Eng.  trans,  by  S.  W. 
Adams  and  A.  H.  Brandon  (1870) ;  J.  Tchernoff,  Associations  et  societes 
secretes  sous  la  deuxieme  ripublique,  1848-1851  (1905),  an  important  col- 
lection of  documents,  and,  by  the  same  author,  Le  parti  repuhlicain  au 
coup  d'etat  et  sous  le  second  empire  (1906) ;  Georges  Weill,  Eistoire  du 
parti  repuhlicain  en  France  de  18 14  d  i8yo  (1900).  On  Napoleon  Ill's 
foreign  policies,  there  are  the  pretentious  volumes  of  A.  W.  Kinglake,  In- 
vasion of  the  Crimea,  9  vols.  (1863-1901),  highly  critical^  of  the  French 
emperor ;  the  diplomatic  study  of  the  papal  question  by  Emile  Bourgeois 
and  E.  Clermont,  Rome  et  NapoUon  III  (1907) ;  the  contemporary  ac- 
count of  Napoleon's  colonial  policy  in  Jules  Duval,  Les  colonies  et  la  politique 
coloniale  de  la  France  (1864) ;  and  the  popular  narrative  of  P.  F.  Martin, 
Maximilian  in  Mexico:  the  Story  of  the  French  Intervention,  i86i~i86y 
(1914).  The  most  thorough  treatment  of  the  constitutional  changes  in 
France  is  that  of  Henry  Berton,  U evolution  constitutionelle  du  second  em- 
pire (1900).  The  most  elaborate  account  of  the  last  ten  years  of  Napoleon 
Ill's  regime  is  the  monumental  apology  of  Emile  Ollivier,  Uempire  liberal, 
17  vols.  (1895-1914).  An  interesting  Catholic  Liberal-Monarchist  narra- 
tive of  the  last  days  of  the  Empire  and  the  early  days  of  the  Third  RepubHc 
is  Samuel  Denis,  Eistoire  contemporaine :  la  chute  de  V empire,  le  gouverne- 
mcnt  de  la  defence  nationale,  Vasscmblee  nationale,  4  vols,  (i 897-1 903). 

The  Political  Unification  of  Italy.  Bolton  King,  A  History  of  Italian 
Unity,  1 8 14-1 8y I,  2  vols.  (1899),  the  best  and  most  readable  account  in 
English ;  Evelyn  (Countess)  Martincngo-Cesarcsco,  The  Liberation  of 
Italy,  i8i5-i8yo,  sympathetic  and  charming;  R.  S.  Holland,  Builders  of 
United  Italy  (1908),  brief  essays  on  Gioberti,  Mazzini,  Garibaldi,  Cavour, 
and  Victor  Emmanuel  II ;  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  Makers  of  Modern  Italy, 
Mazzini  —  Cavour  —  Garibaldi  (1889),  popular  sketches.  On  Cavour: 
W.  R.  Thayer,  The  Life  and  Times  of  Cavour,  2  vols.  (191 1),  the  standard 


2o8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


biography;  Evelyn  (Countess)  Martinengo-Ccsaresco,  Cavour  (1898), 
brief  but  so  happily  written  that  it  might  serve  as  a  model  biography; 
Pietro  Orsi,  Cavour  and  the  Making  of  Modern  Italy,  1810-1861  (1914) 
in  "  Heroes  of  the  Nations  "  Series;  William  de  La  Rive,  Count  Cavour: 
Reminiscences,  Life  and  Character,  Eng.  trans.  (1862),  a  character-sketch 
by  an  intimate  friend ;  F.  X.  Kraus,  Cavour,  die  Erhebung  Italiens  im 
ncunzehnten  Jahrhundcrt  (1902),  the  popular  account  of  a  scholarly  Ger- 
man Catholic ;  and  for  letters  of  Cavour  see  especially  the  editions  of 
Nicomede  Bianchi,  La  politique  du  comte  Camille  de  Cavour  de  1852  d 
1861,  lettres  inedites  (1885),  and  of  Luigi  Chiala,  Lettere  edite  ed'inedite  di 
Camillo  Cavour,  2d  ed,,  10  vols.  (1883-1887).  On  Garibaldi :  Autobiography 
of  Giuseppe  Garibaldi,  Eng.  trans,  by  A.  Werner,  3  vols.  (1889) ;  and  the 
interesting  books  of  G.  M.  Trevelyan,  Garibaldi  and  the  Thousand  (1909) 
and  Garibaldi  and  the  Making  of  Italy  (191 1).  A  sympathetic  biography  of 
the  king  is  that  of  G.  S.  Godkin,  Life  of  Victor  Emmanuel  II,  First  King 
of  Italy,  2  vols.  (1879).  For  special  phases  of  unification:  H.  C.  Wylly, 
The  Campaign  of  Magenta  and  Solferino  (1907) ;  H.  R.  Whitehouse,  Col- 
lapse of  the  Kingdom  of  Naples  (1899) ;  Raffaele  de  Cesare,  The  Last  Days 
of  Papal  Rome,  i8jo-i8yo,  abridged  Eng.  trans,  by  Helen  Zimmern  (1909), 
based  on  important  unpublished  sources  and  anti-Clerical  in  tone ;  Enrico 
della  Rocca,  The  Autobiography  of  a  Veteran,  i8oy~i8Qj,  Eng.  trans,  ed. 
by  Janet  Ross  (1898),  interesting  reminiscences  of  an  active  participant 
in  events  from  1848  to  1870;  The  Birth  of  Modern  Italy,  ed.  by  the  Duke 
Litta-Visconti-Arese  (1909),  memoirs  of  Jessie  White  Mario,  an  enthusiastic 
friend  and  admirer  of  Mazzini  and  Garibaldi,  prejudiced  against  Cavour. 

The  Political  Unification  of  Germany.  Brief  narratives :  G.  M.  Priest, 
Germany  since  1740  (191 5),  ch.  ix,  x;  E.  F.  Henderson,  A  Short  History 
of  Germany,  new  ed.  (191 6),  Vol.  II,  ch.  ix,  x;  Ferdinand  Schevill,  The  Mak- 
ing of  Modern  Germany  (1916),  ch.  v;  Wilhelm  Mliller,  Political  History  of 
Recent  Times,  i8i6~i8'/j.  Eng.  trans,  by  J.  P.  Peters  (1882),  ch.  xv-xxvi; 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch,  xv,  xvi;  Henri  Lichten- 
berger,  Germany  and  its  Evolution  in  Modern  Times,  trans,  from  French  by 
A.  M.  Ludovici  (1913),  Book  II,  pp.  65-137 ;  J.  W.  Headlam,  Bismarck 
and  the  Foundatiojt  of  the  German  Empire  (1899),  in  the  "  Heroes  of  the 
Nations  "  Series,  judicial  and  well-wTitten ;  G.  B.  Malleson,  The  Refound- 
ing  of  the  German  Empire,  1848-1^14,  new  ed,  (1914),  chiefly  military. 
Standard  works :  Heinrich  von  Sybel,  The  Founding  of  the  German  Empire 
by  William  I,  Eng.  trans,  by  M.  L.  Perrin  and  Gamaliel  Bradford,  7  vols. 
( 1 890-1 898),  the  work  of  a  famous  German  patriot-historian  who  had 
access  to  the  Prussian  state  archives  for  the  period  preceding  1867 ;  Wil- 
helm Maurenbrecher,  Griindung  des  deutschen  Reiches,  i8jg-i8yi,  4th  ed. 
by  W.  Busch  (191 1)  ;  Hans  von  Zwiedineck-Siidenhorst,  Deutsche  Ge- 
schichte  von  der  Aufidsung  des  alten  bis  zur  Errichtung  des  neuen  Kaiser- 
reiches,  i8o6--i8yi,  3  vols.  (189 7-1 905),  partisanly  patriotic  in  much  the 
same  way  as  Von  Sybel ;  Wilhelm  Oncken,  Das  Zeitalter  des  Kaisers  Wil- 
helm, 2  vols.  (1890-1892) ;  Ottokar  Lorenz,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  und  die  Be- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  209 


griindung  des  Reichs,  i866-i8yi,  2d  ed.  (1902) ;  P.  Kloeppel,  Dreissig 
Jakre  deutscher  Verjassungsgeschichte,  iSdy-iSgy,  Vol.  I,  Die  Griindung 
des  Reichs  und  die  Jahre  der  Arbeit,  iSdy-iSyy  (1900) ;  Ernest  Denis,  Le 
fondation  de  V empire  allemand,  18 j 2-18/ 1  (1906),  an  excellent  treatise  by  a 
French  scholar.  Special  contributions:  Sir  H.  M.  Hozier,  The  Seven 
Weeks'  War:  its  Antecedents  and  its  Incidents,  2  vols.  (1867),  based  on 
letters  written  during  the  war  from  Bohemia  to  the  London  Times;  Hein- 
rich  Friedjung,  Der  Kampf  urn  die  V orherrschaft  in  Dcutschland,  i8jQ-i866, 
2  vols.  (189 7-1 898) ;  Ludwig  Hahn  (editor),  Zwei  Jahre  preussisch-deutscher 
Politik,  i866-i86y  (1868)  and  Der  Krieg  Deutschlaiids  gegen  Frankreich 
.  .  .  die  deutsche  Politik  i86y  his  187 1  (187 1),  valuable  collections  of 
documents  relating  to  the  foundation  of  the  German  Empire;  Memoirs 
of  Prince  Chlodwig  Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst,  Eng.  trans,  by  G.  W.  Chrystal, 
2  vols.  (1906),  useful  for  relations  between  the  North  German  Confedera- 
tion and  the  south  German  states,  especially  Bavaria.  Of  almost  innumer- 
able lives  of  Bismarck,  the  following  are  the  best  and  most  serviceable : 
Munroe  Smith,  Bismarck  and  German  Unity,  2d  rev.  ed.  (1910),  an  admi- 
rable sketch ;  Charles  Lowe,  Prince  Bismarck  (1899),  an  abridgment  of  the 
same  author's  longer  work  Prince  Bismarck:  an  Historical  Biography, 
2  vols.  (1885) ;  Erich  Marcks,  Bismarck,  eine  Biographic,  now  in  course  of 
publication,  promises  to  be  the  most  satisfactory  account  in  German  — 
Vol.  I  is  entitled  Bismarcks  Jugend,  1815-1848  (1909) ;  Paul  Matter,  Bis- 
marck et  son  temps,  new  ed.,  3  vols.  (19 14),  the  chief  French  authority, 
remarkably  fair-minded.  See  also  Prince  Bismarck^ s  Letters  to  his  Wife, 
his  Sister,  and  Others,  from  1844  to  1870,  Eng.  trans,  by  Fitzh.  Maxse 
(1878).  A  very  elaborate  history  of  Bismarck  —  a  cooperative  enterprise 
in  twelve  volumes  —  is  in  course  of  publication  as  Geschichte  des  Fiirsten 
Bismarck  in  Einzeldarstellungen  (1907  sqq.). 

For  Austria-Hungary,  1848-187 1,  consult  the  bibliography  appended  to 
Chapter  XXIV,  below. 

The  War  of  1870-1871.  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XI  (1909), 
ch.  xxi,  a  compact  account  by  Sir  J.  F.  Maurice ;  J.  H.  Rose,  The  Develop- 
ment of  the  European  Nations,  i8yo-igoo,  Vol.  I  (1905),  ch.  i-iv,  clear  and 
interesting;  Lord  Acton,  Historical  Essays  and  Studies  (1907),  ch.  vii, 
viii;  fimile  OUivier,  The  Franco- Prussian  War  and  its  Hidden  Causes, 
trans,  by  G.  B.  Ives  (191 2),  an  apology  for  and  by  the  French  premier  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war;  George  Hooper,  The  Campaign  of  Sedan,  August- 
September,  i8yo  (1914) ;  Lonsdale  Hale,  People's  War  in  France  (1904), 
based  on  Fritz  Honig,  Der  Volkskrieg  an  der  Loire  im  Herbst  i8yo  .  .  ., 
8  vols.  (1893-1897),  and  useful  for  the  campaigns  after  Sedan;  Arthur 
Chuquet,  La  guerre  de  i8jo-i8yi  (1895),  a  good  brief  narrative;  Jean 
Jaures,  La  guerre  franco- all emoTuie,  i8'/o-i8'/i,  in  Vol.  XI  (1908)  of  the 
Histoire  socialiste;  Edmond  Palat  (pseud.  Pierre  Lehautcourt),  Les  origines 
de  la  guerre  de  i8jo:  la  candidature  Hohenzollern,  1868-1870  (191 2),  a 
valuable  study  in  diplomacy,  and,  by  the  same  author,  Histoire  de  la  guerre 
de  j8jo,  7  vols,  (i  901 -1908),  very  detailed  and  stopping  with  the  surrender 


9       VOL.  II  — p 


2IO 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  Mctz  in  October,  1870,  and  the  briefer  Guerre  de  iS^o-iSyr,  2  vols. 
(1910) ;  HcUmuth  von  Moltke,  Franco-German  War  of  i8yo-i8/i,  Eng. 
trans,  by  Clara  Bell  and  H.  W.  Fischer,  2  vols.  (1891),  important  but 
technical;  the  very  elaborate  documentary  histories  published  under  the 
auspices  of  the  French  General  Staff  and  the  German  General  Staff  respec- 
tively; Albert  Sorel,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  la  guerre  franco-allemande, 
2  vols.  (1875) ;  Antonin  Debidour,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  1' Europe, 
1814-18/8,  Vol.  II  (1891),  ch.  vii-x ;  Moritz  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco- 
German  War,  i8yo-i8yi,  Eng.  trans.,  2  vols.  (1879) ;  Bismarck's  Letters 
to  his  Wife  from  the  Seat  of  War,  i8yo-i8yi.  Eng.  trans,  by  Armin  Harder 
(1903) ;  Diaries  of  Emperor  Frederick  during  the  Campaigns  of  1866  and 
i8'/o-i8'/i,  Eng.  trans,  by  F.  A.  Welby  (1902) ;  E.  B.  Washburne,  Recol- 
lections of  a  Minister  to  France,  1860-1877,  2  vols.  (1887),  and,  by  the  same 
author,  who  was  American  minister  to  France,  Franco-German  War  and 
Insurrection  of  the  Commune  (1878) ;  E.  A.  Vizetelly,  My  Days  of  Adventure  : 
the  Fall  of  France,  1870-1871  (1914),  memoirs  of  an  eye-witness. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


SOCIAL  FACTORS  IN  RECENT  EUROPEAN  HISTORY,  1871-1914 

It  is  always  dangerous  to  emphasize  the  ''periodizing"  of 
history,  for  the  pretty  obvious  reasons  (i)  that  the  label  applied 
to  a  particular  period  or  era,  no  matter  how  appro-  _ 

.     ^.  ,    ^  1      .      1  ,  .1      Dangers  in 

priate  it  may  be,  can  emphasize  but  one  element  in  the  "  Periodiz- 
events  of  the  time  and  may,  therefore,  bhnd  the  eye  j^^^"  ^^s- 
to  secondary  but  none  the  less  significant  features, 
and  (2)  that  the  roots  of  any  period  often  lie  far  back  in  other 
and  widely  scattered  periods,  from  which  they  cannot  be  arbi- 
trarily separated  without  destroying  their  vitality.  Thus,  in 
the  last  chapter,  the  idea  of  ^'nationahsm"  has  been  stressed, 
but  ''nationahsm"  is  by  no  means  a  complete  explanation  of  a 
multitude  of  historical  facts  during  the  years  from  1848  to  187 1 — 
the  growth  of  democracy,  the  furtherance  of  Christian  missions, 
the  increased  wealth  of  capitalists,  the  vogue  of  marble-topped 
tables,  black-walnut  furniture,  and  hoop-skirts.  Nor  is  '^na- 
tionaUsm"  a  novelty  of  the  period  :  its  foundations,  as  we  know, 
rest  upon  a  Napoleonic  myth,  upon  a  revolutionary  sentiment 
styled  '^fraternity,"  and  upon  a  consciousness  of  kind  that  can 
be  traced  back  far  beyond  the  sixteenth  century. 

Convenience  of  treatment  becomes  the  real  justification  for 
guiding  the  stream  of  history  into  Httle  pools  and  eddies.  Politi- 
cally speaking,  nationalism"  was  undeniably  the  most  potent 
factor  in  shaping  the  course  of  Europe  from  1848  to  187 1 ;  and 
if  the  student  remembers  constantly  that  this  fact  must  be  con- 
ditioned in  his  own  mind  by  a  grasp  on  contemporary  develop- 
ments in  science,  art,  religion,  and  society,  he  will  then  be  in  a 
better  position  to  appreciate  the  whole  flow  of  human  events 
down  through  the  tortuous  and  rocky  channel  of  the  nineteenth 
century. 

211 


212  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Whatever  qualifications  must  be  made  in  treating  the  years 
from  1 815  to  1830  as  the  ''Era  of  Metternich,"  or  those  from 
1830  to  1848  as  marked  by  "Democratic  Reform  and  Revolu- 
tion," or  those  from  1848  to  187 1  as  distinguished  by  the  "  Growth 
of  Nationahsm,"  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  at  least  in  politics 
and  government  a  new  era  was  inaugurated  about  187 1,  —  an 
era  of  peace  among  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  which  was  to 
endure  some  forty-three  years,  —  an  era  of  steady  domestic  de- 
velopment along  lines  whose  general  character  it  is  the  purpose 
of  this  chapter  to  set  forth. 


"THE  ERA  OF  THE  BENEVOLENT  BOURGEOISIE," 
1871-1914 

First  and  most  striking  of  the  political  facts  of  the  new  era 
is  that  its  beginning  is  approximately  the  beginning  of  nearly 
all  the  present-day  governments  of  Europe.  From 
emments  '^^^  which  ended  the  preceding  period  date  the 

throughout  German  Empire  and  the  Third  French  Republic. 
1871-1914  kingdom  of  Italy,  proclaimed  in  1861,  was  not 

territorially  complete  until  1870.  The  dual  rela- 
tionship between  the  empire  of  Austria  and  the  kingdom  of 
Hungary,  together  with  the  final  estabHshment  of  constitutional 
government  in  each,  dates  from  1867.  In  the  same  year,  the 
grant  of  the  elective  franchise  to  workingmen  inaugurated  the 
democratic  monarchy  in  Great  Britain.  Constitutional  revi- 
sions in  1866  determined  the  subsequent  representative  systems 
of  Denmark  and  Sweden.  To-day  the  fundamental  law  of  Swit- 
zerland is  the  constitution  of  1874,  and  that  of  Spain,  a  document 
of  1876.  Even  the  present-day  constitutional  regime  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire  is  only  an  appHcation  of  a  scheme  prematurely 
promulgated  in  1876.  Greece  secured  a  new  dynasty  and  a 
new  constitution  in  1864.  And.  the  independence  of  Rumania, 
Serbia,  and  Montenegro,  and  the  autonomy  of  Bulgaria,  were 
definitely  acknowledged  in  the  'seventies. 

It  is,  therefore,  a  politically  new  Europe  with  which  we  have  to 
deal  after  187 1.  But  it  is  one  in  which  the  great  principles  of  the 
French  Revolution  have  triumphed  or  seem  about  to  triumph. 
Barely  six  decades  had  elapsed  since  Metternich  had  played  host 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  213 

to  the  gold-laced  Congress  of  Vienna  and  had  found  in  every 
dignitary  or  potentate  there  assembled  a  willing  ally  ^  in  disre- 
garding nationaHsm,  in  seeking  to  repress  HberaHsm,  jj^^j^^j^^ 
and  in  scoffing  at  equaHty.    But  from  1815  to  1871,  Triumph 
through  stress  of  revolutions  and  storms  of  interna-  p^^^^jp^gg 
tional  wars,  Metternich  and  his  whole  poHtical  school  of  the 
had  been  beaten  and  buffeted  about  and  relegated,  as  J^ench 

,  .  -r»       n        1        •  r  Revolution 

It  were,  to  ancient  history.    By  187 1  the  victory  01 

the  French  Revolution  was  at  last  certain.    Henceforth,  for  an 

indefinite  period,  the  ideal  unit  of  organized  pohtical  life  would  be 

the  nation,  a  group  of  people  speaking  the  same  Ian-  j^^^^j^^gj^ 

guage,  sharing  the  same  general  customs  and  traditions, 

and  conscious  in  every  case,  whether  justifiably  or  not,  of  its  own 

racial  superiority."  This  was  vital  ''nationahsm,"  this  was 
the  new  patriotism,  this  was  the  logical  outcome  of  that  fra- 
ternity which  the  revolutionaries  had  preached  and  the  literary 
people  inculcated  and  which  now  the  whole  world  cherished. 

Henceforth,  also,  the  ideal  method  of  organized  political  life 
would  be  constitutionahsm,  that  is  to  say,  a  solemn  under- 
standing on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  every  Constitu- 
country  that  government,  whether  monarchical  or  tionaUsm 
republican,  centralized  or  federal,  parhamentary  or  congres- 
sional, should  have  no  power  to  restrict  certain  rights  and  priv- 
ileges that  were  held  to  inhere  in  the  individual  citizen,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  that  what  powers  it  did  enjoy  should  be  exercised 
only  by  regularly  elected  representatives  of  the  nation.  This 
was  the  achievement  of  *'Uberty,"  as  the  revolutionaries  had 
conceived  it  and  as  the  Liberals  had  propagated  it. 

Of  ''equaHty"  much  the  same  sort  prevailed  in  fact  after 
187 1  as  had  been  maintained  in  theory  by  the  French  bour- 
geoisie nearly  a  hundred  years  earlier.    It  was  the  p^^..^^ 
sort  which  combated  special  privileges,  of  whatever  nence  of  the 
character,  of  the  ancient  landowning  aristocracy  and  ^^^^^^ 
of  the  Christian  clergy,  whether  Catholic  or  Protes- 
tant ;  which  tended  to  make  business  men  and  professional  men 
the  social  equals  of  priests  and  landlords ;  and  which,  for  the 


^  The  only  exception  was  the  Tsar  Alexander  of  Russia.  It  is  a  curious  fact 
that  the  only  European  monarch  who  zealously  fought  the  principles  of  the  Revo- 
lution after  1871  was  the  tsar  of  Russia. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


people  at  large,  was  simply  a  guarantee  of  equality  before  the 
law  and  of  theoretical  equality  of  individual  rights.  In  a  word, 
it  was  the  ''equality"  which  registered  everywhere  the  economic, 
intellectual,  and  social  preeminence  of  the  middle  class  — • 
the  bourgeoisie.  It  was  not  economic  equality  or  necessarily 
even  complete  equality  of  opportunity. 

Thus,  the  period  after  1871  was  the  consummation  of  the 
bourgeois  Revolution.     Its  poHtical  principles  and 

Bourgeois  .  .11  r  ^         ^  ^ 

Character  practices  Were  mamly  those  of  the  French  bourgeoisie 
1871^1914  ^7^9-  statesmen  belonged  in  sympathy  if  not 
by  birth  to  the  middle  class.  The  bulk  of  its  legisla- 
tion was  in  the  interest  of  the  middle  class  —  the  merchants, 
the  traders,  the    captains  of  industry." 

The  bourgeois  character  of  the  new  era  is  easily  explained 
by  reference  to  the  fact  that  the  period  was  as  much  the  eco- 
The  Era  nomic  result  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  as  the  politi- 
Sociaiiy  the  cal  outcome  of  the  French  Revolution.  The  downfall 
the*inTus°^  of  Metternich,  the  theatrical  adventures  of  Napoleon 
trial  Revo-  III,  the  rise  of  Cavour  and  Bismarck,  must  not 
lution  obscure  the  development  and  expansion  of  the  factory 
system  that  had  been  steadily  going  on  ever  since  the  momen- 
tous year  1768,  when  Richard  Arkwright  had  erected  in  Notting- 
ham his  first  power  factory.  From  that  time  down  to  1871  and 
afterwards,  water  or  steam  was  ever  turning  busy  wheels  of  in- 
dustry, spinning  at  incredible  speed  milHons  upon  milKons  of 
spindles  in  cotton  factories,  moving  the  tireless  steel  arms  of  the 
mechanical  loom,  lifting  and  bringing  down  the  ponderous  steam- 
hammer  with  crushing  weight.  Not  only  in  England  were  fac- 
tories springing  up,  but  since  181 5,  Hke  mushrooms,  in  the 
towns  of  France  and  Italy  and  Germany  and  the  Low  Countries 
and  even  in  the  realms  of  the  Habsburg  emperor.  Blast  fur- 
naces belched  forth  their  lurid  breath  along  the  Rhine  as  well 
as  in  Wales ;  and  black-faced  miners  in  an  endless  search  for 
coal  were  sinking  shaft  after  shaft  in  Belgium,  in  France,  and 
in  Bavaria.  The  steam  locomotive  was  ever  invading  new  terri- 
tories, startling  quiet  countrysides  with  its  noisy  pufhngs  and 
darkening  the  blue  sky  with  its  trail  of  smoke ;  like  a  vast  net- 
work, the  railways  were  extending  themselves  over  France  and 
Belgium,  through  the  passes  of  the  Alps,  down  the  valleys  of  the 


"-T  1^^^^^  .         I         [  Industrial  Districts 

V      \  o      r/  ^ —       /  Agriculture  and  Stock 


CENTRAL  EUROPE 
SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC 


O      Trade  Centres 


ShitoTtier, 


\    ^-^Brucfc^  /Soi-rou"**  "  k  ,      f        ^  k  Varad^XiiC     v 'XX^  V         T'"^  ^S^f" 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


215 


Rhine  and  the  Po,  across  Prussia  and  Austria,  and  on  through  the 
bleak  plains  of  Russia  and  the  Siberian  wastes  to  the  ancient 
Oriental  marts,  —  railways,  new  trade-routes  of  a  great  new  era  ! 

The  social  effect  of  this  resistless  march  of  the  Industrial 
Revolution  becomes  clear  only  when  one  remembers  that  each 
factory,  each  mine,  each  furnace,  each  railway  was  owned  by 
some  bourgeois  capitaKst  or  company  of  bourgeois  capitalists. 
If  Sir  Richard  Arkwright  was  the  ''father  of  the  factory  system," 
as  he  is  so  often  called,  he  was  hkewise  the  father  of  the  factory- 
owner,  and  his  was  a  numerous  and  powerful  progeny.  By 
thousands  they  now  appeared  —  shrewd,  enterprising,  intelli- 
gent business  men,  usually  self-complacent  and  always  self- 
reliant.  In  Russia,  in  Italy,  in  Hungary,  as  well  as  in  France 
and  England  and  Belgium,  the  new  business  man  was  making 
his  place  in  society  and  in  politics. 

When  European  states  since  1871  are  styled  ''bourgeois," 
it  must  not  be  supposed  that  nobility,  clergy,  peasants,  and 
workingmen  had  ceased  to  exist  or  that  all  of  them  „    .  ^ 

.  Persistence 

had  been  transformed  into  a  perfect  middle  class,  in  Recent 
These  variations  in  human  society  have  certainly  sur-  T!"^^^ 
vived  to  the  present  moment,  constituting  in  sum  other  than 
the  large  majority  of  the  population  of  every  country,  gQ^j.ggQjgjg 
but  in  economic  interests  they  have  become  increas- 
ingly dependent  upon  the  bourgeoisie.  The  period  under  review, 
then,  is  bourgeois  because  the  bourgeoisie,  among  all  social 
classes,  is  the  most  influential. 

The  rise  of  the  bourgeoisie,  —  a  long  process,  patronized  by 
the  Commercial  Revolution,  enormously  quickened  alike  by  the 
French  Revolution  and  by  the  Industrial  Revolution,  Altered 
seemingly  consummated  in  the  second  half  of  the  nine-  Relations  of 
teenth  century,  —  had  tremendous  effects   on   the  cksTes 
fortunes  of  all  the  other  traditional  classes  in  society,  to  the 
Thus,  the  ancient  landed  aristocracy  was  in  time 
actually  revolutionized.   The  nobleman  who  formerly  had  prided 
himself  upon  ownership  exclusively  of  land  and  had  despised  the 
bourgeois  as  a  vulgar  shopkeeper  and  tradesman,  now  The 
perceiving  that  his  own  profits  from  the  soil  were  not  Nobility 
keeping  pace  with  the  capitalist's  profits  from  factory,  railway,  or 
mine,  himself  began  to  invest  his  surplus  wealth  in  the  stocks  of 


2l6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


commercial  or  industrial  enterprises,  to  take  up  residence  in  the 
city,  to  become  a  director  of  great  chartered  companies,  and  to  use 
his  landed  estates  as  secondary  assets,  in  many  cases  as  hunting 
preserves  for  his  personal  recreation.  On  the  other  hand,  es- 
pecially wealthy  bourgeois  bought  large  estates  from  impov- 
erished noblemen  and  sometimes  even  purchased  titles  of  no- 
bility for  themselves.  From  both  sides  a  gradual  process  was 
welding  together  the  landowning  aristocracy  and  the  industrial 
and  commercial  bourgeoisie.  In  earlier  days  the  rivalries  of 
these  two  classes  had  characterized  much  of  the  social  history  of 
England,  France,  Spain,  the  Netherlands,  the  Germanics,  and 
Italy;  after  187 1  their  alliance  bespeaks  a  new  character  of 
social  evolution.  In  this  respect,  as  in  every  other,  conditions 
varied  from  one  country  in  Europe  to  another,  from  one  region  to 
another,  but,  in  general,  it  may  be  accepted  as  axiomatic  that 
wherever  the  Industrial  Revolution  was  most  in  evidence,  there 
the  soHdarity  of  nobility  and  middle  class  was  most  pronounced. 

Peasants  and  artisans  and  day-laborers  came  also,  though  in 
a  different  way,  under  the  spell  of  the  new  bourgeois  wealth. 
The  Peasants  who  were  in  the  category  of  thrifty  inde- 

Peasantry  pendent  farmers,  as  was  frequently  the  case  in  France, 
began  discreetly  to  invest  their  little  hoardings  in  stocks  or 
bonds  and  to  become  identified  in  a  small  way  with  the  capital- 
ist system :  in  company  with  nobles  and  bourgeois  they  now 
opposed  any  state  action  that  would  be  Kkely  to  endanger  their 
investments  or  to  reduce  their  dividends.  Peasants  who  were 
less  independent,  such  as  the  generality  of  rural  laborers  in  Great 
Britain,  gradually  perceived  that  their  wages  bore  some  relation 
to  their  landlord's  gains  or  losses  in  business  and  on  the  urban 
exchange,  and  accepted  the  conclusion  that,  therefore,  their 
own  welfare  depended  upon  others'  prosperity.  The  peasants 
who,  finding  their  plight  on  the  farms  too  miserable,  wandered 
away  to  seek  rehef  in  factory-employment,  learned  from  the 
carpenters,  bricklayers,  plumbers,  and  tailors,  from  day  laborers 
and  factory  hands  already  cluttered  together  in  the  towns,  that 
The  the  independence  of  every  wage-earner,  urban  as  well 

Artisans  rural,  was  conditional  upon  the  current  situation 

in  the  money-market  and  in  the  market  of  supply  and 
demand,  that  a  slump  in  stocks  might  suddenly  throw  thousands 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  217 


out  of  work,  and  that  the  livehhood  of  all  was  in  fact  contingent 
upon  the  prosperity  of  the  bourgeoisie.  Ever  since  David 
Ricardo  (1772-1823)  and  J.  R.  M'Culloch  (1789-1864),  those 
intellectual  contributors  to  the  cause  of  the  bourgeoisie,  had 
insisted  in  their  learned  works  on  poUtical  economy  that  wages 
are  derived  from  capital,  professors  and  parhamentarians  had 
vied  with  one  another  in  pointing  out  to  the  masses  that  their 
very  sustenance  is  from  the  bounty  of  one  class.  Backed  by 
such  authority  the  notion  made  rapid  conquests.  It  naturally 
possessed  the  minds  of  all  the  middle  class,  including  the  pro- 
fessional men  who  were  more  or  less  subordinate  to  the  great 
capitahsts,  and  by  the  preachments  of  newspapers  and  more  im- 
pressively by  the  hard  experiences  of  daily  Hfe,  it  was  in  turn 
gradually  communicated  to  the  lower  classes.  Eventually, 
therefore,  it  seemed  as  if  the  first  duty  incumbent  upon  Bourgeois 
all  citizens,  regardless  of  class,  was  to  promote  industry  Matenai- 
and  trade  and  to  enable  the  bourgeois  capitaKst  to 
add  wealth  to  riches.  So  far  was  the  argument  pushed  that 
business  prosperity  was  accepted  in  many  quarters  as  the  end 
and  aim  of  national  patriotism.  The  acceptance  of  this  prosaic 
doctrine  was  made  easier  for  the  lower  classes  in  Europe  by 
the  knowledge  that  now  and  then  an  individual  from  their 
midst  rose  to  be  an  industrial  magnate  and  by  the  widespread 
belief  that  all  of  them  might  rise  in  the  social  scale,  were  they 
but  thrifty  and  honest  and  sober.  It  was  what  those  who 
had  already  risen — the  bourgeoisie  —  termed  ''equality  of 
opportunity." 

Under  the  circumstances  of  their  economic  supremacy  it 
was  possible  and  even  advantageous  for  the  bourgeoisie  to  be 
sincere  supporters  of  the  democratic  governmental 
doctrines  of  the  French  Revolution.    ''Liberty  "  would  Bourgeois 

,  .  Devotion  to 

guarantee  them  important  mdividual  rights,  not  the  Prin- 
least  among  which  was  the  fundamental  right  of  pri-  "p^®^  °^ 

M  n  111  1  1    •  French 

vate  property.      Liberty    would  also,  through  its  Revolution 
emphasis  on  representative  government,  entitle  them 
to  a  decisive  share  in  making  and  executing  the  laws ;  and  even 
the  grant  of  universal  manhood  suffrage,  while  flattering  to  the 
lower  classes,  could  do  the  bourgeois  no  serious  harm,  so  long 
as  the  wage  theories  of  the  classical  economists  were  generally 


2l8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


taught  and  respected.  ''Equality"  was  a  little  dimmer  and 
vaguer  :  for  the  present  it  was  still  a  theoretical  equality  before 
the  law  and  an  assumed  equahty  of  opportunity;  for  the 
future,  it  was  hoped,  the  ideal  of  equality  might  be  rendered 
more  practicable  by  the  diffusion  of  popular  education  and  the 
increase  of  wealth  and  human  efficiency.  But  ''fraternity" 
could  be  immediately  vital;  vigorous  national  patriotism  was 
in  itself  desirable  and  incidentally  distracted  attention  from 
economic  inequaKties ;  it  could  unite  a  whole  nation  in  common 
allegiance  to  a  glorious  emotion ;  it  could  conveniently  serve 
the  middle  class  of  one  country  in  competing  industrially  or 
commercially  with  the  middle  class  of  another  country.  Small 
wonder  that  the  triumph  of  the  principles  of  the  French 
Revolution  was  assured  by  the  triumph  of  the  bourgeoisie  ! 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  summarize  three  great  char- 
acteristics of  the  period  of  European  history  from  1871  to  1914. 

(i)  Politically  speaking,  the  beginning  of  the  period 
ttiTchief  marked  by  the  beginning  in  nearly  every  country 

Characteris-  of  a  new  form  of  government,  which  has  lasted  to  the 
tics  of  the     present.    (2)  Socially,  the  period  was  marked  by  the 

£ra  107I""  .  ri«iiii  • 

1914  preeminence  of  the  middle  class  —  a  preeminence 

which  rested  directly  upon  the  economic  foundations 
of  the  Industrial  Revolution  and  which  profoundly  modified  the 
activities  and  ambitions  of  other  classes.  (3)  PoKtically  again, 
the  period  was  marked  by  the  exaltation,  under  middle-class 
auspices,  of  three  of  the  major  principles  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion :  (a)  individual  liberty ;  (b)  constitutionalism,  including 
representative  government,  and,  in  most  countries,  universal 
manhood  suffrage;  and  (c)  nationalism. 

Within  the  confines  of  a  single  chapter  it  is  impossible  to  tell 
the  story  of  this  period  in  any  such  detail  as  that  with  which 
the  history  of  earlier  eras  has  been  narrated.  The  reasons  are 
simple.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  an  unusually  long  period  — 
forty-three  years.  Secondly,  as  a  period  of  unbroken  peace  in 
the  relations  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  with  one  another, 
it  was  devoid  of  such  great  military  deeds  as  served  to  provide 
a  unifying  theme  for  reviewing  the  career  of  Napoleon  or  the 
growth  of  nationalism  just  prior  to  1871.  Thirdly,  it  was  domi- 
nated by  no  single  domestic  development  common  to  all  Europe 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


219 


—  by  no  such  unique  figure  as  Count  Metternich,  by  no  such 
universally  unsettling  occurrence  as  the  Industrial  Revolution, 
by  no  such  instantly  ubiquitous  movements  as  the  political 
upheavals  of  1848.  Lastly,  the  internal  development  which  forty- 
three  years  of  peace  allowed  to  most  countries  of  Europe  was 
very  far-reaching  and  is  deserving  of  detailed  study. 

Accordingly,  the  main  facts  of  the  period,  in  so  far  as  they 
relate  to  the  domestic  poHtics  of  Europe,  will  be  treated,  country 
by  country,  in  the  following  five  chapters.  In  view  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  these  facts  not  only  to  the  period  itself  blit  to  the 
future  as  well,  it  is  beheved  that  five  chapters  will  not  prove 
too  many  —  one  on  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  one  on  Latin 
Europe,  one  on  Teutonic  Europe,  one  on  Russia,  and  one  on 
the  dismemberment  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  five,  taken 
together,  will  undertake  to  do  for  the  years  from  187 1  to  1914 
what  the  single  chapter  on  Metternich  did  for  the  years  from 
1815  to  1830. 

In  the  present  chapter  the  aim  is  simply  to  indicate  a  few 
striking  points  of  resemblance  in  the  histories  of  all  the  Euro- 
pean countries  during  the  period  and  to  offer  a  somewhat  more 
detailed  explanation  than  has  yet  been  found  necessary  of 
certain  problems  which  were  destined  in  novel  ways  to  agitate  and 
trouble  almost  every  government,  —  the  relations  between  the 
state  and  religion,  and  the  rise  of  SociaHsm. 

In  the  next  five  chapters  the  details  of  the  story  will  vary 
greatly  as  we  pass  from  one  country  to  another.  But  certain 
general  facts  will  appear  again  and  again  with  almost  tiresome 
iteration.  Under  the  newly  constituted  government  of  almost 
every  European  state  will  be  revealed  the  primary  character- 
istics of  the  period  which  have  already  been  mentioned,  —  the 
economic,  social,  intellectual,  and  political  supremacy  of  the 
bourgeoisie,  and  the  rapid  furtherance  of  the  principles  of  politi- 
cal democracy  and  patriotic  nationalism.  For  a  thorough 
understanding  of  the  period,  however,  it  will  not  be  enough  to 
remember  these  primary  factors,  derived  respectively  from  the 
Industrial  Revolution  and  from  the  French  Revolution :  in  ad- 
dition, it  will  be  necessary  to  watch  for  their  common  con- 
crete manifestations,  which,  perhaps,  may  be  called  secondary 
characteristics. 


2  20  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Among  the  secondary  characteristics  of  the  period  from  1871 
to  1 914  which  may  be  readily  detected  and  summarized,  the 
following  seem  particularly  significant  : 

(1)  Legislation  directly  favorable  to  private  industry  and 
commerce,  such  as  the  maintenance  of  order  and  security,  advan- 
Summary  of  tageous  Corporation  laws,  protection  of  private  prop- 
Practical  erty  against  arbitrary  confiscations,  and  legislative 
menWofthe  ^^^^  public  subsiclies  to  private  business.  State 
Era  1871-  action  only  slightly  less  direct  in  its  favors  to  private 
^^^"^  industry  and  commerce  is  evidenced  under  the  next 
headings  (2)-(5). 

(2)  Readjustment  of  taxation-systems,  so  as  to  inflict  as 
little  injury  as  possible  upon  business  interests.  This  impHed 
the  imposition  of  a  slowly  but  steadily  augmenting  customs 
tariff  upon  goods  imported  into  almost  every  Continental 
country,  for  the  avowed  purposes  of  providing  revenue  and 
protecting  native  industries  against  foreign  competition.  Great 
Britain  alone  of  all  the  more  important  states  retained  the  free- 
trade  system  prevalent  in  the  preceding  period ;  she  did  so  because 
of  her  relatively  greater  need  of  raw  materials  for  her  factories 
and  because  of  the  lead  in  industry  which  she  still  enjoyed  over 
the  rest  of  the  world,  though  she  did  so  against  the  loud  protests 
of  a  determined  minority.  In  either  case  —  protective  tariff  or 
free  trade  —  the  policy  was  pursued  which  best  served  the 
prosperity  of  the  industrial  class. 

•  (3)  Unparalleled  growth  of  merchant  marines.  Not  only 
ships  of  Great  Britain,  but  those  of  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Greece,  the  Netherlands,  and  Norway  became  conspicuous 
sea-carriers.  In  many  countries  commercial  expansion  was 
fostered  by  a  system  of  governmental  bounties. 

(4)  A  new  era  of  imperahsm,  in  which  the  business  man's 
desire  for  new  fields  for  the  investment  of  surplus  capital  and 
for  new  markets  for  the  sale  of  surplus  products  was  identified 
with  a  very  real  national  longing  to  have  a  particular  flag  wave 
over  as  wide  and  varied  an  expanse  of  the  earth's  surface  as 
possible.  This  is  national  imperiaHsm,  a  process  in  which  the 
several  European  governments,  backed  by  their  peoples,  engaged 
in  a  mad  scramble  for  the  partition  of  the  globe.  Under  the 
impetus  of  this  national  imperiaHsm,  greater  progress  was  made 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  221 


in  Europeanizing  the  world  in  the  years  from  1871  to  1914  than 
in  all  the  preceding  centuries  since  the  discovery  of  America.^ 

(5)  MiUtarism,  the  maintenance  on  the  part  of  European 
states,  large  and  small,  of  heavier  armaments  on  land  and 
sea  than  the  world  had  ever  before  witnessed,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  whole  period  of  forty-three  years  was  essentially  peace- 
ful. It  was  at  once  the  outcome  of  the  international  struggles 
of  the  preceding  era  and  a  pledge  of  the  contemporary  spirit  of 
national  patriotism,  and  it  was  actively  advocated  by  a  great 
number  of  the  middle  class  who  perceived  in  it  a  guarantee  of 
the  maintenance  of  the  capitaHstic  system,  a  kind  of  public 
insurance  against  the  attacks  of  other  nationahties  upon  their 
colonies,  their  commerce,  and  their  industry.  In  this  connection 
it  is  significant  to  add  that  the  chief  efforts  of  diplomacy  were 
directed  during  the  period,  not  as  once  to  dynastic  aggrandize- 
ment, but  to  the  advancement  of  business  enterprises.^ 

(6)  Gradual  evolution  of  governmental  institutions  in  the 
direction  of  poKtical  democracy.  Here  belong  the  succession  of 
written  constitutions  that  now  encircle  the  globe ;  the  diminu- 
tion of  royal  power  and  the  increase  of  parliamentary  functions ; 
the  almost  universal  extension  of  the  suffrage  to  adult  males, 
and  the  beginnings  of  serious  agitation  for  female  suffrage ;  the 
trial  of  such  expedients  as  the  initiative  and  referendum  in 
Switzerland  and  proportional  representation  in  Belgium.  It 
will  be  noticed  that  these  pohtical  concessions  were  never  stren- 
uously resisted  by  the  middle  class ;  on  the  contrary,  they  were 
often  instigated  by  them.  It  sufficed  the  middle  class  to  main- 
tain their  economic  mastery :  in  every  other  field  they  were 
self-effacing  and  magnanimous.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the 
bourgeoisie  preserved,  as  a  class,  their  old  tradition  of  being 
educated,  enHghtcned,  and  benevolent.  The  next  headings 
(7)-(io)  bespeak  this  fact:  together  with  (6),  they  embrace 
the  benevolent  endeavors  of  an  enlightened  bourgeoisie. 

(7)  Free,  public,  secular  education,  —  the  attempt,  begun 
and  carried  forward  under  bourgeois  auspices,  to  establish  an 

*  "National  Imperialism,"  on  account  of  its  far-reaching  im[)ortance,  is  reserved 
for  fuller  treatment  to  Part  V  of  this  volume,  particularly  to  Chapters  XXVII- 
XXTX. 

'  The  international  relations  of  the  period  are  briefly  treated  in  Chapter  XXX. 


222 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


intellectual  democracy.  Institutions  of  learning  and  research 
were  munificently  endowed.  Never  before  had  European  coun- 
tries devoted  so  much  thought  and  money  to  the  erection  of 
public  schools.  By  the  close  of  the  period  the  highest  percentage 
of  literacy  in  relation  to  illiteracy  had  become  an  added  general 
object  of  international  rivalry. 

(8)  Growing  appreciation  on  the  part  of  the  middle  class  of 
the  necessity  of  safeguarding  the  physical  well-being  of  the 
lower  classes.  All  along  the  line,  signs  were  multiplying  of  an 
eflfort  to  do  away  with  the  earlier  enmity  between  factory- 
owners  and  factory-workers  and  to  substitute  in  its  place  a 
sense  of  social  soHdarity.  Thoughtful  business  men  perceived 
that  social  efficiency  might  be  increased,  rather  than  decreased, 
by  the  industry  of  a  well-fed,  healthy,  contented  working  class. 
Statesmen,  too,  perceived  that  the  strength  and  loyalty  of  the 
numerous  working  class  were  essential  to  the  military  power 
of  their  nations.  Beginning  with  Bismarck's  notable  measures 
in  Germany,  one  European  state  after  another  took  steps, 
usually  with  the  support  of  at  least  a  large  element  of  the  middle 
class,  to  insure  a  minimum  degree  of  material  comfort  to  the 
lower  classes.  Such  were  factory-  and  mines-legislation ;  full 
legalization  of  trade  unions ;  national  insurance  against  illness, 
death,  accident,  and  unemployment;  minimum  wage-rates  in 
particular  industries ;  town-planning ;  tenement-house  inspec- 
tion ;  and  free  medical  service. 

(9)  Steady  advance  in  science,  especially  in  biology  and 
geology  and  in  applied  science,  —  an  advance  zealously  fostered 
by  the  wealthy  capitalists  and  redounding  to  the  practical  benefit 
of  the  whole  world.  A  few  of  the  main  facts  in  this  advance, 
which  were  of  considerable  indirect  importance  in  politics,  will 
be  indicated  presently  in  this  chapter. 

(10)  Neglect  of  rehgion  and  tendency  toward  the  separation 
of  church  and  state.  This  tendency  was  Kkewise  championed 
everywhere  by  a  large  element  of  the  middle  class,  whose  oppo- 
sition to  ''Clericalism"  was  as  traditional  as  their  patronage  of 
science. 

These  ten  characteristics  will  be  found  in  the  history  of  nearly 
every  European  country  from  187 1  to  1914,  betokening  in  all 
cases  the  juncture  of  forces  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  with 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  223 


those  of  the  French  Revolution.    But  it  will  also  be  found  that 
a  good  deal  of  resistance  was  offered  during  the  very  same  period 
to  the  supremacy  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  to  several  Elements 
of  the  tendencies  and  characteristics  with  which  of  Dissent 
they  were  now  impressing  the  era.  SpSt*of  the 

The  resistance  came  chiefly  from  two  groups,  who,  Era  1871- 
from  the  outset,  were  naturally  prone  to  quarrel  with  ^^^^ 
each  other:  (i)  ardent  Christians,  particularly  Roman  CathoHcs, 
regardless  of  social  class;  and  (2)  Socialists,  recruited  chiefly 
from  among  the  working  classes,  though  sometimes  j  «  ^leri- 
led  by  persons  whose  birth  and  environment  placed  cais"; 
them  in  the  middle  class.   After  1871  much  of  the  ^' 
history  of  the  several  European  states,  with  the  possible  exception 
of  Great  Britain,  will  be  found  to  turn  upon  the  efforts  of  the  bulk 
of  the  bourgeoisie  and  its  allies  to  beat  down  now  the  opposition 
of  Catholics,  now  that  of  Socialists,  now  that  of  both.   In  order 
to  appreciate  the  reasons  for  the  resistance  and  the  relative 
strength  of  the  combatants,  it  will  be  convenient  at  this  point 
to  present  certain  recent  developments  in  the  history,  first,  of 
Catholic  Christianity,  and  secondly,  of  SociaKsm.  Incidentally, 
it  will  be  possible  and  desirable  to  refer  to  the  scientific  and 
other  intellectual  developments  of  the  era.^ 

CHRISTIANITY  AND  POLITICS 

In  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  in  earlier 
times,  all  Europe  could  practically  be  called  Christian. ^  It 

*  Let  it  here  be  observed,  once  for  all,  that  the  following  sections  in  this 
chapter  are  not  intended  to  serve  as  well-rounded  outlines  of  the  nineteenth- 
century  development  either  of  Christianity  or  of  natural  science",  they  are 
designed  merely  to  provide  a  background  for  some  understanding  of  the  recent 
acute  struggles  waged  in  many  European  countries  between  "Clericals"  and 
"Anti-Clericals,"  Though  these  struggles  will  perhaps  seem  strange  and  alien 
to  the  average  American  collegian,  some  understanding  of  them  is  absolutely 
prerequisite  to  a  real  understanding  of  the  domestic  history  of  contemporary 
Europe.  At  the  same  time,  because  of  certain  social  difTerences  between  the 
United  States  and  Europe,  the  American  collegian  should  be  on  his  guard  against 
reading  too  diligently  into  the  recent  history  of  his  own  country  such  distinctively 
European  terms  as  "Clerical"  and  "Anti-Clerical,"  and  likewise  "bourgeois" 
and  "proletarian." 

'  Excepting,  of  course,  Mohammedan  districts  in  southeastern  Europe,  and 
groups  of  Jews  widely  Scattered  over  the  Continent. 


224 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


was  Christian  in  that  the  vast  majority  of  its  population  drew 
most  of  their  moral  ideals  and  many  of  their  common  customs 
from  historic  Christianity  and  that  they  utilized  the 
Europe  Still  services  of  Christian  clergy  at  least  in  such  crises  of 

Nominally  .  t-,      •      i      i  •       i  •  i 

"  Christian"  hie  as  death  and  marriage.  But  in  the  degree  in  which 
but  Practi-  Christian  relidon  was  beheved  and  practiced, 

cally  and  t.  -ia 

Funda-  the  Widest  diversity  existed.  At  one  extreme  were 
DivMed^on  ^^o^ghtful  persons  who  assailed  all  revealed  rehgion 
Religion  —  Christianity,  of  course,  included  —  as  an  absurd 
and  superstitious  survival  of  a  primitive  and  ignorant 
state  of  human  society,  as  an  anachronism  in  an  age  of  enlight- 
enment and  progress.  At  the  other  extreme  were  thoughtful 
persons  who  defended  the  dogmas  of  the  Church  and  insisted 
that  a  repudiation  of  Christianity  would  be  attended  by  the 
worst  immorahties  and  crimes.  Between  these  extremes  were 
the  masses,  who,  while  preserving  a  good  deal  of  indifference 
as  to  whether  Christianity  was  an  anachronism  or  a  moral 
necessity,  could  be  depended  upon  to  take  sides  on  concrete 
questions  in  accordance  with  a  great  variety  of  religious,  and 
even  poKtical,  preconceptions  and  predilections.  In  general 
this  was  the  situation  in  Protestant  Scandinavia,  Germany, 
and  England,  as  well  as  in  Roman  Catholic  Spain,  France, 
Italy,  and  Austria. 

In  two  particulars,  however,  the  conflict  between  the  extreme 
religionists  —  the  so-called  Clericals  —  and  the  extreme  anti- 
religionists —  the  so-called  anti-Clericals  —  was  bound 
Conflict  sharper  in  Roman  Cathohc  than  in  Protestant 

i  Acute  Europe.  In  the  first  place,  there  was  the  matter  of 
CattioUc^  dogma :  the  essence  of  the  CathoHc  faith  was  still 
than  in  the  persistent  belief  that  it  was  a  body  of  unalterable 
Countries*  truths  once  delivered  by  Christ  to  the  apostles,  which 
could  not  be  added  to,  nor  subtracted  from,  even  in 
order  to  bring  it  ''into  harmony  with  the  times,"  and  which 
could  properly  be  explained  only  by  clergymen;  on  the  other 
I.  Because  hand,  the  disintegration  of  Protestantism,  which  had 
of  Dogma  steadily  progressing  ever  since  the  days  of  Luther 

and  Calvin  and  Cranmer,  was  now  in  a  fair  way  to  effect  in 
practice  what  Luther  had  championed  in  theory,  —  the  right 
of  private  judgment,  the  subordination  of  dogma  to  a  purely 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  225 


subjective  act  of  the  individual,  —  with  the  result  that  every 
Protestant  layman  and  ecclesiastic  was  free  to  harmonize  his 
profession  of  Christianity  with  the  latest  hypothesis  in  science 
or  with  the  most  recent  experiment  in  politics.  In  a  word,  dog- 
matically speaking,  Roman  CathoUcism  was  uncompromising 
and  clerical;  Protestantism  was  conciHatory  and  strictly  indi- 
vidualistic. 

In  the  second  place,  there  was  a  vital  difference  of  organiza- 
tion between  Catholicism  and  Protestantism.  Protestantism, 
being  essentially  individuahstic,  had,  from  the  very  ^  Because 
nature  of  things,  never  developed  any  strong  ecclesi-  of  Organi- 
astical  organization,  and  whatever  organization  it 
did  possess  was  in  the  form  of  churches  that  tended  to  be  pretty 
rigidly  national  in  scope,  and  in  action  thoroughly  subservient 
to  the  secular  governments.    Roman  Catholicism,  on  the  con- 
trary, with  its  insistently  international  character,  an  anti- 
national  pope,  a  disciphned  hierarchy,  and  an  authoritative 
manner  of  speaking  its  mind,  was  ever  a  possible  check  upon 
the  supremacy  of  the  lay  state.    Thus,  irrehgious  statesmen 
who  could  afford  to  ignore  organized  Protestantism  usually 
found  it  necessary  to  guard  against  anathemas  from  the  bishop 
of  Rome. 

Just  prior  to  187 1,  two  forces  were  operating  throughout 
Catholic   Europe   to   widen   the   breach  between 
Clericals  and  Anti-Clericals  and  to  provide  the  latter  D^vision^in 
with  a  considerable  leverage  with  which  to  pry  the  Europe  both 
mass  of  the  population  of  Catholic  countries  into  a  ^iteiiectma** 
position  of  latent  hostility  towards  the  Catholic 
Church.     One  was  poHtical  and  the  other  was  intellectual. 
Each  requires  special  consideration. 

The  first  difficulty  was  the  pronounced  unwillingness  of  the 
Catholic  Church,  at  least  officially,  to  indorse  the  new  political 
tendencies  of  the  nineteenth  century.     When  one 
recalls  what  the  French  Revolution  meant  to  the  opposition 
Catholic  clergy,  —  the  loss  of  many  of  their  privileges,  to  the 
the  confiscation  of  much  of  their  property,  the  whole-  Revolution 
sale  diminution  of  the  number  of  their  monasteries, 
of  their  schools,  and  of  their  charitable  institutions,  —  one 
ceases  to  wonder  at  their  stubborn  universal  fight  against  the 

YpL.  II— -  0 


226 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


principles  of  the  Revolution.  It  becomes  thoroughly  compre- 
hensible, moreover,  why,  for  many  decades,  the  hierarchy,  from 
the  pope  down,  inveighed  against  a  'liberty"  of  individual 
behef,  an  ''equaHty"  of  all  religions,  and  a  ''fraternity"  which 
endangered  the  international  character  of  the  Church.  The 
result,  already  apparent  from  the  review  of  the  history  of  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  was  that  in  the  politics  of 
every  European  state  the  CathoHc  clergy  were  Conservatives 
and,  as  such,  found  alhes  and  friends  from  among  the  old  land- 
owning nobility  and  the  peasantry  and  such  exceptional  bour- 
geois and  workingmen  as  were  more  religious  than  Liberal.  On 
the  whole,  it  seemed  obvious  that,  because  of  political  reasons, 
a  sharp  social  cleavage  was  appearing  in  the  Catholic  Church, 
for  the  bourgeoisie,  as  a  whole,  were  fully  committed  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  French  Revolution  and  many  workingmen  ex- 
pected from  the  realization  of  those  principles  an  amelioration 
of  their  own  lot. 

For  a  time  a  ''Liberal  Catholic"  movement  had  given  some 
promise  of  staying  the  cleavage.  It  had  been  pointed  out  that 
the  first  and  foremost  aim  of  the  Church  was  the  sal- 
Attempt  of  vation  of  souls  for  the  fife  of  the  world  to  come  and 
erai  Catho-  ^^^^  f orm  of  government  in  the  present  world  was 
lies  "to  not  a  matter  of  serious  concern  to  the  Church ;  that, 
betweeT"^^  in  fact,  the  institutions  of  democracy  might  serve  her 
Catholicism  mission  better  than  the  institutions  of  absolute  mon- 
French*  archy ;  and  this  line  of  reasoning  had  been  fortified 
Revolution  by  the  accurate  assertion  that  popular  sovereignty, 
in  so  far  as  it  was  recognized  as  resting  on  divine  sanc- 
tion, had  never  been  explicitly  condemned  by  the  pope.  "Liberal 
Catholicism"  had  been  furthered  by  such  practical  work  as  that 
of  Daniel  O'Connell  in  Great  Britain  and  that  of  Lamar  tine  and 
his  friends  in  the  French  revolutionary  movement  of  1848. 
And  its  triumph  had  temporarily  seemed  imminent  when  Pius 
IX  ^  mounted  the  papal  throne  in  1846,  for  not  only  was  he 
known  to  be  pious  and  kindly,  but  he  was  suspected  of  a*  favor- 
able disposition  toward  Liberalism. 

But  the  excesses  which  accompanied  the  revolutionary  out- 
breaks of  1848,  and  especially  his  own  experience  in  that  year 
^  Giovanni  Maria  Mastai-Ferretti  (1792-1878), 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  227 


with  Mazzini's  brand  of  Republicanism,  had  changed  the  poli- 
tics of  the  pontiff  and  brought  Liberal  CathoHcism  into  disre- 
pute.   From  that  year  until  his  death  in  1878  Pius  Reactionary 
IX  was  the  zealous  and  aggressive  opponent  of  the  Character 
new  regime  —  of  hberty  and  equahty  and  likewise  of  poS^cate 
nationaUsm,  as  then  understood  and  translated  into  of  Pius  ix, 
action  throughout  Europe.   With  the  aid  of  the  whole  ^^46-1878 
CathoHc  clergy  he  waged  implacable  warfare  against  practices 
which  everywhere  the  bourgeoisie  and  many  workingmen  now 
championed.    He  espoused  the  reactionary  cause  with  p^p^ 
such  success  that  the  Conservative  governments  of  Condemna- 
Spain  and  Austria  signed  concordats  with  him  (185 1  New°Sodai 
and  1855,  respectively),  restoring  to  the  Church  many  andPoUticai 
of  its  ancient  privileges.    He  strengthened  the  ma- 
chinery  of  the  Church  by  reestablishing  Roman  Catholic  hier- 
archies in  England  (1850)  and  Holland  (1853).    And  all  this 
while  he  denounced  the  new  social  and  political  order  in  re- 
peated and  ringing  invectives,  culminating  in  the  famous  encyc- 
Hcal  Quanta  cura  and  the  accompanying  Syllabus  of  Errors 
(1864). 

In  the  encycHcal,  the  pope  not  merely  condemned  the  widely 
accepted  notions  that  a  secular  state  had  supreme  power  and 
authority  over  all  affairs  within  its  territories  and 
that  every  state  had  a  moral  obHgation  to  accord  Encyclical 
religious  liberty,  but  he  vehemently  upheld  the  older  Quanta 
ideal  of  the  CathoHc  state  based  on  the  complete  in-  syi- 
dependence  of  the  ecclesiastical  power  and  on  the  labus  of 
compulsory  unity  of  faith.    The  Syllabus  ''of  the  fgg^^^' 
principal  errors  of  our  times"  reproduced  in  a  very 
abbreviated  form  all  the  doctrines  condemned  by  him,  political 
as  well  as  strictly  religious.    Its  condemnations  covered  many 
groups :    freethinkers  and  agnostics,  who  would  destroy  the 
Church ;  indifferent  people,  who  would  take  away  its  official 
privileges  and  reduce  it  to  the  condition  of  a  private,  voluntary 
association ;  supporters  of  religious  neutrality  or  equality,  who 
would  establish  lay  marriage  and  lay  schools;   advocates  of 
secular  sovereignty,  who  would  abolish  ecclesiastical  courts  and 
obligatory  vows  and  nationalize  the  clergy  by  restricting  their 
communication  with  Rome ;  opponents  of  the  temporal  power 


228  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  the  papacy ;  even  the  Liberal  Catholics,  who  would  admit  of 
religious  liberty. 

Although  Dupanloup,  a  famous  French  bishop  and  one  of 
the  leaders  of  the  Liberal  Catholic  party,  wrote  a  book  to  show 
that  the  Syllabus  of  Errors  was  not  half  so  bad  as  it 
Opposhion  sounded,  —  that  it  had  been  issued  as  a  weapon  of  de- 
to  the  fense  against  the  persecutions  of  the  Church  on  the 
Church*^  part  of  the  new  Italian  kingdom,  and  that  it  was  in- 
tended simply  to  condemn  general  revolution  and  the 
abuses  of  modern  Liberty,  —  and  although  his  book  received  the 
approval  of  Pius  IX  and  of  more  than  six  hundred  other  Roman 
Catholic  bishops,  nevertheless  the  champions  of  the  principles 
of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  patriots  of  the  new  nation- 
alism utilized  the  Syllabus  and  the  encyclical  of  1864  as 
occasions  for  attacking  "Clericalism."  In  ''Clericalism"  the 
statesmen  and  the  powerful  bourgeoisie,  who  were  shaping  the 
unifications  of  Italy  and  Germany  or  agitating  for  political 
democracy  in  France  and  in  Spain,  perceived  an  enemy  of  the 
new  order,  and,  by  calKng  the  Catholic  Church  unpatriotic 
and  undemocratic,  they  secured  allies  for  themselves  from  among 
the  numerous  working  class. 

Another  occasion  for  attacking  ''Clericalism"  was  soon 
afforded  by  the  Vatican  Council  (1869-1870),  the  first  general 
_  „  .      council  the  Catholic  Church  had  held  since  that  of 

The  Vatican  .  . 

CouncU  Irent,  three  centuries  earner.  The  Vatican  Council 
( 1 869-1 870)  ^as  convened  by  Pius  IX,  attended  by  nearly  eight 

and  the         ,       .     ,         .  ,        \     r  i       •  i 

Dogma  of  hundred  prelates,  and  made  famous  by  its  solemn 
Ubufty^^^^"  ratification,  despite  earnest  opposition  from  a  minority 
of  its  members,  of  the  dogma  of  papal  infallibility. 
The  actual  definition  of  papal  infallibility  laid  it  down  as  "a 
dogma  divinely  revealed,  that  the  Roman  pontiff,  when  he 
speaks  ex  cathedra,  —  that  is,  when  in  discharge  of  the  office  of 
pastor  and  doctor  of  all  Christians,  by  virtue  of  his  supreme 
apostolic  authority,  he  defines  a  doctrine  regarding  faith  or 
morals  to  be  held  by  the  universal  Church,  —  by  the  divine 
assistance  promised  him  in  Blessed  Peter,  is  possessed  of  that 
infallibility  with  which  the  divine  Redeemer  willed  that  His 
Church  should  be  endowed  for  defining  faith  or  morals ;  and 
that  therefore  such  definitions  of  the  Roman  pontiff  are  per  se 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  229 


immutable  and  independent  of  the  consent  of  the  Church. 
But  if  any  one  —  which  God  avert !  —  presume  to  con- 
tradict this  our  definition :  let  him  be  anathema."  The 
fathers  who  subscribed  to  this  doctrine  of  papal  infal- 
libihty  in  1870  did  not  think  that  they  were  devising  a 
''new"  dogma;  they  beheved  that  they  were  merely  inter- 
preting and  defining  what  had  been  in  the  mind  of  the 
Church  ever  since  the  days  of  St.  Peter  and  of  Christ  Him- 
self ;  and  certainly  not  many  of  them  could  have  thought  that 
they  were  departing  from  what  had  been  a  well-recognized 
practice  for  many  centuries. 

Nevertheless,  the  defuiition  of  papal  infalHbiHty  elicited  im- 
mediate opposition.   It  was  to  be  expected  that  agnostics  would 
scoff  at  it  and  that  Protestants  would  denounce  it  as  an 
unwarranted  or  even  blasphemous  assumption.   But,  Growth  of 
while  no  CathoHc  bishop  left  the  Church  and  while  it  Opposition 
was  only  a  few  thousand  laymen  in  southern  Germany  oUc^chuTch' 
and  in  Switzerland  who,  following  the  lead  of  a  group 
of  university  professors,  actually  seceded  and  formed  the  ''Old 
CathoHc"  sect,  it  was  difficult  for  many  nominal  CathoHcs  not 
to  be  adversely  influenced  by  the  critics  of  the  dogma.  Several 
historians  wrote  learned  works  in  an  endeavor  to  prove  that 
various  popes  in  the  past  had  been  "faUible."  Controversialists 
maintained  that  the  doctrine  was  essentially  new  and  u 
that  it  was  in  flat  contradiction  to  the  Council  of  Clerical " 
Constance  and  to  the  long-supported  "hberties  of 
the  GalHcan  Church."    But  the  most  telling  blows  were  in  the 
field  of  politics.    Statesmen  represented  the  Vatican  Council  as 
an  astute  scheme  on  the  part  of  Pius  IX  to  secure  a  ratification 
from  the  whole  hierarchy  of  his  pohcies  against  Kberty  and 
nationalism,  and  in  the  decree  of  papal  infaUibihty  they  pictured 
a  monstrous  attempt  to  exalt  the  papacy  above  all  secular 
states  and  to  extend  "faith  and  morals"  to  the  political  domain. 
The  fear  became  general.   The  Austrian  government  promptly 
denounced  the  decree  and  took  occasion  to  annul  the  Concordat 
of  1855.^    Bismarck  soon  inaugurated  a  campaign  against  the 
Catholic  Church  in  Prussia.   Even  Gladstone  thought  it  worth 

'  The  Spanish  Concordat  already  (1869)  had  been  annulled  by  the  new  Repub- 
lican government. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


his  while  to  indite  a  pamphlet  to  his  fellow-Britishers  on  the 
need  of  combating  papal  intolerance  and  papal  interference  with 
the  civil  power. 

Following  closely  upon  the  heels  of  the  Vatican  Council  came 
the  seizure  of  Rome  by  the  troops  of  the  ItaHan  kingdom  (1870) 
Destruction  destruction  of  the  temporal  sovereignty  of 

of  the  the  papacy.  Henceforth,  Pius  IX,  as  the  voluntary 
Temporal  ''prisoner  of  the  Vatican,"  poured  forth  fresh  vials  of 
Sovereignty,  wrath  upon  that  Liberalism  and  nationalism  which, 
exemplified  in  the  new  kingdom  of  Italy,  had  de- 
spoiled God's  earthly  vicar  of  his  rights,  his  liberties^  and  his 
goods.  Henceforth,  his  greatest  efforts  were  exerted  toward 
the  formation  of  Conservative-Clerical  groups  in  the  several 
Catholic  countries  which  would  urge  their  governments  to 
intervene  in  Italy  in  order  to  reestabhsh  his  temporal  rule. 
Naturally  into  such  Clerical  groups  neither  rational  Liberals 
nor  emotional  nationalists  could  be  drawn. 

The  upshot,  then,  of  the  whole  pontificate  of  Pius  IX,  politi- 
cally speaking,  was  a  widespread  conviction  that  ardent  belief 
^  in  Roman  Catholicism  made  a  person  a  Clerical 

Democracy  i     i  •     t  .  i 

and  Nation-  and  that  Clericahsm  was  synonymous  with  opposi- 
aiism  Seem-  ^[q-j^       nationalism  and  Liberalism,  and  a  conse- 

ingly 

Arrayed  quent  political  denunciation  of  Clericahsm  by  most 
cierilSusm  bourgeoisie  and  by  many  of  the  working 

class. 

It  was  not  merely  politics  that  increased  the  numbers  and 
Intellectual  clamors  of  the  An ti- Clericals.  There  was  a  growing 
Compiica-  intellectual  difficulty  as  well,  and  it  is  to  this  intel- 
^^^^  lectual  difficulty  that  we  must  now  turn  our  attention. 


THE  NEW  SCIENCE 

During  the  very  years  that  embraced  the  pontificate  of  Pius 
IX  and  that  witnessed  the  growing  disaffection  on  the  part  of 
many  nominal  Catholics  toward  the  poKtical  tendencies  of  the 
clergy,  developments  occurred  in  the  realm  of  natural  science 
which,  in  the  minds  of  many  prominent  persons,  seemed  to 
strike  at  the  roots  of  revealed  rehgion  and  to  render  the  basic 
dogmas  of  Christianity  no  longer  tenable, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


231 


"Science"  was  certainly,  along  with  the  Industrial  Revolu- 
tion and  with  Liberalism  and  nationahsm,  a  great  distin- 
guishing characteristic  of  the  whole  nineteenth  cen- 
tury.   From  certain  standpoints,  scientific  progress  of^sciencr 
in  the  nineteenth  century  cannot  be  deemed  so  epochal  in  the  Nine- 
as  that  in  the  eighteenth  century,  which  has  been  centujy 
described  in  an  earher  chapter,^  yet  in  three  ways  it 
proved  more  thorough  and  more  widely  influential.   In  the  first 
place,  the  path  of  experimental  science,  plainly  indicated  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  was  persistently  pursued  through-  par-reach- 
out  the  nineteenth  century  by  an  ever-increasing  ingDevei- 
number  of  acute  observers  and  patient  experimenters,  E^^eri- 
who  continually,  if  slowly,  enlarged  the  bounds  of  mental 
human  knowledge  of  the  material  universe :  a  galaxy 
of  chemists  and  physicists,  who  explained  the  transmission  of 
heat  and  light  by  minute  waves  in  the  ether,  discovered  proper- 
ties and  uses  of  electricity,  detailed  the  atomic  theory  of  the 
constitution  of  matter,  and  laid  down  the  principles  of  thermo- 
dynamics; a  group  of  astronomers  and  mathematicians,  who 
dilated  upon  the  nature  and  history  of  the  sun  and  stars,  de- 
veloping and  perfecting  the  mechanical  theory  of  the  planetary 
system  which  Sir  Isaac  Newton  had  first  formulated,  or  adding 
such  a  theory  as  the  nebular  h3^othesis  to  account  for  the  mode 
of  origin  of  that  system ;  biologists,  who  evolved  the  theories  of 
the  cell  and  of  the  protoplasm  as  explanations  of  the  organiza- 
tion of  living  creatures,  and  worked  out  the  theory  of  bacteriology 
that  germs  are  the  cause  of  disease.   All  these  devotees  of  experi- 
mental science  and  Hkewise  the  devotees  of  geology,  botany, 
zoology,  and  paleontology,  as  well  as  of  newer  social  sciences 
such  as  philology,  archaeology,  ethnology,  anthropology,  and 
comparative  religion,  were  perpetually  observing  and  classifying, 
naming  and  theorizing,  —  they  were  Hterally  detailing  the  work 
seriously  begun  in  the  eighteenth  century.    And  like  their  pred- 
ecessors, their  absorption  in  scientific  study  usually  left  Httlc 
time  or  inclination  for  any  absorption  in  positive  religion. 

In  the  second  place,  and  unlike  most  of  the  scientific  advance 
in  the  eighteenth  century,  a  good  deal  of  that  of  the  nineteenth 
century  was  in  the  direction  of  applied  science,  that  is  to  say, 

»  Volume  I,  Chapter  XITI. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


it  was  the  application  of  scientific  discoveries  and  inventions  to 
practical  uses  in  ministering  to  the  health  and  comfort  of  man- 
kind.    Merelv  to  catalogue  the  successive  detailed 

Extensive  m      •       "  r    i         •  • 

Utility  contributions  of  the  scientists  of  the  century  to  the 
Science^^     daily  Hfe  of  the  present  would  fill  a  good-sized  chapter. 

To  mention  but  a  very  few  would  involve  reference  to 
electric  Hghting  and  electric  motive  force;  automobiles  and 
aeroplanes;  telegraph,  telephone,  and  wireless;  photographing 
and  electrotyping ;  phonographs,  stereopticons,  and  cinemato- 
graphs ;  concrete-construction  in  building ;  anaesthetics,  aseptic 
surgery,  and  sanitation;  aniline  dyes,  and  many  products  of 
coal  tar  and  of  rubber ;  purification  of  water  and  improvement 
of  crops. ^  Enthusiasm  for  scientific  and  mechanical  triumphs 
of  this  kind  soon  obsessed  the  minds  of  the  great  mass  of  people 
everywhere  and  gave  plausibility  to  the  idea  that  the  practical 
appHcation  of  scientific  knowledge  would  extend  indefinitely, 
and  that  future  ages  would  see  no  Hmit  to  the  growth  of  man's 
control  of  his  physical  environment  and  of  his  intelligent  use  of 
it  for  the  betterment  of  his  race.  Material  comfort  was  exalted, 
with  a  result  that  the  ancient  Christian  ideas  of  sacrifice  and 
suffering  and  pain  and  death  seemed  aHen  and  downright  per- 
verse to  this  ^'age  of  progress."  Health  of  body  appeared  a 
more  needful,  if  not  a  nobler,  goal  for  which  to  strive  than  cure 
of  souls.  The  practical  scientists  were  frankly  materiahstic  in 
their  aims :  their  kingdom  was  of  this  world,  not  of  a  world 
beyond  the  grave.  Some  of  them  even  went  so  far  as  to  main- 
tain that  crime  and  wrongdoing  could  be  extirpated  by  means 
of  surgery  or  of  scientific  breeding.  It  was  not  so  much  that 
such  scientists  were  anti-Christian  as  that  the  general  atmos- 
phere of  belief  and  of  opinion  created  by  their  achievements 
was  increasingly  non-Christian.  In  fact,  it  was  from  their 
materialistic  achievements  and  purposes  that  proceeded  the 
new  and  popular  philosophy  of  pragmatism,  the  notion  that 
the  value  of  moral  and  reHgious  ideals  is  to  be  judged  solely  by 
their  practical  effects  —  by  the  way  they  ''work." 

But  Christianity  suffered  in  the  nineteenth  century  from  the 
indifference  of  painstaking  experimenters  or  even  from  the 

1  Applied  science,  moreover,  was  closely  related  to  the  Industrial  Revolution. 
See  Chapter  XVIII,  pp.  69-75,  above. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  233 


contempt  of  practical  inventors  to  no  such  extent  as  from  a 
third  class  of  scientists  —  the  evolutionists  and  their  philosoph- 
ical interpreters  and  popularizers.    These  were  the 
group  who  directly  or  indirectly  brought  the  BibHcal  of^E^^Son 
narrative  into  question,  who  cast  doubt  upon  the  his-  and  Phiio- 
toricity  of  the  sacred  Scriptures  on  which  all  historical  science^ 
Christianity — CathoHc  and  Protestant  —  ultimately 
rested.    The  group  was  too  numerous  to  be  treated  of  in  detail 
but  clearly  too  famous  to  be  passed  over  in  one  sentence.  The 
mention  of  a  few  of  the  most  illustrious  names  in  the  group  may 
serve  our  purpose  of  explaining  the  general  character  of  their 
contribution.    It  will  be  noticed  that,  by  a  curious  coincidence, 
the  significant  achievements  of  all  these  men  belonged  almost 
uniformly  in  point  of  time  to  the  pontificate  of  Pope  Pius  IX. 

First  was  Alexander  von  Humboldt  (1769-1859),^  naturalist 
and  traveler,  whose  memorable  expedition  to  the  Americas  with 
its  bearings  upon  the  sciences  of  physical  geography  Alexander 
and  meteorology  made  him,  next  to  Napoleon  von  Hum- 
Bonaparte,  the  most  famous  European  of  his  day. 
It  was  he  who,  at  the  age  of  seventy-six,  brought  out  in  1845 
the  first  volume  of  the  Cosmos,  a  work  completed  in  the  next 
thirteen  years,  which  undertook  to  gather  together  and  to 
harmonize  all  the  scientific  accompHshments  of  the  eighteenth 
century  and  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  and  to  demon- 
strate the  existence  of  a  supreme  unity  amid  the  complex  de- 
tails of  nature.  The  Cosmos  was  at  once  a  useful  scientific  ency- 
clopedia and  a  highly  imaginative  conception  of  the  universe ; 
and  its  picturesque,  almost  poetical,  style,  as  well  as  its  stores  of 
information,  commended  it  to  a  wide  circle  of  intelligent  readers. 
Half  scientific  and  half  philosophical,  it  ignored,  if  it  did  not 
deny,  the  existence  of  any  power  outside  and  beyond  nature, 
and  thereby  contributed  potently  to  the  propagation  of  material- 
istic conceptions  among  the  educated  middle  class.^ 

Secondly  was  Sir  Charles  Lyell  (i 797-1875),  the  revolutionizer 

'  Friodrich  Heinrich  Alexander,  Baron  von  Humboldt,  a  brother  of  Wilhelm 
von  Humboldt,  who  was  the  educational  collaborator  with  Stein  in  the  regenera- 
tion of  Prussia.    See  Vol.  T,  p.  557. 

^  A  somewhat  similar  work  in  our  own  day  is  Carl  Snider's  masterpiece  in  mate- 
rialistic [)essimism,  The  World  Machine.  Humboldt's  work  inspired  Edgar  Allan 
Poe's  "prose  poem,"  Eureka. 


234  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  geology.  By  close  observation  of  geological  processes  ai 
work  in  his  own  time,  —  volcanoes  pouring  out  vast  masses  of 
Sir  Charles  molten  rock,  rivers  wearing  away  their  banks  and  de- 
Lyeii  positing  strata  which  could  naturally  be  transformed 

into  sandstone,  earthquake  shocks  producing  faults  in  the  rocks, 
vegetation  preparing  future  coal-beds,  land  almost  everywhere 
either  rising  or  sinking,  —  he  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  * 
The  New  continuous  operation  of  the  same  processes  over  an 
Geology  almost  incalculable  period  of  time  would  be  sufficient 
to  explain  how  the  earth  had  assumed  its  present  physical  ap- 
pearance. This  conclusion  —  the  so-called  uniformitarian  theory 
• — •  was  the  thesis  of  his  Principles  of  Geology,  an  attempt  to  explain 
the  former  changes  of  the  Earth's  surface  by  reference  to  causes 
now  in  operation,  a  work  appearing  in  three  volumes  in  1830- 
1833.  Received  at  first  with  some  opposition,  so  far  as  its  leading 
theory  was  concerned,  the  work  had  eventually  so  great  a  success 
that,  between  1830  and  1872,  eleven  different  editions  were 
pubHshed,  each  enriched  with  new  material  and  with  the  results 
of  riper  thought.  In  1863  Lyell  published  another  famous 
work  —  The  Geological  Evidences  of  the  Antiquity  of  Man  —  in 
The  which  he  gave  a  general  and  readable  summary  of  the 

Antiquity  arguments  for  man's  very  early  appearance  on  the 
of  Man  earth,  derived  from  the  discoveries  of  human  imple- 
ments and  other  remains  in  lower  strata,  which,  according  to 
the  calculations  of  the  new  geology,  could  have  been  deposited 
not  less  than  fifty  thousand  years  before,  and  possibly  much 
earlier.  Alongside  of  Sir  Charles  Lyell's  ideas,  which  speedily 
secured  acceptance  on  the  part  of  all  contemporary  geologists  ^ 
of  repute,  that  man  had  lived  possibly  a  hundred  thousand  years 
on  the  globe  and  that  the  globe  itself  had  taken  shape  slowly 
and  naturally  throughout  the  course  of  untold  aeons,  were  now 
set  in  sharp  contrast  the  long-accepted  Biblical  account  of  the 
miraculous  creation  of  the  universe  in  six  days  and  the  Anglican 
bishop's  seventeenth-century  exposition^  from  Biblical  chro- 

^  The  subsequent  tendency  of  a  majority  of  geologists  was  to  lengthen,  rather 
than  to  shorten,  the  history  of  the  earth  and  of  man.  Important  contributions 
to  the  study  of  glaciers  as  well  as  to  zoology  were  made  during  the  time  of  Lyell  by 
the  famous  Swiss- American,  Jean  Louis  Rodolphe  Agassiz  (1807-1873). 

2  James  Usher  (1581-1656),  Protestant  bishop  of  Meath  in  Ireland,  and  subse- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  235 


nology  that  the  first  man  —  Adam  by  name  —  had  been  created 
on  a  Friday  in  the  month  of  October  in  the  year  4004  B.C. 

In  The  Antiquity  of  Man  (1863)  Lyell  expressed  not  merely 
his  belief  in  the  slow,  evolutionary  fashioning  of  the  earth  but 
also  his  conversion  to  a  theory  of  the  evolution  of  all  The  Theory 
forms  of  Hfe,  a  theory  which  had  just  been  advanced  Evolution 
through  the  independent  labors  of  two  of  the  most  eminent 
scientists  of  all  time  —  Alfred  Russel  Wallace  (1823-1913)1 
and  Charles  Darwin  (i 809-1 882). 

Darwin,  sent  to  Edinburgh  to  study  medicine  and  trans- 
ferred to  Cambridge  in  order  to  fit  himself  for  the  Anglican 
priesthood,  displayed  in  his  youth  but  one  ambition  —  Charles 
to  become  a  great  naturaHst.  In  his  twenty-third  i^arwin 
year,  with  the  reluctant  permission  of  his  family,  he  abandoned 
the  clerical  calling  and  embarked  as  a  naturalist  on  a  surveying 
vessel,  the  Beagle;  he  was  gone  for  five  years  on  a  voyage 
through  the  South  Sea  islands  and  to  Brazil,  which  proved  to 
be  an  excellent  preparation  for  his  Hfe-work.  His  observa- 
tions on  the  relationship  between  animals  in  islands  and  similar 
animals  in  the  nearest  continental  regions,  near  akin  and  yet 
not  exactly  the  same,  and  between  living  animals  and  those  most 
recently  extinct  and  fossilized  in  the  same  country,  here  again 
related  but  not  the  same,  led  him  to  reflect  deeply  upon  the  pos- 
sible variations  of  species  due  to  differences  of  environment  and 
of  natural  needs.  For  a  number  of  years  after  his  return  to  Eng- 
land, Darwin  was  engaged  in  detailed  study  along  the  numerous 
lines  of  inquiry  suggested  by  the  expedition  of  the  Beagle.  He 
was  particularly  struck  by  Lyell's  Principles  of  Geology,  which 
was  already  accustoming  men's  minds  to  the  vast  changes  which 
could  be  brought  about  by  natural  processes  and  which  paved 
the  way  for  the  statement  of  a  complete  evolutionary  hypothesis. 
He  was  also  struck  by  Malthus's  Essay  on  Population^  which 
had  emphasized  the  idea  that  the  increase  of  population  is  de- 
pendent upon  a  struggle  for  existence  among  mankind.  Why, 

quently  archbishop  of  Armagh,  whose  Annates  veteris  el  novi  lestamenti  were  pub- 
lished in  1650-1654. 

^  Alfred  Russel  Wallace  was  also  famous  as  an  ardent  advocate  of  land  nation- 
alization in  England  and  as  a  sympathetic  ally  of  Henry  George  in  that  field. 
See  below,  p.  304. 

^  See  above,  p.  83.  ' 


236  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


thought  Darwin,  could  not  the  principle  of  Malthus  be  extended 
to  the  whole  organic  creation  and  utilized  to  explain  the  varia- 
tion of  species?  In  June,  1842,  he  wrote  out  a  sketch  of  his  new 
theory  of  biological  evolution,  which  two  years  later  he  ex- 
panded into  a  pretentious  essay,  but  it  was  not  until  fourteen 
years  thereafter  that  he  made  public  his  theory,  and  then  only 
when  Wallace  had  independently  arrived  at  the  same  hypothesis. 

Wallace,  a  younger  British  naturalist,  who  had  already  spent 
several  years  in  Exploration  on  the  Amazon  and  in  the  East 
Alfred  Indies,  was  lying  ill  with  fever  at  Ternate,  in  the 
Wallace  Moluccas,  in  February,  1858,  when  he  too  began  to 
think  of  Malthus's  Essay  on  Population,  read  several  years 
before :  suddenly  the  idea  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest  flashed 
over  him.  In  two  hours  he  had  ''thought  out  almost  th^  whole 
of  the  theory,"  and  in  three  evenings  had  finished  his  essay, 
which  he  promptly  mailed  to  Darwin. 

Darwin  in  England  at  once  recognized  his  own  theory  in  the 
manuscript  which  in  June,  1858,  he  received  from  the  young 
and  almost  unknown  naturalist  in  the  tropics.  ''I  never  saw  a 
more  striking  coincidence,"  he  wrote  to  Lyell:  ''if  Wallace  had 
my  Ms.  sketch  written  out  in  1842,  he  could  not  have  made  a 
better  short  abstract !  Even  his  terms  now  stand  as  heads  of 
my  chapters."  Darwin  then  no  longer  hesitated;  he  read  his 
own  manuscript  essay  and  that  of  Wallace  before  a  learned 
society  in  London,  and  the  so-called  Darwinian  theory  of  evolu- 
tion  was  launched.  The  flash  of  intuition  which  distinguished 
Wallace  was  fortified  in  the  case  of  Darwin  by  the  results  of  many 
years  of  patient  and  laborious  observations  and  experiments; 
and  the  rivalry  between  the  two  men  in  the  discovery  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  natural  selection  proved  the  beginning  of  a  Hfelong 
friendship. 

Darwin's  ideas  of  evolution  were  explained  at  length  in  his 
great  work,  published  in  1859,  On  the  Origin  of  Species  by  Means 
"Dar-  of  Natural  Selection,  or  the  preservation  of  favored 
winism "  races  in  the  struggle  for  life,  and  were  subsequently 
elaborated  in  certain  particulars  in  the  Descent  of  Man  and 
Selection  in  Relation  to  Sex  (187 1),  and  in  numerous  other  pub- 
lications. These  ideas  are  too  technical  and  too  involved,  and 
have  been  too  much  modified  in  certain  details  since  their  first 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


expression,  to  be  fully  described  in  the  present  volume,  but  the 
great  central  idea  —  the  quintessence  of  Darwinism  —  is  com- 
paratively simple.  It  is  the  idea  that  life  —  animal  and  vege- 
table —  in  its  present  very  diverse  forms  and  aspects  has  all 
come  from  a  common,  though  very  distant,  source,  in  a  very 
natural  evolutionary  way.  The  manner  of  evolution,  according 
to  Darwin,  is  slightly  more  complex,  but  may  be  summed  up  as 
follows :  The  pressure  of  the  struggle  for  Hfe  favors  those  indi- 
viduals in  each  species  which  possess  particular  variations  from 
the  normal  type  that  are  of  direct  advantage  to  them  in  their 
surroundings;  such  individuals  tend  to  survive  at  the  expense 
of  their  fellows,  and  to  produce  offspring;  the  new  generation 
shows  variation  also,  and,  once  more,  those  individuals  which 
depart  from  the  ordinary  in  the  most  useful  way  have  a  better 
chance  of  survival  than  the  others;  and,  thus,  gradually,  after 
the  lapse  of  enormous  periods  of  time,  differences  so  far  accumu- 
late in  the  descendants  of  each  one  of  the  original  type  that 
really  new  types,  or  species,  may  be  formed,  — the  inevitable  re- 
sult of  minute  and  almost  imperceptibly  accumulated  variations. 

That  there  were  resemblances  among  all  forms  of  Hfe,  no  one 
could  fail  to  perceive ;  that  these  resemblances  might  be  trace- 
able to  some  form  of  evolutionary  development  had  been  sug- 
gested by  several  scientists  before  Darwin  or  Wallace;  but  it 
was  the  achievement  of  Darwinism  to  offer  a  working  hypothesis 
of  the  manner  in  which  such  development  actually  took  place. 
By  making  out  a  good  case  for  natural  selection,  Darwin  really 
made  evolution  a  fundamental  scientific  hypothesis. 

From  the  outset,  Darwin's  ideas  had  a  redoubtable  champion 
in  Wallace,  whose  volume,  Contributions  to  the  Theory  of  Natural 
Selection^  published  in  187 1,  did  more  than  any  other 
single  work,  except  the  Origin  of  Species,  to  promote  ^on^^^*" 
among  scientists  a  clear  understanding  of  natural  Application 
selection  and  confidence  in  its  truth. ^    But  the  exten- 
sive  vogue  which  Darwinism  has  enjoyed  and  the  deep 
impress  which  it  has  left  on  all  sorts  of  human  activities,  — 
political,  social,  religious,  and  artistic,  —  is  to  be  explained  by 

^  Next  to  Wallace  in  importance  as  scientific  champions  of  Darwinism  were  the 
celebrated  American  botanist,  Asa  Gray  (1810-1888),  and  the  English  botanist, 
Sir  Joseph  Dalton  Hooker  (1817-1911). 


23B 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


reference  not  so  much  to  technical  discussions  by  extremely 
critical  scientists  as  to  more  general  expositions  by  enthu- 
siastic popularizers.  Of  the  latter  kind,  Darwinism  found  its 
most  militant  champions  in  Huxley  and  Spencer. 

It  was  in  i860  —  the  year  following  the  publication  of  the 
Origin  of  Species  —  that  Herbert  Spencer   (1820-1903)  set 

forth  the  prospectus  of  his  Synthetic  Philosophy,  an 
^p^enc^  enormous  work  in  ten  volumes,  upon  which  he  was 
and  his  engaged  for  the  next  thirty-six  years,  and  which 
PhUosophy    Undertook  to  carry  the  principle  of  evolution  into 

the  realms  of  philosophy,  psychology,  sociology,  and 
ethics.  Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  estimate  of  the  value  of 
Spencer's  philosophy,  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  did  noteworthy 
service  in  the  cause  of  evolutionary  conceptions.  "Develop- 
ment," "growth,"  "progress,"  —  these  and  similar  terms  were 
stamped  by  Spencer  as  the  common  coin  of  future  study  and  of 
future  hterature.  It  was  Spencer  who  first  used  the  phrase, 
"survival  of  the  fittest." 

According  to  Spencer,  everything  organic  and  inorganic  —  the 
earth,  the  heavens  above  and  the  waters  beneath,  and  all  flying, 
crawling,  and  walking  creatures  that  be  on  the  face  of  the  earth, — 
everything  has  been  quite  naturally  evolved  out  of  a  more  simple 
and  primitive  state,  the  law  of  existence  in  all  cases  being 
development  "from  the  homogeneous  to  the  heterogeneous."  ^ 
Back  of  this  universal  and  eternal  law  of  evolution,  Spencer 
reasoned  there  must  be  an  inscrutable  Power,  which,  however, 
could  not  be  better  defined  than  as  the  Unknowable.  So  this  was 
the  point  whither  the  Spencerian  philosophy  of  evolution  tended : 
straight  toward  materiahsm  and  agnosticism.  It  is  small  won- 
der that  many  advocates  of  revealed  religion  took  fright. 

Even  more  explosive  were  the  bombs  which  Thomas  Huxley 
(182 5-1 895)  hurled  into  the  theological  camp.    Huxley  combined 

a  good  deal  of  sound  knowledge  about  biology  w^ith 
Hu^y*and  distinct  literary  gifts;  he  was,  moreover,  a  "square- 
his  Attacks  jawed  person  greedy  of  controversy."  And  in  Majt's 
ReSion^^"^  P/ace  in  Nature  (1863)  he  sought,  with  the  aid  of 

epigrams  as  well  as  with  that  of  scientific  facts,  to 
show  that  man  himself  was  but  a  transitional  stage  in  the  natural 

1  Spencer's  The  Development  Hypothesis  (1852). 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


239 


evolution  from  lower  to  higher  types.  Huxley's  work  in  this 
book  and  likewise  in  a  host  of  other  writings  in  vulgarizing  the 
new  ideas  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  But  it  was  in  per- 
petual attacks  upon  the  foundation  of  revealed  rehgion  that 
Huxley  acquired  his  greatest  significance.  Starting  with  the  as- 
sumption that  ''doubt  is  a  beneficent  demon,"  he  declared  that 
''there  is  no  evidence  of  the  existence  of  such  a  being  as  the  God 
of  the  theologians."  Christianity  he  rejected  bodily  and  with 
no  appreciation  of  its  possible  historic  effect  as  a  civilizing 
agency:  he  claimed  that  what  "since  the  second  century  has 
assumed  to  itself  the  title  of  orthodox  Christianity"  has  been 
a  "varying  compound  of  some  of  the  best  and  some  of  the  worst 
elements  of  Paganism  and  Judaism,  maided  in  practice  by  the 
innate  character  of  certain  peoples  of  the  Western  world." 

In  rejecting  Christian  theology,  Huxley  consistently  rejected 
the  theoretical  bases  of  Christian  morality  —  the  divine  Law- 
giver and  the  freedom  of  will  in  the  human  being.  And  his 
substitution  was  fatahsm  in  conduct,  based  on  natural  evolu- 
tion,—  "scientific  Calvinism,"  it  has  been  termed.  "The 
actions  we  call  sinful,"  averred  Huxley,  "are  part  and  parcel 
of  the  struggle  for  existence."  "The  moral  sense  is  a  very  com- 
plex affair  —  dependent  in  part  upon  associations  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  approbation  and  disapprobation,  formed  by  educa- 
tion in  early  youth,  but  in  part  also  on  an  innate  sense  of  moral 
beauty  and  ugHness  (how  originated  need  not  be  discussed), 
which  is  possessed  by  some  people  in  great  strength,  while  some 
are  totally  devoid  of  it." 

The  last  name  to  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  new 
generalizations  of  science  which  characterized  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  is  that  of  Ernest  Renan  (1823-  ^^^^^ 
1892),  the  offspring  of  pious  fisher-folk  of  CathoHc  Renan  and 
Brittany,  who  left  his  Roman  Catholic  seminary  in  ^^^^^  „ 
1845  riot  to  offer  priestly  ministrations  to  Christian 
beHevers  but  to  wage  implacable  Hfelong  warfare  against  historic 
Christianity.    An  early  convert  to  the  scientific  ideal  —  to  the 
certitudes  of  physical  and  natural  science,  —  he  performed  his 
greatest  services  as  an  Orientalist  and  an  exponent  of  the  study  of 
comparative  religion.   While  he  was  still  a  seminarian,  he  made 
up  his  mind  that  the  second  part  of  the  canonical  book  of  Isaias 


240  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


differs  from  the  first  not  only  in  style  but  in  date;  that  the 
grammar  and  the  history  of  the  Pentateuch  are  posterior  to  the 
accepted  dates  of  Moses ;  and  that  the  book  of  Daniel  is  quite 
apocryphal.  Henceforth,  he  gave  himself  to  researches  in  the 
Levant,  to  study  of  the  ancient  languages,  and  to  acute  criticism 
of  the  whole  Bible,  gradually  reaching  the  conclusion  that  the 
Scriptures  and  Christian  theology  were  but  a  development  — 
an  evolution  —  of  primitive  fable  and  myth.  Appointed  pro- 
fessor of  Hebrew  in  the  College  de  France  (1862),  he  referred 
to  Christ  in  his  inaugural  lecture  as  ''an  incomparable  man/^ 
and  the  following  year  ^  he  published  his  best-known  work,  the 
Life  of  Jesus.  This  was  an  attempt  to  treat  Christ  as  a  perfectly 
natural  human  being,  but  it  was  a  treatment  so  lucid  in  expres- 
sion and  so  felicitous  in  phrase  —  Renan  was  a  Htterateur  quite 
as  much  as  a  scientist  —  that  it  gave  an  actual  heart-warmth 
to  agnosticism.  After  Renan  ^  skepticism  was  no  longer  a 
merely  negative  position  with  reference  to  Christianity :  it  was 
henceforth  itself  a  glowing  cult  which  could  enthrall  the  emo- 
tions as  well  as  command  the  intellect. 


CHRISTIANITY  AND  SCIENCE 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  all  these  eminent  scientists  whose 
names  have  just  been  reviewed  belonged  by  birth  or  training 
to  the  middle  class,^  and,  what  is  far  more  important, 

Influence  of  i     i    n      r    i  t    i    •    t  i 

Science  that  the  bulk  of  the  people  who  read  their  books  or 
Bourgeoisie  ^^^^^  ^^^^^  lectures  or  followed  their  investigations 
belonged  to  the  middle  class.  It  was  the  middle  class, 
therefore,  —  university  students,  physicians,  lawyers,  and,  to  a 
certain  extent,  business  men,  —  who  were  first  infected  with  the 

^  1863.  The  next  year  the  French  government  of  Napoleon  III,  anxious  not 
to  antagonize  the  Catholics  further,  deprived  Renan  of  his  professorship.  The 
Anti-Clericals  at  once  hailed  Renan  as  a  martyr  to  free  thought. 

2  Even  before  Renan,  David  Friedrich  Strauss  (1808-1874),  a  German,  had 
published  (1835)  a  Life  of  Jesus,  assailing  the  inspiration  of  the  New  Testament 
and  denying  the  miracles  and  other  supernatural  attributes  of  Christ.  Strauss 
subsequently  accepted  Darwinism,  and  a  group  of  his  associates  and  disciples  in 
the  Protestant  Faculty  of  Theology  in  the  university  of  Tubingen  (Wiirttemberg) 
secured  fame  as  the  Tubingen  School  of  "higher  critics"  of  the  Bible  and  of  all 
so-called  revealed  religion. 

3  The  one  exception  was  Baron  von  Humboldt. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  241 

new  evolutionary  conceptions  and  with  the  accompanying 
virulence  against  dogmatic  religion.    In  Catholic  countries  the 
infection  came  at  the-  very  time  when  Pope  Pius  IX  was  not 
only  identifying  ClericaHsm  with  reactionary  Con-  seemingly 
servatism  in  politics,  but  insisting  vehemently  that  Basic  Con- 
Catholic    Christianity    is    a    thoroughly  dogmatic  ^tween 
religion,  a  truly  revealed  religion,  and  a  religion  that  Science  and 
in  the  intellectual  sphere  satisfactorily  explains  the 
chief  phenomena  of  existence.    It  was  the  time  when  the  encyc- 
Hcal  Quanta  Cura  and  the  Syllabus  of  Errors  were  issued  at 
Rome  (1864) ;  when  the  dogma  of  the  Immaculate  Conception 
of  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary  was  promulgated  by  the  sovereign 
pontiff  (1854) ;  and  when  the  Vatican  Council  solemnly  decreed 
the  infallibihty  of  the  pope  (1869). 

The  upshot  of  the  pontificate  of  Pius  IX,  intellectually  speak- 
ing, was  a  widespread  conviction  among  many  educated  and 
influential  persons,  mainly  of  the  middle  class,  that  an  ardent 
belief  in  Roman  Catholicism  made  a  person  a  Clerical,  and  that 
ClericaHsm  was  synonymous  with  opposition  to  science  and  free 
thought.  Consequently  the  Anti-Clericals  added  to  their  political 
arguments  against  Catholic  Christianity  the  intellectual  ones 
that  the  Clericals  were  unprogressive,  inimical  to  reason,  and 
bent  on  keeping  the  people  in  ignorance.  And  such  arguments 
were  not  without  weight  among  the  workingmen. 

Much  the  same  situation  prevailed  in  Protestant  countries. 
Strict  Protestants  as  well  as  faithful  Catholics  greeted  Darwin's 
OriHn  of  Species  and  similar  works  with  storms  of  ^ 

.  .  ,  .     ,  ,  1    1    •  Protestant 

opposition  and  in  large  numbers  expressed  their  un-  opposition 
willingness  to  accept  evolution  at  all.     Like  the 

'  e  1  •  1    1     1  wimsm 

Copermcan  system  of  astronomy,  which  had  once 
threatened  to  depose  the  earth  from  its  divinely  ordained  central 
position  in  the  Universe,  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  was  thought 
to  dethrone  man,  who  had  been  "made  in  the  image  and  like- 
ness of  God,"  and  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  accepted  dogma  of 
the  special  creation  of  each  distinct  species  and  the  separate 
creation  of  the  human  race  as  a  final  personal  act  of  the  divine 
Creator.  Lutheran  clergymen  were  one  with  those  of  Calvinistic 
sects  and  with  those  of  the  Established  Church  in  England  in 
denouncing  the  new  science  which,  as  many  of  them  maintained, 

VOL.  II  — R 


242  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

would  trace  man's  descent  from  monkeys  rather  than  from  God 
and  would  remove  the  sanction  and  obligation  of  Christian 
morality. 

In  one  respect  Protestantism  was  threatened  by  Darwinism 
more  than  Roman  Catholicism.  While  the  Catholic  faith  was 
Effect  of  based  on  the  writings  of  the  Christian  Fathers  and 
Science  on  ''tradition,"  as  well  as  on  the  Old  and  New  Testa- 
upon  Prot-    ments,  Protestants  ever  since  John  Calvin  had  insisted 

estantism 

that  the  Scriptures  were  for  them  the  sole  rule  of  faith 
and  the  sole  guide  of  conduct.  Now,  when  scientific  theories 
which  appeared  capable  of  demonstration  indicated  that  the 
Bible  in  places  was  downright  erroneous  and  throughout  was 
hardly  more  than  a  ''unique  record  of  the  evolution  of  a  nation's 
moral  consciousness,"  the  Protestant  notion  of  authority  was 
rudely  shaken,  and  the  thoughtful  Protestant  felt  himself  con- 
strained to  modify  his  theological  opinions.  But  in  so  doing,  he 
had  a  certain  advantage  over  his  Catholic  neighbor,  because, 
while  the  sincere  Catholic  was  bound  in  belief  by  the  dogmatic 
utterances  of  the  officials  of  the  Catholic  Church,  he  himself, 
by  reason  of  the  absence  of  an  efficient,  authoritative  Protestant 
organization,  and  likewise  by  reason  of  the  traditional  encourage- 
ment of  the  "right  of  private  judgment,"  was  enabled  profoundly 
to  revise  his  opinion  of  the  Bible  and  still  to  call  himself  a 
Protestant  Christian. 

Of  Darwinism,  therefore,  the  immediate  effects  on  reHgion  were 
somewhat  divergent  in  Catholic  and  Protestant  countries.  In 
the  former  a  sharp  line  was  drawn  between  (i)  those 
Immediate    ^]^q  continued  to  believe  in  revealed  relierion  and  to 

Religious  ° 

Effects  of  accept  the  dogmas  of  the  Roman  Church, —  they  were 
Darwinism    Roman  CathoHcs  who  in  faith  might  be  equally  at 

divergent  .  .  i.f.  i 

in  Catholic  aome  m  the  nineteenth  and  in  the  sixteenth  cen- 
estam^°*"     ^^^y?  —  those  who  unconditionally  received 

Countries  the  new  generalizations  of  science  :  they  were  out-and- 
out  skeptics  and  agnostics,  —  heretics  and  infidels, 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  Church  ;  champions  of  enlightenment 
and  progress,  from  their  own  standpoint.  In  Protestant  coun- 
tries, on  the  other  hand,  the  people  divided  into  three  general 
groups  on  the  religious  question :  first,  real  agnostics,  a  conspic- 
uous minority,  who  felt  that  science  and  any  form  of  Chris- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


tianity  were  mutually  incompatible,  and  that  sound  reason 
compelled  the  rejection  of  Protestantism  no  less  than  of  Catholi- 
cism_;  secondly,  "old-fashioned  Protestants,"  another  minority, 
at  the  outset  larger  but  in  the  course  of  time  possibly  diminish- 
ing, who  stoutly  maintained,  Hke  the  first  group,  that  science  and 
Christianity  were  mutually  incompatible,  but  that  simple  faith 
compelled  the  unquestioning  rejection  of  un-Christian  scientific 
hypotheses ;  and  thirdly,  a  slowly  growing  majority,  who  sought 
to  effect  a  reconciliation  between  reUgion  and  science,  protestant 
In  Protestant  countries  it  was  this  third  group  who  Compromiso 
eventually  appeared  to  have  carried  the  day.  They  sdrncT 
tended  more  and  more  to  accept,  though  often  with  and 
many  quaHfications,  the  theories  of  evolution  and  of  ^®"sion 
the  antiquity  of  man  and  the  universe,  and  all  manner  of  profane 
studies  of  the  Scriptures.  They  tended  more  and  more  to  em- 
phasize morals  and  conduct  at  the  expense  of  faith  and  dogma, 
to  such  an  extent,  in  fact,  that  to  many  minds  the  very  word 
''dogmatic"  became  unbearable,  connoting  repulsive  ideas,  akin 
to  the  word  '' superstitious."  Gradually  they  stripped  the  Old 
Testament  and  even  the  Gospel  story  of  most  of  the  miraculous, 
refashioned  Christ  as  a  simple  moral  teacher  and  social  worker,^ 
and  frankly  admitted  that  Christianity  was  but  one  —  though 
the  best  —  of  evolving,  upKfting  world  rehgions.  Almost  uni- 
formly they  continued  to  call  themselves  Protestants,  but  Protes- 
tantism at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  was,  in  general,  a 
fundamentally  different  set  of  religious  ideas  from  the  Protes- 
tantism of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  Darwinism 
worked  a  greater  change  dogmatically  in  Protest  :.ntism  than 
the  whole  Protestant  revolt  had  effected  in  the  Catholic 
Church.  One  universal  Protestant  doctrine,  however,  still 
remained  as  the  Hnk  with  the  past,  —  the  right  of  private 
judgment ;  and  it  was  a  real  tribute  to  the  potency  of  that 
doctrine  that  historic  Protestantism  had  so  readily  absorbed 
Darwinism. 

To  these  rather  sweeping  generalizations,  exceptions  must 
be  remembered  not  only  in  the  case  of  groups  of  Lutherans, 

^  One  of  the  most  noteworthy  products  of  this  kind  of  Protestantism  was  the 
social  activity  and  the  social  "reform"  championed  by  the  churches  and  repre- 
sented, especially  in  large  cities,  by  the  "institutionalizing"  of  Christianity. 


244 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Presbyterians,  Methodists,  Baptists,  Quakers,  and  other  like 
bodies,  who,  in  different  degree  in  different  localities,  clung  with 
greater  tenacity  to  the  literal  teachings  of  Martin 

Exceptions       °  xi        ^-ii'i  ^  ^ 

to  the  Luther  or  John  Calvin,  but  also,  and  more  particu- 
Protestant    larly ,  in  the  case  of  an  important  section  of  the  Andican 

Compromise  ,         ,  1 1    i  \  ^  i  •  i      i       i  , ,  -r 

Church  —  the  so-called  high  church  party.  Just 
on  the  eve  of  the  work  of  Darwin,  Spencer,  Huxley,  and  Renan, 

a  few  young  clergymen  of  the  Anghcan  communion, 
foM^Move-  including  John  Keble  (1792-1866),  John  Henry  New- 
ment"  in  man  (iSoi-iSqo),^  and  Edward  Pusey  (1800-1882), 
Churclf^^^^  had  set  themselves  to  revive  what  they  thought  to  be 

true  rehgion,  and  their  agitation,  because  it  centered 
in  the  university  of  Oxford,  became  known  as  the  Oxford  Move- 
ment.2  Its  way  had  been  prepared  by  the  pubhcation  of  Keble's 
■Christian  Year  (1827),  and  his  sermon  at  Oxford  on  National 
Apostasy  (1833)  had  indicated  its  aims.  Its  cardinal  teaching 
was  that  the  Anghcan  Church  was  not  Protestant,  but  was  a 
very  real  part  of  the  Holy  Cathohc  Church  and  had  unbroken 
episcopal  connection  with  the  primitive  Christian  Church; 
and  its  disciples  accordingly  inculcated  the  medieval  doctrine 
of  the  seven  sacraments,  including  what  was  very  close  to,  if  not 
identical  with,  the  dogma  of  transubstantiation,  and  tended 
to  emphasize  points  of  agreement  in  forms  and  ceremonies,  as 
well  as  in  doctrine,  with  those  branches  of  the  Catholic  Church, 
notably  the  Roman  Catholic  and  the  Greek  Orthodox,  which 
could  claim  apostohc  succession.  The  Oxford  Movement  grew 
in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  extreme  Protestants,  who  declared 
that  it  was  essentially  "Romanizing,"  until  1845,  when  it  was 
disrupted  by  the  secession  of  Newman  and  several  others  from 
the  Anghcan  Church  to  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  Never- 
theless, largely  under  Pusey's  leadership,  the  dogmatic  principles 
of  Cathohcism  were  kept  alive  within  the  Anghcan  communion 
and  were  henceforth  shared  by  an  apparently  increasing  number 
of  clergy  and  laymen.  In  this  way  the  Anghcan  Church  de- 
veloped by  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  three  main 

^  Newman  was  received  into  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  1845  and  created  a 
cardinal  by  Pope  Leo  XIII  in  1879. 

2  Its  promoters  urged  their  views  in  Tracts  for  the  Times  and  were  therefore 
nicknamed  Tractarians.    They  were  also  referred  to,  especially  later,  as  Puseyites. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  245 


schools  of  thought  among  its  members:  (i)  ''high  church," 
which,  intellectually  and  dogmatically,  approached  nearest  to 
the  official  Roman  CathoHc  position;  (2)  ''low church,"  Divisions  in 
which  adhered  to  the  more  strictly  Protestant  and  theAngUcan 
evangelical  character  that  had  marked  Anglican- 
ism  in  the  eighteenth  century;  and  (3)  "broad  church,"  which 
represented  rather  advanced  rationalism,  and  which,  in  line 
with  the  newer  tendencies  of  the  time  in  Lutheran  and  Cal- 
vinistic  bodies,  sought  to  reconcile  religion  with  science  by 
accepting  the  findings  of  the  latter  and  by  retaining  of  the 
former  the  name,  the  forms,  and  many  of  the  deeper  emotions. 
By  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  it  was  obvious  to  many 
observers  that  both  the  "high  church"  and  the  "broad  church" 
parties  were  growing  at  the  expense  of  the  "low  church,"  and 
that  the  conflict  for  predominance  within  the  Anglican  Church 
in  the  immediate  future  was  likely  to  be  between  these  two 
factions  —  between  those  inclined  to  reaffirm  revealed  religion 
according  to  traditional  Catholic  standards  and  those  inclined 
to  find  in  natural  science  a  broad  basis  for  a  new  and  compre- 
hensive rehgion. 

But  in  England,  as  well  as  in  the  other  lands  that  have  com- 
monly been  called  Protestant,  the  rehgious^  organizations  have 
never  effectually  questioned  the  practical  supremacy  q^^^^^^^^ 
of    secular   government.     Consequently,    whatever  Acute  only 
might  have  been  the  intellectual  and  dogmatic  dif-  Catholic 

f  1  -r^  ^1    .    .  ?  ^    '  Countnes 

lerences  between  Protestant  Christians  and  their  non- 
Christian  fellow-citizens,  Darwinism  brought  in  its  train  no 
great  poHtical  conffict  between  them. 

It  was  otherwise  in  Roman  Catholic  countries.  By  187 1 
"Clericals"  and  "Anti-Clericals"  were  arrayed  against  each 
other,  both  on  pohtical  and  on  intellectual  grounds,  in  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  France,  Spain,  Portugal,  Belgium,  and 
Latin  America.  And  the  combat  was  destined  to  fill  a  con- 
spicuous place  in  the  internal  history  of  each  of  these  states 
from  i87itoi9i4,  a  place  which  is  all  too  briefly  indicated  in  the 
following  chapters.^ 

In  studying  Anti-Clericalism  the  student  will  notice  that  its 
warmest  advocates  will  be  intellectual  and  political  radicals, 

»  Chapters  XXIII  and  XXIV.    See  below,  pp.  351  ff.,  407  ff. 


246 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


drawn  ordinarily  from  the  middle  class,  and  that  its  greatest 
successes  will  be  gained  by  statesmen  who  are  jealous  of  the  en- 
The  "  Anti-  croachments,  real  or  fancied,  of  an  ecclesiastical  organi- 
ciericais  "  zation  upon  national  sovereignty.  He  will  observe  that 
Anti-Clericalism  will  appeal  constantly  and  everywhere  to 
sentiments  of  Liberalism  and  nationalism  and  will  profit  by  the 
unrest  of  workingmen  and  by  the  apathy  and  indifference  of 
many  professing  Catholics  in  country  and  in  town. 

That  Roman  Catholicism  —  or  Clericalism  (call  it  as  one 
may)  — will  not  be  utterly  routed  in  any  country  will  also  become 
obvious  to  the  student  who  follows  closely  the  succes- 
Aggressfve-  ^^^^  events  from  187 1  to  1914.  Not  only  will  he  find 
nessofthe  that  many  peasants  and  artisans  and  unprogressive 
Church^  scions  of  the  ancient  nobiHty  continue  to  conform  to 
Catholicism,  but  a  goodly  number  of  thoughtful  per- 
sons from  the  well-educated  classes  will  renew  their  faith  in,  or 
be  converted  to,  the  dogmas  of  the  Roman  Church.  This  phe- 
nomenon —  the  continued  aggressiveness  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church  in  the  face  of  its  seeming  political  and  intellectual  un- 
popularity —  demands  a  few  words  of  explanation. 

It  was  due  to  an  apparent  alteration  in  the  policy  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church.  The  causes  of  the  Churches  unpopu- 
Pontificate  larity  were  most  active,  as  we  have  seen,  during  the 
of  Leo  XIII,  reign  of  Pius  IX,  with  the  result  that  when  that  pope 
1878-1903  jjg^  1878,  after  the  longest  and  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  pontificates  in  history,  he  left  the  Church  shaken 
to  its  very  foundations  and  in  feud  with  almost  every  secular 
government.  But  the  succeeding  pontificate  of  Leo  XIII  (1878- 
1903)^  served  to  change  matters.  In  contrast  to  his  predeces- 
sor, Leo  was  a  man  of  slow  and  calm  deliberation,  and  a  gifted 
diplomat.  Moreover  he  was  endowed  with  a  good  deal  of  erudi- 
tion, and  possessed  a  nice  appreciation  of  good  literature,  being 
a  distinguished  Latinist  himself.  As  nuncio  in  Brussels  before 
his  election  he  had  become  sympathetically  acquainted  with 
the  machinery  of  democratic  politics  and  of  parHamentary 
government. 

Under  Leo  XIII  it  gradually  became  apparent  to  many 
persons  that  a  working  compromise  was  possible,  whether  in  the 

^  Gioacchino  Pecci  (1810-1903). 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


field  of  politics  or  in  that  of  intellect,  between  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church  and  modern  society.    The  intellectual  gulf  was 
narrowed  by  several  happenings.    In  the  first  place,  j^^^^^^ 
there  was  the  study,  revived  and  intensified  under  study  of 
papal  auspices,  throughout  all  CathoHc  seminaries  ^^^^^ 
and  colleges,  of  the  writings  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  the 
greatest  theologian  and  philosopher  of  the  middle  ages,  who  had 
taught  that  natural  law  and  supernatural  reKgion  could  not  be 
in  ultimate  conflict  because  both  were  from  one  and  the  same 
God,  and  who  had  actually  forearmed  Catholic  theology  against 
the  Darwinian  attack  by  declaring  that  it  mattered  not  at  all 
whether  natural  creation  had  been  effected  by  one  original  divine 
act  or  by  an  infinite  succession  of  divine  acts.    Following  out 
the  suggestion  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  Catholic  philosophers  and 
Cathohc  theologians  began  to  take  a  position  some-  ^.^^j^^jj^. 
thing  like  this  :  that  Darwinism  was  only  a  hypothesis,  Attitude 
which  was  being  confessedly  weakened  in  certain  J?^*^^. 

1-111         1      -i-A        .   .         1  'r  Darwinism 

details;^  that  the  Darwmian  theory,  if  true,  could 
explain  only  the  evolution  of  man's  material  body,  not  the 
creation  and  Ufe  of  immortal  spirits;  that  the  spiritual  side  of 
humanity  still  belonged  to  the  realm  of  faith  and  religion  as 
unquestionably  as  its  material  side  belonged  to  the  province  of 
natural  science;  that  the  possibiHty  of  an  allegorical  interpre- 
tation of  the  account  of  Creation  in  the  book  of  Genesis  as  well 
as  a  literal  interpretation  had  always  been  recognized  by  fore- 
most fathers  of  Christianity;  and  that  a  subsequent  confirma- 
tion of  Darwinism  might  even  serve  to  enlarge  man's  compre- 
hension of  the  wonder-working  ways  of  God. 

Secondly,  under  Leo  XIII,  there  was  the  encouragement 
of  the  study  of  church  history.    To  this  end  the  pope  placed 
the  valuable  archives  and  Hbrary  of  the  Vatican  at  study  of 
the  disposal  of  historians,  his  belief  being  that  the  Church 
pubHcation  of  historical  documents,  far  from  injuring 
the  Church,  would  actually  enhance  its  prestige  by  showing  its 
past  contributions  to  the  development  of  human  civilization. 

Thirdly,  there  was  the  papal  patronage  or,  at  least,  friendly 
toleration  of  experimental  science  among  eminent  Roman  Catho- 

1  Notably  in  respect  of  Darwin's  theory  of  "sex  selection,"  and  in  the  face  of  the 
newer  Mendelism.    See  below,  p.  249. 


248  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

lies,  both  priests  and  laymen.  Thus,  Leo  XIII  at  his  own  ex- 
pense placed  costly  astronomical  instruments  in  the  Vatican  ob- 
„  ,     .      servatory,  providing  accommodation  and  endowment 

Catholicism      .  ,      i        .  r      rr    •    i  rx^i 

and  Experi-  lor  a  whole  staif  01  oflicials.  I  hus,  too,  he  congratu- 
Sdence  l^tcd  many  Catholic  scientists  upon  their  achieve- 
ments. It  was  during  his  pontificate,  moreover,  that 
the  fame  of  two  of  the  greatest  scientists  of  modern  times  — 
both  of  them  Roman  Catholics  —  seemed  to  refute  the  charge 
that  no  person  could  be  at  once  a  sincere  Catholic  Christian  and 
an  eminent  scientist.  These  two  scientists  were  Louis  Pasteur 
and  Gregor  Mendel. 

Pasteur  (1822-1895),  a  devout  Catholic  layman,  revolu- 
tionized organic  chemistry.  He  it  was  who  first  clearly  ex- 
Louis  plained  the  nature  of,  and  gave  the  name  to,  bacteria, 
Pasteur  minute  animal  organisms  that  are  everywhere,  in 

air,  water,  or  earth,  and  that  are  the  cause  of  infectious  diseases. 
His  painstaking  observations  and  experiments  enabled  him  to 
secure  results  which  not  merely  rendered  his  name  immortal,  but 
benefited  humanity  in  a  manner  and  to  a  degree  for  which  no 
one  could  have  ventured  to  hope.  His  work  was  the  starting- 
point  of  all  present-day  achievements  in  aseptic  surgery  and  in 
the  prevention  of  disease.  His  discoveries  on  fermentation 
inaugurated  a  new  era  in  the  brewing  and  wine-making  industries. 
His  practical  researches  enabled  growers  of  silkworms  to  stamp 
out  a  dreadful  plague  that  threatened  the  destruction  of  the  whole 
silk  industry  in  France.-^  And  throughout  the  world,  the  success 
of  his  endeavors  to  reduce  the  mortaHty  of  infants  and  to  find  a 
cure  for  the  dread  disease  of  hydrophobia  are  witnessed  respec- 
tively in  the  ^'pasteurization"  of  milk  and  in  the  treatment  of 
rabies  by  ''Pasteur  Institutes." 

Gregor  Mendel  (1822-1884) — peasant-boy,  priest,  and  finally 
abbot  of  an  Augustinian  monastery  at  Briinn  in  Germany 
Gregor  —  devised  and  carried  out  in  the  garden  of  his 
Mendel  cloister  the  experiments  which  are  to-day  the  founda- 
tion of  that  knowledge  of  the  physiological  process  of  heredity 
which,  known  as  Mendelism,  biologists  are  rapidly  extending 
in  various  directions.   Though  Mendel  pubHshed  an  account  of 


^  Huxley  estimated  the  money  value  of  these  discoveries  as  sufficient  to  cover 
the  whole  cost  of  the  war  indemnity  paid  by  France  to  Germany  in  187 1. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


his  experiments  in  a  Catholic  periodical  as  early  as  1866,  it  was 
not  until  1900,  in  the  last  years  of  Leo's  pontificate,  that  men  of 
science  generally  came  to  appreciate  the  import  of  his  dis- 
coveries. In  recent  years  the  application  of  Mendel's  principles 
on  a  wide  scale  has  served  not  only  to  throw  much  light  upon 
the  important  and  complex  problem  of  heredity,  but  also  to  raise 
objections  to  some  of  the  theories  of  the  evolutionists. 

Of  the  poHtical  principles  of  Pius  IX,  Leo  XIII  professed  not 
to  change  a  jot  or  a  tittle.    He  expressed  in  his  encyclicals  the 
same  ideal  of  Christian  society  and  reproduced  the  pouticai 
same  condemnations  of  many  phases  of  nationalism    Views  of  Leo 
and  Liberalism.    Again  and  again  he  insisted  that  the  ^^^^ 
Christian  Church  should  superintend  and  direct  every  form  of 
civil  life.    But  unlike  his  predecessor,  Leo  never  appeared  as  a 
furious  partisan  of  any  particular  form  of  government  —  abso- 
lutist or  constitutional,  monarchical  or  republican.    He  was 
never  a  reactionary  in  the  earlier  political  sense;  and  as  his 
pontificate  wore  on  he  perceived  that  democracy  might  prove 
fully  as  serviceable  as  monarchy  for  the  preservation  and  strength- 
ening of  CathoHc  principles.    This  is  probably  the  j^j^^^^ 
true  interpretation  of  his  emphatic  encouragement  cathoUc 
of  Catholic  poHtical  parties,  with  distinctly  Liberal  p^*^^ 
tendencies,  in  Germany  and  in  Belgium ;  his  zeal  in 
urging  the  establishment  of  CathoHc  publications  and  CathoHc 
parochial  schools  everywhere  and  for  all  classes;  his  friendly 
attitude  toward  the  rapidly  growing  and  prospering  Church  in 
the  United  States,  and  eventually  toward  the  government  of  the 
Third  French  Republic ;  and,  last  but  not  least,  his  interest  in 
the  social  questions  which  the  Industrial  Revolution  had  in- 
jected into  contemporary  democracy. 

A  famous  encyclical,  called  Rerum  novarum,  which  Leo  XIII 
issued  in  1891,  aimed  to  apply  Christian  principles  to  the  rela- 
tions between  capital  and  labor.  Against  Socialism,  it  affirmed 
the  holding  of  private  property  to  be  an  individual  right  based 
on  abstract  justice  and  older  than  any  state ;  it  insisted  that  a 
certain  amount  of  suffering  and  toil  is  the  lot  of  fallen  human- 
ity; and  it  combated  the  idea  ''that  class  is  naturally  hostile 
to  class  and  that  the  wealthy  and  the  workingmen  are  intended 
by  nature  to  live  in  mutual  conflict."   On  the  contrary,  the  en- 


250 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


cyclical  maintained  the  efficacy  of  Catholic  Christianity,  in 
drawing  the  rich  and  the  poor  bread-winners  together  by  re- 
minding each  class  of  its  duties  to  the  other,  and  es- 
and  the"  pccially  of  the  obKgations  of  justice.  Thus  religion 
Working-  teaches  the  laboring  man  and  the  artisan  to  carry 
Encyclical  honestly  and  fairly  all  equitable  agreements 

Rerum  freely  entered  into ;  never  to  injure  the  property 
Novarum,  outrage  the  person  of  an  employer;  never  to 

resort  to  violence  in  defending  their  own  cause,  nor  to 
engage  in  riot  or  disorder ;  and  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  men 
of  evil  principles,  who  work  upon  the  people  with  artful  promises, 
and  excite  foolish  hopes  which  usually  end  in  disaster  and  in  re- 
pentance when  too  late.  Religion,  moreover,  teaches  the  wealthy 
owner  and  the  employer  that  their  work-people  are  not  to  be 
accounted  their  bondsmen ;  that  in  every  man  they  must  respect 
his  dignity  and  worth  as  a  man  and  as  a  Christian ;  that  labor 
is  nothing  to  be  ashamed  of,  if  we  Hsten  to  right  reason  and  to 
Christian  philosophy,  but  is  an  honorable  calling,  enabling  a 
man  to  sustain  his  life  in  an  upright  and  creditable  way;  and 
that  it  is  shameful  and  inhuman  to  treat  men  like  chattels  to 
make  money  by,  or  to  look  upon  them  merely  as  so  much  muscle 
or  physical  power."  As  immediate  remedial  measures,  the 
encyclical  approved  factory  legislation,  the  regulation  of  the 
hours  of  employment,  especially  of  women  and  children,  the 
creation  of  labor  unions  of  Catholic  workingmen,  and  an  increase 
of  small  landowners.  Employment  is  a  right,  Leo  held :  "each 
one  has  a  right  to  procure  what  is  required  in  order  to  live; 
and  the  poor  can  procure  it  in  no  other  way  than  through  work 
and  wages."  This  encyclical  of  Rerum  novarum  was  translated 
into  the  chief  modern  languages,  and  many  thousands  of  copies 
were  circulated  among  the  working  classes  in  Catholic  countries. 
It  not  only  won  for  Leo  XIII  the  title  of  "the  workingman's 
pope,"  but  it  gained  important  folio  wings  for  the  Roman  CathoHc 
Church  among  the  poorer  classes  of  southern  Germany,  Belgium, 
Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  Spain,  and  France,  as  well  as  confirming 
the  faith  of  Irish  and  PoHsh  industrial  emigrants  scattered  over 
the  world. 

Encouraged  possibly  by  the  reflection  that  in  comparison 
with  the  pontificate  of  Pius  IX  that  of  Leo  XIII  was  distinctly 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  251 


"liberal'^  and  '^progressive/'  a  goodly  number  of  Roman 
CathoKc  apologists  began  early  in  the  twentieth  century  to  agi- 
tate openly  in  favor  of  a  basic  revision  of  the  dogmas  Modernism 
and  policies  of  their  Church.  Influenced  certainly  by  in  the  Cath- 
the  vogue  of  Darwinism  and  by  the  development  of  Church 
Biblical  criticism,  these  apologists  sought  to  stop  the  leakage  of 
intellectual  bourgeois  from  the  Catholic  Church  by  urging  the 
frank  recognition  on  the  part  of  Catholics  that  their  religion 
must  be  ''modernized."  Although  these  so-called  "Modern- 
ists" differed  considerably  among  themselves,  they  generally 
held  that  dogma  is  not  immutable  but  evolutionary,  that  the 
Cathohc  Church  must  be  maintained  not  because  of  any  divine 
origin  but  because  of  its  human  utiHty,  that  ecclesiastical  au- 
thority must  be  weakened,  that  science  must  traverse  every 
field  of  investigation  without  fear  of  conflict  with  the  Church, 
that  the  State  must  not  be  hampered  by  rehgious  authority, 
and  that  the  inspirations  of  private  conscience  must  not  be 
overridden  by  papal  definitions  or  anathemas.  Starting  in 
Italy,  the  movement  soon  won  supporters  in  France,  England, 
Germany,  and  other  countries.  For  a  brief  period  it  appeared 
as  though  Darwinism  might  be  destined  to  work  as  great  a 
dogmatic  change  in  CathoHcism  as  in  Protestantism,  pj^g  ^ 
However,  during  the  pontificate  of  Pius  X  (1903-  (190371914) 
1914),^  several  influential  Modernists  were  excom-  demnation^' 
municated ;  the  whole  movement  was  denounced  in  a  of  Modern- 
Syllabus  of  the  Holy  Office  and  in  the  papal  encycli- 
cal  Pascendi  (1907) ;  and  Roman  CathoHc  priests  were  obhged 
to  take  an  oath  against  Modernist  teachings.  By  19 14  Modern- 
ism seemed  to  have  been  extirpated  from  the  Catholic  Church. 
Although  Pius  X  preserved  intact  the  general  poHcies  of  Leo 
XIII,  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  Modernist  movement 
was  in  part  responsible  for  a  recrudescence  during  his  pontificate 
of  the  bitter  conflict  between  "Clericals"  and  "Anti-Clericals." 

Enough  has  now  been  said  to  afford  some  notion  of  the  con- 
flicts waged  in  Catholic  countries  during  the  period  from  187 1 
to  1914  between  Clericals  and  Anti-Clericals.  The  latter,  de- 
spite the  conciliatory  attitude  of  Leo  XIII  and  the  intellectual 
and  political  developments  within  Catholicism,  continued  to 

^  Giuseppe  Sarto  (1835-1914). 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


comprise  the  majority  of  the  bourgeoisie,  many  intellectual 

radicals  in  the  universities  and  among  artists  and  scientists, 

scattered  supporters  among  the  nobihty  and  peasantry, 

Relative  ^^(^  numerous  vigorous  alhes  in  Socialistic  working- 
Position  of  .  .  11111, 

"  cieri-  men.  ihe  Clericals,  on  the  other  hand,  embraced 
'^'^Anti  conspicuous  individuals  ahke  from  the  intellectual  and 
Clericals "  from  the  industrial  middle  class,  the  majority  of  the 
xJentieth  Peasantry  and  of  the  old  nobihty,  and  well-organized 
Century  minorities  of  the  working  class.  Among  the  Clericals, 
too,  were  small  groups  of  persons,  regardless  of  class, 
who  had  been  drawn  to  Catholic  Christianity  because  they 
longed  for  an  authoritative  voice  that  would  give  rest  to  them 
from  the  tumults  and  uncertainties  of  contemporary  philosophy 
and  science,  or  because  they  found  in  the  Church's  champion- 
ship of  order  and  private  property  the  most  promising  safe- 
guards against  social  revolution,  or  because  they  believed  that 
rehgion  and  morahty  as  taught  by  the  Cathohc  Church  were 
indispensable  conditions  of  future  human  progress.  • 

THE  SOCIAL  PROBLEM  AND  THE  DECLINE  OF  LAISSER- 

FAIRE 

A  characteristic  of  the  period  from  187 1  to  1914,  more  por- 
tentous in  many  ways  than  conflicts  between  Clericals  and 
Anti-Clericals,  was  the  steady  growth  in  numbers  and  influence 
of  the  urban  working  classes  —  skilled  laborers,  factory  opera- 
tives, miners,  and  cheap  day-laborers.  In  an  earher  chapter  — 
that  on  the  Industrial  Revolution  —  some  indication  has  already 
been  given  of  the  process  by  which,  in  every  civilized  country, 
a  large  class  of  wage-earners  came  into  existence;  and  the 
wretchedness  and  misery  therein  described  as  their  common  lot 
continued  to  attend  them  until  well  after  187 1.  In  general  it 
may  be  said  that  the  workingmen  gave  invaluable  support  in 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  both  to  Liberahsm  and  to 
nationahsm,  but  neither  principle  effected  any  striking  improve- 
ment in  their  economic  condition.  After  187 1,  however,  the 
benevolence  and  self-interest  of  the  industrial  bourgeoisie  com- 
bined, as  has  been  intimated  earher  in  this  chapter,^  to  inaugu- 

^  See  above,  p.  222. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


253 


rate  a  new  policy  in  respect  of  the  lower  classes.  Instead  of 
vigorously  and  logically  holding  fast  to  the  doctrine  of  laisser- 
faire  and  thwarting  every  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  State  to 
interfere  in  private  business,  as  they  consistently  had  done 
during  the  first  two-thirds  of  the  nineteenth  century,  many 
manufacturers  were  converted  in  the  last  third  of  the  century 
to  the  idea  of  the  advisability  of  partial  governmental  regula- 
tion of  industry. 

Accordingly,  the  reader  will  discover  that  in  the  history  of 
every  important  industrial  country  since  1871  a  section  is 
allotted  to  social  legislation"  —  legalization  of  trade-unions, 
factory  laws,  wage-boards,  old-age  pensions,  national  insurance, 
etc.  It  is  indicative  of  the  constantly  broadening  functions  of 
the  modern  state. 

That  this  tendency  tow^ard  ''social  legislation"  was  a  very 
general  one  is  witnessed  by  the  fact  that  it  was  not  only  Anti- 
Clericals  like  Bismarck  and  Briand  who  fostered  it,  but  that 
it  was  encouraged  by  Pope  Leo  XIII  and  by  prominent  Anglican 
clergymen,  and  advocated  by  the  newer  Clerical  parties  on  the 
Continent.  It  seemed  as  if  middle-class  Clericals  and  Anti- 
Clericals  were  bidding  against  each  other  for  the  support  of  the 
working  class.  And  there  was  no  doubt  that  by  1914  both 
groups  of  bidders  had  been  in  part  successful.  The  Roman 
Catholic  Church  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  Anglican  Church 
and  the  Protestant  sects,  counted  among  workingmen  numerous 
followers  and  political  alKes ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  approval  or  consent  of  numerous  other  workingmen 
the  many  Anti-Clerical  measures  which  appeared  on  European 
statute-books  could  not  have  been  enacted. 

KARL  MARX  AND  MODERN  SOCIALISM 

While  a  large  group  of  workingmen  was  drawn  toward  Cleri- 
calism and  another  large  group  toward  Anti-Clericalism  —  both 
groups  being  fairly  well  attached  to  bourgeois  Liberalism  and  to 
most  of  the  principles  and  policies  of  the  modern  state,  —  a 
third  group  of  workingmen  was  waxing  more  and  more  vehement 
in  denunciation  of  those  very  principles  and  policies  and  was 
proving  more  and  more  vexatious  to  the  middle  class,  —  this 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


was  the  group  which  was  being  drawn  toward  Socialism.  Modern 
Socialism,  though  combated  ahke  by  Church  and  State,  grew 
steadily  in  Europe  throughout  the  period  from  1871  to  191 4, 
making  important  strides  toward  the  realization  of  its  aim  to 
bring  all  workingmen  within  its  economic  and  political  organi- 
zation. To  the  bourgeois  state,  it  caused  even  greater  uneasi- 
ness than  did  Clericalism ;  in  fact,  had  Socialism  and  Clericalism 
been  thoroughly  compatible,  they  might  in  union  have  dealt  a 
mortal  blow  at  the  supremacy  of  the  middle  class. 

The  real  roots  of  modern  Socialism  lie  back  of  1871  in  the 
Industrial  Revolution  itself.  As  long  ago  as  1794  the  French- 
Early  msin  Babeuf*  had  declared  that  it  was  idle  to  talk 
Socialism:  about  political  or  social  equality  so  long  as  equality 
Babeuf  ^£  wealth  or  of  economic  opportunity  was  lacking. 
''When  I  see  the  poor  without  the  clothing  and  shoes  which 
they  themselves  are  engaged  in  making,"  said  he,  ''and  contem- 
plate the  small  minority  who  do  not  work  and  yet  want  for 
nothing,  I  am  convinced  that  government  is  still  the  old  con- 
spiracy of  the  few  against  the  many,  only  it  has  taken  a  new 
form."  But  nothing  came  of  Babeuf 's  activities  except  in  1797 
his  own  death  warrant.^ 

In  the  comparatively  early  stages  of  the  Industrial  Revolu- 
tion the  cause  of  the  workingmen  was  espoused  by  such  men 
"  Utopian  "  Fourier,  Saint-Simon,  and  Owen,^  who  were  called 
Socialism:  "Socialists,"  ^  but  whose  doctrines  and  purposes  were 
Robert  different  from  those  of  present-day  SociaHsts  as 

Owen 

to  justify  the  appHcation  of  the  quaUfying  adjective 
"Utopian"  to  their  brand  of  Socialism.  The  Utopian  Socialists 
were  what  to-day  we  would  prefer  to  style  philanthropists  — 
individuals  of  a  higher  social  position  who  sought  to  do  good  to 
the  men  under  them.  And  Utopian  SociaHsm  usually  took  the 
form  of  ideal  communities  whose  members  would  live  in  common 
and  share  on  equal  terms  the  labor  and  the  profits.  To  the 
present  it  has  left  the  legacies  of  profit-sharing  in  certain  indus- 

1  See  Vol.  I,  p.  513. 

2  See  above,  pp.  86  f. 

3  The  word  "Socialist"  appears  to  have  been  first  used  in  a  letter  written  to  an 
English  newspaper  in  August,  1835,  by  an  anonymous  disciple  of  Robert  Owen. 
The  Utopians  have  often  been  styled  "Owenites." 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


255 


trial  establishments,  and  in  some  countries  important  systems 
of  cooperative  stores  with  collective  buying  and  selHng.  But 
in  its  dream  of  an  immediate  reorganization  of  society  Utopian 
Socialism  proved  a  failure,  and  to  later  Socialists  it  hardly 
appeared  as  Socialism  at  all. 

A  Httle  later  came  the  Sociahsm  of  Louis  Blanc,^  with  its 
national  workshops,  a  kind  of  Sociahsm  that  might  have  been 
styled  government-ownership.     It  did  conspicuous 
service  in  France  in  the  'forties  in  organizing  working-  ment^'wn- 
men  against  the  bourgeois  government  of  Louis  ership  So- 
Philippe    and   in   precipitating    the   revolutionary  LoufsBianc 
movement  of  1848,  and  it  reaped  some  reward  in  the 
subsequent  almost  universal  tendency  toward  national  ownership 
of  telegraphs,  telephones,  railways,  and  forests,  and  municipal 
ownership  of  pubhc  utiHties,  such  as  water-supply,  gas-  and 
electric-hghting,  tramways,  libraries,  markets,  docks,  baths,  etc. 
But  as  Sociahsm  it  was  so  completely  swallowed  up  by  yet 
another  variety  —  the  Marxian  —  that  Louis  Blanc  himself, 
appearing  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  as  an  old  man  in 
the  'seventies,  declared  that  he  was  no  longer  a  ''Socialist/* 
only  a  ''Radical." 

Marxian  or  "Scientific"  Socialism,  which  supplanted  both 
the  Utopian  and  the  Blanc  kinds,  and  from  which  all  present- 
day  forms  of  Sociahsm  are  directly  derived,  takes  Recent 
its  designation  from  the  name  of  its  classical  formu-  Socialism 
lator  -  Kari  Marx. 

Karl  Marx  was  born  at  Trier  in  Rhenish  Prussia  in  18 18. 
His  father,  a  Jewish  lawyer,  in  his  love  of  learning,  in  his  devo- 
tion to  Voltaire  and  other  eighteenth-century  phi- 
losophers  and  scientists,  in  his  swelhng  patriotism  for 
Prussia,  in  his  outward  conformity  to  Lutheran  Christianity,^  and 
in  his  sycophantic  office-holding,  was  a  typical  bourgeois  product 
of  the  times.  In  middle-class  society,  therefore,  young  Karl  was 
reared,  showing  early  aptitude  for  study,  especially  of  Greek, 
Latin,  and  literature,  and  graduating  from  the  gymnasium  of 
his  native  town  when  he  was  sixteen  years  old.    After  a  year 

^  See  above,  pp.  87  f. 

^  The  elder  Marx  with  his  whole  family,  Karl  included,  was  baptized  in  1824, 
taking  that  occasion  to  change  the  family  name  from  Mordechai  to  Marx. 


256 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


spent  in  the  University  of  Bonn,  he  was  transferred  to  the  Uni- 
versity of  Berlin  in  the  hope  that  a  larger  institution  with  a 
smaller  amount  of  ''college  Kfe"  would  tend  to  mold  the  youth 
more  after  his  father's  heart.  The  father  was  bent  on  making 
his  son  a  conventionally  respectable  lawyer  Hke  himself,  but  the 
son  already  displayed  a  passion  for  unusual  speculation  and 
stayed  away  from  lectures  on  law  in  order  to  attend  those  on 
philosophy  and  history.  From  the  father's  point  of  view,  there- 
fore, Karl's  university  career  was  a  dismal  failure,  and  hence- 
forth the  relations  of  father  and  son  were  strained.  Nevertheless, 
well  steeped  in  history  and  philosophy,  Karl  obtained  the  degree 
of  Ph.D.  from  the  University  of  Jena  in  1841. 

At  Berlin,  Karl  Marx  had  come  under  the  then  all-powerful 
influence  of  Hegel  ^  and  had  joined  the  informal  group  of 
Influence  "Young  Hegelians,"  who  enthusiastically  accepted 
of  Hegel  ^j^g  master's  philosophy  of  history  —  the  idea  that  the 
history  of  the  world  is  a  development  of  poHtical  institutions 
from  the  era  (the  "Oriental")  in  which  the  single  despot  pos- 
sessed freedom,  to  the  era  (the  "Germanic")  in  which  man  as 
man  enjoys  freedom  of  thought  and  action.  With  this  develop- 
mental theory  of  politics  in  mind,  Marx  became  a  pronounced 
Liberal  and  criticized  the  existing  Conservative  government  of 
Prussia  so  frankly  that  the  public  authorities  prevented  him  from 
realizing  his  desire  to  be  a  university  professor  and  in  1843  sup- 
pressed the  newspaper  —  the  Rheinische  Zeitung  —  through  whose 
columns,  as  editor,  he  was  waging  a  vigorous  fight  for  the 
freedom  of  the  press. 

To  Paris  Marx  then  went  and  there  gradually  shifted  his 
opinions  from  bourgeois  Liberalism  to  working-class  Socialism. 
Friedrich  He  began  to  study  factory  conditions.  He  became 
Engeis  interested  in  the  writings  of  the  Utopian  Socialists, 
especially  of  Robert  Owen.  He  made  the  acquaintance  of  Louis 
Blanc,  then  at  the  height  of  his  influence,  and  of  Proudhon 
and  Bakunin,  who  later  secured  fame  as  founders  of  rival  schools 
of  Anarchism.  He  found  a  sympathetic  soul  in  the  poet  Heine 
and  particularly  in  Friedrich  Engeis,^  the  man  who  was  destined 

1  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  (i 770-1831),  the  philosopher,  who  was  pro- 
fessor at  the  University  of  Berlin  from  1818  until  his  death. 

'  Friedrich  Engeis  (1820-1895),  like  Marx,  a  German  Jew,  born  at  Barmen  in 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


257 


to  be  his  lifelong  friend  and  co-laborer  —  his  veritable  alter 
ego.  In  order  to  eke  out  a  li\'ing,  he  did  a  good  deal  of  hack- 
writing  at  Paris  and  edited  the  Radical  pubHcation  Vorwdrts 
for  his  fellow-exiles  from  Germany.  In  1845,  however,  Vor- 
wdrts was  suppressed  by  Louis  Philippe's  prime  minister,  Guizot, 
on  the  urgent  representation  of  the  Prussian  government,  and 
Marx  moved  on  to  Brussels. 

At  Brussels,  where  he  resided  for  the  next  three  years,  Marx 
did  a  number  of  notable  things.  He  repudiated  middle-class 
Hegelianism.  He  conducted  wordy  polemics  with  Proudhon, 
which  served  to  bring  into  bold  rehef  the  fundamental  differences 
between  SociaHsm  and  Anarchism,  differences  that  will  be  no- 
ticed later.  He  agitated  for  poUtical  democracy.  He  organized 
workingmen's  clubs. 

It  was  as  a  statement  of  principles  for  these  workingmen's 
clubs  ^  that  Marx,  in  conjunction  with  Engels,  prepared  and 
published  early  in  1848  the  celebrated  Communist  ^^^^ 
Manifesto,    the   "birthcry   of   modern   Socialism."  Communist 
The  little  pamphlet  passed  practically  unnoticed  at  JJ^®^***' ' 
the  time,  —  the  great  poUtical  revolutions  of  1848 
monopolized  pubhc  attention,  —  but  much  later  it  was  recognized 
as  containing  in  concise  and  vivid  form  the  doctrines  of  the 
founders  of  ''scientific"  Socialism  —  Marx  and  Engels. 

Deferring  for  the  moment  an  analysis  of  the  Communist  Mani- 
festo, it  may  be  said  that  the  remonstrances  of  the  Prussian 
government  having  induced  the  Belgian  authorities  to  ''invite" 
him  to  leave  Brussels,  Marx  was  again  in  Paris  during  the 
February  days  which  witnessed  the  downfall  of  Guizot  and 


the  Rhine  province,  educated  in  the  gymnasium  of  Elberfeldt,  served  in  the  army 
from  1837  to  1841,  sent  in  1842  to  Manchester,  P^ngland,  to  look  after  a  cotton- 
spinning  business  of  which  his  father  was  principal  owner.  His  investigation  of 
factory  conditions  made  him  a  Socialist  and  the  pui3lication  of  his  work,  The  Condi- 
tion of  the  Working  Class  in  England  in  1844,  earned  him  the  friendship  of  Karl 
Marx. 

*  A  "Communist  League"  had  been  formed  in  Paris  as  early  as  1836  by  German 
refugees  and  traveling  workmen,  and  was  apparently  related  to  Mazzini's  revolu- 
tionary societies  in  Italy.  After  1840  it  became  an  "International  Alliance" 
with  loosely  attached  and  struggling  branches  in  several  important  industrial 
centers,  and  in  November,  1847,  Marx  and  Engels  attended  its  first  international 
congress  at  Lonclon.  It  was  out  of  the  discussions  there  that  the  Manifesto-  seems 
to  have  been  developed. 

VOL.  II  —  s 


258 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Louis  Philippe  and  the  proclamation  of  the  Second  French 
Republic.  Then  when  news  reached  him  of  the  spread  of  the 
revolutionary  wave  to  his  native  land,  he  hurried  to  Cologne 
and  began  the  publication  of  the  radical  SociaHstic  Neue  Rhein- 
ische  Zeitung.  But  the  reactionary  developments  of  the  follow- 
ing year  disillusioned  and  embittered  Marx :  everywhere  he 
saw  Conservatives  again  in  the  poHtical  saddle  and  middle- 
class  capitaHsts  in  the  economic  saddle.  Though  acquitted  in 
a  Prussian  court  of  the  charge  preferred  against  him  of  inciting 
to  armed  resistance,  he  was  obliged  again  to  leave  his  country. 

This  time  Marx  sought  refuge  in  England,  and  there  he  lived 
from  1849  to  the  day  of  his  death  in  1883,  disturbed  only  by 
Karl  Marx  financial  difficulties.  Generous  and  hospitable  to  a 
in  England,  fault,  and  a  fond  husband  and  father,  he  experienced 
1849-1883  incessant  hardship  in  making  both  ends  meet."  He 
continued  to  earn  a  precarious  living  by  hack-writing.  He 
translated  books.  He  dabbled  in  journalism,  contributing  a 
series  of  interesting  articles  to  the  New  York  Tribune.  But 
during  the  thirty-four  years  of  arduous  exile,  Marx  found  time 
to  perform  two  great  works,  which,  in  connection  with  his  con- 
tribution to  the  Communist  Manifesto,  constitute  his  chief  titles 
to  fame.  In  the  first  place  he  prepared  a  great  study  of  political 
economy.  Das  Kapital,^  that  was  regarded  by  his  followers  as 
doing  for  its  author  what  the  Wealth  of  Nations  did  for  Adam 
Smith.  In  the  second  place,  he  organized  in  1864  an  international 
society  among  workingmen  for  the  propagation  of  his  ideas. 

It  may  now  be  profitable  to  sketch  briefly  the  distinguishing 
features  of  this  new  Marxian  Socialism  which,  backed  by  the 
erudition  of  Das  Kapital,  was  outlined  in  the  Communist  Mani- 
festo and  embodied  for  action  in  the  International  Working- 
men's  Association. 

According  to  the  Communist  ^  Manifesto,  the  contemporary 
economic  conflict  between  capitalists  and  wage-earners  is  but  a 

^  The  first  volume  appeared  in  1867 ;  the  second,  third,  and  fourth,  revised  and 
edited  by  Engels,  were  not  published  until  after  the  death  of  Marx. 

^  The  word  "Communist"  was  employed  by  Marx  and  Engels  to  distinguish 
their  program  from  that  of  the  Utopians,  who  were  then  regularly  styled  "  Social- 
ists." Subsequently,  when  Utopianism  had  virtually  expired,  the  word  Socialism 
was  accepted  by  Marx  and  Engels  as  equivalent  to  their  "  Cpimniuiism,"  and  has 
gince  supplanted  it. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  259 

phase  of  the  age-long  economic  struggle  between  social  classes. 
History  is  simply  the  record  of  how  one  class  has  gained  wealth 
and  then  secured  poHtical  power  only  to  be  overthrown  xenets  of 
and  succeeded  in  wealth  and  poUtical  power  by  an-  Marxian 
other  class.  At  the  present  time  the  factory  system 
has  magnified  the  wealth  and  poUtical  influence  of  the  bour- 
geoisie—  has,  in  fact,  created  the  "capitaKst  class,"  —  but 
it  has  also  produced  men  who  are  destined  to  deal  capitalism 
its  death  blow,  the  workingmen,  the  ''proletarians,"  herded 
into  towns  and  exploited  on  a  large  scale.  These  proletarians 
"are  increasing  in  power  and  are  becoming  conscious  of  their 
power,"  reenforced  by  the  lower  middle  class,  the  artisans,  and 
the  peasants  who  are  falHng  into  the  proletariat.  As  time  goes 
on,  the  Manifesto  prophesies,  capital  will  be  controlled  by  a 
few.  and  the  many  will  be  proletarians ;  at  that  time  the  many 
will  be  able  by  poHtical  means  to  dispossess  the  few  and  to 
inaugurate  the  Communist  state. 

The  aims  of  "Communism,"  as  set  forth  in  the  Manifesto,  are 
to  organize  the  proletarians  in  a  class  party,  to  have  the  prole- 
tariat gain  political  power,  and  to  aboHsh  middle-class  property 
ownership,  "created  by  the  labor  of  wage-earners  for  the  profit 
of  capitalists."  The  realization  of  these  aims  will  mean  the 
transformation  of  private-owned  capital  into  rightful  common 
property,  and  the  aboHtion  of  middle-class  free  trade,  of  the 
"middle-class  family,"  of  traditional  middle-class  reHgion  and 
morality,  and  of  hostihty  between  nations ;  and  the  reaHzation 
will  be  wrought  by  poHtical  processes.  As  transitional  measures 
toward  the  ultimate  goal,  the  Manifesto  urges  the  proletarians 
to  demand  the  following:  (i)  confiscation  of  land  rent;  (2) 
high  direct  taxes ;  (3)  aboHtion  of  inheritance ;  (4)  confiscation 
of  the  property  of  emigrants ;  (5)  centraHzation  of  credit  by  a 
national  bank  with  pubHc  capital  and  exclusive  monopoly ;  (6) 
pubHc  ownership  of  all  means  of  transportation ;  (7)  national 
factories  and  national  cultivation  of  land ;  (8)  compulsory  labor 
for  all ;  (9)  gradual  abolition  of  the  distinction  between  town 
and  country  by  a  more  equable  cHstribution  of  the  population 
over  the  country;  and  (10)  free  public  education  for  aU  chil- 
dren. The  famous  conclusion  of  the  Manifesto  is  at  once  inter- 
national and  revolutionary  :  "  The  proletarians  have  nothing  to 


26o  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


lose  but  their  chains.  They  have  a  world  to  win.  Workingmen 
of  all  countries,  unite  !  " 

In  estimating  the  significance  of  Karl  Marx,  four  facts  stand 
out  clearly  and  prominently.  In  the  first  place,  he  systematized 
Signifi-  existing  socialistic  theories.  Secondly,  he  emphasized 
cance  of  the  political,  as  well  as  the  economic,  character  of 
Karl  Marx  Socialism,  insisting  that  political  democracy  would 
be  an  indispensable  antecedent  to  the  collective  ownership  of  all 
the  means  of  production  and  distribution  of  economic  goods. 
Thirdly,  he  conferred  upon  SociaHsm  a  philosophy  and  a  claim  to 
be  considered  a  '^science."  His  philosophy,  which  has  been  fre- 
quently styled  ''economic  determinism,"  or,  far  more  commonly, 
the  economic  or  materialistic  interpretation  of  history,  may  be 
embraced  in  three  comprehensive  formulas  :  (i)  that  the  course 
of  history  has  always  been  determined  by  economic  factors ; 
(2)  that  present  society  has  been  evolved  gradually  out  of 
many  class  struggles  of  the  past ;  (3)  that  the  present  capital- 
istic society  will  inevitably  be  transformed  into  another  type  of 
social  organization.  These  three  formulas,  taken  together,  con- 
stituted a  philosophical  synthesis  to  which  the  name  ''Marx- 
ism" was  applied  just  as  the  name  ''Darwinism"  was  contem- 
poraneously applied  to  the  body  of  Darwin's  teaching.  In  fact, 
it  was  pointed  out  that  Marx  did  for  social  science  what 
Darwin  did  for  natural  science.  And  there  is  certainly  little 
doubt  that  Marx's  emphasis  upon  the  economic  interpretation 
of  history  has  tremendously  influenced  a  growing  number  of 
historians  since  his  time,  regardless  of  whether  they  have  called 
themselves  Socialists,  Conservatives,  or  Clericals.  To  such  an 
extent,  certainly,  the  methods  of  Karl  Marx  could  be  deemed 
scientific  as  well  as  philosophical. 

Finally,  Karl  Marx  made  his  appeal  not  so  much  to  theorists 
or  philanthropists  or  altruistic  bourgeois,  Hke  the  Utopians, 
as  directly  to  the  workingmen  themselves.  Although  he 
was  by  birth  and  early  training  a  bourgeois  himself,  —  and  so 
was  Engels,  and  so  were  many  other  leaders  of  modern  Social- 
ism, —  nevertheless  he  insisted  that  by  the  law  of  historical 
evolution  nothing  could  be  really  achieved  for  the  workingmen 
except  by  the  workingmen;  the  only  function  of  middle-class 
agitators  like  himself  would  be  to  make  the  workingmen  class- 


DEMOCRACY  AN])  NATIONALISM  261 


conscious  and  to  assist  them  in  organizing.  And  it  was  not  to 
the  workingmen  of  any  one  country  that  Marx  appealed :  "  work- 
ingmen  have  no  country,"  he  declared;  and  it  was  interna- 
tionalism rather  than  nationalism  that  Marxism  espoused. 

In  order  to  realize  the  aims  of  the  new  Socialism,  Karl  Marx 
took  a  leading  part  in  organizing  and  directing  the  ''International 
Working  Men's  Association"  —  usually  described 
simply  as  "The  International."  Originating  in  an  tion^of^*' 
informal  gathering  of  Enghsh,  French,  and  Belgian  Socialism: 
laborers  at  the  London  Exposition  of  1862,  the  society  nationi^*^^ 
assumed  permanent  form  in  1864  and  adopted  the 
Marxian  teachings  essentially  in  toto.  The  International  was  a 
federation  of  self-governing  ''sections"  on  national  Hnes :  for 
several  years  it  held  annual  congresses,  and  at  one  time  it  in- 
cluded "sections"  in  England,  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Bel- 
gium, Holland,  Switzerland,  and  the  United  States.  Despite 
the  strenuous  efforts  of  Marx,  several  events  conspired  in  the 
'seventies  to  bring  about  the  failure  of  the  International  as  an 
organization.  Its  members  were  always  few  and,  without  excep- 
tion, poor,  which  meant  the  lack  of  financial  support.  Then, 
too,  the  renewed  impetus  given  to  nationalism  by  the  Franco- 
German  War  of  1870-187 1  was  temporarily  destructive  of  all 
international  movements.  Again,  the  failure  of  the  Communist 
uprising  at  Paris  in  1871,  with  which  Marx  heartily  sympathized 
and  which  will  subsequently  be  described,  brought  the  Interna- 
tional into  wide  disrepute  with  friends  of  law  and  order.  Finally, 
the  small  society  was  torn  by  internal  dissensions  between  the 
Socialist  followers  of  Marx  and  the  disciples  of  the  Anarchist 
Bakunin.  The  last  real  congress  of  the  International  was  held 
at  Geneva  in  1873  ;  the  formal  dissolution  of  the  organization 
was  decreed  by  a  few  of  the  faithful  assembled  at  Philadelphia 
in  1876. 

But  the  failure  of  the  International  meant  by  no  means  the 
failure  of  Marxian  Socialism,  the  principles  of  which  were  already 
producing  fruit  in  national  movements  independent 
of  the  "sections"  of  the  International.  The  sue-  ^^^gX^^^^ 
cessful  organization  of  the  movement,  in  fact,  was  not  the  Social 
to  be  ascribed  to  Karl  Marx,  but  rather  to  an-  p^^y -n**'*^ 
other  German  Jew,  the  brilliant  and  somewhat  erratic  Germany 


262  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Ferdinand  Lassalle  (1825-1864),  a  well-educated,  well-to-do 
bourgeois,  famed  both  as  a  man  of  decidedly  fashionable  and 
luxurious  habits  and  as  a  veritable  "messiah  of  the  poor." 
Lassalle's  Open  Letter  of  March,  1863,  which  revived  Louis 
Blanc's  ideas  of  universal  suffrage  and  national  workshops,  was 
the  beginning  of  a  political  party  in  Germany  which  could 
rightfully  lay  claim  to  the  old  name  of  '^Social  Democrat." 
Side  by  side  with  the  Social  Democracy  came  into  existence  the 
German  "sections"  of  Karl  Marx's  International,  including  such 
famous  leaders  as  the  scholarly  bourgeois  Wilhelm  Liebknecht 
(1826-1900),  and  the  eloquent  Saxon  woodturner,  August  Bebel 
( 1 840-1 913).  And  the  fusion  of  the  two  rival  groups  in  1875 
formed  a  single  Social  Democratic  party,  essentially  Marxian 
in  theory,  which  made  an  ever-widening  appeal  to  German 
workingmen.  From  1875  to  1914  Marxian  Socialism  grew  in 
Germany  by  leaps  and  bounds. 

The  Social  Democratic  party  of  Germany  became  the  type 
after  which  the  national  organizations  of  Marxian  Socialism 
National  ^^^^  modeled  in  other  countries,  and  with  such 
Socialist  rapidity  that  by  19 14  every  civilized  nation  had  a 
Parties  Socialist  party  whose  gospel,  at  least  in  theory,  was 
the  teaching  of  Karl  Marx.  And  in  order  to  unite  the  national 
parties  in  a  bond  of  mutual  sympathy  and  encouragement,  there 
had  been  a  recrudescence  of  annual  international  congresses, 
whose  functions,  however,  were  advisory  and  consultative  rather 
than  governmental.  Although  in  some  countries  only  a  rela- 
tively small  minority  of  workingmen  could  be  called  Sociahsts, 
nevertheless  it  was  clear  that  everywhere  wage-earners  were 
being  attracted  to  Socialism  in  increasing  numbers. 

The  growth  of  Marxian  Socialism  was  combated  throughout 
the  period  from  1871  to  1914  alike  by  Clericals  and  by  ordinary 
Opposition  supporters  of  the  bourgeois  regime.  To  the  Clericals, 
of  Many      as  has  already  been  intimated,  Socialism  seemed 

"  Clericals  " 

and"Anti-  radical  and  too  revolutionary:   its  attacks  on 

Clericals"  private  property  were  unjust  and  unnatural;  its 
to  Socialism  ^laintenance  of  the  doctrine  of  the  class-struggle  was 
un-Christian ;  and  the  extreme  views  of  some  of  its  advocates 
on  the  subject  of  marriage  gave  color  to  the  widely  entertained 
belief  that  it  was  anti-religious  and  immoral.    To  the  average 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  263 


respectable  and  comfortable  middle-class  person,  regardless  of 
ecclesiastical  affiliations,  Socialism  appeared  downright  dan- 
gerous :  its  diatribes  against  private  property  were  held  to  be 
destructive  of  indi\ddual  initiative ;  its  appeals  to  a  single  class 
in  the  community  were  likely  to  array  that  class  against  all 
others,  to  ruin  business,  and  to  lead  to  civil  war;  and  its  in- 
sistence upon  international  solidarity  was  positively  unpatriotic. 
Against  ever  so  many  dominant  political  tendencies  of  the 
period.  Socialism  sternly  set  its  face :  it  generally  opposed 
militarism  and  imperialism  and  protective  tariffs  and  all  forms 
of  indirect  taxation  and  commercial  or  industrial  concessions 
to  private  individuals  or  corporations.  With  Socialism  nearly 
every  statesman  of  the  period  had  to  contend. 

In  conducting  their  political  campaigns  during  the  period, 
the  Socialists  came  to  differ  among  themselves,  not  on  the  ques- 
tion of  violence,  for  violence  was  universally  con- 
demned by  official  Socialism,  and  not  on  any  ques-  i^jvision 

r      1       1     •        1      •      iv\i-      •  •     •  1        1        of  the 

tion  of  abandonmg  basic  Marxian  principles,  but  socialists 
rather  on  the  question  of  the  political  tactics  which  ^"t?  . 

1  111  •  1  •  '11  Strict 

they  should  pursue  m  order  to  gam  as  quickly  as  Marxists " 
possible   their  common  economic  ends.     On  this 

■,       I'rr  1  •  1  fornusts 

question  of  tactics,  the  diiierences  which  appeared  on  Ques- 
more  or  less  prominently  in  almost  every  national  p°JJJj°^ 
SociaHst  party  gave  rise  to  two  groups  more  or  Tactics 
less  distinct:  the    strict"  Marxians,  usually  called 
''Marxists,"    and    the    ''loose"    Marxians,  variously  styled 
"Reformists,"  "Revisionists,"  "Possibilists,"  etc.    The  differ- 
ences related  chiefly  to  imperiahsm,  Clericalism,  agriculture,  and 
trade-unionism. 

On  the  question  of  imperialism,  the  Marxists,  true  to  the 
letter  of  their  master's  instructions,  unequivocally  championed 
international  peace  and  protested  against  every  i.  imperial- 
seizure  of  colonies  and  every  increase  of  armaments. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Reformists  heeded  the  instructions  with 
less  assurance  :  they  were  prone  to  talk  about  national  peculiari- 
ties, the  promotion  of  civilization,  "Slav  perils,"  or  "Yellow 
perils" — the  very  language  of  anti-Socialist  imperialists.  The 
Reformists  certainly  held  pretty  generally  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
every  nation  to  defend  itself  by  force  of  arms  against  the  attacks 


264 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  less  socialistically  inclined  nations,  and  that  national  patriot- 
ism was  not  in  every  instance  an  evil  thing. 

On  the  question  of  clericalism,  the  Marxian  theory  that  religion 
was  a  private  concern  was  badly  strained  by  the  anti-Socialist 
2  Religion  ^^^^^^^Y  Christian  clergymen  in  many  countries, 
especially  Roman  Catholic.  The  result  was  that  the 
Reformists  tended  to  lay  stress  upon  the  demand  for  secularizing 
education  and  for  stopping  the  payment  of  ecclesiastical  salaries 
by  the  state  and  that  in  CathoUc  countries  they  were  frankly 
Anti-Clerical. 

Similarly  on  the  question  of  the  peasantry,  the  original  Marx- 
ist contention  that  the  agricultural  classes  should  be  left  un- 

3.  Agrictii-  heeded  to  succumb  to  capitalism  was  sorely  weak- 

ened  in  practical  poHtics  by  the  increasingly  obvious 
fact  that  on  the  Continent  the  resistance  to  Socialism,  electorally 
speaking,  depended  upon  the  peasantry,  who  were  not  succumb- 
ing to  capitalism  at  all  rapidly  and  who  naturally  feared  Socialism 
as  the  despoiler  of  their  little  farms  and  holdings.  This  discrep- 
ancy between  theory  and  practice  induced  many  Reformists  to 
undertake  a  propaganda  of  ''enhghtenment"  among  the  peas- 
antry and  to  bid  for  their  political  support. 

Originally  the  Marxists,  thoroughly  recognizing  the  value  of 
the  achievements  of  the  trade  unions,  were  jealous  of  them, 

4.  Trade-  fearing  that  they  would  conflict  with  the  organiza- 
Unionism  tions  of  simon-purc  Socialism.  But  the  wonderful 
growth  of  trade-unionism  during  the  period  —  a  growth  even 
more  remarkable  than  that  of  Socialism  —  soon  convinced  the 
Reformists  that  well-organized  trade  unions  afforded  the  best 
kind  of  stepping-stones  to  Socialism.  Consequently,  the  Re- 
formists championed  trade-unionism,  and  v/herever  they  could, 
they  either,  as  in  Germany,  annexed  unions  to  the  Socialist  party 
or,  as  in  Great  Britain,  entered  into  alliances  with  inde- 
pendent trade-unionists  under  the  joint  designation  of  Labor 
parties. 

For  most  practical  purposes  the  national  Socialist  parties  were 
able  to  carry  on  their  work  with  the  united  support  of  Marxists 
and  Reformists.  As  time  went  on,  there  was  no  doubt,  how- 
ever, that  the  latter  group  were  in  the  ascendant  and  that  their 
tactics  were  becoming  the  tactics  of  Marxian  Socialism.  Only 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  265 


in  one  particular  —  the  refusal  of  the  leaders  of  the  Socialist 
party  to  become  members  of  coalition  cabinets  with  non-Sociahst 
leaders  —  did  strict  Marxism  appear  triumphant,  and  even  in 
this  particular  the  tremendous  military  crisis  of  19 14  was  des- 
tined to  effect  a  moderating  change. 


ANARCfflSM  AND  SYNDICALISM 

Not  all  the  workingmen  of  the  period  from  1871  to  1914  can 
be  distributed  among  Socialism,  ClericaHsm,  and  non-political 
trade-unionism,  though  a  large  majority  of  the  whole  class  and 
the  mass  of  skilled  laborers  fit  into  one  or  another  of  these 
three  categories.  Yet  one  more  group  remains  to  be  men- 
tioned —  the  disciples  of  Anarchism. 

Modern  Anarchism  like  modern  Socialism  was  a  product  of 
the  Industrial  Revolution :  both  started  as  more  or  less  system- 
atized theories  on  the  part  of  reforming  middle-class  Modern 
philanthropists  of  the  best  way  in  which  to  get  rid  Anarchism 
of  poverty  and  other  ills  that  followed  in  the  wake  theTndus-°^ 
of  poverty ;  both  tended  to  become  panaceas  for  the  trial  Revo- 
workingman  and  to  promise  much  the  same  ultimate  "  ^ 
goal ;  but  from  each  other  the  two  differed  fundamentally  in 
their  means  of  attaining  that  goal.    Sociahsm  would  employ  a 
democratic  government.    Anarchism  would  employ  no  com- 
pulsory government  of  any  sort. 

William  Godwin  (1756- 183 6),  a  shy  and  retiring  ex-parson,  who 
lived  in  England  during  the  period  of  the  French  Revolution, 
has  always  been  acclaimed  as  the  father  of  philosophi-  wuuam 
cal  Anarchism,  l)ut  his  learned  work.  The  Inquiry  Godwin 
concerning  Political  Justice,  and  its  Influence  on  General  Virtue 
and  Happiness  (1793),  was  hardly  simple  enough  in  argument 
or  style  to  make  a  popular  appeal  to  day-laborers.  A  far  more 
influential  person  —  the  one  who  coined  the  word  Anarchist"  — 
was  Pierre  Joseph  Proudhon  (1809- 186 5),  a  French  contemporary 
of  Karl  Marx.  p.^^^ 

Proudhon,  poor  but  bright  and  ambitious,  went  up  Joseph 
from  a  printer's  shop  in  the  provinces  to  Paris  in  Proudhon 
1839  at  the  age  of  thirty  to  pursue  an  ascetic  and  studious 
life.     It  was  just  the  time  when  the  Industrial  Revolution 


266  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


was  coming  into  France  from  England ;  when  machinery  and 
factories  were  being  rapidly  put  up  at  Paris;  when  the  lines 
were  growing  sharper  between  new  classes  —  the  wealthy 
factory  owners  and  the  impoverished  factory  workers.  It  was 
also  the  time  when  many  sorts  of  political  opposition  were 
appearing  against  the  compromising  middle-class  monarchy  of 
Louis  Philippe ;  when  the  factory  owners  were  beginning  to 
demand  a  larger  share  in  government. 

In  this  environment  Proudhon  went  to  work  and  in  1840  pub- 
lished his  first  important  book,  What  is  Property?  The  audacity 
of  his  answer,  ''Property  is  Theft,"  proved  to  be  a  spectacular 
commencement  of  his  revolutionary  career.  With  the  proceeds 
of  journaHstic  hack-writing  he  managed  to  keep  body  and  soul 
together,  and  all  of  his  spare  time  he  gave  to  the  ''cause."  In 
1846  he  published  his  greatest  work,  the  System  of  economic  con- 
tradictions or  the  Philosophy  of  Poverty,  a  thoroughly  Anarchistic 
work,  to  which  Karl  Marx  promptly  replied  with  a  thoroughly 
Socialistic  criticism,  gayly  entitled  the  Poverty  of  Philosophy. 
Proudhon  took  some  part  in  the  revolutionary  movement  of  1848 
and  served  as  a  member  of  the  Constituent  Assembly.  Between 
1848  and  1850  he  started  four  different  newspapers,  all  of  which 
were  in  turn  suppressed  as  anarchistic  and  obnoxious.  An 
attempt  to  found  a  voluntary  bank  which  should  operate  without 
charging  interest  led  to  his  imprisonment  for  two  years.  Four 
years  after  his  release  he  pubhshed  his  third  important  work, 
Of  Justice  in  the  Revolution  and  in  the  Church,  in  which  he  attacked 
existing  pohtical  and  ecclesiastical  institutions  with  such  unusual 
fury  that  he  was  obliged  to  flee  to  Brussels  to  escape  a  second 
incarceration.  After  the  amnesty  which  Napoleon  III  granted 
to  political  offenders  in  i860,  Proudhon  returned  to  France  and 
died  quietly  at  Passy  in  1865. 

Proudhon  left  no  clear,  concise  statement  of  his  opinions, 
but  from  his  various  writings  the  following  have  been  gathered 
Proudhon's  indicative  of  the  Anarchism  which  he  preached. 
Attack  on  In  the  first  place,  he  was  one  with  Marx  in  his  definition 
Property  ^£  pj-jy^^^g  property  and  capital  as  the  power  of  ex- 
ploiting the  labor  of  other  men,  of  claiming  the  results  of  labor 
without  giving  an  equivalent.  "As  slavery,"  said  he,  "is  assassi- 
nation inasmuch  as  it  destroys  all  that  is  valuable  and  desirable 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  267 


in  human  personality,  so  property  is  theft  inasmuch  as  it  appro- 
priates the  vahie  produced  by  the  labor  of  others  without  ren- 
dering an  equivalent."  For  private  property,  however,  he  would 
substitute,  not  pubUc  property  as  the  Marxian  SociaHsts  would 
do,  but  simply  individual  possession,  every  man  having  an 
equal  right  to  use  property  and  to  enjoy  the  full  product  of  his 
own  labor. 

Secondly  —  and  herein  Hes  the  basic  difference  between 
Anarchism  and  Socialism  —  Proudhon  rejected  all  forms  of 
authoritative  government,  social  democratic  as  well  proudhon's 
as  monarchical  or  oligarchical.    He  held  that  ''all  Attack  on 
parties,  without  exception,  in  so  far  as  they  seek  for 
powxr,  are  varieties  of  absolutism,  and  that  there  would  be  no 
liberty  for  citizens,  no  order  for  societies,  no  union  among  work- 
ingmen,  until  in  the  political  catechism  the  renunciation  of 
authority  should  have  replaced  faith  in  authority."   He  summed 
up  his  poHtical  creed  in  the  phrases,  "No  more  parties,  no  more 
authority,  absolute  Hberty  of  man  and  citizen." 

Thirdly,  Proudhon  was  at  once  a  morahst  and  an  optimist 
in  rearing  his  constructive  schemes.  He  believed  that  a  sense  of 
justice  is  inherent  in  every  man,  that  the  Golden  Proudhon's 
Rule  is  the  immutable  law  of  the  individual  conscience.  Opti°"sm 
Justice  demands,  according  to  him,  a  social  human  life  on  the  basis 
of  a  single  law  that  contracts  must  be  lived  up  to.  This  was 
what  Proudhon  meant  by  Anarchism.  After  the  abrogation  of  the 
present-day  state  and  of  man-made  laws,  men  are  still  to  live 
together  in  society,  not  by  any  supreme  authority,  but  only  by 
the  voluntary,  yet  legally  binding,  force  of  contract.  ''Thus 
a  regime  of  voluntary  contracts,  substituted  for  a  regime  of  ob- 
ligatory laws,  would  constitute  the  true  government  of  man,  the 
true  sovereignty  of  the  people,  the  true  Repubhc."  Proudhon 
dwelt  at  length  upon  the  naturalness  of  his  proposed  society  and 
cited  various  voluntary  fraternal  orders  and  the  Christian  Church, 
when  separated  from  the  state,  as  examples  of  the  very  thing 
which  he  advocated  universally.  And  he  optimistically  held 
that  human  nature  is  of  such  a  high  order  that,  emancipated 
from  the  bondage  of  the  State  and  the  tyranny  of  laws,  it  would 
spontaneously  react  in  Anarchistic  society  against  all  wrong- 
doing, 


268 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  p:UROPE 


Finally,  Proudhon  was  a  perfectibilist,  that  is  to  say,  he 
believed  that  man  is  capable  of  an  infinite  amount  of  self-better- 
„         ,    ment.    This  belief  led  him  to  decry  violence  as  a 

Proudhon's  .  .    .  , .  .  , 

Faith  in  means  of  overthrowmg  existmg  pontical,  economic, 
Pro^e^s      social,  and  ecclesiastical  institutions  and  of  ushering 

in  the  ideal  Anarchism.  He  always  insisted  that  man 
could  be  gradually  educated  up  to  an  understanding  of  abuses 
in  the  present  system  and  of  the  advantages  of  the  anarchistic 
regime.  When  that  day  should  come,  society  would  be  intelli- 
gently transformed  of  its  own  volition.  In  Proudhon's  system 
there  was  no  place  for  violence. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  essence  of  the  Anarchism  of 
Proudhon  was  a  tremendous  reliance  on  individuaKsm.  To 

escape  the  economic  and  social  conditions  of  the 
Tenets  o^^  ^^^^  —  whose  evils  both  bitterly  arraigned  —  Prou- 
Phiiosophi-  dhon  departed  in  a  diametrically  opposite  direction 
[s^^^'^^^'   from  Marx.    While  Marx  would  vastly  increase  the 

powers  and  functions  of  the  democratic  state,  Prou- 
dhon would  diminish  them  to  the  vanishing  point  and  would 
carry  the  then  much-vaunted  principle  of  laisser-faire  to  its 
logical  conclusion.  From  this  very  individuaKsm  —  so  inherent 
in  Anarchism  —  it  followed  that  no  central  organization,  with 
a  common  platform  of  policies,  could  be  devised  to  carry  forward 
Proudhon's  movement.  By  leaving  everything  to  the  indi- 
vidual, it  followed  that  almost  as  many  interpretations  were 
placed  on  Anarchism  as  there  were  individual  disciples.-^ 

In  general  it  may  be  said  that  all  Anarchists  since  the  time 
of  Proudhon  have  clung  to  the  first  three  of  the  four  funda- 
Anarchism  mental  characteristics  mentioned  above,  and  that  on 
and  the  fourth  tenet  —  the  employment  of  violence  to 

Terronsm  ^qj-]^  j-j^g  transformation  from  capitalistic  to  anarchis- 
tic society  —  professed  Anarchists  have  tended  to  separate  into 
two  hostile  factions.  One  faction  —  a  small  faction,  composed 
mainly  of  middle-class  Radicals,  intellectual  and  philosophical — 
has  adhered  to  Proudhon's  preachments  of  peaceful  propaganda. 

1  Among  famous  Anarchists,  Nietzsche  has  been  reckoned  a  close  disciple  of 
Proudhon;  Prince  Kropatkin  and  Enrico  Malatesta  as  " anarchist-commvmists " ; 
Count  Tolstoy  as  a  "Christian  Anarchist."  Anarchistic  doctrines  also  appear  to 
the  literary  work  of  Ibsen,  Zola,  and  Walt  Whitman. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  269 


The  other  —  a  growing  faction  —  has  encouraged  the  use  of 
terror  and  violence :  a  method  whose  earliest  and  most  militant 
champion  was  a  Russian  revolutionary,  Mikhail  Bakunin 
(1814-1876). 

Bakunin  came  of  an  aristocratic  family  in  Russia,  served 
in  the  tsar's  army,  and  studied  in  Germany,  where  he  accepted 
the  philosophy  of  Hegel  and  got  into  touch  with  Mikhail 
young  Radicals  in  Berlin.    Journeying  to  Paris,  he  bakunin 
made  the  acquaintance  of  Proudhon  and  the  chief  PoKsh  exiles, 
and  began  his  career  as  a  revolutionary  agitator.    For  his  par- 
ticipation in  an  insurrection  at  Dresden  in  1849  he  was  arrested 
and  handed  over  to  the  Russian  authorities,  who  sent  him  off  to 
a  penal  colony  in  Siberia.   Managing  to  escape  in  1861,  he  spent 
the  remainder  of  his  hfe  in  western  Europe,  principally  in  Swit- 
zerland.   In  1869  he  founded  the  Social  Democratic  Alliance,  a 
society  of  w^orkingmen,  whose  members  were  recruited  largely 
from  the  countries  of  southern  Europe,  and  in  the  same  year 
afiiHated  it  with  Karl  Marx's  International  Working  Men's 
Association.   It  was  not  long  before  the  irreconcilable  differences 
of  Marx  and  Bakunin  became  manifest :  the  former  would  secure 
economic  reforms  through  poKtical  action  and  peace- 
fully; the  latter  would  improve  the  lot  of  the  work-  ijet^y^eeii 
ingmen  through  general  strikes  —  ''direct  action" —  Anarchism 
without  reference  to  government  and  with  the  help  socialism 
of  terrorism.    In  1872  Bakunin  was  outvoted  and 
expelled  by  the  Marxian  SociaHsts,  and  the  attendant  secessions 
from  the  International  were  not  only  a  contributing  cause  of  the 
failure  of  that  general  movement  of  workingmen  but  also  a  recog- 
nition of  the  formal  schism  between  SociaKsm  and  Anarchism 
which  has  survived  to  the  present  day. 

After  Bakunin's  death  in  1876  workingmen  everywhere  were 
far  more  inclined  to  join  the  Socialist  parties  than  to  become 
Anarchists,  and  for  a  score  of  years  Anarchism  of  the  ^,   „  .  . 

-r.  1       .  ,        1    1.    .     1  .  The  Spirit 

Bakunin  type  was  largely  limited  to  secret  conspiracy,  of  Revo- 
terrorism  against  illiberal  government,  such  as  that  lutionary 

i-T»-»iiii  1  1  Anarchism 

of  Russia,  isolated  bomb  outrages,  and  murderous 
attacks  qn  representatives  of  royalty  or  on  particularly  objec- 
tionable capitalists.    The  spirit  underlying  the  numerous  in- 
stances   of    Anarchistic    violence    occurring    between    187 1 


270 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


and  1 914  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  following  passage  of  the 
famous  Revolutionary  Catechism,  written  by  an  associate  of 
Bakunin :  ''The  [revolutionary  Anarchist]  will  use  every  means 
and  every  effort  to  increase  and  intensify  the  evils  and  sorrows, 
which  must  at  last  exhaust  the  patience  of  the  people  and  excite 
them  to  insurrection  en  masse.  By  a  popular  revolution  the 
[individual  Anarchist]  does  not  mean  a  movement  regulated 
according  to  the  classic  patterns  of  the  West,  which,  always 
restrained  in  the  face  of  property  and  of  the  traditional  social 
order  of  so-called  civilization  and  morality,  has  hitherto  been 
limited  merely  to  exchanging  one  form  of  political  organization 
for  another,  and  to  the  creating  of  a  so-called  revolutionary 
state.  The  only  revolution  that  can  do  any  good  to  the  people 
is  that  which  utterly  annihilates  every  idea  of  the  State  and  over- 
throws all  traditions,  orders,  and  classes,  as  in  Russia.  With 
this  end  in  view,  the  [revolutionary  Anarchist]  has  no  intention 
of  imposing  upon  the  people  any  organization  whatever  coming 
from  above.  The  future  organization  will,  without  doubt, 
proceed  from  the  movement  and  life  of  the  people ;  but  that  is 
the  business  of  future  generations.  Our  task  is  destruction, 
terrible,  total,  inexorable,  and  universal." 

Although  anarchistic  workingmen  were  to  be  found  among 
the  Paris  communists  of  1871  and  among  the  abettors  of  pohtical 
disorder  in  Spain  during  the  'seventies,  it  was  not 
Syndical-      until  the  'nineties  that  Anarchism  could  be  said  to 

ism,  a  Re- 
cent Form     have  made  any  considerable  headway  with  the  work- 

tionan^°^^'  class,  and  then  not  under  the  formal  name  of 

Anarchism  Anarchism,  but  rather  under  the  more  ambiguous 
designation  of  SyndicaHsm.  Starting  in  France,  where 
Anarchist  agitators  got  control  of  several  trade  unions  (syndi- 
cats,  as  the  French  style  them),  SyndicaHsm  rapidly  spread 
among  the  laborers,  particularly  in  the  unskilled  trades,  in 
southern  and  central  Europe,  in  Great  Britain,  in  Australia,  and, 
as  the  ''Industrial  Workers  of  the  World,"  in  the  United  States. 

From  usual  trade-unionism.  Syndicalism  differed  in  that  it 
would  organize  the  workers  by  whole  industries  rather  than  by 
trades  or  crafts :  thus,  all  men  engaged  in  railroading,  or  even 
in  transport  work  of  any  sort,  would  be  brought  into  one  mam- 
moth body  which  could  thereby  achieve  control  over  the  entire 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  271 


industry.  From  Socialism,  Syndicalism  differed  in  the  emphasis 
that  it  would  place  upon  direct  action,  that  is  to  say,  upon 
the  action  which  would  bring  immediate  pressure  upon  the 
employer  and  which  is  opposed  to  poHtical  action  or  the  better- 
ment of  conditions  through  legislative  and  other  governmental 
intervention.  As  ''direct  action"  the  SyndicaHsts  would  count 
the  general  strike  and  ''sabotage,"  the  latter  being  the  destruc- 
tion x)T  spoiling  of  materials,  the  choking  of  machinery,  and 
other  crippling  of  the  industrial  processes  so  as  to  reduce  or 
destroy  the  profits  of  the  employer.  In  aims  and  tactics  the  Syn- 
dicaHsts were  part  and  parcel  of  revolutionary  Anarchism. 

Though  in  19 14  the  number  of  Syndicalists  throughout  the 
world  was  distinctly  inferior  to  the  number  of  SociaHsts,  they 
were  making  serious  inroads  upon  Socialism  and  were  beginning 
to  appear  to  statesmen,  ecclesiastics,  and  capitalists  as  enemies 
infinitely  more  dangerous  than  the  Socialists. 

We  have  now  completed  the  task  which  we  set  before 
ourselves  for  this  chapter.  Our  attention  has  been  directed  to 
several  striking  characteristics  of  the  whole  period  from  187 1 
to  1914,  and  we  have  acquired  some  famiharity  with  certain 
forces  in  economics,  science,  and  religion,  which  were  destined 
in  novel  ways  to  affect  the  era.  We  are  thus  in  a  more  advan- 
tageous position  to  follow,  in  the  ensuing  five  chapters,  the 
separate  sketches  of  the  recent  history  of  the  various  European 
states. 

ADDITIONAL  READING 

Textbooks  and  Manuals  on  Recent  European  History.  In  addition 
to  the  texts  cited  in  the  bibliography  appended  to  Chapter  XVII,  above, 
the  following  are  useful  as  indicating  broad  lines  of  European  development 
in  the  period  since  1870:  G.  P.  Gooch,  History  of  Our  Time,  1885-jgii 
(191 1),  in  "  Home  University  Library,"  brief  but  suggestive;  J.  H.  Rose, 
The  Development  of  the  European  Nations,  iHyo-igoo,  4th  ed.,  2  vols. 
(1914) ;  History  of  All  Nations,  Vol.  XX,  Contemporary  Europe,  Asia,  and 
Africa,  iSji-jgoi,  by  C.  M.  Andrews  (1902) ;  Gotllob  Egclhaaf,  Gcschichte 
der  neuesten  Zeit  von  Frankfurter  Frieden  his  zur  Gegcnwart,  4th  ed.^  (1913), 
recent  general  history  from  the  standpoint  of  a  patriotic  German  ;  Edouard 
Driault,  Les  prohlcmes  politiques  et  sociaux  d  la  fin  du  XIX^  siccle  (1900), 
and,  by  the  same  author,  Le  monde  actuel  (1909),  interesting  and  informing 


272 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


essays  by  an  acute  French  observer  of  public  affairs;  A.  W.  Andrews,  A 
Text-Book  of  Geography  (1913),  up-to-date  descriptions  of  principal  coun- 
tries with  greater  emphasis  on  the  physical  and  social  than  on  the  political ; 
and  the  series  of  popular  descriptions  of  present-day  government  and  re- 
cent history  of  the  chief  national  states  edited  by  P.  L.  Haworth  ("  Prob- 
lems of  the  Nations,"  191 5  sqq.),  and  likewise  the  series  edited  by  D.  P. 
Barrows  and  T.  H.  Reed  ("  Government  Handbooks,"  191 5  sqq.).  For 
Annuals  and  general  publications  dealing  with  the  most  recent  history, 
see  the  bibliography  appended  to  Chapter  XXX,  below. 

Political  Developments  and  Problems,  1871-1914.  Brief  surveys: 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  i;  J.  H.  Robinson  and 
C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch.  xxxi. 
Special  treatises:  M.  I.  Ostrogorski,  Democracy  and  the  Organization  of 
Political  Parties,  Eng.  trans,  by  Frederick  Clarke,  2  vols.  (1902) ;  F.  A. 
Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913),  an  indispensable  guide-book,  with 
extended  bibliographies;  W.  F.  Dodd,  Modern  Constitutions,  2  vols.  (1909), 
English  translations  of  the  chief  constitutions  of  the  world,  arranged  country 
by  country  in  alphabetical  order;  Handbuch  des  ojfentlichen  Rechts  der 
Gegenwart  in  Monographien,  ed.  by  Heinrich  Marquardsen  and  others  in 
many  volumes  (1883  sqq.),  authoritative  studies  of  various  governments 
throughout  the  world;  J.  W.  Burgess,  Political  Science  and  Comparative 
Constitutional  Law,  2  vols.  (1902),  and,  by  the  same  author,  The  Reconcilia- 
tion of  Government  with  Liberty  (191 5) ;  Jesse  Macy  and  J.  W.  Gannaway, 
Comparative  Free  Government  (191 5) ;  F.  J.  Goodnow,  Comparative  Adminis- 
trative Law,  2  vols,  in  i  (1903) ;  Percy  Ashley,  Local  and  Central  Govern- 
ment :  a  Comparative  Study  of  England,  France,  Prussia,  and  the  U nited 
States  (1906) ;  W.  B.  Munro,  The  Government  of  European  Cities  (1909) ; 
F.  C.  Howe,  The  Modern  City  and  its  Problems  (191 5)  ;  Kathe  Schirmacher, 
The  Modern  Woman^s  Rights  Movement:  a  Historical  Study,  Eng.  trans, 
by  C.  C.  Eckhardt  (191 2) ;  B.  L.  Hutchins,  Conflicting  Ideals :  Two  Sides 
of  the  Woman^s  Question  (1913) ;  J.  S.  Mill,  The  Subjection  of  Women,  new 
ed.  (1906),  a  famous  article  particularly  valuable  for  the  description  of 
woman's  position  at  the  time  it  was  first  published,  in  1869. 

Social  Developments  and  Problems,  1871-1914.  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  xxiii,  a  brief  summary  of  social  movements, 
by  Sidney  Webb ;  Charles  Seignobos,  A  Political  History  of  Europe  since 
1814,  Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  S.  M.  Macvane  (1900),  ch.  xxii-xxiv;  James 
Samuelson  (editor).  The  Civilization  of  Our  Day  (1896) ;  A.  R.  Wallace, 
The  Wonderful  Century :  its  Successes  and  its  Failures  (1898) ;  Un  siecle : 
mouvement  du  monde  de  1800  a  igoo  (1900),  a  valuable  and  comprehensive 
survey  of  the  social,  political,  and  intellectual  developments  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  published  in  3  vols,  with  profuse  illustrations  and  in  one 
volume  without  illustrations,  prepared  by  a  group  of  scholarly  French 
Cathohcs  under  the  patronage  of  Pope  Leo  XIII ;  F.  A.  Ogg,  Social  Progress 
in  Contemporary  Europe  (191 2),  a  popular  account,  clear  and  suggestive; 
W.  D.  P.  Bliss  (editor),  The  New  Encyclopcedia  of  Social  Reform  (1908),  a 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  273 


large  work  of  reference,  claiming  to  include  "  all  social  reform  movements 
and  activities,  and  the  economic,  industrial,  and  sociological  facts  and 
statistics  of  all  countries  and  all  social  subjects  " ;  Alfred  Marshall,  Prin- 
ciples of  Economics,  6th  ed.  (1910),  a  convenient  manual  on  an  all-important 
topic;  Arthur  Shadwell,  Industrial  Efficiency:  a  Comparative  Study  of 
Industrial  Life  in  England,  Germany,  and  America,  2d  ed.,  2  vols.  (1909) ; 

F.  L.  McVey,  Modern  Industrialism  (1904),  of  much  the  same  scope  as 
Shadwell's  work;  D.  A.  Wells,  Recent  Economic  Changes  and  their  Effiect 
on  the  Production  and  Distribution  of  Wealth  atid  the  Well-Being  of  Society, 
2d  ed.  (1898) ;  Sidney  and  Beatrice  Webb,  Problems  of  Modern  Industry 
(1898);  Percy  Ashley,  Modern  Tariffi  History  :  Germany — •  United  States 
—  France,  2d  ed.  (1910) ;  E.  R.  A.  Seligman,  Essays  in  Taxation,  8th  ed. 
(1913) ;  H.  L.  Moore,  Economic  Cycles,  their  Law  and  Cause  (1914) ;  F.  W. 
Lewis,  State  Insurance,  a  Social  and  htdustrial  Need  (1909) ;  H.  R.  Seager, 
Social  Insurance,  a  Program  of  Social  Reform  (1910) ;  Gabriel  Hanotaux, 
La  democratic  et  le  travail  (1910) ;  Josef  Stammhammer  (editor).  Bibliog- 
raphic der  SozialpoUtik,  2  vols,  (1896-1912)  ;  Hermann  Beck  (editor), 
Bibliographic  der  Sozialwissenschaften,  monthly  since  1905;  R.  E.  Hughes, 
The  Making  of  Citizens:  a  Study  in  Comparative  Education  (1902),  dealing 
with  the  educational  systems  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  and  the 
United  States;  H.  B.  Binns,  A  Century  of  Education,  i8o8~igo8  (1908); 

G.  P.  Gooch,  History  and  Historians  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1913) ; 
George  Saintsbury,  A  History  of  Nineteenth  Century  Literature,  lySo-iSgs 
(1912). 

Science  and  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century.  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  xxiv,  a  brief  survey  of  the  "  Scientific  Age  " 
by  W.  C.  D.  Whetham ;  A.  R.  Wallace  and  others.  Progress  of  the  Century, 
a  collection  of  interesting  essays  by  distinguished  men,  summing  up  the 
main  scientific  achievements  of  the  nineteenth  century ;  Histoire  generate, 
Vol,  X,  ch.  XX,  Vol.  XI,  ch.  xxv,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  xvii,  clear  and  admirable 
summaries  by  Paul  Tannery ;  J.  T.  Merz,  A  History  of  European  Thought 
in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  4  vols.  (1896-1914),  a  thorough  and  highly 
prized  work ;  A.  W,  Benn,  The  History  of  English  Rationalism  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,  2  vols.  (1906),  and,  by  the  same  author,  Modern  England: 
a  Record  of  Opinion  and  Action  from  the  Time  of  the  French  Revolution  to 
the  Present  Day,  2  vols.  (1908) ;  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  Pioneers  of  Science  (1893) ; 
J.  M.  Robertson,  A  Short  History  of  Free  Thought,  3d  ed.,  2  vols.  (191 5); 
Karl  Snider,  The  World  Machine  (1907),  a  highly  colored  and  none  too 
accurate  history  of  modern  science  from  the  standpoint  of  an  enthusiastic 
believer  in  the  mechanistic  theory  of  the  universe ;  G.  T.  Bettany,  Life  of 
Charles  Darwin  (1887),  a  convenient  biography  in  the  "  Great  Writers  " 
Series ;  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,  ed.  by  Francis  Darwin,  2  vols. 
(1887) ;  H.  F.  Osborn,  From  the  Greeks  to  Darwin  (1894),  a  brief  history  of 
the  theory  of  evolution;  G.  J.  Romanes,  Darwin  and  After  Darwin:  an 
Exposition  of  the  Darwinian  Theory  and  a  Discussion  of  Post-Darwiniafi 
Questions,  3  vols.  (1906-1910) ;  William  Bateson,  MendeVs  Principles  of 


VOL.  II  —  T 


274 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Heredity  (1909),  containing  an  English  translation  of  Mendel's  papers  and 
a  biography  as  well  as  an  account  of  more  recent  scientific  work  on  Men- 
delian  lines ;  R.  C.  Punnett,  Mendelism,  3d  ed,  (191 1),  a  good  brief  account 
of  the  subject.  The  Encyclopcedia  Britannica,  nth  ed.,  includes  uniformly 
excellent  articles  on  the  lives  and  achievements  of  famous  scientists  in  the 
nineteenth  century. 

Christianity  in  the  Nineteenth  Century.  On  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church :  Joseph  MacCaffrey,  History  of  the  Catholic  Church  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,  2  vols.  (1910),  the  most  extended  and  best  treatment  of 
the  subject  from  the  Roman  CathoHc  point  of  view ;  William  Barry,  The 
Papacy  and  Modern  Times  (191 1),  ch.  vi,  vii;  Fredrik  Nielsen,  History 
of  the  Papacy  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  Eng.  trans,  by  A.  J.  Mason,  2  vols. 
(1906),  an  unsympathetic  treatment  from  the  pen  of  a  Danish  Lutheran 
bishop ;  J.  A.  G.  (Cardinal)  Hergenrother,  Catholic  Church  and  Christian 
State,  Eng.  trans,  by  C.  S.  Devas,  documentary  and  polemical,  valuable  for 
its  interpretation  of  the  Syllabus  of  1864;  Cambridge  Modern  History, 
Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  XXV,  an  unfavorable  view  of  papal  policies  from  1846 
to  1870;  Justin  McCarthy,  Pope  Leo  XIII  (1896),  a  convenient  popular 
biography ;  Great  Encyclical  Letters  of  Leo  XIII,  Eng.  trans,  ed.  by 
J.  J.  Wynne  (1903),  useful;  Georges  Weill,  Histoire  du  catholicisme  liberal 
en  France,  1828-1908  (1909),  clear  and  scholarly;  J.  J.  Walsh,  Catholic 
Churchmen  in  Science  (1906) ;  Georges  Goyau  and  others,  Le  Vatican, 
les  papes  et  la  civilization,  le  gouvernement  central  de  Veglise  (1895),  elaborate 
essays  by  distinguished  French  Catholics  on  the  relation  of  the  papacy  to 
the  newer  political  and  intellectual  tendencies.  On  the  newer  social  pro- 
gram of  Roman  Catholicism:  George  Metlake,  Christian  Social  Reform: 
Program  OtUlined  by  its  Pioneer  Bishop  von  Ketteler  (191 2);  Joseph 
Husslein,  The  Church  and  Social  Problems  (1914) ;  F.  S.  Nitti,  Catholic 
Socialism,  trans,  from  2d  Ital.  ed.  by  Mary  Mackintosh  (1908) ;  Anatole 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  Papacy,  Socialism  and  Democracy,  Eng.  trans,  by  B.  L. 
O'Donnell  (1892),  suggestive  and  controversial  rather  than  informing; 
Edwardo  (Count)  Soderini,  Socialism  and  Catholicism,  Eng.  trans.  (1896) ; 
C.  S.  Devas,  Political  Economy,  2d  ed.  (1901),  an  attempt  to  provide  a 
basis  in  economics  for  Catholic  social  reform;  The  Catholic  Social  Year 
Book,  an  annual  publication  of  the  Catholic  Social  Guild  in  England  (1910 
sqq,).  La  Civiltd  Cattolica  (1850  sqq.)  publishes  regularly  current  papal 
decrees,  bulls,  encyclicals,  etc.,  both  in  the  original  Latin  and  in  Italian; 
English  translations  of  the  more  important  papal  documents  appear  in 
Rome,  a  weekly  journal  established  in  1906.  On  the  Anglican  Church  and 
the  Oxford  Movement :  F.  W.  Cornish,  A  History  of  the  Church  of  England 
in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  2  Parts  (1910),  the  chief  work;  R.  W.  Church, 
Oxford  Movement :  Twelve  Years,  1833-1845  (1900) ;  John  Stoughton, 
Religion  in  England  from  1800  to  1850,  2  vols.  (1884) ;  Wilfrid  Ward, 
William  George  Ward  and  the  Catholic  Revival  (1893),  and,  by  the  same 
author.  The  Life  of  John  Henry,  Cardinal  Newman,  based  on  his  private 
journals  and  correspondence,  2  vols.  (191 2);  J.  H.  (Cardinal)  Newman, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  275 


Apologia  pro  Vita  Sua  (1864,  frequently  reprinted).  See,  also,  for  the 
general  effects  of  Darwinism  on  Protestantism,  A.  C.  McGiffert,  The  Rise 
of  Modern  Religious  Ideas  (191 5),  and,  for  the  political  and  social  setting 
of  modern  Protestantism,  the  two  books  of  William  Cunningham,  Chris- 
tianity afid  Social  Questions  (1910)  and  Christianity  and  Politics  (1915).  ' 

Marxian  Socialism.  An  excellent  introduction  is  J.  G.  Brooks,  The 
Social  Unrest:  Studies  in  Labor  and  Socialist  Movements  (1913) ;  another 
admirable  survey  of  the  rise  and  evolution  of  Socialism,  with  special  refer- 
ence to  its  political  aspects,  is  S.  P.  Orth,  Socialism  and  Democracy  in 
Europe  (1913).  Expositions  by  Socialists:  John  Spa.rgo,  Socialism :  a 
Summary  and  Interpretation  of  Socialist  Principles,  new  rev.  ed.  (1909) ; 
J.  R.  Macdonald,  The  Socialist  Movement  (191 1)  in  the  "  Home  University 
Library  W.  E.  Walling,  Socialism  as  it  is:  a  Survey  of  the  World-Wide 
Revolutionary  Movement  (191 2);  Friedrich  Engels,  Socialism:  Utopian 
and  Scientific,  Eng.  trans,  by  Edward  Aveling,  3d  ed.  (191 1) ;  John  Spargo, 
Karl  Marx,  his  Life  arid  Work  (1910),  the  best  biography  of  Marx;  Karl 
Kautsky,  Social  Democracy  and  the  Catholic  Church,  Eng.  trans.  (1906) ; 
Robert  Hunter,  Socialists  at  Work  (1908).  Documents  and  source  material 
relating  to  Socialism:  the  Communist  Manifesto  of  Marx  and  Engels,  / 
procurable  in  many  cheap  editions;  Karl  Marx,  Capital:  a  Critique  of 
Political  Economy,  Eng.  trans.,  3  vols.  (1906-1909),  an  elaborate  attempt 
to  provide  a  basis  in  economics  for  Marxian  Socialism;  Gabriel  Deville, 
The  People's  Marx,  a  Popular  Epitome  of  Karl  Marx's  Capital,  Eng.  trans, 
by  R.  R.  La  Monte  (1900) ;  R.  C.  K.  Ensor,  Modern  Socialism,  as  set  forth 
by  Socialists  in  their  Speeches,  Writings,  and  Programmes,  3d  ed.  (1910), 
an  indispensable  source-book;  Jane  T.  Stoddart,  The  New  Socialism,  an 
Impartial  Inquiry  (1909),  largely  a  source-book;  Fabian  Tracts,  published 
by  the  English  Fabian  Society  (1884  sqq.) ;  The  Socialist  Year  Book  and 
Labour  Annual:  a  Guide  Book  to  the  Socialist  and  Labour  Movement  at 
Home  and  Abroad,  pub.  by  the  National  Labour  League  in  Manchester 
(1913  sqq.).  Expositions  of  Socialism  by  opponents:  Albert  Schaffle, 
The  Quintessence  of  Socialism,  trans,  from  8th  German  ed.  by  Bernard 
Bosanquet  (1880) ;  Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu,  Collectivism,  abridged  trans,  by 
Sir  Arthur  Clay  (1908) ;  W.  H.  Mallock,  A  Critical  Examination  of  Social- 
ism (1907) ;  John  Rae,  Contemporary  Socialism,  4th  ed.  (1908) ;  V.  G. 
Simkhovitch,  Marxism  versus  Socialism  (1913) ;  Yves  Guyot,  Where  and 
Why  Public  Ownership  Has  Failed  (1914) ;  R.  T.  Ely,  Socialism:  an  Ex- 
amination of  its  Nature,  its  Strength  and  its  Weakness,  with  Suggestions  for 
Social  Reform  (1894) ;  Victor  Cathrein,  Socialism,  its  Theoretical  Basis 
and  Practical  Application,  trans,  ed.  by  V.  F.  Gcttelmann  (1904),  a  scholarly 
criticism  from  the  Roman  Catholic  standpoint;  Benedetto  Crocc,  His- 
torical Materialism  and  the  Economics  of  Karl  Marx,  Eng.  trans,  by  C.  M. 
Meredith  (1914)  ;  H.  O.  Amold-Forster,  English  Socialism  of  Today,  2d  ed. 
(1908) ;  T,  G.  Masaryk,  Die  philosophischen  und  sociologischen  Grundlagcn 
des  Marxismus:  Sludien  zur  socialen  Frage  (1899) ;  Alfred  Fouillee, 
Le  socialisme  et  la  sociologic  reformiste  (1909).    There  is  an  important 


276 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


biography  of  Lassalle,  the  father  of  the  Social  Democratic  party  in  Ger- 
many, by  Hermann  Oncken,  2d  ed,  (191 2).  For  additional  titles  consult 
Josef  Stammhammer,  Bibliographie  des  Socialismus  und  Communismus, 
3  vols.  (1893-1909). 

Trade-Unionism  and  the  Co6perative  Movement.  Sidney  and  Beatrice 
Webb,  The  History  of  Trade  Unionism,  new  ed.  (191 1),  a  full  and  scholarly 
treatment  of  the  movement  in  England,  and,  by  the  same  authors,  In- 
dustrial Democracy,  2  vols,  in  i  (1902),  a  detailed  analysis  of  aims  and 
methods;  Catherine  Webb,  Industrial  Cooperation,  3d  ed.  (1907),  an 
elementary  account  of  the  cooperative  movement  in  the  United  Kingdom ; 
L.  T.  Hobhouse,  The  Labour  Movement,  3d  ed.  (191 2) ;  G.  J.  Holyoake, 
The  History  of  Cooperation  in  England:  its  Literature  and  its  Advocates, 
rev.  ed.,  2  vols.  (1906);  C.  R.  Fay,  Cooperation  at  Home  and  Abroad:  a 
Description  and  Analysis  (1908) ;  Aneurin  Williams,  Co- Partnership  and 
Profit-Sharing  (1913)  in  "Home  University  Library";  Henry  George, 
Progress  and  Poverty,  new  ed.  (191 2),  Introduction  and  Books  I  and  II, 
a  famous  attack  on  the  doctrines  of  the  classical  economists. 

Anarchism  and  Syndicalism.  E.  V.  Zenker,  Anarchism :  a  Criticism 
and  History  of  the  Anarchist  Theory,  Eng.  trans.  (1898) ;  Paul  Eltzbacher, 
Anarchism,  Eng.  trans,  by  S.  T.  Byington  (1908),  illuminating  extracts 
from  the  writings  of  seven  prominent  Anarchists ;  J.  H.  Harley,  Syndical- 
ism (i9i2)^a  clear,  brief  statement ;  Philip  Snowden,  Socialism  and  Syndical- 
ism (1913) ;  Robert  Hunter,  Violence  and  the  Labor  Movement  (1914) ; 
Louis  Levine,  The  Labor  Movement  in  France  (191 2) ;  Paul  Louis,  Histoire 
du  mouvement  syndical  en  France,  lySg-igio,  2d  ed.  (191 1),  and,  by  the 
same  author,  Le  syndicalisme  europeen  (1914) ;  Dufour,  Le  syndicalisme 
et  la  prochaine  revolution  (1913). 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  UNITED  KINGDOM  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  IRELAND, 

1867-1914 

The  gradual  completion  of  political  democracy,  its  application 
to  meet  social  needs,  and  its  entanglement  with  nationalist  and 
imperialist  sentiments, —  this  is  in  brief  the  history  of  the  United 
Kingdom  since  1867.  Less  courageous  than  France  in  experi- 
menting with  democratic  institutions,  less  precipitate  than  Ger- 
many in  venturing  social  legislation,  but  more  successful  in 
colonial  expansion,  the  United  Kingdom  exemplifies  more  per- 
fectly than  either  France  or  Germany  the  influence  of  the  Indus- 
trial Revolution  upon  politics ;  for  of  that  revolution  England  was 
the  birthplace  and  is  the  result.  The  more  advanced  develop- 
ment of  British  industries  gave  to  the  British  bourgeoisie  greater 
wealth,  power,  and  independence  than  was  enjoyed  by  their  Con- 
tinental compeers.  To  that  superiority  the  British  middle  classes 
owed  their  ability  on  the  one  hand  to  gain  poHtical  power  for 
themselves  by  the  bloodless  revolution"  of  1832,  and  on  the 
other  hand  to  resist  the  demand  of  the  masses  for  complete  democ- 
racy. Throughout  the  first  thirty  years  of  the  long 
reign  of  Queen  Victoria  (1837-1901),  the  middle  "Victorian 
classes  maintained  their  ungenerous  opposition  to  Compro- 
thorough  democratic  reform  and  at  the  same  time 
gave  tacit  support  to  the  retention  of  the  obsolete  feudal  nobil- 
ity and  House  of  Peers  —  into  which  many  of  them  had  purchased 
their  way.  This  denial  of  democracy  they  had  the  effrontery  to 
excuse  and  even  to  glorify,  saying  that  ^'British  Common  Sense" 
wisely  preferred  peaceful  political  evolution  to  the  terrors  and 
turmoil  of  revolution.  Content  with  their  compromise  between 
radicalism  and  conservatism,  the  middle  classes  of  mid-century 
England  gave  every  intimation  of  their  belief  that  with  their  own 
exaltation  the  evolutionary  process  had  reached  its  climax. 

277 


278 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


All  the  while,  the  lower  classes,  forced  down  by  the  factory  sys- 
tem into  a  mire  of  misery,  vice,  poverty,  and  despair,  were  crying 
aloud  for  justice.  And  httle  by  Httle,  morsel  by  morsel,  justice 
they  have  obtained,  first  in  political,  then  in  economic,  affairs. 
This  story  of  the  political  and  social  reforms  in  England  now 
engages  our  attention. 


POLITICAL  REFORM 

The  beginning  of  political  democracy  in  Great  Britain  is  usually 
dated  from  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  when,  as  we 
The  Legacy  havc  noticed  in  an  earher  chapter,^  Dissenters  and 
of  Chartism  Roman  Catholics  were  accorded  political  rights 
(1828-1829),  and  the  middle  classes  gained  representation  in 
Parliament  (1832).  Between  the  Parliamentary  Reform  of 
1832  and  the  second  Reform  Act,  thirty-five  weary  years  elapsed. 
Midway  between  the  two  reforms  occurred  the  tragedy  of  1848, 
when  that  popular  petition  which  anticipated  many  political 
achievements  of  the  next  half  century  —  the  ''People's  Charter" 
—  was  rejected,  and  Chartism  disgraced.  Nevertheless,  there 
persisted  among  the  masses,  even  after  the  passionate  faith  in 
Chartism  had  disappeared,  a  profound  discontent. 

To  trade-unionism  the  more  intelligent  members  of  the  dis- 
contented working  class  looked  for  the  relief  which  Chartism 
Trade  failed  to  bring.    Believing  that  by  united  action 

Unions  and  they  could  force  employers  to  concede  them  fair  wages, 
Democracy  ^orkingmen  everywhere  organized  themselves  into 
trade  unions.  When  it  came  to  enforcing  their  demands,  how- 
ever, the  unionists  could  only  go  on  strike,  or  resort  to  violence. 
Either  course  was  practically  prohibited  by  law.  Obviously  the 
law  must  be  changed.  If  the  Parliament  of  shopkeepers  and 
squires  would  not  make  this  alteration  in  the  law,  the  working- 
men  must  needs  themselves  obtain  control  of  Parliament.  In  this 
fashion  the  trade-union  movement,  after  ignoring  political 
methods  for  a  time,  returned  again  to  the  old  plea  of  the  People's 
Charter  for  more  democracy.  And  the  democratic  demand,  now 
backed  by  a  powerful  and  extended  trade-union  organization, 
was  not  lightly  to  be  dismissed. 

^  See  above,  pp.  102-116. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  279 


During  the  three  decades  which  had  elapsed  since  the  Reform 
of  1832,  the  Liberals  had  been  in  power  most  of  the  time  and  had 
shown  no  disposition  to  make  any  changes  in  an  elec- 
toral system  which  preserved  their  predominance; 
while  the  Conservatives  still  retained  that  distaste  for  PoUtkai 
democratic  innovation  which  had  moved  the  old  Paries 

toward 

Tones  to  oppose  the  Reform  of  1832.    Two  great  Pariia- 
statesmen,  however,  —  one  a  Liberal  and  the  other  a  mentary 

^  .  ,      1      1  •  n  •  Reform, 

Conservative,  —  saw  clearly  that  without  some  voice  1832-1867 
in  the  government,  the  working  classes  would  never  be 
content,  and  that  to  the  party  which  could  put  itself  at  the  head 
of  the  reform  movement,  the  people  would  give  grateful  support. 
Upon  this  point,  if  upon  no  other,  Gladstone  and  Disraeli  were 
agreed,  and  each  endeavored  to  make  his  own  faction  the  party 
of  Reform,  —  moderate  Reform,  —  thus  earning  for  the  present 
the  support  of  the  popular  democratic  movement,  and  for  the 
future,  undying  glory. 

William  Ewart  Gladstone  had  long  delayed  to  espouse  the 
cause  of  democracy.  As  a  youth  he  had  been  well  educated  at 
Eton  and  at  Oxford,  and  even  been  allowed  a  trip  to  Gladstone, 
Italy  by  his  father,  a  Liverpool  merchant-prince,  who,  1809-1898 
having  himself  acquired  sufficient  wealth,  wished  his  son  to  win 
distinction  and  social  position  as  a  statesman.  For  such  a  career 
the  youth  was  eminently  fitted :  his  diligence,  his  sterling  up- 
rightness of  character,  and  his  remarkable  oratorical  powers 
were  popularly  commended.  Best  of  all,  he  showed  no  tendency 
toward  radical  political  doctrines ;  in  a  college  oration  he  so 
eloquently  condemned  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832  that  the  Tory 
duke  of  Newcastle  had  him  elected  to  Parliament  from  the 
pocket  borough''  of  Newark.  In  Parliament  Gladstone  speed- 
,  ily  attracted  attention  as  a  young  Conservative  of  great  promise, 
but,  by  supporting  Sir  Robert  Peel  in  the  repeal  of  the  Corn 
Laws  (1846),  he  estranged  himself  from  the  main  body  of  his 
party.  Fortunately  for  his  future  political  career,  Gladstone 
chanced  in  1850  to  visit  the  Italian  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies, 
just  then  in  the  throes  of  reaction,  and  was  so  shocked  by  that 
example  of  royal  absolutism  that  he  was  at  least  partially  con- 
verted to  moderate  democratic  principles,  and  inclined  toward 
Liberalism.    His  change  of  heart  did  not  immediately  become 


28o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


evident,  however,  for  upon  his  return  to  England  he  still  allowed 
himself  to  be  counted  one  of  the  Peelites,  as  the  free-trade 
faction  of  the  Conservative  party  was  called.  When  in  1852  the 
Peehtcs  united  with  the  Liberals  to  form  a  coalition  ministry, 
it  was  still  as  a  Peelite  that  Gladstone  accepted  the  office  of 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  Only  in  1859  did  he  finally  affiliate 
with  the  Liberals,  accepting  from  the  Liberal  premier,  Lord 
Palmerston,  the  ofiice  of  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  which  he 
held  for  the  ensuing  seven  years. 

During  these  years  Gladstone  made  himself  famous,  not  indeed 
as  a  Parhamentary  Reformer,  but  as  a  financier.  The  free- 
Gladstone's  trade  movement,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  swept 
Free  Trade  aWay  the  protective  duty  on  grain  and  had  opened 
Budgets  other  breaches  in  the  tariff  wall ;  in  i860  a  further  step 
was  taken  when  France  and  Great  Britain  made  reciprocal 
reductions;  but  all  these  changes  cut  down  the  revenue  from 
customs  duties  and  made  imperative  a  readjustment  of  govern- 
mental finance.  To  Gladstone  fell  the  task  of  reorganizing  the 
national  budget  on  a  basis  of  free  trade.  He  approached  the 
problem  with  rare  enthusiasm.  The  Commons  sat  enthralled 
as  he  expounded  his  schemes,  infusing  a  passionate  eloquence 
into  the  very  figures  he  quoted.  In  a  series  of  remarkable  budgets 
he  shifted  the  burden  of  taxation  to  income-,  inheritance-,  and 
liquor-taxes,  and  swept  away  the  import  duties  on  hundreds  of 
articles.  Before  his  first  budget  (1853)  there  had  been  466  dutia- 
ble articles  ;  after  his  budget  of  i860  there  were  only  48.  He  did 
away  with  duties  on  soap,  paper,  and  other  manufactures ;  the 
tariff  on  foodstuffs  completely  disappeared.  Business  throve 
under  the  free-trade  regime,  prosperity  increased  by  leaps  and 
bounds ;  and  every  man  who  bought  a  cheaper  newspaper,  or  ate 
cheaper  food,  or  drank  cheaper  tea  had  William  Ewart  Gladstone 
to  thank.  His  free-trade  budgets  were  Gladstone's  greatest  work ; 
they  secured  him  an  enduring  reputation  for  statesmanship ; 
and  they  won  him  the  friendship  of  the  middle  and  even  of  the 
lower  classes. 

All  this  time  Gladstone  had  controlled  the  zeal  he  presumably 
felt  for  Parhamentary  Reform,  out  of  deference  to  the  premier, 
Lord  Palmerston,  who  was  notoriously  opposed  to  any  extension 
of  the  electorate.    But  Lord  Palmerston  died  in  1865,  and  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  281 


Liberal  party,  having  for  over  thirty  years  repelled  the  idea  of 
further  Reform,  came  under  the  control  of  Gladstone  Death  of 
and  Lord  John  Russell,  now  Earl  Russell.    At  last  paimerston, 
Gladstone  stepped  forward  as  the  champion  of  Re-  1865 
form,  and  urged  working-class  Radicals  to  support  the  Liberal 
party. 

Already  a  rival  bid  for  popularity  had  been  offered  by  Ben- 
jamin Disraeli,^  acting  on  the  part  of  the  Conservatives.  Ben- 
jamin Disraeli  was  as  much  the  antithesis  of  Glad-  Benjamin 
stone  in  character,  as  the  antagonist  of  Gladstone  in  DisraeU, 

1804.  188I 

pohtics.  Against  the  somber  background  of  Glad- 
stone's middle-class  conventionaHty,  Disraeh's  bizarre  personal- 
ity stands  out  in  bright  relief.  As  the  son  of  an  apostate  Jew,  he 
was  regarded  askance  by  British  society ;  as  the  cleverest  man  in 
England,  he  dehghted  to  make  sport  of  society's  stupid  conven- 
tions. London  hardly  knew  what  to  think  of  a  young  man  who 
appeared  at  dinner  parties  arrayed  in  green  velvet  trousers,  a 
canary-colored  waistcoat,  low  shoes,  silver  buckles,  lace  dangling 
at  his  wrists,  and  his  hair  falling  in  ringlets.  While  in  conversa- 
tion he  was  undeniably  briUiant,  sober-minded  matrons  were  be- 
wildered by  his  scintillating  wit  and  baffled  by  his  exasperating 
paradoxes.  When  first  he  addressed  the  House  of  Commons, 
his  outlandish  appearance  and  affected  language  provoked  deri- 
sion, but  unabashed  he  promised  that  one  day  his  words  would 
command  attention.  Novels  he  wrote,  courageous  as  they  were 
clever :  in  Coningshy  he  outraged  the  fashionable  complacency 
with  which  the  upper  classes  regarded  the  reform  of  1832,  by 
asserting  that  the  Hberties  of  the  crown  and  of  the  people  had  been 
stolen  by  an  ohgarchy ;  in  Sybil  he  confronted  the  smug  self- 
satisfaction  of  the  Victorian  age  with  the  assertion  that  a  greedy 
landed  aristocracy  was  neglecting  a  miserable  peasantry,  while 
the  industrial  bourgeoisie  was  using  the  fallacious  laisser-faire 
theory  to  excuse  its  heartless  exploitation  of  factory  labor. 

Upon  the  policy  of  his  party,  Disraeli's  ideas  made  a  deep  and 
lasting  impression.  Of  late  the  Tories,  or,  as  they  were  now 
called,  the  Conservatives,  had  gained  an  unenviable  reputation 
for  resisting  all  progress.  Mere  opposition  to  change  was  not 
Disraeli's  conception  of  Conservatism.    He  would,  it  is  true, 

*  He  was  created  earl  of  Beaconsfield  in  1876. 


282 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


loyally  conserve  the  venerable  institutions  of  royalty,  Estab- 
lished Church,  and  aristocracy.  At  the  same  time  he  would 
have  the  Conservatives  offer  a  positive  program. 
Disraeh  ^^>j  Following  the  tradition  of  Tory  Radicals,  such  as 
Constructive  Shaftesbury,  they  could  pass  laws  to  improve  factory 
Ssm^^^^*  conditions  and  adopt  a  benevolent  attitude  toward  the 
lower  classes.  From  such  a  course  the  Conservatives 
would  not  be  restrained  by  laisser-faire  theories,  as  were  the 
Liberals ;  nor  would  they  suffer  personal  loss  from  it,  as  would  the 
Liberal  factory-owners.  (2)  Secondly,  the  Liberals,  ever  fearful 
lest  business  should  be  interrupted  by  war,  and  compelled  to  be 
cautious  about  incurring  military  expenditure  while  they  were  re- 
ducing the  tariff,  had  pursued  so  inglorious  a  foreign  policy,  that 
the  county  would  rally  with  patriotic  enthusiasm  to  Conserva- 
tism, if  certain  that  Conservatives  would  make  Great  Britain 
both  respected  and  feared  by  other  nations.  (3)  Finally, 
Disraeli  proposed  that  instead  of  weakly  consenting  to  parlia- 
mentary reforms  after  they  had  been  made,  the  Conservative 
party  should  boldly  declare  itself  in  favor  of  a  reasonable  exten- 
sion of  the  franchise,  thus  taking  the  wind  out  of  the  Liberal  sails, 
and  at  the  same  time  giving  proof  that  Conservatism  was  the 
true  champion  of  the  people.  Disraeli  had  actually  proposed 
a  moderate  Reform  Bill  in  1859 ;  its  failure  was  a  matter  of  course, 
but  its  purpose  was  to  familiarize  his  followers  with  the  idea 
that  Reform  and  Conservatism  were  not  contradictory  terms. 

It  was  now  a  question  which  of  the  two  great  parties  would 
take  under  its  protection  the  popular  movement  for  a  democratic 
Influence  franchise.  Just  as  the  question  was  becoming  acute, 
of  the  the  American  Civil  War  (1861-1865)  occurred,  and 
CivU^M  interruption  of  the  cotton  supply  from  the  South- 

ern States  threatened  to  throw  thousands  of  English 
cotton  operatives  out  of  work.  Working-class  agitation  in- 
creased, and  the  workingmen,  who  openly  sympathized  with  the 
struggle  of  the  democratic  North  against  the  landed  and  slave- 
holding  aristocracy  of  the  South,  were  not  Hkely  to  support  the 
party  of  the  landed  aristocracy  in  England  —  the  Conservative 
party.  Nor  were  they,  on  the  other  hand,  wholly  pleased  with 
the  Liberal  party,  for  Gladstone  and  other  members  of  the  gov- 
ernment seemed  to  favor  the  South, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  283 


In  this  juncture  the  man  who  best  expressed  the  sentiments  of 
the  industrial  classes  was  John  Bright,  a  warm  partisan  of  the 
Northern  States,  and  an  active  advocate  of  Parlia- 
mentary  Reform.  John  Bright  was  not  himself  a  Bright, 
workingman,  but  a  member  of  the  middle  class,  whose 
father  owned  a  cotton  mill  in  Lancashire.  From  the  time  when 
he  first  learned  to  speak  in  public  —  at  a  meeting  of  the  local 
Juvenile  Temperance  Society  —  to  his  death,  John  Bright  never 
allowed  his  talent  for  pubKc-speaking  to  grow  rusty;  he  em- 
ployed his  eloquence  in  the  service  of  whatever  seemed  to  him  a 
worthy  cause,  whether  it  was  the  aboHtion  of  capital  punish- 
ment, of  church  rates  (Bright  was  a  Quaker),  of  flogging  in  the 
army,  or  the  discs tabHshment  of  the  Anglican  Church  in  Ireland, 
or  the  admission  of  Jews  to  Parliament,  or  preventing  the  restric- 
tion of  the  hours  of  labor  in  factories.  His  passionate  oratory 
had  resounded  all  over  the  island  during  the  Anti-Corn-Law 
agitation  of  the  'forties  and  made  him  one  of  the  most  popular 
men  in  England.  So  it  was  that  when  John  Bright  threw  himself 
heart  and  soul  into  the  campaign  for  ParHamentary  Reform, 
addressing  monster  mass-meetings  in  the  great  cities,  his  name 
and  his  eloquence  took  the  popular  democratic  party  by  storm. 
It  so  happened  that  as  a  Non-Conformist  John  Bright  was 
opposed  to  Disraeli's  defense  of  the  Established  Church;  as  a 
factory-owner  he  resented  Disraeli's  criticism  of  the  industrial 
system;  as  a  Quaker  he  abhorred  Disraeli's  ''jingoism."  To 
Gladstone,  on  the  other  hand,  John  Bright  was  drawn  by  the  fact 
that  both  were  middle-class  Free  Traders.  With  Gladstone, 
then,  John  Bright  and  his  popular  following  affiliated. 

Upon  the  death  of  Lord  Palmerston  in  1865,  Gladstone  became 
the  leading  spirit  in  the  Liberal  party,  although  the  aged  Earl 
Russell,  father  of  the  first  Reform  Bill,  headed  the  ^ 

.  .  Failure  of 

mmistry.    Reform  was  made  the  issue  of  the  hour,  the  Liberal 

and  Gladstone  brought  in  a  bill  extending  the  franchise  ^^^^^"^ 
to  £14  householders  in  counties  and  £7  householders 
in  boroughs.  The  measure  was  hardly  radical  enough  to  please 
John  Bright's  artisan  supporters;  and  it  was  too  democratic 
for  the  taste  of  a  group  of  old-fashioned  Liberals  in  Parliament, 
who  promptly  combined  with  the  Conservatives  to  overthrow 
the  ministry  (1866).    Shortly  afterwards  Earl  Russell  retired 


284 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


from  political  life  and  Gladstone  became  the  acknowledged 
leader  of  the  Liberal  party  (1867). 

Little  excitement  had  been  aroused  by  the  introduction  of 
Gladstone's  very  moderate  Reform  Bill ;  when  that  measure  was 
Popular  rejected,  however,  and  a  Conservative  cabinet  formed, 
Demonstra-  a  wave  of  indignation  swept  over  the  country  at  this 
the"conser-  sccming  defeat  of  Reform.  John  Bright,  with  cus- 
vative  Re-  tomary  heat,  persuaded  the  populace  of  the  great 
form  Bill  ^ties  that  the  installation  of  a  Conservative  ministry 
was  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  working  classes.  The  trade 
unions  resolved  to  compel  the  government  to  yield,  and  trade- 
union  officials  openly  took  part  in  organizing  a  National  Reform 
League.  When  the  cabinet  locked  the  gates  of  Hyde  Park 
(London)  to  prevent  the  League  from  holding  a  mass-meeting 
there,  an  immense  mob  defiantly  threw  down  the  railings. 
Demonstrations  in  favor  of  universal  manhood  suffrage  stirred 
the  working  classes  in  all  the  important  industrial  centers. 
Whether  they  would  or  no,  the  Conservative  ministers  must  deal 
with  Parliamentary  Reform.  In  this  crisis  the  premier.  Lord 
Derby,  allowed  Disraeh,  who  was  the  real  leader  of  the  party,  to 
present  a  Reform  Bill,  even  though  some  of  the  less  progressive 
ministers  angrily  withdrew  from  the  cabinet.  For  the  bill  as 
first  presented  Disraeh  could  not  obtain  a  majority  in  the  House 
of  Commons.  Then  he  executed  an  astonishing  political  ma- 
neuver. Rather  than  allow  Gladstone  to  gain  the  credit  of 
accomplishing  what  the  people  demanded,  Disraeli  calmly  per- 
mitted his  bill  to  be  amended  until  it  became  more  democratic 
than  even  Gladstone's  Bill  of  1866.  It  was,  as  the  premier  said, 
taking  a  leap  in  the  dark" ;  faint-hearted  Conservatives  grew 
pale  at  its  sweeping  provisions ;  but  it  was  Disraeli's  supreme 
effort  to  win  the  masses  to  Conservatism. 

As  enacted  into  law,  the  measure  contained  the  following 
provisions  :  (i)  Fifty-eight  seats  in  the  House  of  Commons  were 
^    .  .        transferred  from  smaller  borouerhs  to  more  populous 

Provisions  .  /    N     rr^l         r  1   .  .  1  . 

of  the  Re-  districts.  (2)  The  franchise  m  the  countics  was  con- 
1867  f erred  on  tenants-at-will  of  property  worth  £12  a  year 

(formerly  £50),  and  to  lease-  or  copy-holders  of  land 
worth  £5  a  year  (formerly  £10).  (3)  In  the  boroughs,  whereas 
before  1867  a  man  could  vote  if  his  residence  was  worth  £io 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


2^5 


annual  rent,  henceforth  the  franchise  was  extended  to  all  men 
who  occupied  separate  dwelHngs,  of  no  matter  what  value ;  and 
even  to  those  lodgers  in  tenement-houses,  who  had  rented  for  one 
year  rooms  worth  £io  annually,  unfurnished.  Suffrage  was  still 
regarded  as  the  privilege  of  a  minority  rather  than  the  right  of 
all ;  there  were  still  only  two  and  one  half  milHon  voters  out  of  a 
population  of  almost  thirty-two  milHons ;  and  great  inequality 
still  disfigured  the  representative  system.  The  Reform  of  1867 
was,  nevertheless,  the  turning-point  in  British  constitutional 
history.  It  almost  doubled  the  electorate  by  creating  a  million 
new  voters,^  mostly  drawn  from  the  working  classes  in  the  cities. 
How  these  new  electors  would  use  their  power  no  one  could  tell ; 
but  every  one  knew  that  the  middle-class  compromise  of  1832 
had  at  last  been  abandoned,  and  that  Great  Britain  was  definitely 
committed  to  a  poKcy  of  ''More  Democracy." 

If  DisraeH  expected  that  his  Reform  of  1867  would  win  the 
popular  party  away  from  Gladstone  and  Bright,  he  sadly  mis- 
calculated.   In  the  very  next  election  (1868)  these  pm-ther 
two  orators  contrived  to  defeat  Disraeli  by  making  Reform  by 
the  contest  turn  upon  the  Irish  question,  which  was  a^s:^the^" 
just  then  particularly  pressing.    After  that  election  Ballot  Act, 
the  middle-class  Liberals  continued  to  cooperate  with  ^^^^ 
their  more  radical  working-class  allies,  and  further  democratic 
reforms  were  accomplished  under  Liberal  auspices.    In  1872 
Gladstone  was  responsible  for  the  Ballot  Act,  a  measure  long 
demanded  by  working-class  Radicals.    Heretofore  electors  had 
signified  orally  wliich  candidate  they  preferred,  so  that  a  land- 
lord might  easily,  and  often  did,  discover  and  punish  those  of  his 
tenants  who  voted  contrary  to  his  wishes ;  or  a  political  "boss," 
having  bribed  an  elector,  could  see  that  the  vote  was  actually  cast 
as  stipulated.    With  the  AustraHan  ^  ballot,  which  was  intro- 
duced into  all  British  municipal  and  Parliamentary  elections  in 
1872,  the  elector  marked  the  name  of  his  candidate  secretly  on  a 
slip  of  paper,  and,  theoretically  at  least,  no  other  person  could 
discover  which  name  he  marked.    The  voter  was  henceforth  far 

'These  figures  are  for  the  entire  United  Kingdom.  The  Act  of  1867  applied 
only  to  P>ngland  and  Wales;  but  in  1868  almost  identical  measures  were  enacted 
for  Scotland  and  Ireland. 

*  So  called  because  it  had  previously  been  invented  and  adopted  hy  the  British 
colonists  in  Australia. 


286 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


less  likely  to  be  bribed  and  far  more  independent  in  casting  his 
ballot  for  whomsoever  he  chose. 

After  the  Reform  of  1867,  the  agricultural  laborers  loudly 
complained  that  in  the  counties  electoral  qualifications  were  more 
exclusive  than  in  the  boroughs.  To  remove  this  in- 
and^the"^  justicc,  Gladstone  in  1884  put  through  a  Representa- 
Reforms  of  tion  of  the  People  Act,  which,  by  making  the  county 
1885  franchise  identical  with  that  of  the  boroughs,  enfran- 

chised two  millions  of  rural  workers  and  increased  the 
electorate  by  40  per  cent.  The  great  majority  of  men  over  21 
years  of  age  were  henceforth  qualified  to  vote,  either  (i)  as  owners 
or  tenants  of  land  or  rooms  worth  £10  a  year,  or  (2)  as  owners  or 
tenants  of  a  dwelling  house,  or  part  of  a  house  used  as  a  separate 
dwelling,  no  matter  of  what  value,  or  (3)  in  counties,  as  owners  of 
land  worth  forty  shillings  a  year,  or  (4)  as  graduates  of  a  univer- 
sity, for  three  universities  send  two  members  each  to  Parliament, 
or  (5)  under  some  other  of  the  many  qualifications  surviving  from 
earlier  times.  In  1913  there  were  some  eight  million  electors 
out  of  about  ten  million  adult  males,  and  out  of  a  total  population 
of  more  than  forty-five  millions.  The  franchise  is  still  far  from 
democratic.  The  ballot  is  not  yet  every  man's  right,  or  any 
woman's  right,  and  about  half  a  million  men,  possessing  quali- 
fications in  several  constituencies,  are  entitled  to  cast  two,  three, 
or  even  as  many  as  twenty,  votes  apiece.  Moreover,  the  laws 
regarding  the  franchise  are  so  complicated  that  endless  confusion 
and  litigation  are  inevitable. 

What  the  law  of  1884  did  for  the  franchise  was  done  for  the 
representation  by  the  Redistribution  of  Seats  Bill  passed  in  1885. 
The  existing  system,  with  its  obvious  inequalities  of  representa- 
tion, had  grown  up  by  a  haphazard  process  of  giving  to  this  or 
that  borough  and  to  every  county,  irrespective  of  its  population, 
two  seats  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The  law  of  1885  at- 
tempted to  introduce  a  little  rational  order  into  the  represen- 
tation by  dividing  the  country  into  constituencies  so  that,  roughly 
speaking,  each  member  of  the  Commons  would  represent  50,000 
people.  The  county  of  Lancashire,  for  instance,  which  had 
been  divided  into  four  two-member  districts,  was  subdivided 
to  form  twenty-three  constituencies  of  one  member  each. 
The  principle  was  by  no  means  thoroughly  applied,  however, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  287 


and,  as  no  redistribution  has  been  made  since  1885,  Ireland  in 
1 9 14  had  thirty-eight  seats  which  should  belong  to  England, 
and  other  glaring  inequahties  were  demanding  attention. 

Political  democracy,  then,  is  not  yet  completely  reahzed  in  the 
United  Kingdom;  but  so  far  as  it  has  gone  the  progress  of 
democratic  reform  has  in  a  striking  manner  conformed  partial  FuI- 
to  the  Six  Points  of  the  Chartists,    (i)  Universal  fiiiment  of 
(adult  male)  suffrage  was  substantially,  although  not  po^nts^"^ 
perfectly,  achieved  in  1884.    (2)  The  principle  of  of  the 
equal  electoral  districts  was  recognized,  if  not  com-  ^^^'^^^^ 
pletely  carried  out,  in  1885.    (3)  The  secret  ballot  was  obtained 
in  1872.    (4)  Parhaments  are  not  yet  elected  annually,  as  the 
Chartists  demanded,  but,  by  a  law  of  191 1,  the  maximum  Hfe  of 
a  single  Parhament  has  been  shortened  from  seven  to  five  years. 
(5)  The  abolition  of  the  property  qualification  for  members  of 
the  House  of  Commons  was  accomplished  in  1858.    (6)  Finally, 
salaries  (of  £400  a  year)  for  members  of  Parliament  have  been 
appropriated  since  191 1.    However  incompletely  realized,  these 
reforms,  as  the  Chartists  anticipated,  have  enabled  the  working- 
men  to  enter  politics,  to  elect  working-class  representatives,  and 
to  insist  that  the  government  shall  attempt  to  cope  with  the 
problems  of  modern  industrialism. 

While  successive  reform  measures  were  converting  the  House 
of  Commons  into  a  more  or  less  democratic  body,  the  other  half 
of  Parliament  remained  thorouffhly  aristocratic,  quite  .  .  , 

.  °  .  Anstocratic 

impervious  to  popular  influences.    From  the  passing  Nature  of 
of  the  first  Reform  Bill  on  through  the  nineteenth  cen-  *f  ^^ds^* 
tury,  as  time  and  again  the  will  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons was  checkmated,  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  the 
House  of  Lords  must  be  ^'mended  or  ended." 

What  most  offended  believers  in  democracy  was  the  fact  that 
the  upper  chamber  was  frankly  and  avowedly  the  organ  of  the 
titled  aristocracy.  The  great  majority  of  its  members  ^  were 
noblemen, —  dukes,  marquesses,  earls,  viscounts,  and  barons, — 

^  The  membership  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  1914  totaled  more  than  600,  and 
comprised  (i)  hereditary  peers,  (2)  16  elective  Scottish  peers,  (3)  28  elective  Irish 
peers,  (4)  26  Anglican  prelates,  (5)  princes  of  the  blood,  (6)  4  "law  lords,"  ranking 
as  barons,  appointed  for  life  by  reason  of  their  special  juristic  qualifications  to  exer- 
cise the  judicial  functions  which  the  House  of  Lords  possesses  as  supreme  Court  of 
Appeal. 


288 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


most  of  whom  sat  in  Parliament  not  because  they  were  eminently 
qualified,  but  because  they  had  inherited  the  privilege  as  heredi- 
tary peers.  Too  often  the  hereditary  peers  preferred  the  pleas- 
ures of  their  country  estates  to  the  dull  routine  of  Parliamentary 
business,  and  left  the  burdens  of  legislation  to  a  handful  of  the 
more  conscientious.  Then  when  tliey  did  appear  to  vote  on  some 
measure  in  which  they  felt  a  personal  interest,  their  unfamiliarity 
with  Parliamentary  procedure  and  their  unfitness  as  legislators  was 
often  patent.  A  few  of  the  peers —  i6  elected  by  the  Scottish 
nobility  and  28  by  the  Irish  nobility  —  might  be  expected  to  show 
more  political  ability  than  the  hereditary  peers,  but  they  were  no 
less  opposed  to  democratic  interests.  This,  then,  was  the  great 
•  objection  to  the  House  of  Lords,  that  it  was  composed  of  titled 
aristocrats,  many  of  whom  were  unfit  for  their  duty,  and  domi- 
nated by  their  class  interests  as  members  of  the  landed  aristocracy. 

A  second  objection  to  the  Plouse  of  Lords  was  felt  most  keenly 
by  Non-Conformists.  It  was  held  to  be  manifestly  unfair  that 
Tjjg  the  Anglican  Church  should  be  represented  by  the 

Anglican  archbishop  of  Canterbury  and  25  other  bishops, 
Bishops  whereas  the  other  religious  denominations  possessed 
no  official  representation.  This  injustice  became  especially 
grievous  when  the  Anglican  bishops  habitually  used  their  position 
in  Parliament  to  maintain  the  privileges,  church-rates,  and  educa- 
tional institutions  of  the  EstabHshed  Church  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  Non-Conformists. 

To  these  two  grievances  was  added  a  third  and  more  powerful 
consideration.  The  House  of  Lords  was  distinctly  a  partisan 
assembly  opposed  to  Liberalism.  While  the  Conserva- 
Character  tives  were  in  power,  harmony  existed  between  the  two 
of  the  chambers,  but  when  the  Liberals  controlled  the  House 
Lo°rds^  Commons,  the  House  of  Lords  simply  afforded  the 

Conservatives  a  veto  on  Liberal  legislation.  The 
House  of  Lords  had  opposed  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832  and  the 
Municipal  Corporation  Reform  of  1835  5  it  had  thrown  itself 
in  the  way  w^hen  the  Liberals  had  sought  to  grant  Home  Rule  to 
Ireland,  to  disestablish  the  AngKcan  Church  in  Ireland,  or  to 
regulate  the  liquor  trafi&c.^    The  situation  became  intolerable 

1  All  this  was  the  Liberal  contention.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Conservatives 
insisted  that  the  House  of  Lords  performed  a  highly  valuable  service  in  blocking 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  289 


when  the  Lords,  after  obstructing  important  measures  of  the 
Liberal  ministry,  had  the  temerity  in  1909  to  throw  out  the 
Finance  Bill  passed  by  the  House  of  Commons  and  popularly 
known  as  the  Lloyd  George  Budget,  thus  contravening  a  long 
estabhshed  usage  which  bound  the  Upper  House  to  give  perfunc- 
tory assent  to  finance  bills  as  prepared  by  the  Commons.  'The 
Liberal  premier,  Mr.  Asquith,  backed  by  an  angry  Liberal 
majority  in  the  House  of  Commons,  declared  the  action  of  the 
Lords  to  be  ''a  breach  of  the  Constitution,"  appealed  to  the 
electorate,  and,  being  returned  to  office,  proceeded  to  frame  a  bill 
to  restrict  the  veto  power  of  the  House  of  Lords. 

Realizing  that  something  must  be  done  to  satisfy  democratic 
demands,  the  Conservatives  (or  Unionists,  as  they  now  were 
called)  proposed  an  alternative  measure  which  would  ^^^^^ 
leave  finance  biUs  to  the  Commons  and  would  settle  Lords :  the 
other  disputed  questions  by  joint  sessions  of  the  two  ^^"j™ 
Houses  or  by  referendum  to  the  country.  Another 
election  was  held  in  order  that  the  electorate  might  choose  be- 
tween the  two  plans.    The  Liberals  again  being  returned  with 
a  working  majority  pressed  forward  their  bill,  and  the  Lords 
were  forced  to  assent,  as  in  1832,  by  Mr.  Asquith's  threat  to  have 
the  king  create,  if  necessary,  enough  Liberal  peers  to  pass  the 
Bill.    On  18  August,  191 1,  the  famous  Parliament  Act  became 
law.    By  that  Act,^  (i)  Money  bills  passed  by  the  Commons 
automatically  would  become  law  one  month  after  being  sub- 
mitted to  the  House  of  Lords ;  (2)  Other  public  bills  might  be- 
come law,  despite  repeated  rejection  by  the  Lords,  if  passed  by 
the  House  of  Commons  in  three  successive  sessions,^  provided, 

proposed  Liberal  legislation  and  thereby  obliging  a  Liberal  ministry  to  appeal  to 
the  country ;  the  House  of  Lords,  they  asserted,  had  never  blocked  measures 
which  the  voters  of  the  country  had  unmistakably  indorsed,  and  as  special  proof 
of  their  assertion  they  cited  the  instance  in  1893  when  the  House  of  Lords  had 
blocked  Gladstone's  second  Home  Rule  Hill  and  in  the  ensuing  general  elections 
had  been  upheld  by  the  country.  It  is  certainly  a  tribute  to  the  growth  of  the 
democratic  spirit  in  the  United  Kingdom  that  the  Liberal  party  should  be  attack- 
ing the  House  of  Lords  in  the  name  of  democracy  and  that  at  the  same  time  the 
Conservative  i)arty  should  be  defending  the  House  of  Lords  as  a  bulwark  of  real 
democracy. 

'  The  Parliament  Act  also  limited  the  maximum  duration  of  a  Parliament  to 
five  years. 

2  If  a  bill  is  amended  during  this  time,  it  is  considered  a  new  bill  for  the  purpose 
pf  the  Act. 

VOL.  u  —  u 


290 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


however,  that  at  least  two  years  must  elapse  between  the  first 
consideration  of  such  a  Bill  and  its  final  enactment.  The  first 
provision  of  the  Parliament  Act  confirmed  the  complete  authority 
of  the  House  of  Commons  in  financial  measures.  The  second 
provision  left  the  Lords  with  only  a  suspensive  veto  in  other 
matters.  Even  this  suspensive  veto  may  prove  a  serious  obstruc- 
tion to  Liberal  legislation,  however,  as  the  Asquith  ministry  dis- 
covered when  it  attempted  under  the  provisions  of  the  ParHament 
Act  to  pass  a  bill  to  abolish  plural  voting,^  a  bill  to  disestablish 
the  AngHcan  Church  in  Wales,  and  a  bill  to  confer  Home  Rule 
on  Ireland.  The  last  two  measures  were  passed  three  times  by 
the  Commons,  and  thus  enacted  into  law,  but  only  after  a  long 
and  embarrassing  struggle.  And  the  execution  of  both  was 
delayed  by  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Nations  (August, 
1914)- 

To  the  Unionists  (Conservatives),  the  Parliament  Act  was 
extremely  distasteful.    Insisting  that  the  House  of  Lords  is  a 
venerable  part  of  the  British  Constitution,  and  is  a 

Future  .  . 

Reform  of  wholesome  check  upon  the  impulses  of  an  imprudent  or 
of  Lw-dT^  an  unrepresentative  House  of  Commons,  the  Unionists 
still  demand  that  the  Upper  Chamber  shall  retain  its 
legislative  powers.  They  are  willing,  however,  that  the  House  of 
Lords  shall  be  made  more  efficient  by  reducing  the  number  of 
hereditary  peerages  and  by  allowing  the  crown  (the  ministry,  in 
effect)  to  bestow  life  peerages  upon  men  distinguished  in  various 
walks  of  Hfe.  The  Liberals,  on  the  other  hand,  contemplate 
establishing  the  Upper  Chamber  "on  a  popular  instead  of  an 
hereditary  basis."  ^  Many  of  the  more  radical  politicians  would 
go  still  further,  and  abolish  the  House  of  Lords  altogether,  as  an 
unnecessary  impediment  to  the  fulfillment  of  the  popular  will, 
undemocratic  in  principle  and  unwarranted  in  practice. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 

Here  at  the  end  of  our  story  of  political  reforms  in  Great  Britain, 
and  before  taking  up  the  social  reforms,  we  shall  do  well  to  pause 

1  The  Plural  Voting  Bill  was  passed  by  the  Commons  in  1913  and  again  in 
1 9 14,  but  on  both  occasions  was  rejected  by  the  Lords. 

2  Preamble  to  the  Parliament  Act,  191 1. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  291 

a  moment  in  contemplation  of  the  British  poHtical  system, 
as  it  exists  to-day.    To  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  the 
government  of  the  United  Kingdom  is  remarkable  in 
three  respects :  (i)  it  is  based  on  an  ever  evolving  charac- 
rather  than  a  fixed  and  written  constitution;  (2)  it  is  tensticsof 
parHamentary  rather  than  congressional;   (3)  it  is  Governjment 
central  rather  than  federal. 

The  British  Constitution  is  not  a  document  but  a  miscellany. 
International  treaties,  Magna  Carta  (12 15),  the  Petition  of 
Right  (1628),  the  Bill  of  Rights  (1689),  the  Habeas  i.  evoIu- 
Corpus  Act  (1679),  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  character  of 
(1835),  the  various  Reform  Acts  (1832,  1867, 1884),  the  the  Consti- 
ParHament  Act  (191 1),  and  countless  other  statutes, 
together  with  the  intangible  body  of  legal  precedents  known  as 
the  Common  Law,  are  no  more  important  parts  of  the  British 
Constitution  than  the  set  of  traditional  usages  which  are  so  many 
unwritten  laws  governing  the  conduct  of  king,  ministry,  and 
Parliament.  New  laws  are  never  declared  unconstitutional  by 
the  courts,  for  every  bill  dealing  with  Constitutional  subjects 
—  no  matter  how  trifling  or  how  momentous  —  becomes  a  part 
of  the  Constitution  directly  it  is  enacted  into  law,  previous  laws 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  Because  it  is  so  easy  to  amend, 
the  British  Constitution  is  extremely  flexible ;  it  is  never  fixed, 
but  ever-evolving. 

As  a  result  of  this  easy  process  of  constitutional  evolution, 
British  institutions  are  historical  rather  than  rational.  Divine- 
right  monarchy  still  survives  in  the  title  of  the  present  crown : 
monarch,  ''George  V,  by  the  Grace  of  God  of  the  a  Relic  of 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  and  of 
the  British  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas  King,  Defender  of  the 
Faith,  Emperor  of  India."  ^  Theoretically  the  king  still  has  most 
of  the  powers  of  an  Henry  VIII.  Practically,  however,  the  sov- 
ereign is  only  a  poUte  gentleman,  who  graces  public  functions  with 
his  benign  presence,  entertains  royal  visitors,  reads  speeches  (pre- 
pared by  his  ministers)  at  the  opening  and  closing  of  Parliament, 
and  occasionally  even  exerts  some  slight  influence  upon  public 


*  George  V,  the  eighth  of  the  House  of  Hanover,  succeeded  Edward  VIT,  his 
father,  in  1910.  George  V  is  the  grandson  of  Victoria,  who  reigned  from  1837  to 
1901.    See  below,  p.  729. 


292 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


affairs  by  talking  with  prominent  politicians.  But  if  in  some 
mad  moment  George  V  should  act  like  an  absolute  monarch, 
every  one  knows  he  would  be  deposed  by  Parliament,  as  was 
James  II. 

No  less  an  anachronism  is  the  House  of  Lords.  France  has 
deprived  her  feudal  nobles  of  superior  political  privileges;  but 
^t-  Tx        Great  Britain  still  allows  her  dukes  and  barons  by 

The  House  .  .  .  . 

of  Lords :  a  hereditary  right  to  sit  in  the  Upper  Chamber  of  Parlia- 
Feudaifsm  ^^^^  '^^  the  days  of  King  Edward  III.  Here  again, 
while  the  form  has  remained,  the  fact  has  changed. 
The  peers  are  no  longer  warlike  barons,  each  surrounded  by  his 
men-at-arms  ;  they  are  gentlemen  landlords,  bankers,  merchants, 
ex-brewers,  captains  of  industry,  who  have  been  elevated  to  the 
peerage  in  return  for  services  to  the  nation  or  monetary  contri- 
butions to  the  party  in  power.  Only  a  few,  like  the  duke  of 
Norfolk,  trace  their  descent  back  of  1500. 

While  the  king  still  remains  the  chief  dignitary  of  the  state,  and 
the  House  of  Lords  still  wields  a  two-year  suspensive  veto  in  legis- 
Democ  lation  in  addition  to  exercising  judicial  functions  as 
racy:  the  Supreme  court  of  appeal,  the  dominant  force  in  the 
Commoiis  British  polity  is  democracy,  represented  by  the  House 
of  Commons.  Even  this  body  possesses  an  ancient 
pedigree,^  descending  without  break  from  Simon  de  Montfort's 
assembly  of  knights  and  burgesses  (1265).  It  has  become,  how- 
ever, an  essentially  modern  institution.  The  House  of  Commons 
consists  of  670  representatives,  elected  by  almost  universal  man- 
hood suffrage  —  495  from  England  and  Wales,  72  from  Scotland, 
103  from  Ireland,  —  sitting  in  Westminster  Palace  regularly  from 
February  to  August  each  year  to  make  the  nation's  laws.  Clergy- 
men,^ government  contractors,  sheriffs,  English  and  Scottish  peers, 
and  youths  under  21  years  of  age  are  debarred  from  membership. 
Otherwise  any  registered  elector  is  eligible  for  Parliament ;  and 
the  salary  of  £400  a  year  enables  poor  men  as  well  as  rich  to 
devote  themselves  to  legislative  labors. 

With  the  number  and  qualifications  of  the  voters  who  elect 
the  House  of  Commons,  we  are  already  familiar.  The  manner  of 
election,  however,  deserves  our  attention.    When  a  general  elec- 

1  See  Vol,  I,  pp.  265  ff. 

2  Except  of  Protestant  Non-Conformist  Churches. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


293 


lion  ^  is  to  be  held,  writs  of  election  are  sent  out  to  the  sheriffs 
of  all  Irish  and  Scotch  constituencies,  to  the  sheriffs  of  English 
counties,  and  to  the  mayors  of  English  boroughs,  Electoral 
who  act  as  returning  officers.  The  returning  officer  in  Procedure 
each  constituency  immediately  designates  an  election  day,  which 
must  not  be  more  than  nine  days  after  the  receipt  of  the  writ,  in 
the  case  of  counties,  or  four  days  in  the  case  of  boroughs.  On 
election  day  there  is  no  balloting,  but  nominations  are  then 
received  for  the  first  time,  in  writing,  and  each  must  be  supported 
by  nine  registered  electors.  Frequently,  as  for  instance  in  the 
overwhelmingly  NationaHst  districts  of  Ireland,  only  one  can- 
didate is  nominated  for  a  seat,  and  he  is  at  once  declared  to  be 
elected  without  the  expensive  formahty  of  polling. 

Where  an  election  is  contested  by  rival  candidates,  however, 
the  returning  officer  fixes  a  polling  day  in  the  boroughs  not  more 
than  six  and  in  the  counties  from  two  to  six  days  after  election 
day.  On  polling  day  the  real  election  takes  place,  when  each 
elector  presents  himself  at  the  polls,  receives  a  ballot-paper  on 
which  the  names  of  the  candidates  are  printed,  and  enters  a 
small  booth,  where  unobserved  he  may  mark  a  cross  opposite 
the  name  of  his  choice.  The  papers  are  deposited  in  a  locked 
ballot-box,  and  counted  at  the  end  of  the  day  in  the  presence  of 
the  returning  ofiicer,^  who  declares  the  election  of  the  candidate 
with  the  largest  number  of  votes.  It  is  important  to  notice  that 
under  this  system  election  and  poUing  take  place  on  different  days 
in  different  constituencies,  so  that  for  the  entire  country  a 
general  election  may  last  two  weeks,  and  a  plural  voter  may, 
for  example,  vote  in  London  on  Monday,  in  Liverpool  on  Tues- 
day, and  in  Bristol  on  Thursday.^  Naturally,  as  the  elections 
proceed,  excitement  increases  until  it  is  fmally  known  whether  or 
not  the  Opposition  has  overthrown  the  Ministry.  This  brings 
us  to  the  second  remarkable  feature  of  the  British  poHtical 
system. 

*  Between  general  elections  there  are  frequent  "by-elections"  in  single  constit- 
uencies to  fill  places  vacated  by  death  or  retirement.  A  member  appointed  to 
office  in  the  ministry,  moreover,  usually  resigns  his  seat  and  offers  himself  for 
reiilection. 

2  In  university  constituencies  voting  by  word  of  mouth  and  by  proxy  still  prevails. 
'  To  prevent  this  was  the  design  of  the  Plural  Voting  Bill  passed  by  the  Commons 
and  rejected  by  the  Lords  in  1913  and  in  1914. 


294 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  ministry,  or  rather  the  cabinet,  is 
dependent  upon  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  This 
2  The  essence  of  parKamentary  government,  as  con- 

Parliamen-  trasted  with  congressional  government,  where  the 
the'cabinet'  ^administrative  officials  are  appointed  independently 
by  the  president,  or  the  monarch,  as  the  case  may  be. 
The  term  "ministry,"  be  it  understood,  technically  denotes  the 
numerous  hierarchy  of  administrative  officials,  of  whom  the 
"cabinet"  includes  only  the  more  important  heads  of  depart- 
ments ;  in  common  speech,  however,  ministry  and  cabinet  are 
interchangeable,  since  the  cabinet  both  controls  the  policy  and 
determines  the  personnel  of  the  entire  ministry.  The  cabinet 
system  again  illustrates  the  English  habit  of  fitting  new  practices 
into  the  shells  of  decayed  institutions.  Before  the  law,  cabinet 
officers  are  members  of  the  large  and  now  purely  honorary  Privy 
Council,  whose  function  is  "to  advise  the  king";  in  fact,  the 
cabinet  is  a  Parliamentary  committee,  selected  from  the  party 
uppermost  in  the  House  of  Commons,  to  direct  legislation,  deter- 
mine policy,  and  administer  the  laws.  Although  the  number  of 
men  in  the  cabinet  is  not  rigidly  fixed,  it  usually  includes  about  a 
score  of  the  most  important  officials  of  the  realm  :  the  first  lord  of 
the  treasury,  who  is  usually  prime  minister ;  the  lord  president  of 
the  council ;  the  lord  high  chancellor ;  the  secretaries  of  state  for 
foreign  affairs,  for  India,  for  the  home  department,  for  the  colonies, 
and  for  war ;  the  chancellor  of  the  exchequer ;  the  first  lord  of  the 
admiralty ;  the  chief  secretary  to  the  lord-lieutenant  of  Ireland ; 
the  presidents  of  the  board  of  trade,  local  government  board, 
the  board  of  education,  and  of  the  board  of  agriculture;  the 
secretary  for  Scotland ;  the  postmaster-general ;  the  first  com- 
missioner of  works ;  the  attorney-general ;  and  the  chancellor 
of  the  duchy  of  Lancaster.  In  practice  every  department  of  the 
administration  is  thus  subjected  to  the  cabinet. 

The  cabinet  system  combines  efficiency  with  representative 
government.  The  former  quaHty  is  assured  by  the  fact  that  the 
cabinet  controls  both  legislation  and  administration.  It  drafts 
most  of  the  important  measures  —  including  the  budget  —  which 
Parliament  passes,  and  then  superintends  their  execution. 
Harmony  is  maintained  by  frequent  secret  sessions,  and  by  the 
leadership  of  the  prime  minister.    The  prime  minister  is,  in- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


295 


deed,  the  ruler  of  the  nation.  Powerful  as  it  is,  the  ministry  is 
an  instrument  of  democracy  rather  than  of  autocracy,  because  it 
is  responsible  to  the  elective  chamber  of  ParHament. 
In  the  first  place,  the  king,  in  appointing  a  prime  fj^^Re.^^ 
minister,  is  bound  by  custom  to  select  the  recognized  sponsibiuty 
leader  of  the  most  numerous  party ;  the  prime  minis-  caWnet 
ter,  in  turn,  is  expected  to  choose  as  subordinates  the 
prominent  politicians  in  his  own  party. The  cabinet,  therefore, 
represents  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Should  the 
ministry  for  any  reason  lose  the  support  of  the  majority,  an  un- 
written law  compels  the  premier  immediately  to  resign,  and  the 
other  ministers  with  him.  Thereupon  the  king  seeks  out  a  new 
premier  capable  of  commanding  a  Parliamentary  majority.  Or, 
if  the  defeated  premier  believes  Parliament  to  be  out  of  harmony 
with  the  electorate,  instead  of  resigning  he  may  dissolve  Parlia- 
ment and  call  a  general  election.  In  case  the  new  House  of 
Commons  is  unfriendly,  he  inevitably  resigns.  This  power  of  the 
ministry  to  call  new  elections  at  any  time  has  occasionally  been 
used  in  order  to  make  sure  that  the  House  of  Commons  repre- 
sented the  wishes  of  the  people,  before  proceeding  with  some 
weighty  matter  —  as,  for  instance,  just  before  the  enactment  of 
the  ParHament  Act.  In  1913,  again,  the  Unionists  demanded  a 
general  election  before  the  Home  Rule  Bill  should  be  passed, 
claiming  that  the  question  of  Irish  Home  Rule  had  not  been  the 
dominant  issue  in  the  last  election  (December,  19 10) ;  the  Liberal 
Government,  on  the  other  hand,  asserting  that  its  victory  in  the 
elections  of  1910  at  least  impHed  popular  approval  of  Home 
Rule,  refused  the  demand  for  a  special  election  and  allowed  the 
ParHament  to  live  out  its  full  legal  term  of  five  years.^ 

Before  we  leave  the  subject  of  Parliament,  it  may  be  well  to 
insert  a  word  about  the  way  in  which  biUs  ^  are  actually  handled. 

^  Under  the  abnormal  conditions  prevailing  after  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of 
the  Nations,  party  lines  were  partly  obliterated,  and  in  May,  1915,  several 
Unionist  leaders  were  brought  into  Mr.  Asquith's  cabinet.  In  this  "coalition 
cabinet"  places  were  created  for  a  "minister  of  munitions"  and  a  "minister 
without  portfolio." 

^  In  fact,  on  account  of  the  exigencies  of  war,  the  provision  of  the  Parliament 
Act  respecting  the  five-year  elections  of  members  of  the  House  of  Commons  was 
suspended,  and  the  duration  of  the  Parliament  elected  in  19 10  was  prolonged. 

'  These  very  general  remarks  are  subject  to  exceptions  in  the  case  of  finance 
bills  and  private  bills. 


296 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Bills  go  through  three  readings  in  each  House.  The  first  reading 
is  merely  introductory.  At  the  second  reading  general  principles 
are  debated.  Next  the  bill  is  handed  over  to  a  committee  for 
detailed  consideration  and  possible  amendment.  After  the  com- 
mittee has  reported  it  back  to  the  House,  a  vote  is  taken  upon  the 
third  and  fmal  reading,  which  means  the  acceptance  or  rejection 
of  the  bill  as  a  whole.  Then  the  measure  is  considered  by  the 
other  House  of  Parliament,  and  if  both  houses  agree,  it  receives 
the  perfunctory  assent  of  the  crown  and  thus  passes  into  law. 

The  third  respect  in  which  the  government  of  the  United 
Kingdom  ^  merits  attention  is  its  realization  of  the  idea  of  central 
3  Central  rather  than  of  federal  government.  One  might  expect 
and  Local  Scotland,  Ireland,  Wales,  and  England  each  to  have  its 
Government  Parliament,  as  each  state  in  the  United  States 
has  its  own  legislature.  This,  in  fact,  is  what  some  politicians 
are  demanding.  But  at  present  the  Parhament  at  Westminster 
makes  laws  for  the  whole  United  Kingdom,  as  it  has  done  ever 
since  the  unions  with  Scotland  (1707)  and  Ireland  (1801).  In 
administration  the  divisions  are  somewhat  separate,  Ireland 
having  its  lord-lieutenant  and  local  government  board  and  both 
Ireland  and  Scotland  having  separate  secretaries  in  the  common 
cabinet.  With  this  exception,  the  local  government  is  substan- 
tially similar  throughout  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  is  super- 
vised by  the  five  central  authorities  :  ^  the  home  ofhce  (regulating 
factory-inspection  and  police),  the  board  of  trade  (regulating 
commercial  enterprises),  the  local  government  board  (superin- 
tending charities,  sanitation,  finance),  the  board  of  education, 
and  the  board  of  agriculture.  The  old  counties,  with  their  mih- 
tary  lord-lieutenants,  their  sheriffs,  and  their  justices  of  the 
peace  —  all  crown  officers  —  have  been  largely  superseded  by 
new  administrative  units.  The  most  important  units  are  now 
(i)  the  administrative  counties  ^  and  (2)  county  boroughs.^ 
(i)  The  administrative  counties  have  each  their  popularly 
elected  county  councils,  supervising  finance,  bridges,  roads,  public 


^  We  are  here  leaving  the  colonies  out  of  consideration.    See  below,  ch.  xxix. 

2  Some  of  these  boards  are  separate  for  Ireland  and  Scotland  but  under  general 
cabinet  control. 

3  There  are  62  of  these  in  England  (and  Wales). 

*  There  are  74  county  boroughs  in  England  (and  Wales). 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  297 


buildings,  asylums,  industrial  schools,  education,  and,  to  a 
limited  degree,  police.  Each  county  has  also  its  clerk,  treasurer, 
chief  constable,  coroners,  and  educational  officials.  The  county 
is  subdivided  into  rural  districts  (each  of  which  usually  comprises 
several  parishes) ,  and  urban  districts  or  towns ;  both  urban  and 
rural  districts  have  their  subordinate  elective  councils  to  care  for 
highways  and  sanitation.  There  are  also  chartered  municipal 
boroughs  within  the  counties,  with  governments  similar  to  those 
of  the  larger  county  boroughs,  but  less  autonomous.  (2)  The 
county  boroughs  are  cities  large  enough  (at  least  50,000  inhabit- 
ants) in  effect  to  become  counties  by  themselves.  Each  such 
borough  is  a  chartered  municipal  corporation,  governed  by  an 
elective  borough  council.  The  borough  council,  comprising 
councilors,  aldermen,  and  mayor,  is  one  of  the  most  significant 
features  of  British  government,  for  it  not  only  exercises  the  famil- 
iar sanitary,  poHce,  and  educational  functions,  but  frequently 
ventures  on  socialistic  experiments,  such  as  municipal  ownership 
of  tramways,  gas-works,  and  electric-plants.  (3)  Finally,  the 
position  of  London  has  always  been  unique.  London  is  now  an 
administrative  county  made  up  of  twenty-eight  metropolitan 
boroughs,  besides  a  district  which  still  calls  itself  the  City  —  as 
indeed  it  was  in  the  sixteenth  century  —  and  takes  pride  in  its 
pompous  lord  mayor. 


BRITISH  POLITICAL  PARTIES 

While  dwelHng  on  the  evolution  of  democratic  political  ma- 
chinery in  the  United  Kingdom,  we  have  almost  lost  sight  of  the 
fact  that  each  epochal  alteration  in  the  British  con-  p^jj^j^^^j 
stitution  has  been  attended  by  significant  transforma-  Reform  and 
tion  in  the  composition  and  ideals  of  the  political  fartyXrans- 

A    1     •    r  •  r    1  •  r-r^    •    •   ^  formation 

parties.    A  brief  review  of  the  transmutation  of  British 
political  parties  in  the  nineteenth  century  may  throw  new  light 
upon  already  familiar  events,  as  well  as  upon  the  domestic  situa- 
tion in  1914. 

In  the  rivalries  of  Whigs  and  Tories,  prior  to  the  Reform  of 
1832,  the  masses  had  no  part.  Government  was  notoriously 
corrupt,  absurdly  unrepresentative,  and  hopelessly  reactionary. 
The  faction  in  power  —  the  Tories  —  still  reiterating  their  horror 


298 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  revolution,  censored  the  press,  dispersed  mass-meetings,  and 
hanged  popular  agitators,  —  all  in  the  name  of  the  ancient 
Whigs  and  Crown,  the  Established  Church,  and  the  glorious 
Tories,  and  Constitution.  While  the  miserable  lower  classes  were 
Sasses^^^^  helpless  under  the  yoke,  the  prosperous  middle  classes 
asserted  their  rights  and  gained  representation  in  Par- 
Hament.  The  former  Whig  Opposition,  —  which  had  consisted 
of  a  few  aristocratic  famihes  with  a  following  of  Non-Conformist 
tradesmen,  —  having  identified  itself  with  the  Reform,  received 
into  its  bosom  the  grateful  factory-owners  and  shop-keepers  who 
had  benefited  by  the  Reform;  from  the  new  recruits  the  old 
Whigs  learned  to  call  themselves  Liberals,  and  to  advocate 
bourgeois  reforms.  A  considerable  number  of  the  new  electors, 
however,  either  from  fear  of  further  reform  or  from  loyalty  to 
the  EstabHshed  Church,  were  attracted  to  the  To^y  party,  which 
had  heretofore  relied  mainly  upon  the  landed  gentry,  the  clergy, 
and  some  of  the  old  mercantile  families.  These  factory-owners 
were  ill  at  ease,  however,  among  the  old  Tories  :  under  Sir  Robert 
Peel  they  repudiated  the  Tory  protective  tariff,  and  subsequently, 
for  the  sake  of  free  trade,  many  of  them  followed  WilHam  Ewart 
Gladstone  into  the  Liberal  party. 

From  1832  to  1867  was  the  era  of  the  bourgeois  compromise  — 
the  ''Victorian  Compromise"  between  democracy  and  oligarchy, 
whereby  the  bourgeois  enjoyed  pohtical  rights  and  left  the  lower 
classes  to  shift  for  themselves.  It  was  tacitly  assumed  that  if  a 
man  was  poor,  it  was  due  either  to  his  own  fault  or  to  inexorable 
economic  laws,  —  and  in  either  case  he  was  unfit  to  vote.  Against 
the  compromise  a  few  philosophical  Radicals  feebly  protested, 
then  lapsed  into  silence. 

The  second  upheaval  in  the  party  system  was  caused  by  the 
rise  of  the  working  classes.  The  Chartist  agitation  gave  proof 
that  the  leaven  of  democratic  doctrine  was  powerfully 
Con?wva^^  at  work  among  the  discontented  masses.  The  trade- 
tives,  and  union  movement  disclosed  an  astonishing  spirit  of  self- 
ingOasses  help,  independence,  and  class-conscious  organization 
on  the  part  of  the  workingmen.  Slowly  the  older 
parties  reahzed  that  the  workingmen  were  becoming  a  factor 
in  politics.  Disraeli  would  have  bound  the  lower  classes  to  the 
ancient  institutions  of  crown,  church,  and  nobility  by  golden 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


chains  of  patriotism,  veneration,  and  gratitude :  he  would  have 
had  the  Conservative  party  feel,  as  he  himself  did,  quick  sympathy 
with  Chartism,  and  a  desire  to  take  immediate  and  practical  steps 
for  the  benefit  of  the  unhappy  miUions.  When  the  sweeping 
electoral  reform  of  1867  was  sponsored  by  a  Conservative  cabinet, 
it  seemed  as  if  the  Conservatives  were  becoming  the  democratic 
party. 

Disraeli's  move  was  counteracted  by  Gladstone,  the  Liberal 
free  trader,  and  Bright,  the  Radical  orator,  who  persuaded 
democratic  audiences  that  the  Conservatives  were  landed  aristo- 
crats and  Disraeli  an  insincere  charlatan.  The  election  of  1868 
established  Gladstone  and  Bright  in  power  for  the  six  years 
1868-1874.  It  also  swamped  the  older  aristocratic  Whiggish 
element  of  the  Liberal  party  in  a  sea  of  working-class  votes. 
Gladstone,  as  a  Liverpool  merchant's  son,  and  Bright,  as  a 
Lancashire  factory-owner,  naturally  avoided  factory  legislation, 
and  by  attacking  privilege  —  the  privilege  of  the  landed  aristoc- 
racy and  of  the  Anglican  clergy  in  Ireland,  —  by  introducing 
the  ballot,  by  extending  the  franchise,  by  promoting  popular 
elementary  education,  by  shouting  peace,  retrenchment,  and 
reform,"  made  the  workingmen  forget  low  wages  and  long  hours. 
!  In  1874,  however,  DisraeH  came  into  power  as  the  champion  of 
vigorous  foreign  poHcy  and  of  social  reform.  He  gave  the  city 
artisans  better  dwelHngs;  he  safeguarded  the  savings  of  the 
poor  against  wild-cat  insurance  companies ;  he  enabled  tenant- 
farmers  to  claim  compensation  for  improvements  when  resigning 
their  holdings.  Unfortunately  DisraeH 's  attention  was  devoted 
more  to  securing  glory  abroad  than  to  insuring  contentment  at 
home.  His  acquisition  of  a  controlling  financial  interest  in  the 
Suez  Canal  (1875)  was  an  unmixed  advantage ;  but  his  interven- 
tion in  the  Balkan  peninsula  and  support  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
against  Russian  aggrandizement  (187 7-1 878)  ^  were  censured  by 
Gladstonian  Liberals.  At  the  same  time  the  appearance  of  an 
Irish  Home  Rule  party  still  further  embarrassed  the  Conservative 
ministry. 

The  election  of  1880  returned  Gladstone  to  power.  Glad- 
stone's administration,  however,  proved  to  be  more  peaceful 
than  Disraeli's,  and  certainly  was  less  glorious.    The  Irish  Home 

*  3ec  below,  pp.  505  f, 


300 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Rule  party,  far  from  being  mollified  by  Gladstone's  incomplete 
concessions,  combined  with  the  Conservative  Opposition. 
Then  it  was  that  Gladstone,  in  order  to  win  the  support  of  the 
Home  Rule  faction,  which  he  needed  in  order  to  obtain  a  majority, 
reversed  his  former  Irish  poUcy  and  consented  to  support  Irish 
Home  Rule  (1886). 

Gladstone's  sudden  change  of  front  on  the  Irish  question  threw 
the  Liberals  into  dire  confusion.  For  twenty  years  he  had  domi- 
nated the  party,  but  his  convincing  eloquence  was  failing,  and  his 
followers  discontented.  The  Whiggish  Liberals  resented  his 
democratic  reforms.  The  Radical  Liberals,  too,  were  unsatisfied, 
although  for  the  opposite  reason.  The  tendency  to  a  spHt  was 
only  too  obvious :  only  the  energy  of  a  forceful  personahty  was 
needed  to  effect  the  complete  disruption  of  the  Liberal  party. 

Such  a  personality  was  that  of  Joseph  Chamberlain  (1836- 
1914).  As  Gladstone  represented  the  old-fashioned  laisser-faire 
bourgeoisie,  so  Joseph  Chamberlain  stood  for  the 
Chamber-  younger  generation,  the  most  progressive  element  of 
lain  and  the  the  Capitalist  class.  While  yet  a  young  man,  he  be- 
u^oidsts  came  well  known  as  one  of  the  most  energetic  and 
successful  manufacturers  in  Birmingham,  distinguished 
for  poKtical  views  more  radical  than  those  of  the  ordinary  Liberal. 
Restless  energy  carried  young  Chamberlain  from  business  into 
local  politics,  and  won  him  immediate  recognition.  In  1874  he 
was  elected  mayor  of  Birmingham.  After  cleaning  up  the  city 
slums,  and  estabHshing  municipal  ownership  of  gas  and  water 
supply,  Chamberlain  entered  national  politics  and  secured  a  seat 
in  Parliament  (1876).  The  more  radical  Liberals  speedily  ac- 
knowledged him  as  their  chief,  and  subscribed  to  his  doctrines  of 
free  education,  small  holdings,  graduated  taxes,  and  the  develop- 
ment of  local  government.  For  a  time  Chamberlain  submitted 
to  Gladstone's  leadership,  but  his  patience  must  have  been  sorely 
tried  by  Gladstone's  old-fashioned  oratory,  antiquated  politics, 
and  neglect  of  social  reform. 

When  Gladstone  took  up  Irish  Home  Rule,  to  which  Chamber- 
lain was  unalterably  opposed,  Chamberlain  openly  rebelled,  and 
John  Bright  with  the  rest  of  the  radical  Liberals  followed  him. 
The  seceding  Liberals,  with  Chamberlain  as  their  leader,  for  a 
time  constituted  an  independent  group,  adopting  the  name 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  ^6f 


Liberal  Unionists,  to  advertise  their  refusal  to  dissolve  the 
legislative  Union  of  Ireland  and  Great  Britain.    As  Gladstone, 
now  more  dependent  than  ever  upon  Irish  votes,  con- 
tinued to  make  Irish  Home  Rule  the  main  feature  of  ^g^^berai 
Gladstonian  Liberalism,  the  Liberal  Unionists  began  Unionists 
to  discover  that  in  loyalty  to  the  Union,  in  patriotism,  ^^atives 
and  occasionally  even  in  social  reform,  they  could  (1895)  :  the 
cooperate  with  the  Conservatives.    In  1895  Chamber-  p^^^* 
lain  finally  allied  himself  with  the  Conservative  leader, 
the  marquess  of  Salisbury,  and  the  coalition  thus  formed  was 
able  to  control  the  government  for  the  next  ten  years.  By 
virtue  of  its  predominant  purpose  —  the  preservation  of  the 
Union  —  the  coahtion  was  usually  called  the  Unionist  party. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Chamberlain  was  a  Unitarian  Non-Con- 
formist, the  Unionists  in  general  preserved  the  traditional  Con- 
servative respect  for  the  Established  Church  and  the  House  of 
Lords.    On  the  other  hand,  Chamberlain  and  his  followers  con- 
tributed an  enthusiasm  for  progressive  social  reform.    In  this 
respect  the  influence  of  Joseph  Chamberlain  in  the  'nineties 
strikingly  resembled  the  influence  of  Benjamin  Disraeli  in  the 
'sixties. 

In  respect  of  its  membership,  the  Unionist  party  was  now 
more  comprehensive  than  the  old  Conservative  party.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  nobiUty,  clergy,  and  gentry,  the  Unionists  controlled 
the  bulk  of  the  lawyers  and  of  the  university  graduates,  and  the 
majority  of  prominent  merchants,  manufacturers,  and  financiers 
in  the  great  cities,  —  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  Joseph 
Chamberlain  was  himself  a  university  man  and  a  manufacturer. 
Many  clerks,  tradesmen,  and  shopkeepers,  and  even  a  consider- 
able section  of  the  lower  classes  followed  their  employers  in 
adopting  Unionist  principles. 

The  great  appeal  of  Unionism  to  the  patriotic  ardor  of  the 
masses  no  doubt  won  the  party  many  adherents,  but  at  the  same 
time  weakened  it  internally.    Joseph  Chamberlain,  j^^^^y^ 
while  colonial  secretary  (i 895-1 903),  became  intensely  chamber- 
interested  in  building  up  the  strength  and  unity  of  the  ]^^^^  ^® 
British  Empire.    As  he  studied  the  problem,  he  be- 
came convinced  that  the  Liberal  policy  of  peace,  small  arma- 
ments, and  loose  relations  between  the  colonies  and  mother- 


302 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


country  was  all  wrong.  The  colonies  should  be  closely  federated 
to  the  United  Kingdom,  he  believed,  and  should  not  only  be 
induced  to  cooperate  in  the  work  of  defending  the  empire,  but 
should  be  bound  to  England  by  commercial  ties.  This  he  pro- 
posed to  accomphsh  by  establishing  a  system  of  imperial  prefer- 
ence, whereby  the  United  Kingdo-m  would  impose  a  customs 
tariff  on  imports  —  a  low  duty  on  foodstuffs,  lo  per  cent  on 
manufactures,  no  duty  on  raw  materials  —  except  from  her 
colonies,  and  the  colonies  would  reciprocate  by  giving  British 
manufactures  a  preference.  Three  purposes  thereby  would  be 
served  :  (i)  the  preferential  agreement  would  cement  the  empire ; 
(2)  the  tariff  protection  would  stimulate  British  industry  and 
allow  British  employers  to  pay  higher  wages  and  still  compete 
with  foreign  manufacturers;  (3)  the  customs  receipts  would 
bring  in  revenue  sufficient  to  enlarge  the  navy  and  to  accom- 
plish expensive  social  reforms  such  as  old-age  pensions.  The 
propaganda  was  launched  in  1903,  when  a  Tariff  Reform  League 
was  formed,  and  a  lively  campaign  ensued.  The  Liberal- 
Unionist  wing  of  the  party  acquiesced;  but  the  Conservative 
wing,  now  almost  as  fondly  attached  to  free  trade  as  once  it  had 
been  to  protection,  conceived  a  violent  dislike  for  ^' taxes  on 
food."  The  resulting  lack  of  harmony  between  the  two  sections 
of  the  Unionist  party  enabled  the  Liberals  to  carry  the  election 
of  1906,  and  continued  to  embarrass  the  present  Unionist  leader, 
Mr.  Andrew  Bonar  Law. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  in  1886  Joseph  Chamberlain 
represented  the  radical  wing  of  Gladstone's  party,  his  alliance 
The  Labor  With  the  Conservatives  —  still  regarded  as  aristocrats 
Party  —  ^^^^  gradual  subordination  of  social  reform  to 
imperialism,  become  all  the  more  significant.  Ever  since  the 
Reform  of  1867  the  organized  labor  vote  had  been  a  political 
factor  of  increasing  importance,  and  had  generally  supported  the 
progressive  Liberals.  By  Joseph  Chamberlain's  defection,  this 
labor  vote  was  left  completely  stranded.  Clearly  there  was 
opportunity  for  the  trade  unions  to  enter  politics  independently 
of  the  Liberal  and  Unionist  parties.  The  first  general  trade- 
union  Congress,  held  at  London  in  1899,  convoked  an  assemblage 
of  representatives  of  all  working-class  organizations  which  would 
be  willing  to  cooperate  in  securing  an  adequate  representation 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


of  labor  interests  in  Parliament.  This  body  met  in  the  follow- 
ing year  and  formed  a  ''Labor  Representation  Committee." 
The  need  for  such  action  was  felt  all  the  more  keenly  by  trade- 
unionists  in  1 901,  when  strikes  were  practically  prohibited  by  a 
judicial  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords  (The  Taff  Vale  Railway 
Company  v.  the  Amalgamated  Society  of  Railway  Servants), 
which  rendered  trade  unions  liable  to  suits  for  damages  when- 
ever their  action  (as  in  a  strike)  caused  loss  to  other  persons. 
Hot  with  wrath,  the  trade  unions  pressed  forward  with  renewed 
vigor  the  plans  of  the  Labor  Representation  Committee  to 
establish  a  regular  Labor  party  in  ParKament,  which  would 
secure  the  enactment  of  laws  favorable  to  trade  unions,  and  to 
labor  interests  in  general.  The  Fabian  Society  (an  association 
pledged  to  educate  the  public  in  Socialism),  the  Social  Democratic 
Federation  (a  small  Socialist  organization  with  strict  Marxist  prin- 
ciples) ,  and  the  Independent  Labor  Party  (a  rival  Sociahst  organiza- 
tion of  workingmen,  founded  as  early  as  1893  by  Mr.  Keir  Hardie, 
and  already  represented  in  ParKament)  gave  the  Labor  Represen- 
tation Committee  their  whole-hearted  support.  At  the  election 
of  1906,  the  committee  secured  twenty-nine  representatives  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  who,  together  with  eleven  representa- 
tives of  miners'  associations,  and  fourteen  other  workmen  (Liberal 
Laborites  and  Independent  Laborites),  gave  the  working  classes 
54  members  of  Parliament.  The  Labor  party,  as  the  organiza- 
tion is  now  called,  represented  in  1914  some  1,500,000  constitu- 
ents, and  controlled  40  seats  in  the  House  of  Commons,  under  the 
leadership  ^  of  Mr.  Ramsay  Macdonald. 

Meanwhile  a  remarkable  change  had  come  over  the  Liberal 
party.    Dismayed  by  the  Unionist  secession  (1886),  discouraged 
by  their  inability  to  overcome  the  Lords'  resistance  to  Regen 
Gladstone's  Irish  Home  Rule  Bill  (1893),  and  dis-  erationof 
heartened  by  the  death  of  their  veteran  leader  (1898),  p^^j.^y*^^^^ 
Gladstonian  Liberals  were  forced  for  ten  years  (1895- 
1905)  to  sit  on  the  opposition  benches  in  gloomy  meditation. 
While  the  Liberals  were  thus  despondent,  three  influences  were 
at  work  re-vitalizing  their  creed.    In  the  first  place,  since  the 
agricultural  laborers  had  been  enfranchised  (1884),  the  land 
problem  had  begun  to  loom  larger  on  the  political  horizon. 

^  Mr.  Keir  Ilardie,  an  ex-miner,  led  the  Independent  Labor  Party  (Socialist). 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Great  Britain,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  not  swept  away  the 
lingering  power  of  feudal  landlordism,  as  had  the  Revolutionary 
I.  Influence  France;  and  consequently  instead  of  being,  like  the 
of  Henry  French,  a  nation  of  contented  peasant-proprietors 
George  small  land-owners) ,  rural  England  was  still  a 

nation  of  grasping  landlords  and  discontented  laborers.  Dis- 
cussion of  this  agrarian  problem  had  recently  been  stimulated  by 
the  proposal  of  Henry  George,  an  American  reformer,  that  the 
nation  should  impose  a  ''single  tax"  on  land-owners,  with  the 
purpose  of  taxing  the  landlords  out  of  existence  and  ultimately 
estabhshing  national  ownership  of  the  land.  This  nationaliza- 
tion of  the  land,  explained  Henry  George  in  Progress  and  Poverty 
(1879),  would  not  only  aboHsh  the  idle  landlord,  but  would 
powerfully  work  to  increase  the  wages  and  independence  of  urban 
workingmen.  The  theory,  ably  expounded,  was  eagerly  taken 
up  by  associations  in  Great  Britain  as  well  as  in  America.  It 
appealed  with  particular  force  to  the  middle-class  Gladstonian 
Liberals,  who  had  always  looked  with  disfavor  upon  the  landed 
aristocracy,  and  were  now  sorely  tempted  to  try  an  experiment 
which  could  in  any  case  injure  only  the  landlords  and  which  prom- 
ised to  exterminate  all  poverty.  The  Liberals  did  not  unre- 
servedly adopt  Henry  George's  theories,  but  a  number  of  them, 
and  notably  Mr.  David  Lloyd  George,  were  incited  to  formulate 
a  less  revolutionary  program  of  land  reform. 

A  second  circumstance  by  which^"th€.  Liberals  profited  was 
Joseph  Chamberlain's  advocacy  of  a  return  to  a  protective  tariff. 
2  Opposi  free-trade  plank  of  the  Liberal  platform,  which 

tion  to  the  had  become  a  commonplace  since  Gladstone's  free- 
posi^s^^°"  t^^^^  budgets,  suddenly  assumed  fundamental  im- 
portance. Endless  statistical  speeches  were  again  in 
vogue,  as  Liberal  orators  endeavored  to  prove  that  to  free  trade 
alone  Great  Britain  owed  her  wealth ;  that  a  tariff  would  increase 
the  price  of  the  workingman's  loaf  of  bread.  To  the  revival  of 
the  tariff  issue,  and  to  the  general  aversion  of  the  country  from 
tariff  experiments,  the  Liberals  chiefly  owed  their  increased 
popularity. 

A  third  factor  in  the  regeneration  of  LiberaKsm  was  the  influ- 
ence of  the  Boer  War  ( 1899-190 2).  The  war  grew  out  of  a 
conflict  between  the  aggressive  British  colonists  and  the  older 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  305 


Dutch  population  (Boers)  in  the  Transvaal  region  of  South  Africa.-^ 
The  Unionist  government,  under  whose  regime  the  war  oc- 
curred, aroused  in  the  United  Kingdom  the  most  bit-  3.  The  Boer 
ter  criticism.  The  Opposition  alleged  that  the  war 
was  an  unjustifiable  aggression,  that  the  management  of  military 
operations  was  disfigured  by  shameful  corruption  and  inefiiciency. 
The  Liberals,  as  the  advocates  of  peace  and  army  reform,  were 
thus  able  to  deHver  telHng  blows  at  the  ministry. 

In  another  way  the  Boer  War  was  of  vital  importance.  In 
enhsting  army  recruits  for  the  war,  the  mihtary  authorities  made 
the  appalling  discovery  that  many  factory-workers  were  such 
poor,  stoop-shouldered,  anemic,  ill-nourished,  deformed,  con- 
sumptive creatures  as  to  be  physically  unfit  for  service  in  the 
army.  Further  investigation  only  confirmed  the  fact  that  the 
working  population  was  deteriorating  physically,  as  well  as 
mentally  and  morally,  under  the  debasing  influence  of  long  hours 
and  starvation  wages.  It  meant  that  something  must  be  done 
immediately  to  Hft  the  lower  classes  out  of  the  quagmire  of 
poverty,  vice,  and  disease  into  which  they  had  been  thrust. 
The  old  laisser-faire  Liberahsm,  which  declared  the  state  must 
not  interfere  with  the  free  economic  relations  of  employer  and 
employed,  was  now  contemptuously  cast  aside  as  a  The  New 
disgraceful  failure,  and  in  its  place  a  new  Liberalism  Liberalism 
arose  with  ardent  enthusiasm,  determined  ''to  wage  implacable 
warfare  against  poverty  and  squahdness."  The  new  ideal  of 
government  for  the  people  fired  the  ardent  spirits  of  many 
}'junger  men,  among  them  David  Lloyd  George  and  Winston 
Churchill,  who  infused  the  old  party  with  fresh  Hfe.  The  new 
Li])erals  reminded  the  workingmen  that  Joseph  Chamberlain, 
:;ince  his  alliance  with  the  Conservatives,  had  become  absorbed 
in  imperialistic  schemes  and  had  forgotten  his  former  zeal  for 
social  reform.  The  new  Liberals  were  becoming  the  party  of 
social  reform. 

This  new-born  determination  of  the  Liberals  to  improve  the 
economic  condition  of  the  lower  classes  made  possible 
an  alliance  with  the  Labor  party.    As  the  Liberals  and  victory 
were  already  allied  with  the  Irish  Nationalist  faction,  of  the  New 

-  Ill  •    •        r    1       1  Liberahsm 

they  now  commanded  a  large  majority  of  the  electo- 

*  For  a  treatment  of  the  Boer  War,  see  below,  pp.  651  f. 
VOL.  II  —  X 


3o6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


rate,  and  in  the  elections  of  1906  succeeded  in  marshaling  against 
the  Unionists  4,026,704  out  of  6,555,301  voters.    From  this 
overwhelming  victory  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of 

Liberal  i      tvt    •  i      t  -i       i         t  • 

Achieve-  the  Nations,  the  Liberal  coahtion  was  continuously 
^)o6-i9i4  office,  first  with  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman, 
then  with  Mr.  Herbert  Asquith  (1908),  as  premier. 
The  activities  of  these  nine  years  (1906-19 14)  may  be  summed 
up  under  five  heads. 

(1)  Fiscal.  The  Liberals  maintained  free  trade,  repealed 
some  of  the  taxes  left  over  from  the  Boer  War,  and  effected  some 
economies.  But  for  naval  increases  and  for  social  reforms,  larger 
revenues  were  needed.  These  David  Lloyd  George,  chancellor 
of  the  exchequer,  proposed  in  his  famous  budget  of  1909  to  find 
by  a  graduated  income  tax ;  ^  an  inheritance  tax ;  taxes  on  the 
unearned  increment  of  land- values,  on  undeveloped  land,  on 
motor  cars,  motor  cycles,  and  gasoline ;  stamp-taxes,  licenses, 
and  excise  taxes  on  beer,  spirits,  and  tobacco.  This  budget 
had  the  threefold  effect  of  providing  ample  revenues,  of  attack- 
ing landlordism,  and  of  shifting  part  of  the  tax-burden  to  the 
shoulders  of  those  best  able  to  bear  it  —  the  rich. 

(2)  Non-Conformist.  Inasmuch  as  no  small  portion  of  the 
Liberal  party  is  made  up  of  the  Non-Conformists  of  England, 
and  especially  of  Scotland  and  Wales,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  Liberal  program  should  have  given  evidence  of  Non-Con- 
formist interests.  As  the  Non- Conformist  sects  had  found  it 
difficult  to  estabhsh  denominational  schools  of  their  own,  the 
Liberals  advocated  the  estabhshment  of  state  lay  schools,  in 
which  no  rehgion  should  be  taught.  The  Non-Conformist  con- 
science also  demanded  regulation  of  the  liquor  traffic.  These 
two  measures  were  vetoed  by  the  Lords.  A  third  bill  to  dis- 
establish the  Anglican  Church  in  Wales,  where  most  of  the 
population  is  Non-Conformist,  was  carried  over  the  Lords'  veto 
(1914)  by  means  of  the  Parliament  Act. 

(3)  Democratic.  In  the  interests  of  political  democracy,  the 
Liberals  passed  (191 1)  the  Parhament  Act,  of  which  we  have 
already  made  sufficient  mention.  Their  bill  to  abolish  plural 
voting,  twice  carried  through  the  House  of  Commons  (1913, 1914), 
was  both  times  rejected  by  the  Lords.    For  a  sorely  needed 

^  I.e.,  large  incomes  were  taxed  at  a  higher  rate  per  cent  than  small  incomes. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  307 


redistribution  of  Parliamentary  representation,  the  Liberals 
showed  no  enthusiasm.  On  the  question  of  extending  the 
suffrage  to  women,  the  Liberals  were  divided,  and  since  the 
Asquith  cabinet  refused  to  make  woman  suffrage  a  government 
measure,  the  "suffragettes"  manifested  their  furious  displeasure 
by  repeated  remonstrances,  by  breaking  windows,  by  dropping 
acid  in  mail  boxes,  and  by  placing  bombs  in  churches. 

(4)  Irish.  To  satisfy  their  Irish  NationaKst  allies,  the  Liberals 
passed  a  Home  Rule  Bill,  with  which  we  shall  deal  in  a  following 
section. 

(5)  Social.  Finally,  the  Liberal  government  enacted  a  num- 
ber of  benevolent  and  far-sighted  laws  in  an  attempt  to  bring 
about  ''that  good  time  when  poverty  and  wretchedness  and 
human  degradation  which  always  follows  in  its  camp  will  be  as 
remote  to  the  people  of  this  country  as  the  wolves  which  once 
infested  its  forests." 

It  is  worth  while  noting  that  the  dependence  of  the  Liberals 
upon  their  Laborite  allies  tended  to  accelerate  the  work  of  social 
reform  just  as  the  Liberal  dependence  upon  the  Nationalist 
group  redoubled  the  government's  efforts  to  enact  the 
Home  Rule  Bill.    Although  theoretically  the  two-  pact  and 
party  system  still  prevailed  in  British  poKtics,  in  fact  the  Two- 
there  were  in  191 3  at  least  four  important  parties  :  the  j^eory 
Unionists  with  281  members,  the  Liberals  with  265,  the 
Laborites  with  40,  and  the  Irish  Nationalists  with  84.  Mani- 
festly, the  Liberal  government  was  supported  not  by  the  largest 
party,  but  by  a  coalition  of  three  more  or  less  harmonious  parties. 
This  multiplication  of  parties,  the  essence  of  the  so-called  "group" 
system,  although  usually  regarded  as  characteristic  of  Conti- 
nental rather  than  Anglo-Saxon  governments,  has  in  practice 
become  a  feature  of  British  poUtics. 


BRITISH  SOCIAL  LEGISLATION 

The  fifth  category  of  Liberal  activities  —  social  legislation  — 
is  worthy  of  closer  examination ;  for  it  exemplified  in  striking 
manner  how  political  democracy  might  serve  social  The  Social 
needs.    By  successive  political  reforms,  the  British  Problem 
government  had  come  more  and  more  to  represent  the  interests 


3o8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE, 


of  the  common  people,  and  the  democratic  state  was  bound 
sooner  or  later  to  attack  the  problems  which  weighed  most 
heavily  upon  the  common  people.  These  problems  might  be 
summed  up  under  two  heads.  In  the  first  place,  the  factories, 
mines,  railways,  and  shops  were  owned  by  private  capitalists 
who  enjoyed  superabundant  wealth  and  leisure;  while  their 
employees — including  most  of  the  men  in  the  realm,  many  of 
the  women,  and  some  of  the  young  boys  and  girls  —  had  neither 
hours  enough  for  rest,  wages  enough  to  buy  satisfying  food, 
security  of  employment,  nor  decent  homes  in  which  to  bring  up 
their  children.  The  life  of  the  workingman  was  one  constant 
battle  with  starvation,  vice,  and  disease.  Secondly,  the  land 
was  owned  mostly  by  a  few  thousand  great  landlords,^  as  in 
feudal  days,  who  without  toil  or  merit  of  their  own  were  entitled 
to  collect  millions  of  dollars  annually  in  rent.  In  the  cities 
this  meant  that  grasping  landlords  were  exacting  heavy  toll  on 
the  wages  of  the  workingman  and  the  profits  of  the  shopkeeper. 
In  the  country  it  meant  that  the  majority  of  agricultural  workers, 
instead  of  being  prosperous  yeomen,  were  miserable  hirelings 
laboring  for  pittances  on  rich  men's  farms. 

A  drastic  remedy  for  these  maladies  of  society  was  prescribed 
by  Mr.  Keir  Hardie  and  other  SociaHsts.  They  maintained  that 
General  land,  factories,  mines,  and  railways  were  of  vital  im- 
Nature  of  portance  to  the  whole  people ;  that  such  public  utili- 
Sofutiols^of  ^i^^  should  not  be  exploited  for  profit  by  private 
the  Prob-  capitalists  ;  that  the  common  people  would  continue 
to  suffer  from  injustice,  greed,  dishonesty,  and  ineffi- 
ciency, so  long  as  factories,  mines,  land,  and  railways  continued 
to  be  controlled  and  owned  by  selfish  individuals  instead  of 
by  the  state.  The  Liberals,  and  even  some  of  the  Laborites, 
were  unwilKng  to  go  to  the  full  length  of  public  ownership  of 
public  utilities ;  but  in  devising  less  radical  remedies  to  meet 
immediate  needs,  the  Liberal-Labor  coalition  was  quite  wilHng 
to  adopt  many  of  the  reforms  which  the  SociaHsts  had  long 
advocated.  These  reforms  attacked  the  industrial  and  agrarian 
problems  from  three  angles  :  (i)  they  would  shield  the  poor  from 
disease,  overwork,  poverty,  and  accident ;  (2)  they  would  en- 
courage education  and  trade-unionism  as  means  whereby  the 

^  Fewer  than  5000  persons  owned  half  of  Great  Britain. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  309 


workingman  might  help  himself ;  (3)  they  would  tend  to  equahze 
wealth  by  imposing  heavier  burdens  upon  ''swollen"  and  un- 
earned fortunes. 

In  the  first  department  of  social  reform,  the  protection  of  the 
poorer  classes,  the  most  obvious  and  worst-needed  measures 
had  been  enacted  before  the  accession  of  Mr.  Asquith,  Factory  and 
—  measures  insuring  sanitary  conditions  in  factories,  ^"^^s  Acts 
preventing  the  labor  of  young  children,  and  limiting  the  labor  of 
women  in  factory,  mine,  and  shop.  There  had  been  much  opposi- 
tion to  overcome,  however.  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century  the  owners  of  factories,  mines,  and  shops  were  firmly 
convinced  that  the  government  had  no  right  to  interfere  wdth  a 
man's  private  business,  and  they  strenuously  resisted  govern- 
mental regulation  of  industrial  conditions.  Because  the  busi- 
ness men  insisted  upon  ''industrial  liberty,"  little  could  be  done 
to  reheve  the  cruel  conditions  in  mine  and  in  factory.  The  first 
attempts  to  cope  with  the  situation  were  inadequate.  We  read 
with  amazement,  for  example,  that  it  was  necessary  to  pass  a 
special  act  (the  Act  of  1819)  just  to  declare  that  children  under 
nine  years  of  age  should  not  be  compelled  to  work  more  than 
twelve  hours  a  day  in  cotton  mills.  Even  by  the  Factory  Act  of 
1844,  grown  women  were  allowed  to  work  twelve  hours  every 
day,  and  children  twelve  hours  on  alternate  days  or  six  hours 
every  day,  and  this  act  made  no  attempt  to  deal  with  any  but 
textile  factories.  In  1847  the  working  day  in  textile  mills  was  cut 
down  from  twelve  to  ten  hours.  During  the  'sixties  the  workers 
in  other  industries  than  textile  were  given  the  benefit  of  similar 
regulations.  In  1874  children  under  ten  years  of  age  were 
legally  prohibited  from  working  in  textile  factories.  These  and 
other  haphazard  regulations,  together  with  provisions  for  the 
inspection  and  sanitation  of  factories,  were  codified  by  the  great 
Consolidating  Act  of  1878.  A  second  revision  and  codification 
took  place  in  1901,  when  the  minimum  age  of  child-workers  was 
raised  to  twelve  years,  elaborate  provisions  were  designed  to 
secure  sanitary  working-conditions,  and  careful  inspection  was 
organized. 

In  the  coal-mines,  conditions  were  at  the  outset  even  worse 
than  in  factories  and  relief  equally  slow.  Not  until  1842  were 
women,  girls,  and  boys  under  ten  years  of  age  excluded  from  the 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


mines,  where  they  had  hitherto  worked  with  the  men,  half- 
naked,  struggUng  along  in  the  dark  damp  underground  passages, 
dragging  bags  of  coal  or  puUing  carts  of  ore.  The  great  event  in 
the  history  of  mining  was  the  preparation  of  a  code  of  mines 
regulations  in  1872,  by  which  women,  girls,  and  boys  under  12 
years  were  excluded  from  underground  labor.  Mine-owners 
were  compelled  to  take  reasonable  precautions  for  the  safety  of 
their  employees. 

The  purpose  of  factory  and  mine  acts  passed  between  18 19  and 
1 901  had  been  to  insure  safe  and  healthful  conditions  in  mines  and 
Sweated  mills,  also  to  prevent  the  employment  of  women  and 
Labor  children,  which  was  breaking  up  the  home  and  ruining 
the  health  of  the  following  generation.  In  1909,  however,  the 
Liberal  government  struck  out  in  a  new  direction  by  asserting 
the  right  of  the  state  to  regulate  wages,  in  addition  to  super- 
vising the  conditions  and  hours  of  labor.  The  new  principle 
was  incorporated  in  the  Trade  Boards  Act  of  1909,  which  estab- 
lished wages  boards  —  composed  of  representatives  of  employers 
and  employed  in  equal  numbers  —  to  fix  the  minimum  wage 
which  should  be  paid  to  workers  in  the  so-called  ''sweated  trades," 
viz.  tailoring,  cardboard  box-making,  machine-made  lace-making 
and  finishing,  and  ready-made  blouse-making.  This  was  con- 
fessedly an  exceptional  measure  to  cope  with  the  evils  of  sweated 
labor.  For  in  the  sweated  trades,  the  workers  were  particularly 
defenseless,  being  compelled  to  work  irregularly,  at  home  or  else 
in  overcrowded,  foul-smelling  rooms  (''sweat-shops"),  at  ex- 
tremely low  wages. 

The  principle  of  governmental  regulation  of  wages,  as  intro- 
duced for  the  benefit  of  sweated  laborers,  was  destined  three 
.     years  later  to  receive  an  important  and  somewhat 

The  Mini-  ,        , .      .  i  i  • 

mum  Wage  Unexpected  application.  In  191 2  the  coal-mmers  went 
for  Miners,  strike  as  a  result  of  a  dispute  about  wages. 

More  than  a  million  miners  ceased  work,  and  by  stop- 
ping the  supply  of  coal  they  threatened  to  paralyze  the  business 
world.  In  order  to  avert  such  a  disaster,  Mr.  Asquith  hurriedly 
induced  ParKament  to  enact  a  Minimum  Wage  Bill  which  would 
concede  the  main  principle,  if  not  the  exact  details,  of  the  miners' 
demands.  The  miners  contended  that  every  adult  miner  should 
receive  a  minimum  wage  of  at  least  $s.  a  day  ($1.25)  for  his 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  311 


labor  and  each  boy  of  14  years  2s.  a  day.  Instead  of  establishing 
the  fixed  rate  of  55.  a  day  for  the  entire  kingdom,  the  govern- 
ment's bill  provided  that  the  exact  figure  of  the  minimum  wage 
should  be  determined  separately  in  each  district  by  a  local 
board.  But  the  principle  that  the  government  may  establish  a 
minimum  wage  by  law  was  firmly  estabHshed. 

The  Minimum  Wage  Act  was  hailed  by  Socialists  as  a  joyous 
harbinger  of  future  triumph,  foreshadowing  the  happy  day  when 
the  government  would  insure  to  every  citizen  a  full  justice  and 
and  fair  return  for  his  labor.  But  the  Act  of  191 2  the  Mini- 
contemplated  no  such  revolutionary  purpose  :  it  pro- 
posed  to  establish  not  a  fair  wage,  but  simply  a  minimum  wage. 
The  distinction  is  important.  It  is  the  same  distinction  which 
ran  through  all  the  social  legislation  of  the  Liberal  government. 
It  is  the  distinction  between  abstract  justice  and  practical 
benevolence.  The  Liberals  were  not  so  much  concerned  about 
apportioning  to  every  man  what  is  justly  his,  as  they  were  intent 
upon  guaranteeing  to  every  man  at  least  a  certain  minimum  of 
health,  wealth,  and  happiness.  Even  the  poorest  and  most 
unfortunate  pauper  must  not  be  allowed  to  sink  below  a  certain 
level  of  comfort  and  civilization.  To  bring  up  the  straggling 
rear-guard  of  civilization  is  the  ideal  of  the  new  Liberals,  and  of 
their  laws. 

The  statesmanlike  altruism  of  Liberals  like  Lloyd  George 
and  Winston  Churchill  may  sometimes  work  in  harmony  with 
the  less  lofty  motives  of  calculating  business  men.  Altruism 
Many  employers  of  labor  have  recently  come  to  the  and 
conclusion  that  in  the  long  run  it  pays  to  have  work- 
ingmen  clean,  intelligent,  well-fed,  well-housed,  comfortably 
clad,  and  self-respecting.    What  is  lost  in  higher  wages  and  addi- 
tional expenses  may  be  gained  in  the  increased  efficiency,  energy, 
and  honesty  of  the  workers.    This  at  least  is  the  argument  which 
has  persuaded  many  capitalists  to  abandon  their  former  opposi- 
tion and  actually  to  encourage  the  enactment  of  social  legislation. 
Thus  altruism  and  efficiency  go  hand  in  hand. 

Altruistic  reformers  had  much  to  do  besides  regulating  the 
conditions,  hours,  and  wages  of  labor.  None  of  the  above- 
mentioned  measures  relieved  what  was  probably  the  most  acute 
suffering  of  all  —  the  suffering  of  the  poor  who  were  unable  to 


312 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


work,  the  sick  and  disabled,  the  children,  the  old  people,  and 
those  who  could  not  find  employment.    For  the  benefit  of  these 
. .         the  Liberal  government  devised  a  series  of  benevolent 

Working-  °  .111 

men's  Com-  laws.  First  of  all  was  Considered  the  case  of  those  un- 
1897^1906  fortunate  workmen  who,  being  accidentally  injured, 
were  disabled  from  earning  a  living.  Every  month  400 
workpeople  were  being  killed,  so  it  was  asserted,  and  7000  injured 
in  one  way  or  another :  sometimes  through  their  own  fault, 
sometimes  through  the  neglect  of  the  employer  to  establish 
proper  safeguards,  sometimes  through  inevitable  accidents,  as 
in  mining.  In  any  case  the  result  was  grief  and  destitution 
for  the  family  of  the  unhappy  workman.  And  in  any  case  the 
government  resolved  that  the  workman,  or  his  bereaved  family, 
should  receive  compensation  sufficient  to  prevent  starvation. 
The  principle  of  workmen's  compensation  for  accident  had 
already  been  appHed  to  a  few  trades  by  an  Act  of  1897, 
agricultural  laborers  in  1900;  in  1906  the  Liberal  ParHament 
extended  compensation  to  almost  all  industries.  By  the  Act 
of  1906  the  workman  received  from  his  employer  a  sum  not 
exceeding  $5.00  a  week  in  case  he  was  disabled  by  accident; 
in  case  of  mortal  injury  the  family  of  the  workman  received  a 
lump  sum  of  from  $750  to  $1500.  It  is  an  interesting  fact  that 
in  the  23  years  from  1884  to  1907,  twenty  other  countries  adopted 
similar  measures  for  the  compensation  of  workmen. 

The  protection  of  those  who  were  either  too  young  or  too 
aged  to  help  themselves  was  also  attempted  by  the  Asquith 
Child  ministry.  School-teachers  had  reported  that  many 
Welfare,      poor  children  came  to  school  without  sufficient  food ; 

the  Education  Act  of  1906  made  it  possible  to  provide 
such  children  with  free  meals.  Subsequent  acts  provided  play 
centers  and  free  medical  inspection  for  the  children,  and  at- 
tempted to  provide  proper  medical  care  for  infants.  The 
Children  Act  of  1908  contained  a  host  of  provisions,  deaHng  with 
every  phase  of  child  fife,  from  the  protection  of  infant  children, 
the  prevention  of  burns,  the  correction  of  juvenile  criminals, 
and  the  treatment  of  children  in  industrial  schools,  to  the  pro- 
hibition of  juvenile  smoking. 

The  problem  of  the  aged  and  infirm  was  next  attacked.  Under 
the  Poor  Law  of  1834,  poor  people  too  old  or  too  feeble  to  sup- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  313 


port  themselves  had  usually  been  taken  away  from  home  and 
friends  and  sent  to  one  of  those  grim  workhouses  —  the  last  re- 
sort of  the  poor  —  more  Hke  prisons  than  houses  of  qm  Age 
charity.    Various  alterations  of  the  workhouse  system  Pensions, 
were  made  from  time  to  time  as  the  century  wore 
on,  but  the  question  was  not  settled.    In  1906,  however,  the 
Labor  members  in  Parhament  asked  that  the  state  should  provide 
pensions  for  all  old  people  whose  incomes  were  insufficient  for 
their  support,  just  as  it  provided  pensions  for  soldiers.  The 
Ministry,  approving  the  idea,  in  1908  introduced  a  bill  which 
guaranteed  to  every  person  over  seventy  years  of  age,  whose 
annual  income  failed  to  exceed  $105,  a  weekly  pension  of  $1.25. 
In  1913  almost  a  million  old  people  were  receiving  pensions. 

In  the  following  year,  ParHament  took  up  the  question  of  the 
unemployed.    Always  there  were  in  London,  and  in  every  large 
city,  thousands  of  able-bodied  men,  starving  and  with- 
out work,  many  of  them  through  no  fault  of  their  own.  employed: 
A  panic  in  some  distant  stock  market,  the  failure  of  the  the  Labor 
American  cotton  crop,  or  a  falling-off  in  the  demand  fct^ig^p^ 
for  cahcoes,  might  be  the  ultimate  cause  for  the  closing 
down  of  an  English  factory  and  so  throw  a  thousand  English 
laborers  out  of  work ;  other  thousands  were  left  stranded  by 
the  fluctuations  of  the  ice-business,  or  the  coal  traffic,  or  the 
building  trades.    Whatever  the  cause,  it  was  a  great  pity  that 
the  workman  should  be  left  destitute,  simply  because  he  could 
find  no  work  to  do.    By  an  act  of  1909,  accordingly,  the  govern- 
ment created  a  system'  of  government  employment-bureaus,  or 
labor  exchanges,  to  inform  unemployed  workmen  where  there 
was  work  to  be  had,  and,  if  necessary,  to  pay  the  workman's 
carfare  to  the  place  where  work  was  offered.    It  did  not  guarantee 
employment  to  every  vrorkman,  but  it  enormously  assisted  the 
idle  to  find  work. 

The  labor  exchanges  by  no  means  ended  all  unemployment, 
and  the  problem  of  providing  for  unemployed  workmen  remained 
to  be  solved.    In  191 1  David  Lloyd  George  proposed  N^jonai 
the  government's  partial  solution  :  the  National  Insur-  insurance 
ance  Bill.    The  Bill,  enacted  as  the  National  Insur- 
ance  Act,  had  two  main  provisions.    One  was  that  workmen 
should  pay  2^(1.  per  week,  to  which  the  employers  and  state 


314 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


w^ould  add,  as  insurance  against  unemployment.  The  workman 
would  then  be  entitled,  if  thrown  out  of  work,  to  receive  65.  or 
75.  a  week.  This  applied  only  to  the  engineering  and  building 
trades,  including  some  2,300,000  men.  The  other  and  more 
important  section  of  the  bill  aimed  ''to  provide  for  Insurance 
against  loss  of  Health  and  for  the  Prevention  and  Cure  of  Sick- 
ness." It  affected  almost  fifteen  millions  of  workers  directly, 
and  indirectly  millions  more.  By  this  law,  the  wage-earner  was 
compelled  to  insure  himself  against  sickness,  by  paying  from 
id.  to  4d.  a  week,  to  which  the  employer  added  3^/.,  and  the  state 
2d.  In  return  the  workman  would  receive  free  medical  attend- 
ance, free  treatment  at  hospitals,  and  weekly  allowances  while 
sick.  Approved  insurance  companies  and  benefit  societies  already 
in  existence  were  allowed  and  encouraged  to  act  as  the  machinery 
for  the  National  Insurance  scheme,  although  the  state  itself 
would  provide  for  those  who  preferred  to  insure  themselves 
through  the  post  office  rather  than  through  a  society.  The 
results  of  National  Insurance  are  not  yet  fully  apparent,  but  it 
appears  not  unlikely  that  the  provision  for  medical  attendance 
will  materially  diminish  the  prevalence  of  sickness  and  disease 
and  enormously  relieve  suffering. 

All  the  measures  thus  far  described  represent  in  one  way  or 
another  the  Liberal  government's  benevolent  desire  to  protect 
Education  ^^^^  i^om  overwork,  disease,  poverty,  and  accident. 

The  second  phase  of  social  reform  is  that  of  encourag- 
ing the  poor  to  help  themselves,  and  it  is  done  chiefly  in  two  ways, 
—  by  the  provision  of  education  and  by  the  encouragement  of 
trade-unionism.  As  late  as  1870  almost  half  the  children  had  no 
regular  schooling;  there  was  no  system  of  free,  compulsory 
education;  and  the  establishment  of  schools  was  left  by  the 
government  to  the  Church  of  England  or  to  voluntary  societies. 
The  progress  of  education  was  hindered  then,  as  now,  by  the 
fact  that  there  were  in  England  a  multiplicity  of  religious  sects, 
some  of  which  demanded  that  religion  should  be  taught  in  the 
schools,  some  that  education  should  be  non-sectarian.  To  meet 
this  embarrassing  situation,  the  Education  Act  of  1870  provided 
that,  while  ''voluntary"  or  church  schools  giving  religious  in- 
struction should  receive  financial  aid  from  the  government, 
there  were  also  to  be  established  —  wherever  the  need  was  clear 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  315 


—  non-sectarian  Board  Schools/'  in  which  no  denominational 
religious  teaching  should  be  allowed.  These  Board  Schools 
would  be  supported  partly  by  parents'  fees,  partly  by  local 
rates  (taxes),  and  partly  by  government  subsidies.  Since  1870 
the  extent  and  cost  of  education  has  been  enormously  expanded, 
so  that  in  191 3  the  amount  expended  on  education  from  local 
taxes  and  government  funds  exceeded  £30,000,000  ($150,000,000), 
and  there  were  in  191 3  more  than  6,500,000  children  attending 
school.  A  large  number  of  schools  still  remained  under  the 
control  of  reHgious  denominations,  while  receiving  generous 
monetary  grants  from  the  government.  Inasmuch  as  the  great 
majority  of  these  were  schools  of  the  Anglican  Church,  the  Dis- 
senters continued  to  protest ;  and  the  Liberal  party,  representing 
the  Dissenters,  attempted  to  remove  public  education  from 
denominational  control  by  a  bill  of  1906.  The  bill  was  thrown 
out  by  the  Lords,  however,  and  the  intention  of  the  Liberals  to 
create  a  system  of  universal,  public,  non-sectarian,  elementary 
education  remained  unfulfilled.  Although  it  failed  in  this 
respect,  the  Liberal  government  did  make  a  real  contribution  to 
education  by  providing  meals  for  poor  students,  by  estabHshing 
industrial  schools,  and  by  enforcing  medical  and  sanitary  regula- 
tions to  improve  the  health  of  school  children. 

We  can  hardly  exaggerate  the  importance  of  this  expansion 
of  education  in  enabling  the  lower  classes  to  play  a  more  impor- 
tant and  intelligent  role  in  society.  For  the  laboring  man  who 
can  read  in  the  newspapers  what  Parliament  is  doing  to  help  or 
injure  him,  and  can  read  in  pamphlets  new  doctrines  of  social 
and  economic  democracy,  is  more  and  more  inclined  to  demand 
larger  consideration  in  politics. 

Even  more  important  in  training  the  workingmen  to  look  out 
for  their  own  interests  has  been  the  development  of  trade-union- 
ism. The  movement,  as  we  have  stated  in  another  Trade- 
connection,  had  gathered  headway  in  the  first  two-  Unionism 
thirds  of  the  nineteenth  century  despite  serious  legal  hindrances. 
To  remove  these  checks,  the  trade-unionists  had  inaugurated  a 
poHtical  movement,  had  obtained  the  vote  (1867),  and  by  Acts  of 
1871-1876  had  obtained  recognition  as  legal  associations.  The 
trade  unions,  annually  assembling  in  Trade  Union  Congresses 
to  discuss  the  problems  of  laboring  men,  and  since  1899  united 


3i6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


in  a  General  Federation  of  Trade  Unions,  rapidly  became  a 
powerful  factor  in  industrial  and  political  life.  Alarmed  by  their 
activity,  the  House  of  Lords  in  1901  handed  down  the  famous 
Taff  Vale  decision,  whereby  employers  were  able  to  exact  damage- 
compensation  from  trade  unions  in  consequence  of  strikes.  That 
year  the  number  of  industrial  disputes  (strikes  and  lockouts)  fell 
off  from  642  to  442.  It  was  for  this  reason  that  the  resentful 
trade  unions  so  strongly  supported  the  Labor  party,  and  it  was 
to  pacify  them  that  the  Liberal  government  in  1906  passed  its 
Trade  Disputes  Act,  which  safeguarded  the  funds  of  trade  unions 
from  suits  for  damages,  and  permitted  trade-union  ''pickets"  to 
use  ''peaceful  persuasion"  in  endeavors  to  induce  their  fellow- 
workmen  to  strike  with  them.  Again  in  1909  the  House  of  Lords 
attempted  to  circumscribe  trade-union  activities  by  making  it 
illegal  for  trade  unions  to  collect  compulsory  contributions  for 
the  support  of  the  labor  members  in  ParHament.  And  again  the 
trade  unions  triumphed,  in  191 1  securing  the  payment  of  all  mem- 
bers of  the  House  of  Commons  and  in  191 3  the  right  to  use  trade- 
union  funds  for  poHtical  purposes,  although  the  members  of  the 
union  might  not  be  compelled  to  contribute  to  the  "political 
fund"  of  the  trade  union. 

The  Liberal  government  has  thus  removed  the  most  serious 
obstructions  to  trade-union  activity,  political  and  industrial. 
Moreover,  since  the  government  has  entered  the  field  to  assist  in 
bearing  what  once  were  the  heaviest  burdens  of  the  trade  union, 
—  the  support  of  the  sick,  aged,  and  unemployed,  —  the  trade 
unions  have  been  able  to  devote  their  resources  more  effectively 
than  ever  before  to  the  struggle  for  the  rights  of  labor,  for  higher 
wages,  for  shorter  hours.  The  struggle  has  been  waged  unceas- 
ingly in  the  industrial  world  by  means  of  the  strike,  and  in  the 
Parliamentary  world  by  means  of  the  ballot.  To  the  trade-union 
movement  above  all  things  else  the  workingman  owes  his  in- 
creased comfort  and  independence,  his  influence  upon  poKtics, 
and  his  training  in  democratic  self-government. 

Finally,  we  come  to  the  third  department  of  social  reform, 
Taxation  of  the  attack  on  arbitrary  privilege  and  unearned  wealth, 
the  Rich  jj^  order  to  defray  the  enormous  expense  of  old-age  pen- 
sions, of  national  insurance,  of  pubHc  education,  of  naval  arma- 
ment, the  government  had  to  find  new  sources  of  revenue.  How 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  317 


Lloyd  George's  budgets  have  imposed  increasing  burdens  upon 
large  incomes,  inheritances,  and  luxuries,  we  have  already  set 
forth;  it  is  here  necessary  only  to  recall  the  fact.  But  his 
attack  on  the  unearned  revenues  and  privileges  of  the  landlord 
class  deserve  more  than  passing  attention. 

To  the  minds  of  David  Lloyd  George  and  his  colleagues  it 
seemed  absurd  and  iniquitous  that  ten  men  should  own  a  quarter 
of  the  city  of  London,  that  landlord  peers  should  pos-  The  Land 
sess  whole  villages ;  that  the  landlords  should  have  Problem 
the  legal  power  at  will  to  tear  down  cottages  or  dispossess  indus- 
trious tenant-farmers  or  turn  farm  land  into  wilderness ;  that  in 
the  last  half-century  the  rural  population  should  have  fallen  o£f 
by  600,000  while  in  the  last  sixty  years  the  gamekeepers  increased 
from  9000  to  23,000;  that  over  60  per  cent  of  the  adult  agricul- 
tural laborers  should  be  receiving  less  than  iSs.  ($4.50)  a  week 
while  rents  still  soared ;  that  wealthy  landlords  should  be  allowed 
to  exact  rent  for  thousands  upon  thousands  of  miserable  cottages 
and  tenements  unfit  for  human  habitation.  The  Liberals,  there- 
fore, set  themselves  to  remedy  these  evils. 

Faint-hearted  beginnings  had  already  been  made,  even  before 
Mr.  David  Lloyd  George,  the  most  eloquent  advocate  of  land 
reform,  set  his  hand  to  the  task.  In  Ireland  the  government  had 
stepped  in  to  cut  down  exorbitant  rents,  to  protect  the  tenants, 
to  lend  peasants  money  from  the  pubHc  treasury  to  purchase  their 
holdings  outright.  Land  legislation  in  England,  however,  had 
lagged  behind.  The  first  important  step  was  the  appointment 
of  a  commission  (1884)  to  investigate  the  problem.  In  reporting 
to  Parliament,  the  commission  made  it  clear  that  pauperism, 
drunkenness,  disease,  physical  degeneration,  excessive  death-rates, 
and  crime  were  in  no  small  part  traceable  to  the  insanitary  and 
overcrowded  tenements  in  which  the  poor  in  town  and  country 
were  forced  to  live.  Consequently  an  act  was  passed  in  1890  for 
the  housing  of  the  working  classes.  This,  with  the  more 
important  Housing  and  Town  Planning  Act  (1909),  passed  nine- 
teen years  later  by  the  Asquith  ministry,  enabled  local  authori- 
ties (county  councils)  to  close  up  the  damp  cellars  and  tear  down 
the  airless  tenements  in  which  miserable  families  were  living, 
and,  if  necessary,  to  purchase  from  landlords  land  on  which  to 
erect  Hght,  clean,  and  airy  tenements  for  the  poor.    As  a  result,  — 


3i8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


prior  to  1914,  —  56,318  dwelling  houses  were  condemned  as  unfit 
for  human  habitation ;  county  and  borough  councils  purchased 
possibly  200,000  acres  of  land  ;  in  London,  for  example,  a  hundred 
thousand  tenants  were  living  in  sanitary  dwellings  erected  and 
owned  by  pubHc  authorities ;  and  scores  of  towns  adopted  definite 
plans  for  the  future  beautification  and  deliberate  development  of 
playgrounds  and  parks.  In  the  Small  Holdings  and  Allotments 
Act  (1907)  the  Liberals  made  a  beginning  in  the  direction  of 
''giving  every  laborer  a  garden  patch."  In  his  famous  budget  of 
1909,  David  Lloyd  George  gave  notice  that  henceforth  the 
burden  of  taxation  would  fall  ever  more  heavily  upon  the  land- 
lords. The  same  year  witnessed  an  act  for  the  development  of 
rural  roads  and  forests,  and  the*  beginning  of  a  five-year  census 
or  survey  of  everything  concerning  land-ownership  —  a  modem 
parallel  of  William  the  Conqueror's  eleventh-century  Domesday 
Book.  These  were  but  the  opening  skirmishes  in  the  battle 
which  Lloyd  George  began  in  the  winter  of  1913-1914= 

In  a  series  of  stirring  speeches  that  winter,  the  chancellor  of 
the  exchequer  expounded  the  government's  program  of  land 
Lloyd  reform.  For  the  supervision  of  land  reforms,  a  new 
George's  administrative  department,  the  ministry  of  lands,  was 
Lan?Re-*^^  to  be  Created.  Commissioners  acting  under  the  min- 
form,  1913-  ister  of  lands  would  be  endowed  with  large  powers : 
1914  They  would  protect  the  tenant  against  arbitrary 

eviction  and  unfair  rent.  (2)  They  would  regulate  the  hours  of 
farm-labor,  and  work  towards  the  establishment  of  a  minimum 
wage  for  agricultural  laborers.  (3)  The  "game  nuisance,"  the 
ruining  of  crops  by  deer  and  the  inclusion  of  agricultural  land 
in  the  useless  deer  parks  of  the  nobility,  was  to  be  restricted. 
(4)  The  millions  of  acres  of  land  now  lying  waste  would  be 
reclaimed  and  afforested,  —  at  least  in  part.  (5)  The  provision 
of  healthful  houses  and  garden  patches  for  the  working  classes 
would  be  pushed  forward  under  national,  rather  than  local, 
auspices.  (6)  Finally,  the  value  of  land  would  be  accurately  and 
equitably  estimated,  both  for  the  purpose  of  regulating  the  selhng 
price  of  real  estate,  and  as  a  basis  of  future  taxes  and  land 
reforms. 

When  in  August,  1914,  Great  Britain  was  drawn  into  the 
great  European  war,  forgetting  all  else  in  the  mad  conflict  of 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  319 


arms,  Lloyd  George's  promise  of  land  reform  was  as  yet  unful- 
filled. Possibly  future  historians  will  write  that  the  first  period 
of  Liberal  land  reform,  as  well  as  Liberal  social  and  industrial 
legislation,  was  abruptly  terminated  by  the  disastrous  War  of  the 
Nations.  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  foresee  what  the  future 
holds  in  store,  but  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  ringing  words 
of  David  Lloyd  George  will  be  entirely  forgotten : 

"You  have  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  —  working  unceasingly  for 
wages  that  barely  bring  them  enough  bread  to  keep  themselves  and  their 
families  above  privation.  Generation  after  generation  they  see  their  chil- 
dren wither  before  their  eyes  for  lack  of  air,  light,  and  space,  which  is  denied 
them  by  men  who  have  square  miles  of  it  for  their  own  use.  Take  our 
cities,  the  great  cities  of  a  great  Empire.  Right  in  the  heart  of  them 
everywhere  you  have  ugly  quagmires  of  human  misery,  seething,  rotting, 
at  last  fermenting.  We  pass  them  by  every  day  on  our  way  to  our  com- 
fortable homes.  We  forget  that  divine  justice  never  passed  by  a  great 
wrong.  You  can  hear,  carried  by  the  breezes  from  the  north,  the  south, 
the  east,  and  the  west,  ominous  rumbling.  The  chariots  of  retribution 
are  drawing  nigh.  How  long  will  all  these  injustices  last  for  myriads  of 
men,  women,  and  children  created  in  the  image  of  God  —  how  long  ?  I 
believe  it  is  coming  to  an  end." 


THE  IRISH  QUESTION 

As  the  preceding  section  explained  the  cooperation  of  the 
Liberals  with  the  smaller  Laborite  party  to  effect  social  reforms, 
so  the  present  section  is  devoted  to  the  alliance  of  the  ^,  , 

.  .  .  Gladstone  s 

Liberals  with  the  other  minor  Parliamentary  group,  —  Advocacy 
the  Irish  NationaHsts,  —  for  the  purpose  of  righting  ^^^J^^^^^ 
the  wrongs  of  Ireland.    The  Liberal-Irish  coalition 
first  came  to  the  fore  in  the  election  of  1868,  when  Gladstone 
seized  upon  the  need  of  reform  in  Ireland  as  a  most  efifective 
campaign  issue  upon  which  to  overthrow  Disraeli's  Conservative 
government.    From  that  day  to  this,  Irish  reform  has  figured 
prominently  in  the  platform  of  the  Liberal  party.    At  the  time  of 
Gladstone's  first  ministry  (i 868-1 874),  three  Irish  grievances 
—  religious,  agrarian,  and  nationalist  —  demanded  attention. 
How  each  of  these  grievances  arose,  what  Gladstone  did  to  redress 
it,  and  what  further  redress  has  since  been  obtained,  we  shall 
consider  separately. 


320 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


The  persecution  of  the  Roman  CathoHc  faith  in  Ireland  goes 
back  to  the  sixteenth  century,  when  Henry  VIII,  unable  to  make 
I  Ecciesi-  Irish  accept  Anglicanism,  suppressed  the  Irish 

asticai :  monasteries,  appropriated  the  churches,  established  an 
^/the^"^^^  Anglican  hierarchy  in  Ireland,  and  assumed  the  title 
Irish  ''king  of  Ireland."    Despite  bloody  strife  under 

Catholics  Queen  Elizabeth,  despite  Oliver  Cromwell's  deporta- 
tion of  Catholics  to  the  West  Indies  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
despite  cruel  coercive  laws  in  the  eighteenth  century,  three- 
quarters  of  the  Irish  population  remain  to  this  day  steadfastly 
Roman  Catholic ;  and  Protestantism  is  represented  only  by  the 
half  miUion  Protestant  Episcopahans  (of  the  so-called  Church 
of  Ireland),  and  a  somewhat  smaller  number  of  Presbyterians, 
who  are  descendants  respectively  of  English  and  Scotch  settlers. 
The  Protestants  are  congregated  chiefly  in  the  industrial  city  of 
Belfast,  and  the  surrounding  nine  counties  —  grouped  in  the 
province  of  Ulster.  Even  in  Ulster,  however,  there  are  almost  as 
many  Roman  Catholics  as  Protestants.  For  three  centuries  the 
Protestant  minority,  supported  by  British  arms,  imposed  upon 
the  Catholic  majority  the  most  crushing  legal  burdens ;  only  in 
the  nineteenth  century  has,  anything  like  religious  equality  been 
obtained. 

With  the  first  steps  towards  religious  liberty,  we  are  already 
famihar.^    The  Catholic  Emancipation  of  1829  removed  the 

political  disabilities  of  Roman  CathoKcs,  and  practical 
Ushmen^  of  freedom  of  worship  had  already  been  gained.  But  the 
the  Irish  Catholics  were  still  compelled  to  pay  tithes^  to  the 
1869^^'       Protestant  ''Church  of  Ireland"  for  the  support  of 

Protestant  clergymen,  many  of  whom  lived  in  England. 
Against  the  tithes  Daniel  O'Connell,  the  Irish  leader,  had  vainly 
directed  his  eloquence.  But  when  Gladstone  came  into  power  in 
1868,  after  an  especially  violent  outbreak  of  Irish  unrest,  he  pro- 
posed to  pacify  Ireland  by  removing  some  of  the  worst  grievances. 
"The  fulfillment  of  his  promise  was  the  disendowment  and  dis- 
establishment of  the  ''Church  of  Ireland."  Disestablishment 
meant  that  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  was  no  longer  the 
state  church  of  Ireland,  and  could  no  longer  collect  tithes.  It 

1  See  above,  pp.  103  f.  *  Commuted,  1838. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  321 

retained,  nevertheless,  the  use  of  its  churches  and  cathedrals, 
and  the  clergymen  affected  received  personal  compensation. 

The  ecclesiastical  question  was  thus  practically  settled,  and 
Gladstone  was  free  to  attack  the  even  more  pressing  agrarian 
problem.  Ireland's  once  promising  woolen  industry,  ^  Agrarian 
we  should  remember,  had  been  destroyed  by  English  Evils  and 
legislation,  and  Ireland's  native  population  reduced  to 
squalor  and  misery  by  the  Enghsh  landlords  who  owned  most  of 
the  island.  This  poverty-stricken  peasantry,  subsisting  mainly 
on  a  meager  but  cheap  diet  of  potatoes,^  suffered  periodically 
from  famine  —  as  in  1739  when  one  out  of  every  five  persons  is 
supposed  to  have  perished,  or  in  1846,  when  thousands  of  starving 
peasants  fell  dead  on  the  roads,  and  other  thousands  fled  to 
America,  so  that  the  population  fell  from  more  than  eight  milHons 
in  1845  to  six  and  a  half  millions  in  1851 .  The  landlords,  cheated 
of  their  rent  by  the  famine  of  1846,  then  evicted  their  poorer 
tenants  who,  in  case  of  another  famine,  would  be  unable  to  pay 
their  rents.  The  resentment  of  the  peasantry  fired  up  in  revolt 
in  1848,  but  without  effect.  In  1850  a  Tenant-Right  League  was 
formed  to  demand  the  "three  F's"  —  fair  rent,  fixity  of  tenure 
(which  meant  that  a  peasant  could  hold  his  land  as  long  as  he 
paid  rent),  and  free  sale  {i.e.,  the  right  of  a  peasant  to  sell  his 
tenancy).  These  rights,  thought  the  Leaguers,  would  insure  the 
tenant  against  arbitrary  eviction.  Nothing  was  acccomplished, 
however,  until  the  enactment  of  Gladstone's  Land  Act  of  1870, 
which  forbade  the  landlord  to  raise  rents  at  will,  or  arbitrarily 
to  evict  a  peasant  without  paying  for  whatever  improvements  the 
peasant  had  made.  The  Act  of  1870  was  ineffectual,  however, 
and  the  agitation  for  the  ''three  F's"  was  renewed  in  the  next 
decade  by  the  Land  League.  The  Irish  peasants  were  rapidly 
coming  to  the  conviction  that  the  agrarian  system  would  never 
be  reformed  unless  Ireland  could  gain  the  right  to  govern  itself, 
and  they,  therefore,  gave  hearty  support  to  a  political  move- 
ment for  Home  Rule.  In  vain  the  government  attempted  to 
suppress  the  movement.  The  situation  became  so  threatening 
that  Gladstone  attempted  to  pacify  the  peasantry  by  granting 
their  demands.  His  Second  Irish  Land  Act  (1881)  practically 
conceded  the  ''three  F's,"  establishing  a  Land  Court  to  fix  fair 

*  The  potato  was  introduced  into  Ireland  from  America. 
VOL.  n  — Y 


32  2  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

rents,  protecting  peasants  against  unjust  eviction,  and  allowing 
them  to  sell  their  holdings.  The  Land  Court  succeeded  in  re- 
ducing rents  by  a  quarter  but  did  not  give  permanent  satisfaction. 

The  great  Irish  agrarian  reform  was  not  the  work  of  Gladstone, 
but  of  the  Conservatives.  After  tentative  efforts  the  second 
The  Land  SaHsbury  ministry  in  1891  carried  a  general  Land 
Purchase  Purchase  Act,  under  which  a  tenant  was  enabled,  if 
Act,  1891  Y^iiiing,  to  purchase  his  holding  outright  from  the 
landlord  by  borrowing  from  the  government  a  sum  equal  to  the 
full  purchase  price.  For  five  years  the  peasant  would  pay  four 
and  three-quarters  per  cent  on  the  loan,  and  for  forty-four  y-ears 
four  per  cent ;  but  this  payment  amounted  to  much  less  than  his 
rent  had  been,  and  after  49  annual  payments  he  would  be  an 
independent  landowner.  Thousands  of  tenants  rushed  to  avail 
themselves  of  the  scheme,  and  the  foundations  of  a  more  pros- 
perous Ireland  were  firmly  laid.  Another  Land  Act  of  1896  still 
further  facilitated  the  creation  of  a  free  Irish  peasantry,  and  the 
Local  Government  Act  of  1898  gave  Ireland  autonomous  county 
government,  which  still  further  improved  agrarian  conditions. 
Famines  and  evictions  were  not  yet  ended,  but  rural  Ireland  was 
immeasurably  happier  than  ever  before. 

Before  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  then,  Ireland's 
religious  and  agrarian  complaints  had  been  at  least  partially 
3.  Irish  Na-  heeded,  but  there  remained  political  discontent,  and  it 
tionaUsm  nationaHsm.    Let  us  now  go  back  and  trace 

the  development  of  nationaHsm  in  Ireland.  Before  the  twelfth 
century  Ireland,  independent  though  disunited,  had  possessed  her 
Prior  to  the  kings,  her  own  culture,  her  own  speech.    In  the 

Act  of  fateful  twelfth  century,  however,  English  invaders 
Union,  1800  j^^^  conquered  at  least  part  of  Ireland  for  King  Henry 
11.  Under  Henry  VII,  ''Poyning's  Law"  had  been  passed,  sub- 
jecting all  the  acts  of  the  Irish  Parliament  to  the  approval  of  the 
English  government.  Henry  VIII  had  assumed  the  title  ''king 
of  Ireland."  Meanwhile  great  Irish  estates  had  been  granted  to 
English  nobles,  but  English  authority  was  not  much  respected 
outside  of  the  small  district  in  the  east,  known  as  the  Irish  Pale. 
Under  James  I,  EngKsh  and  Scotch  colonists  were  extensively 
settled  in  Ulster.  In  1641  the  native  Irish  rebelled  against  the 
foreigners,  but  were  cruelly  subdued  (1649-165 2)  by  Oliver 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


Cromwell.  Again,  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  of  1689,  Ireland 
rose  in  rebellion  only  to  be  defeated  in  the  battle  of  the  Boyne, 
I  July,  1690.  Thousands  of  the  defeated  rebels  emigrated  and 
their  descendants  made  Irish  names  famous  in  French  history.^ 
A  century  later,  a  new  revolt  occurred  in  Ireland,  engineered 
this  iime,  however,  by  the  Protestant  settlers  who  resented 
EngHsh  restrictions  on  Irish  trade.  The  insurrection  was 
successful,  and,  as  a  result,  Ireland  gained  Home  Rule  or 
legislative  autonomy  for  eighteen  years  (i 782-1800)  —  that 
is,  Protestant  Ireland  gained  Home  Rule,  for  until  1793  the 
Catholics  had  no  voice  in  the  Irish  ParHament.  During 
the  period  of  Home  Rule,  a  society  of  United  Irishmen  was  or- 
ganized under  the  influence  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  insti- 
gated the  unsuccessful  insurrection  of  1798.  This  gave  the 
British  government  an  excuse  for  terminating  the  Home  Rule 
regime.  The  Irish  Parliament  was  bribed  to  abolish  itself,  and 
Ireland  was  joined  with  England  and  Scotland  in  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  (1801) .  Laws  were  hence- 
forth made  for  Ireland  by  the  Westminster  Parliament,  in  which 
sat  twenty-eight  Irish  peers  and  a  hundred  Irish  Commoners. 

Subordination  to  a  British  Parliament  was  in  itself  irritating 
to  Irish  patriots,  and,  when  that  British  Parliament  showed 
itself  consistently  hostile  to  Irish  interests,  the  yoke  irfshAgita- 
became  intolerable.  Yet  the  first  great  agitation  for  tion  against 
repeal  of  the  Act  of  Union  was  orderly  and  peaceful 
under  the  leadership  of  the  famous  Daniel  O'Connell.  When 
O'Connell's  peaceful  Repeal  movement  was  suppressed  in  1843, 
more  violent  spirits  took  up  the  cause,  formed  a  ''Young  Ireland'^ 
party,  and  unsuccessfully  imitated  the  Continental  revolutions 
of  1848.  In  the  next  generation  Ireland's  cause  was  again  revived 
when  thousands  of  Irish-Americans  who  had  fought  in  the  Ameri- 
can Civil  War  (1861-1865)  organized  the  ''Fenian  Brotherhood'* 
to  emancipate  Ireland,  and  in  1867  attacked  Canada  while  simul- 
taneously raising  the  standard  of  revolt  in  Ireland.  As  always, 
revolt  failed ;  but  not  entirely,  for  the  Fenian  disorders  con- 
vinced Gladstone  that  Irish  reform  was  sadly  needed.  Glad- 
stone, as  we  have  seen,  then  secured  the  Disestablishment  (1869), 
and  passed  a  Land  Act  (1870) ;  but  under  a  new  leader  —  Charles 

*  Marshal  MacMahon,  for  instance. 


324  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Stewart  Parnell,  able,  enthusiastic,  and  a  Protestant  withal  — 
Irish  nationalism  persisted.  The  NationaHsts  persuaded  the  dis- 
contented peasantry  that  in  Home  Rule  was  the  only  sure  cure 
for  Ireland's  ills,  and  organized  a  political  Home  Rule  party, 
which  appeared  with  nearly  eighty  representatives  in  the  Parlia- 
ment of  1880.  Gladstone  again  sought  to  buy  off  the  Home 
Rulers  by  passing  a  Land  Act  (1881).  When  the  agitation  only 
redoubled  in  vigor,  the  government  for  a  time  imprisoned  Parnell 
and  forty  other  Irish  leaders. 

All  this  time  Gladstone  had  championed  Irish  reform  while  he 
opposed  Home  Rule  and  antagonized  Home  Rulers.    In  1886, 
^      ,    however,  a  Conservative  ministry  was  in  office,  and 

Gladstone's  ,  ,  i     -r  m       i  ^         •  •  111 

First  Home  Gladstone,  leadmg  the  Liberal  Opposition,  needed  the 
fsse  ^^^^^      Parnell's  Home  Rule  faction.    Then  was 

concluded  the  alHance  between  Liberalism  and  Home 
Rule  :  the  Irish  members  helped  Gladstone  into  office,  and  Glad- 
stone prepared  a  bill  to  establish  a  quasi-independent  Dublin 
parHament.  Many  of  the  Liberals  revolted  against  Gladstone's 
bargain,  however,  and  united  with  the  Conservatives  to  defeat 
-      ,    the  Home  Rule  Bill  of  1886  and  to  oust  Gladstone. 

Gladstone's    ^  1         ^^    1  ,  1.  •  •  i 

Second  Seven  years  later  Gladstone  s  coantion,  again  control- 
Bm"i893^*  ling  a  majority  in  the  Commons,  passed  the  Second 
Home  Rule  Bill  (1893).  The  bill  was  defeated  by 
the  House  of  Lords,  however,  and  Gladstone,  now  over  eighty 
years  of  age,  soon  withdrew  from  public  life.^  In  the  years  from 
1895  to  1905  the  disorganized  Liberal  party  remained  in  oppo-^ 
sition,  and  Home  Rule  in  the  background,  the  Unionist  ministry 
endeavoring  to  ignore  nationalism  while  instituting  agrarian  re- 
forms, hoping  thus  to  "kill  Home  Rule  by  kindness." 

Home  Rule  would  not  be  killed.  The  Irish  Nationalist  party, 
now  led  by  John  Redmond,  with  eighty-odd  members  in  the 
The  Home  House  of  Commons,  persisted  in  its  demand  for  Home 
Rule  Bill  Rule.  However,  the  general  election  of  1906,  which 
of  1912  returned  the  Liberals  to  power,  did  not  lead  immedi- 
ately to  the  realization  of  Nationalist  aspirations.  The  Liberals 
in  the  House  of  Commons  now  outnumbered  all  the  other  parties 
combined,  and  accordingly  were  not  dependent  upon  the  votes 
of  the  Irish  Nationalists  i  "i  Gladstone  had  been  in  1886 ;  besides, 

*  Gladstone  died  19  May,  18  8,  at  the  advanced  age  of  eighty-eight  years. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  325 


the  Liberals  were  so  absorbed  in  schemes  of  British  social  reform 
that  they  gave  Uttle  attention  to  Irish  demands,  and  even  had 
they  carried  a  Home  Rule  bill  through  the  Commons,  they 
would  have  been  certain  to  find  it  blocked  by  the  overwhelming 
Unionist  majority  in  the  Lords.  The  situation  was  changed  in 
1910-1911,  when,  as  the  results  of  new  elections  and  the  passage 
of  the  Parliament  Act,  the  House  of  Lords  was  shorn  of  its  con- 
stitutional right  to  exercise  more  than  a  suspensory  veto  over 
legislation  and  the  Liberal  ministry  found  itself  reduced  to  de- 
pendence upon  a  coaUtion  of  Liberal-Laborite-Nationalist  votes 
in  the  House  of  Commons.  Then  it  was  that  the  Liberal  min- 
istry definitely  returned  to  Gladstone's  policy  of  urging  the 
immediate  establishment  of  Home  Rule.  On  11  April,  191 2, 
Mr.  Asquith,  the  prime  minister,  introduced  a  Government  of 
Ireland  Bill,  whereby  Ireland,  while  retaining  42  representatives 
in  the  British  House  of  Commons  at  Westminster,  would  receive 
limited  rights  of  self-government,  with  a  bicameral  Irish  parlia- 
ment at  Dublin.  The  lord  lieutenant,  as  the  king's  personal 
representative,  would  govern  Ireland  through  ministers  respon- 
sible to  the  DubUn  parKament. 

The  Home  Rule  Bill  encountered  furious  opposition  at  the 
hands  of  the  Scotch-Irish  and  English-Irish  inhabitants  of 
Ulster,  whose  sentiments  and  traditions  were  naturally  incom- 
patible with  the  nationalism  of  the  native  Irish.  The  Ulster 
opposition  was  stimulated  by  the  fact  that  the  prosperous  busi- 
ness men  of  Belfast  would  probably  be  heavily  taxed  jji^^qj.  and 
by  an  Irish  parliament  representing  the  peasant  Unionist 
majority.  This  strong  economic  motive  for  resisting  ^pp**^*^^^ 
Home  Rule  was  reenforced  by  an  appeal  to  religious  bigotry,  and 
the  Protestant  minority,  having  long  oppressed  the  Catholic 
majority,  now  became  fearful  lest  the  situation  should  be 
reversed,  and  Home  Rule  mean  ''Rome  Rule."  The  provision 
in  the  bill  making  it  impossible  for  the  Irish  parliament  to  endow 
any  religion,  or  to  impose  any  religious  disabilities  whatsoever, 
was  of  no  avail  to  reassure  Protestant  Ulster.  The  Unionists, 
therefore,  led  on  by  the  fiery  eloquence  of  Sir  Edward  Carson 
and  with  the  acquiescence  of  the  Unionists  in  England,  held 
imposing  mass-meetings,  bound  themselves  by  a  ''solemn  cove- 
nant" never  to  submit  to  an  Irish  parliament,  and  actually  pro- 


326 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ceeded  to  drill  and  equip  volunteer  armies  with  the  avowed 
intent  of  resorting  to  civil  war.  Curiously  enough,  they  insisted 
that  all  these  acts  were  inspired  by  undying  devotion  to  the 
crown.  Perhaps  at  first  Sir  Edward  Carson  intended  the  Ulster 
volunteer  movement  merely  to  intimidate  the  Liberal  govern- 
ment and  thus  to  stave  off  Home  Rule.  Perhaps,  also,  many 
English  Unionists  abetted  the  movement  as  a  convenient  means 
of  discrediting  and  overturning  the  Asquith  ministry  and  thereby 
preventing  further  Liberal  attacks  on  the  House  of  Lords,  the 
landed  aristocracy,  and  the  Anglican  Church.  Nevertheless,  the 
Asquith  government  proceeded  resolutely  with  its  Home  Rule 
Bill,  and,  after  the  seeming  failure  of  efforts  at  compromise,  was 
preparing  in  the  summer  of  1914  to  place  it  upon  the  statute 
book  despite  the  real  menace  of  civil  war  in  Ireland.  Blood 
was  shed  in  Dublin  on  26  July. 

At  this  juncture  came  suddenly  the  outbreak  of  the  Great 
War  and  the  temporary  obscuring  of  all  domestic  differences  by 
The  Home  hesit  and  haze  of  the  vast  international  struggle. 
Rule  Act,  In  zeal  to  repel  the  German  invasion  of  Belgium, 
^^^^  Unionists  and  Liberals  could  now  present  a  united 

front;  and  Mr.  John  Redmond,  the  Nationalist  leader,  evoked 
a  round  of  applause  from  the  House  of  Commons  by  stating  "  that 
the  coast  of  Ireland  will  be  defended  from  foreign  invasion  by  her 
armed  sons,  and  for  this  purpose  armed  Nationalist  Catholics  in 
the  South  will  be  only  too  glad  to  join  arms  with  the  arnied 
Protestant  Ulstermenin  the  North."  Under  these  circumstances 
a  truce  was  quickly  arranged  for  the  hostile  factions  in  Ireland. 
The  Home  Rule  Bill,  which  had  already  twice  passed  the  House 
of  Commons,  was  now  passed  a  third  time ;  and,  though  still 
not  sanctioned  by  the  House  of  Lords,  it  received  the  formal 
assent  of  the  king  on  18  September,  1914,  and  thus,  despite  the 
bitter  protest  of  the  Unionists,  became  law  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  ParHament  Act  of  191 1.  At  the  same  time 
a  bill  was  passed  temporarily  suspending  the  Government  of 
Ireland  Act.^ 

^  The  official  title  of  the  Home  Rule  Act.  The  operation  of  the  Welsh 
Disestablishment  Act,  passed  also  in  1914,  was  postponed  until  the  conclusion 
of  the  war. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  327 


ADDITIONAL  READING 

General.  Brief  summaries:  A.  L.  Cross,  History  of  England  and 
Greater  Britain  (1914),  ch.  lii-lvii;  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The 
Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch.  xxv,  xxvi;  C.  D.  Hazen, 
Europe  since  1815  (1910),  ch.  xx,  xxi ;  Gilbert  Slater,  The  Making  of  Modern 
England,  new  ed.  (191 5),  ch.  xv-xxiii,  essentially  social;  C.  W.  Oman, 
England  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1900),  ch.  vii-ix;  J.  A.  R.  Marriott, 
England  since  Waterloo  (1913),  Book  III,  ch.  xviii-xxvi ;  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  xii,  1856-1868,  by  Sir  Spencer  Walpole,  and 
Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  iii,  i868~igio,  by  Stanley  Leathes;  A.  D.  Innes, 
History  of  England  and  the  British  Empire,  Vol.  IV  (1914),  ch.  vi-xi; 
Sidney  Low  and  L.  C.  Sanders,  Political  History  of  England,  i8jy-iQoi 
(1907),  ch.  x-xix.  More  detailed  works:  Sir  Spencer  Walpole,  History  of 
England  since  181 5,  new  ed.,  6  vols.  (1902-1905),  reaching  down  to  1858, 
and,  by  the  same  author,  an  eminent  scholar  and  in  politics  a  moderate 
Liberal,  History  of  Twenty-Five  Years,  1856-1880,  4  vols,  (i 904-1 908) ; 
J.  F.  Bright,  History  of  Efigland,  5  vols.  (1884-1904) — Vol.  IV,  Growth 
of  Democracy,  18:57-1880,  and  Vol.  V,  Imperial  Reaction,  1880-igoi,  fair- 
minded  and  excellent;  R.  H.  Gretton,  A  Modern  History  of  the  English 
People,  1880-igio,  2d  ed.,  2  vols.  (1913),  popular  and  pronouncedly  Liberal, 
but  clear  and  emphasizes  economic  and  social  history ;  Sir  Herbert  Maxwell, 
A  Century  of  Empire,  Vol.  Ill,  1867-igoo  (191 1),  Conservative  in  point  of 
view  and  rather  narrowly  political;  H.  W.  Paul,  A  History  of  Modern 
England,  5  vols.  (1904-1906),  covering  the  years  1845-1895,  vivid,  political, 
and  Liberal ;  Justin  McCarthy,  A  History  of  Our  Own  Times,  1857-igoi, 
7  vols.  (1879-1905),  journalistic,  anecdotal,  and  at  times  diffuse.  Special 
treatments:  G.  K.  Chesterton,  The  Victorian  Age  in  Literature  (1913) 
in  the  "  Home  University  Library,"  suggestive  synthesis  of  broad  outlines 
in  history,  economics,  and  literature;  Ernest  Barker,  Political  Thought  in 
England  from  Herbert  Spencer  to  the  Present  Day  (191 5),  another  handy 
volume  in  the  "  Home  University  Library  " ;  C.  A.  Whitmore,  Six  Years 
of  Unionist  Government,  i886-i8g2  (1892);  H.  R.  Whates,  Third  Salisbury 
Administration,  i8g5-igoo  (1900) ;  Paul  Mantoux,  A  travers  V Angleterre 
contemporaine  (1909). 

Biographies.  Sir  Sidney  Lee,  Queen  Victoria:  a  Biography  (1903) ;  A.  C. 
Benson  and  Viscount  Esher  (editors).  The  Letters  of  Queen  Victoria,  a  Selection 
from  Her  Majesty's  Correspondence  between  the  years  i8j'/  and  1861,  3  vols. 
(1907) ;  W.  F.  Monypenny,  The  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  Earl  of  Beacons- 
field,  2  vols.,  1804-1846  (1910-1912),  continued  by  G.  E.  Buckle,  Vol.  Ill, 
1846-185 5  (19 14),  and  Vol.  IV,  185 5-1 868  (191 6),  a  monumental  work  for 
which  the  authors  had  access  to  Disraeli's  papers ;  Georg  Brandcs,  Lord  Bca- 
consfield,  a  Study,  Eng.  trans,  by  Mrs.  George  Sturge  (1880),  an  appreciation 
of  Disraeli  primarily  as  a  man  of  letters ;  T.  P.  O'Connor,  Lord  Beacons- 
field:  a  Biography,  7th  ed.  (1896),  a  hostile  estimate  ;  T.  E.  Kebbel  (editor), 
Selected  Speeches  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  2  vols.  (1882),  and  Lord  Bcaconsficld 


328 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


and  other  Tory  Memoirs  (1907) ;  John  (Viscount)  Morley,  The  Life  of 
William  Ewart  Gladstone,  new  ed.,  3  vols,  in  2  (191 1),  containing  copious 
extracts  and  quotations  from  Gladstone's  letters  and  speeches;  G.  M. 
Trevelyan,  The  Life  of  John  Bright  (1913),  scholarly,  sympathetic,  and 
brilliantly  written;  William  Robertson,  Life  and  Times  of  John  Bright, 
new  ed,  by  A.  M.  Perkins  (191 2);  Thorold  Rogers  (editor).  Speeches  of 
John  Bright  (1869)  and  Public  Addresses  of  John  Bright  (1879) ;  Alexander 
Mackintosh,  Joseph  Chamberlain,  an  Honest  Biography,  new  ed.  (1914) ; 
C.  W.  Boyd  (editor).  Speeches  of  Joseph  Chamberlain,  2  vols.  (1914) ;  Lytton 
Bulwer,  Life  of  Sir  H.  J.  Temple,  Viscount  Palmer ston,  2  vols.  (1871), 
continued  by  Evelyn  Ashley,  Vol.  Ill  (1874) ;  George  Saintsbury,  Earl  of 
Derby  (1892) ;  W.  S.  Churchill,  Lord  Randolph  Churchill,  2  vols.  (1906) ; 
H.  D.  Traill,  Marquis  of  Salisbury  (1891) ;  Sir  G.  0.  Trevelyan,  The  Life 
and  Letters  of  Lord  Macaulay,  2  vols.  (1876). 

The  British  Constitution.  Standard  treatises:  A.  L.  Lowell,  The  Gov- 
ernment of  England,  new  ed.,  2  vols.  (191 2) ;  Sidney  Low,  The  Governance 
of  England,  new  ed.  (1914) ;  Sir  William  Anson,  The  Law  and  Custom  of 
the  Constitution,  3d  ed.,  3  vols.  (1907-1909) ;  A.  V.  Dicey,  Introduction  to 
the  Study  of  the  Law  of  the  Constitution,  8th  ed.  (1915);  Sir  Thomas  E. 
May  (Lord  Farnborough),  Constitutional  History  of  England  since  the 
Accession  of  George  the  Third,  ed.  and  cont.  by  Francis  Holland,  3  vols. 
(191 2) ;  Walter  Bagehot,  The  English  Constitution,  new  ed.  (191 1),  abrilHant 
but  older  interpretation;  D.  J.  Medley,  A  Students'  Manual  of  English 
Constitutional  History,  5th  ed.  (1913),  a  topical  treatment,  useful  for  refer- 
ence. Excellent  brief  compendiums  of  the  whole  subject  are  F.  A.  Ogg, 
The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913),  ch.  i-viii,  and  T.  F.  Moran,  The  Theory 
and  Practice  of  the  English  Government  (1903).  Important  monographs: 
Sir  Courtney  Ilbert,  Legislative  Methods  and  Fofms  (1901),  and,  by  the 
same  author,  in  the  "  Home  University  Library,"  Parliament,  its  History, 
Constitution  and  Practice  (1911);  Charles  Seymour,  Electoral  Reforrh  in 
England  and  Wales  (191 5),  a  historical  survey  of  the  extension  of  the  fran- 
chise from  1832  to  1885 ;  Josef  Redlich,  The  Procedure  of  the  House  of 
Commons :  a  Study  of  its  History  and  Present  Form,  Eng.  trans,  by  A.  E. 
Steinthal,  3  vols.  (1908) ;  Josef  Redlich  and  F.  W.  Hirst,  Local  Government 
in  England,  2  vols.  (1903) ;  F.  C.  Howe,  The  British  City,  the  Beginnings 
of  Democracy  (1907). 

Political  Parties  in  Great  Britain.  A.  V.  Dicey,  Lectures  on  the  Relation 
between  Law  and  Public  Opinion  in  England  during  the  Nineteenth  Century, 
2d  ed.  (1914),  an  illuminating  study ;  Lord  Hugh  Cecil,  Conservatism  (1912), 
a  popular  sketch  of  the  principles  of  the  Conservative  party,  to  which  the 
author  belongs;  L.  T.  Hobhouse,  Liberalism  (191 1),  a  similar  sketch  of 
the  principles  of  the  Liberal  party,  likewise  in  the  "  Home  University 
Library  " ;  W.  L.  Blease,  A  Short  History  of  English  Liberalism  (1913) ; 
W.  S.  Churchill,  Liberalism  and  the  Social  Problem  (1909),  a  collection  of 
speeches  comprising  an  excellent  statement  of  the  position  of  the  new  genera- 
tion of  Radical  Liberals;  L.  T.  Hobhouse,  The  Labour  Movement,  3d  ed. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


(1906)  ;  A.  W.  Humphrey,  A  History  of  Labour  Representation  (191 2); 
S.  P.  Orth,  Socialism  and  Democracy  in  Europe  (1913),  ch.  ix,  a  clear 
statement  of  the  rise  and  organization  of  the  Labor  party;  F.  J.  Shaw 
(pseud.  Brougham  Villiers),  The  Socialist  Movement  in  England  (1908) ; 
M,  Beer,  Geschichte  des  Sozialismus  in  England  (1913) ;  W.  L.  Blease,  The 
Emancipation  of  English  Women,  new  ed.  (1913),  an  admirable  historical 
survey;  Emmeline  Pankhurst,  My  Own  Story  (1914),  interesting  statement 
by  the  leading  militant  suffragist;  Hilaire  Belloc  and  Cecil  Chesterton, 
The  Party  System  (191 1),  a  severe  indictment. 

Social  Politics  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Carlton  Hayes,  British  Social 
Politics  (1913),  a  collection  of  documents  illustrating  action  of  the  British 
government  from  1906  to  1913  for  the  partial  solution  of  grave  social  prob- 
lems ;  George  Howell,  Labour  Legislation ^  Labour  Movements,  and  Labour 
Leaders,  2d  ed.  (1905) ;  C.  G.  F.  Masterman,  The  Condition  of  England, 
4th  ed.  (1910) ;  Charles  Booth  (editor),  Life  and  Labour  of  the  People  in 
London,  17  vols,  (i 892-1 903),  the  result  of  a  detailed  investigation  of  the 
wages,  homes,  and  general  living  conditions  of  the  working  classes  of  Lon- 
don, a  mine  of  social  information;  B.  S.  Rowntree,  Poverty:  a  Study  of 
Town  Life,  2d  ed.  (1902),  a  painstaking  study  of  the  condition  of  the  work- 
ing class  in  the  city  of  York,  comparable  in^  importance  to  the  work  of 
Charles  Booth  though  much  slighter  in  bulk ;  Edouard  Guyot,  Le  socialisme 
et  revolution  de  VAngleterre  contemporaine,  1880-igii  (1913),  a  French 
interpretation  of  the  factors  making  for  the  increased  public  interest  in 
British  social  problems;  B.  S.  Rowntree,  How  the  Labourer  Lives,  a  Study 
of  the  Rural  Labour  Problem  (1913) ;  Sidney  and  Beatrice  Webb,  English 
Poor  Law  Policy  (1910),  dealing  with  developments  from  1834  to  1908; 
B.  S.  Rowntree  and  Bruno  Lasker,  Unemployment:  a  Social  Study  (1911) ; 
W.  H.  Beveridge,  Unemployment,  2d  ed.  (1912);  M.  F.  Robinson,  The 
Spirit  of  Association,  being  some  account  of  the  Gilds,  Friendly  Societies, 
Cooperative  Movement,  and  Trade  Unions  of  Great  Britain  (1913) ;  Beatrice 
Potter  (Mrs.  Sidney  Webb),  The  Co-operative  Movement  in  Great  Britain 
(1899) ;  Sidney  and  Beatrice  Webb,  The  History  of  Trade  Unionism,  new  ed. 
(191 1) ;  H.  H.  Schloesser  and  W.  S.  Clark,  The  Legal  Position  of  Trade 
Unions,  2d  ed.  (1913) ;  H.  L.  Smith  and  Vaughan  Nash,  Story  of  the  Dockers^ 
Strike  (1889) ;  B.  L.  Hutchins  and  A.  Harrison,  A  History  of  Factory  Legis- 
lation, 2d  ed.  (191 1);  Ohve  J.  Dunlop,  English  Apprenticeship  and  Child 
Labor:  a  History  (19 12);  Frederic  Keeling,  Child  Labour  in  the  United 
Kingdom  :  a  Study  of  the  Development  and  Administration  of  the  Law 
Relating  to  the  Employment  of  Children  (1914) ;  A.  S.  C.  Carr,  W.  H.  Gar- 
nett,  and  J.  H.  Taylor,  National  Insurance,  4th  ed.  (1913) ;  E.  R.  Dewsnup, 
The  Housing  Problem  in  Englaiui,  its  Statistics,  Legislation,  and  Policy 

(1907)  ;  A.  R.  Wallace,  Land  Nationalisation,  its  Necessity  and  its  Aims 
(1882);  A.  H.  Dyke  Acland  (chairman).  The  Report  of  the  Land  Enquiry 
Committee,  2  vols.  (1914) ;  Gilbert  Slater,  The  English  Peasantry  and  the 
Enclosure  of  the  Common  Fields  (1907) ;  F.  G.  Heath,  British  Rural  Life 
and  Labour  (191 1);  R.  E.  Prothero,  English  Farming  Past  and  Present 


330 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


(191 2) ;  W.  J.  Ashley,  British  Industries,  2d  ed.  (1907),  and,  by  the  same 
author,  The  Tarijff  Problem  (1903) ;  William  Cunningham,  Rise  and  Decline 
of  the  Free  Trade  Movement,  2d  ed.  (1905),  like  Ashley's  work,  a  plea  for 
the  acceptance  of  Joseph  Chamberlain's  tariff  proposals ;  George  Armitage- 
Smith,  The  Free  Trade  Movement  and  its  Results  (1898) ;  William  Smart, 
Return  to  Protection  (1904) ;  Graham  Balfour,  The  Educational  Systems 
oj  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  2d  ed.  (1903). 

The  Irish  Question.  Sketches  of  Irish  history:  W.  O'C.  Morris,  Ire- 
land, jygS-iSgS  (1898) ;  Charles  Johnston  and  Carita  Spencer,  Ireland's 
Story  (1905) ;  Goldwin  Smith,  Irish  History  and  the  Irish  Question  (1905) ; 
Alice  S.  Green,  Irish  Nationality  (191 1),  in  "Home  University  Library," 
Somewhat  more  detailed  or  specialized  works:  Louis  Paul-Dubois,  Con- 
temporary Ireland,  Eng.  trans.  (1908),  containing  an  excellent  account  of 
the  land  question  and  of  educational  and  religious  problems,  with  much 
historical  background;  Alice  E.  Murray,  A  History  of  the  Commercial 
and  Financial  Relations  between  England  and  Ireland  from  the  Period  of 
the  Restoration  (1903) ;  W.  P.  O'Brien,  Great  Famine  in  Ireland  and  a 
Retrospect  of  the  Fifty  Years  i845-i8g5  (1896) ;  T.  P.  O'Connor,  Parnell 
Movement,  with  a  Sketch  of  Irish  Parties  from  184J,  2d  ed.  (1886);  R.  B. 
O'Brien,  Life  of  Charles  Stewart  Parnell,  2  vols,  in  i  (1898) ;  J.  H.  Parnell, 
Charles  Stewart  Parnell  (1914),  a  brother's  intimate  study;  G.  J.  Shaw- 
Lefevre  (Baron  Eversley),  Gladstone  and  Ireland,  the  Irish  Policy  of  Parlia- 
ment from  i8jo-'i8Q4  (191 2);  Michael  Davitt,  The  Fall  of  Feudalism  in 
Ireland,  or  the  Story  of  the  Land  League  Revolution  (1904) ;  Sir  Horace 
Plunkett,  Ireland  in  the  New  Century  (1904) ;  T.  D.  Ingram,  A  History 
of  the  Legislative  Union  of  Great  Britain  a^td  Ireland  (1887),  an  attempt 
to  justify  English  policies  toward  Ireland;  S.  Rosenbaum  (editor).  Against 
Home  Rule  :  the  Case  for  the  Union  (191 2),  a  collection  of  partisap  articles 
by  A.  J.  Balfour,  J.  A.  Chamberlain,  Sir  Edward  Carson,  and  other  con- 
spicuous Unionists. 


Ik 


CHAPTER  XXIII 
LATIN  EUROPE,  1870-1914 
I.  THE  THIRD  FRENCH  REPUBLIC 

The  Making  or  the  Republic 

The  French  political  groups  that  during  the  last  years  of 
Napoleon  III  had  suppHed  the  chief  criticisms  of  his  imperial 
regime,  were  the  RepubKcans,  the  Liberal  Monarch-  „    ,  . 

•  1    1      o     .  T  T  1  11  Revolution- 

ists, and  the  Sociahsts.    It  was  only  natural,  then,  ary  Proc- 

that  when  disaster  overtook  the  imperial  arms  at  1*™^°^, 

o    1  1  r      •  -r.     .      1      1  1  1  Third 

bedan,  these  same  factions  at  Pans  should  hasten  to  Republic,  4 
declare  (4  September,  1870)  the  deposition  of  Na- 
poleon  III  and  his  dynasty.    They  proclaimed  a  ^'re- 
pubhc"  to  take  the  place  of  the  discredited  empire,  because  that 
was  the  only  name  which  seemed  sufhciently  comprehensive 
and  elastic  to  hold  together  their  discordant  elements.  By 
''repubhc"  each  of  these  three  groups  meant  a  different  thing: 
most  RepubKcans  thought  of  it  as  a  restoration  of  the  bourgeois 
Jacobinism  of  1792  and  1848;  Liberal  Monarchists  perceived  in 
it  a  temporary  scaffolding  for  the  erection  by  a  democratically 
incHned  Bourbon  prince  of  a  government  in  France  modeled 
after  that  of  England ;  and  the  Socialists  dreamed  of  the  speedy 
fulfillment  of  Karl  Marx's  communist  schemes  and  economic, 
as  well  as  political,  democracy. 

So  long  as  Paris  was  besieged  by  Germans,  the  three  groups 
held  together  fairly  well.    Sociahsts  participated  actively  in 
the  national  defense.     Gambetta,   the  RepubHcan 
leader,  and  Thiers,  the  Liberal  Monarchist,  were  the  National 
two  most  conspicuous  supporters  of  the  provisional  ^l^^^^jg^^g 
government :  Gambetta,  escaping  from  Paris  in  a 
balloon,  became  the  heart  and  soul  of  that  stubborn  patriotic 
resistance  which  protracted  the  hopeless  struggle  for  several 

331 


332 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


months,  while  Thiers  undertook  a  diplomatic  mission  to  every 
important  European  capital  in  a  vain  endeavor  to  obtain 
foreign  assistance  for  France.  But  when  at  length  in  January, 
187 1,  Paris  surrendered  to  the  Germans  and  a  truce  was  agreed 
to  in  order  that  the  French  people  might  elect  a  National 
Assembly  to  treat  for  peace  with  the  victors,  then  a  cleavage 
appeared  between  Republicans  and  Monarchists.  The  latter 
were  willing  for  the  sake  of  peace  to  make  even  unfavorable 
terms  with  the  Germans;  the  former,  anxious  not  to  handicap 
the  republic  at  the  outset  with  a  disastrous  foreign  treaty,  were 
bent  on  continuing  the  war. 

On  this  issue  the  first  electoral  campaign  under  the  Third 
Republic  was  waged  in  February,  1871,  with  the  result  that  of  the 
Its  Mon-  seven-hundred-odd  representatives  who  were  elected 
archist  by  Universal  manhood  suffrage  of  the  French  nation. 
Complexion  hundred  were  reckoned  as  Monarchists  and  only 
two  hundred  as  Republicans.  The  apparent  triumph  of  the 
Monarchists  did  not  prove  that  the  nation  preferred  a  monar- 
chical form  of  government  but  simply  showed  that  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  French  people  were  sick  and  tired  of 
the  German  War. 

The  National  Assembly,  meeting  at  Bordeaux,  naturally 
refused  formally  to  sanction  the  Repubhc,  contenting  itself 
Its  Conciu  "^^^  choosing  Thiers  as  ''head  of  the  executive 
sionof  power"  and  with  deciding  that  he  should  exercise  his 
Peace  with  power  under  the  supervision  of  the  Assembly  and  with 
the  aid  of  ministers  chosen  and  directed  by  himself. 
Having  thus  by  the  so-called  Compact  of  Bordeaux  (17  February, 
187 1)  arranged  temporarily  for  the  internal  government  of 
France,  the  National  Assembly,  with  its  Monarchist  majority 
moved  to  Versailles,  and  in  due  time  ratified  the  humihating 
treaty  of  Frankfort  (May,  1871),  according  to  which,  as  we 
have  learned,^  Alsace  and  the  greater  part  of  Lorraine  were 
ceded  to  the  newly  created  German  Empire,  and  France  promised 
to  pay  a  war  indemnity  of  five  billion  francs.  Thus  the  first 
work  of  the  National  Assembly  —  the  work  for  which  it  had 
been  specifically  convoked  —  was  accomplished  and  peace  wa§ 
restored. 

1  See  above,  p.  201. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


But  before  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  with  the  Germans, 
another  cleavage  appeared  in  the  groups  that  had  acclaimed  the 
^'repubHc,"  a  cleavage  between  the  Parisian  work-  ^.^ 
mgmen  and  the  bourgeois  Assembly,  a  cleavage  that  cuities  with 
led  to  the  brief  but  terrible  civil  war  known  as  J|jj^jj]^y^°^"" 
the  Commune.    'Xommune"  in  France  is  the  ordi-  Commune 
nary  word  signifying  the  local  government  of  what  in  ^g^^*"*'' 
the  United  States  would  be  termed  a  township  or  a 
municipaHty.    Now  it  so  happened  that,  in  the  troubled  con- 
ditions within  Paris  consequent  upon  the  rigorous  five-month 
siege  of  the  city  by  the  Germans,  an  unofficial  ''central  com- 
mittee," which  had  been  elected  by  the  workingmen  to  look 
after  their  interests,  and  had  been  installed  in  the  headquarters 
of  the  Socialistic  '' Interna tionalj"  fused  with  another  ''central 
committee"  of  Republican  guardsmen  to  form  a  Joint  Com- 
mittee which  estabHshed  itself  in  the  city-hall  and  took  over  the 
actual  government  of  the  Commune  of  Paris.    This  revolu- 
tionary Commune,  reenforced  by  a  municipal  election  conducted 
under  its  auspices,  constituted  the  real  government  of  Paris 
from  March  to  May,  1871. 

This  Commune  was  at  no  time  a  homogeneous  body.  Of  its 
members,  nearly  half  were  bourgeois  Radicals  of  the  type  of 
1793,  while  the  other  half,  composed  of  workingmen,  were 
divided  about  equally  between  Socialist  members  of  the  Inter- 
national —  followers  of  Karl  Marx  —  and  Anarchist  disciples 
of  Proudhon.  Yet  common  grievances  held  it  together.  Paris, 
especially  its  workingmen,  had  suffered  from  the  recent  war 
more  severely  than  any  other  part  of  France.  Paris,  being  pre- 
dominantly Republican,  distrusted  the  Monarchist  Assembly 
and  disliked  the  transfer  of  the  national  capital  from  Paris  to 
Versailles.  Worst  of  all  was  the  economic  distress  in  the  city. 
Not  only  were  the  factories  shut  down  and  the  labor-market 
glutted  by  the  sudden  disbanding  of  a  host  of  regular  troops,  but 
the  Versailles  government  ordered  the  resumption  of  the  payment 
of  rents  and  notes,  which  had  been  suspended  during  the  war, 
and  at  the  same  time  suppressed  the  payment  of  the  franc-and- 
a-half  daily  wage  to  the  national  guardsmen,  which  had  been 
the  sole  means  of  subsistence  to  a  large  majority  of  workingmen 
in  the  city.    No  doubt  these  last  measures  were  urgently  de- 


334 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


manded  in  view  of  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  national 
treasury,  but  they  were  quite  naturally  deemed  by  the  working- 
men  to  have  been  dictated  not  so  much  in  their  interest  as  in 
that  of  the  upper  and  middle  classes. 

So  the  Commune  of  Paris  revolted  against  the  National  As- 
sembly, declaring  that  the  city  was  free  and  sovereign  and  that 
,  „  the  French  state  should  consist  simply  of  a  loose  fed- 

Its  Sup-  ^ 

pression  of  eration  of  self-governing  Communes.  Most  of  France, 
the  Parisian  outside  of  Paris,  angered  by  this  outrage  on  national 

Rebellion  .     .         n     i     i  i  r        •  i  r 

patriotism,  flocked  to  the  support  of  Thiers  and  of 
the  Versailles  Assembly,  and  fighting  began.  The  actual  mili- 
tary operations,  which  lasted  from  i  April  to  28  May,  1871, 
were  the  usual  story  of  the  siege  and  sacking  of  a  city :  the  slow 
advance  of  the  besiegers,  who  were  better  disciplined,  armed, 
and  generaled,  the  taking  of  outpost  after  outpost,  the  attack 
on  a  weak  position  of  the  rampart  near  the  St.  Cloud  gate,  the 
entrance  of  the  Versailles  troops,  the  desperate  defense  behind 
the  barricades,  the  capture  of  one  section  after  another,  the 
firing  of  pubHc  buildings,  the  assassination  of  the  archbishop, 
the  frantic  efforts  of  the  conquerors  to  stay  the  flames  and  to 
exterminate  the  rebels,  the  frenzy  of  the  vanquished  and  the 
ferocity  of  the  victors,  the  piles  of  dead,  the  ruined  buildings 
and  squares,  the  wholesale  massacre  of  prisoners,  the  deporta- 
tions and  imprisonments.  The  number  of  Parisians  killed  by 
French  soldiers  in  the  last  week  of  May,  1 871,  was  at  least  15,000, 
and  possibly  double  that  number.  It  was  a  terrible  fate  that 
such  a  cruel  siege  and  capture  of  Paris  should  follow  so  closely 
upon  the  siege  and  capture  of  the  city  by  the  Germans,  but  it 
was  an  inevitable  aftermath  of  the  trickery  and  ambition  which 
had  precipitated  the  Franco- German  War.  The  real  authors 
of  the  Paris  Commune  of  1871  were  not  the  workingmen,  but 
Bismarck  and  Napoleon  III. 
The  suppression  of  the  Commune  made  it  certain  that  for 

many  years  to  come  the  Third  French  Republic  would 

Significance  •'    ,  ,  ,  ,  .      ,  ^ 

of  the  preserve  its  moderate  and  bourgeois  character,  ine 
of^is^r'^^  numbers  both  of  Socialists  and  of  Anarchists  were 
greatly  diminished,  and  their  principles  were  dis- 
credited in  the  eyes  of  the  nation.  At  the  same  time,  the  ex- 
treme bitterness  which  rankled  in  the  minds  of  Communists  who 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


survived,  served  in  the  long  run  to  commit  a  group  of  French 
workingmen  to  ultra-RadicaHsm. 

By  the  end  of  May,  1871,  Thiers  and  the  National  Assembly 
had  made  peace  with  the  Germans  and  had  restored  order  in 
France.    The  Assembly,  however,  despite  Republican  ^^^^ 
protests,  gave  no  indication  of  a  purpose  to  termi-  Law  (1871) : 
nate  its  career.      In  fact,  the  Monarchist  majority  JJ^®^^,  „ 

11  A  o  1  President" 

proceeded  on  31  August,  1871,  to  enact  the  Rivet 
Law,  whereby  the  Assembly  arrogated  to  itself  full  power  not 
only  to  make  laws  for  France  but  also  to  draw  up  a  constitu- 
tion for  the~  country  and  conferred  upon  Thiers  the  new  title  of 
"  president  of  the  French  Repubhc,"  stipulating  that  he  should 
thereafter  be  responsible  to  the  Assembly  and  implying  that  he 
would  be  removable  by  majority  vote.  From  August,  1871, 
more  than  four  years  were  to  elapse  before  the  National  As- 
sembly would  dissolve,  and  they  were  to  be  four  years  of  su- 
preme importance  in  laying  the  foundations  for  a  new  era. 
Throughout  two  of  the  four  years  Thiers  himself  was  the 
guiding  spirit. 

In  the  first  place,  the  government  reorganized  the  national 
finances  and  floated  additional  loans  with  such  amazing  success 
that  in  1873  the  final  installment  of  the  war  indemnity  j.^^ 
of  five  bilHon  francs  was  paid  to  Germany  and  the  last  tionai 
German  troops  were  withdrawn  from  French  soil.   The  'Pinandsd 
fact  that  the  great  bulk  of  the  prodigious  loans  were  Achieve- 
subscribed  to  by  Frenchmen,  and  a  goodly  part  of 
them  by  peasants,  was  at  once  a  proof  of  the  wealth  of  the 
country  and  a  guarantee  of  the  stability  of  the  new  regime. 

Secondly,  elaborate  military  reforms  were  inaugurated.  Fol- 
lowing the  example  of  victorious  Prussia,  universal  compulsory 
service  was  decreed,  the  term  being  fixed  as  five  years  its  Military 
in  the  active  army  and  eleven  years  in  the  reserve,  Reforms 
and  the  only  exemptions  allowed  being  in  the  cases  of  clergy- 
men, teachers,  and  sons  of  widows.  Moreover,  strong  fortresses 
were  erected  along  the  new  German  frontier  and  the  defenses  of 
Paris  were  strengthened ;  the  provision  of  arms,  ammunition, 
and  other  supplies  was  perfected ;  and  naval  construction  was 
quickened.  It  was  apparent  that  France,  though  lately  de- 
feated, was  resolved  to  retain  her  position  and  prestige  as  a 


336 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Great  Power,  and  that  many  influential  Frenchmen  were  al- 
ready thinking  of  a  ''War  of  Revenge"  for  the  recovery  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  Militarism  became  an  early  attribute  of  the 
Third  RepubHc. 

Thirdly,  it  was  this  same  National  Assembly  that  reformed 
the  local  government  of  the  country  and  devised  the  form  of  the 
central  government,  which,  with  slight  modifications,  has  en- 
dured in  France  for  a  longer  period  than  any  governmental  sys- 
tem since  the  days  of  the  old  regime  and  of  Bourbon  absolutism. 

In  reforming  the  local  government  the  members  of  the  Na- 
tional Assembly,  whether  Monarchist  or  Republican,  were  in 
Its  Conser-  practical  agreement.  The  system  of  local  adminis- 
vation  of  tration,  planned  during  the  Revolution  and  developed 
System  of  Under  Napoleon  I,  had  since  been  preserved  by  Louis 
Local  XVIII,  Charles  X,  Louis  Philippe,  the  Second  Re- 
Government  ^^^^^^  Napoleon  III;  and  now  that  the  Paris 
Commune  had  been  suppressed,  there  was  no  serious  demand 
from  any  quarter  for  an  essential  change.  For  administrative 
purposes,  therefore,  France  continued  to  be  divided  into  86 
Departments,  or  87  if  the  "territory  of  Belfort"  —  a  remnant  of 
Alsace  —  be  considered  as  a  separate  Department,  with  the 
addition,  for  most  purposes,  of  the  three  Departments  of 
Algeria.  Each  Department  remained  under  a  Prefect,  named 
by  the  central  government,  and  assisted  by  a  General  Council 
elected  for  six  years  by  universal  manhood  suffrage.  Under  the 
Third  RepubHc  the  powers  of  this  General  Council  were  ex- 
tended so  as  to  include  the  apportionment  of  taxes,  rehef  of  the 
poor,  and  care  of  the  highways  and  pubKc  schools.-^  Each 
Department  continued  to  be  divided  into  several  Arrondisse- 
ments,  or  Districts,  which  were  under  Sub-Prefects,  likewise 
appointed  by  the  central  government  and  advised  by  popularly 
elected  Councils  of  the  Arrondissement.  Each  Arrondissement 
continued  to  be  divided  into  Communes,  the  lowest  units  of 
local  government.  By  191 1  there  were  36,241  Communes  in 
France,  of  which  more  than  half  had  fewer  than  500  inhab- 
itants each  and  only  a  few  had  a  population  in  excess  of 
20,000.  The  local  administration  of  each  Commune  was  vested 
in  a  Municipal  Council  elected  for  four  years  by  universal  man- 

^  In  accordance  with  a  law  of  August,  1871. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  337 


hood  suffrage,  and  in  a  Mayor  chosen  by  the  Municipal  Council.^ 
In  an  intermediate  position  between  the  divisions  of  the  Arron- 
dissements  and  the  Communes  survived  the  Cantons,  not  as 
administrative  districts,  but  as  seats  of  justices  of  the  peace. 

Such  is  the  framework  of  local  government  that  has  existed 
in  France  throughout  the  period  of  the  Third  Republic.  To  its 
absolute  uniformity,  the  only  exception  is  in  the  ad-  Local 
ministration  of  Paris,^  where  the  duties  of  government  Government 
are  distributed  among  a  special  Prefect  of  PoHce  and 
the  regular  Prefect  of  the  Department  of  the  Seine  —  both 
appointed  by  the  central  government  —  and  a  peculiar  Municipal 
Council,  composed  of  four  elected  representatives  from  each  of 
the  twenty  Arrondissements  (Wards)  into  which  the  city  is 
divided,  each  Arrondissement  possessing  a  Mayor  of  its  own. 

Of  this  whole  framework,  centralization  is  still  the  distin- 
guishing characteristic.  The  central  government  has  the  right 
to  nominate  all  Prefects  and  Sub-Prefects,  as  well  as  ^, .  , 

.  Chief 

the  right  to  veto  any  act  of  a  General  Council,  a  Coun-  character- 
cil  of  an  Arrondissement,  or  a  Municipal  Council.  The 

_     ,  '  ,      ^  .    ,  French 

nmety  Prefects,  moreover,  are  the  very  eyes  and  the  system  of 
right  arms  of  the  central  government ;  they  make  fre-  Q^^^^j^g^^ 
quent  reports  to  it  of  what  goes  on  in  their  Depart- 
ments ;  they  appoint  numerous  subordinate  officials ;  they  super- 
vise the  execution  of  national  laws,  control  the  local  police,  and 
themselves  enjoy  the  power  of  veto  over  the  acts  of  any  represen- 
tative body  within  their  respective  Departments.  The  Prefects 
are  the  real  successors  of  the  Intendants  of  the  days  of  Cardinal 
Richelieu.  The  centralization  of  administration,  which  has 
proceeded  further  in  France  than  in  any  other  country  of  the 
world,  operates  in  practice  to  insure  the  faithful,  uniform  ex- 
ecution of  national  laws  throughout  the  entire  country  and  to 
enable  one  readily  to  fix  the  responsibility  for  any  non-enforce- 
ment of  law.  Moreover,  involving,  as  it  does,  the  popular 
election  of  but  three  or  four  officials,  it  tends  to  produce  the 
advantages  of  the  ''short  ballot,"  particularly  simplicity  and  the 
centering  of  public  attention  upon  the  qualifications  of  the  few 
who  are  elected.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  despite  the  elaborate 
system  of  administrative  courts,  which  are  supposed  to  safeguard 

*  Only  since  1884.  '  And  in  the  administration  of  L^'ons. 

VOL.  11  —  z 


338 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


civil  servants  against  arbitrary  dismissal  from  office^  the  cen- 
tralized government  has  often  been  accused  of  using  its 
control  of  local  government  to  promote  personal  and  par- 
tisan ends,  to  influence  national  elections  and  to  reward 
friends  .^ith  offices. 

While  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly  proved  to  be 
unanimous  in  187 1  in  their  desire  to  maintain  and  fortify 
strife  in  Na  relatively  venerable  institutions  of  French  local 
tionai  government,  they  fell  to  quarreling  bitterly  about 
Assembly  the  future  form  of  the  central  government.  Should 
Form  of  it  be  a  repubhc  or  a  monarchy  ?  When  it  is  recalled 
Permanent  that  five  hundred  out  of  the  seven  hundred  deputies 
Govern-  were  avowed  Monarchists,  it  may  seem  surprising 
ment:  Re-  that  the  qucstion  was  not  promptly  and  vociferously 
Monarchy?  answered  with  the  word  ''monarchy."  But  a  grave 
difficulty  lurked  in  the  fact  that  the  Monarchist  ma- 
jority was  split  into  three  seemingly  irreconcilable  factions,  none 
of  which  alone  possessed  a  controlling  vote.  Of  the  three  factions, 
the  ImperiaHsts,  as  the  followers  of  Napoleon  III  were  henceforth 
styled,  were  naturally,  in  view  of  the  recent  disastrous  war,  an 
almost  negHgible  quantity,  but  the  other  two  —  Legitimists 
and  Orleanists  —  were  numerous  and  very  quarrelsome.  The 
Legitimists  supported  the  claims  of  the  count  of  Chambord 
(1820-1883),  the  grandson  of  Charles  X,  and  worked  for  the 
restoration  of  a  government  as  far  as  possible  in  harmony  with 
the  ancient  traditions  of  French  royalty.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Orleanists  upheld  the  cause  of  Liberal  Monarchy  as  exem- 
plified in  the  governmental  system  of  Great  Britain  and  as 
feasible  in  the  person  of  the  count  of  Paris  (1838-1894),  the 
grandson  of  that  bourgeois  duke  of  Orleans,  Louis  Philippe. 
Between  the  count  of  Chambord  and  the  count  of  Paris  no  love 
was  lost,  for  the  grandfather  of  one  had  not  so  long  ago  been 
chased  out  of  France  by  the  grandfather  of  the  other;  and 
among  their  respective  partisans  their  divergent  principles  were 
still  kept  ahve.  Under  these  curious  circumstances  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  for  a  long  time  made  little  progress  in  framing 
a  constitution  for  the  Third  Republic.  The  RepubHcans  were 
hopelessly  outnumbered  and  the  Monarchists  were  disputing 
among  themselves. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  339 


In  1872,  however,  the  Monarchists  were  temporarily  brought 
together  by  the  confession  of  Thiers  that  their  bickerings  had 
converted  him  from  Liberal  Monarchy  to  Repub-  ^ 

.  Temporary 

licanism  and  that  in  his  opinion  the  majority  of  Advantage 
the  French  people  desired  a  Republican  form  of  govern-  ^"^gj^" 
ment.    In  the  following  May  they  united  in  forcing 
his  resignation  and  in  electing  as  president  the  unwavering 
Monarchist  and  Clerical,  Marshal  MacMahon  (i  808-1 893). 
And  by  August  it  seemed  as  if  their  differences  were  quite  com- 
posed and  as  if  they  could  proceed  forthwith  to  proclaim  the 
Bourbon  Monarchy,  for  in  that  month  the  count  of  Paris  traveled 
to  Austria,  threw  himself  at  the  feet  of  his  cousin,  the  count  of 
Chambord,  begging  pardon  and  friendship,  and  consented  to  an 
arrangement  whereby  the  latter  should  succeed  to  the  French 
throne  as  "  Henry  V,"  while  he  himself  should  be  recognized 
as  heir-apparent. 

But  the  agreement  of  the  Monarchists  was  short-lived.  The 
announcement  in  October,  1873,  by  the  prospective  ''Henry 
V"  of  his  unalterable  determination  not  to  abandon 

Tne 

the  principles  of  divine-right  monarchy  nor  the  white  chambord 
flag  of  the  Bourbons  sealed  his  fate,  and  incidentally  Jg^^®^*' 
that  of  the  monarchy.    The  Orleanists  drew  back 
and  reaffirmed  their  devotion  to  LiberaHsm.    Marshal  Mac- 
Mahon, sturdy  soldier  and  zealous  Monarchist,  acutely  ob- 
served that  at  the  very  sight  of  the  white  flag  of  absolutism 
''the  rifles  in  the  army  would  go  off  by  themselves."    And  the 
revulsion  of  feehng  displayed  itself  throughout  the  country  in 
the  victory  of  the  Repubhcans  at  the  by-elections  which  were 
held  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  Assembly.    The  French  people  were 
obviously  too  steeped  in  the  constitutional  doctrines  of  the 
Revolution  to  accept  a  very  obstinate  prince,  just  as  he  was, 
with  his  old-fashioned  principles  and  his  moth-eaten  flag. 

Henceforth  but  one  practicable  course  presented  itself  to  the 
Orleanists  and  other  Liberal  Monarchists,  and  that  was  to 
organize,  in  conjunction  with  the  Republicans,  a  gov-  Halting 
ernment  which  could  serve  as  a  makeshift  till  the  count  Acceptance 
of  Chambord  had  taken  the  white  flag  to  the  grave  and  p|j^Hc  by 
had  left  the  way  to  the  throne  open  to  the  count  of  the  National 
Paris.    The  first  step  in  such  a  course  was  taken  in 


340 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


November,  1873,  when  a  bill  was  passed  bestowing  upon  Marshal 
MacMahon  the  title  and  office  of  President  of  the  Republic  for 
a  definite  term  of  seven  years.  So  great,  however,  were  the 
natural  antipathies  between  the  two  factions,  on  whose  joint 
action  the  adoption  of  even  a  makeshift  now  depended,  that  it 
was  not  until  January,  1875,  that  the  National  Assembly  took 
the  next  step.  At  that  time  it  adopted  by  the  slender  margin 
The  "  Con  yotc  an  amendment  which  provided  for  the 

stitutional  election  of  future  presidents  of  the  Republic,  thereby 
1875^''^^  practically  recognizing  the  Republic.  Then  followed 
more  rapidly  two  constitutional  laws  in  February  and 
a  third  in  July.  These  constitutional  laws,"  thus  loosely 
drafted  and  voted  piecemeal  by  a  National  Assembly  which  had 
been  elected  four  years  earlier  to  make  peace  with  the  Germans, 
and  in  which  Monarchists  still  predominated,  proved  to  be,  with 
very  few  subsequent  amendments,  the  permanent  constitution 
of  the  Third  French  RepubHc. 

UnHke  earlier  instruments  of  government  in  France,  the  con- 
stitutional laws  of  1875  were  of  an  essentially  practical  nature: 
Government  ^^^Y  ^^^^  down  no  theoretical  principles,  and  their 
of  the  Third  provisions  Were  confined  to  what  was  necessary  to  insure 
Repubhc  ^j^^  proper  operation  of  governmental  machinery.  In 
many  respects  they  showed  clear  borrowing  from  the  British 
system  of  parhamentary  government,  and  in  other  respects 
compromises  between  the  RepubHcan  and  Monarchist  framers. 
The  system  which  they  estabhshed  may  be  sketched  as  follows : 

The  legislative  power  was  given  to  a  parliament,  consisting  of 
two  elective  Chambers,  a  majority  vote  of  both  of  which  is  neces- 
sary to  enact  laws.  The  two  Chambers,  when  they  meet  jointly 
as  a  National  Assembly,  have  the  right  to  amend  the  constitu- 
tional laws  and  the  duty  of  electing  the  President  of  the  Repub- 
lic. One  Chamber,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which  in  1914 
comprised  602  members,  is  elected  by  direct  universal  manhood 
suffrage,^  and  is  renewed  every  four  years ;  the  other,  the  Senate, 

^  The  manner  of  election  of  Deputies  has  been  modified  several  times  since 
1871.  The  scrutin  de  liste,  under  which  each  elector  votes  for  as  many  Deputies 
as  the  entire  Department  has  to  elect,  was  introduced  in  1871.  In  1876  it  was 
replaced  by  the  scrutin  d'arrondissement,  under  which  each  Department  is  divided 
into  a  number  of  Arrondissements,  each  elector  voting  for  one  Deputy  only;  in 
1885  there  was  a  return  to  the  scrntin  de  liste;  in  1889  resort  was  again  had  to  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  341 


consists  of  three  hundred  members,  chosen  by  indirect  election  ^ 
for  nine  years,  a  third  of  the  house  being  renewed  every  three 
years.  The  executive  power  was  intrusted  to  a  President, 
elected  by  the  National  Assembly  for  seven  years  and  eligible 
for  reelection.  His  powers  are  theoretically  extremely  broad, 
including  the  initiative  in  legislation  jointly  with  the  Chambers, 
the  appointment  of  all  civil  and  military  officers,  the  right  of 
individual  pardon,  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  and  the  con- 
clusion of  treaties  (which,  however,  in  some  cases  must  be 
ratified  by  the  Chambers),  the  mobihzation  of  the  army  (al- 
though a  formal  declaration  of  war  may  be  made  only  with  the 
approval  of  the  Chambers),  and,  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate, 
the  dissolution  at  any  time  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and 
the  direction  of  new  elections  thereto.  But  in  practice,  not  a 
single  one  of  these  wide  powers  may  be  exercised  by  the  Presi- 
dent without  the  written  countersignature  of  a  member  of  the 
Ministry,  who  are  severally  and  jointly  responsible  to  the 
Chambers. 

In  this  way  the  French  parliament  is  supreme  in  the  execution 
of  laws  as  well  as  in  the  making  of  laws  and  in  the  amending  of 
the  constitution.    The  Ministry,  who  discharge  the  supremacy 
functions  of  the  President  and  who  Hkewise  control  of  the 
the  whole  machinery  of  local  government  throughout 
France,  must  maintain  a  majority  in  the  Chambers;  if  they 
fail  to  carry  the  measures  they  propose  or  if  the  Chambers  pass 
a  vote  of  'Hack  of  confidence,"  they  must  resign  and  leave  to  the 
President  the  task  of  forming  a  new  cabinet  which  can  command 

scrutin  d^arrondissement;  and  since  then  the  same  system  has  remained.  In  i88g 
it  was  enacted  that  each  candidate  is  bound  to  make,  within  the  fortnight  which 
precedes  the  elections,  a  declaration  as  to  his  being  a  candidate  for  a  given  constit- 
uency, and  for  one  constituency  only  —  all  votes  which  may  eventually  be  given 
him  in  other  constituencies  being  reckoned  as  void.  Elections  are  conducted 
under  the  auspices  of  a  commission  of  Councilors-General  appointed  by  the  Pre- 
fect of  the  Department.  As  in  most  Continental  countries,  elections  are  held  on 
Sunday,  and  a  Deputy-elect  must  have  received  an  absolute  majority,  rather  than 
a  mere  plurality  of  all  votes  cast ;  if  a  clear  majority  is  not  forthcoming  in  a  given 
constituency,  a  second  ballot  must  be  taken  two  weeks  later. 

*  The  Senators  are  chosen  in  each  Department  by  special  electoral  colleges  that 
include  the  Deputies  and  the  Councilors-General  of  the  Department,  and  the 
members  of  the  Councils  of  the  Arrondissements  and  delegates  elected  by  the 
Councils  of  the  Communes  into  which  the  Department  is  divided.  Until  1884 
provision  was  made  for  the  election  of  75  Senators  for  life. 


342 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  Chambers'  confidence.  Thus,  unlike  the  American  Republic, 
the  French  RcpubHc  does  not  recognize  the  principle  of  a  division 
of  political  powers  but  subordinates  all  of  them  to  an  elected 
parliament.  In  this  respect  it  approaches  the  parliamentary 
system  of  Great  Britain.  In  fact  the  French  President  is  re- 
duced to  the  position  of  a  fine  figure-head,  a  kind  of  elected 
British  king,  whose  chief  obligations  are  of  a  social  and  cere- 
monial character. 

Having  drafted  the  constitutional  laws,  whose  main  provisions 
have  just  been  indicated,  the  National  Assembly  closed  its  mani- 
,  ,    fold  labors  late  in  187 ;  and  the  first  regular  elections 

Close  of  the        .       ,  .    ,  _     '  ^, '  ,    ,  ,  , 

National  Under  the  ihird  Republic  were  held.  The  result  was 
1875°^^^^'  the  return  of  a  Republican  Chamber  of  Deputies  and 
of  a  Monarchist  Senate,  and  a  renewal  ^f  fierce  par- 
tisan strife  between  the  two  factions  for  the  control  of  the  whole 
machinery  of  government. 

In  these  trying  days,  while  it  was  still  a  doubtful  question  of 
republic  or  monarchy,  the  real  Monarchist  leader  was  Presi- 
Marshai  ^^^^  MacMahon  himself.  He  did  all  he  could  to  ex- 
Mac-  tend  that  party's  propaganda.  He  appealed  with 
Resident  much  success  to  the  old  nobility,  to  the  peasantry,  and 
and  to  the  soldiers.  To  the  same  end,  he  utilized  his 
Monarchist  gg^^^jg^j.  patronage  and  his  right,  in  accordance  with 
the  Concordat  of  1801,  to  name  the  French  bishops.  In  order 
to  identify  French  ClericaHsm  fully  with  the  political  cause  of 
monarchy,  he  gave  moral  support  to  the  agitation  for  French 
intervention  in  Italy  in  behalf  of  the  pope's  temporal  power  and 
he  gave  liberally  toward  defraying  the  expense  of  building,  ''as 
an  expiation  for  the  sins  of  revolution,"  the  great  Church  of  the 
Sacred  Heart  on  the  heights  of  Montmartre,  where  crowds  of 
Communists  had  been  shot  down  in  1871.  And  in  the  duke  of 
Broglie  (1821-1901),  MacMahon  had  for  some  time  a  prime 
minister  who  actively  sought  to  further  all  these  policies. 

On  the  RepubHcan  side,  the  foremost  leader  was  Leon  Gam- 
Gambetta  bctta.  Born  in  southeastern  France  in  1838,  the  son 
RepubUcan  of  a  grocer  of  Genoese  descent,  Gambetta  had  become 
Leader  ^  lawyer  in  Paris  and  was  already  a  hostile  critic  of 
Napoleon  III  when  in  1868  he  acquired  national  notoriety  as  the 
brilliant  successful  attorney  for  a  certain  Delescluze,  a  journaHst 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  343 


who  was  on  trial  ^  charged  with  collecting  subscriptions  for  a 
monument  to  a  man  who  had  resisted  the  coup  d^etat  of  185 1. 
Gambetta  was  speedily  elected  in  1869  to  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties, where  he  joined  the  small  Republican  minority  and  in  the 
following  year  voted  with  them  against  the  German  War.  But 
once  the  war  was  well  under  way  and  the  French  were  suffering 
severe  reverses,  the  patriotism  of  Gambetta  became  the  central 
point  of  national  resistance.  He  it  was  who  helped  to  proclaim 
the  republic  on  4  September,  1870;  he  it  was  who  for  the  next 
five  months,  as  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  National  De- 
fense and  virtual  dictator  of  the  country,  displayed  immense 
energy  and  skill  in  bringing  army  after  army  of  raw  recruits 
against  the  unconquerable  Germans ;  and  he  it  was  whose  un- 
quenchable spirit,  never  admitting  defeat,  fought  vainly  in 
February,  187 1,  both  in  the  electoral  campaign  and  in  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  against  yielding  Alsace-Lorraine  and  making 
peace  with  the  national  foe. 

Although  Gambetta  distrusted  Thiers  and  detested  the  Mon- 
archist majority  in  the  National  Assembly,  he  entertained  little 
sympathy  for  such  extreme  RadicaHsm  as  was  ex-  ^    ^  ^ 

1  •  ^    V  .      1     -r^    •    ^  11  11       Gambetta  a 

emphfied  m  the  Pans  Commune,  and  he  was  doubt-  "  Moder- 
less  glad  to  retire  to  Spain  during  the  spring  of  1871  p^^jjjjj^" 
while  the  Versailles  government  was  suppressing  civil 
war.    Gambetta  was  an  early  type  of  a  host  of  poHticians  who 
have  figured  in  the  annals  of  the  Third  RepubHc  —  a  middle- 
class  Radical,  extremely  patriotic,  very  much  devoted  to  the 
assurance  of  business  prosperity,  a  true  friend  of  internal  secur- 
ity, whose  Radicalism  was  primarily  of  a  political  and  reli- 
gious character  not  much  given  to  special  theorizing  about 
the  welfare  of  the  working  classes.    In  other  words,  Gambetta 
and  most  of  the  Republican  leaders  after  him  supported  Capital- 
ism with  one  arm  and  with  the  other  dealt  staggering  blows  at 
Clericalism.    This  is  really  what  is  meant  when  the  opinions 
of  Gambetta  are  referred  to  as  ''Moderate." 

It  was  the  moderation  of  Gambetta  as  well  as  his  remarkable 
gifts  of  oratory  that  enabled  him  after  June,  187 1,  when  he  took 

^  Delescluze  (1809-1871)  was  a  member  of  the  Socialist  "International,"  and 
subsequently  a  member  of  the  Paris  Commune,  and  died  fighting  on  the  barricades 
in  May,  1871. 


344 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


a  seat  in  the  National  Assembly,  to  hold  the  Republican  minority 
together  and  gradually  in  the  course  of  the  ensuing  four  years 
to  effect  compromise  after  compromise  with  the  faction  of  Liberal 
Monarchists.  Next  to  the  exigencies  of  the  Orleanists,  the 
pohtical  ideas  and  maneuvers  of  Gambetta  were  the  most 
potent  factor  in  actually  shaping  the  constitution  of  the  Third 
French  Republic. 

Now  that  the  new  form  of  government  was  in  operation,  it 
devolved  upon  Gambetta  to  lead  the  political  struggle  against 

President  MacMahon's  subversive  tendencies  and  to 
fndthe***  cnKst  wider  popular  support  for  the  RepubUcan  regime. 
Rise  of  Shrewdly  taking  advantage  of  the  objections  to  the  in- 
cdism^^"     tellectual  and  political  position  of  the  Catholic  Church, 

objections  which  were  undoubtedly  growing  in  the 
last  years  of  the  pontificate  of  Pope  Pius  IX,  he  raised  the  ques- 
tion of  Clericalism.  In  the  Chamber  and  in  the  country  he 
poured  out  floods  of  oratory  now  against  the  Monarchists  be- 
cause they  aided  the  Church  and  now  against  the  Church  because 
it  was  run  by  Monarchists  and  for  Monarchists.  As  he  expected, 
his  attacks  upon  the  Clericals  became  increasingly  popular  and 
gradually  swelled  the  number  of  Republicans.  And  an  espe- 
cially bitter  diatribe  which  he  deHvered  in  the  Chamber  on  4  May, 
1877,  in  the  course  of  which  he  uttered  the  memorable  phrase  — 
''Clericalism,  there  is  the  enemy"  —  was  the  immediate  oc- 
casion for  the  real  test  of  strength  between  Gambetta  and 
MacMahon. 

Tiring  of  the  chronic  disputes  between  himself  and  the  Re- 
publican Chamber  and  believing  that  the  Republican  leader's 
Issue  of  the  rampant  Anti-ClericaHsm  would  be  properly  rebuked 
struggle  by  the  country  at  large,  the  Monarchist  President  on 
MacMahon  May,  1 87 7,  appointed  a  Clerical  ministry  under  the 
and  duke  of  Broglie  and  adjourned  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 

Gambetta  ^^^^  ^  month,  and  then  formally  dissolved  it,  with 
the  constitutional  consent  of  the  Senate,  and  directed  that 
new  elections  should  be  held  throughout  France.  The  ensuing 
electoral  campaign  was  one  of  the  most  spectacular  and  stub- 
bornly contested  in  history.  Both  Gambetta  and  the  President 
made  speech-making  tours.  None  could  deny  that  both  had 
loved  their  country  and  deserved  well  of  the  nation;  none 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  345 


could  doubt  MacMahon's  sincerity;  but  few  could  withstand 
Gambetta's  eloquence.  The  campaign  proved  to  be  one  of  the 
most  decisive  in  history,  for  the  Republicans  won,  securing 
almost  as  large  a  majority  in  the  new  Chamber  as  they  had 
possessed  in  the  old,  and  a  Republican  ministry  replaced  that  of 
the  duke  of  Broglie.  For  another  year  the  Monarchist  and 
Clerical  Marshal-President  doggedly  struggled  on  against 
powerful  odds,  but  when,  early  in  1879,  partial  elections  to  the 
Senate  insured  RepubKcan  control  of  that  house  as  well  as  of 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  he  finally  perceived  the  hopelessness 
of  his  situation.  He  resigned  the  presidency  in  January,  1879, 
and  was  succeeded  by  Jules  Grevy  (1813-1891),  a  thorough- 
going Republican.  In  the  following  year  (1880),  the  seat  of 
government  was  transferred  from  Versailles  to  Paris,  and  the 
fourteenth  of  July  —  the  anniversary  of  the  fall  of  the  Bastille 
and  the  day  dear  to  French  Revolutionaries  —  was  formally 
proclaimed  the  national  holiday.    France  was  Republican. 

Thus  the  Third  French  Republic,  proclaimed  in  1870,  came 
fully  into  Republican  hands  first  in  1879.    Gambetta,  to  whom 
must  be  awarded  chief  credit  for  the  outcome  of  the 
nine  years'  political  struggle,  did  not  long  survive;  fanThfcon- 
after  a  brief  term  as  prime  minister,  he  was  acciden-  troi  of  the 
tally  killed  (1882)  under  tragic  circumstances.   But  the  fg^^p"^^^^' 
Republicans,  though  they  were  thereby  deprived  of 
their  ablest  leader  and  henceforth  tended  to  break  up  into  petty 
factions,  never  lost  control  of  the  state.    On  the  contrary,  from 
1879  to  1914,  the  Republicans  were  always  growing  in  number 
and  strength  and  the  Monarchists  were  steadily  declining  to  the 
position  of  an  inconsequential  faction. 

The  Bourgeois  Character  of  the  Republic  and  the 
Repression  of  Clerical  and  Military  Opposition 

As  general  features  in  the  history  of  the  Third  Republic  under 
Republicans  and  down  to  the  year  19 14  may  be  remarked  first  the 
bourgeois  character  and  policies  of  the  dominant  states-  ^,   „  , 

,  .  .  -     „  .      The  Repub- 

men  and  pohticians,  witnessed  alike  m  internal  affairs  uc  under 
and  in  external  relations ;  secondly,  the  conflict  with  RepubU- 
Clericalism ;  and  thirdly,  the  problems  of  militarism. 


346  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


In  following  the  history  of  the  Third  Republic  one  is  struck 
by  the  almost  complete  absence  of  the  names  of  noblemen  and 
_   ^         clergymen  from  the  list  of  prominent  statesmen  and 

The  Gov-  ,  °r  .  .       ,  ,    ,        n  t     1  r 

erning  Class  pubucists ;  One  IS  also  strucK  by  the  utter  Jack  of  any 
is-^^^ipu  P^^^^^  during  the  period  stood  politically  head 
and  shoulders  above  other  persons ;  in  a  word,  one  is 
struck  by  the  simple  fact  that  the  working  majority  in  the  parlia- 
ment, the  chief  local  officials,  the  cabinet-members,  and  the 
presidents  were,  almost  without  exception,  lawyers,  or  teachers, 
or  business  men,  —  members  of  the  middle  class,  intelligent, 
well-educated,  and  competent,  but  on  a  uniform  level  of  society 
and  of  achievement. 

That  such  a  company  of  public  men  should  devote  their  best 
efforts  to  promoting  material  prosperity  was  to  be  expected; 
Promotion  ^  ^^^^  ^^^^  Under  the  Third  Republic  France 

of  Material  made  greater  economic  advance  than  in  any  earlier 
Prospenty  pej-jod  of  like  duration.  In  line  with  policies  of  Louis 
Philippe  and  of  Napoleon  III,  agriculture,  industry,  and  com- 
merce were  encouraged  in  every  conceivable  way.  Between 
1879  and  1904  public  moneys  equal  in  amount  to  the  huge  war 
indemnity  paid  to  Germany  were  expended  on  works  of  peace 
within  France :  approximately  200,000  kilometers  of  splendid 
new  highways  were  built ;  200  kilometers  of  canals  were  added 
to  the  existing  1000,  and  all  were  freed  from  public  dues  (1880) 
and  from  private  tolls  (1889) ;  30,000  kilometers  of  new  railway 
were  laid;  harbors  were  deepened  at  Dunkirk,  Dieppe,  Rouen, 
Nantes,  and  Bordeaux,  and  spacious  new  ones  were  constructed 
Agriculture  "^^  Havre  and  St.  Nazaire.  Upon  the  agricultural 
classes,  still  relatively  very  important  in  France  because 
of  the  fertility  of  the  country  and  the  traditional  thrift  of  the 
numerous  peasant  proprietors,  many  favors  were  conferred :  a 
special  ministry  of  agriculture  was  created  (1881) ;  large  financial 
grants  were  made  in  aid  of  the  vine-growers  (1879) ;  bounties 
were  repeatedly  voted  to  foster  the  culture  of  silk,  flax,  and 
hemp,  and  for  the  breeding  of  horses ;  farmers  were  authorized 
(1884)  to  form  cooperative  societies  for  collective  buying  and 
selHng;  mutual  loan  banks  and  insurance  companies  were  es- 
tablished (1894)  under  state  guarantees  to  assist  the  peasants; 
agricultural  schools  were  opened  and  endowed;  and  a  system 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  347 


of  tariff  protection  in  favor  of  agricultural  produce,  especially 
of  wheat  and  beet-root  sugar,  partially  secured  by  a  law  of  1885, 
was  completed  by  the  great  tariff  act  of  1892.  The  efficacy  of 
these  measures  is  partly  registered  in  the  fact  that  the  annual 
value  of  the  agricultural  output  of  France,  which  between  1800 
and  i860  only  rose  from  four  to  six  billions  of  francs,  reached  in 
1 91 3  a  total  in  excess  of  eleven  billions. 

But  the  growth  of  French  industry  during  the  period  was 
even  more  remarkable  than  the  agricultural  advance.  The 
machines  in  the  factories  increased  in  number  from  ,  ^  ^ 

Industry 

30,600  to  90,000,  multiplying  themselves  tenfold  in 
power,  from  870,000  horse-power  to  8,600,000.  The  output  of 
the  coal  mines  was  doubled,  and  that  of  the  blast-furnaces  was 
multipHed  sixfold.  Though  the  chief  market  for  French  indus- 
tries was  at  home,  there  was  none  the  less  an  increase  of  25  per 
cent  in  exported  goods.  It  was  to  protect  industry  as  well  as 
agriculture  that  the  Republic  adopted  in  1892  the  poHcy  of  a 
high  customs  tariff. 

It  was  likewise  to  the  advantage  of  French  business  that  under 
the  Third  Repubhc  a  particularly  vigorous  colonial  poKcy  was 
pursued.  Deferring  until  Part  V  of  this  volume  a  vigorous 
detailed  treatment  of  the  manner  and  extent  of  Colonial 
French  colonial  expansion,  it  will  suffice  in  this  place 
to  state  three  facts :  first,  that  by  19 14  France  possessed  a  new 
colonial  empire  in  Africa,  in  Indo-China,  and  in  island  archi- 
pelagoes of  the  Pacific,  to  say  nothing  of  the  scattered  remnants 
of  the  old-time  empire  in  America  and  in  India,  which  in  total 
area  and  population  ranked  second  only  to  the  British  Empire ; 
secondly,  that  of  these  holdings,  considerably  more  than  three- 
fourths  of  the  area  and  of  the  population  were  added  under 
RepubHcan  auspices  between  1879  and  1913 ;  and  thirdly,  that 
the  annual  trade  of  France  with  her  colonies  steadily  increased 
during  the  period  from  350  million  francs  to  nearly  two  billions. 
To  French  capitalists,  the  new  colonies  afforded  not  only  good 
markets  for  the  sale  of  the  surplus  products  of  their  factories 
and  farms  but  excellent  fields  for  the  investment  of  surplus  capital 
in  such  lucrative  enterprises  as  the  development  of  natural  re- 
sources and  the  introduction  of  internal  improvements.  By 
means  of  constant  military  expeditions  and  the  maintenance  of 


348  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


a  powerful  navy  for  many  years  surpassed  in  tonnage  and  armor 
only  by  that  of  Great  Britain,  the  French  Republic  preserved 
order  throughout  her  colonial  empire  and  incidentally  guaranteed 
to  her  capitalists  safe  financial  returns  on  their  investments. 

Of  course  business  was  not  the  sole  motive  that  actuated  this 
distant  empire-building  of  the  Third  RepubUc.  ReHgion  played 
Clerical  part,  too.    The  devout  Catholic  priest  who  found 

Support  of  in  the  French  flag  and  arms  a  valuable  protection  for 
Colonialism  j^.^  missionary  zeal  among  infidels  and  heathen,  was 
able,  at  least  on  one  question,  to  agree  with  the  worldly  business 
man ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  business  man,  often  strenuously 
Anti-Clerical  at  home,  discovered  the  missionaries  to  be  so  useful 
in  preparing  the  natives  for  the  commodities  of  Western  civili- 
zation that  on  colonial  matters  he  could  afford  to  be  tolerably 
Clerical.  But  even  more  controlHng  than  religion  —  because 
it  was  more  universally  entertained  by  Frenchmen  —  was  the 
potent  motive  of  nationalism  in  colonial  expansion.  For  a  nation 
which  since  the  sixteenth  century  had  had  a  glorious,  if  some- 
what unfortunate,  history  of  exploration  and  colonization  and 
which  recently  had  suffered  at  German  hands  a  sharp  dimxinu- 
tion  of  international  prestige  and  the  loss  of  two  rich  provinces 
in  Europe,  it  was  perfectly  natural  to  transfer  ambitions  and 
energies  beyond  the  seas  to  other  continents.  HumiHated  at 
home,  France  sought  consolation  abroad ;  and  imperialism  was 
the  one  thing  which  could  unite  the  nation.  CapitaUsts  and 
Clericals  led  the  way,  and  all  patriotic  people  followed.  A 
boasted  pilot  of  political  democracy  in  Europe,  the  Third  Re- 
pubhc  definitely  embarked  upon  a  wholesale  policy  of  proudly 
and  arbitrarily  ruling  ''inferior"  races  in  other  parts  of  the  globe. 

Thus,  by  means  of  colonialism,  of  tariff  protectionism,  and  of 
the  matchless  domestic  developments  in  industry,  commerce, 
Increase  of  and  agriculture,  —  all  attended  and  supported  by  a 
Wealth  great  show  of  miHtarism,  —  the  wealth  of  France 
enormously  increased  under  the  Third  Republic.  Not  only 
did  Frenchmen  continually  add  to  their  investments  of  capital 
in  their  own  country  and  in  their  colonies,  but  they  became  the 
foremost  money-lenders  of  the  Continent,  as  regards  both  the 
bond-issues  of  foreign  governments  and  the  stock-sales  of  foreign 
development-companies . 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


349 


In  France,  as  in  other  countries  affected  by  the  Industrial 
Revolution,  the  increase  of  wealth  was  not  evenly  distributed. 
There  still  remained  the  proletariat,  working  long  social 
hours  for  small  wages,  huddled  in  the  cities  or  in  the  legislation 
mines,  and  deprived  of  most  comforts  of  life.  To  reduce  the 
number  of  this  class  the  Third  Republic  did  little,  but  to  ameli- 
orate their  lot  it  enacted  several  measures.  In  thus  entering 
the  sphere  of  social  poHtics  and  impressing  a  new  character 
upon  the  whole  period,  RepubHcan  statesmen  were  undoubtedly 
moved  by  three  motives  :  first,  a  sense  of  fair-play  in  the  minds  of 
many  respectable  middle-class  citizens,  mingled  in  some  cases 
with  an  idea  that  a  contented  healthy  working  class  would  be 
a  most  valuable  national  asset ;  secondly,  a  certain  fear  of 
SociaKsm  and  a  wilhngness  to  grant  some  concessions  to  work- 
ingmen  in  order  to  avoid  what  might  otherwise  be  a  dire  neces- 
sity of  conceding  all  the  SociaHst  demands ;  and  thirdly,  a  polit- 
ical bid  for  the  support  of  the  working  classes  against  Monarchy 
and  ClericaHsm.  Sometimes  it  was  one  of  these  motives  behind 
a  bit  of  social  legislation,  sometimes  another,  sometimes  all  three. 

Of  the  social  legislation  which  belonged  to  the  Third  Republic 
during  the  era  from  187 1  to  1914,  the  following  significant  meas- 
ures may  be  cited,  (i)  The  great  Act  of  1892,^  as  subsequently 
amended  in  certain  particulars,  regulated  the  employment  of 
women ;  forbade  the  employment  of  children  under  thirteen 
years  of  age ;  provided  a  maximum  working  day  of  ten  hours  for 
all  workingmen ;  prohibited  all  manual  work  on  Sunday,  except 
in  certain  industries,  in  which,  however,  another  day  of  the  week 
must  be  substituted  for  Sunday  as  a  day  of  rest ;  and  placed 
elaborate  restrictions  on  labor  in  the  mines.  (2)  An  act  of  1893, 
amended  in  1903,  made  adequate  provision  for  the  hygiene  and 
safety  of  workers  in  industrial  establishments,  and  another  act 
of  the  year  1893  insured  free  medical  attendance  for  working- 
men  and  their  families.  (3)  An  act  of  1900  required  shopkeepers 
to  provide  seats  for  all  the  women  and  children  employed  by 
them,  and  extended  many  of  the  factory  laws  to  cover  retail 
shops.  (4)  An  act  of  1905  provided  for  miners  a  maximum 
working-day  of  nine  hours,  which  was  reduced  to  eight  hours 
by  an  act  of  1907.    (5)  A  very  important  act  of  1884  followed 

*  This  act  was  a  development  of  measures  passed  in  1848,  1874,  and  1885. 


350 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


up  the  Napoleonic  act  of  1864,  which  had  partially  recognized 
trade  unions,  by  according  full  protection  and  encouragement 
to  the  numerous  activities  of  combinations  of  workingmen, 
with  a  result  that  by  1913  French  trade  unions  (syndicats)  num- 
bered more  than  12,000  with  at  least  two  million  members, 
many  of  them  possessing  employment  bureaus,  libraries,  insur- 
ance funds,  and  even  professional  and  technical  schools.  (6)  An 
act  of  1892  created  machinery  for  official  but  voluntary  concil- 
iation and  arbitration  in  the  case  of  collective  disputes  between 
employers  and  workmen.  (7)  An  important  act  of  1898  obliged 
employers  to  compensate  workmen  for  injuries  received  in  the 
course  of  their  employment.  (8)  In  191 1  a  system  of  old-age 
pensions  came  into  force  in  France,  embracing  all  wage-earners 
with  the  exception  of  railway  servants,  miners,  and  sailors,  for 
whom  special  provision  already  had  been  made,  and  including 
domestic  servants  and  farm  laborers ;  the  system  is  compulsory 
and  contributory,  the  premiums  being  paid  partly  by  the 
workers,  partly  by  the  employers,  and  partly  by  the  state. 

The  Third  Republic  acquired  a  merited  reputation  not  only 
for  an  attempt  to  confer  some  measure  of  ''social  justice"  upon 
Guarantees  workingmen,  but  likewise,  and  in  line  with  its  heri- 
of  Individual  tage  from  the  French  Revolution,  for  repeated  statu- 
Liberties  ^^^^  guarantees  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  in- 
dividual. "Liberty"  was  stressed.  A  law  of  1881,  as  amended 
twenty  years  later,  established  the  right  of  holding  meetings 
without  any  preliminary  authorization  on  the  part  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  full  freedom  of  speech.  Another  act  of  1881, 
which  assured  the  freedom  of  publication,  is  one  of  the  most 
liberal  press  laws  in  the  world :  by  it  all  oflfenses  committed  by 
any  kind  of  publication  are  submitted  to  a  jury ;  and  the  punish- 
ment for  mere  expression  of  obnoxious  opinions  is  abolished, 
the  only  penalties  being  for  slander,  libel,  inciting  to  crime,  and 
in  certain  instances  the  publication  of  false  news.  A  third  act, 
the  famous  Associations  Act  of  1901,  decreed  the  freedom  of  as- 
sociation, by  recognizing,  on  condition  of  a  simple  declaration 
to  the  administrative  authorities,  the  legal  status  of  all  voluntary 
societies,  the  objects  of  which  are  not  contrary  to  law  or  to  public 
order  or  morality,  the  monastic  congregations  of  the  Catholic 
Church  alone  being  excepted. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  351 


In  this  connection  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Third  Republic 
in  harmony  with  a  general  tendency  of  the  era  adopted  a  good 
deal  of  humanitarian  legislation.  Between  187 1  and  Humani- 
1914  there  were  more  than  fifty  enactments  involving  tarfanLegis- 
important  modifications  of  the  criminal  law,  due  to  ^^^^^ 
more  scientific  ideas  of  punishment  and  to  a  tenderer  regard 
for  offenders.  Moreover,  an  important  act  of  1899  not  only 
gave  much  better  protection  to  children  who  are  ill-treated  or 
morally  neglected,  but  also  modified  the  Code  Napoleon  so  as  to 
reduce  the  power  of  the  father  over  the  family.  On  the  other 
hand,  divorce,  which  had  been  permitted  by  the  Code  but 
abolished  under  Clerical  influence  in  18 16,  was  restored  by  an 
act  of  1884. 

More  spectacular  and  perhaps  more  distinctive  of  the  Re- 
publican regime  in  France  than  economic  progress  has  been  the 
growth  of  Anti-Clericalism.    Clearly  indicated  by  g^^^^y 
Gambetta  in  1877  as  the  chief  issue,  it  came  promptly  Growth  of 
to  the  fore  as  soon  as  the  Republicans  secured  control  ^^g^^®"" 
of  the  machinery  of  government.    At  that  time,  poHt- 
ically  speaking.    Monarchist   and   Clerical   were  practically 
synonymous  terms.    Consequently  the  wholesale  dismissal  of 
Monarchist  office-holders  throughout  the  country  deprived  the 
Clericals  of  the  influence  in  local  government  which  they  had 
notoriously  been  utilizing  to  serve  the  interests  of  the  clergy 
and  the  hoped-for  Monarchy ;  and  the  new  Republican  prefects 
and  sub-prefects  became  so  many  centers  of  energetic  Anti- 
Clerical  agitation. 

The  first  and  perhaps  most  basic  source  of  conflict  between 
Republicans  and  Clericals  was  the  question  of  education.  The 
preeminence  in  the  instruction  of  the  youth  which  the  g^^^.^^ 
Catholic  Church  had  continued  to  enjoy  in  France  conflict 
throughout  the  greater  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  ^^g^^^^"" 
and  which  had  been  magnified  under  Napoleon  III, 
was  now  assailed  by  Republicans  on  the  ground  that  the  church- 
schools  were  hot-beds  of  Monarchist  propaganda  and  that  it 
was  the  duty  of  a  democracy  to  provide  education  for  -^^^^^^^^^^ 
all  children  without  displaying  any  favoritism  in  behalf 
of  any  particular  religion.    In  other  words,  the  Republicans 
championed  ''neutral"  schools,  which  the  Clericals  denounced  as 


352 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


atheistical  and  immoral.  Largely  through  the  efforts  of  Ferdi- 
nand Buisson  (184 1-  ),  who  was  director  of  primary  education 
from  1879  to  1896,  a  new  system  of  public  instruction  was  gradu- 
ally evolved  and  applied,  the  first  important  legislative  authori- 
The  Ferry  zation  being  a  series  of  enactments  introduced  in  the 
Laws  early  'eighties  by  the  Republican  minister  of  education, 

Jules  Ferry  (183  2- 1893).  These  so-called  Ferry  Laws  estab- 
lished primary  education  in  France  on  much  the  same  basis  as 
that  which  obtained  in  the  United  States :  compulsory  attend- 
ance at  some  school  was  prescribed  for  all  children,  but  it  was 
left  to  parents  to  decide  whether  their  children  should  attend 
a  public  school  or  a  private  (church)  school ;  ^  only  the  public 
schools  should  receive  financial  support  from  the  state,  and  in 
the  public  schools  none  but  laymen  should  teach  and  no  religious 
instruction  should  be  given. 

This  educational  program  of  the  Republicans,  together  with 
their  revival  of  obsolescent  eighteenth-century  statutes  against 
''unauthorized"  communities  of  monks  and  nuns,  and  their 
legalization  of  civil  marriage  and  divorce  —  all  effected  in  the 
early  'eighties  —  naturally  aroused  the  most  bitter  opposition 
of  the  Clericals,  who  now,  almost  to  a  man,  worked  directly  as 
Monarchists  for  the  subversion  of  the  Republic. 

For  a  while  in  the  late  'eighties  the  Monarchist-Clericals 
almost  succeeded  in  embarrassing  the  Republic.  It  was  in 
connection  with  the  curious  Boulanger  episode.  In 
Opposhion  view  of  the  obvious  need  of  assuring  the  utmost  effi- 
and  the  ciency  to  the  national  defense,  the  Republicans  had 
Episode^'  not  removed  Monarchists  from  military  command  at 
the  time  when  they  were  getting  rid  of  Monarchists 
in  the  civil  employments,  with  the  result  that  the  army  was  the 
one  public  service  still  filled  with  Monarchists  and,  from  its 
very  nature  and  discipline,  pecuharly  dangerous  to  the  Republic. 
Boulanger  (1837-1891)  himself,  though  a  general  in  the  army, 
posed  at  first  as  an  ardent  Radical  Republican,  becoming  minis- 
ter of  war  in  1886.  But  when  his  jingoistic  utterances  about 
a  "war  of  revenge"  against  Germany  had  rendered  him  the  most 

^  In  France  the  private  schools  are  customarily  caUed  "free,"  referring  to  the 
freedom  of  religious  instruction  in  them;  while  in  the  United  States  the  word 
"free"  is  appUed  to  the  pubhc  schools. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


353 


popular  man  in  France  —  a  really  national  figure  —  he  began 
to  show  signs  of  an  ambition  to  play  a  role  not  unlike  that  of 
General  Bonaparte.  Distrusted  now  by  his  former  colleagues 
and  forced  out  of  the  cabinet  (1887),  General  Boulanger  secured 
a  large  Monarchist  following  in  the  army  and  in  the  nation  alike 
from  Orleanists  and  from  Imperialists,  while  retaining  the  noisy 
allegiance  of  many  other  particularly  patriotic  people.  At  the 
same  time  the  publication  of  positive  proof  that  President 
Grevy's  son-in-law  had  been  guilty  of  trafficking  in  the  decora- 
tions of  the  Legion  of  Honor  gave  color  to  the  Boulangist  party's 
allegations  that  the  whole  Republican  regime  was  hopelessly 
corrupt  and  unpatriotic.  Though  the  Republican  majority  in 
the  parliament  prevailed  upon  Grevy,  whom  they  had  just  re- 
elected as  president  for  a  second  term,  to  resign  (1887),  and 
although  they  chose  as  his  successor  Sadi  Carnot  (183  7- 1894), 
the  grandson  of  the  very  famous  Carnot  who  had  organized  the 
armies  of  national  defense  in  the  days  of  the  Great  Revolution, 
the  Boulangist  movement  was  not  thereby  stayed.  All  ele- 
ments opposed  to  the  parliamentary  Republic  seemed  to  unite 
to  espouse  a  miUtary  dictatorship  under  General  Boulanger  and 
a  thorough  revision  of  the  constitution.  Dismissed  from  the 
army,  the  redoubtable  adventurer  was  elected  a  deputy  from 
several  Departments,  capping  the  climax  by  being  returned  from^ 
Paris  by  an  overwhelming  majority  (January,  1889). 

If  General  Boulanger's  ambition  was  as  far-reaching  as  General 
Bonaparte's,  his  ability  was  infinitely  less  than  the  Corsican's. 
It  is  probable  that  had  he  acted  promptly  upon  his  electoral 
victory  in  Paris,  he  might  have  overthrown  the  Republic  by  a 
coup  d'etat.  But  he  was  merely  a  talker  and  a  swaggerer;  he 
possessed  no  constructive  plans  whatsoever.  He  let  the  chance 
slip.  Too  timid  to  appeal  to  armed  violence,  when  the  Re- 
publican ministry  prepared  to  bring  charges  of  conspiracy  against 
him,  Boulanger  preferred  personal  safety  to  precarious  power, 
ignominiously  fled  across  the  border  into  Belgium,  thence  to 
England,  and  was  convicted  in  his  absence.  In  the  general  elec- 
tions of  1889,  Boulanger's  supporters  were  able  to  win  only 
38  seats,  whereas  the  various  Republican  factions,  uniting  in  the 
face  of  danger,  elected  366  deputies  (out  of  a  total  of  576)  — 
an  overwhelming  majority.    Disillusioned  and  discredited,  the 

VOL.  II  — 2  A 


354 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


groups  which  had  supported  Boulanger  had  already  fallen  to 
quarreling  among  themselves,  when  the  adventurer  with  his 
own  hand  dealt  the  last  blow  to  the  movement  by  committing 
suicide  at  Brussels  in  1891. 

Several  results  of  the  Boulanger  episode  deserve  mention.  In 
the  first  place  the  RepubHc  was  unquestionably  strengthened 
Results  of  pubHc  opinion,  both  in  France  and  abroad:  the 
Bouianger's  haunting  fear  of  a  miUtary  coup  d'etat,  such  as  had 
FaUure  overthrown  the  First  and  Second  Republics,  was 
largely  banished  from  the  Third  RepubHc.  Secondly,  there 
was  a  marked  tendency  at  once  to  lessen  jingoism  and  to  re- 
publicanize  the  army :  a  new  law  of  1889  reduced  the  term  of 
active  service  in  the  army  from  five  to  three  years,  and  required 
those  formerly  exempt  to  serve  one  year  with  the  colors;  and 
many  Monarchist  officers  were  retired  and  succeeded  by  Republi- 
cans. Thirdly,  the  cause  of  the  Monarchists  was  seriously  com- 
promised by  the  open  support  which  both  the  Bourbon  and  Bona- 
partist  pretenders  had  given  to  an  adventurer  who  had  proved 
himself  utterly  incompetent  and  worthless.  Finally,  Cleri- 
calism suffered  sorely  —  so  much  so,  in  fact,  that  in  1892  Pope 
Leo  XIII  issued  a  famous  encyclical  letter  to  French  CathoUcs, 
urging  them  to  desist  from  further  attacks  upon  the  Republic, 
to  accept  the  new  form  of  government  cheerfully  and  definitively, 
and  to  utilize  it  for  the  furtherance  of  legislation  favorable  to  the 
Church.  A  small  number  of  Roman  Catholics  in  France  — 
the  so-called  Rallies  —  promptly  heeded  the  papal  admonition 
and  became  Republicans,  but  the  majority,  more  zealous  than 
prudent,  more  unbending  than  the  pope,  clung  tenaciously  to 
Monarchism  and  fought  the  Republic  at  every  turn.  This  open 
breach  in  the  ranks  of  the  Clericals  on  a  question  of  poHtical 
tactics  proved  to  be  a  potent  factor  in  the  subsequent  triumphs 
of  An ti- Clericalism. 

Not  long  after  the  collapse  of  the  Boulanger  movement,  the 
Monarchist-Clericals  were  able  to  make  another  effort  to  dis- 
The  Dreyfus  Credit  the  RepubHc.  A  certain  fidouard  Drumont, 
already  famous  as  the  author  of  a  widely-read  book, 
Jewish  France,  a  violent  Anti-Semitic  work  written  to  denounce 
the  influence  exercised  by  Jewish  financiers  on  the  poHtics  of  the 
Third  RepubHc,  founded  at  Paris  in  1892  a  scandalous  news- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  355 


paper,  La  Libre  Parole,  which  made  strong  appeals  in  many 
directions  for  a  national"  union  against  the  Jews.^  It  appeared 
as  a  friend  of  the  workingmen,  telling  them  that  their  real  op- 
pressors were  the  Jewish  capitalists  who  dominated  Republican 
poHtics.  It  enHsted  the  support  of  many  Catholics  by  blaming 
the  irreligious  and  Anti-Clerical  legislation  of  the  Republic  upon 
the  Jews.  It  adroitly  appealed  to  national  patriotism  to  rid 
the  army  of  Jewish  influence,  insisting  that  the  Jews  Anti- 
had  designs  upon  the  French  military  establishment  Semitism 
and  that  they  were  in  practice  the  secret  agents  of  their  German 
kinsmen.  Thus  Anti-Semitism  became  in  France  a  rallying-cry 
whereby  the  Monarchists  could  draw  to  themselves  numerous 
diverse  elements  and  gather  them  into  a  single  Nationalist 
party,  bent  upon  the  overthrow  of  the  ''bourgeois  and  Jewish" 
republic.  This  process  was  hastened  by  two  notable  events 
in  1894 :  first,  the  exposure  of  grave  financial  scandals  in  con- 
nection with  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal,  in  which 
several  Jewish  bankers  and  Republican  deputies  were  implicated ; 
and  secondly,  by  the  news  that  a  certain  Alfred  Dreyfus,  a 
Jewish  captain  of  artillery  attached  to  the  general  staff  of  the 
French  army  and  in  poHtics  a  RepubHcan,  had  been  con- 
victed by  court-martial  of  selling  military  secrets  to  the  Ger- 
mans and  had  consequently  been  sentenced  to  degradation  and 
to  penal  servitude  for  life  on  Devil's  Island  off  the  coast  of 
French  Guiana.  Here,  apparently,  were  convincing  proofs  of 
the  truth  of  Drumont's  assertions ;  and  Anti-Semitism  naturally 
grew  by  leaps  and  bounds. 

Of  the  Panama  scandals  no  exculpation  was  possible,  but 
they  were  soon  dwarfed  by  the  political  importance 
which,  by  virtue  of  new  developments,  the  "Dreyfus  ^^s'^ws 
affair"  assumed.    In  1897  Colonel  Picquart,  a  new  "Anti- 
head  of  the  spying  system  of  the  French  army  and  a  ^^Y''*^" 
Republican  withal,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  Drey- 
fus had  been  convicted  unjustly  and  that  the  real  offender  was 

^  This  so-called  Anti-Semitism  characterized  the  politics  in  the  last  quarter  of 
the  nineteenth  century  not  only  of  France,  but  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary, 
and  produced  most  deplorable  results  in  Russia  and  Rumania.  For  details  of 
the  entire  movement  see  the  clear  and  interesting  statement  by  Lucien  Wolf  in  the 
Encyclopedia  Brilannica,  eleventh  edition.  Vol.  II,  pp.  134-146. 


356 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


a  certain  Major  Esterhazy,  a  soldier  of  fortune  and  an  avowed 
Monarchist.  But  the  ''honor"  of  the  French  army  was  re- 
garded by  its  chiefs  as  bound  up  in  the  original  verdict,  and  thus 
the  strength  of  organized  mihtarism  was  thrown  on  the  side 
of  Anti-Semitism,  with  the  result  that  Esterhazy  was  acquitted 
and  Picquart  was  disgraced  (1898).  Then  £mile  Zola,  the 
novelist,  entered  the  lists  in  behalf  of  Dreyfus,  publishing  a 
scathing  accusation  of  all  who  had  taken  a  decisive  part  in  the 
case  —  the  Anti-Semitic  press  and  party,  the  alleged  forgers 
of  the  incriminating  documents,  and  the  army  generals  who  had 
countenanced  the  conviction  of  an  innocent  man.  Though 
Zola  was  promptly  convicted  of  libel,  his  open  letter  was  a  most 
effective  means  of  crystallizing  French  opinion  on  the  Dreyfus 
case.  On  one  side  were  arrayed  the  '' Anti-Drey fusards"  — 
Monarchists,  Clericals,  army  ofi&cers,  Jew-baiters,  and  con- 
siderable numbers  of  workingmen ;  on  the  other  side,  the  "Drey- 
fusards"  —  RepubHcans  of  every  stamp,  including  even  the 
Socialists,  drawn  together  by  the  common  danger  to  democratic 
institutions. 

The  victory  of  the  ''Dreyfusards,"  foreshadowed  by  the  zeal 
of  Zola,  was  little  in  doubt  after  the  confession  and  suicide  of 
Victory  of  Monarchist  forgers  and  after  Esterhazy's 

the  "Drey-  flight  from  France  late  in  1898.  The  following  year 
fusards"  Dreyfus  was  retried  on  the  order  of  the  supreme 
French  court  by  a  new  court-martial  at  Rennes,  which,  though 
still  so  much  under  Anti-Dreyfusard  influence  that  it  again 
found  him  guilty,  nevertheless  in  view  of  "extenuating  cir- 
cumstances" recommended  him  to  presidential  clemency.  Anti- 
Semitism  speedily  collapsed.  Dreyfus  was  pardoned  by 
President  Loubet;  and  in  1906  the  Supreme  Court  annulled 
the  Rennes  verdict  unconditionally,  and  restored  him  to  the 
army.  Dreyfus  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  major,  and 
made  a  chevalier  of  the  Legion  of  Honor.  Picquart  also  was 
vindicated  and  restored,  and  in  1908  served  as  minister  of 
war.  Zola,  who  died  in  1902,  was  rewarded  with  a  state  burial 
within  the  Pantheon. 

The  outcome  of  the  ''Dreyfus  affair"  was  much  the  same  as 
that  of  the  Boulanger  episode,  except  that  it  was  more  decisive. 
First,  Monarchism  was  thoroughly  crushed  and  discredited. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  357 


Secondly,  all  Republican  factions,  the  Socialists  included,  were 
welded  together  in  a  compact  hloc,  which  for  many  years  com- 
manded a  large  majority  in  the  parliament  and  di-  outcome  of 
rected  the  poHcies  of  the  Republic.  Thirdly,  by  the  Dreyfus 
means  of  new  appointments  Republicans  gained  con-  ^^^jism^ 
trol  of  the  army,  and  by  means  of  an  act  of  1905  the  and  Anti- 
term  of  active  military  service  was  reduced  to  two 
years,  no  exemptions,  not  even  of  prospective  priests,  being  al- 
lowed. Finally,  legislation  assumed  a  distinctly  Anti-Clerical 
tone.  Doubtless  many  Clericals  had  been  Anti-Dreyfusards  only 
because  they  had  believed  sincerely  in  the  guilt  of  Dreyfus,  and 
certainly  not  all  French  Catholics  had  sympathized  with  the 
Anti-Semitic  agitation,  but  now  the  whole  Catholic  Church  was 
assailed  as  the  one  remaining  menace  to  the  Republic.  And 
it  is  not  without  interest  that  many  nominal  and  professed 
Catholics  upheld  this  Anti-Clerical  legislation,  obviously  out  of 
disgust  or  disappointment  with  the  fatal  thirty  years'  alliance 
of  Clericahsm  and  Monarchism  against  Republican  institutions ; 
it  was  unmistakable  evidence  of  the  increasing  stabiHty  and 
popularity  of  the  Third  Republic. 

Chief  among  the  Clericals  who  were  accused  of  systematic 
plotting  against  the  Republic  were  the  ''regular  clergy"  — 
monks  and  religious  of  various  orders,  Jesuits,  As-  jj^g  ^gg^, 
sumptionists,  Christian  Brothers,  Eudists,  Francis-  ciations  Act, 
cans,  Dominicans,  etc.,  —  many  of  whom  conducted  ^^^^ 
educational  and  charitable  establishments,  and  some  of  whom, 
—  like  the  famous  Carthusian  monks,  —  were  engaged  in  com- 
mercial and  industrial  undertakings.  Against  them  the  first 
blow  was  struck.  By  the  Associations  Act  of  1901  it  was  pro- 
vided that  no  rehgious  order  should  exist  in  France  unless  it  had 
received  governmental  authorization  and  that  no  member  of 
an  unauthorized  order  should  be  permitted  to  teach  in  any 
school  in  France.  The  law  was  rigidly  applied,  the  govern- 
ment refusing  to  grant  most  of  the  applications  made  by  the 
numerous  unauthorized  associations,  with  the  result  that  within 
two  years  hundreds  of  religious  were  driven  out  of  France  and 
obliged  to  seek  refuge  in  Spain,  Belgium,  Great  Britain,  or  the 
United  States,  and  that  ten  thousand  church  schools  were 
closed.    It  was  a  proud  boast  of  the  stern  Anti-Clerical  prime 


358 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


minister,  fimile  Combes/  under  whose  auspices  the  measure 
was  so  severely  enforced,  that  the  Associations  Act  not  only 
exiled  and  silenced  the  Republic's  most  active  foes  but  greatly 
weakened  the  religious  schools  by  depriving  them  of  their 
teachers.  It  was  in  line  with  the  latter  policy  that  Combes 
secured  the  enactment  (1904)  of  another  bill  on  the  congrega- 
tions, whereby  all  members  of  rehgious  associations,  whether 
authorized  or  unauthorized,  would  be  deprived  within  ten  years 
of  the  right  to  teach  in  private  as  well  as  pubhc  schools. 

From  that  time  forward  it  became  increasingly  difficult  for 
the  Catholic  Church  to  maintain  its  schools.  .  There  was  an 
alarming  shortage  of  lay  teachers  who  would  or  could  take  the 
place  of  the  clergymen ;  time  was  required  to  train  the  new  ones ; 
and  more  money  than  the  Church  possessed  was  needed  to  sup- 
port them.  A  sudden  growth  of  the  public  non-religious  schools 
at  the  expense  of  the  private  rehgious  schools  followed,  as  was 
expected  and  planned:  in  the  year  1912-1913  there  were  more 
than  four  and  a  half  milHons  of  French  children  in  the  former 
and  only  about  one  million  in  the  latter. 

But  before  the  effects  of  the  Associations  Act  were  fully  ap- 
parent, Combes  was  inducing  the  Anti-Clerical  bloc  in  the 
parhament  to  give  serious  attention  to  an  even  more 

Separation  . 

of  Church  radical  proposal  —  the  abrogation  of  the  concordat 
and  state,  which  had  regulated  the  relations  of  church  and  state 
in  France  for  more  than  a  century.  The  pretext  for 
this  epochal  proposal  was  the  protest  of  the  recently  elected 
Pope  Pius  X  against  President  Loubet's  official  visit  to  the  king 
of  Italy  in  Rome  (April,  1904).  In  May  the  parliamentary 
leader  of  the  Sociafist  party,  Jean  Jaures  (1859-1914),  demanded 
reprisals  for  what  he  deemed  foreign  interference  in  the  pofitical 
affairs  of  France,  and  Theophile  Delcasse  (1852-  ),  the  minis- 
ter of  foreign  affairs  in  the  cabinet  of  Combes,  recalled  the 
French  ambassador  from  the  Vatican.  Already  a  gifted  and 
rising  young  SociaHst,  Aristide  Briand  (1862-  ),  had  been  at 
work  with  a  parliam^entary  commission  drafting  a  bill  for  the 
separation  of  church  and  state,  and  now  that  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  the  Vatican  were  ruptured,  his  proposals  were  em- 

^  Emile  Combes  (1835-  ),  premier  from  1903  to  1905.  The  Associations 
Act  was  passed  during  the  ministry  of  Waldeck-Rousseau, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


bodied  in  law  at  the  dose  of  1905  after  a  long  and  exciting 
debate. 

Under  the  Separation  Law  of  1905,  the  Concordat  of  1801 
was  formally  denounced,  the  adherents  of  all  creeds  were  placed 
on  an  equal  footing  and  were  authorized  to  form  associations  of 
laymen  {associations  cuUuelles)  for  public  worship,  and  the  state 
was  relieved  from  payment  of  salaries.  As  transitory  measures, 
ecclesiastics  over  45  years  of  age  and  of  over  25  years  of  service 
were  entitled  to  pensions  and  all  other  ecclesiastics  were  to  re- 
ceive a  grant  during  a  period  of  from  four  to  eight  years.  All 
buildings  actually  used  for  public  worship  and  as  dwellings  in 
that  connection  were  to  be  made  over,  after  an  inventory  was 
taken,  to  the  associations  for  public  worship ;  the  places  of  wor- 
ship for  the  total  period  of  the  existence  of  these  associations, 
the  ecclesiastical  dwellings  for  a  time.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Church  was  henceforth  to  be  free  to  manage  its  own  internal 
affairs  without  state  intervention. 

To  the  pope  and  to  many  prominent  Catholics  ^e  Separation 
Act  seemed  very  objectionable.  In  its  preparation  the  ecclesi- 
astical authorities  had  not  been  consulted.    It  was  „ 

.  .  Reasons  for 

contrary  to  the  prmciples  of  mternational  usage  be-  continued 
cause  it  involved  the  denunciation  of  the  concordat 

•  1  1  r    1         1  X  Opposition 

by  one  party  without  the  agreement  01  the  other.  It 
was  opposed  to  canon  law  because  it  authorized  laymen  to 
participate  by  means  of  the  associations  for  public  worship  in 
the  management  of  ecclesiastical  affairs.  It  was  repugnant  to 
fundamental  laws  of  nature  and  justice  in  that  it  confiscated 
a  good  deal  of  ecclesiastical  property,  and  by  ceasing  to  pay 
salaries  to  churchmen,  repudiated  a  debt  which  the  state  owed 
the  Church  ever  since  the  wholesale  secularization  of  church 
property  in  the  days  of  the  French  Revolution.  For  these 
reasons.  Pope  Pius  X  condemned  the  law  and  forbade  its  observ- 
ance ;  and  French  Catholics  formed  no  associations  for  pubHc 
worship. 

After  two  years  of  chaos  in  the  affairs  of  the  CathoHc  Church 
in  France,  during  which  time  extreme  Anti-Clericals  declared 
that  they  would  close  all  the  church  edifices  and  put  an  end  to 
Catholic  worship,  while  faithful  Clericals  insisted  that  they 
would  die  on  the  thresholds  of  the  churches  as  martyrs  in  de- 


360 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


fense  of  the  Christian  rehgion,  a  practical  compromise  was  at 
length  reached  through  the  tactful  efforts  of  Briand  in  enacting 

the  law  of  1907,  by  which,  failing  the  formation  of  as- 
clmpromise  sociations  for  public  worship,  the  churches  with  their 
between  ornaments  and  furniture  were  left  to  the  disposition  of 
and  state  faithful  and  clergy  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  the 

cult,  and,  on  certain  conditions,  the  long  use  of  them 
might  be  granted  as  a  free  gift  to  the  clergy.  In  other  words, 
the  Catholics,  though  obliged  to  submit  to  the  separation  of 
church  and  state  and  to  the  cessation  of  public  payment  of 
ecclesiastical  salaries,  were  suffered  to  manage  their  affairs  as 
they  would  and  in  harmony  with  the  pope  and  to  continue  to 
use  their  churches  as  places  of  worship. 

Thus  between  1871  and  1907  the  Catholic  Church  completely 
lost  in  France  the  financial  and  moral  assistance  of  the  state,  the 

right  to  form  any  religious  associations  except  for  the 
Anti-'cferi-^^  purposcs  of  charity,  the  preponderance  of  religious 
cai  Legisia-  schools,  and  even  the  privileges  of  exemption  from 
th^Repubiic  ^lihtary  service  and  from  taxation  which  from  time 

immemorial  had  been  accorded  to  the  Christian  clergy. 
This  noteworthy  decline  of  the  public  prestige  of  Roman  Catholi- 
cism was  undoubtedly  due  not  only  to  a  general  increase  of 
skepticism  and  agnosticism  in  France  but  to  the  quite 
mistaken  poHtics  of  the  Clericals.  Nevertheless,  from  a  long- 
maintained  position  of  aggression  against  the  Republic,  the 
Clericals  were  now  gradually  being  forced  into  a  new  position 
of  defense  of  such  democratic  principles  as  freedom  of  religion, 
freedom  of  worship,  freedom  of  association,  freedom  of  speech 
and  publication.  Perhaps  it  was  an  indication  of  the  revolu- 
tion that  was  going  on  within  the  Church  and  a  portent  of  the 
democratic  and  more  fortunate  role  that  ClericaHsm  would 
play  in  future  France.  At  any  rate,  there  was  Httle  doubt  that 
despite  the  Education  and  Associations  Acts  and  the  Separation 
Act,  the  Roman  CathoKc  Church  in  France  showed  in  19 14 
increasing,  rather  than  decreasing,  vigor  and  determination. 

Before  19 14  evidences  were  not  lacking  that  the  parliamentary 
bloc,  or  coahtion  of  all  Republican  factions,  which  the  Dreyfus 
affair"  had  called  into  existence  and  from  which  had  issued  all 
the  Anti-Clerical  legislation  of  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  361 


century,  was  in  process  of  dissolution,  and  now,  with  the  Re- 
pubHc  undoubtedly  strengthened,  the  various  groups  which  had 
constituted  the  Hoc  could  fittingly  and  naturally  renew  hostilities 
with  each  other  on  questions  other  than  ecclesiastical. 


The  Political  Groups  in  France 

At  this  point  it  behooves  us  to  have  in  mind  a  peculiarity  of 
the  poUtical  Hfe  of  France  distinguishing  it  since  187 1  very 
markedly  from  that  of  Great  Britain  or  of  the  United 
States.  In  the  latter  countries  there  are  well-organ-  The  "Group 
ized  national  pohtical  parties,  usually  two  in  number,  py^nc?Dis°^ 
that  alternate  in  the  conduct  of  pubHc  business.  In  tingtiished 
France,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  very  many  poHt- 

1  11     1       1         1  1      r  Two-party 

ical  groups,  usually  local  and  temporary  and  often  System  of 
composed  of  a  purely  personal  following,  which  in  opin-  ^^^^^ 
ion  shade  into  one  another  from  one  extreme  to  the  the  United 
other  and  in  practical  poHtics  sometimes  work  to- 
gether  and  sometimes  fly  apart.    Now  while  con- 
stitutionally and  formally  the  parliamentary  systems  of  France 
and  Great  Britain  are  much  the  same,  the  so-called  "group 
system"  of  pohtical  parties  that  obtains  in  the  former  gives 
to  their  actual  operation  an  appearance  of  wide  divergence. 
Thus  many  writers  have  contrasted  the  "instabihty"  of  the 
French  government  with  the  ''stabiHty"  of  the  British,  to  the 
obvious  detriment  of  the  group  system  and  to  the  corresponding 
advantage  of  the  two-party  system.    The  chief  argument  which 
they  can  advance  to  substantiate  their  contention  is  the  unques- 
tionable, and  at  first  thought  convincing,  statement  that  from 
the  close  of  the  Franco-German  War  in  187 1  to  the  outbreak  of 
the  War  of  the  Nations  in  19 14,  Great  Britain  has  had  nine  dif- 
fere    ministries  while  France  has  had  not  fewer  than  fifty ! 

But  the  fallacy  of  this  reasoning  Hes  in  the  fact  that  changes 
of  French  ministries  are  not  attended  by  such  consequences  as 
normally  result  from  changes  of  ministry  in  Great  Britain.  In 
Great  Britain  the  members  of  any  given  cabinet  are  members  of 
a  single  political  party  and  are  expected  to  forward  all  the  proj- 
ects of  that  particular  party ;  when  they  lose  their  majority  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  they  are  succeeded  by  a  ministry  all  of 


362 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


whose  members  are  drawn  exclusively  from  the  rival  party  and 
are  bent  on  the  furtherance  of  the  principles  of  their  party. 

Were  this  to  happen  with  every  change  of  ministry 

Instability       .  rr/  ^-  •      r     /  '4.  • 

of  French  m  T  rance  —  nfty  times  in  forty-three  years  —  it  is 
Ministries    obvious  that  there  could  be  no  stability  in  public 

with  Rela-  ...        ,  .  .      .  .  ,  , 

tive  sta-  pohcies,  domestic  or  foreign.  But  with  the  one  ex- 
Poiicy^^  ception  in  the  late  'seventies  of  the  change  from  a 
ministry  of  Monarchists  to  one  of  Republicans,  a 
change  of  ministry  in  France  means  simply  that  a  given  cabinet 
has  lost  the  support  of  one  group  out  of  three,  four,  or  more 
groups  upon  whose  temporary  coalition  its  parliamentary  major- 
ity depended  (for  no  one  group  of  itself  has  ever  been  sufficiently 
numerous  and  well  organized  to  command  a  clear  majority), 
and  that  a  new  cabinet  has  been  formed  which  has  merely  added 
representatives  of  some  hitherto  unrepresented  group  to  repre- 
sentatives of  groups  who  were  included  in  the  previous  cabinet. 
Expressed  a  Httle  differently,  a  change  of  ministry  in  France 
usually  operates  only  to  stress  or  weaken  the  emphasis  upon 
one  part  of  the  general  policy  pursued  by  the  government  and 
actually  leaves  most  under-officials  of  the  various  great  state 
departments  unchanged.  In  fact,  it  is  surprising  how  in  the 
changes  of  French  ministries  the  same  names  of  individual 
members  will  perpetually  bob  up,  as  in  a  kaleidoscope,  remind- 
ing one  that  though  the  positions  are  somewhat  shifted  the  com- 
ponent parts  are  strangely  familiar.  And  it  is  obvious  from  a 
survey  of  French  history  under  the  Third  RepubHc  that  fifty 
changes  of  ministry  have  not  prevented  a  steady,  consistent  de- 
velopment of  public  poHcies.  In  every  important  particular,  — 
Anti-ClericaHsm,  democratizing  the  army,  promotion  of  colo- 
niahsm  and  of  protectionism,  internal  betterment  of  agriculture, 
industry,  and  commerce,  pursuit  of  a  foreign  poHcy  ^  of  cement- 
ing an  alHance  with  Russia  and  gradually  isolating  Germany,  and 
development  of  republican  institutions  and  usages,  —  ministerial 
changes  have  meant  changes  of  persons  and  not  of  poHcies.  In 
summary  it  may  be  truthfully  affirmed  that  the  French  ''group 
system"  has  carried  in  its  wake  both  an  alarming  instability  of 
ministries  and  a  conservative  stability  of  poHcies. 

^  For  a  treatment  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Third  French  Republic,  see  Chapter 
XXX. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  363 

To  write  a  brief  history  of  the  manifold  political  groups  which 
appeared  in  France  under  the  Third  Republic  is  an  impossible 
task,  but  some  idea  of  recent  tendencies  in  poHtical  The  French 
groupings  may  be  gathered  from  a  hurried  sketch  of  Groups 
the  parliamentary  situation  during  the  first  decade  of  the  twen- 
tieth century. 

•  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  the  French  parliament,  as 
in  the  parliaments  of  most  Continental  states,  the  members  sit 
according  to  their  general  political  notions,  the  ex-  "Right" 
treme  conservatives  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  pre-  "  ^^^^ " 
siding  officer,  and  the  extreme  Hberals  on  the  extreme  left,  so 
that  Right  and  Left  are  frequently  used  to  denote  the  opposites 
of  political  opinion.  In  France  the  extreme  Right  and  the 
extreme  Left  are  respectively  the  Monarchists  and  the  Socialists, 
relatively  small  groups,  squarely  opposed  to  each  other,  and 
in  the  main  opposed  alike  to  the  larger  intervening  groups  of 
the  Center. 

On  the  extreme  Right  the  Monarchists  at  the  opening  of  the 
twentieth  century  were  greatly  reduced  from  their  former 
estate.  Only  a  handful  of  deputies  ^  without^  able  The 
leaders,  the  group  continued  to  draw  electoral  support  Monarchists 
from  the  few  aristocratic  sections  in  Paris,  where  Monarchism 
was  still  a  badge  of  social  distinction,  or  from  certain  isolated 
communities  like  Brittany,  where  with  peasants  and  fisher-folk 
it  was  a  habit.  Impotent  to  carry  out  any  constructive  plans 
the  group  still  continued  to  preach  militarism  and  Clericalism 
and  to  make  clamorous  complaints  against  the  Republic  as  a 
corrupt  and  cowardly  government. 

Quite  different  was  the  attitude  on  the  extreme  Left,  where 
the  Socialists  were  steadily  growing  in  numbers  and  in  influence. 
Prior  to  1900  the  growth  of  Socialism  had  been  slower  The  Unified 
in  France  than  in  Germany,  due  to  the  relatively  Socialists 
greater  strength  of  the  agricultural  population,  to  the  discredit 
which  the  failure  of  the  Paris  Commune  had  cast  upon  French 
Socialism,  and  to  the  more  pronounced  tendency  to  split  up 
into  little  warring  factions.  But  after  1900,  despite  the  fact 
that  many  workingmen  were  lost  to  Syndicalism,  Socialism 

^  In  1 9 14  there  were  26  deputies  of  the  Right,  still  divided  between  support  of 
the  Bourbon  pretender  and  of  the  Bonapartist  pretender. 


364  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


advanced  rapidly.  Thanks  to  the  united  efforts  of  the  Marxist 
leader,  Jules  Guesde,  and  of  the  Reformist  leader,  Jean  Jaures, 
the  Unified  Socialist  party  was  formed  in  1905.  This  group  is 
the  nearest  French  approach  to  a  political  party  in  the  British 
or  American  sense.  It  is  national  in  extent,  having  annual 
congresses,  an  executive  committee,  and  a  definite  platform 
of  principles.  In  1914  it  polled  1,250,000  votes  and  won 
102  seats  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
votes  polled  by  30  Independent  SociaHsts"  who  occupied 
adjacent  seats  in  the  Chamber  but  acted  independently  of  the 
Unified  party. 

Another  political  group  in  France,  somewhat  resembling  in 
organization  a  British  or  American  political  party,  is  the  Action 
The  Action  Liberale  (Liberal  Action),  a  group  organized  in  1901 
Liberale  under  the  able  leadership  of  the  Count  de  Mun  (1841- 
191 4)  for  the  purpose  of  reconciling  Catholicism  with  Republi- 
canism. It  is  fairly  well  organized  with  local  and  national  com- 
mittees and  has  an  enrolled  and  paying  membership  of  a  quarter 
of  a  million.  While  it  stands  strongly  for  the  repeal  of  Anti- 
Clerical  legislation  and  for  this  purpose  is  willing  to  cooperate 
with  the  Clerical  Monarchists,  it  frankly  supports  the  Republic. 
Moreover  it  accepts  the  social  program  of  Pope  Leo  XIII  and 
appeals  for  the  aid  of  the  working  class  by  championing  factory 
legislation,  old-age  pensions,  workingmen's  insurance,  and  trade- 
unionism.  Its  immediate  political  demands  are  embraced 
in  the  so-called  ''three  r's":  representation  proportionelle,  or 
parliamentary  representation  of  minorities;  representation  pro- 
fessionelle,  the  organization  of  a  special  parliament  composed 
of  representatives  of  economic  groups,  such  as  day-laborers, 
lawyers,  farmers,  factory-owners,  etc.,  apportioned  according  to 
numerical  strength,  in  order  to  advise  the  existing  Chamber  of 
Deputies  in  law-making;  and  repartition  proportionelle,  public 
financial  support  for  Catholic  and  other  private  schools  as  well 
as  for  the  pubHc  schools.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Action 
Liberate  polled  a  hundred  thousand  more  votes  in  1914  than  the 
Unified  SociaHsts,  it  secured  but  34  seats  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  to  the  latter's  102. ^ 

1  This  surprising  discrepancy  is  due  to  the  greater  concentration  of  the  Socialists 
in  certain  industrial  constituencies,  and  to  the  French  practice  of  second  ballotings 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


365 


Between -the  Socialists  on  the  Left  and  the  Monarchists  and 
Action  Liberate  on  the  Right  sat  from  1900  to  1910  the  famous 
bloc  of  Republican  groups,  which,  brought  into  harmo-  ^^^^ 
nious  relations  with  one  another  by  the  exigencies  of  the 
Boulanger  episode  and  the  Dreyfus  affair,  continued  to  cooperate 
throughout  these  years  in  naming  the  ministries  and  in  control- 
ling the  Dolicies  of  the  Republic.    Reckoning  from  Right  to  Left, 
the  bloc  included  (i)  Progressist  Repubhcans,  headed  Progress- 
by  Paul  Deschanel  (1856-       ,  for  many  years  presi-  i^ts 
dent  of  the  Chamber),  recruited  from  the  upper  middle  class  and 
from  the  small  propertied  class,  devoted  to  the  individual  rights 
and  Hberties  proclaimed  by  the  Revolution,  especially  to  the  basic 
right  of  private  property;  (2)  Radicals  of  varying  j^^^^^^g 
titles,  the  core,  and  by  far  the  most  numerous,  of  the  bloc, 
true  disciples  of  Gambetta,  shapers  of  bourgeois  poHcies,  intellec- 
tual radicals,  most  stalwart  Anti-Clericals,  including  in  1910  such 
influential  politicians  as  Senators  Clemenceau  (1841-       )  and 
Combes  and  Deputy  Caillaux ;  and  (3)  Radical  Socialists,  or, 
as  would  be  more  accurately  descriptive,  the  ''social-  Radical 
istically  inclined  Radicals,"  a  remarkable  group,  who  Socialists 
with  pronounced  Anti-Clericalism  combined  a  determination 
to  drag  their  more  or  less  unwilhng  allies  along  the  path  of  social 
reform  and  to  do  for  the  working  classes  what  the  French  Rev- 
olution did  for  the  bourgeoisie,  a  ''bourgeois  party  -^ith  a  popular 
soul,"  championing  not  only  strict  governmental  regulation  of 
industry  but  government  ownership  of  all  means  of  communica- 
tion and  transportation,  likewise  of  national  resources  like  mines, 
forests,  oil-fields,  etc.    Among  the  Radical  Socialist  group  were 
to  be  counted  several  brilliant  men,  such  as  Briand,  Millerand, 
and  Viviani,  who  called  themselves  plain  Socialists  but  who 
were  read  out  of  the  regular  SociaHst  camp  because  of  their 
willingness      enter  coaHtion  ministries  with  representatives  of 
non-Sociahst  groups. 

Anti-Clericalism  was  the  issue  which  held  the  bloc  together 
from  1900  to  1 9 10  and  enabled  it  to  expel  the  religious  orders 
from  France,  to  separate  church  and  state,  and  to  strengthen 

upon  which  Radical  Republicans  often  unite  with  the  Socialists  to  insure  the  defeat 
of  Clerical  candirlates.  It  accounts  for  the  fact  that  in  France  the  Socialists  are 
opp<jscd  to  "electoral  reform"  while  the  Action  Liberate  espouses  it. 


366 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


non-religious  education.  But  by  191 3  other  questions  had 
arisen  which  tended  to  produce  a  different  aHgnment  of  political 
Political  groups.  There  was  first  the  question  of  an  income 
Issues  in  tax  and  further  social  reform,  which  was  urged  by 
'^^^  the  Socialists,  Radical  Socialists,  and  Action  Liberate , 

and  resisted  by  many  Radicals  and  Moderates.  There  was 
secondly  the  question  of  miHtarism,  for  many  Radicals  joined 
with  the  Socialists  in  offering  a  wordy,  though  vain,  opposition 
to  the  enactment  and  enforcement  of  a  new  army  bill  (191 3), 
which  this  time,  in  view  of  particularly  troubled  international 
relations,  lengthened  the  term  of  active  service  in  the  French 
army  from  two  to  three  years.  Thirdly,  there  was  still  the 
question  of  Anti-Clericalism  in  its  various  phases  :  many  Radical 
Socialists  felt  that  the  dangers  of  ClericaHsm  were  now  suffi- 
ciently remote  to  allow  the  Repubhc  to  turn  its  attention  and 
energy  elsewhere ;  many  Radicals  thought  otherwise  and  were 
resolved  to  maintain  against  the  CathoHc  Church  a  fight  which 
was  already  proving  advantageous  to  them  in  distracting  public 
attention  from  grave  economic  ills ;  while  the  Action  Liberate 
was  growing  more  vehement  in  its  demand  for  the  repeal  of  past 
Anti-Clerical  legislation.  Finally,  there  was  the  newly  raised 
political  question  of  electoral  reform :  proposals  for  the  revival 
of  the  scrutin  de  tiste,  with  provisions  for  proportional  repre- 
sentation of  minorities,  received  powerful  support  from  the  Action 
Liberate,  the  Moderates,  and  the  Radical  Socialists,  who  be- 
lieved them  more  fundamentally  democratic  than  the  existing 
system  of  elections  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies;  on  the  other 
hand,  many  Radicals  and  most  Socialists  denounced  them  as 
tending  to  increase  the  strength  of  the  Right  and  to  imperil  the 
Anti-Clerical  legislation  of  the  preceding  decade. 

Of  these  four  questions,  only  the  second  —  that  of  militarism 
—  was  immediately  settled.  The  army  bill  was  voted  in  1913 
Renewed  in  a  burst  of  patriotism  which  overspread  all  groups 
Miutarism  except  the  Unified  Socialist.  It  was  probably  due  at 
least  in  part  to  the  campaign  which  in  press  and  speech  the 
Unified  Sociahsts  waged  against  the  three-year  army  bill  that 
Jean  Jaures,  the  able  Socialist  leader  and  editor,  was  assassinated 
by  a  fanatical  patriot  on  the  eve  of  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of 
the  Nations  (1914).    But  it  was  a  significant  fact  that  once  war 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


367 


was  declared  the  Unified  Socialists  shared  the  common  national 
emotions  and  that  within  a  month  Jules  Guesde,  the  strait- 
laced  Marxist,  accepted  a  post  in  the  cabinet  with  Viviani, 
Millerand,  and  Briand. 

Differences  of  opinion  among  members  of  the  hloc  upon  the 
three  other  questions  were  quite  apparent  in  the  elections  of 
April-May,  19 14.    Of  the  bourgeois  groups  formerly 
included  in  the  hloc,  the  Progressists  (Federated  Re-  poj^cai 
publicans)  adhered  to  their  earlier  principles  and  Groups :  the 
maintained  their  strength  practically  unimpaired.  R^cais 
But  the  Radicals  and  Radical  Sociahsts  were  spHt  up 
into  a  number  of  groups,  which  tended,  both  in  the  parliament 
and  in  the  country  at  large,  to  gravitate  toward  one  or  other 
of  two  new  and  rival  combinations.    The  first  was  the  Unified 
Radicals,  including  such  men  as  Caillaux,  Combes,  and  Clemen- 
ceau,  bent  upon  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  more  extreme  Anti- 
Clerical  legislation,  especially  legislation  against  private  church 
schools,  generally  hostile  to  electoral  reform,  and  lukewarm  in 
the  cause  of  labor  legislation.    The  second  new  coaHtion  was 
the  Federation  of  the  Left,  whose  principles  were  championed 
by  Briand  and  by  Poincare,  who  had  been  elected  -pj^^  pe^er- 
to  the  presidency  in  January,  1913  :  it  urged  both  ation  of  the 
labor  legislation  and  parliamentary  reform,  and  while 
not  favoring  any  repeal  of  Anti-Clerical  legislation,  it  was  un- 
willing further  to  open  the  breach  between  Catholics  and  non- 
Catholics. 

Such  was  the  general  political  situation  when  the  War  of  the 
Nations  broke  out  in  August,  19 14,  sweeping  France  into  a  mael- 
strom of  blood  and  suddenly  engulfing  all  domestic  outbreak  of 
differences  in  a  wave  of  national  enthusiasm.  The  cer-  the  Great 
tain  fact  that  it  was  a  politically  stronger  and  more  ^^^^ 
united  France  which  went  into  the  war  of  1914  than  the  France 
which  plunged  into  the  war  of  1870,  is  of  itself  an  eloquent 
tribute  to  the  achievements  of  the  Third  French  Republic. 


2.  THE  KINGDOM  OF  ITALY 


The  chief  social  and  political  events  in  the  history  of  Italy 
from  1870  to  1914  were  connected  either  with  problems  which 


368  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


grew  out  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  and  therefore  were  com- 
mon to  all  countries  in  a  like  stage  of  industrial  development, 
or  with  problems  which  were  incidental  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  peninsula  was  pohtically  unified  and  were  accordingly  more 
or  less  pecuhar  to  Italy.  To  the  latter  category  belonged 
various  administrative  and  governmental  problems  and  like- 
wise those  involved  in  the  curious  new  relations  between  the 
national  Italian  kingdom  and  the  papacy. 

In  dealing  with  ItaHan  governmental  problems,  it  should  be 
borne  in  mind  at  the  outset  that  the  kingdom  had  been  very 
Italy  a  Cen-  Suddenly  created  by  the  consolidation  within  eleven 
traiized  years  (1859-1870)  of  eight  formerly  distinct  states, 
and  that,  thanks  largely  to  the  intense  nationalism  of 
the  Italian  people  and  to  the  patriotic  policy  of  Cavour,  the 
resulting  kingdom  in  187 1  was  not  a  federation  but  a  single 
state.  Italy  thus  furnished  a  unique  instance  of  a  union  of 
different  states  without  a  federal  government.  In  its  centraH- 
zation  Italy  approximated  to  France  and  Great  Britain  rather 
than  to  Germany  or  the  United  States. 

Now  while  this  centralization  of  poHtical  institutions  was  a 
laudable  achievement  of  national  patriotism,  it  made  it  incum- 
„  ^,      ,    bent  upon  the  central  government  to  equahze  taxation 

Problem  of         i  t  ,         ,  ,  .  .       ,  , 

Social  and  and  expenditure  throughout  the  entire  pemnsula  and 
Economic     g^j-       same  time  to  bring  the  different  regions  to  the 

Unification  ■,      r      1        •  i  •         n  i  • 

same  level  of  education  and  economic  well-being. 
Here  was  a  most  serious  difficulty.  Between  northern  Italy  — 
the  fertile  valley  of  the  Po  and  the  prosperous  district  of  Pied- 
mont —  and  that  part  of  southern  Italy  which  had  suffered  for 
centuries  under  the  paralyzing  despotism  of  the  SiciKan  Bourbons, 
the  most  startling  discrepancies  were  at  once  evident.    In  the 

North,  there  were  railways  and  all  manner  of  internal 

Contrast        .  '  ,11   11 

between  improvements,  a  wealthy  bourgeoisie,  cities  with  large 
South  industrial  populations,  and  a  relatively  high  percent- 
age of  literacy.  In  the  South,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
were  few  modern  public  works,  comparatively  little  industry, 
prevalence  of  brigandage,  and  an  ignorant  peasantry  of  whose 
adult  males  not  one  in  ten  could  read  or  write.  The  economic 
unification  of  Italy  thus  presented  an  even  more  perplexing 
problem  than  had  the  political  unification  of  the  peninsula  and 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  369 


one  to  which  Italian  statesmen  devoted  a  good  deal  of  attention 
between  1870  and  1914.  Much  certainly  was  accomplished. 
The  state  built  and  operated  thousands  of  miles  of  new  railways 
which  served  not  only  as  arteries  of  internal  trade  and  travel 
but  as  valuable  means  of  unifying  the  culture  of  the  country. 
Good  highways  were  constructed,  harbors  were  improved,  and 
land  surveys  undertaken.  Encouragement  was  given  to  the 
spread  of  the  factory  system  to  Naples,  Palermo,  and  Messina, 
as  well  as  throughout  the  flourishing  cities  of  Lombardy  and 
Tuscany.  A  law  of  1877,  which  decreed  compulsory  education 
for  children  between  six  and  nine  years  of  age,  though  imper- 
fectly applied  for  financial  reasons,  proved  a  potent  factor  in 
gradually  lowering  the  percentage  of  illiteracy  throughout  the 
whole  kingdom. 

Economic  unification,  however,  was  expensive.  To  a  national 
treasury  already  burdened  by  heavy  financial  outlays  in  the 
cause  of  political  unification  were  now  added  the  enor-  Burdens  of 
mous  expenditures  in  behalf  of  pubHc  works  and  in-  taxation 
temal  improvements.  Taxes  steadily  rose  to  a  height  greater 
per  capita  than  in  any  other  country  of  contemporary  Europe. 
Not  only  did  the  taxes  increase  the  misery  and  poverty  of  the 
working  classes  but  they  called  forth  repeated  complaints  from 
more  well-to-do  taxpayers  of  the  North  that  the  sums  collected 
were  being  expended  disproportionately  and  too  lavishly  upon 
the  South.  On  the  other  hand,  SiciHan  politicians  protested 
that  the  public  offices  were  being  monopoHzed  by  Northerners 
who  too  often  diverted  the  public  funds  into  their  own  private 
pockets,  with  the  result  that  the  South  was  not  particularly 
better  off  under  the  House  of  Savoy  than  it  had  been  under  the 
Bourbons.  Although  this  internal  friction  long  remained  an 
element  in  the  domestic  politics  of  Italy,  it  did  not  seriously 
menace  national  unity.  With  the  exception  of  an  unimportant 
separatist  movement  in  Sicily  led  by  a  certain  Signor  Nasi,  a 
politician  and  self-seeker,  there  was  no  expressed  desire  to  break 
up  the  nation  as  constituted  by  the  spectacular  exploits  of  1859- 
1860.  It  was  too  apparent  that  actual  improvements  were  being 
made  and  that  the  national  finances  were  surely,  if  very  slowly, 
becoming  solvent. 

Centralization  of  government  was  but  one  of  Cavour's  ideals 

VOL.  n  —  2  B 


370 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


which  the  new  Italian  kingdom  had  reahzed.  A  second  was  that 
of  a  parliamentary  government  modeled  after  Great  Britain's. 
Pariiamen-  Quite  as  significant  as  the  political  unification  was 
tary  Govern-  the  extension  of  the  Sardinian  Statuto  of  1848  to  the 
entire  peninsula,  for  in  accordance  with  its  Hberal 
and  constitutional  provisions  the  whole  kingdom  has  been  gov- 
erned since  1870.  By  virtue  of  this  document  and  of  the  usages 
that  have  grown  up  about  it,  supreme  authority  is  vested  i^i  a 
parhament  of  two  houses  —  an  elective  Chamber  of  Deputies 
and  an  appointive  and  aristocratic  Senate  ^  —  and  in  a  ministry 
responsible  to  the  parhament,  the  position  of  the  king  of  Italy 
being  not  unlike  that  of  the  British  sovereign.  Inasmuch  as  the 
group  system"  of  pohtical  parties  prevails  in  Italy,  the  actual 
operation  of  the  parliamentary  system  resembles  more  nearly 
that  of  France  than  that  of  Great  Britain.  For  many  years 
property  and  educational  qualifications  for  the  exercise  of  the 
franchise  assured  a  completely  bourgeois  character  to  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies,  but  finally  both  the  SociaHst  and  the  CathoHc 
pressure  for  political  democracy  became  so  great  that  in  191 2  ^ 
an  important  electoral  law  was  passed,  making  the  suffrage 
almost  universal  for  men  and  denying  the  franchise  only  to 
those  under  thirty  years  of  age  who  had  neither  performed  their 
miHtary  service  nor  learned  to  read  and  write.^ 

Growing  out  of  the  problems  of  national  unification  and 
political  democracy  was  the  particularly  perplexing  problem  of 
the  relation  of  church  and  state.    Here  again  Cavour 
ttie  Re5a^  indicated  the  ideal  which  the  statesmen  of  the 

tionof  ItaHan  kingdom  sought  to  realize  —  ''a  free  church 
state^^  ^  ^^^^  state."    It  was  an  ideal  derived  from  Liberal- 

ism but  difficult  of  attainment  because  of  the  devel- 
opment of  the  An ti- Clericalism  common  to  all  Continental 

^  The  Senate  is  composed  of  a  few  princes  of  the  royal  family  and  of  an  unlimited 
number  of  members  above  forty  years  of  age  who  are  nominated  by  the  king  for 
life ;  a  condition  of  the  nomination  being  that  the  person  shall  either  have  filled  a 
high  office,  or  have  acquired  fame  in  science,  literature,  or  any  other  pursuit  tend- 
ing to  the  benefit  of  the  nation,  or,  finally,  shall  pay  taxes  to  the  annual  amount 
of  $600. 

2  An  important  extension  of  the  suffrage  had  been  made  in  1882,  increasing  the 
electorate  from  600,000  to  2,000,000, 

^  The  electoral  reform  of  191 2  increased  the  number  of  voters  to  more  than 
6,000,000. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


countries,  and  because  of  the  peculiar  position  which  the  papacy 
occupied  in  Italy.  Church  and  state  were  not  separated :  the 
Italian  government  continued  to  pay  the  salaries  of  the  clergy 
and  to  pass  upon  the  appointment  of  bishops ;  religious  instruc- 
tion was  still  given  normally  in  the  public  schools;  divorce 
was  not  sanctioned  by  the  state.  But  following  Cavour's  ex- 
ample in  Piedmont  the  number  of  monastic  estabhshments 
throughout  the  whole  kingdom  was  gradually  reduced  and  the 
property  of  the  Church  was  repeatedly  subjected  to  complete 
or  partial  confiscation.  In  respect  of  the  papacy,  Position  of 
whose  temporal  possessions  had  been  appropriated  by  Papacy 
the  ItaKan  government  in  1870,  the  greatest  difiiculty  was 
encountered.  In  1871,  shortly  after  the  occupation  of  Rome 
by  ItaUan  troops,  the  Italian  parliament  enacted  a  ''law  of 
papal  guarantees,"  whereby  the  new  monarchy  under-  jj^^  ^^^^ 
took  to  allow  the  pope  a  considerable  latitude  of  free-  Papal  Guar- 
dom.  The  pope  was  to  be  accorded  sovereign  rights  '^^i 
on  a  par  with  those  of  the  king  of  Italy  —  inviolabiHty  of  his 
own  person,  the  right  to  receive  and  send  ambassadors,  and  the 
honor  due  a  reigning  sovereign,  —  and  over  the  Vatican  and 
Lateran  buildings  and  gardens  and  the  villa  of  Castel  Gandolfo 
he  was  to  enjoy  full  sovereignty.  Moreover  the  papal  govern- 
ment was  to  have  free  use  of  the  Italian  telegraph,  railway,  and 
postal  systems,  and,  as  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the  temporal 
possessions,  to  receive  an  annual  subsidy  from  the  royal  treas- 
ury of  3,225,000  lire.  This  law  Pius  IX  promptly  condemned 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  in  the  nature  of  a  simple  law  of  the 
Italian  kingdom  rather  than  an  international  agreement  and  that 
its  acceptance  would  involve  papal  recognition  of  a  government 
which  had  despoiled  God's  vicar  "  of  his  lands  and  Papai 
of  his  real  freedom.  The  pope  feared  lest  by  becom-  Opposition 
ing  a  pensioner  of  the  Italian  kingdom  he  should  lose  much  of 
his  influence  and  prestige  in  foreign  countries. 

Not  only  did  Pius  IX  condemn  the  law  of  papal  guarantees. 
He  obstinately  refused  to  accept  any  part  of  the  financial  grants ; 
he  shut  himself  up  as  a  ''prisoner"  in  the  Vatican  ;  he  summoned 
Catholic  princes  to  cooperate  in  restoring  the  temporal  power; 
and  he  positively  forbade  any  Italian  Catholic  to  vote  or  to  hold 
office  under  the  royal  government  (the  so-called  non  cxpedit). 


372 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


This  papal  attitude  seriously  embarrassed  both  the  foreign  and 
the  domestic  relations  of  the  kingdom.  In  Italy  a  sharp  line 
was  drawn  between  loyal  patriots  and  faithful  Catholics,  with 
unfortunate  results  both  for  state  and  for  church.  On  the  one 
side,  while  the  bulk  of  Italians  continued  to  describe  themselves 
as  Catholics,  the  church  by  combating  nationalism  weakened  its 
hold  upon  them.  On  the  other  side,  the  conscientious  absten- 
tion of  many  good  and  honest  people  from  politics  left  the 
Italian  government  in  the  hands  of  men  indifferent,  if  not  op- 
posed, to  rehgion,  and  weakened  the  state.  Only  slight  im- 
provement was  registered  by  special  permissions  accorded  from 
time  to  time  by  Pius  IX  and  Leo  XIII  (i 878-1 903)  to  Catholics 
to  participate  in  local  elections,  and  it  was  not  until  the  prac- 
tical aboHtion  of  the  non  expedit  for  parliamentary  elections  by 
Pius  X  in  1905  that  an  effective  compromise  seemed  possible. 
All  three  popes  persisted  in  styling  themselves  ^'prisoners,"  and 
one  of  the  first  pronouncements  of  Benedict  XV,  who  mounted 
the  papal  throne  in  19 14,  was  a  plea  for  the  restoration  of  the 
temporal  power. 

From  1870  to  1876  the  destinies  of  the  Italian  kingdom  were 
presided  over  by  a  group  of  statesmen  from  the  ''Right"  — 
Italian  ^  g^oup  w^hose  chicf  electoral  strength  lay  in  Pied- 
Poiitics,  mont,  Lombardy,  and  Tuscany,  and  whose  main 
1870-1914  achievement  had  been  the  completion  of  national 
unification  during  the  stormy  days  from  1859  to  1870.  It  was 
this  group  which  dictated  the  Italian  constitution,  enacted  the 
The  Regime  papal  guarantees,  centralized  the  local  adminis- 

ofthe  tration  after  the  French  model,  ruthlessly  imposed 
^2***'  „  ^     and  collected  taxes,  nationahzed  the  railways,  re- 

1870-1876  .11  1  /     o        \  1         •  (• 

organized  the  army  and  navy  (1875)  on  a  basis  of 
compulsory  mihtary  service,  and  betrayed  again  and  again  a 
latent  hostility  to  democracy. 

For  a  whole  decade  after  1876,  with  two  short  interruptions, 
the  premiership  was  controlled  by  Agostino  Depretis  (1813-1887), 
The  Regime  the  leader  of  the  Left.  Under  him  the  Sicilians  and 
of  the  Left  Neapolitans  were  favored  at  the  expense  of  the 
Northern  Italians,  and  the  suffrage  was  radically  extended 
(1882).  Nevertheless  Depretis  proved  himself  as  ardent  a  na- 
tionalist and  as  warm  a  friend  of  the  industrial  class  as  Cavour. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


373 


He  maintained  the  large  army  and  strengthened  the  navy;  he 
completed  the  railway  system  and  leased  it  out  to  private 
operating  companies ;  ^  he  formed  the  Triple  AlKance  Depretis, 
of  Italy  with  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  (1882) ;  1876-1887 
and  he  initiated  a  colonial  policy  by  the  occupation  of  Massawa 
in  Africa.  His  predecessors  had  made  Italy  a  nation ;  he  would 
make  it  a  Great  Power.  To  reach  this  goal  he  vastly  increased 
indirect  taxation,  seriously  impaired  the  stabihty  of  ItaHan 
finance,  and  caused  much  distress  among  his  poorer  country- 
men; at  the  same  time  he  practiced  poHtical  corruption  un- 
paralleled in  the  history  of  the  monarchy  and  inaugurated  a 
system  of  government  by  factions  and  sectional  interests  which 
long  disgraced  Italy. 

The  poKcies  of  Depretis  were  carried  forward  after  his  death 
(1887)  by  Francesco  Crispi  (181 9-1 901),  a  proud  self-centered 
Sicihan  who  had  once  been  a  companion-in-arms  of  crispi, 
Garibaldi.  MiHtarism  was  confirmed.  The  Triple  1887-1896 
Alliance  was  renewed.  Imperiahsm  was  vigorously  prosecuted 
in  Eritrea  and  SomaUland.  Dictatorial  methods  were  employed 
to  make  public  revenue  and  expenditures  balance  and  to  crush 
opposition  whether  from  Clericals  or  from  Socialists  and  Republi- 
cans. It  was  an  ironical  and  tragic  commentary  on  Crispi's 
policies  that  his  downfall  was  occasioned  by  the  decisive  defeat 
which  the  Itahan  colonial  troops  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the 
Abyssinians  at  Adowa  (1896),  and  that  King  Humbert,  who  had 
succeeded  his  remarkable  father,  Victor  Emmanuel  II,  in  1878 
and  who  had  loyally  supported  both  Depretis  and  Crispi,  was 
assassinated  (1900)  by  an  Anarchist. 

The  passing  of  Crispi  and  King  Humbert  marked  almost  a 
new  era  in  Italian  poUtics.    The  new  king,  Victor 
Emmanuel  III  (1900-       ),  was  enlightened,  amiable,  Dgygiop- 
and  democratically-minded ;  and  the  statesmen  who  ments  in 
served  under  him  frankly  accepted  the  more  Hberal  '^^^ 
poHcy  that  the  country  demanded.    It  is  true  that 
any  reduction  in  armaments  was  steadfastly  opposed  ^  and  that 

*  In  1885,    The  state  resumed  operation  of  the  railways  in  1905. 

2  The  expenditures  for  the  army  amounted  in  1871  to  $30,000,000,  and  in  1913 
to  $85,000,000.  Naval  expenditures  amounted  in  1871  to  $4,500,000,  and  in  1913 
to  $51,300,000. 


374 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


colonial  failure  in  Abyssinia  was  more  than  compensated  for  by 
success  in  a  war  against  Turkey  and  in  the  accompanying  occupa- 
Miiitarism  ^^^^  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  (1911-1912).  It  is  also 
and  imperi-  true  that  the  interests  of  the  industrial  class  were 
^^^^^  zealously  safeguarded  by  means  of  protective  tariffs 

and  governmental  bounties,  with  such  results  as  the  following 
figures  indicate.  From  187 1  to  1897  the  annual  amount  of 
exports  and  imports  (excluding  the  precious  metals)  did  not 
vary  much  from  440  milHon  dollars,  but  after  1897  it  rose 
steadily  until  in  1913  it  reached  the  figure  of  1200  million 
dollars.  The  increase  in  exports  of  manufactured  goods  between 
1897  and  1 9 13  was  almost  threefold.  The  exports  of  raw  and 
manufactured  silk  rose  from  66  milHon  dollars  in  1897  9° 
Industrial  ^l^i^ns  in  1 913,  Milan  surpassing  Lyons  as  the 
and  Com-  greatest  silk  market  in  the  world ;  and  during  the  same 
veiopment^  period  ItaHan  cotton  goods  not  only  captured  the 
home  market  but  also  increased  as  exports  from 
5  millions  to  nearly  50  millions.  The  Italian  merchant  marine 
in  1 914  numbered  1060  ships  of  over  a  hundred  tons  each  and 
possessed  a  total  tonnage  of  1,668,296,  —  ranking  close  to  the 
Japanese,  which  then  was  exceeded  only  by  the  British,  German, 
American,  Norwegian,  and  French. 

Parallel  with  the  growth  of  Italian  commerce  and  industry 
from  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  went  new  and  increas- 
Sociai  ing  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  government  to  guarantee 
Legislation  ^  minimum  of  comfort  to  the  growing  industrial  prole- 
tariat. Factory  acts  of  1886  regulating  child  labor  were  now 
strengthened  and  applied  to  women,  who,  together  with  children 
under  thirteen,  were  excluded  from  underground  and  night  work. 
An  employers'  liabiHty  act  of  1898  required  employers  to  insure 
their  workingmen  against  accidents,  and  another  act  of  that 
year  estabHshed  contributory  systems  of  sickness  insurance  and 
old-age  pensions.  An  act  of  1908  made  provision  for  a  weekly 
day  of  rest  for  laborers.  An  act  of  191 2  nationaHzed  life  in- 
surance. Municipalities  were  authorized  to  own  and  operate 
public  utilities.  Trade  unions  were  legalized  and  their  funds 
and  activities  protected.  Some  progress  was  made  in  the  arbi- 
tration of  chronic  labor  disputes  and  of  the  strikes  with  which 
the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  teemed.  Cooperative 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  375 


societies  for  banking  and  for  wholesake  buying  and  selling 
were  encouraged,  especially  in  the  rural  districts.  And  the 
electoral  reform  of  191 2,  which  instituted  almost  universal 
manhood  suffrage,  augured  still  further  experiments  in  social 
legislation. 

It  was  the  cities  that  most  benefited  by  these  reforms,  although 
it  was  the  country  districts  that  most  needed  them.  Despite 
her  relatively  great  advance  in  commerce  and  indus-  itaUan 
try,  Italy  could  not  hope  permanently  to  rival  Great  Agriculture 
Britain,  France,  Germany,  or  the  United  States,  which  were  far 
more  Hberally  suppHed  by  nature  with  iron  and  coal  and  other 
mineral  resources.  Italy  was  still  chiefly  an  agricultural  nation. 
In  1 91 3  over  a  third  of  her  population  were  agricultural  laborers. 
Yet  in  agriculture  Italy  was  remarkably  backward.  In  Naples 
and  Sicily,  whither  the  land  reforms  of  the  French  Revolution  had 
never  thoroughly  penetrated,  the  soil  was  still  held  largely  by 
great  landowners,  whose  miserable  peasantry,  hopeless  and 
helpless,  toiled  in  diminishing  numbers  on  soil  scourged  by  the 
mysterious  pellagra  and  malarial  fever,  ravaged  by  untamed 
watercourses,  or  periodically  desolated  by  earthquakes  and  vol- 
canic eruptions.  In  northern  Italy  the  large  estates  had  been 
broken  up  into  small  holdings,  on  which  thrifty  and  hard-work- 
ing farmers,  with  the  aid  of  the  cooperative  societies,  rural 
credit  banks,  and  improved  methods  of  tillage,  were  gradually 
but  perceptibly  bettering  their  lot.  Yet  over  all  the  agricultural 
classes  of  Italy  fell  the  shadow  of  taxation  —  taxation  for  mili- 
tarism, for  imperialism,  for  education,  for  public  improvements, 
—  taxation  far  heavier  than  was  to  be  found  in  any  other 
country  of  Europe.  . 

With  these  facts  in  mind,  together  with  the  additional  fact 
that  for  several  years  the  increase  in  Italian  population  surpassed 
the  average  annual  increase  of  the  other  European  ^  . 

.    .  ,  1     1      T    1.  •  Emigration 

states,  it  is  easy  for  us  to  understand  why  Itahan  emi- 
gration was  particularly  heavy  at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury and  in  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth.  In  1900  the 
number  of  emigrants  was  353,000  and  in  191 1  it  was  533,000. 
This  exodus  did  not  represent  a  total  loss  of  population,  for  nearly 
half  returned  after  earning  money  abroad.  Thus,  in  191 1  some 
219,000  returned,  of  whom   140,000  were  from  the  United 


376  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


States.  Nevertheless,  it  was  officially  stated  in  1910  that  Italy 
had  lost  to  date  about  5,558,000  citizens,  who  had  permanently 
settled  in  foreign  countries,  mainly  in  the  United  States,  Argen- 
tina, Uruguay,  and  Brazil,  and  that  peasants,  chiefly  from 
southern  Italy,  constituted  80  per  cent  of  this  loss. 

In  dealing  with  social  and  economic  problems  the  Italian  gov- 
ernment was  handicapped  by  the  mutual  rivalries  and  conflicts 
Opposition  ^^^^  distinct  poHtical  groups,  each  one  of  which  was 
to  the  more  or  less  hostile  to  the  existing  political  regime. 
Government  rj.^^  Clericals  displayed  increasing  strength  after 
the  removal  of  the  non  expedit  in  1905.  They  were  perfecting 
their  organization,  founding  newspapers,  and  developing  political 

1.  The  platforms,  which,  on  the  one  side,  denounced  Social- 
Clericals  isjjj  2iXid  state  infringements  on  the  rights  and  Ub- 
erties  of  the  papacy  and  the  Church,  and,  on  the  other 
side,  urged  social  reform  —  factory  legislation,  extension  of 
workingmen's  insurance,  the  breaking  up  of  large  landed  es- 
tates into  small  holdings,  and  cooperative  movements  for  the 
rural  classes.  In  the  general  election  of  1913  —  the  first  under 
universal  manhood  suffrage  —  professed  Clericals  won  35  seats 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  a  gain  of  14,  besides  securing  from 
some  200  Moderate  Monarchist  members  promises  to  oppose 
Anti-Clerical  legislation.    (2)  Middle-class  Anti-Clerical  Republi- 

2.  The  Re-  canism  of  the  type  championed  in  the  first  half  of  the 
pubUcans  nineteenth  century  by  Mazzini  and  Garibaldi,  despite 
its  temporary  eclipse  by  the  success  of  the  Monarchists  in  unify- 
ing the  nation,  had  subsequently  remained  a  political  tradition 
with  many  Freemasons  and  other  intellectual  radicals.  These 
Republicans  sought  any  opportunity  to  embarrass  the  monarchy 
and  to  pave  the  way  for  the  establishment  of  an  Italian  Republic. 
In  the  elections  of  19 13  they  lost  six  seats  but  still  retained 

3.  The  seventeen.  (3)  SociaKsm  made  little  headway  in 
SociaUsts  Italy  till  early  in  the  'nineties,  when  its  social  gospel 
attracted  several  ardent  young  intellectuals  and  a  considerable 
number  of  workingmen  in  industrial  Milan  and  in  the  North  gen- 
erally. In  spite  of  chronic  factional  disputes  and  a  virtual  split 
of  the  Socialist  party  into  the  two  groups  of  Marxists  and  Re- 
formists, Socialism  grew  steadily  in  Italy.  The  election  of  1913 
returned  78  Socialists  to  the  Chamber,  —  a  noteworthy  gain  for 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


377 


them,  under  universal  manhood  suffrage,  of  37  seats.  (4)  Dan- 
gerous to  the  government,  disquieting  to  the  Clericals,  and  a 
source  of  dissension  to  the  Socialists  was  the  compara-  4.  The  Syn- 
tively  rapid  development  among  the  industrial  pro-  dicaUsts 
letarians  of  revolutionary  Syndicalism,  with  its  strikes  and 
violence  and  repugnance  to  governmental  authority. 

In  studying  the  history  of  the  Italian  kingdom  from  1870  to 
1 9 14  we  must  not  be  so  blinded  by  the  violence  of  Syndicalists 
or  by  the  partisan  appeals  of  Socialists,  Republicans,  National 
and  Clericals,  or  even  by  the  grave  facts  of  emigration,  Patriotism 
industrial  distress,  poverty,  illiteracy,  and  burden-  ^^^^ 
some  taxation,  as  to  lose  sight  of  a  most  basic  factor  in  Italian 
political  and  social  life  —  the  factor  of  nationalism,  of  patriot- 
ism, of  a  yearning  in  the  breast  of  every  loyal  modern  Italian 
to  emulate  the  ancient  Romans  in  culture  and  in  prowess. 
It  was  this  factor  which  made  possible  the  political  unification 
of  the  peninsula  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.    It  was 
this  factor  which  rendered  inevitable  the  ambitious  efforts  of 
the  statesmen  of  the  new  kingdom  to  make  Italy  a  Great  Power, 
which  caused  them  to  develop  militarism  at  home  and  imperial- 
ism in  Africa.    It  was  this  factor  likewise  which  made  every 
Italian  a  latent  ''Irredentist."    Irredentism  was  the  ideal  of 
annexing  those  Italian  regions,  —  Trent,  Triest,  and  the  eastern 
coast  of  the  Adriatic,  —  which  still  belonged  to  Austria.  Such 
an  ideal  the  Italian  government  could  not  hope  to  jjj.g^gjjtjgjjj 
realize  so  long  as  commercial  and  colonial  rivalry  and  the 
with  France  forced  Italy  to  maintain  an  alliance  with  ^^^^^^j^*" 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  (1882-1915),  and  the  itaiy  in  the 
government  long  frowned  officially,  therefore,  upon  ^^^J^^^*^® 
Irredentist  agitation.    But  improved  relations  with 
France  in  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century,  and  the 
precipitation  of  the  vast  War  of  the  Nations  by  an  Austro- 
Hungariai  attack  on  Serbia  (July,  1914),  gave  Italy  her  chance. 
Forgetting  the  grievous  burdens  of  militarism  and  taxation,  the 
Italian  people  were  now  swept  off  their  feet  by  a  wave  of  Irre- 
dentist enthusiasm.    In  May,  191 5,  Italy  denounced  her  treaty  of 
alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  and  plunged  into  the  war  as  an  ally 
of  Russia,  France,  Great  Britain,  Japan,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro. 
Italia  irredenta  (''Italy  unredeemed")  must  now  be  redeemed. 


378  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


For  Italians  the  Great  War  was  but  another  attack  on  Austria 
—  a  continuation  and  hoped-for  consummation  of  the  wars  of 
1859  and  1866  for  national  unity  and  independence. 


3-  SPAIN 

With  an  area  almost  as  great  as  France  and  considerably 

larger  than  Italy,  Spain  played  a  distinctly  inferior  r61e  in  the 

„  .  history  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  one  rather  in 
Spain  ;  .11 

Contrasted  accordance  with  her  population,  which  m  19 10  was 

with  Italy  only  about  half  that  of  Italy  or  France.^  Nature 

and  France  .  .  . 

handicapped  Spain,  since  the  poverty  of  much  of  the 
Spanish  soil  was  a  barrier  to  any  phenomenal  development  of 
agriculture,  and  the  high  mountain  ranges  which  traversed  the 
peninsula  militated  against  commercial  progress  and  the  growth 
of  industry.  Such  drawbacks  help  to  explain  the  constantly 
large  emigration  of  energetic  Spaniards  to  Latin  America, 
especially  to  Argentina,  and  the  relatively  small  population  in 
Spain  itself.  And  this  fact,  together  with  the  tragic  efforts 
of  Spanish  kings  and  statesmen  throughout  the  sixteenth, 
seventeenth,  and  eighteenth  centuries  to  exercise  a  great  world 
dominion,  out  of  all  relation  to  the  resources  and  population  of 
their  country,  rendered  inevitable  the  lapse  of  Spain  into  the 
class  of  second-rate  Powers. 

For  the  first  seventy-five  years  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
moreover,  Spain  suffered  from  abominable  governments  and  a 
Seventy-five  series  of  civil  wars.  French  intervention  during  the 
Years' PoUt-  era  of  Napolcon  not  only  led  to  the  protracted  and 
ters  hi^^^'  costly  War  of  independence  but  also  served  to  crystal- 
Spain,  1800-  lize  in  Spain  bitterly  hostile  factions  of  Revoiution- 
'^^^  aries  and  Reactionaries.    Then,  it  will  be  recalled,^ 

came  the  reign  (1814-1833)  of  the  despicable  Ferdinand  VII, 
remembered  for  his  absolutism,  for  his  cruelty  and 
Ferdinand     cunning,  and  for  his  loss  of  the  bulk  of  the  Spanish 
1814-1833     Empire  in  the  New  World.    In  setting  aside  the 

^  In  1910  France  had  an  area  of  207,129  sq.  mi.  and  a  population  of  39,601,509 ; 
Italy  had  an  area  of  110,688  sq.  mi.  and  a  population  of  34,671,377;  and  Spain  had 
an  area  of  194,794  sq.  mi.,  and  a  population  of  19,611,334. 

2  See  above,  pp.  20-26. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  379 


Bourbon  law  of  inheritance,  which  fixed  the  royal  succession 
only  in  the  male  line,  and  in  bequeathing  the  crown  of  Spain  to 
his  youthful  daughter,  Isabella  II,  Ferdinand  left  his  country 
another  unfortunate  legacy,  for  Don  Carlos,  Ferdinand's  brother, 
contested  the  succession;  and  from  1833  to  1840  a  destructive 
civil  war  was  waged  between  CaHists  and  Chris tinos  jj^^  cariist 
—  as  the  followers  of  Don  Carlos  and  of  Donna  Chris-  War, 
tina,  mother  of  Queen  Isabella  and  regent,  were  re-  ^^33-1840 
spectively  called.    Don  Carlos  attracted  to  his  standard  the 
reactionaries,  Clericals,  and  most  of  the  combative  elements 
from  the  mountainous  districts  of  the  north.    Christina,  on  the 
other  hand,  won  the  Liberals  by  the  grant  of  a  parliamentary 
constitution  (1837). 

The  upshot  of  the  Cariist  War  was  the  flight  of  Don  Carlos 
in  1840  and  the  general  recognition  of  Queen  Isabella.  Unfor- 
tunately, throughout  her  long  personal  reign  (1843-  Isabella  11, 
1868),  Isabella  II  displayed  neither  good  sense  nor  the  1843-1868 
spirit  of  conciliation.  She  alienated  the  Liberals  by  revising 
the  constitution  in  a  conservative  direction  (1845)  ^.nd  by  her 
constant  attempt  to  rule  despotically  with  the  mere  pretense  of 
a  parliament,  and  at  the  same  time  she  failed  to  win  the  loyal 
support  of  the  Cariist  faction.  The  queen's  gross  immorality 
shocked  and  scandalized  the  sincere  Catholics,  and  her  extrava- 
gance and  addiction  to  favorites  embarrassed  the  finances.  Re- 
publican doctrines  spread  among  the  middle  class  and  in  the 
army.  There  were  repeated  revolts  and  insurrections  of  grow- 
ing intensity. 

A  successful  revolution  in  1868  sent  Queen  Isabella  fleeing 
as  an  exile  to  France,  but  ushered  in  a  seven-year  period  of  anarchy 
in  Spanish  government.    A  new  constitution  was  j^ie  Revo- 
adopted  in  1869,  guaranteeing  individual  liberties  and  lutionof 
religious  toleration  and  providing  for  a  monarchical  ^^^^ 
parliamentary  regime ;  but  considerable  difficulty  was  encoun- 
tered in  securing  a  king.    After  the  final  declination  of  Prince 
Leopold  of  Hohcnzollcrn-Sigmaringen,^  Prince  Amadco  of  Savoy, 
the  second  son  of  King  Victor  Emmanuel  II  of  Italy,  accepted 
the  Spanish  crown  in  1870.    It  was  a  shaky  throne  which  King 

'  It  was  the  candidature  of  Prince  Leo[)()ld  which  occasioned  the  Franco-German 
War  of  1870-1871.    See  above,  pp.  198  f. 


38o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Amadeo  mounted,  for  neither  Carlists  nor  Republicans  would 
support  him,  and  the  Liberal  Monarchists  were  divided  into  so 
^jjg  many  warring  groups  that  no  settled  policy  could 

Amadeo,  be  Consistently  pursued.  While  both  Amadeo  and 
1870-1873  Yiis  queen  were  respected  for  their  personal  qualities 
by  those  who  knew  them  intimately,  the  majority  of  Spaniards, 
intensely  patriotic,  regarded  them  as  foreigners  and  intruders. 
In  disgust  Amadeo  abdicated  in  February,  1873,  returned 
to  Italy ;  and  a  republic  was  proclaimed  in  Spain. 

The  Republicans  were  even  less  successful  than  the  Liberal 
Monarchists.  They  were  at  best  only  a  minority,  and  they 
The  Spanish  Speedily  Split  into  two  factions :  (i)  those  who  favored 
Republic,  a  Centralized  state,  and  (2)  those  who,  under  the  in- 
1873-1875  fluence  of  contemporary  Communism  in  France,^ 
favored  a  federal  republic.  At  first  the  Federalists  controlled 
the  government  from  February,  1873,  to  January,  1874,  but 
their  president,  Emilio  Castelar  (183  2-1899),  ^.n  able  and  con- 
ciUatory  statesman,  was  obHged  for  the  sake  of  public  order  to 
resort  to  a  dictatorship.  Then  the  RepubHcan  army  chiefs 
executed  a  coup  d'etat  and  put  Marshal  Serrano  in  the  presi- 
dential chair.  This  was  but  a  prelude  to  the  destruction  of 
the  unpopular  Spanish  Republic  and  the  restoration  of  the  Bour- 
Restoration  ^ons.  In  January,  1875,  the  son  of  Isabella  II,  a  young 
of  the  Bour-  man  in  his  eighteenth  year,  entered  Madrid  as  Kjng 
bons,  1875  Alphonso  XII  amid  the  plaudits  of  a  wearied  nation, 
and  the  work  of  national  consolidation  and  reform  was  begun. 

The  accession  of  Alphonso  XII  opened  a  new  and  happier 
era  in  Spanish  history.  The  young  king  himself  was  benevo- 
Aiphonso  ^^^^  sympathetic  in  disposition  and  a  good  judge 
XII  (1875-  of  men.  And  from  the  two  most  distinguished 
Be^Ming^  Spanish  statesmen  of  the  nineteenth  century  —  Mar- 
ofaNew  shal  Campos  (i  831-1900),  the  soldier,  and  Canovas 
del  Castillo  (1828-1897),  the  conservative  civilian  — 
he  received  invaluable  encouragement  and  advice.  Under  the 
generalship  of  Marshal  Campos  the  last  serious  Carlist  insur- 
rection was  suppressed  (1876)  and  law  and  order  were  restored 
throughout  the  kingdom;  under  him,  hkewise,  an  insurrection 
which  had  been  raging  in  Cuba  since  1868  was  ended  (1878). 

^  See  above,  pp.  333  f . 


38i 

On  the  advice  of  Canovas  del  Castillo  a  new  constitution  was 
drawn  up  and  promulgated  in  1876,  a  moderately  liberal  docu- 
ment which  conciliated  most  of  the  nation  and  which  has 
remained  in  force  to  the  present  time. 

The  constitution  of  1876  contains  moderate  guarantees  of 
individual  Hberties  and  vests  supreme  political  authority  in  the 
Cortes  —  a  parKament  of  two  houses  :  a  Senate  of  not  Spanish 
more  than  360  members,  part  of  whom  are  nominated  Govern- 
by  the  crown  for  life  and  the  rest  serve  by  virtue  of  Con- 
the  occupancy  of  some  specified  office  or  dignity ;  and   stitution  of 
a  Congress  of  Deputies,  of  406  members,  elected  by  ^^^^ 
popular  vote.    The  executive  power  resides  in  a  ministry  re- 
sponsible to  the  Cortes ;  and  the  king,  whose  every  act  must  be 
coimtersigned  by  a  minister,  enjoys  an  authority  hardly  superior 
to  that  of  the  British  king  or  the  French  president.    In  local 
government  less  centralization  and  a  greater  degree  of  autonomy 
prevail  in  Spain  than  in  France. 

In  rehgious  matters  the  government  of  Alphonso  XII  re- 
pressed Anti-Clericalism,  which  had  been  much  in  evidence  during 
the  revolutionary  period  from  1868  to  1875,  and  pro- 
tected Roman  Catholicism,  the  faith  of  the  vast  ma-  churtrand 
jority  of  Spaniards.    Not  only  were  the  provisions  of  state  under 
the  papal  Concordat  of  1851  rigorously  enforced,  but  toration 
the  Jesuits  and  religious  orders  of  both  sexes  were 
allowed  to  spread  to  an  extent  without  precedent  in  the  century 
and  to  take  hold  of  the  education  of  more  than  half  of  the  youth 
of  both  sexes  in  all  classes  of  society. 

During  the  greater  part  of  the  reign  of  Alphonso  XII  (1875- 
1885)  Canovas  del  Castillo  was  prime  minister.    Out  of  the 
least  reactionary  groups  of  the  days  of  Queen  Isabella  q^^^^^^^ 
II  and  out  of  the  more  moderate  elements  of  the  rev-  tive  Regime 
olution  he  constructed  a  Conservative  party,  which  °}  Canovas 

1       11  •      .         r         ^  del  Castillo 

loyally  supported  the  Constitution  of  1876  and  the 
religious  settlement  favorable  to  the  Church.  He  insisted  upon 
the  retention  of  a  heavy  property  qualification  for  the  exercise 
of  the  suffrage,  managed  Carlist  or  Republican  opposition  with 
a  firm  hand,  improved  the  national  finances,  reorganized  the 
army,  sent  military  expeditions  into  northern  Morocco,  showed 
leanings  toward  a  protective  tariff  for  the  advancement  of 


382 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Spanish  agriculture  and  industry,  and  courted  abroad  the  friend- 
ship of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  after  contributing  to  the 
marriage  of  his  king  to  an  Austrian  archduchess,  Maria  Christina. 
At  the  same  time  he  cheerfully  acquiesced  in  the  formation  of  a 
Liberal  party  under  the  leadership  of  Sagasta  (182 7-1 903), 
believing  that  in  the  orderly  rotation  in  office  of  two  great  polit- 
ical parties  the  permanence  of  the  new  monarchical  regime 
would  be  assured. 

The  first  real  test  of  the  stability  of  the  Spanish  government 
came  with  the  premature  demise  of  the  gifted  Alphonso  XII 

(1885)  and  the  accession  of  his  posthumous  son,  Al- 
gelfcy  of  phonso  XIII  (1886),  Under  the  regency  of  the  Queen- 
Maria  Mother  Maria  Christina.  Maria  Christina  was  an 
1885-1902     intelligent  woman  who  knew  how  to  enforce  obedience 

and  respect.  While  she  never  swerved  from  the 
utmost  loyalty  to  the  Church  and  always  sought  the  advice  of 
the  Conservative  leaders  Campos  and  Canovas  del  Castillo, 
she  gained  the  admiration  of  the  Liberals  at  the  beginning  of 
her  regency  by  summoning  Sagasta  to  be  her  prime  minister. 
Under  Sagasta's  Liberal  regime  a  uniform  civil  code  was  prepared 
Liberal  adopted ;  reciprocity  treaties  were  negotiated  with 

Regime  several  foreign  countries;  liberal  press  and  associa- 
of  Sagasta  ^-^^  j^^^  were  enacted ;  trial  by  jury  was  introduced  ; 
and  in  1890  universal  manhood  suffrage  was  instituted  for 
elections  to  the  Congress  of  Deputies.  The  return  to  office  of 
Canovas  del  Castillo  in  1890  led  to  the  reversal  of  the  tariff 
policy  of  the  Liberals,  the  denunciation  of  the  commercial 
treaties,  and  the  enactment  in  1892  of  a  highly  protectionist 
tariff.  It  led  likewise  to  renewed  interference  in  Moroccan  affairs 
and  to  an  unyielding  attitude  toward  the  demands  of  the  Cubans 
for  local  self-government.  At  home,  however,  public  business 
was  fairly  well  conducted,  and  it  was  a  source  of  deep  regret  to 
most  patriotic  Spaniards  that  Canovas  was  assassinated  by  an 
anarchist  (1897). 

The  second  real  test  of  the  monarchy's  stability  was  the 
stubborn  Cuban  revolt  (1895-1898)  and  the  resulting  disastrous 
war  with  the  United  States  (1898).  By  the  treaty  of  Paris 
(1898)  Spain  renounced  unconditionally  all  rights  of  sovereignty 
over  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  and  ceded  the  Philippines  and  Guam 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  383 


in  consideration  of  a  payment  of  twenty  million  dollars.  Thus 
ended  a  struggle  which  left  to  Spain,  out  of  her  former  huge 
colonial  empire,  only  the  Carolines  and  a  few  other 
islands,  which  she  sold  to  Germany  in  1899  for  four  the  United 
million  dollars.    The  war  was  a  serious  blow  to  ^*g*g*^ 
Spanish  prestige  and  pride  and  enormously  com-  Final  Ex- 
plicated the  financial  problems  of  the  kingdom.    But  Unction  of 

1  •  1     1  •        f  r    1  T  •!       1  Spanish 

the  queen-regent,  with  the  cooperation  of  both  Liberal  Empire  in 

and  Conservative  leaders,  weathered  the  storm  and 

^  „  .11  1  All  the  Pacific 

peacefully  transmitted  her  powers  to  her  son,  Alphonso 

XIII,  when  in  1902  he  came  of  age.  The  young  king  endeared 
himself  to  the  nation  by  his  adventurous  and  buoyant  spirits, 
by  his  amiability  and  upright  life,  and  by  his  loyalty  Alphonso 
to  the  constitutional  regime.  His  marriage  in  1906  ^^02- 
with  the  British  Princess  Victoria  insured  him  direct  heirs, 
and,  despite  several  attempts  on  the  part  of  fanatical  anar- 
chists to  assassinate  him,  the  throne  of  Alphonso  XIII 
seemed  in  191 5  comparatively  safe.  Not  even  Republican 
influence  from  France  or  the  revolutionary  establishment  of  a 
republic  in  adjacent  Portugal  (19 10)  appeared  to  have  shaken  it. 

Several  facts  in  the  history  of  the  reign  of  Alphonso  XIII 
from  1902  to  1915  deserve  mention.  In  the  fixst  place  there 
was  a  slow  but  steady  improvement  in  public  finances  Economic 
and  in  the  economic  condition  of  the  whole  kingdom.  Develop- 
On  one  hand,  though  maintaining  a  fairly  large  army 
and  attempting  to  rebuild  a  small  but  effective  navy,  Spain 
was  not  burdened  with  such  crushing  militarism  as  afflicted  the 
Great  Powers  of  Europe.  On  the  other  hand,  natural  resources 
were  developed.  During  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth 
century  more  than  200  miles  of  railway  were  opened  to  traffic 
every  year,  and  by  1910  some  9020  miles  had  been  completed 
and  the  entire  country  was  covered  with  a  network  of  privately 
owned  railways  which  linked  together  all  the  principal  towns. 
Spain's  merchant  marine,  far  from  decaying  through  the  loss  of 
her  colonies  in  1898,  seemed  to  have  been  given  fresh  impetus; 
and  the  value  of  Spanish  commerce  increased  from  375  million 
dollars  in  1890  to  450  millions  in  1913.  Agriculture  remained 
easily  the  most  important  Spanish  occupation,  the  eastern 
provinces  of  Valencia  and  Catalonia  being  particularly  well 


3^4 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


tilled  and  producing  a  considerable  quantity  of  grain,  wine, 
fruit,  and  sugar ;  but  an  industrial  revolution  was  already  much 
in  evidence  in  Barcelona  and  in  the  towns  of  the  North,  develop- 
ing a  very  important  cotton  business  and  other  manufacturing 
enterprises,  and  creating  in  its  wake,  as  elsewhere,  the  two  new 
social  classes  of  industrial  capitalists  and  industrial  proletarians. 

Secondly,  despite  the  seeming  stability  of  the  monarchy,  there 
was  a  growing  acrimony  among  the  political  groups.  The 
Political  dynastic  parties  of  Conservatives  and  Liberals  tended 
Factions  to  break  up  into  factions  after  the  deaths  of  Canovas 
in  Spain  Castillo  (1897)        Sagasta  (1903).    There  was  a 

marked  recrudescence  of  Carlism  and  Federalism.  Republican- 
ism gained  in  the  cities,  especially  in  Madrid.  Socialism  made 
some  appeal  to  the  industrial  proletariat.  And  intellectual 
anarchism,  championed  by  Francisco  Ferrer  (i 859-1 909),  who 
rose  from  the  position  of  a  railway  employee  to  become  the 
head  of  an  anti-clerical  ''Modern  School,"  and  who  was  put  to 
death  in  1909  for  alleged  complicity  in  an  insurrection  at  Bar- 
celona, found  allies  among  Syndicalist  trade  unions.  In  view 
of  this  situation  Spanish  legislation  assumed  a  more  liberal  tone. 
An  act  of  1907  strengthened  universal  manhood  suffrage  by 
Legislation,  making  the  exercise  of  the  voting  privilege  compulsory, 
1902-1914  Belgium  and  Austria.    An  act  of  1909  granted 

a  greater  measure  of  control  to  local  elected  bodies  and  did  away 
with  official  interference  at  the  polls.  In  order  to  reduce  the 
startlingly  high  percentage  of  illiteracy  (which  was  returned 
officially  in  1910  as  63  per  cent),  the  government  undertook  in 
1902  to  support  public  and  primary  schools,  and  in  1909  made 
elementary  education  obligatory.  At  the  same  time  efforts 
were  made  to  utilize  arbitration  in  the  settlement  of  strikes, 
which  in  Spain  often  had  a  political,  as  well  as  an  economic, 
aspect,  and  to  improve  the  lot  of  the  industrial  classes  by  means 
of  social  legislation,  such  as  employers'  Kability,  factory  laws, 
cooperative  shops,  and  state-guaranteed  insurance.  For  a 
time  in  1 909-1 910  the  government  seemed  bent  on  an  anti- 
clerical program :  Protestant  worship  was  formally  legalized ; 
a  so-called  "Padlock  Act"  prohibited  the  establishment  of  any 
more  Catholic  religious  houses  without  governmental  sanction ; 
and  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  the  Vatican  was  recalled.  But 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  385 


so  great  was  the  opposition  from  Conservatives  and  Moderate 
Liberals  that  diplomatic  relations  with  the  pope  were  restored 
in  191 2  and  further  anti-clerical  projects  were  abandoned. 

Thirdly,  there  was  a  revival  of  imperiaHsm,  partially  to  benefit 
the  influential  capitalists,  partially  for  patriotic  motives,  and 
partially  perhaps  to  distract  attention  from  grave  Spain  in 
domestic  ills.  To  the  African  possessions  which  Spain  Morocco 
already  had,  —  the  Balearic  and  Canary  Islands,  Rio  de  Oro, 
the  Muni  River  settlements,  and  Ceuta,  ■ — were  added  in  1912 
by  agreement  with  France  the  northern  coast  of  Morocco,  the 
enclave  of  Ifni,  and  a  considerable  extension  of  Rio  de  Oro. 
Even  this  imperialism  evoked  criticisms  and  protests  from  many 
Spaniards  :  there  were  serious  mutinies  in  the  army,  and  repeated 
anti-militaristic  demonstrations ;  and  much  difficulty  was  en- 
countered in  subjugating  that  part  of  Morocco  allotted  to  Spain. 
Anti-miHtarism  and  anti-imperialism  certainly  were  factors  in 
keeping  Spain  out  of  the  Great  War  of  19 14  and  in  enabling  her 
people  to  husband  their  strength  and  resources  for  the  solution 
of  domestic  problems. 

4.  PORTUGAL 

Portugal,  with  a  population  in  191 1  less  than  one- third  that 
of  Spain  and  with  an  area  only  about  one-sixth  as  large,^  had 
continued  throughout  the  nineteenth  century  to  Comparison 
present  an  historical  development,  as  it  had  in  earlier  ^p^^^ 
centuries,  strikingly  similar  to  its  neighbor's  in  the  Iberian 
peninsula.  Like  Spain,  Portugal  had  suffered  from  foreign 
intervention  during  the  era  of  Napoleon  and  had  subsequently 
been  torn  by  strife  between  revolutionaries  and  reactionaries. 
Like  Spain,  Portugal  had  lost  her  colonial  empire  on  the  American 
continent  in  the  early  'twenties.  Like  Spain,  Portugal  in  the 
'thirties  had  been  the  victim  of  a  dynastic  feud,  the  position 
and  pretensions  of  Dom  Miguel  in  the  smaller  country  being 
much  the  same  as  Don  Carlos's  in  the  larger  nation.  In  Portu- 
gal the  reign  of  Queen  Maria  II  (i 834-1 853)  corresponded  in 
kind  and  approximately  in  time  to  that  of  Queen  Isabella  II 
in  Spain :  Maria  was  a  better  woman  than  Isabella,  but  she 

^  The  area  of  Portugal  is  34,254  sq.  mi.,  and  its  population  (191 1)  5,54S,595« 

VOL.  II  — 2  C 


386 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


was  no  more  successful  in  putting  an  end  to  court  intrigues, 
military  coups,  and  general  lawlessness. 

Nominally  the  government  of  Portugal  had  been  parliamentary 
since  the  grant  by  Pedro  IV  of  the  charter  of  1826,  but  it  was 

not  until  the  last  year  of  Maria's  reign  that  constitu- 
under  the  tional  provision  (1852)  was  made  for  direct  election  of 
Portuguese  deputies  and  for  popular  participation  in  local  gov- 
1852-1889    ernment.    Under  Maria's  two  sons  and  successors  — 

Pedro  V  (1853-1861)  and  Luiz  I  ( 186 i-i 889)  —  there 
was  a  respite  from  civil  war  and  an  orderly  operation  of  con- 
stitutional government.  Gradually  political  groups  crystallized 
in  Portugal  much  the  same  as  in  Spain :  there  were  the  two  dy- 
nastic parties  of  Regenerators  and  Progressives,  corresponding 
to  the  Spanish  Conservatives  and  Liberals  respectively;  there 
was  a  growing  number  of  anti-clerical  Republicans,  formally 
organized  in  1881 ;  there  were  Miguehtes,  corresponding  to 
Carlists;  there  were  small  followings  of  SociaHsm  and  Anar- 
chism. Despite  the  seeming  popular  majority  that  either  Re- 
generators or  Progressives  could  always  command,  the  period 
was  remarkably  sterile  of  legislative  activity.  It  is  true  that 
slavery  was  abolished  in  the  Portuguese  colonies  (1869)  and 
that  democracy  was  emphasized  by  the  provision  for  the  gradual 
extinction  of  the  right  of  hereditary  peers  to  sit  in  the  Upper 
House  of  the  Cortes  (1885),  but  the  prevalence  of  pohtical  cor- 
ruption and  the  exigencies  of  maintaining  a  colonial  system  far 
beyond  the  practical  power  and  resources  of  the  kingdom  ^ 
created  financial  difficulties  from  which  the  state  seemed  unable 
to  extricate  itself.  And  in  the  meanwhile  taxes  were  most 
burdensome,  education  was  woefully  neglected,  needed  reforms 
were  postponed,  and  tens  of  thousands  of  the  most  industrious 
and  enlightened  Portuguese  were  emigrating  to  the  happier  and 
better  Portuguese-speaking  country  of  Brazil. 

^  Portugal  possessed  in  1914  a  colonial  empire  surpassed  in  extent  only  by  those 
of  three  Great  Powers  —  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Germany.  Its  total  area  was 
about  803,000  sq.  mi.  —  almost  twenty -five  times  the  size  of  the  mother  country. 
The  empire  comprised,  in  Africa,  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  Portuguese  Guinea, 
Angola,  and  Portuguese  East  Africa  or  Mozambique;  in  India,  Goa,  Damaun, 
and  Diu ;  in  China,  Macao ;  and  in  the  Malay  Archipelago,  part  of  Timor.  For 
a  treatment  of  the  Portuguese  empire  in  Africa,  see  below,  pp.  61 5  f.,  625.  Between 
1870  and  1900,  Portugal  expended  some  75  million  dollars  from  the  national  treasury 
for  colonial  maintenance. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  387 


At  the  very  time  when  Alphonso  XII,  Maria  Christina,  and 
Alphonso  XIII,  with  the  aid  of  distinguished  and  patriotic 
statesmen,  were  putting  the  Spanish  house  in  order, 
affairs  in  Portugal  went  from  bad  to  worse.    Under  J^trouf" 
Carlos  I  ( 1 889-1 908)  financial  crises  recurred  with  Reign  of 
alarming  frequency  and  growing  intensity.    The  two  iggj^ipos 
dynastic  parties  of  Regenerators  and  Progressives 
passed  under  the  sway  of  professional  politicians  whose  votes 
were  determined  almost  wholly  by  their  private  interests,  and 
skillful  manipulation  of  the  electoral  returns  enabled  these  two 
parties  to  hold  office  in  fairly  regular  rotation  and  to  obstruct 
the  election  of  RepubHcans  and  Independents.    The  king  him- 
self was  licentious  and  extravagant,  and  interfered  excessively 
in  pontics,  oftentimes  in  a  quite  undignified  manner,  to  secure 
public  loans  and  financial  pri\ileges  for  his  personal  use.  On 
several  occasions  the  king  utilized  a  right  accorded  him  by  the 
constitution  to  prorogue  the  parHament  and  govern  the  country 
by  means  of  ministerial  decrees  —  a  breach  of  constitutional 
practice  if  not  of  law.    The  last  occasion  —  and  the  most  noto- 
rious —  was  in  May,  1907,  when,  following  fierce  factional  strife 
among  the  monarchical  groups  and  rebellious  outbreaks 
on  the  part  of  RepubHcans,  Joao  Franco,  the  prime  torsh?p^of" 
minister,  assumed,  with  royal  approval,  a  practical  Franco  and 
dictatorship.    Franco  was  honest  and  patriotic  and  ous^nd"' 
determined  to  introduce  sweeping  reforms.    But  his 
opponents  were  numerous  and  active;  they  included  the  Re- 
publicans, the  professional  pohticians  and  those  officials  who 
feared  investigation,  the  judiciary,  the  local  government  boards, 
and  a  large  body  of  citizens  who  still  beheved  in  parliamentary 
government.    Newspapers  and  politicians  openly  advocated 
rebelUon;  Franco  repHed  by  suppressing  seditious  newspapers 
and  by  filling  jails  and  fortresses  with  poHtical  prisoners.  On 
I  February,  1908,  King  Carlos  and  the  crown  prince  were  assassi- 
nated while  driving  through  the  streets  of  Lisbon ;  and  Franco's 
dictatorship  came  to  an  inglorious  end. 

Manoel  II  ( 1908-19 10),  the  inexperienced  youth  who  succeeded 
his  father  on  the  damaged  Portuguese  throne,  was  frankly 
unfit  to  cope  with  the  situation.  Franco,  the  one  strong  Mon- 
archist, was  now  in  exile,  and  the  Progressive  and  Regenerator 


388  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


chieftains  were  unable  to  agree  upon  any  common  policy.  The 
murder  of  a  prominent  Republican  physician  in  October,  1910, 
The  Repub  signal  for  a  revolution.    Republican  soldiers 

lican  Revo-  in  Lisbon,  aided  by  armed  civilians  and  by  the  war- 
i"*io^         ships  in  the  Tagus,  overthrew  the  monarchical  regime 

after  some  severe  street  fighting  and  proclaimed  the 
Portuguese  Repubhc.  King  Manoel  fled  from  the  country, 
eventually  settling  in  England,  and  a  provisional  government 
was  erected  at  Lisbon  under  the  presidency  of  Theophilo  Braga, 
a  distinguished  scholar  and  poet. 

A  constitution  for  the  new  repubhc  was  adopted  in  August, 
191 1,  modeled  rather  closely  after  that  of  the  Third  French 

Repubhc.  It  provided  for  a  legislature  (Cortes)  of 
onhe**"**°^  two  Chambers,  —  a  National  Council  elected  by  direct 
Portuguese  manhood  suffrage  for  three  years,  and  a  Second  Cham- 
fgiT^^^*^'     ber  chosen  by  local  councils  and  renewable  half  every 

three  years,  — for  a  president  elected  by  the  combined 
Chambers  for  four  years,  and  for  a  ministry  responsible  to  the 
Cortes.  The  document  went  into  immediate  effect.  Dr.  Manoel 
Arriaga  being  chosen  the  first  constitutional  president  (191 1- 
191 5)  of  the  Portuguese  Repubhc. 

During  the  first  five  years  of  the  repubhc,  Portugal  remained 
in  an  acutely  troubled  condition.  The  new  regime  was  not 
Portugal  ^^^^  repubhcan  but  severely  anti-clerical.  In  191 1 
under  the  the  rehgious  orders  were  expelled  and  theJr  property 
Repubhc,      confiscated  for  the  benefit  of  the  state  treasury.  In 

the  same  year  the  separation  of  church  and  state  was 
decreed  :  the  pubhc  payment  of  salaries  to  the  clergy  was  to  cease, 
and,  under  the  guise  of  safeguarding  the  repubhc,  serious  re- 
strictions were  imposed  upon  the  freedom  of  the  Roman  Cathohc 
Church  in  Portugal.  And  in  191 3  the  Portuguese  legation 
at  the  Vatican  was  abolished.  It  was  quite  natural,  therefore, 
that  the  Clericals  should  oppose  the  government  and  should 
give  at  least  moral  support  to  the  chronic  counter-plots  of  the 
Royalists.  Then,  too,  the  Repubhcan  leaders  were  mainly 
bourgeois  who  had  none  too  much  sympathy  for  the  poorer 
working  classes  and  who  displayed  no  undue  haste  in  instituting 
economic  reforms.  The  working  classes,  therefore,  led  by 
extremists  of  various  sorts,  embarrassed  the  new  regime  by 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


389 


strikes,  mutinies,  and  political  demonstrations.  To  maintain 
themselves  in  power  the  RepubUcans  resorted  to  many  of  the 
tactics  which  had  brought  reproach  upon  the  monarchy :  they 
manipulated  electoral  returns;  they  crowded  the  prisons  with 
political  offenders  ;  they  restricted  freedom  of  speech ;  they  prac- 
ticed bribery  and  corruption.  Only  the  support  of  the  soldiery 
and  the  dissensions  among  its  foes  enabled  the  republic  to  survive. 

5.  THE  KINGDOM  OF  BELGIUM 

How  Belgium  secured  its  independence  from  Holland  (1830- 
1839)  and  obtained  an  international  guarantee  of  neutrality  from 
the  Great  Powers  (1839)  has  been  related  in  an  earlier  ^j^g 
chapter.^  The  constitution  of  the  new  state,  which  stitutionof 
was  pubHshed  in  1831  and  which  underwent  very  few  ^^^^ 
later  modifications,  proclaimed  Belgium  "a  constitutional,  repre- 
sentative, and  hereditary  monarchy."  The  legislative  power 
was  vested  in  a  king,  a  Senate,  and  a  Chamber  of  Representa- 
tives. The  king,  contrary  to  the  practice  in  most  democratic 
monarchies,  might  initiate  legislation,  but  no  other  act  of  the 
king  could  have  effect  unless  countersigned  by  a  minister  re- 
sponsible to  the  parliament.  The  Senate  was  to  consist  of  1 20 
members  elected  for  eight  years,  partly  directly  and  partly 
indirectly.  Elections  to  the  Chamber  of  Representatives  were 
to  be  for  four  years  and  down  to  1893  were  based  on  a  fairly 
heavy  property  qualification  so  that  in  that  year  there  were 
only  137,000  votes  out  of  a  population  of  six  and  a  half  millions. 

Under  the  enlightened  and  tactful  Leopold  I  (i 831-1865)  and 
the  shrewd  and  enterprising  Leopold  II  (1865-1909),  Belgium 
developed  in  an  almost  phenomenal  manner.  Of  two  or  three 
phases  of  this  development  it  is  well  to  make  mention. 

In  the  first  place  there  was  an  almost  unparalleled  economic 
growth.    Though  possessing  an  area  barely  one-third  the  extent 
of  Httle  Portugal,  Belgium  had  in  1 9 10  a  population  Economic 
larger  by  two  miUions.^    Unlike  the  Portuguese  or  Deveiop- 
Italians,  very  few  Belgians  left  their  native  land ;  in 
fact,  immigration  exceeded  emigration.    The  comparative  con- 

'  See  above,  pp.  53  ff. 

^  The  area  of  Belgium  was  11,373  sq.  mi.  with  a  population  in  1910  of  7,423,784, 
the  density  of  poj)ulation  being  greater  than  in  any  other  European  country. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


tentment  of  the  Belgians  was  due  to  the  economic  prosperity 
of  the  farmers,  who,  though  in  diminishing  numbers,  had  learned 
the  art  and  science  of  intensive  cultivation  of  their  small  hold- 
ings ;  and,  to  an  even  greater  extent,  it  was  due  to  a  remarkable 
expansion  of  industry  and  trade.  Valuable  mines  and  other 
natural  resources,  the  geographical  position  of  the  country,  the 
splendid  harbor  of  Antwerp,  and  the  network  of  canals  and 
railways  conspired  to  promote  the  Industrial  Revolution  in 
Belgium.  Manufacturing  and  mining  were  done  on  an  ever- 
enlarging  scale,  and  commerce  increased  by  leaps  and  bounds. 
By  191 1  some  28,000  steam-engines  were  operating  in  Belgium 
with  a  horse-power  of  2,750,000;  the  kingdom  possessed  a 
greater  railway  mileage  in  proportion  to  its  area  than  any  other 
country  in  the  world;  and  imports  and  exports  (exclusive  of 
precious  metals)  totaled  annually  more  than  one  and  a  half 
billion  dollars  —  a  third  more  than  Italy's  and  more  than  five 
'  times  the  amount  of  Spain's.  Of  the  vast  Belgian  shipping  over 
one-half  was  carried  (191 2)  in  British  ships,  over  a  third  in  Ger- 
man vessels,  and  over  a  seventh  in  Belgium's  merchant  marine. 

A  second  significant  factor  in  Belgian  development  was  the 
relation  of  the  state  to  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  whose  faith 
was  professed  by  the  great  bulk  of  the  nation.  The 
Uc  Ch^ch"  Constitution  of  1831,  while  requiring  the  king  to  be  a 
andPoiiti-  communicant  of  that  Church,  guaranteed  general 
Ss^ighim  religious  Hberty.  The  Church  was  assured  full  free- 
dom from  lay  interference,  and  the  state  continued 
to  contribute  to  the  financial  support  of  the  clergy  of  all  denomi- 
nations —  Catholic,  Protestant,  and  Jewish.  Over  the  ques- 
tion of  public  education  pronounced  differences  of  opimon 

1.  The  arose.  As  early  as  1847  ^wo  poKtical  parties  had 
CathoUc       formed  on  this  question  —  the  Catholic  party,  which 

sought  to  make  moral  and  reHgious  instruction  com- 
pulsory in  the  schools  and  to  intrust  it  to  the  CathoKc  clergy, 
and  the  Liberal  party,  which  espoused  the  idea  of  neutral  schools 

2.  The  ^  iorm  of  anti-clericahsm.    From  1847 
Liberal        1884  the  Liberals  managed  to  maintain  ministries  for 

terms  aggregating  twenty-eight  years,  and  during 
the  period  of  their  supremacy  they  aboHshed  reHgious  in- 
struction in  the  pubHc  schools  and  for  a  time  actually  broke 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  391 


off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  pope.  But  towards  the  close 
of  the  nineteenth  century  the  Liberal  party  dwindled  in  size 
and  influence,  and  the  CathoHcs  would  have  had  almost  no 
opposition  had  it  not  been  for  the  organization  (1885)  3.  The  So- 
of  many  of  the  urban  workingmen  into  a  Sociahst 
party  which  not  only  was  bent  on  radical  social  legislation  but 
also  was  incHned  to  anti-clericalism. 

From  1884  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Nations  in  19 14 
—  thirty  years  —  the  CathoHc  party  governed  Belgium.  Partly 
on  their  own  initiative  and  partly  from  Sociahst  and  cathoUc  Su- 
Liberal  pressure  they  instituted  a  large  number  of  re-  premacy, 
forms.    ReHgious  instruction  was  restored  in  most  of  ^^^"^  ^^^^ 
the  pubHc  schools ;  and  education  was  fostered  with  such  note- 
worthy success  as  greatly  to  reduce  the  percentage  of  Belgian 
ilHteracy.^    PoHtical  democracy  was  furthered.    In  1894  the 
property  qualification  was  removed  and  every  Bel-  Education 
gian  was  given  one  vote  on  attaining  the  age  of  25  and  and  Poiiti- 
after  one  year's  residence  in  his  commune;  at  the  caiDemoc- 

.     .  .  .  racy 

same  time  the  principle  of  plural  voting  was  intro- 
duced by  the  grant  of  one  or  two  additional  votes  to  an  elector 
in  possession  of  certain  financial  or  educational  qualifications.  In 
1899  proportional  representation  was  established  for  the  protec- 
tion of  poHtical  minorities,  whereby  the  parhamentary  seats  to  be 
filled  by  a  given  district  would  be  distributed  among  the  parties 
or  candidates  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  followers  or  voters 
of  each.  In  their  opposition  to  the  Catholic  party,  which  had 
fathered  these  reforms,  both  SociaHsts  and  Liberals  attacked  es- 
pecially the  Clerical  control  of  the  schools  and  the  institution  of 
plural  voting.  In  191 3  the  Socialists  were  particularly  vehement 
with  their  slogan  of  ''one  man,  one  vote"  and  even  attempted  a 
general  strike  in  behalf  of  electoral  reform,  but  the  elections  of 
1914  preserved  a  comfortable  Cathohc  majority  in  the  Chamber. 

The  Catholic  party  during  the  long  period  of  its  ascendancy 
did  not  neglect  social  legislation.    An  enlightened  factory  code 
was  prepared;  trade  unions  were  protected  (1898);  social 
a  system  of  old-age  pensions  was  organized  (1900)  ;  legislation 

*  According  to  census  returns  the  proportion  of  the  population  above  eight  years 
of  age  who  could  neither  read  nor  write  was  30.26  per  cent  in  1880;  25.0  in  1890^ 
19.1  in  1900;  and  13. i  in  1910. 


392  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  considerable  progress  was  made  in  decently  housing  the 
working  classes  and  in  otherwise  providing  for  their  material 
well-being. 

In  1908  the  Belgian  government,  against  the  will  of  a  deter- 
mined minority,  took  over  as  a  colony  the  huge  African  terri- 
Worid  Poii    ^^^^  Congo,  which  the  business  acumen  of  King 

tics  and  Leopold  II  had  done  much  to  develop.^  This  step 
the  War  of    marked  the  entry  of  httle  Belgium  into  world  politics, 

the  Nations  1  1         -t  1  1 

and  was  a  natural  antecedent  to  the  mihtary  law  of 
1909,  which  substituted  compulsory  personal  service  for  the 
formerly  lax  system  of  conscription  and  greatly  reduced  the 
number  of  exemptions.  Extensive  fortifications  were  erected 
at  Antwerp  and  Liege.  It  was  the  national  wealth,  the  strate- 
gic position  of  Antwerp,  and  the  new  colonial  importance  of 
Belgium  probably  quite  as  much  as  the  geographical  position 
of  the  Httle  state  between  Germany,  France,  and  Great  Britain, 
which  invited  the  Germans  in  August,  19 14,  to  violate  the  soil 
of  Belgium,  which  they  had  promised  to  respect,  and  to  launch 
their  attack  against  France  via  Liege  and  Brussels, — an  action 
which  occasioned  the  entrance  of  Great  Britain  into  the  War  of 
the  Nations.^  Despite  the  patriotic  and  united  resistance  of 
the  Belgians  under  their  plucky  King  Albert  (1909-  ),  the 
country  was  speedily  overrun  by  German  troops ;  and  the  loss 
of  life,  the  destruction  of  towns,  the  devastation  of  the  country, 
and  the  general  paralysis  of  productive  industry  all  helped  to 
plunge  the  Belgian  nation  into  the  deepest  misery.  Whoever 
was  directly  responsible  for  the  Great  War,  it  was  not  Belgium ; 
yet  it  was  Belgium  that  in  1914-1915  suffered  most  grievously. 


ADDITIONAL  READING 


France,  General.  Brief  treatments:  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815 
(1910),  ch.  XV ;  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern 
Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch.  xxiv ;  J.  H.  Rose,  The  Development  of  the  European 
Nations,  1870-igoo,  Vol.  I  (1905),  ch.  iv,  v;  Cambridge  Modern  History, 
Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  v;  Histoire  generate,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  i;  W.  G.  Berry, 
France  since  Waterloo  (1909).  Important  general  descriptions  of  France 
under  the  Third  Republic :  A.  L.  Guerard,  French  Civilization  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  (1914),  an  excellent  introduction;  E.  A.  Vizetelly,  Repub- 


On  the  Congo,  see  below,  pp.  619  f. 


2  On  the  war,  see  below,  pp.  714  ff. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


lican  France,  i8/(>-'igi2:  her  Presidents,  Statesmen,  Policy,  Vicissitudes, 
and  Social  Life  (1913),  good  especially  for  personal  portraits ;  J.  C.  Bracq, 
France  under  the  Republic  (19 10),  an  appreciation  by  a  zealous  patriot  and 
Republican;  W.  L.  George,  France  in  the  Twentieth  Century  (1909),  a 
collection  of  interesting  essays;  Barrett  Wendell,  The  France  of  To-day 
(1907),  a  discussion  of  French  culture,  "  temperament,"  and  ideals ;  J.  E.  C. 
Bodley,  France,  new  ed.  (1899),  written  by  a  patriotic  Englishman  at  a 
time  when  relations  between  France  and  his  own  country  were  strained,  a 
discursive  book  filled  with  many  prejudices  against  the  French  system  of 
government  and  mode  of  life ;  Ernest  Dimnet,  France  Herself  Again  (1914), 
though  primarily  a  war-book,  valuable  for  its  account  of  the  newer  tenden- 
cies since  1900;  Pierre  de  Coubertin,  The  Evolution  of  France  wider  the 
Third  Republic,  Eng.  trans,  by  Isabel  F.  Hapgood  (1897),  pretentious  and 
somewhat  philosophical;   Frederick  Lawton,  The  Third  French  Republic 

(1909)  ,  a  readable  sketch;  C.  H.  C.  Wright,  The  History  of  the  Third 
Fremh  Republic  (1916).  More  detailed  histories  of  the  Third  Republic: 
Gabriel  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  Eng.  trans,  by  J.  C.  Tarver,  4  vols, 
(i  903-1 909),  covering  the  years  18 70-1 88  2,  the  authoritative  work  of  a  dis- 
tinguished French  statesman  and  historian;  Edgar  Zevort,  Histoire  de 
la  troisieme  republique,  2d  rev.  ed.,  4  vols.  (1898-1901),  covering  the  years 

1 870-  1 894,  useful  and  well-written;  fimile  Simond,  Histoire  de  la  troisieme 
republique  de  1887  a  18^4  (1913) ;  John  Labusquiere,  La  troisieme  republique, 

1871-  igoo  (1909),  being  Vol.  XII  of  the  Histoire  socialiste,  ed.  by  Jean 
Jaures;   Louis  Hosotte,  Histoire  de  la  troisieme  republique,  1870-igio 

(1910)  ;  Georges  Weill,  Histoire  du  mouvement  social  en  France,  1852- 
igio,  2d  ed.  (191 1),  scholarly  and  indispensable  for  a  thorough  study  of 
social  problems  in  France;  Leon  Jacques,  Les  partis  politiques  sous  la 
troisieme  republique :  doctrine  et  programme,  organisation  et  tactique  d'apres 
les  dernier s  congres  (19 13),  an  attempt  to  give  young  voters  an  impartial 
account  of  existing  political  parties. 

France.  Relations  of  Church  and  State.  A  valuable  account  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  moderate  non-Catholic  is  that  of  Paul  Sabatier,  Disestab- 
lishment in  France  (1906).  The  Roman  Catholic  view  is  ably  presented 
in  the  Catholic  Encyclopcedia  under  the  article  Concordat.  For  special 
study,  consult :  Antonin  Debidour,  VSglise  catholique  et  Vetat  sous  la  troisi- 
eme republique,  i8yo~igo6,  2  vols.  (1906-1909),  exhaustive  and  critical; 
Eugene  Spuller,  U evolution  politique  et  sociale  de  Veglise  (1893),  an  excellent 
brief  statement ;  Aristide  Briand,  La  separation  des  eglises  et  de  Vetat  (1905), 
the  official  report  presented  by  the  commission  to  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies ;  Gaspard  Odin  and  Eugene  Remaud,  La  loi  du  g  decembre  igoj 
concernant  la  separation  des  eglises  et  de  Vetat  (1906),  a  carefully  annotated 
study  of  the  Separation  Law;  E.  Lecanuet,  Ueglise  de  France  sous  la 
troisieme  republique,  2  vols.  (1907-1910),  coming  down  to  1894,  the  con- 
tribution of  a  Catholic  priest ;  Alfred  Baudrillart,  Quatre  cent  ans  de  con- 
cordat (1905),  an  admirable  review  from  the  pen  of  a  Catholic  scholar; 
Emmanuel  Barbier,  Le  progres  du  liberalisme  catholique  en  France  sous  Le 
papc  Leon  XIII,  2  vols.  (1907). 


394  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


France.  Colonies.  Alfred  Rambaud  and  others,  La  France  coloniale, 
6th  ed.  (1893),  descriptive  and  historical;  Marcel  Dubois  and  August© 
Terrier,  Un  siecle  expansion  coloniale,  1800-igoo,  new  ed.  (1902);  Paul 
Gaffarel,  Les  colonies  Jranqaises,  6th  ed.  (1899) ;  i^mile  Levasseur,  La 
France  et  ses  colonies,  geographic  et  statistique,  3  vols,  (i 890-1 893) ;  Louis 
Vignon,  Les  colonies  franqaises :  leur  commerce,  leur  situation  economique, 
leur  utilite  pour  la  metropole,  leur  avenir  (1886),  and,  by  the  same  author, 
V expansion  de  la  France  (1891) ;  C.  B.  Norman,  Colonial  France  (1886). 
See,  also,  the  bibliographies  attached  to  chapters  in  Part  V,  below. 

France.  Other  Special  Topics.  On  the  form  of  government:  F.  A. 
Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913),  ch.  xv-xviii,  the  best  brief  account 
of  governmental  machinery  and  its  evolution  since  1789;  A.  L.  Lowell, 
The  Governments  of  France,  Italy,  and  Germany  (191 5),  an  abridgment  of 
the  author's  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  2  vols.  (1897), 
of  which  Vol.  I,  ch.  i,  ii,  treats  of  French  politics,  good  on  the  law  of  the 
constitution  but  too  prejudiced  in  favor  of  a  two-party  system  to  make 
clear  its  actual  operation ;  Raymond  Poincare,  How  France  Is  Governed, 
Eng.  trans.  (1914),  a  simple  narrative  told  originally  by  the  president  of 
the  republic  for  French  school-children,  useful  in  view  of  the  lack  of  more 
advanced  and  sympathetic  treatises  in  English ;  a  partial  antidote  for  the 
preconceptions  of  Lowell  and  of  Bodley,  cited  above,  is  the  illuminating 
little  article  by  J.  T.  Shotwell  on  The  Political  Capacity  of  the  French  in 
the  "  Political  Science  Quarterly,"  Vol.  XXIV  (March,  1909).  On  the 
struggle  between  Republicans  and  Monarchists  in  the  'seventies :  Sir  F.  T. 
Marzials,  Life  of  Leon  Gambetta  (1890)  in  the  Statesmen  "  Series;  P.  B. 
Gheusi,  Gambetta:  Life  and  Letters,  Eng.  trans,  by  Violette  M.  Montague 
(1910) ;    Lettres  de  Jules  Ferry,  i846-i8gj,  ed.  by  Eugene  Jules-Ferry 

(1914)  ;  Memoirs  of  M.  Thiers,  1870-1873,  Eng.  trans,  by  F.  M.  Atkinson 

(191 5)  ;  Jules  Simon,  The  Government  of  M.  Thiers  from  8  February,  187 1, 
to  24  May,  i8y3.  Eng.  trans.,  2  vols.  (1879) ;  Samuel  Denis,  Histoire  con- 
temporaine :  la  chute  de  V empire :  le  gouvernement  de  la  defense  nationale: 
Vassemblee  nationale,  4  vols.  (1897-1903),  Liberal  Monarchist  in  sympathy; 
Marquis  de  Dreux-Breze,  Notes  et  souvenirs  pour  servir  a  Vhistoire  du  parti 
royaliste,  1 8/2-1 88 j,  4th  ed.  (1899).  On  the  Commune  of  1871 :  P.  O. 
Lissagaray,  History  of  the  commune  of  iSyi,  Eng.  trans,  by  Eleanor  M. 
Aveling,  2d  ed.  (1898),  interesting  memoirs  of  an  ardent  sympathizer; 
Edmond  Lepelletier,  Histoire  de  la  commune  de  i8ji,  2  vols.  (1911-1912), 
the  most  recent  and  best  account ;  Maxime  Du  Camp,  Les  convulsions  de 
Paris,  5th  ed.,  4  vols.  (1881),  detailed  and  Conservative  in  tone;  Louis 
Dubreuilh,  La  commune,  18/1,  in  Vol.  XI  (1908)  of  the  Histoire  socialiste, 
ed.  by  Jean  Jaures ;  Jules  Claretie,  Histoire  de  la  revolution  de  1870-187 1 
(1872).  On  the  Dreyfus  case:  Narcisse  Leven,  Cinquante  ans  d' histoire: 
V alliance  israelite  universelle,  1860-igio,  Vol.  I  (191 1),  for  the  general 
growth  of  anti-Semitism;  Joseph  Reinach,  Histoire  de  Vafaire  Dreyfus, 
7  vols.  (1898-1911),  the  standard  work,  very  sympathetic  toward  Dreyfus; 
Alfred  Dreyfus,  Lettres  d'un  innocent  (1898),  and  Cinq  annies  de  ma  vie 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  395 


(1901),  both  in  English  translation;  Paul  Desachy,  Bihliographie  de  Vaf- 
faire  Dreyfus  (1905) ;  and  Paul  Fesch,  Bihliographie  de  la  franc-ma gmnerie 
et  des  societes  secretes,  2  parts  (1912-1913).  On  social  problems  and 
social  policies  under  the  Third  Republic :  H.  O.  Meredith,  Protection  in 
France  (1904),  a  summary  of  the  fiscal  policy;  Emile  Levasseur,  Histoire 
du  commerce  de  la  France,  Vol.  II  (19 12),  and,  by  the  same  author.  Questions 
ouvrieres  et  ind-ustrielles  en  France  sous  la  troisieme  republique  (1907),  im- 
portant works  by  an  eminent  authority;  S.  P.  Orth,  Socialism  and  De- 
mocracy in  Europe  (19 13),  ch.  v,  a  brief  outline  of  the  rise  of  Socialism  in 
France;  Alexandre  Bourson  (pseud.  Zevaes),  Le  socialisme  en  France 
depuis  1 8/ 1  (1908),  Le  syndicalisme  contemporain  (191 1),  and  (editor),  His- 
toire des  partis  socialistes  en  France,  11  vols.  (1911-1912);  Eugen  Jager, 
Die  sociale  Bewegung  in  Frankreich,  2  vols,  in  i  (1900) ;  Roger  Fighiera, 
La  protection  legale  des  travailleurs  en  France  (1913),  a  valuable  commen- 
tary, the  best  on  the  subject ;  Paul  Pic,  Traite  elemcntaire  de  legislation 
industrielle :  les  lois  ouvrieres,  4th  ed.  (191 2),  a  convenient  summary  of 
labor  legislation ;  Henry  Ferrette,  Manuel  de  legislation  industrielle,  .  .  . 
avec  le  texte  des  lois  ouvrieres  et  des  tableaux  analytiques  (1909),  a  collection 
of  labor  laws. 

Italy.  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815  (1910),  ch.  xvi,  and  J.  H.  Robin- 
son and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907), 
ch.  xxi,  parallel  brief  summaries;  Cambridge  Moderii  History,  Vol.  XII 
(1910),  ch.  viii,  by  Thomas  Okey,  the  best  historical  outline  in  English; 
Histoire  generale,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  viii,  a  good  French  outline ;  Bolton  King 
and  Thomas  Okey,  Italy  To- Day,  2d  ed.  (1909),  an  excellent  and  detailed 
study  of  Italian  public  problems;  W.  R.  Thayer,  Italica  (1908),  containing 
suggestive  essays  on  "  Thirty  Years  of  Italian  Progress  "  and  "  Italy  in 
1907  "  ;  F.  M.  Underwood,  United  Italy  (1912),  deals  with  Italy  since  1870 
in  a  way  calculated  to  give  the  reader  a  satisfactory  understanding  of 
present-day  conditions;  W.  J.  Stillman,  Francesco  Crispi  (1899),  a  useful 
biography  of  a  prominent  statesman ;  Memoirs  of  Francesco  Crispi,  Eng. 
trans,  of  documents  collected  by  Crispi's  nephew,  3  vols.  (1912-1914), 
valuable  for  both  domestic  and  foreign  policies ;  Italy's  Foreign  and  Colonial 
Policy:  a  Selection  from  the  Speeches  Delivered  in  the  Italian  Parliament 
by  the  Foreign  A  fairs  Minister,  Senator  Tommaso  Tittoni,  iqoj-iqoq,  Eng. 
trans,  by  Bernardo  Quaranta  di  San  Severino  (191 5);  Ernest  Lemonon, 
Ultalie  iconomique  et  sociale,  i86i-igi2  (1913),  a  valuable  monograph  on 
the  more  recent  social  history  of  Italy;  A.  L.  Lowell,  Governments  and 
Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  Vol.  I  (1897),  ch.  iii,  iv,  and  the  subsequent 
abridgment  of  the  work  under  the  title.  The  Governments  of  France, 
Italy,  and  Germany  (1915) ;  F,  A.  Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913), 
ch.  xix-xxi. 

Spain  and  Portugal.  Brief  general  accounts:  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe 
since  1815  (1910),  ch.  xxiv;  Charles  Seignobos,  Political  History  of  Europe 
since  1814,  Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  S.  M.  Macvanc  (1907),  ch.  x;  F.  A.  Ogg, 
The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913),  ch.  xxxiii,  xxxiv;  Cambridge  Modern 


396 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  xix,  and  Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  x;  Histoirc 
generale,  Vol.  XI,  ch.  ix,  and  Vol.  XII,  ch.  ix.  The  fullest  English  narra- 
tive of  Spanish  history  in  the  nineteenth  century  is  that  of  Butler  Clarke, 
Modem  Spain,  iSij-iSgS  (1906),  which,  however,  is  ill-balanced  and  in- 
effectively presented;  a  better  general  account  is  that  of  M.  A.  S.  Hume, 
Modern  Spain,  lySS-iSgS  (1900)  in  the  "  Story  of  the  Nations  "  Series. 
On  the  reign  of  Isabella  II  in  Spain :  Francis  Gribble,  The  Tragedy  of 
Isabella  II  (1913) ;  Gustave  Hubbard,  Histoire  contemporaine  de  VEs- 
pagne,  6  vols.  (1869-1883),  a  standard  work  covering  the  years  1814-1868  ; 
Hermann  Baumgarten,  Geschichte  Spaniens  vom  Aushruch  der  franzdsischeii 
Revolution  bis  auf  unsere  Tage,  Vol.  Ill  (1871),  dealing  with  Isabella  and 
the  Carlist  Wars.  On  the  revolutionary  period,  1868-1875:  H.  A.  L. 
Fisher,  The  Republican  Tradition  in  Europe  (191 1),  ch.  xii,  suggestive; 

E.  H.  Strobel,  The  Spanish  Revolution,  1868-1875  (1898),  clear  and  scholarly ; 
H.  R.  Whitehouse,  The  Sacrifice  of  a  Throne  (1897),  the  history  of  the  short 
reign  of  Amadeo  of  Savoy;  David  Hannay,  Don  Emilio  Castelar  (1896), 
a  biography  of  the  Republican  leader.  On  Spain  since  1870:  J.  L.  M. 
Curry,  Constitutional  Government  in  Spain  (1889),  memoirs  of  an  American 
minister  at  Madrid;  Yves  Guyot,  U evolution  politique  et  sociale  de  VEs- 
pagne  (1899),  a  description  of  public  life  in  Spain  at  the  close  of  the  nine- 
teenth century;  Angel  Marvaud,  La  question  sociale  en  Espagne  (1910) 
and  L' Espagne  au  XX^  siecle  (1913),  useful  recent  studies;  J.  W.  Root, 
Spain  and  its  Colonies  (1898) ;  J.  D.  Fitz-Gerald,  Rambles  in  Spain  (1910), 
a  popular  work  of  travel.  On  Portugal :  Francis  Gribble,  The  Royal 
House  of  Portugal  (19 15);  Angel  Marvaud,  Le  Portugal  et  ses  colonies 
(191 2),  including  a  discussion  of  social  conditions  and  of  the  causes  of  the 
overthrow  of  the  monarchy;  Gustav  Diercks,  Das  moderne  Portugal  (1913), 
a  similar  work  in  German;  and  the  popular  treatment  of  W.  H.  Koebel, 
Portugal,  its  Land  and  People  (1909). 

Belgium.  R.  C.  K.  Ensor,  Belgium  (191 5),  a  brief  study  of  present-day 
Belgium  in  the  "  Home  University  Library  "  ;  J.  de  C.  MacDonnell,  Belgium, 
her  Kings,  Kingdom,  and  People  (191 4),  another  brief  and  useful  study,  sym- 
pathetic with  the  Clericals  as  Ensor  with  the  Liberals  and  Socialists;  B.  S. 
Rowntree,  Land  and  Labour:  Lessons  from  Belgium  (1910),  the  most  pains- 
taking work  on  social  problems  in  Belgium;  D.  C.  Boulger,  Belgian  Life  in 
Town  and  Country  (1904),  a  general  survey  of  social  conditions,  and,  by  the 
same  author.  The  History  of  Belgium,  Vol.  II,  1815-1865  (1909) ;  Cambridge 
Modern  History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  xxiii,  and  Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  ix, 
a  sketch  of  Belgian  history  since  1839;  S.  P.  Orth,  Socialism  and  Democ- 
racy in  Europe  (1913),  ch.  vi,  a  good  account  of  the  Belgian  Labor  party; 

F.  A.  Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913),  ch.  xxix,  an  excellent  account 
of  pohtical  institutions ;  Louis  Bertrand,  Histoire  de  la  democratic  et  du  so- 
cialisme  en  Belgique  depuis  18 jo,  2  vols,  (i 906-1 907),  written  from  the  So- 
cialist position ;  Charles  Woeste,  Echos  des  luttes  contemporaines,  2  vols. 
(1906),  Belgian  politics  treated  by  a  distinguished  Catholic;  Leon  Dupriez, 
U organisation  du  suffrage  universel  en  Belgique,  vote  plural,  vote  obligatoire, 
representation  proportionelle  (1901). 


10  


GERMANY 
1871-1914 


Lougitude  East  12 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


TEUTONIC  EUROPE,  1871-1914 

I.  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE 

The  Constitution  and  Government  of  Germany 

It  has  been  pointed  out  in  an  earlier  chapter  ^  how  the  Ger- 
man Empire  was  created  under  the  leadership  of  Prussia  as 
the  result  of  three  wars  during  the  seven  years  from  1864  to 
1871. 

The  constitution  of  the  new  empire,  bearing  date  of  16  April, 
187 1,  was  in  the  nature  of  permanent  treaties  between  the  North 
German  Confederation  and  the  four  south  German  xhe  German 
states,  and  consecrated  a  federal  ''union  for  the  pro-  Constitu- 
tection  of  the  realm  and  the  care  of  the  welfare  of  the  '^^^ 
German  people."    Supreme  direction  of  the  military  and  polit- 
ical affairs  of  the  empire  was  vested  in  the  king  of  Prussia, 
who,  in  this  capacity,  was  accorded  the  title  of  Deutscher  Kaiser 
(German  Emperor).    To  the  emperor  was  intrusted  command 
of  the  army  and  navy,  appointment  of  the  imperial  chancellor, 
and  power  to  declare  war  if  defensive,  as  well  as  to  en-  The 
ter  into  treaties  with  other  nations  and  to  appoint  and  Emperor 
receive  ambassadors.    But  in  case  of  treaties  relating  to  matters 
regulated  by  imperial  legislation,  and  in  case  of  declaration  of 
offensive  war,  the  emperor  must  have  the  consent  of  the  Bundes- 
rat  (Federal  Council),  in  which  body,  together  with  the  Reichstag 
(Imperial  Diet),  were  vested  the  legislative  functions  of  the 
empire.    Over  the  laws  passed  by  these  bodies  the  emperor  was 
accorded  no  direct  veto. 

Just  as  in  the  federal  government  of  the  United  States  the 
Senate  represented  the  states  and  the  House  represented  the 

^  See  above,  pp.  180-203. 
397 


398 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


people,  so  in  Germany  the  people  were  represented  in  the  Reichs- 
tag and  the  states  in  the  Bundesrat.  But  whereas  the  German 
The  Federal  ^^^^^^^(^g,  being  elected  by  adult  males  over  25  years 
Govern-  of  age,  resembled  rather  closely  the  American  House 
Reichstag  Representatives,  the  Bundesrat  presented  a  marked 
and  contrast  to  the  American  Senate.    While  the  Senate 

Bundesrat  contained  equal  representations  from  all  the  Ameri- 
can states,  the  votes  in  the  Bundesrat  were  distributed  in 
some  relation  to  the  size  and  influence  of  the  twenty-six  com- 
ponent states  of  the  empire ;  and  whereas  in  the  United  States 
a  Senator  was  free  to  vote  in  accordance  with  his  own  will  or  with 
that  of  his  political  party,  in  Germany  the  representatives  of 
the  states  in  the  Bundesrat  were  bound  to  vote  as  units  in  accord- 
ance with  instructions  received  on  every  question  from  their 
respective  state  governments.  In  these  respects  the  Bundesrat 
more  nearly  resembled  a  permanent  congress  of  diplomats  than 
a  legislative  and  "  deliberative  body.  Representing  the  state 
governments  (in  many  cases,  the  princes),  the  Bundesrat  also 
was  aristocratic  rather  than  popular. 

The  table  on  the  opposite  page  gives  the  names  of  the  vari- 
ous states  of  the  German  Empire,  their  area  and  population 
(1910),  their  number  of  votes  in  the  Bundesrat,  and  the  number 
of  deputies  elected  from  each  to  the  Reichstag. 

A  primary  problem  that  confronts  every  federal  state  is  the 
distribution  of  powers  between  the  central  government  and  the 
„  ,  .         local  governments.    The  German  constitution,  like 

Relations  .  t    i  •     i     •  i  • 

between  the  that  of  the  United  States,  specified  certain  legislative 
Federal       powers  which  the  central  government  —  that  is,  the 

Government  i     it^.t  •  j 

and  the  Bundesrat  and  the  Reichstag  — might  exercise,  and 
ernmentT"  ^^^^^^  that  all  powers  not  specifically  delegated  to 
the  central  government  should  be  reserved  to  the  vari- 
ous federated  states.  The  scope  of  such  delegated  powers, 
however,  was  broader  in  the  German  Empire  than  in  the  Ameri- 
can RepubKc,  for  they  included  not  only  the  regulation  of  foreign 
and  interstate  commerce,  the  coining  of  money,  and  the  deter- 
mination of  weights  and  measures,  but  also  the  control  of  in- 
tra-state  commerce,  of  banking,  of  telegraphs  and  telephones, 
and  the  estabhshment  of  uniform  criminal  and  civil  law  ^  through- 

^  By  amendment  to  the  German  constitution. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  399 


Number 

Number 

States  of  the  Empire 

Area 
(Sq.  Mi.) 

Population 
(1910) 

OF  Votes 

IN  BUN- 

of  Depu- 
ties IN 

desrat 

Reichstag 

I.  Kingdom  of  Prussia  

1^4.616 

4.0.165;. 210 

17 

2^6 

2.  Kingdom  of  Bavaria  

20.202 

6,887,291 

6 

48 

3   Kingdom  of  Saxony  

Jy  1 

4,806,661 

A 

27 

4.  Kingdom  of  Wiirttemberg  .... 

7  t^^-l 

A 
T- 

17 

5.  Grand-duchy  of  Baden  

0  »^  0 

2.1A2.S77 

7 

14. 

6.  Grand-duchy  of  Hesse  

2,966 

1,282,051 

7 

0 
y 

7.  Grand-duchy    of  Mecklenburg- 

Schwerin  

6^o,ot;8 

"oy,y«j 

2 

6 

8.  Grand-duchy  of  Saxony  (Saxe-Wei- 

mar)   

d.1 7.Id.0 

I 

9.  Grand-duchy  of  Mecklenburg-Stre- 

litz  

106,442 

I 

10.  Grand-duchy  of  Oldenburg  .... 

2,482 

48^. OA  2 

II.  Duchy  of  Brunswick  

I  418 

AQA  770 

■2 

12.  Duchy  of  Saxe-Meiningen  .... 

278,762 

2 

13.  Duchy  of  Saxe-Altenburg  .... 

0 

216,128 

I 

14,  Duchy  of  Saxe-Coburg-Gotha  . 

764 

257,177 

2 

15.  Duchy  of  Anhalt  

888 

^^1,128 

2 

16.  Principality  of  Schwarzburg-Sonders- 

hausen  

000 

80  017 

I 

17.  Principality  of  Schwarzburg-Rudol- 

stadt  1  

100,702 

J. 

I 

433 

61,707 

I 

19.  Principality  of  Reuss  (Elder  Line) 

122 

72,769 

I 

20.  Principality  of  Reuss  (Younger  Line) 

319 

152,752 

I 

21.  Principality  of  Schaumburg-Lippe 

131 

46,652 

I 

469 

150,937 

I 

115 

116,599 

I 

99 

299,526 

I 

25.  Free  Town  of  Hamburg  

160 

1,014,664 

3 

26.  Imperial    territory    (Reichslatid)  of 

5,604 

1,874,014 

3 

IS 

Total   

208,780 

64,925,993 

61 

397 

*  Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt  was  joined  with  Schwarzburg-Sondershausen  in  1916, 
.Ljreby  reducing  the  number  of  states  in  the  German  Empire  to  twenty-five. 

2  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  was  acquired  from  France  by  the  treaty  of  Frankfort 
(May,  187 1 ),  was  without  local  self-government  and  without  any  voice  in  the 
Bnndcsrat  until  1911.  The  Bundesrat,  therefore,  contained  but  58  votes  from 
1871  to  1911. 


400 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


out  the  entire  empire.-^  At  the  same  time  the  execution  of  im- 
perial laws  was  placed,  not  as  in  the  United  States  in  the  hands  of 
a  hierarchy  of  federal  officials  distinct  from  the  state  adminis- 
tration, but  directly  in  charge  of  the  states  themselves.  This 
meant  in  practice  that  some  differences  prevailed  in  various 
parts  of  Germany  as  to  the  rigor  with  which  imperial  legislation 
was  enforced ;  nevertheless,  in  extremities  it  was  always  possible 
for  Prussia,  with  her  paramount  army,  to  coerce  the  other  states 
to  execute  laws  of  which  her  government  approved,  while  all 
the  other  states  unitedly  could  hardly  hope  to  force  Prussia  to 
execute  a  law  of  which  the  Prussian  government  seriously  dis- 
approved. To  several  states,  other  than  Prussia,  the  German 
constitution  accorded  special  privileges.  For  example,  Bavaria 
was  to  manage  her  own  railways,  post-offices,  and  army  (in 
time  of  peace) ;  in  Saxony  was  to  be  held  the  supreme  court 
of  the  empire ;  and  of  the  five  members  of  the  Bundesrafs 
committee  on  foreign  affairs  one  each  was  to  be  from  Bavaria, 
Saxony,  and  Wiirttemberg. 

The  constitution  of  the  German  Empire  has  been  extolled 
as  a  mark  of  the  utmost  genius  in  adjusting  the  political  diffi- 
Conflicting  ^^^^i^^  which  had  long  militated  against  national  uni- 
Estimates  of  fication,  —  in  effecting  a  nice  compromise  between 
the  German  powerful  mihtaristic  Prussia  and  the  proud  princes  of 

Government  ,  ,  .        ,  .  ,  . 

the  lesser  states,  and  m  yoking  up  the  newer  influences 
of  liberalism  and  democracy  with  the  older  forces  of  aristocracy 
and  divine-right  monarchy.  But  when  one  examines  closely 
the  practical  operation  of  the  German  constitution,  one  begins 
to  perceive  that  something  is  to  be  said  also  for  the  recurring 
denunciations  of  an  arrangement  which  favored  the  aristocratic 
classes  and  rendered  Germany  the  least  democratic  country 
of  western  Europe. 

It  was  quite  natural  that  Prussia  should  exercise  the  predomi- 
nant influence  in  the  new  Germany,  for  Prussia  embraced  approxi- 
mately two- thirds  the  area  and  two- thirds  the  population  of 

^  Reserved  entirely  to  the  several  German  states  are,  however,  such  important 
powers  as  the  determination  of  their  own  form  of  government,  of  relations  between 
church  and  state,  of  questions  pertaining  to  their  internal  administration,  the 
framing  of  their  own  budgets,  police  regulations,  land  laws,  and  the  control  of  public 
instruction. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  401 


the  whole  empire.    Prussia,  it  must  be  remembered,  continued 
to  be  governed  in  accordance  with  the  constitution  promulgated 
by  King  Frederick  William  IV  in  1850  —  a  severely 
conservative  constitution,  with  its  three-class  sys-  po^on^of 
tem  of  voting,  which  gave  political  preponderance  Prussia  in 
to  the  landed  aristocracy,  and  with  its  provision  EmpL?™*° 
for  a  ministry  largely  independent  of  the  parliament, 
which  enabled  the  king  to  exercise  very  wide  financial  and 
military  powers.^    This  king  of  Prussia  was  now  ipso  facto 
German  Emperor.     In  his  latter  capacity  he  appointed  the  im- 
perial chancellor.    And  the  chancellor,  according  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  empire,  enjoyed  a  commanding  position  §0  long  as 
he  retained  the  confidence  of  the  emperor.    He  was  -^j^g 
the  active  agent  of  the  emperor,  the  link  between  the  imperial 
Prussian  Kingdom  and  the  German  Empire.^    He  pre-  ^^^^^^^^^ 
sided  over  the  Bundesrat;  he  cast  the  seventeen  votes  of  Prussia 
in  that  body;   he  might  address  the  Reichstag  whenever  he 
desired;  he  proposed  most  of  the  legislation  both  in  Prussia 
and  in  the  empire ;  he  customarily  named  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments of  imperial  administration  and  supervised  their  work; 
he  was  charged  with  the  promulgation  and  execution  of  all 
imperial  laws. 

Not  only  did  the  constitution  confer  these  extensive  powers 
upon  the  chancellor,  who  was  usually  a  Prussian  and  who  in  prac- 
tice was  responsible  only  to  the  king  of  Prussia,  but  it 
made  the  oligarchical  Bundesrat  distinctly  superior  ^atic^har- 
in  law-making  to  the  democratic  Reichstag.    Thus,  it  acter  of  the 
was  for  the  Bundesrat  to  pass  upon  the  constitu-  oovermnent 
tionality  of  proposed  laws  and  normally  to  initiate 
legislation.    Thus,  too,  it  was  provided  that  the  constitution 
could  not  be  amended,  taxes  could  not  be  decreased,  and  the 
military  establishment  could  not  be  reduced,  if  on  any  of  these 
proposals  fourteen  adverse  votes  were  cast  in  the  Bundesrat  — 
and  the  chancellor  alone  had  seventeen  votes  at  his  disposal. 
Again,  through  the  indirect  influence  which  the  Prussian  gov- 

^  For  the  constitution  of  Prussia,  as  distinct  from  that  of  Germany,  see  above, 
pp.  143  f. 

2  Customarily,  the  imperial  chancellor  was  also  the  head  of  the  Prussian 
ministry. 

VOL.  II  —  2D 


402  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ernment  could  exert  upon  the  governments  of  a  number  of  the 
smaller  states,  several  of  which  were  completely  surrounded  by 
Prussian  territory,  it  was  nearly  always  possible  for  the  chancellor 
to  control  a  clear  majority  of  the  votes  in  the  Bundesrat  — 
and  a  clear  majority  of  the  Bundesrat  could  constitutionally 
veto  any  proposal  originating  in  the  Reichstag,  no  matter  how 
large  the  majority  which  it  commanded  in  the  popularly  elected 
House.  The  Reichstag  was  a  debating  society  for  the  nation; 
on  occasion  it  might  even  embarrass  the  chancellor  and  the  em- 
peror by  refusing,  or  threatening  to  refuse,  to  approve  new 
taxes  or  increased  armaments  or  changes  of  public  policy  in- 
dorsed by  the  Bundesrat;  but  its  real  powers  were  slight  com- 
pared with  those  of  the  British  House  of  Commons  or  the  French 
Chamber  of  Deputies  or  even  the  American  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. Moreover,  inasmuch  as  there  was  no  reapportion- 
ment of  its  seats  throughout  the  period  from  1871  to  191 4,  even 
the  Reichstag  was  not  thoroughly  representative  of  the  democratic 
electorate :  the  relatively  rapid  growth  of  German  cities  during 
the  period  was  paralleled  by  no  shift  of  representation  in  the 
Reichstag,  with  the  result  that  in  191 2  the  average  number  of 
voters  in  a  district  in  Conservative  and  agricultural  East  Prussia 
was  121,000,  while  in  Socialist  and  industrial  Berlin  it  was 
345,000;  in  191 2  twelve  of  the  most  populous  electoral  districts 
of  the  whole  empire  contained  1,950,000  voters  and  twelve  of 
the  least  populous  had  170,000. 

It  may  seem  surprising  that  the  German  people,  Hving  in  an 
age  and  on  a  continent  pretty  thoroughly  permeated  by  demo- 
cratic ideals,  should  have  suffered  the  establishment 
l^e^sta-^^^^  and  maintenance  of  an  essentially  undemocratic  na- 
biuty  of  the  tional  government.  Certainly  in  the  revolutionary 
Govermnent  movements  of  1848-1849  the  German  people  had  dis- 
played markedly  democratic  proclivities.  In  explana- 
tion of  the  phenomenon,  three  facts  must  be  borne  in  mind. 
First,  the  Prussian  political  tradition  since  the  days  of  the  Great 
J  jjjg  Elector  in  the  seventeenth  century  had  been  a  tra- 
Prussian  dition  of  militarism,  bureaucracy,  and  divine-right 
Tradition  monarchy,  and  it  was  under  this  triune  aegis  that 
Bismarck,  the  Prussian  statesman,  had  accomplished  in  the 
second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  what  democratically 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


minded  poets  and  philosophers  had  failed  to  achieve  in  the  first 
half  —  the  national  unification  of  the  country ;  and,  as  has 
been  previously  remarked,  nationalism  was  a  more  potent  factor 
than  democracy  in  fashioning  nineteenth-century  Europe. 
Secondly,  the  new  German  government  was  undoubtedly  strong 
and  efficient,  if  not  democratic,  and  under  its  effi-  . 

,  .  ,  ,  ,  ,  .    .  2.  Efficiency 

ciency  the  nation  made  such  notable  progress  m  mdus-  and  Ma- 
trial  development  and  in  foreign  prestige  as  to  neu-  p^^^y^^®^" 
tralize  and  even  to  disarm  the  Particularist  ^  critics 
who  would  strengthen  democracy  in  the  various  states  by  weak- 
•  ening  the  central  government,  and  the  Radicals  who  would 
at  once  nationalize  and  democratize  all  the  political  machinery 
in  Germany.  Thirdly,  the  ideal  of  democracy  still  remained 
in  the  German  heart  and  mind :  if  only  sHghtly  realized  in  the 
organization  and  operation  of  the  new  federal  government,  it 
actuated  a  number  of  achievements  in  local  government.  It 
was  efficiency,  leavened  by  democracy,  that  revo-  ^  ^ocai 
lutionized  the  administration  of  German  cities  and  PoUticai 
caused  them  to  become  exemplars  to  the  world  of  the 
advantages  of  urban  ownership  and  control  of  all  manner  of 
public  utilities.  It  was  the  same  elements  which  prompted 
the  state-purchase  of  most  of  the  railways.  It  was  a  more 
-or  less  conscious  imitation  of  British  democracy  that  led  the 
Prussian  govenmient  to  establish  (187  2-1889)  ^  i^^w  form  of 
local  government,  by  a  redivision  of  the  kingdom  into  prov- 
r-inces,  districts,  and  circles,  whose  officials  were  to  be  in  part 
■^appointed  by  the  king  and  in  part  elected  by  the  people.  And 
it  was  democracy  which  inspired  the  gradual  constitutional 
changes  in  the  lesser  German  states.  In  1909  Saxony  substi- 
tuted for  her  former  three-class  suffrage  a  new  system  of  plural 
voting  based  on  that  of  Belgium.  Bavaria  obtained  parlia- 
mentary government  with  ministerial  responsibility,  and  in  1906 
adopted  the  direct  secret  ballot.  Universal  manhood  suffrage 
for  state  elections  was  introduced  in  Baden  in  1904  and  with 
provision  for  proportional  representation  in  Wiirttemberg  in 
1906.  Of  the  twenty-six  German  states,  only  the  Mccklenburgs 
remained  in  1914  without  written  constitutions  and  without 
some  form  of  popular  participation  in  government. 

^"Particularism"  is  the  word  commonly  ap|)lie(l  in  Germany  to  what  in  the 
United  States  passes  under  the  name  of  "States'  Rights." 


404  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


The  German  Empire  under  Bismarck,  1871-1890 

Prince  Otto  von  Bismarck's  political  career  may  be  separated 
into  two  important  parts  by  the  year  187 1.    In  the  nine  years 

preceding  that  date  he  had  made  King  William  I  of 
Maker  <rf'  Pmssia,  whom  he  found  on  the  point  of  resigning,  the 
United  most  powerful  ruler  in  Europe  and  had  given  to  Ger- 
and  Fk^t  niany  national  unity  and  constitutional  government. 
ChanceUor  For  almost  twenty  years  after  1871  Bismarck  as  first 
EmpSe        chancellor  of  the  German  Empire  remained  the  chief 

figure  in  the  domestic  politics  of  his  own  country  and 
in  the  international  politics  of  Europe.  Reserving  to  a  final 
chapter  ^  the  account  of  how  he  preserved  friendly  relations 
with  the  British  Empire,  promoted  friendship  with  the  Russian 
tsars,  and  created  the  Triple  Alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
Italy,  thereby  isolating  France,  preventing  a  French  war  of 
revenge,  and  securing  the  peaceful  integrity  of  the  recently 
founded  German  Empire,  we  shall  here  confine  ourselves  to  a 
review  of  political  developments  within  Germany  from  1871 
to  the  downfall  of  Bismarck  in  1890. 

At  the  outset  a  good  deal  of  legislation  was  enacted  to  meet 
the  changed  political  conditions,  (i)  Far-reaching  legal  reforms 
Consoiida  "^ere  effected.  The  common  code  for  trade,  commerce, 
tion  of  the  and  banking,  and  the  uniform  code  of  criminal  law, 
Empire,       both  of  which  had  been  adopted  by  the  North  German 

1871-1877         ^ri««r.^  11  1 

Confederation  m  1860,  were  now  extended  to  the 


whole  empire.  An  imperial  commission  of  distinguished  jurists. 
Legal         working  steadily  from  1871  to  1877,  compiled  similar 

codes  for  civil  and  criminal  procedure  and  for  the 
organization  of  law  courts,  which  were  then  promulgated  through- 
out the  empire.  Greater  difficulties  were  encountered  in  pre- 
paring a  uniform  civil  code  which  would  harmonize  the  widely 
divergent  property  laws  of  the  several  states,  and  it  was  not 
until  1896  that  an  agreement  was  reached  and  not  until  1900 
Financial      ^^^^        imperial  civil  code  became  fuUy  operative. 

(2)  Financial  uniformity  was  effected.  The  imperial 
government  speedily  made  use  of  its  constitutional  right  to 
regulate  coinage :   the  new  coins,  bearing  likenesses  of  the 

^  See  below,  pp.  691-697. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  405 


emperor's  head  and  of  the  arms  of  the  empire,  were  so  many 
gospelers  of  the  new  regime  far  and  wide  throughout  Germany. 
The  Bank  Act  of  1875  transferred  the  control  of  banking  from 
the  state  governments  to  the  Bundesrat.  The  establishment  in 
1876  of  the  famous  Imperial  Bank  {Reichshank),  under  the  super- 
intendence and  management  of  the  empire,  enabled  the  central 
government  to  conduct  its  financial  operations  more  expedi- 
tiously and  guaranteed  the  economic  stabiHty  of  the  German 
Empire.  (3)  An  act  of  1873  created  an  imperial  railway 
bureau,  which  did  much  in  the  matter  of  unifying  the  „ 

r  .1  If  1  RaUway 

various  systems  of  state  railways  and  01  regulating 
their  relations  to  the  mihtary,  postal,  and  telegraphic  organiza- 
tions of  the  empire.  (4)  There  was  further  military  develop- 
ment. From  the  large  war  indemnity  extorted  from  France, 
large  sums  were  expended  on  coast  defense,  on  fortifi-  j^yj^^y 
cations,  on  replacing  the  equipment  and  stores  de- 
stroyed during  the  war  of  1870-1871,  and  on  pensions.  Though 
technically  the  various  German  states  retained  their  own  armies, 
the  imperial  constitution  provided  that  the  whole  of  the  Prussian 
mihtary  system,  including  not  only  the  obHgation  to  mihtary 
service,  but  the  rules  for  recruiting,  organization,  drill,  and 
uniforms,  must  be  followed  in  all  the  states.  To  give  full  force 
to  this  provision,  a  common  system  of  mihtary  jurisprudence 
was  introduced  in  1872  for  the  whole  empire  except  Bavaria. 
Over  the  size  and  financial  support  of  the  mihtary  estabhsh- 
ment  much  haggUng  occurred.  Bismarck,  and  the  ardent  Con- 
servative nationahsts  who  supported  him,  felt  that  wholesale 
mihtarism  was  destined  to  be  the  one  safe  bulwark  for  the 
preservation  of  the  German  Empire  as  it  had  been  the  one 
trustworthy  weapon  in  creating  the  empire.  He  demanded, 
therefore,  that  the  provisional  arrangement  made  in  1867, 
whereby  the  authorized  standing  army  in  time  of  peace  was 
reckoned  at  i  per  cent  of  the  population  and  the  annual  financial 
appropriation  at  $165  for  each  soldier,  should  be  extended 
throughout  the  empire  and  rendered  permanent.  In  the  face 
of  determined  opposition,  Bismarck  carried  the  main  part  of 
his  mihtary  program,  fixing  the  peace  strength  of  the  German 
army  at  about  400,000  men,  but  he  was  obHged  (1874)  to  accept 
financial  grants  for  it  from  the  Reichstag,  not  in  perpetuity  as 


4o6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


he  desired,  but  for  a  limited  period  of  seven  years  ^  —  the  so- 
called  ''sep tennate."  The  principle  of  compulsory  military 
"  The  Sep-  Service  was  subsequently  maintained  and  strength- 
tennate "  ened,  but  the  periodical  votes  on  appropriations 
for  the  army  became  crucial  occasions  for  formally  testing 
the  strength  of  the  chancellor's  government. 

Of  the  three  German  political  parties  mentioned  in  an  earlier 
chapter,^  —  the  Conservatives,  the  Progressives,  and  the  Na- 
Poiiticai  tional  Liberals, —  it  was  the  last  named  which  elec- 
Parties  torally  benefited  most  by  the  establishment  of  the 
B?s1narck  German  Empire  and  upon  which  Bismarck  chiefly 
relied  in  inducing  the  Reichstag  to  nationahze  legal 
procedure,  banking,  railways,  and  the  army.  The  National 
I  The  Na-  Liberals  were  of  two  sorts :  the  bourgeoisie,  partic- 
tional  ularly  the  business  men,  who  had  economic  motives 
Liberals  strengthening  the  national  government  at  the 

expense  of  the  state  governments;  and  the  patriots,  regard- 
less of  social  class,  whose  opposition  to  states'  rights  flowed 
naturally  from  their  exaltation  of  united  Germany.  In  the 
National  Liberals,  therefore,  Bismarck  found  stanch  champions 
of  most  of  his  imperial  poKcies.    The  Conservatives  were  al- 

2.  The  Con-  most  wholly  a  Prussian  agricultural  party,  who  could 
servatives  hardly  be  expected  to  offer  serious  resistance  to  Bis- 
marck so  long  as  Prussia  preserved  its  hegemony  in  Germany 
and  Bismarck  did  not  disturb  their  economic  mastery  in  Prussia. 

3.  The  Pro-  Only  the  Progressives  —  those  intellectual  liberals  and 
gressives  radicals  —  continued  to  assert  an  undying  faith  in 
democracy  and  an  unswerving  hostility  to  Bismarck's  political 
ideals;  but  the  success  of  Bismarck's  poKcies  in  unifying  the 
nation  had  greatly  weakened  the  hold  of  the  party  on  the  people, 
and  their  objections  to  his  later  practical  proposals  were  more 
often  platonic  than  really  vigorous. 

In  the  early  'seventies,  however,  arose  a  fourth  political  party — 
the  Catholic,  or,  as  designated  from  the  seats  which  its  repre- 
^  ^jjg  sentatives  occupied  in  the  Reichstag,  the  Center. 
CathoUcs,  Recruited  almost  exclusively  from  the  liberally  in- 
or  Center  qXiyiq^  Rhenish  province  of  Prussia,  which  distrusted 
the  ruling  Conservative  majority  in  that  kingdom,  and  from  the 

1  Reduced  to  five  years,  in  1893.  2  ggg  above,  pp.  184  f.,  193. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


south  German  states  of  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg,  Baden,  and 
Hesse,  which  were  traditionally  jealous  of  their  own  privileges, 
the  Center  party  was  essentially  a  states'  rights'  party  and 
inimical  to  the  nationaHzing  tendencies  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. For  this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  Bismarck  and  the  Na- 
tional Liberals  would  have  combated  the  CathoHcs.  But  there 
were  other  reasons  for  the  sharp  conflict  between  Bis-  Reasons  for 
marck  and  the  Catholic  Church,  which  characterized  the  Conflict 
German  politics  throughout  the  decade  of  the  'seven-  Bismarck 
ties.  One  of  these  reasons  was  that  many  CathoHcs  and  the 
were  embittered  against  Bismarck  by  his  refusal  to 
intervene  in  Italy  in  order  to  reestablish  the  temporal  rule  of 
the  papacy,  and  that  the  chancellor,  on  his  side,  accused  the 
CathoHcs  of  seeking  to  embarrass  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
newly  founded  empire  by  stirring  up  trouble  between  Germany 
and  Italy.  Another  was  the  fear  in  the  minds  of  Bismarck 
and  other  German  nationaHsts  that  the  doctrine  of  papal  in- 
falHbiHty  decreed  by  the  Vatican  Council  (1869-18 70),  together 
with  the  Syllabus  of  Errors  of  Pius  IX  (1864),  was  intended 
to  register  a  divine  sanction  for  attempts  on  the  part  of  the  pope 
to  interfere  in  the  domestic  poHtics  of  Germany.  Still  another 
reason  was  the  growing  breach,  in  Germany  as  elsewhere,  between 
the  inteUectual  position  of  the  CathoHc  Church  and  that  of 
popular  scientists  and  philosophers.  In  domestic  poHtics  most 
of  the  latter  were  Progressives,  and  it  was  a  curious  irony  of 
fate  that  for  his  anti-clerical  poHcies  Bismarck  could  count  upon 
the  support  of  the  Progressives  and  some  of  the  Lutheran  Con- 
servatives as  well  as  upon  that  of  the  National  Liberals. 

The  occasion  for  the  opening  of  hostilities  between  church 
and  state, —  the  combat  which  was  dignified  in  popular  parlance 
by  the  name  KulturkdMpf    struggle  for  civilization  "),  outbreak  of 
—  was  Roman  CathoHc  opposition  to  the  support  the  Conflict 
rendered  by  the  state  governments  even  of  south  ^mpf*^^in 
Germany  to  the  faction  of  *'01d  CathoHcs"  who  had  South 
rejected  the  decree  of  papal  infallibility.    Though  the 
Roman  CathoHcs  rallied  to  the  aid  of  their  bishops  and  formed 
a  compact  Center  party  in  south  Germany,  it  was  not  until 
1890  that  they  secured  definite  control  of  the  Bavarian  govern- 
ment and  finally  revoked  the  concessions  which  had  been  granted 


4o8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


earlier  to  the  ^'Old  Catholics."  With  the  eventual  collapse  of 
''Old  CathoHcism"  the  Roman  Catholics  regained  all  that  they 
had  lost  in  south  Germany. 

Meanwhile,  in  1872,  Bismarck  had  inaugurated  the  Kultur- 
kampf  in  Prussia  and  throughout  the  whole  empire.    In  that  year 

the  Jesuits  were  expelled  from  Germany  and  diplo- 
turkampf  in  i^^^tic  relations  between  Prussia  and  the  Vatican  were 
Prussia  and  broken  off.  Within  the  next  two  years  several  drastic 
i872^?879^'  ^^^^  were  enacted  in  Prussia,  sometimes  called  the 

"  May  Laws,"  and  sometimes  cited,  from  the  name  of 
the  Prussian  minister  of  education,  as  the  'Talk  Laws."  The 
most  important  of  these  acts  provided  that  no  one  should  be 
appointed  to  any  office  in  the  CathoKc  Church  except  a  German, 
who  must  have  received  his  education  in  a  German  Gymnasium 
(high  school) ,  have  studied  for  three  years  in  a  German  university, 
and  have  passed  a  state  examination  in  philosophy,  history, 
German  literature,  and  the  classics ;  all  ecclesiastical  seminaries 
were  placed  under  the  control  of  the  state,  and  all  seminaries 
for  boys  were  forbidden.  The  Roman  Catholic  bishops  in 
Prussia  appreciated  at  once  the  fact  that  this  law  represented  a 
complete  reversal  of  the  policy  pursued  by  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment since  1850  of  not  interfering  in  the  appointment  of  bishops 
and  priests  and  of  leaving  the  education  of  prospective  priests 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  hierarchy;  these  bishops,  there- 
fore, with  the  moral  encouragement  and  active  support  of  their 
fellow-bishops  in  the  other  German  states  a^d  of  the  pope, 
condemned  the  "May  Laws"  and  refused  to  obey  them.  Then 
an  open  conflict  ensued,  fought  not  by  powder  and  ball  but  by 
clerical  manifestoes  and  decrees  and  by  repressive  measures 
on  the  part  of  Bismarck  and  the  Prussian  government. 

On  the  governmental  side,  further  laws  were  passed,  forbidding 
the  exercise  of  ecclesiastical  functions  by  unauthorized  persons, 
providing  that  any  one  who  had  been  convicted  of  disobedience 
to  the  state  could  be  deprived  of  his  rights  of  citizenship,  ordered 
to  live  in  a  particular  district,  or  even  expelled  from  the  country, 
and  authorizing  the  suspension,  in  every  diocese  where  the 
bishop  proved  recalcitrant,  of  the  payment  of  that  financial 
contribution  to  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  which  had  been 
given  by  Prussia  in  accordance  with  the  concordat  of  181 7. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


409 


So  great  was  the  severity  with  which  these  measures  were 
enforced  that  within  a  single  year  six  Prussian  bishops  were 
imprisoned  and  in  over  1300  parishes  CathoHc  worship  ceased. 

On  the  side  of  the  Church,  the  CathoHc  laity  flocked  to  the 
support  of  their  persecuted  clergy.  The  Center  party,  hitherto 
weak  in  numbers  and  devoid  of  concrete  political  issues  on  which 
to  stand,  now  came  forward  as  the  champion  of  religious  liberty 
and  by  adroit  promises  of  laboring  for  radical  social  legislation 
enlisted  the  votes  of  the  Catholic  workingmen,  with  the  result 
that  in  the  imperial  elections  of  1874,  despite  governmental 
counter  efforts,  the  Center  polled  1,443,000  votes  and  increased 
its  representation  in  the  Reichstag  from  63  to  91. 

Bismarck  did  not  triumph  in  the  KuUurkampf ;  he  merely 
raised  up  a  compact  party  which,  with  the  aid  of  disgruntled 
Poles,  Danes,  Hanoverians,  and  representatives  from 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  of  a  section  of  sympathetic  Con-  Efsmarck's^ 
servatives,  threatened  to  block  his  nationalistic  and  Failure  in 
miUtaristic  schemes.    Worse  still  for  the  imperial  Jurkampf 
chancellor  was  the  appearance  in  the  Reichstag  of  a 
small  but  growing  group  of  talkative  and  troublesome  SociaHsts ; 
and  Socialism,  in  Bismarck's  mind,  was  a  more  serious  menace  to 
the  new  empire  than  Catholicism.    To  break  the  unholy  alH- 
ance  between  Socialists  and  Centrists  in  the  Reichstag,  Bismarck 
gradually  abandoned  the  KuUurkampf  in  Prussia.    In  1880 
the  king  was  empowered  to  use  his  own  discretion  in  admin- 
istering the  ''May  Laws";  diplomatic  relations  were  restored 
with  the  Vatican ;  and  in  1886  most  of  the  anti-clerical  legislation 
was  formally  repealed.    The  termination  of  the  KuUurkampf 
did  not  signify  the  dissolution  of  the  Center  party.    On  the 
contrary,  the  Catholic  Party  was  permanently  sohdified ;  and, 
with  its  pretty  constant  vote  in  the  Reichstag  —  _ 
sHghtly  under  a  hundred  —  it  maintained  throughout  of  the 
the  period  from  1874  to  1914  a  very  independent  posi-  ^^^^^ 
tion,  sometimes  supporting  and  sometimes  opposing 
the  government.    Under  the  able  leadership  of  Windhorst,  an 
ex-minister  of  the  defunct  kingdom  of  Hanover,  the  Center 
party  adopted  a  platform  of  principles  favoring  the  claims  of  the 
Catholic  Church,  social  legislation,  indirect  taxation,  and  states' 
rights,  and  resisting  excessive  militarism  and  imperialism. 


4IO  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

On  the  heels  of  the  KuUurkampf  came  Bismarck's  war  on 
Socialism.  In  1875  the  fusion  of  the  followers  of  Karl  Marx 
5  The  with  those  of  Ferdinand  Lassalle  created  a  united  na- 
Sociai  tional  ^'Social  Democratic  party,"  whose  principles 
Democrats  ^£  absolute  political  democracy,  drastic  direct  taxa- 
tion, revolutionary  social  legislation,  and  anti-militarism  were 
the  very  antitheses  of  Bismarck's  and  were  calculated,  accord- 
ing to  the  chancellor's  opinion,  to  destroy  the  family,  the  state, 
and  civilization.  Yet  the  new  party  was  obviously  making  an 
ever-widening  appeal  to  German  workingmen.  In  the  im- 
perial elections  of  1874  the  Socialists  had  secured  nine  seats  in 
the  Reichstag;  in  1877  they  polled  half  a  million  votes  and  in- 
creased their  representation  in  the  Imperial  Diet  to  twelve. 
Bismarck  was  alarmed  and  at  once  resolved  to  institute  repres- 
sive measures  against  the  Socialists. 

Making  use  in  1878  of  the  public  excitement  aroused  by  two 
unsuccessful  attempts  on  the  part  of  alleged  Socialists  to  assas- 
sinate Emperor  William  I,  Bismarck  prevailed  upon 

Bismarck's      ,      .  i      •        i  r  i 

War  on  the  imperial  parliament,  despite  the  protests  of  the 
1878*^18^0  Progressives  and  Centrists,  to  enact  a  law  for  the  sup- 
pression of  Socialism.  This  law,  originally  enacted  for 
a  term  of  four  years,  was  subsequently  reenacted  and  remained 
on  the  German  statute-books  until  Bismarck's  retirement  in 
1890.  Its  sweeping  provisions  prohibited  the  spread  of  So- 
cialist opinions  by  means  of  books,  newspapers,  or  public  meet- 
ings, empowered  the  police  to  break  up  meetings  and  to 
suppress  publications,  and  legalized  the  arbitrary  arrest  and 
punishment  of  Socialist  offenders.  It  smacked  of  the  Carlsbad 
Decrees  and  other  enactments  of  the  reactionary  governments 
of  sixty  years  earlier,  and  placed  Bismarck  in  a  class  with  Metter- 
Growth  of  nich.  In  spite  of  the  rigorous  enforcement  of  the  legis- 
SociaUsm  lation  against  Socialism,  the  Socialists  preserved  their 
organization,  conducted  an  energetic  propaganda  from  neigh- 
boring countries,  and  steadily  increased  their  influence  in  the 
Reichstag} 

^  In  the  elections  of  1881  they  secured  12  seats;  24  in  1884;  11  in  1887;  and 
35  in  1890.  Their  progress  was  naturally  more  marked  after  the  lapse  of  the 
repressive  legislation:  they  obtained  44  seats  in  1893;  56  in  1898;  81  in  1903; 
43  in  1907;  and  no  in  1912. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  411 

The  decade  of  the  'eighties  was  characterized  in  German  his- 
tory not  only  by  Bismarck's  repressive  legislation  against  So- 
ciaUsm  but  also  by  a  very  real  and  fairly  fruitful  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  chancellor  to  promote  the  material  fnt^Sun 
and  economic  welfare  of  the  whole  German  nation.  Economic 
Ever  since  the  formation  of  the  ZollvcYeiti  in  the  'thir-  j^g^^ 
ties,  German  agriculture  had  been  holding  its  own  and 
German  manufactures  and  commerce  had  been  enjoying  a  period 
of  rapid  growth  and  expansion,  with  the  result  that  between 
1830  and  1870  the  territory  which  subsequently  comprised  the 
German  Empire  advanced  in  the  value  of  its  annual  foreign 
commerce  from  $185,000,000  to  $1,060,000,000.    For  a  time 
in  the  'seventies  the  payment  of  the  huge  French  war  indemnity 
tended  to  make  money  too  plentiful  in  Germany,  to  cause  over- 
speculation,  to  raise  unduly  the  cost  of  living,  and  to  create 
financial  panics  and  great  economic  distress  among  employers 
and  workingmen  ahke.    The  resulting  unrest  Bismarck  believed 
to  be  the  chief  cause  of  the  rise  of  SociaHsm,  and  to  remove  this 
cause  the  chancellor  inaugurated  quite  a  new  economic  policy. 

The  National  Liberals,  upon  whom  Bismarck  had  reHed 
throughout  the  'seventies  to  effect  his  nationalistic  schemes, 
were  committed  in  fiscal  affairs  to  the  principles  of 
laisser-faire,  which  distinguished  contemporary  Liber-  Bismarck's 
alism  in  Great  Britain  and  in  Italy  and  which  had  w^a^**^ 
become  traditional  in  the  tariff  arrangements  of  the  tionai  Lib- 
German  Zollverein.    Bismarck  was  the  first  important  Aban- 
statesman  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  react  against  donment 
the  doctrines  of  laisser-faire:  he  gradually  accepted  f^re^iSyp- 
the  theories  of  a  group  of  German  economists  that  1890 
trade  and  industry  must  be  regulated  by  the  state, 
and  in  prosecuting  his  new  economic  policy  he  naturally  aban- 
doned his  alliance  with  the  National  Liberals  and  formed  a 
somewhat  fantastic  one  with  the  recently  despised  and  hated 
Centrists. 

The  new  policy  was  threefold  —  a  protective  tariff,  imperial- 
ism, and  social  legislation.  In  1879,  with  the  cooperation  of 
the  Catholic  Center  and  the  Prussian  Conservatives,^  Bismarck 

^  Likewise  with  the  cooperation  of  a  small  but  active  group  of  Anti-Semites 
See  below,  p.  417,  footnote. 


412 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


secured  tariff  protection  for  German  farm  products  and  do- 
mestic manufactures  together  with  excise  taxes  and  a  high  duty 
The  New  tobacco  and  sugar.    The  chancellor's  purpose  in 

Economic     this  reform  was  not  only  to  protect  'infant  industries " 
and  to  steady  German  economic  Hfe,  but  also  to  pro- 
vide adequate  income  for  the  imperial  government  and  thereby 
to  relieve  the  empire  of  the  necessity  of  making  unwelcome  as- 

1.  Protective  sessments  (matricula)  upon  the  federated  states,  as  it 
Tariff,  1879  been  forced  to  do  since  1871.  The  tariff  invested 
the  central  government  with  new  strength  and  further  unified 
the  empire.  The  tariff  likewise  gave  a  marked  impetus  to 
industrial  development. 

Before  the  adoption  of  a  protective  tariff  Bismarck  had 
opposed  colonialism ;  in  187 1  he  dismissed  with  a  sneer  the  French 

2.  Acquisi-  ^^^^  ^^^^  colouics  in  licu  of  Alsace-Lorraine ; 
tion  of  throughout  the  'seventies  he  professed  to  believe  that 
AfricTand^  Germany  should  devote  all  her  energies  to  maintaining 
in  Oceanica,  her  position  on  the  continent  of  Europe  and  should 
1884-1885  3^yQi(j  colonial  enterprises  as  likely  to  embarrass  the 
empire's  foreign  relations.  But  the  merchant's  desire  to  sell 
his  surplus  products  and  the  capitalist's  desire  to  invest  his  sur- 
plus profits  and  the  missionary's  desire  to  convert  the  heathen 
to  Christianity  and  the  patriot's  desire  to  see  Germany  not  only 
a  Great  Power  in  Europe  but  also  a  real  World  Power,  all 
worked  to  develop  an  irresistible  national  desire  for  German 
colonies  beyond  the  seas.  Merchants  and  missionaries  led  the 
way.  In  1879  a  German  Mercantile  Marine  Company  acquired 
privileges  in  the  Samoan  Islands.  In  1882  a  German  Colonial 
Union  was  formed.  Business  men  of  Hamburg,  Liibeck,  and 
Bremen  obtained  concessions  in  Africa,  —  German  Southwest 
Africa,  Togoland,  Kamerun,  German  East  Africa,  —  and  in  the 
South  Seas  —  the  Marshall  Islands,  a  part  of  New  Guinea, 
Kaiser  Wilhelms  Land,  and  a  group  of  islands  in  the  New  Britain 
archipelago,  later  rechristened  the  Bismarck  archipelago.  Bis- 
marck, in  his  new  role  as  champion  of  German  merchants,  swal- 
lowed his  earHer  prejudices  and  followed  the  merchants  and 
missionaries.  In  1 884-1 885  he  prevailed  upon  the  Reichstag  to 
establish  protectorates  over  the  distant  commercial  posts  in 
Africa  and  in  the  Pacific.    In  1886  he  secured  governmental 


DEMOCR.\CY  AND  NATIONALISM 


413 


subsidies  for  steamers  which  plied  regularly  between  Germany 
and  the  protectorates.  And  before  his  retirement  in  1890  the 
process  was  already  far  advanced  of  transforming  the  mercantile 
protectorates  into  crown  colonies,  administered  by  imperial 
officials  and  poHced  by  German  troops.^ 

Protectionism  and  imperiaHsm  were  but  one  side  of  Bismarck's 
new  economic  poHcy,  —  the  side  favorable  primarily  to  employ- 
ers,—  though  both  were  supposed  secondarily  to  assist  ^  ^^^^^^^ 
employees  by  raising  wages  and  opening  new  forms  of  Legislation, 
employment.  On  the  other  side,  —  direct  state  action 
in  behalf  of  workingmen,  —  Bismarck  was  a  pioneer  among  Euro- 
pean statesmen  and  Germany  set  the  example  which  sooner  or 
later  every  industrial  country  was  moved  to  follow.  Bis- 
marck was  led  to  espouse  social  legislation  not  only  in  order 
to  remove  the  chief  economic  grievances  on  which  SociaHsm 
throve  but  also  to  guarantee  the  efficiency  of  German  militarism 
by  pro\T[ding  that  the  recruits  from  industrial  establishments 
and  from  the  cities  should  be  physically  fit  and  fairly  contented. 
In  advocating  social  legislation  Bismarck  was  supported  by  the 
new  school  of  political  economists,  by  the  old  Prussian  tradi- 
tion of  benevolent  paterriahsm,  and  by  the  party  pledges  and 
deciding  votes  of  the  Catholic  Center.  The  novel  experiment 
was  foreshadowed  in  the  speech  from  the  throne  of  1 7  November, 
1 88 1,  in  which  Emperor  WilHam  I  asked  the  help  of  the  Reichstag 
for  ''healing  social  ills  by  means  of  legislation  .  .  .  based  on 
the  moral  foundations  of  Christianity."  In  1883  a  bill  was 
passed  insuring  workingmen  against  sickness  and  in  working- 
1884  employers  were  obHged  to  insure  their  laborers  men's 
against  accidents.  In  1887  laws  were  adopted  Hmit-  ^^^"^^^'^^ 
ing  child  and  female  labor,  establishing  a  maximum  number 
of  working  hours,  and  setting  Sunday  apart  as  a  day  of  rest. 
In  1889  a  law  was  passed,  by  a  very  close  vote,  providing  for 
a  compulsory  insurance  of  workingmen  against  old  age  and  in- 
capacity, which  became  effective  on  i  January,  1891.  It  was 
arranged  that  all  the  various  insurance-funds  should  be  admin- 
istered by  joint  boards  of  employers  and  employees,  under  gen- 
eral governmental  supervision ;  of  the  premiums  for  old-age 
and  incapacity  insurance,  the  employer  should  contribute  one- 

*  On  the  German  colonics,  sec  below,  pp.  594,  621  fT.,  633  IT. 


414  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

half  and  the  employee  one-half,  while  of  those  for  sicknees 
insurance  the  employer  should  contribute  one-third,  the  employee 
two-thirds,  and  the  central  government  should  pay  $12.50  for 
each  pension. 

This  scheme  of  workingmen's  insurance,  which  was  somewhat 
extended  and  strengthened  by  divers  amendments  between 
1890  and  1914,  produced  inestimable  benefits.  In  1907,  accord- 
ing to  an  official  report,  ''the  number  of  those  insured  against 
illness  in  the  German  Empire  amounted  to  thirteen  milHons, 
those  insured  against  accident  to  twenty  millions,  those  insured 
against  incapacity  to  fifteen  millions.  The  amount  of  compensa- 
tion paid  in  1907  in  all  three  branches  of  insurance  was  626 
million  marks  ($156,500,000),  the  total  sum  for  the  3^ears  1885- 
1907  being  6310  million  marks  ($1,577,500,000)."  National 
insurance,  together  with  enlightened  factory  regulations,  an 
admirable  system  of  labor  exchanges,  and  the  remarkable  growth 
of  trade-unionism,  prepared  the  German  people  from  below,  as 
protectionism  and  imperialism  aided  them  from  above,  to  become 
one  of  the  most  efficient  industrial  nations  in  the  world. 

Before  his  new  economic  policies  were  entirely  worked  out 
and  applied,  the  long  period  of  Bismarck's  domination  was 
Emperor  coming  to  a  close.  The  death  of  the  aged  Emperor 
Frederick  William  I  (9  March,  1888),  his  sturdy  ally  and  loyal 
III,  1888  friend,  called  to  the  throne  of  Prussia  and  of  the  em- 
pire Frederick  III,^  whose  well-known  attachment  to  Liber aHsm 
boded  no  good  to  Bismarck.  Frederick  III,  however,  was 
fatally  ill  at  the  time  of  his  accession  and  died  after  a  reign  of 
only  ninety-nine  days  (15  June,  1888).  William  11,^  the  young 
man  who  thereupon  ascended  the  Hohenzollern  thrones,  enter- 
tained ideas  of  divine-right  monarchy  and  of  militarism  more 
Accession  characteristic  of  his  grandfather  William  than  of  his 
ofWiUiam    father  Frederick,  but  his  impulsiveness  and  egotism 

IT  1888 

were  very  irritating  to  Bismarck,  who  had  long  been 
in  the  habit  of  handling  the  reins  of  government  himself  and 
who  was  now  an  old  man.  From  the  new  emperor's  standpoint 
it  soon  became  a  question,  as  he  subsequently  expressed  it, 


^  Frederick  III,  the  son  of  William  I,  was  born  in  1831. 

2  William  II  was  born  in  1859,  the  son  of  Frederick  III  and  of  the  Princess 
Victoria,  daughter  of  Queen  Victoria  of  Great  Britain. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  415 


whether  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  or  the  Bismarck  dynasty 
should  reign."  In  March,  1890,  differences  between  the  young 
emperor  and  the  old  chancellor  reached  a  climax.  WilHam  II 
refused  to  sanction  Bismarck's  proposals  to  renew  the  repres- 
sive legislation  against  the  Sociahsts  and  to  cow  people  and  parHa- 
ment  into  submission,  if  necessary,  by  armed  force.  Bismarck 
declined  to  accept  a  cabinet  order  whereby  as  chancellor  he 
would  no  longer  be  the  intermediary  between  the  other  ministers 
of  state  and  the  emperor.  The  emperor  demanded  Bismarck's 
resignation  and  the  Iron  Chancellor  withdrew  to  his  Dismissal  of 
large  private  estates  in  Lauenburg.  There  the  man  Bismarck, 
who  had  done  more  than  any  one  else  to  unite  the  Ger-  ^^^^ 
manies  and  for  twenty  years  to  shape  the  foreign  and  domestic 
poHcies  of  the  empire  lived  in  more  or  less  open  criticism  of  the 
emperor  and  the  new  ministers  until  his  death  at  the  advanced 
age  of  eighty-three,  on  31  July,  1898. 


The  German  Empire  under  William  II,  1890-19 14 

From  1890  to  19 14  Emperor  Wilham  II  occupied  the  chief 
position  in  Germany  and  preserved  Germany's  leadership  in 
Europe.    One  of  the  best  brief  summaries  of  the  char-  Emperor 
acter  and  aims  of  William  II,  written  by  a  distin-  William  11 
guished  German  historian  on  the  occasion  of  the  twenty-fifth 
anniversary  (19 13)  of  the  emperor's  accession,  is  here  inserted. 

''William  II  has  desired  to  be  something  more  than  the  heir  of 
a  great  name,  the  mere  representative  of  an  institution.  He  has 
striven  for  no  lower  an  object  than  to  be  the  real  leader  of  the 
nation.  And  yet  his  personality  does  not  seem  to  embody  that 
resolute  simplicity  characteristic  of  the  born  leader  of  men,  but, 
in  its  singular  mixture  of  traditional  and  modern  traits,  em- 
braces a  whole  world  of  contradictions.  .  .  .  On  one  side  there 
is  a  conception  of  his  duties  as  a  monarch  directed  by  a  rehgious 
and  extremely  personal  sense  of  responsibiUty  .  .  .,  a  strongly 
marked  taste  for  all  that  has  become  historic,  all  that  is  anchored 
fast  to  authority,  tradition,  and  discipline  of  Kfe,  and  a  predi- 
lection for  the  Prussian  words  of  mihtary  command,  definite 
and  incisive  as  they  are,  even  in  contests  for  which  they  were 
not  suited.    On  the  other  side  is  the  thoroughly  modern  man, 


41 6  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


sanguine  in  temperament  and  speech,  singularly  receptive  and 
impressionistic,  struggling  to  understand  every  problem  of 
business,  of  commerce,  of  science  or  art,  which  the  many-sided 
and  congested  life  of  the  present  day  thrusts  upon  us  —  a  mon- 
arch, in  short,  the  tenor  of  whose  life  and  leanings  has  carried 
immeasurably  far  from  the  simpler  type  of  his  forefathers." 

The  bulk  of  the  domestic  policies  inaugurated  by  Bismarck 
were  preserved  and  developed  by  William  11.    The  historic 
Hohenzollern  ideal  of  divine-right  monarchy  was 

Retention         rr         ^    '  •  rr^i  • 

of  Most  of  ainrmed  in  no  uncertam  terms.  The  conservative 
PoUcfe^s^^^  character  of  the  central  federal  government  was  main- 
tained. Militarism  was  extolled,  and  the  emperor, 
whose  fondness  for  military  reviews  became  proverbial,  asserted 
in  true  Bismarckian  style  that  the  soldier  and  the  army,  not 
parliamentary  majorities,  have  welded  together  the  German 
Empire  —  my  confidence  is  placed  in  the  army."  At  the  same 
time  the  Christian  character  of  the  imperial  regime  was  em- 
phasized :  the  emperor  declared  in  his  first  proclamation  to 
the  German  people  that  he  had  assumed  the  government  ''in 
presence  of  the  King  of  kings  and  had  promised  God  to  be  a 
just  and  clement  prince,  to  cultivate  piety  and  the  fear  of  God." 
While  social  legislation  was  furthered  and  education  promoted 
and  the  laws  against  Socialism  allowed  to  lapse,  William  II 
remained,  like  Bismarck,  a  pronounced  enemy  of  the  Sociahsts 
and  free-thinkers,  a  natural  ally  of  fire-eating  militarists,  of 
landowning  aristocrats,  of '  conservative  university  professors, 
and  of  the  newer  industrial  magnates. 

Under  William  II  German  industry  and  trade  continued  to 
expand  by  leaps  and  bounds.  Protectionism  and  imperiahsm 
Economic  Combined  with  national  thrift  and  scientific 

Develop-  progress  to  produce  amazing  economic  results.  In 
Geraiany  ^^^^  the  number  of  German  citizens  employed  in  man- 
under  ufacture  and  commerce  was  about  twenty  millions ; 
WiiUamii  iqiq  it  was  thirty-five  milhons.  In  1885  less  than 
4  milHon  tons  of  pig  iron  were  smelted  in  Germany;  in  1913 
some  15  million  tons  were  smelted.  In  1891  the  German  coal 
mines  yielded  73  million  tons  and  in  19 13  more  than  185  million 
tons.  The  number  of  spindles  in  the  cotton  mills  doubled 
between  1897  and  191 2.    Germany's  share  in  the  world's  mer- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


417 


chant  shipping  increased  from  6  per  cent  in  1890  to  11  per 
cent  in  1913.  The  phenomenal  increase  of  the  value  of  the 
export  trade  of  the  German  Empire  from  three  and  one-half 
milliards  of  marks  in  1890  to  ten  milliards  (two  and  one-half 
bilhon  dollars)  in  19 13  bears  eloquent  testimony  to  the  industrial 
progress  of  Germany  which  on  the  eve  of  the  War  of  the  Nations 
made  that  country  second  only  to  Great  Britain  as  a  manu- 
facturing state. 

Parallel  with  the  development  of  economic  prosperity  was 
the  growth  of  population.  Germany,  which  was  not  much  more 
populous  than  France  in  1871,  was  over  one  and  Growth  of 
one-half  times  as  populous  in  1910 :  the  population  Population 
of  the  empire  was  forty-one  milHons  in  187 1  and  close  to  sixty- 
five  milKons  in  19 10.  Of  the  total  increase,  the  chief  part  was 
urban  rather  than  rural :  in  19 10  there  were  forty-eight  German 
cities  each  containing  .more  than  100,000  inhabitants.  More- 
over, emigration,  very  heavy  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  and  amounting  annually  even  in  the  'eighties  to  nearly 
a  quarter  of  a  milHon,  was  gradually  checked,  so  that  in  1913 
only  25,843  German  citizens  left  their  country  as  emigrants 
and  those  chiefly  for  America. 

PoHtical  life  in  Germany  remained  much  the  same  under 
WiUiam  II  as  under  Bismarck.    Of  the  five  major  political 
parties  ^  in  the  Reichstag,  the  Centrists,  Conservatives,  j^e  Five 
and  National  Liberals  almost,  if  not  quite,  held  their  Major 
own ;  the  Progressives  dwindled ;  and  the  SociaHsts  parties^ 
increased.    In  the  general  elections  of  191 2  the  So-  under 
cialists  polled  four  and  a  quarter  million  votes  to  two 
millions  polled  by  the  Catholic  Center,  1,720,000  by  the  Na- 
tional Liberals,  1,500,000  by  the  Progressives,  and  1,500,000 
by  the  Conservatives.^    The  apparent  growth  of  Socialism  was 


^  A  sixth  political  party  in  Germany  was  that  of  the  Anti-Semites,  a  group  of 
extreme  nationalists,  defmitely  organized  in  1879,  who  sought  to  lessen  Jewish  influ- 
ence in  politics  and  finance,  and  whose  representation  in  the  Reichstag  fluctuated 
from  one  to  twenty  in  the  years  between  1887  and  1907.  In  1907  this  party  polled 
about  a  quarter  of  a  million  votes  throughout  the  empire. 

'  Some  indication  of  the  need  of  a  redistribution  of  seats  in  the  Reichstag  is 
afforded  by  the  fact  that  these  political  parties  secured  from  the  elections  of  191 2 
seats  in  the  Reichstag  as  f()ll')ws  :  Socialists,  no;  Centrists,  90;  National  Liberals, 
45;  Progressives,  42;  Conservatives,  57. 
yoj,,  Jl  —  2  E 


41 8  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


explicable  in  large  part  in  three  ways:  (i)  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic party,  unlike  most  of  the  others,  put  up  candidates  in 
constituencies  in  which  they  had  Httle  or  no  chance  of  winning. 
Reasons  for  scattered  votes  for  such  candidates  were  reck- 

the  Growth  oncd  in  the  total  poll  of  the  party ;  (2)  the  Social  Demo- 
SodaUsm^  cratic  party  possessed  numerous  allies  and  supporters 
from  among  workingmen,  especially  trade-unionists, 
who  hoped  to  obtain  economic  amelioration  through  the  polit- 
ical triumph  of  Socialism ;  and  (3)  the  Social  Democratic  party 
attracted  votes  from  many  middle-class  radicals,  who,  though 
not  enthusiastic  about  the  economic  doctrines  of  Socialism,  felt 
that  its  growth  was  the  most  promising  means  of  Hberalizing 
imperial  institutions  and  establishing  real  political  democracy 
in  Germany.  However,  the  extensive  enrollment  of  steady- 
going  trade-unionists  and  of  bourgeois  radicals  as  Social  Demo- 
crats tended  to  render  Socialism  not  only  more  popular  but  less 
extreme  and  less  anti-nationaHstic  in  Germany  than  in  any 
other  European  country  and  paved  the  way  for  the  almost 
universal  support  accorded  to  the  government  by  the  German 
people  on  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Nations. 

To  the  political  opposition  offered  the  imperial  and  Prussian 
governments  almost  constantly  by  the  SociaHsts  and  spasmodi- 
^      cally  by  Centrists  and  Progressives,  was  added  dur- 

Mmor  Pollt-     .  ^  .  .  ,-,r-ii-  tt  h  i  1  1 

ical  Groups  mg  the  reign  of  William  11  as  well  as  throughout  the 
don  chancellorship  of  Bismarck  a  pretty  constant  resistance 

by  a  number  of  small  national  groups  represented 
in  the  Reichstag  or  in  the  Prussian  parliament.  There  were 
I  Gueifs     always  a  few  ^'Guelfs"  from  the  province  of  Hanover 

who  never  missed  an  opportunity  to  protest  against 
the  forcible  annexation  of  their  kingdom  to  Prussia  in  1866.^ 
2.  The  There  was  always  a  Dane  or  two  in  the  Reichstag 
Danes  ^]^q  demanded  the  retrocession  of  Danish-speaking 
Schleswig  to  the  king  of  Denmark.  There  were  always  the 
^^^^^  members  of  the  Reichstag  from  Alsace-Lorraine,  who 
Lorrainers    almost  to  a  man  resisted  the  steady  "  Germanization  " 

^  The  renunciation  of  his  claims  to  the  throne  of  Hanover  by  the  pretender 
Ernest  Augustus,  his  marriage  with  the  daughter  of  Emperor  William  II,  and  his 
accession  to  the  throne  of  Brunswick,  promised  in  1913  to  end  the  long  feud  between. 
Gueifs  and  HohenzoUerns  and  to  remove  the  raison  d'etre  of  the  Guelf  party. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  419 

of  the  two  provinces  which  against  their  will  had  been  torn  from 
France  in  187 1,  and  who,  in  some  cases,  earned  the  epithet  of 
''traitors"  by  agitating  openly  for  reannexation  to  France. 
Not  even  the  grant  in  191 1  of  a  considerable  measure  of  local 
autonomy  served  immediately  to  reconcile  a  majority  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  German  Empire.  Finally, 
there  were  compact  groups  of  Poles  from  the  districts  p^^^^ 
centering  in  Posen,  anti-German  in  speech,  in  customs, 
and  in  national  consciousness,  who  were  always  allying  themselves 
with  Centrists  or  Sociahsts  or  any  other  party  which  at  any 
given  time  threatened  to  embarrass  the  government.  Against 
Prussia  the  Poles  felt  their  chief  bitterness.  Following  the 
failure  of  Bismarck  to  prevent  the  use  of  the  Polish  language 
in  the  public  schools  of  Posen  and  West  Prussia  and  to  colonize 
Polish  estates  with  German  peasants,  the  Prussian  government 
in  the  early  'nineties  adopted  a  conciliatory  attitude  toward  its 
three  and  a  quarter  million  Polish-speaking  subjects.  But  even 
conciliation  would  not  wake  the  Poles  from  their  dream  of 
national  independence,  and  repressive  measures  were  renewed. 
In  1 90 1  the  use  of  the  PoHsh  language  was  again  limited  by  re- 
quiring that  rehgious  instruction  be  given  henceforth  pj.yggj^jj 
only  in  German.  In  1906,  when  many  thousand  Measures 
Polish  school  children  went  on  strike,  their  parents  p^^^^^**^® 
were  fined  and  imprisoned;  newspapers  were  sup- 
pressed ;  public  speeches  in  PoHsh  were  prohibited ;  and  Polish 
peasants  were  forbidden  to  build  houses  on  their  own  land. 
In  1907  the  Prussian  government  was  authorized  to  compel  the 
sale  of  many  Polish  estates  to  prospective  German  buyers  and 
thereby  to  drive  the  dispossessed  Poles  off  the  land.  Although 
the  Prussian  government  encountered  many  difficulties  in  enforc- 
ing these  measures,  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Na- 
tions the  Poles  obtained  no  respite  from  official  per-  ^ 

^  *  German 

secution.  Politics 

One  other  political  factor  of  the  reign  of  William  II 
—  and  that  a  novel  one  —  merits  attention.    It  is  the  "  wiuiam  11 
fact  that,  after  the  retirement  of  Bismarck  in  1800,  the       ^"^^  „ 

11  -     1  •   r,  Chancellor" 

emperor  personally  exercised  a  controlling  influence 

over  the  domestic  and  foreign  policies  of  Germany.     In  the 

words  of  Bismarck,    William  II  became  his  own  chancellor." 


420  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Of  course,  the  succession  of  designated  chancellors  continued 
constitutionally,  —  Caprivi  (1890-1894),  Hohenlohe  (1894-1900), 
Billow  (1900-1909),  and  Bethmann-Hollweg  (1909-  ), — but 
none  exercised  such  independence  of  initiative  or  judgment  as 
Bismarck,  and  all  took  their  cues  from  the  emperor.  Some  idea 
of  the  more  recent  poHtical  developments  in  the  German  Em- 
pire may  be  derived  from  a  brief  summary  of  the  principal 
events  in  each  chancellorship. 

Count  von  Caprivi  (1831-1899),^  who  succeeded  Bismarck 
in  1890,  was  rigidly  mihtaristic  and  religious,  and,  not  being  a 
Caprivi,  great  landowner  Hke  his  predecessor,  relied  for  poHt- 
1890-1894  [^^i  support  in  the  Reichstag  more  upon  the  National 
Liberals  than  upon  the  Conservatives.  By  treaty  with  Great 
Britain  (1890)  Germany  secured  the  cession  of  the  valuable 
strategic  island  of  Heligoland  in  the  North  Sea  and  the  settle- 
ment of  outstanding  colonial  disputes  in  Africa.  Likewise,  the 
German  protective  tariff  was  partially  modified  by  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  principle  of  reciprocity  and  by  the  conclusion  of 
commercial  treaties  with  Austria-Hungary,  Russia,  Rumania, 
Reciprocity  Italy,  whereby  the  import  duties  on  grain  were 

and  Agrarian  lowered  in  retum  for  favorable  foreign  treatment  of 
Opposition  Qerman  exports.  This  arrangement  was  as  distaste- 
ful to  German  farmers  as  it  was  advantageous  to  German  manu- 
facturers ;  and  the  extreme  Prussian  Conservatives  —  the  Agra- 
rians —  were  moved  mightily  against  Caprivi.  In  vain  the 
chancellor  sought  to  humor  them  by  strengthening  the  influence 
of  the  Lutheran  Church  in  Prussian  education  and  by  reducing 
the  term  of  active  military  service  to  two  years. ^  They  demanded 
his  dismissal  by  the  emperor,  and  the  emperor  complied  in  1894. 

Caprivi's  successor  as  chancellor  was  Prince  Hohenlohe 
(1819-1901),^  who  in  his  younger  years  had  been  the  stoutest 

^  Georg  Leo  von  Caprivi,  descended  from  an  Italian  family  of  Carniola  which 
had  settled  in  Prussia  in  the  eighteenth  century,  was  a  life  member  of  the  Prussian 
House  of  Lords,  and  had  served  as  an  army  officer  in  the  wars  of  1866  and  1870-1871. 

2  Though  the  term  of  active  service  was  reduced,  the  number  of  exemptions 
was  greatly  reduced,  so  that  the  peace  footing  of  the  German  army  was  actually 
strengthened  by  Caprivi's  reform. 

3  Prince  Chlodwig  Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst,  a  Catholic  and  a  Liberal,  sat  in 
the  Bavarian  parliament  from  1846  to  1866,  was  prime  minister  of  Bavaria  from 
1866  to  1870,  pursuing  a  nationalist  and  anti-clerical  policy,  was  German  ambassa- 
dor in  Paris  from  1873  to  1885,  governor  of  Alsace-Lorraine  from  1885  to  1894, 
and  chancellor  from  1894  to  1900. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  421 


champion  in  his  native  Bavaria  of  national  unilfication,  who  had 
served  in  the  Franco- German  War,  then  in  the  diplomatic  serv- 
ice, and  then  as  imperial  governor  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Hoheniohe, 
On  account  of  the  new  chancellor's  advanced  age  —  1894-1900 
he  was  seventy-five  —  the  actual  conduct  of  imperial  affairs 
was  less  in  his  hands  than  in  those  of  the  emperor  and  of  Prince 
von  Biilow,  the  secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs.    In  domestic 
matters  the  government  persevered  in  its  resolute  independence 
of  the  Agrarian  group  in  Prussia  and  leaned  heavily  for  poHtical 
support  upon  the  National  Liberals.    This  fact  gave  to  German 
history  during  Hohenlohe's  administration  an  im-  Germany  a 
perialist  complexion.    It  caused  Germany  to  become   "  World 
definitely  a  World  Power.  Power 

In  a  way  the  transition  of  Germany  from  the  role  of  the  chief 
Power  in  continental  Europe  to  that  of  a  prominent  World 
Power  was  not  sudden.    It  had  certainly  begun  in  the  jj^g^j^^^jj^ 
days  of  Bismarck.    Although  that  astute  chancellor  Result  of 
was  ever  preaching  the  necessity  and  desirability  of  p^j^^^g^^^ 
Germany's  devoting  all  her  energies  to  the  consolida- 
tion of  her  power  and  influence  in  Europe  and  warning  his  fellow- 
countrymen  of  the  dangers  of  distant  entanglements,  it  was 
under  his  auspices  that  Germany  imposed  her  protective  tariff 
and  estabHshed  her  first  and  most  important  colonies  in  Africa 
and  in  Oceanica  and  expanded  her  industry  and  merchant  ma- 
rine and  increased  her  wealth  and  accumulated  vast  masses 
of  private  capital.    And  these  things  were  the  raw  stuff  out  of 
which  a  great  world  policy  was  to  be  fashioned.    The  fashion- 
ing was  hurried  forward  in  the  'nineties  by  the  formation  of  the 
Dual  Alliance  between  France  and  Russia,  which  „ 

Process 

changed  fundamentally  the  European  relations  of  Rapid  in 
Germany,  and  by  the  dehberate  efforts  of  William  II,  ^[^^^j^g 
Hoheniohe,  and  Biilow,  which  were  directed  toward 
obtaining  compensation  outside  of  Europe. 

Three  great  kinds  of  German  achievement  in  world  politics 
marked  the  years  from  1894  to  1900.  First  was  a  renewed 
activity  in  the  acquisition  of  colonies.  The  emperor  himself  de- 
clared in  1895  that  *'the  German  Empire  has  become  a  world 
empire."  In  1897  the  murder  of  two  German  missionaries  in 
China  was  made  the  pretext  for  landing  troops  in  the  bay  of 


422 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Kiao-chau  and  for  securing  the  lease  of  some  200  square  miles  of 
Chinese  territory  on  the  peninsula  of  Shan-tung.  In  1899,  fol- 
lowing the  Spanish-American  War,  Germany  pur- 
Actwity  in  chased  from  Spain  the  Caroline,  Pelew,  and  Marianne 
Acquisition  islands  in  the  Pacific.  In  1 899-1 900  by  agreement 
i897°-i9or'  wi^^  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  she  ac- 
quired the  two  largest  of  the  Samoan  Islands.  In 
1900  German  troops  cooperated  with  those  of  other  European 
Powers  and  of  Japan  and  the  United  States  in  suppressing  the 
Boxer  uprising  in  China. 

Secondly,  there  was  imperial  encouragement  and  protection 
of  German  investments  in  comparatively  undeveloped  foreign 
countries.  In  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  German  gov- 
Son  ofoer-  ernment,  assisted  by  the  personal  efforts  of  WilHam 
man  Invest-  II ,  who  theatrically  visited  the  sultan  at  Constanti- 
Abroad  nople,  gained  important  concessions  for  German  com- 
merce and  German  investment.  The  Turkish  army 
was  drilled  and  commanded  by  German  officers,  and  in  1899 
a  group  of  German  financiers  secured  a  valuable  concession  for 
building  a  railway  from  Bagdad  to  Constantinople :  German 
influence  began  to  supplant  both  British  and  Russian  in  Turkey. 
Similarly,  in  obtaining  the  lease  of  the  Chinese  port  of  Kiao- 
chau,  the  German  government  also  secured  for  German  capi- 
tahsts  important  concessions  for  railway  construction  in  China. 
In  Brazil,  organized  private  enterprise,  backed  by  the  moral 
support  of  the  imperial  government,  established  a  considerable 
settlement  of  German  immigrants,  and,  though  there  was  no 
prospect  of  acquiring  pohtical  power,  German  investment  and 
German  trade  increased  greatly  throughout  South  America. 

Thirdly,  during  Hohenlohe's  administration  there  was  a  pro- 
nounced stimulus  to  navalism,  and  the  beginnings  of  the  power- 
ful German  fleet.  For  many  years  Germany  had  been 
of^Extenslve  foremost  military  state  in  the  world;  now  she 
German  aspired  to  rival  even  Great  Britain  in  the  size  and 
1898^-^19^0  strength  of  armaments  on  sea.  Several  reasons  may 
be  assigned  for  the  rise  of  German  navalism :  the 
steady  growth  of  nationalism  and  the  resultant  popular  desire, 
since  the  German  army  was  organized  on  a  state  basis,  to  possess 
in  a  navy  a  system  of  armaments  organized  on  a  national  basis 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


and  controlled  directly  by  the  imperial  government ;  the  preach- 
ments of  many  German  economists,  merchants,  and  professional 
mihtarists  that  a  powerful  navy  constituted  the  surest  protec- 
tion of  large  foreign  commerce  and  investment;  the  lesson  of 
the  importance  of  sea  power  learned  from  the  American  victory 
over  the  Spaniards  and  from  the  British  conquest  of  the  Boer 
repubhcs  in  South  Africa;  the  widespread  propaganda  of^the 
German  Navy  League,  which  in  the  late  'nineties  aroused  na- 
tional patriotism  and  enlisted  electoral  and  financial  support  for 
the  building  of  a  navy ;  the  personal  enthusiasm  of  the  emperor, 
whose  natural  art  of  phrase-making  did  excellent  service  to  the 
cause  in  such  pithy  sayings  as  ''Germany's  future  lies  upon  the 
water,"  or  ''the  ocean  is  essential  to  Germany's  greatness"; 
and  last  but  not  least  the  organizing  and  persuasive  ability  of 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  who  was  appointed  secretary  of  state  for 
the  imperial  navy  in  1898  and  who  was  still  acting  in  that  capacity 
in  1 9 14.  Whatever  the  reasons  may  be,  German  navalism  speed- 
ily became  an  important  factor  in  international  politics.  The 
acquisition  of  HeHgoland  (1890)  enabled  Germany  to  establish 
a  new  naval  base  off  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe.  The  completion 
in  1896  of  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  afforded  a  valuable  strategic 
connection  between  the  Baltic  and  North  seas.  And  two 
great  Navy  Acts,  passed  by  the  German  parliament  in  1898 
and  1900  respectively,  inaugurated  that  prodigious  program 
of  naval  construction,  which,  pursued  consistently  up  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Nations,  gave  Germany  a  wonderful 
array  of  dreadnoughts,  super-dreadnoughts,  battle  cruisers, 
and  submarines,  —  representing  a  total  tonnage  second  only  to 
that  of  Great  Britain,  —  and  cost  the  German  people  an  ever- 
enlarging  national  appropriation,  rising  from  30  million  doUars 
in  1898  to  120  millions  in  19 13. 

The  retirement  of  the  aged  Prince  Hohenlohe  in  1900  and 
the  promotion  to  the  chancellorship  of  Prince  von  Biilow 
(1849-  a  great  Prussian  landowner,  served  to  pro-  BiUow, 

mote  more  cordial  relations  between  the  imperial  gov-  1900-1909 
ernment  and  the  Prussian  Conservatives.    In  harmony  with  the 

^  Bemhard  von  Biilow  served  in  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870-1871,  in  the 
imperial  diplomatic  service  from  1876  to  1897,  as  foreign  secretary  under  Hohen- 
lohe from  1897  to  1900,  and  as  chancellor  of  the  empire  from  1900  to  1909. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


well-known  wishes  of  the  Agrarians,  the  policy  of  commercial 
reciprocity,  which  had  been  followed  since  the  advent  of  Caprivi, 
was  gradually  abandoned;  and  a  new  tariff  law  of  1902  re- 
The  Tariff  imposed  heavy  protective  duties  on  the  import  of 
of  1902  and  foreign  grain  and  other  foodstuffs.  At  the  same  time 
the  Bloc  Billow  did  not  repudiate  the  manufacturing  and  trad- 
ing classes :  for  several  years  he  rehed  for  legislative  assistance 
in  the  Reichstag  upon  a  curious  coalition  —  the  famous  Bloc 
■ —  of  Conservatives  and  National  Liberals,  and  primarily  for 
the  benefit  of  the  latter  he  strove  ever  more  zealously  to  realize 
the  growing  German  ambition  for  world  power.  Germany 
strengthened  her  economic  grip  on  Turkey  and  endeavored 
to  block  French  advance  in  Morocco.  She  supplied  munitions 
of  war  to  Russia  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (i 904-1 905),  and 
Vigor  in  ^^^^  forced  Russia  to  accept  Austro-Hungarian  aggres- 
Foreign  sion  in  the  Balkans  (1908-1909).  These  actions,  ac- 
companied  by  the  emperor's  striking  references  to 
Germany's  mailed  fist"  and  by  the  growth  of  Pan-Germanist 
sentiment  in  the  pubKc  press  and  popular  mind,  evoked  lively 
feelings  of  apprehension  in  Russia  and  France  and  particularly 
in  Great  Britain.  Italy,  too,  showed  symptoms  of  weakening 
in  her  attachment  to  Germany.  That  a  vigorous  world  policy 
was  creating  dangerously  jealous  foreign  enemies  for  Germany, 
few  impartial  observers  could  now  deny.  And  even  in  Germany 
were  to  be  found  numerous  protestants  against  the  newer  poH- 
cies  of  emperor  and  chancellor.  Neither  Socialists  nor  Centrists 
had  ever  taken  kindly  to  the  enormous  financial  outlays  for 
army  and  navy;  and  the  difficulties  which  the  government 
experienced  in  putting  down  a  native  rebellion  in  German  South- 
west Africa  were  seized  upon  by  these  parties  and  their  allies 
in  the  Reichstag  as  an  occasion  for  withholding  additional  colonial 
appropriations  (1906).  In  the  ensuing  electoral  campaign, 
imperialism  and  world  power  were  the  vital  issues,  and  so  influ- 
ential were  the  patriotic  appeals  made  to  the  German  people 
The  Deci-  emperor  himself  and  so  unscrupulous  was  the 

sive  Elec-  chancellor's  interference  in  the  campaign  that  the 
tionsiniQoy  gig(.|-jQj^g  j^q^  served  as  a  decisive  indorsement  of 
militarism,  navalism,  and  imperialism,  and  the  Socialists,  though 
increasing  their  popular  vote,  found  their  representation  in  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  425 


Reichstag  reduced  from  79  to  43.  Henceforth  both  Centrists 
and  Socialists  were  chastened  in  their  opposition  to  the  world 
poKcies  of  the  emperor  and  the  patriots.  And  it  was  a  curious 
fact  that  the  resignation  of  Biilow  in  1909  was  caused  not  by 
the  Socialists  or  Center  but  by  the  hostility  of  Conservatives 
to  his  taxation  proposals  and  by  the  demonstration  of  the  mili- 
tary party,  led  by  the  crown  prince,  against  what  they  con- 
sidered the  chancellor's  lack  of  forcefulness  in  checking  the  French 
in  Morocco. 

Bethmann-Hollweg  (1856-      ),^  who  succeeded  Biilow  as 
chancellor,  maintained  his  predecessor's  foreign  and  domestic 
poKcies  essentially  intact,  though  relying  for  legis-  Bethmann- 
lative  assistance  chiefly  upon  a  coaHtion  of  Conserva-  Hoiiweg, 
tives  and  Centrists.    He  displayed  no  lack  of  force- 
fulness  in  asserting  Germany's  right  to  be  considered  a  World 
Power,  and,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Socialists  more  than  doubled 
their  representation  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  general  elections  of 
191 2,  he  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  support  of  all  the  pohtical 
parties,  the  Social  Democrats  alone  excepted,  for  his  great 
Army  Bill  of  1913,  w^hich  raised  the  peace  footing  of  The  Army 
the  empire  from  656,000  men  to  870,000  and  involved       ®^  '^'^ 
the  extraordinary  expenditure  of  almost  a  billion  marks.  Even 
the  Socialists  voted  in  favor  of  the  required  new  taxes  when  the 
government  consented  to  make  the  special  war  levy  g^^jj^jj^g 
in  the  form  of  direct  taxation  on  incomes  and  estates,  solidarity 
It  was  obvious  that  at  last  nationaHsm  was  weld-  of  Political 

Parties 

mg  the  whole  German  people  together. 

Reserving  for  another  place  an  attempt  to  assemble  the  causes 
of  the  Great  War,  with  which  Germany  was  most  conspicuously 
concerned,  it  may  properly  be  remarked  here  that, 
once  the  herculean  struggle  was  begun,  the  whole  Ger-  S^^jJ^Sons 
man  nation  almost  to  a  man  appeared  to  give  enthusi-  and  the 
astic  support  to  the  emperor  and  his  government.    To  peo^g" 
the  thoughtful  student  of  German  history  from  187 1 
to  19 14  the  wiUing  sacrifice  of  life  and  money  on  the  part  of 

^  Theobald  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  son  of  a  v/ealthy  Rhenish  landowner, 
studied  law,  entered  the  Prussian  civil  service  in  1882,  became  governor  of  the 
province  of  Brandenburg  in  1899,  Prussian  minister  of  the  interior  in  1905,  and  in 
1907  imperial  secretary  of  state  for  the  interior  under  Biilow. 


426  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


millions  of  Germans  should  occasion  no  surprise.  Rightly  or 
wrongly  the  German  people  believed  that  they  were  maliciously 
attacked  by  a  circle  of  jealous  and  greedy  foreign  states  and 
that  their  empire,  created  by  their  fathers'  life-blood  in  the 
anxious  days  of  1866-187 1,  was  now  in  jeopardy.  Their  brave 
loyalty  was  certainly  a  tribute  to  the  growing  respect  which 
from  1871  to  1914  they  had  learned  to  entertain  for  that  empire. 
In  their  opinion  it  was  an  empire  that  had  grown  great,  an 
empire  that  had  striven  to  harmonize  conflicting  interests  of 
farmers  and  business  men,  of  capitalists  and  workingmen,  an 
empire  that  had  cherished  Hterature,  the  arts,  and  the  sciences, 
an  empire  that  personified  efficiency  and  culture  —  Kultur, 
—  an  empire  that  by  reason  of  these  and  other  achievements 
had  justly  earned  its  right  to  survive  not  merely  as  a  European 
nation  but  as  a  World  Power  of  the  first  magnitude.  Patriots 
knew  that  a  defeat  for  German  arms  would  mean  certainly  the 
loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  and  possibly  the  cession  of 
the  Polish  provinces  to  Russia  and  of  Schleswig  to  Denmark, 
perhaps  the  dismemberment  of  Prussia  and  the  undoing  of  na- 
tional unification.  Merchants  and  manufacturers  and  capitahsts 
knew  that  a  defeat  would  entail  not  only  the  loss  of  invaluable 
industrial  and  mining  districts  in  Europe  and  of  the  colonies  in 
Africa  and  Oceanica  but  also  the  lessening  of  that  prestige 
which  enabled  them  to  sell  their  wares  or  make  investments  in 
far-off  regions  of  the  world.  Catholics  felt  that  a  defeat  would 
spell  ruin  for  Austria-Hungary  as  well  as  for  Germany  and 
would  thereby  remove  the  last  obstacle  to  the  victorious  onward 
march  of  the  Orthodox  Church  of  the  eastern  Slavs.  Progressives 
and  Socialists  professed  to  believe  that  German  defeat  would 
signify  Russian  triumph  —  the  triumph  of  autocracy  and  bar- 
barism at  the  expense  of  efficiency  and  social  democracy.  Ger- 
many, quite  disunited  in  181 5,  seemed  quite  united  in  191 5. 
But  possibly  the  Great  War  showed  that  unity  had  its  curses 
no  less  than  disunion. 

2.  THE  DUAL  MONARCHY  OF  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY,  1867-1914 

In  spite  of  the  disastrous  Seven  Weeks'  War  of  1866,  which 
excluded  Austria  from  membership  in  the  German  Empire  and 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


deprived  her  of  the  rich  Italian  province  of  Venetia,  Francis 
Joseph,  the  German  Habsburg,  in  his  historic  castle  in  Vienna, 
was  still  lord  of  dominions  the  area,  population,  and  -pj^g  Habs- 
natural  resources  of  which  entitled  him  to  rank  as  a  burg  Mon- 
sovereign  of  a  Great  Power.  In  one  important  re-  ?^s*^^iverse 
spect — vitally  important  in  the  nineteenth  century —  Nation- 
the  Habsburg  dominion  was  unlike  any  other  Great  ^^^^ 
Power :  it  was  based  upon  personal  loyalty  to  the  reigning  family 
and  upon  an  ancient  tradition  of  cosmopoHtanism,  not  upon 
the  nationalism  which  now  distinguished  France,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  Spain,  Germany,  and  even  Russia.  Although  the  dynasty 
was  Teutonic,  and  likewise  much  of  the  civilization  and  the  most 
generally  used  official  language,  nevertheless  out  of  a  total  popu- 
lation of  51,300,000  in  Austria-Hungary  in  19 10,  there  were 
only  twelve  million  Germans,  while  the  non-Teutons  numbered 
over  thirty-nine  millions.  What  enabled  the  Teutonic  minority 
to  exercise  a  predominant  influence  in  the  monarchy  was  not  so 
much  the  proximity  of  the  powerful  allied  German  Empire  as 
the  divisions  among  the  non-Teutonic  majority.  In  19 10,  of 
the  39,000,000  non-Germans,  10,000,000  were  Magyars,  4,000,000 
were  Latins  (3,250,000  Rumans  in  Transylvania  and  Bukowina 
and  750,000  Italians  in  Triest,  Istria,  and  Trent),  and  24,250,000 
were  Slavs.  But  the  Slavs,  who  appeared  to  be  the  most  nu- 
merous, were  in  fact  widely  diverse  in  language  and  customs 
and  the  most  separated  geographically.  There  were  17,500,000 
northern  Slavs  and  6,750,000  southern  Slavs.  Among  the  former 
were  reckoned  8,500,000  Czechs  and  Slovaks  in  Bohemia,  Mo- 
ravia, Austrian  Silesia,  and  northern  Hungary;  5,000,000  Poles 
in  Cracow  and  western  Galicia;  and  4,000,000  Ruthenians  in 
eastern  Galicia.  As  southern  Slavs  were  accounted  5,500,000 
Serbo-Croats  in  Croatia-Slavonia,  Bosnia,  and  Dalmatia;  and 
1,250,000  Slovenes  in  Styria  and  Carniola. 

The  Ausgleich  (Compromise)  of  1867  ^  determined  the  general 
character  of  the  Habsburg  government  of  these  mani-  Govem- 
fold  peoples  during  the  period  under  review.    By  this  ment:  the 
arrangement  the  whole  dominion  was  split  into  two  ^^^f^!^^^ 
autonomous  parts:  (i)  the  empire  of  Austria,  includ- 

^  For  an  account  of  the  preliminaries  to  the  Ausgleich,  sec  above,  pp.  1 26-1 31, 
1 37-1 41,  and  especially  194  f. 


428 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ing  the  archduchies  of  Upper  and  Lower  Austria,  the  kingdoms 
of  Bohemia,  Galicia,  and  Dalmatia,  the  margravates  of  Moravia 
and  Istria,  the  duchies  of  Salzburg,  Styria,  Carinthia,  Carni- 
ola,  and  Bukowina,  the  county  of  Tyrol,  and  the  city  of 
Triest;  (2)  the  kingdom  of  Hungary,  including  Hungary 
proper,  the  kingdom  of  Croatia-Slavonia,  and  the  principality 
The  King-  Transylvania.  In  accordance  with  the  agreement, 
dom  of  Francis  Joseph  assumed  the  joint  title  of  emperor  of 
Hungary  Austria  and  king  of  Hungary ;  each  of  the  two  major 
divisions  was  to  manage  all  of  its  local  affairs ;  and  for  purposes 
Political  common  action  provision  was  made  for  the  appoint- 

Connec-  mcnt  by  the  emperor-king  of  a  joint  ministry  of  foreign 
between  affairs,  army,  and  finance,  for  ten-year  treaties  on 
Austria  and  trade,  tariff,  public  debt,  and  railways,  and  for  the 
Hungary  creation  of  a  curious  joint  parliament,  known  as  the 
Delegations,  to  supervise  the  work  of  the  joint  ministry  and  to 
promulgate  laws  affecting  the  common  concerns  of  the  two 
The  "Dele-  States.  In  order  to  emphasize  the  parity  of  Austria 
gations "  g^j^j  Hungary,  it  was  arranged  that  the  members  of 
the  Delegations — 120  in  all  —  should  be  elected  annually, 
half  by  the  Austrian  parliament  and  half  by  the  Hungarian  parHa- 
ment,  that  their  meetings  should  be  held  alternately  in  Vienna 
and  in  Budapest,  that  they  should  assemble  in  separate  cham- 
bers, the  Austrian  delegates  using  the  German  language  and 
those  from  Hungary  speaking  Magyar,  the  two  groups  communi- 
cating with  each  other  in  writing  —  both  in  Magyar  and  in 
German,  —  and  that  only  in  the  event  of  a  failure  to  agree  after 
a  third  exchange  of  written  communications  might  all  the  Dele- 
gates meet  in  joint  session,  and  then  simply  to  vote,  not  to 
debate. 

Contemporary  with  the  adoption  of  the  Ausgleich,  parlia- 
mentary government  was  firmly  estabhshed  in  Austria.  Already 
The  1^61  imperial  decrees  had  granted  a  large  measure 

Governinent  of  home-rule  to  popularly  elected  Diets  in  the  seven- 
of  Austria  ^^^^  provinces  of  Austria,  and  now  the  constitutional 
laws  of  December,  1867,  created  a  supreme  parKament  —  the 
Reichsrat  —  for  the  entire  Austrian  half  of  the  Dual  Monarchy. 
The  Reichsrat  was  composed  of  two  chambers:  a  House  of 
Lords,  containing  hereditary  nobles,  ecclesiastical  dignitaries, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  429 


and  a  majority  of  peers  named  for  life  by  the  emperor ;  and  a 
House  of  Representatives,  elected  at  first  by  a  restricted  class- 
suflrage.^  Thenceforth  laws  could  be  made  only  by  consent  of 
a  majority  of  each  of  the  two  Houses  of  the  Reichsrat,  and  their 
execution  was  solely  in  the  hands  of  an  Austrian  ministry, 
responsible  to  the  Reichsrat. 

At  the  same  time  the  Hungarian  Constitution  of  1848,  which 
had  been  in  abeyance  since  the  suppression  of  the  Magyar  in- 
surrection in  1849,  was  restored  in  its  essentials 
(1867)  for  the  regulation  of  the  central  govern-  Government 
ment  in  the  Hungarian  half  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  H^^g^ry 
By  this  constitution  the  law-making  power  was  vested  in  a 
parliament  of  the  famihar  type, —  a  Table  of  Magnates,  em- 
bracing several  clergymen,  a  few  appointed  members,  and  a 
relatively  large  body  of  hereditary  noblemen,  and  a  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  of  453  members,  elected  by  means  of  a  highly 
ilKberal  franchise,  —  while  the  execution  of  laws  and  oversight 
of  administration  were  intrusted  to  a  ministry  responsible  to 
the  parliament.  In  grants  of  home-rule  to  subject  peoples  the 
Hungarian  government  was  less  liberal  than  the  Austrian. 
Transylvania  was  deprived  of  its  local  Diet  in  1868 ;  and  even 
the  home-rule  accorded  to  Croatia-Slavonia  in  1868  was  qualified 
by  conferring  extensive  powers  upon  the  local  ban,  or  Croatia- 
governor,  who  in  practice  was  named  by  the  Hun-  siavonia 
garian  government,  by  restricting  the  suffrage  in  Croatia-Slavonia 
largely  to  the  ''Magyarized"  section  of  society,  and  by  carefully 
circumscribing  the  privileges  of  Croatian  representatives  in 
the  Hungarian  parHament. 

Since  the  adoption  of  the  Ausgleich  in  1867  and  the  definite  es- 
tablishment of  parhamentary  government  in  Austria  and  in 
Hungary,  the  Dual  Monarchy,  like  the  countries  of  western 
Europe,  has  been  greatly  affected  by  the  Industrial  Revolution 
and  by  the  growth  of  democracy ;  but,  far  more  than  any  other 
European  state,  it  has  been  peculiarly  troubled  by  the  jealousies 
and  conflicts  of  its  numerous  races  and  nationalities. 
'  Between  Austria  and  Hungary  the  most  cordial  relations  have 
not  always  prevailed  since  1867.    Every  tenth-year  renewal  of 

'  The  size  of  the  Austrian  House  of  Representatives  was  gradually  increased 
from  203  members  in  1867  to  516  in  1907. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  treaties  on  commerce,  taxes,  and  railways  became  an  occa- 
sion for  the  display  of  rabid  nationalism  on  the  part  of  Magyars 
Relations  Germans.     By  the  first  set  of  treaties  Austria 

between  promised  to  contribute  70  per  cent  of  the  total  funds 
Hungary^^  required  for  joint  expenditure,  and  Hungary  30  per 
under  the  cent ;  but  the  relative  advantage  which  Hungary  en- 
Ausgieich  joyed  Under  this  arrangement  was  somewhat  lessened 
by  the  treaty  of  1907,  which  reduced  Austria's  share  to  63.6  per 
cent  and  increased  Hungary's  to  36.4  per  cent.  Then,  too,  the 
fact  that  Austria  became  an  important  industrial  state  while 
Hungary  remained  preponderantly  agricultural,  led  to  tariff 
reform  during  the  years  from  1881  to  1887,  whereby  protective 
duties  were  levied  not  only  upon  foreign  manufactures  but  also 
upon  the  importation  of  grain  from  Rumania  and  Russia.  The 
establishment  in  1868  of  compulsory  mihtary  service  both 
in  Austria  and  in  Hungary  assured  the  Dual  Monarchy's  posi- 
tion as  a  Great  Power,  but  produced  many  bickerings  between 
the  two  governments  as  to  the  recruiting  and  officering  of  the 
joint  forces.  It  was  arranged  ultimately  that  these  matters 
should  be  left  to  the  respective  governments  of  Austria  and  Hun- 
gary and  that  the  joint  minister  of  war  should  not  assume  charge 
of  the  whole  army  until  the  two  contingents  were  duly  recruited 
and  officered.  Hungarian  insistence  that  the  commands  ad- 
dressed to  their  contingent  should  be  in  the  Magyar  language 
was  a  primary  cause  of  the  failure  to  renew  the  treaties  at  the 
appointed  time  in  1897  ;  the  general  use  of  German  was  enforced, 
however,  through  annual  decrees  of  the  emperor-king;  and  the 
treaties  were  again  formally  renewed  in  1907  without  express 
settlement  of  the  question  of  language.  Similarly,  the  Hun- 
garians protested  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Bank,  which 
had  been  incorporated  at  Vienna  in  1878,  and  demanded  in  its 
stead  the  establishment  of  separate  banks  for  Austria  and  Hun- 
gary with,  at  most,  common  superintendence.  Although  in 
this  respect,  as  in  that  of  the  army,  the  Magyars  secured  no 
concession,  they  obtained  a  promise  that  after  191 7  commercial 
treaties  with  foreign  nations  should  be  signed,  not  merely  by 
the  common  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  but  by  a  special  Austrian 
and  a  special  Hungarian  representative. 
Despite  the  friction  between  the  two  members  of  the  Dual 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


431 


Monarchy,  they  found  it  possible  and  desirable  to  present  a 
united  front  to  the  world  on  the  major  questions  of  foreign 
affairs.    Hungary,  quite  as  much  as  Austria,  was  hos-  „  .  , 

•       i  rT-»  -         loi-  United 

tile  to  the  national  aspirations  of  Rumania  and  Serbia  Foreign 
and  to  the  aggrandizement  of  Russia.    It  was  of  eco-  ^^^^Sy,^^ 

,  11  *         •  Balkans 

nomic  advantage  to  Hungary,  no  less  than  to  Austria, 
to  carve  a  sphere  of  influence  out  of  the  western  part  of  European 
Turkey.  In  the  pursuit  of  a  vigorous  foreign  poHcy  in  the  Bal- 
kans, therefore,  the  statesmen  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  whether 
Germans  or  Magyars,  came  to  espouse  miUtarism  and  a  strong 
navy  in  the  Adriatic,  to  lean  heavily  upon  the  alliance  with  the 
German  Empire,  and  to  support  the  Triple  Alliance  with  Ger- 
many and  Italy,  which  endured  from  1882  to  1915.  In  1878 
the  miUtary  occupation  of  the  two  Turkish  provinces  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  was  intrusted  to  Austria-Hungary,  and  in 
1908  they  were  formally  annexed  to  the  Dual  Monarchy.  In 
1 910  civil  government  was  set  up  in  the  two  provinces  Bosnia  and 
by  means  of  a  constitution,  which  provided  for  a  local  Herzegovina 
Diet  whose  acts,  however,  must  receive  the  assent  of  both  the 
Austrian  and  the  Hungarian  ministry.  In  back  of  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  was  a  desire  of  Austro-Hungarian 
capitaHsts  to  build  railways  and  otherwise  to  exploit  the  economic 
possibilities  not  only  of  the  two  provinces  but  also  of  Albania, 
western  Macedonia,  and  Salonica.  It  was  a  desire  which  ran 
counter  to  the  achievements  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (1912-1913),^ 
especially  to  the  territorial  gains  of  Serbia,  and  was  the  direct 
cause  of  the  War  of  the  Nations  (1914). 

Meanwhile  there  was  marked  progress  in  each  of  the  halves 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy.    In  the  empire  of  Austria  the  rapid 
march  of  the  industrial  revolution  was  registered  in  the  Austrian 
increasing  numbers  and  wealth  of  the  middle  class  and  Progress, 
Hkewise  in  the  growth  of  political  democracy.    Ele-  '^^^^-iqm 
mentary  public  instruction  was  made  compulsory  in  1869. 
Electoral  reform  in  1896  more  than  tripled  the  num-  Political 
ber  of  voters;  and  an  important  act  of  1907  estab-  Democracy 
lished  universal  manhood  suffrage  for  members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  and  rendered  the  exercise  of  the  franchise 
obligatory.    Political  parties   in  the   Reichsrat  were  formed 

^  See  below,  pp.  538  f . 


432 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


mainly  along  national  lines,  —  Germans,  Czechs,  Poles,  Ruthe- 
nians,  etc.,  —  but  three  groups  had  more  than  a  racial  appeal : 
(i)  the  Liberals,  a  bourgeois  group  tinged  with  anti-clericaHsm, 
Poutical  who  dominated  the  state  in  the  'seventies;  (2)  the 
Parties  Christian  SociaHsts,  a  Catholic  group,  who  in  their 
defense  of  the  privileges  of  the  Church  and  in  their  espousal  of 
social  legislation  resembled  the  Center  party  in  Germany  and 
the  Action  Liberate  in  France;  and  (3)  the  Social  Democratic 
party,  a  Marxian  group,  definitely  organized  in  1888  and  greatly 
strengthened  in  political  influence  by  the  grant  of  universal 
manhood  suffrage  in  1907. 

Under  the  influence  of  the  Christian  SociaHsts,  ably  led  by 
the  redoubtable  Karl  Lueger  (1844-1910),^  and  of  their  Polish 
Social  and  Czech  alhes,  not  only  was  rehgious  instruction 
Legislation  securely  established  in  the  public  schools  but  a  good 
deal  of  social  legislation  was  enacted.  In  1884  and  1885  meas- 
ures were  passed  regulating  the  work  in  the  mines  and  factories 
and  introducing  a  maximum  working  day  of  eleven  hours  in 
factories  and  ten  hours  in  mines.  Sunday  labor  was  forbidden, 
and  the  employment  of  women  and  children  was  limited.  The 
wide  powers  which  at  first  were  given  to  the  government  to  re- 
lax the  appHcation  of  these  laws  in  special  cases  and  special 
trades  were  closely  restricted  by  a  supplementary  law  of  1893. 
In  1887-1888  Austrian  statutes,  modeled  on  the  new  German 
legislation,  established  compulsory  insurance  of  workingmen 
against  accidents  and  sickness.  Trade  unions  were  legaHzed, 
and  the  pubfic  ownership  of  railways  —  a  poHcy  already  in- 
augurated in  the  'seventies  by  the  Liberals  —  was  expedited. 
And  the  growth  of  Socialist  strength  with  the  advent  of  uni- 
versal suffrage  —  the  Social  Democrats  increased  their  repre- 
sentation in  the  Reichsrat  from  11  in  1901  to  87  in  1907^  — 

^  Lueger  was  a  bitter  and  outspoken  opponent  of  the  Jewish  capitalists  who 
constituted  an  important  factor  in  the  Liberal  party  and  who  were  accused  of  gross 
political  corruption,  especially  in  the  municipality  of  Vienna.  Under  Lueger's 
administration  of  Vienna,  that  city  was  certainly  transformed.  Nearly  trebled 
in  size,  it  became  a  model  to  the  world  in  perfection  of  municipal  organization  and 
in  success  of  municipal  ownership. 

^  In  the  elections  of  1907  —  the  first  under  universal  manhood  suffrage  —  the 
Social  Democrats  won  87  seats;  the  Christian  Socialists,  67;  Clericals  of  various 
national  affiliations,  86;  Liberals  of  various  national  affiliations,  122;  while  the 
remainder  were  distributed  among  small  national  groups. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


433 


seemed  to  betoken  an  ever-widening  popular  sympathy  with 
social  reform. 

That  more  social  legislation  was  not  enacted  was  due  in  large 
part  to  the  overshadowing  importance  which  nationalism  as- 
sumed in  the  Austrian  Reichsrat.    Poles,   Czechs,  ^  ^. 

1      •  r-1  1    X    T         1  Conflict  of 

Ruthemans,  Slovenes,  and  Italians  became  equally  Nation- 
clamorous  with  Austrian  Germans  in  demanding  ^^^^^^ 
special  privileges  and  almost  equally  hable  to  embar- 
rass the  operation  of  parliamentary  government.  The  Czechs, 
infuriated  that  the  Austrian  government  had  not  granted  the 
same  rights  to  Bohemia  as  it  had  accorded  to  Hungary,  absented 
themselves  for  several  years  from  the  House  of  Representatives, 
and  when  they  did  appear  they  displayed  much  skill  in  throwing 
ink-bottles  at  the  presiding  officer  and  otherwise  in  provoking 
the  wildest  tumult.  The  Poles,  toward  whom  the  Austrian  gov- 
ernment, unlike  the  Prussian  or  the  Russian,  adopted  a  concilia- 
tory attitude,  were  not  so  obstreperous ;  but  Ruthenians,  Slo- 
venes, and  Italians  required  no  instruction  from  the  Czechs  to 
learn  the  lesson  of  parhamentary  disorder.  On  their  part  the 
officials  of  the  central  Austrian  government  learned  that  con- 
cessions to  any  one  nationahty  served  only  to  arouse  bitter 
resentment  among  the  others  and  to  inspire  demands  for  imperial 
recognition  of  the  local  language  and  for  the  erection  of  national 
institutions  of  learning.  Systematic  nationalist  obstruction 
repeatedly  brought  parliamentary  government  at  Vienna  to  a 
standstill ;  and  the  half-hearted  loyalty  of  the  minor  nationalities 
augured  ill  for  the  military  triumph  of  Austria  in  the  War  of  the 
Nations.  Only  a  fear  of  what  might  become  of  them,  were  the 
Habsburg  Empire  to  be  partitioned,  and  a  sense  of  personal  af- 
fection for  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  induced  these  national- 
ities to  support  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  its  hour  of  need. 

In  Hungary  the  racial  animosities  were  even  more  bitter  than 
in  Austria.    The  Magyars,  though  constituting  but  a  meager 
half  of  the  total  population  of  the  kingdom,  were 
particularly  illiberal  in  their  treatment  of  the  large  poutksTnd 
minorities  of  Rumans  and  Serbo-Croats.    They  pre-  Racial  Con- 
served their  economic  hold  on  large  landed  estates.  Hungary 
They  forced  their  language  upon  the  public  schools. 
They  abolished  all  traces  of  local  autonomy  in  Transylvania 

VOL.  II  —  2  F 


434  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


and  seriously  abridged  the  rights  of  self-government  in  Croatia- 
Slavonia.  They  steadily  refused  to  extend  the  franchise  to 
servants,  apprenticed  workingmen,  or  agricultural  laborers; 
and  so  high  were  the  property  qualifications  which  they  retained 
and  so  intricate  the  electoral  laws  that  in  1910,  out  of  a  total 
population  of  20,886,000  in  the  Hungarian  kingdom,  there  were 
not  more  than  1,000,000  voters,  and  in  the  same  year,  out  of 
413  members  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  privileged  to  vote 
on  all  questions,  there  were  only  seven  non-Magyars.  Among 
the  disgruntled  minorities  the  resulting  bitterness  gave  rise 
to  nationaHst  movements  looking  toward  the  incorporation  of 
Transylvania  into  the  kingdom  of  Rumania  and  the  inclusion  of 
the  Serbo-Croats  in  the  kingdom  of  Serbia.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Magyars  undertook  to  justify  their  policy  on  the  ground 
that  they  were  the  cultural  element  in  the  kingdom  of  Hungary 
and  that  concessions  to  Rumans  or  Serbo-Croats  would  under- 
mine the  state  and  put  an  end  to  its  civilizing  mission  in  south- 
eastern Europe. 

It  was  the  poorer  classes  of  Magyars  as  well  as  Serbo-Croats 
and  Rumans  who  suffered  from  the  undemocratic  regime  in 

Hungary.  Though  popular  education  was  zealously 
PoMcaia^d  promoted  and  though  some  of  the  worst  grievances 
Social  of  the  peasants  against  their  landlords  were  removed, 
S^Hungary         great  landowners  and  the  governmental  oligarchy 

were  the  chief  beneficiaries  of  the  wonderful  agricul- 
tural development  of  Hungary  between  1867  and  1914.  This 
fact  was  evidenced  by  the  alarmingly  heavy  emigration  from 
the  country,  —  amounting  to  over  a  million  for  the  years  from 
1896  to  1 9 10,  —  and  by  a  widespread  popular  agitation  for 
electoral  reform,  which  in  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury brought  the  kingdom  to  the  verge  of  civil  war.  These 
domestic  problems  were  still  unsolved  when  the  outbreak  of 
foreign  war  in  1914  threatened  Hungary's  very  existence. 

In  Hungary  as  well  as  in  Austria  existed  a  deep-rooted  re- 
spect for  the  Emperor-King  Francis  Joseph,  whose  long  reign 
since  1848  had  been  full  of  stirring  scenes,  —  the  wars  of  1849, 
1859,  and  1866 ;  the  establishment  of  the  Ausgleich;  the  eco- 
nomic and  poHtical  transformation  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  It 
was  Francis  Joseph  who  bridged  the  gap  between  Metternich 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  435 


and  the  War  of  the  Nations ;  he  had  witnessed  the  rise  and  fall 
of  Napoleon  III,  the  achievements  of  Gladstone,  DisraeH,  and 
Lloyd  George,  the  rise  and  retirement  of  Bismarck. 
It  was  Francis  Joseph  whose  counsels  in  Austria-  peror-icing 
Hungary  since  1867  had  almost  invariably  been  on  Francis 
the  side  of  concessions  to  democracy  and  nationaHsm.  1848-1916 
And  with  popular  respect  was  mingled  human  sym- 
pathy for  a  series  of  domestic  tragedies,  —  the  execution  of 
his  brother  MaximiHan,  emperor  of  Mexico,  in  1867 ;  the 
mysterious  suicide  of  his  only  son  Rudolph  in  1889 ;  the  assas- 
sination of  his  wife  by  an  anarchist  at  Geneva  in  1897  5  ^^d  the 
murder  of  his  nephew  and  heir,  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand, 
by  Serb  conspirators  at  Sarajevo,  the  capital  of  Bosnia,  in  19 14. 
Following  closely  upon  this  last  domestic  tragedy  came  to 
the  old  emperor-king,  now  in  his  eighty-fifth  year,  the  Great 
War,  the  greatest  catastrophe  of  his  long  and  eventful  career. 


3.  THE  SWISS  CONFEDERATION 

Mountain-girt  little  Switzerland,  like  the  broad  Danubian 
plains  of  Austria-Hungary,  presents  a  spectacle  of  divergent 
races    and    languages    rather    arbitrarily  brought 
together,  through  the  historical  development  of  cen-  of  diverse 
turies,  to  form  a  poHtical  union  and  something  resem-  Languages 
bling  a  national  culture.    Within  a  territory,  perched  ^^nf 
high  upon  the  common  Alpine  watersheds  of  the 
Rhine,  Danube,  and  Rhone,  hardly  larger  than  Holland  and 
smaller  than  the  combined  areas  of  Vermont  and  New  Hampshire, 
were  included  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
some  twenty-two  diminutive  communities,  or  cantons,  differing 
among  themselves  in  language,  religion,  and  customs,  according 
to  their  geographical  proximity  to  Germany,  France,  or  Italy. 
In  fifteen  cantons  —  two-thirds  of  the  entire  population  of  the 
Confederation  —  the  German  language  prevailed ;   of  the  re- 
mainder, five  were  predominantly  French-speaking  and  two 
were  Italian.    Protestants  were  in  a  majority  in  twelve  of  the 
cantons  and  Roman  Catholics  in  ten. 

That  racial  antipathies  did  not  produce  results  as  unfortu- 
nate in  Switzerland  as  in  Austria-Hungary  was  due  in  large  part 


436  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


to  the  fact  that  the  Swiss  nationalities  were  generally  separated 
by  cantonal  boundaries  and  that  each  of  the  twenty-two  cantons 

was  treated  as  a  sovereign  state  and  its  citizens  were 
Emphasis  allowed  to  exercise  wide  powers  of  self-government, 
upon  Local  In  fact,  with  the  exception  of  a  brief  period  of  en- 
ernm^nr     forced  centraHzation  during  the  era  of  Napoleon  I, 

the  Swiss  Confederation  from  its  earliest  beginnings 
in  the  middle  ages  down  to  the  year  1848  was  merely  a  defensive 
alHance  between  practically  independent  communities,  involving 
more  or  less  regular  meetings  of  cantonal  ambassadors,  but  leav- 
ing the  domestic  affairs  of  the  several  states  quite  untouched. 

In  1848,  however,  following  a  brief  civil  war,  in  which  a 
party  of  Liberals,  or  CentraHsts,  coerced  the  freedom-loving 

Catholic  mountaineers  of  central  Switzerland,  the 
stitution  of  Swiss  people  voted  by  an  overwhelming  majority  to 
1848  and  adopt  a  written  constitution,  which  made  provision  for 
Formation  ^  fairly  strong  federal  government.  The  Swiss  Con- 
of  the  Swiss  stitution  of  1 848,  modeled  after  that  oi  the  United 
tio?^^^^*'    States,  really  inaugurated  the  Swiss  Confederation  as 

we  know  it  to-day.  It  established  a  central  legisla- 
ture of  two  chambers,  —  a  Council  of  States,  consisting  of  two 
representatives  from  each  canton,  chosen  in  such  manner  as  the 
canton  might  direct,  and  a  National  Council,  elected  by  universal 
manhood  suffrage  in  proportion  to  population,, —  and  a  central 
executive  in  the  form  of  a  Federal  Council  of  seven  members  des- 
ignated for  three-year  terms  by  the  legislature.  The  Federal 
Council  was  to  act  as  a  kind  of  cabinet  under  the  chairmanship 
of  a  President  of  the  Confederation,  elected  annually  by  the 
legislature.  The  Constitution  of  1848  conferred  on  the  new 
federal  government  power  to  conduct  the  foreign  relations  of 
Switzerland,  to  levy  customs  duties  and  other  taxes,  to  raise 
a  national  army,  and  to  regulate  interstate  commerce.  A  com- 
mon Swiss  citizenship  was  created  and  elaborate  guarantees  of 
individual  liberties  were  proclaimed.  All  Christians  were 
accorded  the  free  exercise  of  their  religion,  but,  conformably 
to  the  anti-clerical  tendencies  of  the  constitution-framers  of 
1848,  the  Jesuits  and  similar  rehgious  orders  of  the  Roman  Cath- 
olic Church  were  not  to  be  received  in  any  canton.  German, 
French,  and  Italian  were  recognized  as  national  languages. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


437 


The  history  of  Switzerland  from  1848  to  19 14  was  marked 
by  three  general  characteristics:  (i)  the  gradual  paring  down 
of  the  many  rights  still  reserved  to  the  cantons  by  the  General 
Constitution  of  1848;  (2)  the  economic  development  Character- 
of  the  country ;  and  (3)  the  radical  extension  of  poHt-  swiss°His- 
ical  democracy  and  the  trial  of  novel  governmental  tory,  1848- 
experiments  both  in  federal  and  in  cantonal  affairs.  ^^^^ 

In  respect  of  the  first  of  these  three  general  characteristics, 
it  may  be  pointed  out  that  soon  after  1848  a  beginning  was  made 
of  organizing  the  different  pubHc  services  which  had  increase  of 
been  brought  within  the  scope  of  the  federal  authority.  Federal 
Thus,  a  uniform  postal  service  was  estabhshed ;   a  Se^Expense 
single  coinage  replaced  the  confusing  cantonal  cur-  of  the  Vari- 
rencies ;    all  customs  duties  between  cantons  were  Cantons 
aboUshed ;   and  the  metric  system  of  weights  and  measures 
was  made  obhgatory.    A  complete  revision  of  the  Swiss  Con- 
stitution in  1874,  though  making  no  important  change  ^he  Con- 
in  the  organization  of  government,  further  enlarged  stitutionof 
the  federal  powers  by  authorizing  the  estabhshment  ^^'^^ 
of  a  system  of  free  elementary  schools  under  the  superintendence 
of  the  Confederation  but  managed  by  the  several  cantons,  and 
by  introducing  the  principle  of  the  referendum  in  national  law- 
making.   As  a  corollary  to  the  referendum,  the  initiative  {i.e., 
the  right  of  any  so,ooo  Swiss  citizens  to  demand  the  „  ,  , 

.    .         r  1  r  Federal 

submission  of  any  measure  to  popular  vote,  or  refer-  Referendum 
endum)  was  introduced  in  federal  legislation  in  1891.  J^^.^^.^^ 
Thenceforth,  by  means  of  the  initiative  and  referen- 
dum, as  well  as  through  indirect  action  on  the  part  of  the  cen- 
tral legislature,  federal  authority  was  extended  to  many  domains. 
In  1 89 1  the  principle  of  a  national  bank  was  indorsed,  though 
such  a  bank  was  not  opened  until  1907.  In  1891  the  Swiss 
departed  from  their  traditional  free-trade  poUcy  and  established 
a  protective  tariff,  which  was  considerably  increased  in  1903. 
In  1898  the  federal  government  was  authorized  to  prepare  and 
enforce  uniform  codes  of  civil  and  criminal  law  and  to  purchase 
and  operate  the  privately  owned  railways.  In  1908  the  im- 
mense water  power  supplied  by  the  many  rivers  and  mountain 
torrents  became  a  monopoly  of  the  federal  government.  Though 
the  principle  of  compulsory  insurance  of  workingmen  against 


43^ 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


sickness  and  accidents  was  approved  by  popular  vote  in  1890, 
a  definite  plan  was  not  found  acceptable  until  1913.  In  the 
matter  of  militarism,  the  Swiss  people,  in  view  of  the  growing 
armaments  of  all  the  surrounding  Great  Powers  and  the  fear 
that  their  own  neutrality,  despite  the  solemn  guarantees  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  (18 15),  might  not  be  respected  in  case  of  a 
The  Militia  S^eat  international  war,  thought  it  necessary  to  sanc- 
tion the  compulsory  enrollment  of  all  able-bodied 
young  men  and  military  training  for  a  certain  number  of  days 
every  year.  Such  a  national  militia,  approved  in  1874  and  later 
strengthened,  especially  by  a  law  of  1907,  earned  the  reputation 
of  being  a  most  efhcient  force  for  national  defense,  but  cost 
the  Swiss  people  almost  a  third  of  their  total  federal  income. 

To  the  economic  prosperity  of  Switzerland  three  factors  con- 
tributed. First  was  the  thrift  of  the  hardy  natives  who  still 
Economic  in  considerable  numbers  herded  flocks  upon  the  moun- 
Prosperity  tain-sides  or  practiced  the  science  of  intensive  culti- 
vation in  the  narrow  but  fertile  valleys.  Secondly  was  the  influx, 
steadily  augmenting,  of  wealthy  foreign  tourists  who  interspersed 
their  mountain-climbing  and  sight-seeing  with  liberal  expendi- 
ture to  innkeepers  and  to  purveyors  of  Swiss  souvenirs.  Thirdly 
was  a  noticeable  growth  of  manufacturing,  stimulated  by  the 
imposition  of  the  protective  tariff,  and  represented  in  1905  by 
nearly  250,000  industrial  and  commercial  establishments,  em- 
bracing factories  for  textiles,  gloves,  pottery,  watches  and  clocks, 
and  milk  chocolate. 

With  the  increasing  wealth  and  prosperity  of  the  country 
and  the  enlarging  scope  of  the  federal  government,  the  growth 
Political  political  democracy  kept  pace.    In  four  of  the  small- 

Democracy  est  cantons  the  people  continued  to  exercise  their  local 
ton^lndTn  powers  direct,  without  the  intervention  of  any  parlia- 
the  Confed-  mentary  machinery,  all  male  citizens  of  full  age  assem- 
eration  bling  together  in  the  open  air,  at  stated  intervals,  mak- 
ing laws  and  appointing  their  administrators.  In  the  other 
cantons,  whose  size  naturally  militated  against  such  ^'town 
meetings"  (Lands gemeinden),  local  government  was  carried 
on  by  means  of  representative  institutions,  but  in  all  of  them 
the  suffrage  was  extended  to  every  adult  male,  regardless  of 
wealth  or  education,  and  in  nearly  all  of  them  the  referendum 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


obtained  constitutional  recognition.  The  principle  of  the  refer- 
endum was  most  fully  developed  in  the  canton  of  Zurich,  where 
all  laws  and  the  chief  matters  of  finance,  as  well  as  proposed 
constitutional  amendments,  must  be  submitted  to  popular  vote. 
In  many  cantons  the  popular  initiative  was  Likewise  introduced. 
In  federal  affairs,  the  successful  operation  of  the  referendum 
and  initiative  served  not  only,  as  we  have  seen,  to  strengthen 
the  central  government  but  also  to  develop  the  democratic 
spirit  throughout  Switzerland  and  to  apply  it  to  social  reform. 


4.  THE  KINGDOM  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS  (HOLLAND) 

Shorn  of  its  Belgian  provinces  by  the  revolution  of  1830, 
the  kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  retained  in  Europe  a  territory  ^ 
less  than  half  the  size  of  little  Portugal,  though  beyond 
the  seas  it  continued  to  possess  a  large  part  of  the  dom  and  its 
proud  imperial  domain  which  had  been  a  source  of  Coiomai 

.  Empire 

great  wealth  to  Dutch  burghers  in  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury. Dutch  government  was  still  maintained  in  Java,  Sumatra, 
the  Spice  Islands,  Borneo,  and  New  Guinea,  —  an  East  Indian 
empire  fifty-eight  times  as  large  as  the  mother-country  and  six 
times  as  populous;  while  46,500  square  miles  of  land  and  a 
population  of  140,000  constituted  the  Dutch  possessions  of  Guiana 
(Surinam)  in  South  America  and  Curasao  in  the  West  Indies. 

For  twenty-five  years  after  the  Congress  of  Vienna  (181 5) 
the  government  of  the  Netherlands  was  conducted  by  King 
William  I,  a  prince  of  the  famous  Orange  family,  whose  wiUiam  i, 
stubborn  refusal  to  make  concessions  to  Belgium  1815-1840 
cost  him  disastrous  foreign  war  and  whose  incessant  opposition 
to  any  liberalizing  of  the  conservative  constitution  of  181 5 
earned  him  grave  unpopularity  at  home  so  that  in  1840  he  saw 
fit  to  abdicate.    From  his  son  and  successor,  King  William 
II,  the  Dutch  Liberals,  excited  by  the  general  revo-  ^he  Con- 
lutionary  movement  that  pervaded  Europe,  wrung  in  stitution  of 
1848  a  new  constitution,  which  established  the  form  '^"^^ 
of  Dutch  government  that  obtained,  with  slight  change,  from 
then  until  1914.    By  this  constitution  the  royal  ministers  were 

*  Its  European  territory  embraced  12,648  sq.  mi.  with  a  population  in  1910  of 
5,858,175. 


440 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


made  responsible  to  the  States-General,  a  central  parliament 
consisting  of  a  First  Chamber,  chosen  by  the  provincial 
states,  and  a  Second  Chamber,  elected  by  a  closely  restricted 
popular  suffrage.  At  the  same  time  a  large  measure  of  autonomy 
in  local  affairs  was  guaranteed  to  the  elective  ''states"  of  the 
eleven  provinces  into  which  the  kingdom  was  divided. 

During  the  long  reign  of  the  enlightened  and  benevolent 
King  William  III  (i 849-1 890),  the  chief  struggle  of  the  political 
King  parties  in  the  States-General  centered  in  religious 

wuiiamin,  education.  On  one  side  were  the  Liberals,  drawn 
1849-1890  la^j-ggiy  ixom  the  commercial  classes  in  the  towns,  who 
demanded  the  establishment  of  a  system  of  free,  public,  secular 
schools.  On  the  other  side  were  the  Protestant  Conservatives, 
supported  by  the  Calvinistic  peasantry,  and  the  Roman  Catho- 
lics, who,  growing  in  numbers  in  the  nineteenth  century,  came 
to  represent  about  one-third  of  the  total  population.  The  out- 
come of  the  struggle  was  in  the  nature  of  a  compromise :  ele- 
mentary schools  in  which  no  religious  instruction  was  given, 
were  opened  in  large  numbers  and  were  maintained  at  public 
expense ;  but  in  1889  the  Conservatives  and  Catholics  obtained 
governmental  financial  assistance  for  their  private  parochial 
schools;  compulsory  attendance  either  at  public  or  at  private 
school  was  enacted  in  1900.  At  the  same  time  the  property 
qualifications  for  exercise  of  the  franchise  were  gradually  low- 
ered, so  that  the  number  of  voters  in  the  elections  to  the  Second 
Chamber  was  doubled  in  1887  and  again  in  1896.  Despite 
these  concessions,  political  democracy  made  slower  headway 
in  the  Netherlands  than  in  any  other  country  of  western  Europe ; 
in  1 914  only  about  five-eighths  of  the  Dutchmen  over  25  years 
of  age  possessed  the  suffrage. 

William  III  was  succeeded  on  the  Dutch  throne  in  1890  by 
his  daughter  Wilhelmina,  who  came  of  age  in  1898.  The  young 
Queen  WU-  Q^een  was  personally  very  popular,  but  her  marriage 
heimina,  in  1901  to  Prince  Henry  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  was 
1890-  distasteful  to  many  Dutch  patriots,  who  feared  Ger- 
man political  influence  in  their  country.  The  birth  of  an  heiress 
to  the  throne,  the  Princess  Juliana,  in  1909  seemed  to  render 
more  remote  the  danger  of  German  intervention  in  the  Nether- 
lands, but  the  chief  efforts  of  Dutch  statesmen  from  1890  to 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


441 


1914  were  directed  toward  perfecting  the  national  defense. 
A  law  of  1898  reorganized  the  militia,  on  the  Swiss  basis,  with 
provision  for  compulsory  personal  service.  The  army  was 
further  strengthened  in  191 2  ;  and  in  1913  an  extensive  program 
of  naval  construction  was  approved,  and  elaborate  fortifications 
were  begun  at  Amsterdam  and  at  Flushing.  The  Dutch  people 
appeared  ready  and  determined  in  19 14  to  offer  serious  resistance 
to  any  combatant  in  the  War  of  the  Nations  who  should  attempt 
to  violate  their  neutraHty. 

Throughout  the  period  under  review,  the  economic  prosperity 
of  the  Netherlands  continued  to  depend  upon  agriculture  — 
especially  dair>ang  and  gardening  —  and  upon  colonial  Economic 
commerce  and  shipbuilding.  In  an  increasing  degree  Prosperity 
it  depended  likewise  upon  trade  in  the  industrial  products  of 
the  surrounding  countries  of  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and 
Belgium.^  Because  of  the  country's  lack  of  mineral  resources, 
Holland  did  not  become  an  important  manufacturing  state ; 
and  because  of  its  economic  dependence  upon  its  neighbors,  the 
Netherlands  remained,  almost  alone  of  all  Continental  states, 
a  free-trade  country. 

In  conclusion  a  word  should  be  said  about  the  diminutive 
grand-duchy  of  Luxemburg,  which,  lying  on  the  borders  of 
France,  Belgium,  and  Germany,  was  a  member  of  the  Grand- 
Germanic  Confederation  from  1815  to  1866,  was  Duchy  of 
recognized  as  neutral  territory  in  1867,  and  was  ^^^^^^^^ 
united  in  a  personal  union  with  the  Netherlands  until  the  death 
of  King  William  III  in  1890.  Then,  when  Queen  WiUielmina 
ascended  the  throne  of  Holland,  the  grand-duchy  of  Luxemburg 
passed  to  her  male  kinsman,  Adolphus,  duke  of  Nassau,  who, 
with  a  local  parliament,  governed  the  grand-duchy  until  his 
death  in  1905.  Curiously  enough,  upon  the  death  of  the  suc- 
ceeding Grand  Duke  William  in  191 2,  the  sovereignty  of 
Luxemburg  devolved  upon  another  female  member  of  the 
Orange  family,  the  Grand-Duchess  Marie  Adelaide.  Despite 
the  international  assurance  of  its  territorial  integrity  and  neu- 
trality, Luxemburg  was  occupied  by  German  troops  at  the  very 
opening  of  hostihtics  in  the  War  of  the  Nations  (August,  1914) 

*The  total  commerce  of  the  Netherlands  in  191 2  reached  a  value  of  more  than 
two  and  a  half  billion  dollars. 


442  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  used  by  them  as  a  strategic  point  of  departure  for  their 
invasion  of  France. 


5.  THE  SCANDINAVIAN  STATES:  DENMARK,  SWEDEN, 
AND  NORWAY 

The  three  peoples  of  northwestern  Europe,  —  Danes,  Swedes, 
and  Norwegians,  —  very  much  alike  in  origin,  language,  re- 
ligion, and  conditions  of  life,  continued  in  the  nine- 
ments^Com-  teenth  and  twentieth  centuries  to  pass  through  simi- 
mon  to  the  lar  social  and  political  evolutions.  All  three  countries 
^an^Nations  became  limited  monarchies ;  in  all  three,  the  bulk  of 
the  population  lived  by  agriculture,  conimerce,  and 
fishing,  rather  than  by  manufactures ;  all  three  nations  retained 
almost  unanimous  allegiance  to  the  Lutheran  Church,  though 
they  gradually  granted  religious  toleration;  popular  education 
was  fostered  under  ecclesiastical  supervision ;  all  three  peoples  de- 
veloped native  literatures  and  a  Hvely  sense  of  nationalism ;  and 
in  all  three,  social  and  political  democracy  made  steady  progress. 

Denmark,  by  ceding  Norway  to  Sweden  in  18 14  and  by  surren- 
dering the  duchies  of  Schleswig-Holstein  to  Germany  in  1864, 
The  King-  restricted  in  Scandinavia  to  the  peninsula  of  Jut- 

dom  of  Den-  land  and  its  adjacent  islands,  and  became  the  smallest 
of  the  three  Scandinavian  countries.^  Alone  of  these 
countries,  however,  Denmark  possessed  a  colonial  empire  in 
Iceland,  Greenland,  and  the  West  Indian  islands  of  St.  Croix, 
St.  Thomas,  and  St.  John.  By  a  Constitution  of  1849,  revised 
in  1866,  the  king  of  Denmark  shared  his  power  with  a  parlia- 
its  Govern-  ment  (Rigsdag) ,  which  consisted  of  two  Houses  —  a 
conservative  Landsthing,  composed  of  members  partly 
appointed  by  the  crown  and  partly  chosen  by  indirect  election, 
and  a  democratic  Folkething,  elected  by  the  majority  of  males 
over  thirty  years  of  age.  Throughout  the  greater  part  of  the 
long  reign  of  Christian  IX  (i 863-1 906)  a  bitter  political  struggle 
was  waged  between  the  king  and  his  ministers  and  the  Lands- 

1  The  area  of  Denmark  in  191 1  was  15,582  sq.  mi.,  including  the  Faroe  Islands 
but  excluding  an  area  of  86,634  sq.  mi.  in  the  colonies  of  Iceland,  Greenland,  and 
the  West  Indies.  Denmark's  population  in  191 1  was  2,775,076.  At  the  same  time, 
Sweden  had  an  area  of  172,876  sq.  mi.  and  a  population  of  5,522,403,  while  Norway 
had  an  area  of  124,643  sq.  mi.  and  a  population  of  2,391,782. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  443 


thing,  on  one  side,  and  the  Folkething  and  the  majority  of  peasants, 
on  the  other  side.  The  latter  demanded  the  complete  establish- 
ment of  parliamentary  government  by  making  the  ministry 
responsible  to  the  Folkething;  the  former,  bent  upon  the  strength- 
ening of  Danish  armaments,  persistently  refused  to  make  con- 
cessions to  a  House  which  declined  to  increase  appropriations 
for  military  purposes.  From  1872  to  1901  the  constitution  was 
reduced  almost  to  waste  paper ;  during  the  period  huge  budgets 
were  repeatedly  put  into  effect  by  simple  decree  of  the  king  and 
ministers.  Meanwhile,  however,  the  Danish  peasantry  were 
steadily  improving  their  economic  condition  by  means  of  intensive 
cultivation  of  their  small  holdings  and  by  a  remarkable  develop- 
ment of  dairy-farming  and  of  cooperative  enterprise,  and  thereby 
they  were  enabled  to  bring  such  political  pressure  to  bear  on 
the  government  that  in  1901  the  aged  king  yielded  to  the  well- 
known  wishes  of  his  people  and  installed  a  cabinet  representing 
the  majority  party  in  the  Folkething. 

Under  the  new  Danish  regime  (1901-1914)  the  chief  political 
interest  shifted  from  the  army,  which  was  left  on  a  basis  of 
national  militia,  as  in  Switzerland,  to  electoral  reform.  „  , 

.  .  .  Political 

The  death  of  Christian  IX  in  1906  and  the  accession  Democracy 

of  his  democratically  minded  son,  Frederick  VIII  in  Denmark, 
/     ^        \  .  11  .      .  1901-1914 

( 1 906-1 9 1 2),  gave  an  impetus  to  the  democratic  agita- 
tion, championed  by  Danish  Liberals  and  by  a  small  but  rapidly 
growing  group  of  Danish  Sociahsts.  After  protracted  debates 
and  several  exciting  elections,  after  the  death  of  Frederick  VIII, 
and  the  accession  of  Christian  X  (191 2-  ),  constitutional 
amendments  were  adopted,  1914-1915,  which  reduced  the  age  limit 
of  electors  from  30  to  25,  extended  the  suffrage  for  the  Folkething 
to  all  males  and  also  to  most  females,  and  abolished  the  appointive 
seats  in  the  Landsthing.  Home  rule  was  conferred  upon  Ice- 
land in  1903. 

As  results  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  at  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century  Sweden  had  lost  the  errand-duchy  of  „    ,  . 

T^'  1      J  •     1     1      •      1  XT  r  1      Sweden  m 

rmlana  to  Russia,  had  gained  Norway  from  Denmark,  the  Nine- 
and  had  secured  the  founder  of  a  new  royal  dynasty 
in  the  person  of  King  Charles  XIV  (18 18-1844), 
erstwhile  Marshal  Bernadotte  of  France.^    All  of  these  results 

1  See  Vol.  I,  pp.  541,  575. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


had  marked  significance  for  Swedish  history  throughout  the 
nineteenth  century.  The  Bernadotte  dynasty,  despite  its  French 
origin,  proved  to  be  more  loyally  attached  to  royal  prerogatives 
than  the  Danish  monarchs.  The  loss  of  Finland  stimulated 
popular  ill-feeling  toward  Russia  and  led  to  a  more  pronounced 
militarism  in  Sweden  than  in  Denmark.  And  the  artificial 
union  of  Sweden  and  Norway  produced  a  long-standing  feud 
between  these  two  Scandinavian  peoples. 

Sweden  and  Norway  were  not  compatible  in  political  union. 
Sweden  was  a  country  of  large  landed  estates,  with  a  powerful 
nobility  and  a  poverty-stricken  peasantry.  Norway 

Differences  ^  ^  ^'  •  i        7  i 

between  was  divided  mto  small  holdings  with  a  farmer  class 
Norway  accustomed  to  economic  independence  and  to  a  feeling 
of  contempt  for  titles  of  nobiHty.  As  the  nineteenth 
century  advanced,  manufacturing  and  iron-mining  tended  to 
develop  numerous  capitalistic  and  proletarian  urban  classes  in 
Sweden,  while  Norway  remained  predominantly  agricultural 
and  commercial.^  In  political  institutions,  too,  there  was 
wide  divergence.  Just  before  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement 
for  the  union  of  Sweden  and  Norway,  the  Norwegians  had 
prepared, and  adopted  (1814)  a  very  democratic  constitution, 
which  vested  supreme  authority  in  a  parliament,  or  Storthing, 
Norwegian  elected  indirectly  by  male  tax-payers.  On  the  other 
Government  hand,  in  Sweden  the  only  check  upon  the  royal  author- 
ity was  until  1863  the  clumsy  old  device  of  the  Four  Estates  of 
nobles,  clergy,  burghers,  and  peasants.    The  Swedish  Consti- 

Swedish  tution  of  1 863,  it  is  true,  substituted  for  this  four- 
Government  chamber  representation  a  bicameral  parliament  (Riks- 
dag), but  the  wealthy  classes  were  strongly  intrenched  in  the 
Upper  House  and  the  king  retained  an  absolute  veto  over  all 
proposed  legislation. 

By  the  agreement  of  1815,  Norway  was  recognized  as  "a  free, 
independent,  and  indivisible  kingdom,  united  with  Sweden 
under  one  king."    Accordingly,  under  the  union  Norway  and 

1  It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  Norway,  with  an  insignificant  navy,  possessed  a 
merchant  marine  in  1913  totaling  more  than  two  and  one-half  million  tons  and 
ranking  in  size  next  to  those  of  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  the  United  States. 
Even  the  Swedish  merchant  marine  was  larger  than  the  Russian  or  the  Austro- 
Hungarian. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  445 


Sweden  each  preserved  its  own  constitution  and  exercised  au- 
tonomy in  all  domestic  affairs :  only  foreign  relations  and  mili- 
tary matters  were  managed  in  common  under  the 
supervision  of  the  joint  king.    Nevertheless,  the  king  uSonaf 


always  considered  himself  first  a  Swede  and  secondly  Sweden  and 
a  Norwegian ;  he  appointed  Swedes  rather  than  Nor-  Jg^^^^os 
wegians  to  the  most  responsible  and  most  lucrative 
posts  in  the  joint  service  and,  backed  by  Swedish  popular  senti- 
ment, he  urged  again  and  again  a  closer  union  between  the  two 
states.  The  union  was  already  too  close  to  suit  the  Norwegians : 
inspired  by  a  noteworthy  literary  and  nationalist  revival,  they 
began  to  clamor  for  the  recognition  of  their  national  flag  and  for 
the  establishment  of  a  Norwegian  consular  service  distinct  from 
that  of  Sweden.  It  was  this  last  demand  which  finally  ruptured 
the  union.  Following  the  determined  refusal  of  Oscar  II  (1872- 
1907)  to  sanction  the  appointment  of  Norwegian  consuls  for 
foreign  cities,  the  Norwegian  Storthing  on  7  June,  1905,  by  unani- 
mous vote  decreed  the  dethronement  of  their  Swedish  king  and 
the  complete  independence  of  Norway.  The  decree  independ- 
was  indorsed  by  a  plebiscite  of  the  Norwegian  people,  ence  of  Nor- 
and  was  grudgingly  accepted  by  the  Swedish  govern- 
ment  in  the  same  year.  Thereupon  the  Storthing,  in  spite  of 
considerable  republican  sentiment  in  their  country,  invited  the 
second  son  of  the  Danish  monarch  to  become  king  of  the  newly 
independent  Norway :  this  prince,  whose  election  was  ratified 
by  a  large  popular  majority,  assumed  the  title  of  Haakon  VII 
(1905-  ).  In  1907  a  treaty  guaranteeing  the  integrity  and 
neutrality  of  Norwegian  territory  was  signed  at  Christiania  by 
representatives  of  Norway,  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany, 
and  Russia. 

The  dissolution  of  the  union  between  Sweden  and  Norway 
undoubtedly  furthered  democratic  tendencies  in  both  countries. 
In  Norway  universal  manhood  suffrage  had  already 
been  introduced  (1898) ;  now  direct  elections  were  pouJicai^^ 
substituted  for  indirect  (1906) ;    the  franchise  was  Democracy 
extended  to  women,  at  first  (1907)  with  property  ^^^^^^gj^ 
qualifications,  and  ultimately  (1913)  on  the  same 
broad  basis  as  to  men.    In  fact  Norway  was  the  first  sovereign 
state  in  Europe  to  permit  women  to  vote  at  general  elections 


446  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


and  to  sit  in  parliament.  In  1913  the  royal  veto  was  entirel}) 
aboUshed  in  Norway.  In  Sweden,  also,  political  democracy 
became  a  potent  factor.  Constitutional  amendments,  adopted 
in  1909,  established  proportional  representation  for  both  Cham- 
In  Sweden,  bers  of  the  Riksdag,  introduced  universal  manhood 
1905-1914  suffrage  in  the  elections  to  the  Lower  Chamber,  and 
lowered  the  property  qualifications  for  members  of  the  Upper 
Chamber.  A  government  bill  of  191 2,  which  proposed  to  con- 
fer the  franchise  on  all  persons  over  24  years  of  age  without 
distinction  of  sex,  temporarily  failed  of  passage  because  of  an 
acute  conflict  between  King  Gustavus  V  (1907-  )  and  his 
Liberal  ministry  concerning  the  royal  advocacy  of  a  thorough 
military  reorganization  involving  large  expenditures  for  uni- 
versal training  and  for  an  elaborate  system  of  fortifications. 
The  elections  of  1914,  influenced  by  the  outbreak  of  the  Great 
War  in  Europe,  were  favorable  to  the  king  and  militarism,  al- 
though the  opposing  Socialists  obtained  87  seats  out  of  the  total 
230  in  the  Lower  Chamber. 

The  remarkable  growth  of  Socialism  attested  the  existence 
of  a  large  body  of  urban  workingmen  in  Sweden  as  certainly  as 
„  .     .      the  imposition  of  a  protective  tariff  in  1888  witnessed 

Emigration  .      .   ^  r  i      n     i         i  i  • 

to  the  growing  miluence  of  landlords  and  business  men. 
Sweden,  more  than  any  other  Scandinavian  country,  was  en- 
tering into  competition  with  great  industrial  nations.  In 
Sweden,  as  in  other  European  countries,  the  government  did 
a  good  deal  to  promote  social  legislation.  In  1901  the  Riksdag 
accepted  a  bill  for  state  insurance  of  workingmen  against  acci- 
dents and  for  the  limitation  of  working  hours  of  women  and 
children.  Both  Norway  and  Denmark  secured  similar  legis- 
lation, but  with  them,  as  with  Sweden,  the  social  reforms  only 
increased  the  numbers  and  radical  demands  of  the  Socialists. 
Some  index  to  the  need  of  economic  betterment  was  afforded 
by  the  large  emigration  of  Scandinavians  to  the  United  States : 
Sweden,  the  worst  sufferer  in  this  respect,  lost  in  the  second  half 
of  the  nineteenth  century  a  million  citizens,  nearly  all  of  whom 
settled  permanently  in  America. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  447 


ADDITIONAL  READING 

Germany.  General.  Brief  historical  narratives:  G.  M.  Priest,  Ger- 
many since  1740  (1915),  ch.  xi,  xii;  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The 
Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch.  xxiii;  C.  D.  Hazen, 
Europe  since  18 15  (1910),  ch.  xiv ;  Ferdinand  Schevill,  The  Making  of  Modern 
Germany  (1916),  ch.  vi,  appendices  d-f,  h;  E.  F.  Henderson,  A  Short  History 
of  Germany,  new  ed..  Vol.  II  (1916),  ch.  xi-xiii;  Cambridge  Modern  History, 
Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  vi ;  Histoire  generale,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  x.  Detailed  descrip- 
tions of  contemporary  Germany :  W.  H.  Dawson,  The  Evolution  of  Modern 
Germany  (1908),  perhaps  the  best ;  T.  B.  Veblen,  Imperial  Germany  and  the 
Industrial  Revolution  (191 5) ;  F.  C.  Howe,  Socialized  Germany  (191 5) ;  J.  E. 
Barker,  Modern  Germany,  her  Political  and  Economic  Problems,  her  Foreign 
atid  Domestic  Policy,  her  Ambitions,  and  the  Causes  of  her  Success,  5th  rev. 
ed.  (191 5);  Henri  Lichtenberger,  Germany  and  its  Evolution  in  Modern 
Times,  Eng.  trans,  by  A.  M.  Ludovici  (1913) ;  W.  P.  Paterson  (editor), 
German  Culture :  the  Contribution  of  the  Germans  to  Knowledge,  Literature, 
Art,  and  Life  (191 5),  nine  essays  by  British  specialists;  Antoine  Guilland, 
Modern  Germany  and  her  Historians,  Eng.  trans.  (19 15);  John  Dewey, 
German  Philosophy  and  Politics  (191 5).  Among  the  mass  of  German 
histories  of  the  empire  reference  may  be  made  to  Gottlob  Egelhaaf,  Ge- 
schichte  der  neuesten  Zeit,  4th  ed.  (1913),  a  brief  work,  and  Karl  Lamprecht, 
Deutsche  Geschichte  der  jiingsten  Vergangenheit  und  Gegenwart,  2  vols.  (191 2- 
1913) ;  and  for  a  curious  exposition  of  the  "  racial  superiority  "  of  the  Ger- 
mans consult  the  elaborate  work  of  the  ex-Englishman,  H.  S.  Chamberlain, 
The  Foundations  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  trans,  from  the  German  by  John 
Lees,  2  vols.  (1911).  On  the  political  institutions  of  Germany:  F.  A.  Ogg, 
The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913),  ch.  ix-xiv,  a  satisfactory  resume;  B.  E. 
Howard,  The  German  Empire  (1906),  an  exhaustive  analysis  of  the  struc- 
ture of  the  imperial  government ;  Fritz-Konrad  Kriiger,  Government  and 
Politics  of  the  German  Empire  (191 5),  a  clear  account,  with  critical  bibliog- 
raphies, in  the  "  Government  Handbooks  "  Series ;  A.  L.  Lowell,  Govern- 
ments and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  2  vols.  (1897),  ch.  v-vii,  an  ex- 
cellent study,  and  likewise  its  more  recent  abridgment  and  revision  in  The 
Governments  of  France,  Italy,  and  Germany  (191 5) ;  H.  G.  James,  Principles 
of  Prussian  Administration  (1913),  a  valuable  monograph  ;  W.  H.  Dawson, 
Municipal  Life  and  Government  in  Germany  (1914) ;  Paul  Laband,  Das 
Staatsrecht  des  deutschen  Reiches,  4th  ed.,  4  vols.  (1901),  the  standard  Ger- 
man work  on  the  subject,  and,  by  the  same  author,  Deutsches  Reichsstaats- 
recht,  6th  ed.  (191 2);  Gaetan  (Vicomte)  Combes  de  Lestrade,  Lcs  mo- 
narchies de  Vempire  allemand,  organisation  constitutionelle  et  administrative 
(1904),  an  admirable  French  study  of  German  government  —  imperial 
and  state;  Felix  Salomon,  Die  deutschen  Parteipro gramme,  2d  ed.,  2  vols. 
(191 2),  containing  the  texts  of  party  platforms  or  similar  documents  from 
1845  to  191 2;   Oskar  Stillich,  Die  politischcn  Parteicn  in  Dcutschland: 


44^  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


eine  wissenschaftliche  Darlegung  ihrer  Grundsdtze  und  ihrer  geschichtlichen 
Entwickelung,  a  monumental  history  of  German  political  parties  projected 
in  five  volumes,  of  which  two  have  appeared  —  Vol.  I,  Die  Konservaliven 
(1908),  and  Vol.  II,  Der  Liheralismus  (191 1);  and,  for  an  even  more  de- 
tailed history  of  German  Liberalism,  Oskar  Klein-Hattingen,  Geschichte 
des  deutschen  Liheralismus,  Vol.  I,  toi87i(i9ii).  For  an  important  phase 
of  the  work  of  the  Center  party,  consult  C.  D.  Plater,  Catholic  Social  Work 
in  Germany  (1909). 

Germany  under  Bismarck,  1871-1890.  In  addition  to  the  biographies 
of  Bismarck  mentioned  in  the  bibliography  to  Chapter  XX,  above,  the 
famous  chancellor  left  his  own  account,  Reflections  and  Reminiscences, 
Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  A.  J.  Butler,  2  vols.  (1899),  which,  however,  should  be 
used  with  caution  and  in  the  light  of  criticism  supplied  by  such  eminent 
scholars  of  Bismarck  historiography  as  Gustav  Schmoller,  Max  Lenz, 
Erich  Marcks,  and  Hans  Delbriick  (1899) ;  also  of  interest  are  Bismarck^ s 
Speeches  and  Letters,  selections  ed.  by  Herrmann  Schoenfeld  (1905) ;  Di6 
politischen  Reden  des  Fiirsten  Bismarck,  ed.  by  Horst  Kohl,  12  vols.  (1892- 
1894) ;  Moritz  Busch,  Bismarck  —  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  Eng. 
trans.,  2  vols.  (1898),  a  diary  kept  by  the  writer  during  25  years'  official 
and  private  intercourse  with  the  chancellor;  Hermann  Hofmann,  Fiirst 
Bismarck,  i8go~i8g8,  nach  persdnlichen  Mitteilungen  des  Fiirsten  und 
eigenen  Aufzeichjiungen  des  Verfassers,  nebst  einer  authentischen  Ausgahe 
alter  vom  Fiirsten  Bismarck  herruhrenden  Artikel  in  den  "  Hamburger  Nach- 
richten,''  2  vols.  (1913),  very  important  for  Bismarck's  criticisms  of  the 
imperial  government  after  his  own  retirement  from  the  chancellorship. 
Standard  German  histories  of  the  period :  Erich  Marcks,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  I, 
5th  ed.  (1905),  admirable;  Wilhelm  Oncken,  Das  Zeitalter  des  Kaisers 
Wilhelm,  Vol.  II  (1892) ;  Hans  Blum,  Das  deutsche  Reich  zurZeit  Bismarcks : 
politische  Geschichte  von  iSyi  his  iSgo  (1893),  a  work  mainly  inspired  by 
Bismarck;  P.  Rloeppel,  Dreissig  Jahre  deutscher  Verfassungsgeschichte, 
i867-i8g7.  Vol.  I,  1867-1877  (1900).  On  the  Kulturkampf:  J.  W.  Kissling, 
Geschichte  des  Kulturkampf es  im  deutschen  Reiche,  projected  in  3  vols.,  of 
jvhich  Vol.  I  (1911)  comes  down  to  1871,  promises  to  present  the  Clerical 
side  of  the  controversy;  Georges  Goyau,  L'Allemagne  religieuse,  1800-1870: 
le  catholicisme,  4  vols.  (1905-1909),  and,  by  the  same  author,  the  leading 
authority,  Bismarck  et  I'eglise:  le  Culturkampf,  1870-1887,  4  vols.  (191 1- 
1913) ;  Ludwig  Hahn,  Geschichte  des  Kulturkampfes  in  Preussen  (1881), 
important  documents.  The  best  account  of  the  tariff  changes  in  the  empire 
is  W.  H.  Dawson,  Protection  in  Germany,  a  History  of  German  Fiscal  Policy 
during  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1904).  On  social  legislation  in  Germany 
there  are  three  authoritative  volumes  of  W.  H.  Dawson,  Bismarck  and 
State  Socialism  (1891),  The  German  Workman:  a  Study  in  National  Effi- 
ciency (1906),  and  Social  Insurance  in  Germany,  i88j-igii:  its  History, 
Operation,  Results,  and  a  Comparison  with  the  [British]  National  Insurance 
Act,  igii  (1912).  On  German  Socialism:  S.  P.  Orth,  Socialism  and  De- 
mocracy in  Europe  (19 13),  ch.  vii,  viii,  an  excellent  introduction;  Edgard 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


449 


Milhaud,  La  democratie  socialiste  allemande  (1903) ;  August  Bebel,  Aus 
meinom  Leben,  3  vols,  (i 910-19 14),  an  interesting  autobiography  of  the 
great  Socialist  leader,  trans,  in  an  abridged  English  edition  as  My  Life 
(191 2);  and  see  also  the  general  bibliography  on  Socialism  appended  to 
Chapter  XXI,  above. 

Germany  under  William  II.  In  addition  to  the  works  of  general  descrip- 
tion cited  in  the  first  paragraph  of  the  present  bibliography,  the  student 
would  do  well  to  consult  E.  D.  Howard,  The  Cause  and  Extent  of  the  Recent 
Industrial  Progress  of  Germany  (1907) ;  Charles  Tower,  Germany  of  To- 
day (1913),  a  handy  volume  in  the  "Home  University  Library";  and 
Bernhard  von  Billow,  Imperial  Germany,  Eng.  trans,  by  Marie  A.  Lewenz 
(1914),  an  illuminating  apology  for  newer  tendencies  in  foreign  and  domestic 
politics,  written  by  a  distinguished  chancellor  under  William  II.  Glimpses 
of  the  character  and  policies  of  Wiliam  II :  Herbert  Perris,  Germany  and 
the  German  Emperor  (19 12),  popular  and  impressionistic  ;  Hermann  Oncken, 
Germany  under  William  II,  i888-iqij,  an  interesting  resume  on  the  oc- 
casion of  25th  anniversary  of  the  emperor's  accession,  in  the  "  Quarterly 
Review,"  Vol.  CCXIX  (October,  1913) ;  The  Kaiser^s  Speeches,  Forming 
a  Character  Portrait  of  Emperor  William  II,  Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  Wolf  von 
Schierbrand  (1903) ;  Christian  Gauss,  The  German  Emperor  as  Shown  in 
his  Public  Utterances  (19 15);  A.  H.  Fried,  The  German  Emperor  and  the 
Peace  of  the  World  (191 2),  a  Nobel  Prize  Essay,  setting  forth  the  German 
emperor  as  the  well-convinced  friend  of  peace ;  K.  F.  L.  von  Behr-Pinnow, 
Eduard  Dietrich,  and  Dr.  Kayserling,  Soziale  Kultur  und  V olkswohlfahrt 
wdhrend  der  ersten  25  Regierungsjahre  Kaiser  Wilhelms  II  (191 3),  an  elab- 
orate appreciation  of  social  development  in  Germany  under  William  II; 
F.  W.  Wile,  Men  around  the  Kaiser:  the  Makers  of  Modern  Germany  (1913), 
thirty-one  biographical  sketches  by  the  Berlin  correspondent  of  the  London 
Daily  Mail  and  the  New  York  Times.  On  German  colonies  and  world  pol- 
itics: Archibald  Hurd  and  Henry  Castle,  German  Sea-Power,  its  Rise, 
Progress,  and  Economic  Basis  (1913) ;  Alfred  Zimmermann,  Geschichte  der 
deutschen  Kolonialpolitik  (1914) ;  Kurt  Hassert,  Deutschlands  Kolonien: 
Erwebungs-  utui  Entwickelungs geschichte,  landes  und  wirtschaftliche  Bedeutung 
unserer  Schutzgebiete,  2d  ed.  rev.  (1910) ;  Kurt  Herrfurth,  Fiirst  Bismarck  und 
die  Kolonialpolitik  (1909)  being  Vol.  VIII  of  iheGeschichte  dcs  Fiirstcn  Bismarck 
in  Einzeldarstellungen ;  Theodor  Schiemann  (editor),  Deutschland  und  die 
grosse  Politik,  a  German  annual  since  1901,  mainly  a  reissue  in  book  form 
of  the  weekly  reviews  appearing  in  the  celebrated  Conservative  Kreuzzeitung ; 
R.  G.  Usher,  Pan-Germanism  (19 13),  an  exposition  of  the  views  of  some  of 
the  extreme  German  advocates  of  world-empire ;  Herman  Frobenius,  The 
German  Empire's  Hour  of  Destiny,  Eng.  trans.  (1914),  an  apology  for  Ger- 
many's part  in  the  War  of  1914.  Sec  also  the  titles  listed  in  the  bibliog- 
raphy to  Chapter  XXX,  below. 

Austria-Hungary,  1866-1914.  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XII 
(1910),  ch.  vii,  an  excellent  general  narrative  by  Louis  Eisenmann ;  Geof- 
frey Dragc,  Austria- Hungary  (1909),  valuable  descriptions  with  an  ap- 

VOL.  n  —  2  G 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


pendix  containing  important  laws  and  treaties  and  statistical  tables ;  H.  W. 
Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  2d  ed.  (19 14),  an  interesting  study  by  an 
Englishman  who  served  ten  years  in  Vienna  as  correspondent  of  the  London 
Times;  Bertrand  Auerbach,  Les  races  et  les  nationalUes  en  Autriche-Hongrie 
(1898),  a  painstaking  investigation  of  racial  problems  in  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy; Sidney  Whitman,  The  Realm  of  the  Hapsburgs  (1893),  readable 
but  somewhat  out-of-date;  F.  A.  Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913), 
ch.  xxiv-xxvii,  indispensable  for  poHtical  institutions  and  parties;  A.  L. 
Lowell,  Governments  and  Parties  of  Continental  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1897), 
ch.  viii-x ;  Louis  Ei^enmann,  Le  compromis  austro-hongrois  de  1867,  itude 
sur  le  dualisme  (1904),  an  important  monograph;  Josef  Ulbrich,  Das 
oesterreichische  Staatsrecht,  3d  ed.  (1904),  the  standard  work  on  Austrian  public 
law;  Alexandre  de  Bertha,  La  constitution  hongroise  (1898),  a  good  outline 
of  constitutional  development  in  Hungary  from  1848  to  1897;  J.  A.  von 
Helfert,  Geschichte  Oesterreichs  vom  Ausgange  des  Wiener  October-Aus- 
standes  1848,  4  vols,  in  5  (1869-1886),  the  standard  Austrian  history; 
R.  W.  Seton-Watson  (pseud.  Scotus-Viator),  Corruption  and  Reform  in 
Hungary:  a  Study  of  Electoral  Practice  (191 1),  provided  with  numerous 
documents,  and,  by  the  same  author.  Racial  Problems  in  Hungary  (1908) 
and  The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  (191 1) ;  C.  M. 
KnatchbuU-Hugessen,  The  Political  Evolution  of  the  Hungarian  Nation, 
Vol.  II  (1908),  ch.  xvii-xx,  an  historical  summary  since  i860;  Alexandre 
de  Bertha,  La  Hongrie  moderne,  i84Q~iqoi  (1901),  another  sympathetic 
treatment  of  Magyar  history ;  Rudolf  Sieghart,  Zolltrennung  und  Zollein- 
heit :  die  Geschichte  der  oesterreichisch-ungarischen  Zwischenzoll-Linie  (191 5), 
an  exhaustive  study  of  the  vexed  questions  of  the  economic  relations  be- 
tween Austria  and  Hungary;  R.  P.  Mahaffy,  Francis  Joseph  I,  his  Life 
and  Times,  an  Essay  in  Politics,  new  ed.  (1915);  Sir  Horace  Rumbold, 
Francis  Joseph  and  his  Times  (1909) ;  F.  F.  von  Beust,  Aus  drei  Viertel- 
Jahrhunderten:  Erinnerungen  und  Aufzeichnungen,  trans,  into  English  as 
Memoirs,  2  vols.  (1887) ;  Florence  A.  Forster,  Francis  Dedk,  Hungarian 
Statesman,  a  Memoir  (1880) ;  Alexandre  de  Bertha,  Magyars  et  Roumains 
devant  Vhistoire  (1899),  an  Hungarian  statement  of  the  issues  in  the  racial 
rivalries  of  Magyars  and  Rumans;  Andre  Cheradame,  U Europe  et  la 
question  d^Autriche  au  seuil  du  XX^  sihcle  (1901) ;  Ferdinand  Schmid, 
Bosnien  und  die  Herzegovina  unter  der  Verwaltung  Oesterreich-  U ngarns 
(1914) ;  Theodor  von  Sosnosky,  Die  Balkanpolitik  Oesterreich-U ngarns  seit 
1866,  2  vols.  (1913-1914). 

Switzerland.  W.  D.  McCrackan,  Rise  of  the  Swiss  Republic,  2d  ed. 
(1901),  a  brief  historical  sketch ;  Karl  Dandliker,  A  Short  History  of  Switzer- 
land, Eng.  trans.  (1899),  a  hasty  summary;  F.  G.  Baker,  The  Model  Re- 
public, a  History  of  the  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Swiss  People  (1895),  an 
outline;  Histoire  gSnerale,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  v,  a  good  accoimt  of  the  period 
from  1848  to  1900;  H.  D.  Lloyd,  A  Sovereign  People :  a  Study  of  Swiss 
Democracy,  ed.  by  J.  A.  Hobson  (1907) ;  J.  M.  Vincent,  Government  in 
Switzerland  (1900) ;  F.  A.  Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe  (1913),  ch.  xxii, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  451 


xxiii ;  A.  L.  Lowell,  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  Vol.  II 
(1897),  ch.  xi-xiii;  W.  H.  Dawson,  Social  Switzerland,  Studies  of  Present- 
Day  Social  Movements  atui  Legislation  in  the  Swiss  Republic  (1897) ;  Paul 
Seippel  (editor),  La  Suisse  an  dix-neuvieme  siecle,  3  vols.  (1899-1901),  a 
cooperative  work  by  a  group  of  Swiss  writers,  full  and  authoritative; 
Wilhelm  Oechsli,  Geschichte  der  Schweiz  im  neunzehntcn  Jahrhundert,  a 
monumental  undertaking  of  which  two  volumes  have  appeared  (1903- 
1913),  covering  the  years  1798-1830;  1.  B.  Richman,  Appenzell,  Pure 
Democracy  and  Pastoral  Life  in  Inner  Rhoden  (1895). 

Holland.  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  xxiii,  and 
Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  ix;  P.  J.  Blok,  History  of  the  People  of  the  Netherlands, 
Vol.  V,  Eighteenth  and  Nineteenth  Centuries,  Eng.  trans,  by  Ruth  Putnam 
(191 2),  the  work  of  the  foremost  Dutch  historian;  Clive  Day,  The  Policy 
and  Administration  of  the  Dutch  in  Java  (1904),  a  valuable  monograph; 
George  Renwick,  Luxembourg:  the  Grand  Duchy  and  its  People  (1913). 

The  Scandinavian  Countries.  R.  N.  Bain,  Scandinavia,  a  Political 
History  of  Denmark,  Norway,  and  Sweden,  from  ijij  to  igoo  (1905),  ch. 
xvi,  xvii;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  xxiv,  and  Vol. 
XII  (1910),  ch.  xi;  Povl  Drachmann,  The  Industrial  Development  and 
Commercial  Policies  of  the  Three  Scandinavian  Countries  (19 15);  Knut 
Gjerset,  History  of  the  Norwegian  People,  Vol.  II  (191 5);  J.  Carlsen,  H. 
Olrik,  and  C.  N.  Starcke,  Le  Danemark,  Stat  actuel  de  sa  civilisation  et  de 
son  organisation  sociale  (1900);  Gustav  Sundbarg  (editor),  Sweden,  its 
People  and  hidustries  (1904),  historical  and  statistical,  published  by  order 
of  the  Swedish  government;  Fridtjof  Nansen,  Norway  and  the  Union  with 
Sweden  (1905),  presents  the  Norwegian  side  of  the  controversy;  Karl 
Nordlund,  The  Swedish-  Norwegian  Union  Crisis,  a  History  with  Docu- 
ments (1905),  a  Swedish  rejoinder  to  Nansen;  H.  A.  L.  Fisher,  The  Re- 
publican Tradition  in  Europe  (191 1),  ch.  xiii,  an  illuminating  essay  on 
republicanism  in  Norway. 


CHAPTER  XXV 


THE  RUSSUN  EMPIRE,  1865-1914 

THE  REIGN  OF  ALEXANDER  II  (1855-1881):  REFORMS, 
REACTION,  AND  THE  RISE  OF  TERRORISM 

In  1855  the  scepter  of  "all  the  Russias"  passed  naturally 
from  the  Tsar  and  Autocrat  Nicholas  I  to  his  son,  the  Tsar  and 
Autocrat  Alexander  II,  and  the  event  gave  promise  of 
Heritage a  new  era  in  Russian  history.    Nicholas  1(1825-1855), 
from  unlike  contemporary  European  sovereigns,  had  never 

1825-1855  been  obliged  to  make  terms  with  revolutionaries  :  fully 
convinced  of  the  divine  mission  of  Russia  in  a  naughty 
world  and  of  his  own  sacred  right  to  rule  the  elect,  he  had  sup- 
ported the  Holy  Orthodox  Church  and  had  clung  tenaciously 
to  the  principles  and  practices  of  autocracy ;  and,  blunt  soldier 
as  he  was,  he  not  only  had  crushed  mercilessly  the  Decembrist 
Revolt  of  1825  and  the  Polish  Insurrection  of  1831  but  also  had 
searched  out  and  severely  punished  any  and  every  Russian 
abettor  of  that  Liberalism,  which,  in  his  opinion,  was  disgracing 
western  Europe.  Only  once  in  his  long  reign  of  thirty  years  had 
Nicholas  I  appeared  to  be  on  the  side  of  revolution  —  and  that 
was  in  the  case  of  the  Greek  War  of  Independence,  —  but  even 
in  this  case  it  was  not  democracy  which  the  autocrat  was  cham- 
pioning —  it  was  the  might  and  prestige  of  Russia  and  of  Russia's 
holy  religion.^ 

Yet  Nicholas  I  had  not  been  completely  successful.  The 
most  repressive  legislation  that  he  could  devise  was  not  sufficient 
The  to  keep  the  cultured  educated  classes  in  Russia  from 

Demand  for  gaining  some  knowledge  of,  and  sympathy  with,  the 
Reform  democratic  developments  in  western  Europe,  and  as 
soon  as  the  strong  hand  of  the  uncompromising  autocrat  was 
withdrawn  these  classes  were  sure  to  clamor  loudly  for  radical 

1  For  further  details  of  the  reign  of  Nicholas  I,  see  above,  pp.  40  f.,  49  f.,  56  f. 

452 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


453 


changes  in  the  aims  and  methods  of  their  rulers.  Then,  too, 
the  military  machine  upon  the  perfection  of  which  Nicholas 
had  set  his  heart,  though  of  service  to  the  cause  of  divine-right 
monarchy  in  suppressing  the  PoHsh  Insurrection  of  1831  and  in 
affording  decisive  aid  to  the  Austrian  Habsburgs  in  their  attempt 
to  destroy  the  Hungarian  Republic  (1849),  was  not  proof  against 
the  combined  armies  and  fleets  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Turkey, 
and  Sardinia,  in  the  Crimean  War  (1854-1856).^  In  fact,  it  was 
in  the  midst  of  the  diplomatic  humihations  and  miHtary  disasters 
of  the  Crimean  War  that  Nicholas  I  died. 

Alexander  II  (1855-1881)  at  the  time  of  his  accession  was 
thirty-six  years  of  age,  untried  and  inexperienced  in  affairs  of 
state.    He  had  been  brought  up  in  his  father's  dis-  Alexander 
trust  of  democracy,  but,  unlike  Nicholas,  he  was  n,  1855- 
kindly  and  tender-hearted,  and  showed  no  love  of  '^^^ 
mihtarism.    Both  his  natural  disposition  and  his  lack  of  expe- 
rience made  it  impossible  for  him  to  maintain  his  father's  pol- 
icies in  undiminished  vigor.    And  the  importunities  of  Russian 
Liberals  so  changed  the  stage-setting  of  Russian  history  that 
Alexander  II  essayed  to  play  the  role  of  a  great  reforming  tsar. 

Bringing  the  distasteful  Crimean  War  to  a  close  in  1856,  the 
new  tsar  devoted  the  first  ten  years  of  his  reign  to  the  insti- 
tution of  internal  reforms  which  deservedly  estab-  „  ^ 

1-11  1     •  •       r      1  •      1  1  /  Reforms  of 

hshed  an  endurmg  reputation  for  ms  able  performance  Alexander 
of  the  difficult  role  that  had  been  thrust  upon  him.  "g^^^^^" 
The  major  reforms  of  Alexander  II  were :   (i)  the 
emancipation  of  the  serfs ;  (2)  the  erection  of  elective  provincial 
assemblies  —  the  zemslvos  —  for  participation  in  local  adminis- 
tration ;  and  (3)  the  radical  rcmodehng  of  the  legal  and  judicial 
systems.    Each  one  of  these  reforms  merits  some  explanation. 

Russia  was  largely  an  agricultural  country,  and  when  Alexander 
II  came  to  the  throne  the  bulk  of  his  subjects  were  serfs  like  the 
people  of  western  Europe  in  the  middle  ages.  It  is  serfdom  in 
true  that  northern  Russia  was  inhabited  by  landown-  ^"^sia 
ing  peasants,  that  the  extreme  South  was  studded  with  economi- 
cally independent  colonics  of  Cossacks,  and  that  serfdom  had 
already  been  abolished  in  the  Baltic  provinces  and  in  Poland ; 
but  nine-tenths  of  the  whole  arable  land  of  the  empire  was  still 

*  On  the  Crimean  War,  see  above,  pp.  162  f.,  and  below,  pp.  501  f. 


454  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


held  in  large  estates,  part  belonging  to  the  tsar  and  the  royal 
princes,  the  rest  to  about  100,000  noble  families.  Each  such 
estate  was  divided  into  two  parts,  the  produce  of  the  one  going 
directly  to  the  noble  owner,  that  of  the  other  being  for  the  sup- 
The  Mir      ^^^^    ^  village  {fnir)  of  peasants.    Under  the  Russian 

system  of  serfdom,  the  lot  of  the  peasants  was  deplor- 
able. They  were  attached  to  the  soil,  that  is,  without  their 
lord's  consent  they  could  not  leave  the  estate  on  which  they 
were  born,  and  a  transfer  of  an  estate  from  one  nobleman  to  an- 
other automatically  transferred  the  peasants'  allegiance.  To 
their  lord  the  peasants  paid  dues,  for  him  they  performed  com- 
pulsory manual  labor,  to  him  they  rendered  obedience  as  to  a 
personal  master.  Sometimes  the  noblemen  detached  their 
peasants  from  the  land  and  sent  them  to  work  in  the  cities, 
requiring  them  to  pay  a  fixed  due  from  their  earnings  and  reserv- 
ing the  right  to  call  them  home  at  will.  Sometimes  the  noble- 
men employed  the  peasants  in  household  service  virtually  as 
slaves  :  of  these  there  were  about  two  millions  in  1855.  Doubt- 
less in  many  parts  of  Russia  there  were  lenient  and  kind-hearted 
noblemen  and  considerate  taskmasters,  but  too  often  the  nobles 
and  their  overseers  were  cruel  and  capricious :  they  could  make 
the  most  exorbitant  demands  upon  their  peasants'  strength 
and  funds  and  visit  disobedience  with  corporal  punishment; 
they  could,  and  often  did,  interfere  outrageously  in  the  strictly 
domestic  and  family  concerns  of  their  peasants. 

To  reform  the  Russian  land  system  was  an  herculean  task,  and 
it  is  greatly  to  the  credit  of  Alexander  II  that  any  improvement 

was  effected.  Setting  an  example  by  freeing  first  the 
ti^^of  ttTe  serfs  on  the  lands  belonging  to  members  of  the  imperial 
Serfs :  the  family,  and  then  with  dogged  pertinacity  and  cautious 
cre^of^86i  compromise  overcoming  the  opposition  of  interested 

and  selfish  landlords,  the  tsar  at  length  revolutionized 
the  whole  agrarian  system  by  decree  (ukase)  of  3  March,  1861, 
the  sixth  anniversary  of  his  accession  to  the  throne.  The  decree 
aboHshed  all  legal  rights  of  noblemen  over  peasants :  the  serfs 
who  were  living  detached  from  the  soil,  whether  domestic  serv- 
ants or  laborers  in  towns,  obtained  their  personal  freedom  but 
no  right  to  property ;  the  serfs  who  were  working  on  the  large 
estates  secured  not  only  their  liberty  but  an  interest  in  a  portion 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  455 


of  the  land  which  was  bought  from  the  nobles  with  money  ad- 
vanced by  the  government  and  which  was  now  turned  over  to 
the  village  communities  (mirs)  to  be  parceled  out  for  individual 
use  among  the  resident  peasants.  Many  years  elapsed  before 
the  decree  was  fully  executed,  but  the  benefits  of  even  partial 
emancipation  of  the  serfs  gradually  appeared  in  an  enlarged  area 
of  cultivation,  increased  value  of  land,  greater  yield  of  taxes, 
growth  of  export  trade,  and  improved  general  condition  of  the 
peasantry. 

There  were  also  less  happy  results  of  the  aboHtion  of  serfdom 
in  Russia.  The  peasants  formerly  attached  to  the  soil  now 
found  themselves  in  occupation  of  farms  that  in  many  ^,  , 

-  -  11  11         The  Plight 

cases  were  altogether  too  small  to  support  themselves  of  the 
and  their  famihes.    Such  peasants,  moreover,  were  Emanci- 

,         ,  -         ,  ^  ^  ,  pated  Serfs 

obnged  for  a  long  term  of  years  to  repay  to  the  state 
installments  of  the  money  advanced  as  compensation  to  the 
nobles ;  and,  though  released  from  the  jurisdiction  of  noblemen's 
courts,  they  were  brought  under  subjection  to  the  rules  and 
regulations  of  the  mir  and  to  the  tax-gatherers  and  police  ofiicials 
of  the  central  government.  And  the  treatment  of  the  emanci- 
pated peasants  by  the  state  ofiicials  was  often  harsh  and  corrupt. 
It  has  been  remarked  wisely,  though  possibly  a  little  strongly, 
that  the  decree  of  Alexander  II  freed  the  peasants  from  the  nobles 
only  to  make  them  ''serfs  of  the  state."  One  result  of  this  un- 
fortunate situation  was  a  considerable  emigration  of  ex-serfs 
from  the  country  to  the  city.  The  growth  of  the  urban  popula- 
tion of  Russia  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
certainly  due  to  the  abolition  of  serfdom  as  well  as  to  the  intro- 
duction of  machinery  and  factories ;  and  ex-serfs  became  the 
chief  victims  of  overwork  in  the  dismal  factories  and  of  un- 
healthful  life  in  the  congested  towns.  EstabUsh- 

The  second  great  reform  of  Alexander  II  was  the  ment  of  the 
creation  of  provincial  assemblies.    According  to  a  de-  forTocaT 
cree  of  1864,  each  district  and  each  province  of  the  Seif-Gov- 
thirty-four  "governments,"  into  which  eighteenth-  the  Tsar's 
century  Russia  was  divided,  was  to  have  an  assembly.  Decree  of 
or  zemstvo,  composed  of  large  landed  proprietors  and  ^^^^ 
of  delegates  indirectly  elected  by  the  townsfolk  and  peasants; 
and  each  zemstvo  was  to  exercise  the  right  of  imposing  local  taxes 


456  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

and  to  legislate  on  such  local  matters  as  roads,  bridges,  public 
buildings,  churches  and  schools,  relief  of  the  poor,  prisons,  and 
public  health.^  The  execution  of  local  ordinances  was  intrusted 
to  standing  committees  chosen  by  the  zemstvos. 

Prior  to  the  accession  of  Alexander  II,  justice  had  been  dis- 
pensed by  state  officials  secretly  and  arbitrarily.  In  1862  the 
tsar  decreed  that  henceforth  the  judicial  power  in  civil 
Reforms-  Criminal  cases  "should  be  independent  of  the  regu- 

the  Tsar's  lar  administration  and  reserved  to  a  hierarchy  of  courts 
^862^^  the  Western  model,  —  justices  of  the  peace,  elected 

by  municipal  councils  or  by  the  zemstvos;  district  and 
circuit  courts;  and  a  senate,  acting  as  a  court  of  final  appeal. 
As  in  the  countries  of  western  Europe,  laws  were  codified,  pros- 
ecuting attorneys  were  appointed,  trial  by  jury  instituted  for 
criminal  cases,  the  judges  given  secure  tenure,  and  court  pro- 
ceedings made  pubHc.  In  one  important  respect,  however,  — 
trials  of  political  offenders,  —  the  old  secret  and  arbitrary  adminis- 
trative procedure  was  retained  and  strengthened. 

Such  were  the  major  reforms  of  Alexander  II:  emancipation 
of  the  serfs  in  1861,  reorganization  of  the  courts  in  1862,  and 
other  creation  of  the  zemstvos  in  1864.  In  addition  to  these 
Reforms  of  epochal  changes,  the  tsar  encouraged  the  organization 
Alexander  II  elementary  and  technical  schools,  accorded  a  con- 
siderable degree  of  hberty  to  the  press,  and  proposed  several 
schemes  for  railway  construction  and  for  developing  more  rapidly 
the  vast  natural  resources  of  the  country. 

By  1865,  however,  —  ten  years  after  his  accession,  —  the 
reforming  spirit  of  Alexander  II  was  spent.  The  tsar  had  never 
been  at  heart  a  democrat  or  even  a  liberal;  what 
ment  oT"  reforms  he  had  instituted  had  been  in  large  part  a 
LiberaUsm  response  to  popular  protest  against  a  reactionary 
and^r^n  government  which  had  suffered  foreign  reverses  in 
1 854-1 8 56,  but  by  1865  the  Crimean  War  was  a  sub- 
ject of  history.  Without  doubt  the  decisive  factor  in  altering 
the  tsar's  policy  was  the  Polish  Insurrection  of  1863.    In  that 

^  In  1870  Alexander  II  established  municipal  councils  (dumas)  for  the  exercise 
of  such  functions  in  the  cities  of  European  Russia  as  the  zemstvos  discharged  in  the 
provinces.  The  dumas  were  to  be  elected  by  the  citizens  in  proportion  to  their 
wealth  on  a  three-class  basis  much  the  same  as  prevailed  in  Prussia. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  457 


year  the  secret  agitation  and  intrigue  which  PoHsh  patriots 
for  some  time  had  been  engineering  from  Warsaw  burst  forth 
into  open  rebelHon  against  the  Russian  authorities.  It  jj^g  poUgh 
was  not  nearly  as  formidable  as  the  revolt  of  1831  :  it  insurrec- 
was  merely  a  struggle  of  ill-armed  partisans,  never  °'  '^^^ 
numerous,  against  regular  troops,  and  was  marked  by  no  real 
battle.  The  PoHsh  leaders  aroused  the  bitterest  hatred  of 
Russian  nationaHsts,  Liberals  as  well  as  Reactionaries,  by  their 
expressed  intention  of  reuniting  Lithuania  to  Poland.  And 
Bismarck,  for  the  sake  of  his  domestic  and  foreign  policies,  offered 
Prussian  aid,  if  needed,  to  the  Russian  government.  The  tsar 
had  no  need  of  Prussian  assistance :  his  own  loyal  troops  readily 
put  an  end  to  the  disorders  in  Poland,  and  the  suppression  of  the 
rising  was  followed  by  a  return  to  the  harsh  methods  of  the  Tsar 
Nicholas  I.  The  PoHsh  nobles,  gentry,  and  ecclesiastics,  —  the 
educated  classes  generally,  —  were  crushed. 

Statesmen  of  the  old  regime  in  Russia,  by  whom  Alexander  II 
was  surrounded,  were  not  slow  in  pointing  out  to  the  humane 
tsar  that  the  troubles  in  Poland  had  been  caused  by  his 
leniency,  and  that  further  introduction  of  Western  poUcleTof^ 
novelties  into  holy  Russia  would  lead  just  as  inevitably  Alexander 
to  dreadful  commotions  and  bloodshed  throughout  Jg'si^^^" 
the  empire.    Alexander  turned  back  on  the  poHtical 
path  that  he  had  been  following.    Henceforth  reaction  was 
again  in  full  swing  in  Russia.    The  provincial  zenistvos  and  mu- 
nicipal dumas  were  forbidden  to  express  poHtical  views  and  their 
acts  were  made  subject  to  veto  by  the  imperial  governors.  Rigor- 
ous press  censorship  was  restored.    The  government  assumed 
the  right  to  distinguish  by  administrative  decree  between  po- 
litical offenders  and  ordinary  criminals :  the  former  could  be 
arbitrarily  seized  by  the  poHce  and  kept  indefinitely  in  prison  on 
mere  suspicion  or  bundled  off  to  some  secret  place  in  Siberia 
without  any  judicial  formalities.    The  infamous  secret  police 
or  detective  force  —  the  ''third  section  of  the  imperial  secret 
chancery,"  —  instituted  by  Nicholas  I  in  1826  for  the  PoUce  or 
searching  out  and  summary  punishment  of  poHtical  ^j^^JJ^f^ 
offenders,  was  now  reinvigorated  and,  formally  trans- 
ferred to  the  imperial  department  of  the  interior  in  1880,  it 
counted  its  victims  by  thousands.    Even  the  educational  system 


45S  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


felt  the  force  of  reaction :  the  newer  developments  in  natural  and 
experimental  science  were  carefully  expurgated  from  the  cur- 
ricula as  being  inimical  to  the  Orthodox  religion  and  conducive  to 
social  and  political  unrest,  and  in  their  place  was  substituted  the 
safer  and  more  sedative  study  of  the  ancient  languages.  The 
only  reform  of  Alexander's  later  years  —  and  that  hardly  a  liberal 
reform  —  was  the  reorganization  of  the  army  and  the  introduc- 
tion, following  the  example  of  Germany,  of  the  principle  of  com- 
pulsory universal  military  service  (1874). 

In  the  younger  ranks  of  the  educated  classes  the  gradual 
conversion  of  Alexander  II  to  unqualified  support  of  traditional 

Russian  absolutism  produced  keen  dissatisfaction, 
Revolution-  which  soon  found  vent  in  three  varieties  of  revolution- 
ary Parties  ary  agitation,  all  closely  related.  First  of  all  were  the 
andern^^      Nihilists,"  a  group  of  intellectual  radicals,  recruited 

from  the  universities  and  professional  classes,  who 
admired  and  lauded  science  and  reason  and  higher  education 
and  the  material  progress  of  the  countries  of  western  Europe, 
I.  The  and  who  in  corresponding  degree  despised  and  de- 
Nihilists  nounced  the  Orthodox  Faith,  the  political  autocracy, 
the  social  institutions,  and  the  general  backwardness  of  Russia.^ 
Like  the  French  philosophers  of  the  eighteenth  century  they 
would  scoff  at  existing  irrational  institutions  and  would  educate 
the  people  to  a  proper  appreciation  of  ''enlightenment"  and 
"progress";  influenced  by  nineteenth-century  Darwinism,  they 
believed  in  the  infallible  evolution  of  humanity  from  autocracy 
to  democracy,  from  barbarism  to  culture.  The  Nihilists  at  first 
Hmited  their  agitation  to  academic  discussion  and  clandestine 
publication,  but  as  the  university  and  press  censorship  tightened 
they  had  recourse  to  secret  associations  which  undertook  to 
spread  their  doctrines  by  word  of  mouth  among  the  masses  and 
in  the  army. 

Secondly  came  the  influence  of  Socialism,  not  the  mild  man- 
nered Socialism  of  the  workingmen's  political  parties  of  western 

^The  name  "Nihilists"  was  first  applied  to  these  Russian  devotees  of  natural 
science  and  positivist  philosophy,  who  would  leave  nothing  of  the  old  regime  un- 
touched, by  the  novelist  Ivan  Turgeniev  (1818-1883)  in  his  Father  and  Sons  (1862). 
The  name  became  famous  all  over  Europe  and  America  and  was  subsequently 
applied  most  loosely  to  every  sort  of  revolutionary  or  terrorist. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


Europe,  but  the  anarchistic  Socialism  of  the  followers  of  the 
Russian  Mikhail  Bakunin.^    These  Russian  Socialists  of  the 
'sixties  and  'seventies  appealed  not  only  to  the  arti-  ^ 
sans  of  the  towns  but  also  to  the  peasants,  whom  they  Anarchistic 
urged  to  seize  all  the  land  of  the  noblemen ;  they  ad- 
vocated  the  destruction  of  the  state,  the  church,  and  the  tradi- 
tional family ;  and,  being  unable  to  conduct  their  propaganda  by 
means  of  parHamentary  or  other  peaceful  agencies,  they  resorted 
to  the  employment  of  violence. 

The  more  reactionary  Alexander  II  became,  and  the  more  re- 
pressive his  governmental  measures  against  Sociahsts  and  Nihil- 
ists, the  more  bitter  and  violent  grew  the  revolution-  3.  The 
aries.  Gradually  there  developed  among  a  small  num-  Terrorists 
ber  of  the  most  extreme  radicals  the  conviction  that  the  tsar  and 
the  governing  classes  of  Russia  —  officials,  nobles,  and  clergy  — 
must  be  terrorized  into  reforms,  that  terrorism  would  be  the  only 
sure  way  of  opening  the  eyes  of  the  Russian  people  to  the  grave 
abuses  in  their  social  and  political  life.  The  Terrorists  thus 
constituted  the  third  group  of  revolutionaries.  Some  of  them 
were  Nihilists,  some  were  Socialists  or  Anarchists,  some  were 
individuals  without  principles  or  philosophies,  who  bore  personal 
grudges  against  a  judge  or  a  tax-collector.  The  center  of  the 
revolutionary  Terrorism  was  a  secret  committee,  organized  at 
Petrograd  in  1878,  which  ordered  and  directed  attempts  against 
the  authorities.  It  operated  secret  printing  shops,  laboratories 
in  which  highly  explosive  bombs  were  manufactured,  and  a 
system  of  espionage.  Its  members  bound  themselves  to  execute 
its  decrees ;  and  within  three  years  the  Terrorists  assassinated 
six  high  officials,  including  the  chief  of  police,  and  nine  govern- 
mental spies.  For  its  part,  the  government  relentlessly  pursued 
the  Terrorists:  31  were  put  to  death,  8  died  in  prison,  and  3 
committed  suicide.  But  the  Terrorists  did  not  hesitate.  They 
tried  on  several  occasions  to  take  the  Hfe  of  the  tsar  himself. 

The  tsar  was  alarmed.    In  vain  he  intrusted  almost  . 
dictatorial  powers  to  one  of  his  faithful  ministers.    At  tion  of  Alex- 
length  on  13  March,  1881  he  signed  a  decree  authoriz- 
ing  the  creation  of  special  commissions,  composed  of 
high  officials  and  distinguished  private  personages,  who  should 

^  See  above,  pp.  269  f. 


46o  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


prepare  reforms  in  various  branches  of  the  administration.  But 
the  seeming  reversion  of  the  tsar  to  his  earher  Liberal  policies 
came  too  late.  On  the  very  day  that  he  signed  the  hopeful 
decree  Alexander  II  was  killed  by  the  explosion  of  bombs  hurled 
by  Terrorists. 


THE  MAINTENANCE  OF  AUTOCRACY  AND  THE  PROSECU- 
TION OF  ''RUSSIFICATION"  UNDER  ALEXANDER  III 
AND  NICHOLAS  II,  1881-1905 

The  tragic  death  of  Alexander  II  —  the  reforming"  tsar — ■ 
brought  to  the  Russian  throne  his  son,  Alexander  III  (1881- 
Aiexander  1^94)?  whose  blunt  soldierly  qualities  resembled  those 
III,  1881-  of  his  grandfather,  Nicholas  1.  Alexander  III  was  not 
^^^^  well  educated,  and  entertained  no  sympathy  with  the 

culture  of  western  Europe.  In  his  narrow  but  pertinacious  way 
he  sought  throughout  his  reign  to  correct  what  he  considered  the 
too  liberal  tendencies  of  his  father.  In  his  opinion,  Russia  was 
to  be  saved  from  revolution  and  anarchy,  not  by  parliamentary 
institutions,  such  as  obtained  in  Great  Britain  and  France,  but 
by  great  principles  indigenous  to  Russia  and  the  natural  pride  of 
every  Russian  patriot:  autocracy,  Slavic  nationahsm,  and 
Eastern  Orthodoxy.  Strenuously  the  new  tsar  maintained  au- 
tocracy. Vigorously  he  pushed  the  process  of  Russification  "  — 
exalting  the  influence  of  the  Slavic  race  and  of  the  Orthodox 
rehgion.  Devoted  to  these  policies,  he  was  hardly  aware  of  yet 
another  and  an  unofficial  force  that  was  transforming  his  country 
General  during  his  reign,  —  the  introduction  into  Russia,  on  a 
Character-  large  scale,  of  the  Industrial  Revolution, —  the  erec- 
Re£i°^  ^^^^  factories,  the  building  of  railways,  the  saving 
of  capital,  the  shift  of  population  from  country  to 
town,  and  the  growth  of  a  middle  class  and  of  a  working  class 
that  jointly  would  do  in  time  for  Russia  what  earher  NihiHsts 
and  SociaHsts  and  Terrorists  had  aspired  most  vainly  to  do  — 
temper  Russian  autocracy  with  Western  Liberalism.  These 
three  things,  then,  —  maintenance  of  autocracy,  ''Russification," 
and  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  Russia,  —  are  the  great  land- 
marks of  the  reign  of  Alexander  III,  and  to  each  one  of  the  three 
in  turn  we  must  now  give  attention. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  461 


The  first  acts  of  Alexander  III  were  to  revoke  his  father's 
last  liberal  decree,  to  inflict  summary  vengeance  upon  the  assas- 
sins, and  to  proclaim  to  the  world  that  "the  Voice  of 
God  orders  Us  to  stand  firm  at  the  helm  of  govern-  Alexander*^ 
ment  .  .  .  with  faith  in  the  strength  and  truth  of  the  ni  to  the 
autocratic  power,  which  We  are  called  to  consohdate  Autocracy 
and  preserve,  for  the  good  of  the  people,  from  every 
kind  of  encroachment."     In  carrying  out  his  program  of 
thoroughgoing  autocracy  the  new  tsar  was  ably  assisted  by  two 
men  of  Hke  mind  with  himself  —  Plehve  and  Pobedonostsev. 

Kons  tan  tine  Pobedonostsev  (182  7-1907)  ^  had  studied  law  at 
Petrograd,  had  risen  slowly  from  one  rung  to  another  on  the 
ladder  of  pubHc  service,  had  been  professor  of  civil  law  in  the 
university  of  Moscow,  had  tutored  the  sons  of  Alex-  ^  , . , 

1      XT  •      1       1  r  •     •         1  1      1    •  •  Pobedono- 

ander  II  m  the  theory  of  jurisprudence  and  admmis-  stsev,  the 
tration,  and  had  been  rewarded  in  1880  by  appoint-  Phijosopher 

,  ,         1  ,  .  r         ^       of  Reaction 

ment  to  the  responsible  and  lucrative  post  of  secular 
chairman  of  the  governing  body  of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church 
("Procurator  of  the  Holy  Synod").  This  man,  who  had  tre- 
mendous influence  on  Alexander  III,  developed  a  veritable 
philosophy  of  reaction.  In  speech  and  publication  he  was  always 
insisting  that  the  newer  poHtical  and  social  institutions  of  western 
Europe  were  radically  bad  in  themselves  and  totally  inapplicable 
to  Russia.  To  him  parliaments  were  nothing  but  breeding- 
places  of  the  most  selfish  and  sordid  ambitions;  newspapers 
existed  primarily  to  disseminate  falsehood;  secular  education 
was  both  dangerous  and  immoral;  limited  monarchy  was  a 
"vain  fancy, "  and  trial  by  jury  was  simply  a  means  of  practicing 
the  "arts  of  casuistry."  "If  all  representatives  of  the  people 
were  saints,"  wrote  the  reactionary  philosopher,  "a  parHamentary 
regime  would  be  the  very  best  kind  of  all ;  but  as  popular  repre- 
sentatives are  usually  of  a  more  than  doubtful  morality,  a  par- 
liamentary regime  is  the  worst."  To  the  Western  novelties  which 
he  condemned,  Pobedonostsev  found  a  counterpoise  in  the  respect 
of  the  masses  for  institutions  developed  slowly  and  automatically 
during  the  past  centuries  of  national  life.  For  Russia,  therefore, 
he  believed  that  the  chief  function  of  government  was  to  preserve 

'  Pob^donostsev's  opinions  arc  clearly  set  forth  in  his  Reflections  of  a  Russian 
Statesman,  published  in  English  translation  by  R.  C.  Long,  in  1898. 


462  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  autocracy  and  to  foster  among  the  people  traditional  venera- 
tion for  the  offices  of  the  national  Orthodox  Church. 

To  the  support  which  was  accorded  Alexander  III  by  the 
philosophy  of  Pobedonostsev,  and  by  his  rigid  administration  of 
ecclesiastical  affairs,  was  added  the  concrete  and  direct 

Plehve,  the  .  .  . 

Practical  poUtical  service  of  Plehve  (1846-1904).^  Appointed 
Reaction  director  of  the  state  pohce  in  1881,  Plehve  not  only 
ferreted  out  and  punished  the  assassins  of  Alexander 
II,  but  likewise  pursued  all  Nihilists  and  Socialists  and  Terrorists 
with  a  vigor  so  great  and  a  success  so  terrible  that  the  reign  of 
Alexander  III  was  marked  by  a  seeming  lull  in  revolutionary 
propaganda. 

With  the  aid  of  such  men  as  Plehve  and  Pobedonostsev, 
Alexander  III  sought  to  strengthen  and  centraHze  the  whole 
imperial  administration  and  to  bring  it  more  completely 
nance  of  under  his  personal  control.  He  placed  the  formerly 
Autocracy  autonomous  government  of  the  peasant  communes 
and^r^m  (fnirs)  under  the  supervision  of  wealthy  landed  pro- 
prietors appointed  by  the  imperial  ministry.  He 
abridged  the  powers  conferred  by  his  father  upon  the  provincial 
zemstvos  and  municipal  dumas;  he  revised  the  constitution  of  all 
these  local  assemblies  by  increasing  the  representation  of  the 
nobles  and  officials  and  decreasing  that  of  the  peasants  and  by 
excluding  the  professional  classes  altogether ;  and  over  the  acts 
of  the  emasculated  assembHes  he  strengthened  the  veto  power 
of  the  imperial  governors.  He  frowned  upon  secular  education 
and  confirmed  the  control  of  the  state  church  over  elementary 
instruction.  He  strove  to  remove  all  vestiges  of  special  Hberties 
or  privileges  that  had  formerly  been  enjoyed  by  non-Russian 
peoples  in  the  empire.  At  the  same  time  he  was  ever  enlarging 
Russian  territory  in  central  Asia ;  and  in  foreign  poKcy  the  appar- 
ent decKne  of  Russian  influence  in  southeastern  Europe,  ascrib- 
able,  in  Alexander's  opinion,  to  Germany's  increasing  support  of 
Austro-Hungarian  pretensions,  caused  him  to  waver  in  the 
hearty  friendship  which  his  father  had  entertained  for  Bismarck 
and  the  German  Empire,  and  gradually  brought  this  most  auto- 

1  Viatsdieslaf  von  Plehve  was  of  Lithuanian  stock,  was  educated  at  Warsaw  and 
at  Petrograd,  and  as  a  lawyer  began  his  public  career  in  the  department  of  justice 
under  Alexander  II. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  463 


cratic  of  all  the  Russian  Autocrats  into  particularly  friendly 
relations,  curiously  enough,  with  the  extremely  democratic 
government  of  RepubHcan  France. 

In  Russia  the  autocracy  of  Alexander  III  was  maintained  at 
a  fearful  sacrifice  of  national  well-being.  No  matter  how  up- 
right and  benevolent  the  autocrat  personally  might  be, 
he  himself  could  not  know  first-hand  all  the  needs  of  Se^Auto^^ 
his  hundred  million  subjects,  nor  could  he  alone  exe-  cratic 
cute  his  manifold  decrees  throughout  the  length  and  ^^^^  *° 
breadth  of  his  enormous  domain.  In  all  these  matters 
he  had  to  trust  to  the  honor  and  honesty  of  his  chief  ministers 
and  of  a  vast  hierarchy  of  lesser  officials,  military,  financial, 
judicial,  and  administrative.  Even  a  tsar  of  genius  could  not  be 
proof  against  the  incompetence  or  the  corruption  of  a  tax- 
collector,  a  judge,  a  pohce  agent,  or  a  distant  governor.  And 
Alexander  III  was  not  a  genius.  Then,  too,  in  a  country  where 
wealthy  nobles  were  accustomed  to  exercise  political  control  over 
large  numbers  of  poor  and  ignorant  peasants,  where  a  powerful 
military  cHque  were  in  the  habit  of  dominating  the  rank  and  file 
of  a  numerous  army,  where  the  ordinary  officials  both  in  church 
and  in  state  were  traditionally  arrogant  and  thoroughly  imbued 
with  a  notion  of  their  irresponsibility  save  to  a  far-above  and 
far-away  master  whom  they  seldom  or  never  beheld,  in  such  a 
country  negligence  in  administration  and  dishonesty  in  financial 
transactions  were  bound  to  flourish.  Alexander  Ill's  poHcy  of 
repression  only  exaggerated  the  evils  of  Russian  autocracy. 
The  officials  became  more  and  more  sycophantic ;  the  wider  their 
fields  of  activity,  the  narrower  grew  their  vision.  As  in  France 
before  the  Great  Revolution,  incompetence  promoted  corruption, 
and  corruption  fostered  incompetence.  And  the  bulk  of  the  Rus- 
sian people,  though  dumb  under  oppression,  suffered  miserably. 

The  question  has  often  been  raised  why  autocracy  survived  in 
Russia  several  generations  after  it  had  disappeared  in  western 
Europe  and  whether  it  was  not  due  to  peculiar  racial 
traits  of  the  Russian  people.    Of  course,  in  last  analy-  ^j^g  Main- 
si.5,  autocracy  rested  in  Russia,  as  in  any  other  country,  tenance  of 
on  the  expressed  or  tacit  consent  of  the  bulk  of  the  (^"russu 
population,  for  had  a  majority  of  the  people  been  vio- 
lently opposed  to  the  existing  regime  they  could  certainly  have 


464 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


dispatched  it  as  did  the  French  in  their  Great  Revolution  oi 
1789.  But  without  reference  to  any  pecuHarities  of  race,  which 
at  best  are  pretty  hazy  and  vague,  it  may  still  be  possible  to 
account  for  the  maintenance  of  autocracy  as  the  chief  political 
institution  of  nineteenth-century  Russia  by  pointing  out  the 
following  facts.    In  the  first  place,  the  governing  classes  were 

1  Loyalty  ^umerous,  powerful,  and  naturally  loyal  to  the  auto- 
of  the  crat  on  whose  bounty  they  fed  :  the  grand-dukes  and 
ciasseT^^    other  members  of  the  imperial  Romanov  family ;  the 

ministers  of  state ;  the  governors ;  the  army  officers ; 
the  local  administrators ;  the  judges ;  the  thousands  of  clerks ; 
and  the  officials  of  poHce.    Secondly,  the  Orthodox  Church,  to 

2  Support  "^^i^^  most  Russians  adhered,  had  become  for  poHtical 
of  the  purposes  a  regular  branch  of  the  imperial  government : 
Church°^     since  the  days  of  Peter  the  Great,  its  clergy  had  been 

appointed  and  controlled  by  an  imperial  board  —  the 
Holy  Synod  —  which  taught  the  rehgiously  inclined  peasants  to 
exalt  the  Church  as  the  custodian  of  national  welfare  and  to 
3.  Lack  of  exalt  the  autocracy  as  the  preserver  and  defender  of 
Popular  the  Church.  Thirdly,  popular  education  was  especially 
Education  backward  in  Russia;  what  there  was  of  elementary 
instruction  was  a  monopoly  of  the  Church,  loyally  attached  to 
autocracy ;  the  extent  of  the  empire,  the  sparsity  of  inhabitants 
in  many  of  its  districts,  and  the  relative  poverty  of  its  national 
finances,  were  natural  obstacles  to  any  rapid  extension  of  a  public- 
school  system;  at  times  the  authorities  actually  discouraged 
education ;  and  the  result  was  that  at  the  death  of  Alexander  III 
(1894)  the  number  of  ilHterates  varied  from  50  to  90  per  cent  of 
the  total  population  in  the  rural  communities,  and  from  40  to 
65  per  cent  in  the  urban,  — a  higher  average  of  ilHteracy  in  Russia 
than  in  any  other  country  of  Europe.  Fourthly,  mention  should 
again  be  made  of  the  rigorous  repressive  measures  employed 
by  the  governing  classes,  particularly  under  Alexander  III,  —  the 

arbitrary  arrests  and  imprisonments,  the  banishments 
sive  Meas-  to  Siberia,  and  the  executions,  —  which  struck  terror 
ures  of  the    [^^^  j-j^g  hearts  of  many  middle-class  people  who 

Government  .         .  ^     ,  t  i  x  m  i 

otherwise  might  have  directed  a  strong  Liberal  move- 
ment against  the  autocracy.  Fifthly,  and  in  noteworthy  con- 
trast to  this  terroristic  poHcy  of  the  government,  was  the  idea 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  465 


sedulously  implanted  in  the  minds  of  the  ignorant  peasantry 

by  officials  of  church  and  state  that  the  Russian 

.  1  .     ,  r  1        1  5-  Filial 

nation  was  a  big  happy  family,  that  the  tsar  was  Devotion  oi 

the  "little  father"  of  his  subjects,  governing  well  the  Peas- 

r  1  •      rr      •       r        i  i  antry  to  the 

m  consequence  of  his  affection  for  them  and  tower-  xsar,  the 
ing  above  all  the  rest  in  consequence  of  a  conscious-  p^^^^g^,, 
ness  of  his  duty  as  an  autocratic  paterfamilias. 
Sixthly,  Russia  remained  throughout  the  nineteenth  century 
largely  an  agricultural  country,  and  the  bulk  of  the  ^  R^ggia 
population  were  serfs  but  recently  and  partially  eman-  ptedomi- 
cipated  from  economic  dependence  upon  great  noble-  ^^j^JJf^^^^ 
men :   such  a  population  was  hardly  prepared  for  therefore 
radical  political  changes;    conservative  by  instinct 
and  environment,  Hke  all  agricultural  communities, 
it  clung  tenaciously  to  the  principle  of  autocracy  which  had 
done  inestimable  service  to  Russia  by  freeing  the  ^  Tradition 
country  from  Mongol,  Turkish,  Swedish,  and  PoHsh  of  Autocracy 
interference  and  by  raising  up  such  heroic  figures  ^^^"^^^^ 
as  Peter  the  Great,  Catherine  the  Great,  and  Alexander  1.  No 
wonder  that  the  glories  of  Russian  history  redounded  to  the 
glory  of  Russian  autocracy ! 

But  even  more  important  than  any  one  of  the  explanations 
already  offered  for  the  maintenance  of  autocracy  in  Russia  was 
the  partially  patriotic  and  partially  intellectual  motive 
which  actuated  such  intelligent  Russians  as  Pobe-  8.  intimate 
donostsev  and  Plehve  to  give  cordial  and  most  active  o^Russfan^ 
support  to  the  cause  of  autocracy.    This  was  the  idea  Autocracy 
in  their  minds  and  in  the  minds  of  many  thoughtful  J^^^f 
Russians  that  democracy  could  never  be  a  real  success  "  Pan-siav- 
in  such  an  extended  empire  as  Russia  and  among  such  ^^Russtfica- 
diverse  peoples  as  were  contained  within  its  borders,  tion  " 
and  that  the  autocracy  was  not  only  a  divinely  inspired 
instrument  but  also  a  practical  necessity  for  holding  the  Russian 
Empire  together  and  for  furthering  its  rcHgious  and  cultural 
mission  in  the  world.    This  was  the  ideal  of  Pan-Slavism  and  the 
justification  of  the  process,  dcHberately  developed  by  Alexander 
III,  of  *'Russification."    Foremost  Pan-Slavists  in  Russia  were 
devotees  of  autocracy;  and,  conversely,  devotees  of  autocracy 
were  almost  to  a  man  ardent  patriots  of  Pan-Slavic  stamp. 

VOL.  II  —  2  II 


466 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


In  order  to  understand  Russian  Pan-Slavism  and  to  follow 
The  Russian  intelligently  the  steps  taken  by  Alexander  III  and 
Empire  at  Nicholas  II  to  Russify"  their  dominions,  it  is  neces- 
the  Nine^-  °^  ^^^Y  ^^^^  point  to  present  a  brief  survey  of  the  ex- 
teenth  Cen-  tent  and  varied  populations  of  the  Russian  Empire 

toward  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
^  (i)  The  core  of  the  Russian  Empire  was  the  region  known  as 
Great  Russia  (the  former  grand-duchy  of  Muscovy  with  its  imme- 
Great         diate  dependencies),  with  a  compact  and  homogene- 
Russia  population,  numbering  in  1897  some  fifty  millions, 

speaking  the  Great  Russian  dialect  of  the  Slav  tongue,  —  the 
literary  and  official  language  of  the  empire,  —  and  belonging 
mainly  to  the  Orthodox  Church.  The  only  serious  source  of 
dissension  in  Great  Russia  was  the  existence  of  considerable 
numbers  of  religious  dissenters  (''Old  Believers"),  who  had 
seceded  from  the  state  church  at  the  time  of  the  reform  of  the 
liturgy  in  the  seventeenth  century,  and  who  now  formed  numer- 
ous small  sects,  though  forbidden  by  law. 

(2)  Little  Russia  (Kiev,  Ukraine)  embraced  the  steppes  of 
southwestern  Russia  and  part  of  the  valley  of  the  Dnieper  and 
Little  of  the  easterly  watershed  of  the  Carpathian  Moun- 
Russia  tains.  It  had  a  population  of  some  twenty  millions 
speaking  a  Russian  language  and  adhering  to  the  Orthodox 
Church.  But  the  Little  Russian  dialect  was  sufficiently  different 
from  Hterary  Great  Russian  to  have  a  distinct  popular  literature, 
and  the  Orthodox  Faith  was  not  the  only  one  professed,  for,  with- 
out speaking  of  scattered  colonies  of  Protestant  Germans,  many 
PoHsh  Jews  had  settled  in  the  cities  (Kiev,  etc.),  and  a  number 
of  Orthodox  Christians  had  joined  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
as  "Uniates,"  retaining  their  married  clergy  and  Slavic  liturgy. 

(3)  The  grand-duchy  of  Lithuania,  armexed  by  Catherine  II 
in  the  eighteenth  century,  was  peopled  in  part  by  some  five 
White  million  Russians,  speaking  yet  another  dialect  —  the 
Russia        White  Russian  —  and  belonging  to  the  Orthodox 

.       Church  :  in  part  by  some  two  and  a  half  million  Lithu- 

Lithuania  .  .  ,         .n  •         i    •  u 

anians  —  a  Slavic  people,  still  preserving  their  old 
national  speech,  dress,  and  attachment  to  the  Roman  Catholic 
reHgion ;  and  finally  by  a  Hberal  sprinkling  of  Jewish  towns- 
folk and  of  CathoHc  Polish  landlords. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  467 


(4)  Southern  Russia,  composed  of  territory  taken  from  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  was  inhabited  by  Great  Russian  colonists  — 
the  Cossacks  —  and  by  Mongol  and  other  Asiatic  southern 
tribes,  now  largely  intermarried  and  united  in  alle-  Russia  and 
giance  to  the  Orthodox  Church.    Bessarabia,  which 

had  finally  been  detached  from  the  kingdom  of  Rumania  in 
1878,^  had  a  population  Orthodox  in  rehgion  but  Ruman  in 
speech  and  nationality,  plentifully  interspersed  with  Jews,  es- 
pecially in  the  cities.- 

(5)  The  Baltic  provinces  (Esthonia,  Livonia,  Courland), 
acquired  from  Sweden  and  Poland  during  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, retained  a  population  of  two  kinds  :  the  peasants  The  Baltic 
were  mainly  Finns  or  Letts,  the  latter  akin  to  the  Provinces 
Lithuanians ;  the  upper  classes  and  townspeople,  descended  from 
German  colonists,  still  spoke  the  German  language  and  adhered 
to  Lutheran  Protestantism.  The  district  of  Petrograd  (for- 
merly Ingria),  cut  off  from  the  Baltic  provinces,  had  lost  its 
original  character  and,  as  the  residence  of  the  imperial  govern- 
ment, had  become  a  melting  pot  of  all  the  languages  and  all  the 
religions  in  the  empire,  the  Great  Russian  dialect  and  the  Ortho- 
dox Faith  gradually  becoming  predominant. 

(6)  Caucasia,  added  to  the  empire  in  the  course  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  was  an  interesting  Babel  of  Httle  peoples,  some 
schismatic  Christian  (Hke  the  Armenians),  and  others  „ 
Mohammedan  (such  as  the  Circassians),  but  all  war- 
like and  all  bent  on  preserving  their  separate  national  life  —  the 
only  exception  being  the  mingling  of  several  princely  native 
families  with  the  Russig^n  aristocracy. 

(7)  The  Russian  dominion  gradually  but  mightily  extending 
from  the  Volga  River  and  the  Ural  Mountains  across  northern 
Asia  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  well  into  the  central  Russia  in 
regions  of  the  Asiatic  continent  ^  was  inhabited  by 

some  six  million  hardy  and  industrious  Russian  colonists  and  by 
some  eight  millions  of  native  tribesmen,  exhibiting  the  widest 
diversity  of  language  and  race,  and  in  religion  offering  ex- 

*  As  a  result  of  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-1878.    See  below,  pp.  505  f. 
'  Kishinev,  the  capital  of  Bessarabia,  was  43  per  cent  Jewish  in  1897. 

*  For  a  s[)ccial  treatment  of  the  Russian  Empire  in  Asia  —  Siberia,  Turkestan, 
etc.  —  see  below,  pp.  58O-592. 


468 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


amples  of  Mohammedanism,  Buddhism,  animal  worship,  and 
polytheism. 

In  addition  to  these  integral  parts  of  the  Russian  Empire  were 
(8)  the  kingdom  of  Poland  and  (9)  the  grand-duchy  of  Finland. 
The  King-  Warsaw  and  surrounding  Polish  territory  had  been 
dom  of  erected  into  the  kingdom  of  Poland  and  intrusted  to 
Poland  ^j^^  sovereignty  of  the  tsar  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
(181 5).  The  written  constitution  which  King  Alexander  I  then 
granted  had  been  annulled  by  Nicholas  I,  following  the  Polish 
RebelKon  of  1831 ;  and  as  a  result  of  the  insurrection  of  1863 
Alexander  II,  as  we  have  seen,  incorporated  for  administrative 
purposes  his  kingdom  of  Poland  into  his  empire  of  Russia. 
The  PoHsh  subjects  of  the  tsar  constituted  a  compact  and  fairly 
homogeneous  population  of  seven  and  a  half  millions,  proud  of 
their  separate  language  and  Hterature,  enthusiastically  loyal  to 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  ambitious  to  reestabHsh  the 
poHtical  independence  of  their  entire  nation.  They  detested  the 
Russians  and  despised  and  often  persecuted  the  million  and  a 
quarter  Jews  who  lived  among  them  and  who  complicated  their 
national  problems. 

For  ninety  years  after  its  union  with  Russia  (1809),  Finland 
was  practically  a  distinct  state,  the  tsar  as  grand-duke  governing 
The  Grand-  i^^^ns  of  a  nominated  senate  and  a  Diet  organized 
Duchy  of  on  the  Swedish  model  with  separate  representative 
Finland  bodics  of  nobles,  clergymen,  burghers,  and  peasants. 
Of  the  total  population  of  two  and  one  half  milKons  in  1897,  the 
bulk  were  peasants,  descended  from  the  ancient  Asiatic  race  of 
Finns,  preserving  their  Finnish  language  and  costume ;  but  the 
upper  classes  were  mainly  Swedish,  and  Swedish  was  long  the 
official  language  of  the  local  government.  All  the  inhabitants 
were  Lutheran  in  religion  and  Jealous  of  Russian  encroachments 
on  their  traditional  Hberties. 

In  this  hodge-podge  of  territories  and  populations  subject 
to  the  Autocrat  of  All  the  Russias,  Pan-Slavism  became  a  driving 
Pan-Slavism  unifying  force  in  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
intheRus-  tury.  Stimulated  by  the  contemporary  growth  of 
sian  Empire  n^tionaHsm  in  Germany  and  Italy,  a  host  of  Russian 
poHticians,  scholars,  journalists,  and  litterateurs  arose,  especially 
in  Great  Russia,  pointing  out  the  glory  and  grandeur  of  the  Slav 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


469 


race.  They  demonstrated  that  from  a  common  parent-stock 
had  come  not  only  the  Great  Russians,  Little  Russians,  White 
Russians,  the  Lithuanians,  Letts,  and  Poles,  —  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  population  of  the  Russian  Empire,  —  but  also  the 
Poles  of  Prussia,  and  the  Poles,  Czechs,  Ruthenians,  Slovenes,  and 
Serbo-Croats  of  the  Habsburg  Empire,  and  the  Serbs  and  Bulgars 
in  the  Balkan  peninsula.  They  showed  that  of  all  these  Slavic 
peoples,  the  Great  Russians  were  by  far  the  most  numerous  and 
the  most  powerful.  Their  Pan-Slavic  program,  therefore,  as- 
sumed a  twofold  aspect.  In  the  first  place,  they  would  force,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  language  and  the  institutions  of  Great  Russia 
upon  the  heterogeneous  peoples  within  the  Russian  Empire, 
—  in  a  word,  they  would  "Russify"  the  empire.  And  in  the 
second  place  they  would  extend  Russian  influence  abroad  — 
eastward  into  Asia,  westward  against  Teutonic  Habsburg  and 
Hohenzollem,  southward  into  the  Balkans.  In  the  latter  case 
Russian  Pan-Slavists  were  ardent  sympathizers  with  the  struggles 
of  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  to  increase  their  territories  at 
the  expense  of  Turkey  or  of  Austria-Hungary,  provided  of  course 
that  these  Balkan  states  remembered  their  debt  of  gratitude  to 
their  elder  brother  Russia;  and  at  the  same  time  the  alliance 
between  Russia  and  France,  cemented  in  1895,  was  commended 
by  Russian  Pan-Slavists  as  promising  to  curb  the  anti-Slav 
policies  of  the  great  Teutonic  states  of  central  Europe.  Within 
Russia  itself,  the  Pan-Slavists  discovered  that  the  distinctive 
monuments  of  the  national  genius  were  the  Russian  language, 
the  Orthodox  Church,  the  village  community  engaged  in  agricul- 
ture, and  the  political  autocracy.  To  impress  these  institutions 
upon  the  entire  empire,  the  Pan-Slavists  disbelieved  in  the 
efficacy  of  democracy  and  held  that  one-man  power  was  much 
more  beneficial  for  carrying  out  their  program.  Just  as  British 
patriots  and  nationalists  extolled  the  slowly  evolving  form  of 
parliamentary  government  which  had  enriched  and  glorified 
Great  Britain,  so  the  Pan-Slavists  in  Russia  exalted  and  magnified 
the  autocracy  under  which  their  country  had  gradually  grown 
great  and  respected.  Russian  patriotism  made  for  autocracy. 
Without  autocracy  Russian  Pan-Slavists  could  hardly  hope  to 
realize  for  the  entire  empire  their  ideal  of  "one  law,  one  lan- 
guage, one  religion." 


470 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


''Russification"  was  simply  the  process  of  attempting  to 
realize  the  Pan-Slavic  ideal  throughout  the  Russian  Empire,  of 
endeavoring  to  stamp  out  lesser  languages  and  dissi- 
csdi^n'^  dent  faiths.  Efforts  at  ''Russification"  in  the  reigns 
under  of  Nicholas  I  and  Alexander  II,  except  in  the  instance 
Alexander  Poland,  had  been  merely  occasional  and  intermittent, 
but  under  Alexander  III  (1881-1894)  they  became 
systematic  and  showed  very  Httle  consideration  for  the  feehngs, 
wishes,  and  interests  of  the  people  concerned.  Both  Pobedonos- 
tsev  and  Plehve  were  earnest  champions  of  ''Russification"  : 
the  latter,  as  head  of  the  state  police,  undertook  to  suppress 
public  meetings  and  publications  which  voiced  national  aspira- 
tions of  minority  peoples  in  the  empire ;  the  former,  as  Procura- 
tor of  the  Holy  Synod,  punished  with  great  severity  not  only 
the  members  of  the  religious  sects  separated  from  the  Orthodox 
Church  but  also  the  missionaries  of  Roman  Catholic  or  Protestant 
Christianity  who  occasionally  proselyted  among  the  Orthodox; 
the  former  Kkewise  compelled  the  unwilling  ''reconversion"  of 
thousands  of  "Uniates"  to  Orthodoxy  and  oppressively  inter- 
fered with  the  Catholic  Church  in  Poland  and  with  the  Lutheran 
in  the  Baltic  provinces.  The  tsar  himself  issued  decree  after 
decree,  upholding  the  work  of  his  zealous  ministers  and  prosecut- 
ing "  Russification  "  in  a  hundred  different  ways.  In  Poland  the 
harsh  laws  of  Alexander  II  were  confirmed  and  rendered  more 
In  Poland  ^^^^^  '  secondary  schools  were  entirely  Russian- 
ized ;  Polish  literature  and  even  the  Polish  language 
were  taught  to  Poles  in  Russian ;  Poles  were  excluded  from  gov- 
ernment posts  in  Poland;  and  from  1885  to  1897  ^ole  was 
permitted  to  sell  land  to  a  non-Russian.  In  White  Russia  and 
Lithuania  " Russification "  assumed  a  religious  guise:  the 
Catholic  Uniates  were  vigorously  persecuted,  and  their  marriages 
and  children  the  Russian  government  refused  to  recognize  as 
legitimate.  The  tsar,  moreover,  forbade  the  printing  of  any 
original  work  in  Little  Russian,  as  well  as  acting,  reciting,  or 
In  the  singing  in  that  dialect.  In  the  Baltic  provinces  Rus- 
Baitic  sian  was  introduced  as  the  official  tongue  in  1885,  and 
Provinces  ^-^^  same  time  Lutheran  churches  were  not  to  be 
constructed  without  the  sanction  of  the  Procurator  of  the  Holy 
Synod ;  subsequently  the  use  of  German  was  forbidden  in  univer- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  471 


sity  lectures  and  even  in  private  schools,  local  law  courts  were 
suppressed,  the  press  was  put  under  Russian  censorship,  and 
German  place  names  were  changed  to  Russian.-^  In  the  Caucasus 
and  in  Siberia,  special  favor  was  shown  to  Russian  colonists  who 
would  establish  and  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  Russian 
language  and  the  Orthodox  Church. 

Persecution  of  the  Jews  was  a  phase  of  Pan-Slavism  and 
''Russification."  The  Russian  Empire  embraced  some  five 
milHon  Jews,  settled  mainly  in  Poland,  Lithuania,  Measures 
Little  Russia  (Kiev),  and  Bessarabia  (Kishinev),  who  against  the 
preserved  not  only  their  religion  and  national  tradi-  ^^^^ 
tions,  but  also  the  Yiddish  language,  a  German  jargon  intermixed 
with  Hebrew  words  and  written  with  Hebrew  characters.  The 
Jews  were  particularly  disliked  because  of  their  propensity  to 
clannishness,  to  close  financial  dealings,  and  to  revolutionary 
propaganda ;  and  Alexander  III,  backed  undoubtedly  by  popu- 
lar support,  instituted  a  series  of  repressive  measures  against 
them.  In  1882  he  forbade  Jews  to  acquire  land  or  to  enter 
the  Hquor  trade.  To  keep  them  out  of  the  liberal  profes- 
sions he  set  a  limit  to  the  number  of  Jews  that  should  be 
admitted  to  any  secondary  school  or  university :  at  first  the 
number  of  Jews  was  not  allowed  to  exceed  10  per  cent 
of  the  whole  student  body;  later,  the  percentage  was  cut 
down  to  3  per  cent.  In  1890  he  issued  a  sweeping  decree 
against  the  Jews :  all  who  had  remained  in  the  interior  of 
Russia  were  now  to  emigrate  to  the  western  provinces,  unless 
they  could  secure  individual  authorization  to  tarry;  and  in 
the  districts  where  they  were  henceforth  concentrated  —  the 
so-called  Jewish  Pale  —  they  were  forbidden  to  own  or  lease 
lands  and  were  obliged  to  five  in  cities  where  most  Hberal  pro- 
fessions were  closed  to  them.  Taking  their  cue  from  the  attitude 
of  the  central  government,  many  Russian  administrators  gave 
free  rein  to  the  anti- Jewish  prejudices  of  an  ignorant  and  bigoted 
peasantry  and  townsfolk,  and  tolerated,  if  they  did  not  incite, 
more  or  less  organized  popular  outbreaks  against  the  Jews  —  the 
so-called  pogroms  —  attended  by  plundering  and  burning  and 

*  It  was  in  accordance  with  this  spirit  that  in  1914,  just  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  War  of  the  Nations,  the  name  of  the  capital  city  of  Russia  was  oflicially  changed 
from  the  Teutonic  form  "St.  Petersburg"  to  the  Slavic  form  "Pctrograd." 


472 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


in  some  cases  by  massacre.  From  pogroms  and  repressive  legis- 
lation the  Russian  and  Polish  Jews  suffered  greatly;  and,  de- 
Pogroms  ^P^^^  efforts  of  the  government  to  make  them 
stay  within  the  empire,  some  300,000  Jews  left 
Russia  in  a  single  year  (1891).  It  was  the  beginning  of  the 
wholesale  immigration  of  PoHsh  and  Russian  Jews  into  the 
United  States. 

The  death  of  Alexander  III  in  1894  did  not  serve  immediately 
to  shake  autocracy  or  to  lessen  the  ardor  of  Pan-Slavists  and 
Mainte  Russifiers."    His  son  and  successor,  Nicholas  II 

nance  of  the  (1894-  ),  though  more  amiable  and  less  strong- 
Principles  of  willed,  let  it  be  known  from  the  outset  that  he  con- 
Alexander        .111  1      .  r  1  •  •  1  . 

Ill  by  sidered  the  weakening  of  his  sovereign  authority  a 
fsgj-^*^^^*  ''senseless  dream."  He  reposed  the  utmost  confi- 
dence in  Pobedonostsev,  who  had  been  his  chief  tutor 
and  whom  he  retained^  as  Procurator  of  the  Holy  Synod  until 
1905  ;  he  kept  Plehve  in  office  and  promoted  him  in  1902  to  the 
post  of  minister  of  the  interior  with  almost  dictatorial  powers. 
If  the  new  tsar  showed  himself  less  inclined  than  his  father  to 
persecute  religious  dissenters,  he  proved  himself  as  docile  an 
agent  of  the  Pan-Slavists  in  promoting  all  the  other  forms  of 
''Russification." 

Under  Nicholas  II  the  Russian  government  continued  to  earn 
bitter  hatred  in  Poland,  in  Lithuania,  and  in  the  Baltic  prov- 
Continued  '^^^  Armenian  Church  in  the  Caucasus  was  de- 

"  Russifica-   spoiled.    The  legislation  against  the  Jews  was  enforced 

and  the  number  of  pogroms  increased,  culminatinsr  in 
Nicholas  II      ,  .  „ :  ,  .         ,        \    •        i  •  1  1 

the  massacre  of  Kishinev  (1903),  m  which  several 

thousand  Jews  lost  their  hves  and  to  which  Plehve  himself  was 
credited  with  being  accessory.  At  the  same  time,  and  always 
in  the  interest  of  Pan-Slavism  abroad,  the  French  Alliance 
was  upheld ;  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkans  was  steadily  ex- 
tended; and  in  the  Far  East  Russian  colonists  and  Russian 
diplomacy  were  stealthily  appropriating  northern  China  and 
marking  out  Korea  as  a  suitable  conquest  for  Russian  autocracy. 
The  Russo-Japanese  War  of  1 904-1 905  was  the  result  of  the 
attempt  of  the  Pan-Slavists  to  extend  Russian  domination  to 
the  Japanese  and  Yellow  seas  —  a  result  singularly  disappoint- 
ing to  Pan-Slavic  ambition. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  473 


To  the  grand-duchy  of  Finland,  whose  constitution  and  sepa- 
rate nationalism  even  Alexander  III  had  respected,  a  process  of 
"  RMssification  "  was  applied  by  Nicholas  11.  In  1899  Nicholas  11 
the\ tsar) made  a  wholesale  substitution  of  Russians  for  Finland 
Finns  in  the  civil  administration  of  the  grand-duchy ;  he  intro- 
duced a  Russian  poHce ;  he  conformed  the  Finnish  military  estab  - 
lishment to  the  Russian ;  he  decreed  that  all  Finnish  legislation 
must  be  drafted  by  Russian  ministers  in  conjunction  with  the 
secretary  of  state  for  Finland,  and  only  such  matters  need  be 
submitted  to  the  Finnish  Diet  as  concerned  Finland  alone ; 
and  he  capped  the  climax  by  appointing  (August,  1899)  the 
stern  and  faithful  Pan-Slavist  Plehve  as  secretary  of  state  for 
Finland. 


THE  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTION  IN  RUSSIA  AND  RE- 
VIVAL OF  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  AUTOCRACY 

Parallel  with  the  rise  of  Pan-Slavism  and  the  extension  of 
^'Russification"  was  the  progress  of  the  Russian  Industrial 
Revolution,  which,  beginning  seriously  in  the  reign  of 
Alexander  III,  reached  large  proportions  under  Nicho-  RusSn°* 
las  XL    Commercial  activity  showed  a  marked  gain  in  Commerce 
the  'eighties;  after  1895  it  developed  with  prodigious  J^y^aMhT' 
rapidity.    The  construction  of  railways  in  southern  Close  of  the 
Russia  ( 1 895-1 897)  served  to  tap  important  coal-fields  century"*^ 
and  iron-mines  and  thereby  to  change  the  face  of  the 
whole  country.    Factories  began  to  spring  up  like  mushrooms. 
Between  1886  and  1899  the  annual  output  of  iron  was  more  than 
quadrupled,  until  it  exceeded  that  of  France.    Other  trades 
developed  hardly  less  rapidly.    Textile  workers  increased  from 
400,000  in  1887  to  643,000  in  1897  5  pottery  workers  from  67,000 
to  143,000.    The  total  number  of  factory  operatives  in  the  larger 
industries  increased  from  1,318,000  in  1887  to  2,100,000  in  1897, 
and  later  exceeded  three  millions,  while  the  value  of  manufactured 
articles  more  than  tripled  within  ten  years.    This  phenomenal 
growth  of  Russian  industry  was  due  in  part  to  an  increasing 
supply  of  cheap  labor  in  the  cities,  resulting  from  the  influx  of 
poverty-stricken  peasants  from  the  country  districts,  and  in  part 
to  extensive  investments  of  foreign  capital,  particularly  of  French 


474  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


capital  after  the  consummation  of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance. 
With  the  aid  of  French  capital  and  cheap  native  labor,  railway 
building  was  everywhere  prosecuted.  In  1885  the  railway  mile- 
age within  the  Russian  Empire  totaled  16,155;  in  1895  it  was 
22,600;  in  1905  it  was  40,500;  and  in  1913  there  were  built  or 
building  some  51,000  miles.  The  important  Siberian  Railway, 
begun  in  1891  and  completed  in  1905,  with  its  branch  connec- 
tions, not  only  increased  the  migration  of  Russian  peasants  to 
Siberia  and  strengthened  commercial  relations  with  China  and 
Japan,  but  also  brought  to  Russian  industry  and  trade  the  petro- 
leum of  the  Caucasus,  the  cotton  of  central  Asia,  and  the  grain, 
timber,  and  minerals  of  Siberia. 

Although  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  Russia  did  not  destroy 
the  predominance  of  agriculture,^  nevertheless  it  created  peculiar 
problems  sufhciently  grave  to  tax  the  resources  of  the 
o/opirdon  ^.utocracy.  Capitalists  and  urban  proletarians  arose, 
as  to  the  clamoring  for  governmental  protection  and  support, 
tude^of^he    -^^^^^^  ^^^^      could  to  oppose  the  industrial 

Government  and  Commercial  development  of  Russia  on  the  now 
toward  the    familiar  lines  of  western  Europe,  on  the  ground  that 

New  Indus-  ,     i        i  .         ^       i     ^  •  r  i 

trial  Classes  such  development  involved  the  existence  of  a  danger- 
ous proletariat  and  of  a  prosperous  middle  class  equally 
inimical  to  the  autocracy  and  to  the  agricultural  society  upon 
which  political  autocracy  ultimately  rested.  But  Plehve  and 
his  many  Pan-Slavist  partisans  were  quite  unable  to  resist  the 
operation  of  the  newer  economic  tendencies.  And  in  Serge  de 
Witte  the  industrial  classes,  as  well  as  the  autocracy  and  the 
Russian  patriots,  found  a  valiant  friend  and  champion. 

Serge  de  Witte  (1849-1915)  ^  had  been  born  at  Tiflis  in  the 
Caucasus,  where  his  father  (of  Dutch  extraction)  was  an  imperial 
administrator,  had  been  educated  at  the  state  university  of 
Odessa,  had  been  identified  for  a  time  with  reactionary  journal- 

1  In  i860  less  than  10  per  cent  of  the  entire  population  of  the  Russian  Empire 
was  urban;  in  1897  the  urban  population  constituted  13  per  cent  of  the  whole  and 
in  191 2  14  per  cent.  In  Poland,  whither  the  Industrial  Revolution  first  pene- 
trated, the  urban  population  in  191 2  constituted  30  per  cent  of  the  whole. 

2  Witte  secured  American  fame  by  serving  as  the  Russian  agent  in  the  nego- 
tiations at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  which  ended  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
(1905).  He  also  worked  zealously  for  a  diminution  of  the  prevalent  Russian 
vice  of  drunkenness. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


475 


ism,  and  had  acquired  a  technical  knowledge  of  railway  con- 
struction and  railway  finance  by  reason  of  a  long  official  connec- 
tion with  the  railway  system  of  southern  Russia.  This 
early  environment  and  experience  rendered  Witte  at  ^^ampion 
once  an  enthusiastic  apostle  of  "  Russification "  and  of  industrial 
the  maintenance  of  the  principles  of  autocracy  in  Rus-  ^enf  and 
sia,  and  a  determined  advocate  of  commercial  and  in-  influential 
dus trial  development.    Appointed  head  of  the  depart-  Jg^^igoa 
ment  of  railways  in  the  imperial  ministry  of  finance  by 
Alexander  III,  he  was  promoted  to  be  minister  of  communications 
in  1892  and  minister  of  finance  in  1893.  Thenceforth  for  ten  years 
he  served  as  finance  minister  to  Nicholas  II,  introducing  foreign 
capital,  rapidly  extending  the  state  system  of  railways  through- 
out the  empire,  and  nearly  doubling  the  public  revenues.  Like 
Bismarck  in  Germany  and  Joseph  Chamberlain  in  Great  Britain, 
he  sought  to  develop  home  industries  by  means  of  colonial  expan- 
sion and  the  imposition  of  a  protective  tariff.    Thus,  colonial 
he  steadily  heightened  Russian  influence  in  northern  Expansion 
China  and  Persia,  —  a  policy  quite  in  keeping  with  that  ^siti^'of 
of  the  Pan-Slavists,  —  and,  in  order  to  benefit  the  a  Protective 
capitalists,  —  though  here  opposed  by  most  Pan- 
Slavists, — he  estabHshed  the  gold  standard  for  Russian  currency, 
bought  up  the  non-paying  privately  owned  railways,  subsidized 
many  industrial  enterprises,  strengthened  the  state  banks,  and 
in  1 89 1  imposed  very  large  customs  duties  on  coal  and  iron.  By 
1894,  under  Witte's  guidance,  Russia  had  become  a  thoroughly 
protectionist  country,  relying  for  its  pubHc  revenues  upon  in- 
direct taxes  rather  than  upon  direct  levies  on  land  or  income. 
Protection  of  manufacturers  and  great  landlords,  however,  cost 
the  poor  peasant  and  workingman  very  dearly :  it  was  demon- 
strated in  1905  that  the  retail  price  of  cotton  and  sugar  was  two 
and  one-half  times  as  great  in  Russia  as  in  Germany,  that  of  iron 
four  and  one-half  times  as  great,  and  that  of  coal  six  times 
as  great. 

At  the  same  time,  Witte,  again  in  common  with  Bismarck  and 
Joseph  Chamberlain,  believed  that  industrial  efficiency  and 
national  well-being  would  be  promoted  by  the  enactment  of 
social  legislation  for  the  benefit  of  the  working  classes.  And  in 
this  belief  he  was  encouraged  by  the  repeated  expressions  of 


476  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


fear  on  the  part  of  reactionaries  lest  the  ever-recurring  strikes 
of  a  miserable  proletariat  might  gradually  acquire  political  sig- 
Advocacy  of  nificance  and  threaten  the  stabiHty  of  the  autocracy. 
Social  Accordingly,  the  elaborate  factory  law  of  1886  was 
Legislation  extended  and  enforced.  Government  officials  were  to 
mediate  in  all  labor  disputes.  Mines  regulations  were  instituted, 
and  plans  for  insurance  of  all  workmen  against  accidents  were 
prepared.  The  chief  concern  of  Witte  in  social  legislation  was  to 
reduce  the  glaring  evils  of  intemperance  :  with  this  end  in  view  he 
obtained  in  1894  an  imperial  decree  estabHshing  a  state  monop- 
oly of  the  sale  of  spirituous  liquors  and  abolishing  all  private 
retail  liquor  shops  without  adequate  compensation  to  their 
owners  except  in  Poland  and  the  Baltic  provinces. 

Witte 's  policies  aroused  a  host  of  influential  critics  and  enemies, 
including  such  dominant  figures  as  Plehve  and  Pobedonostsev, 
Dismissal  with  the  result  that  in  1903  the  tsar  sent  his  distin- 
of  Witte,      guished  finance  minister  into  retirement.    In  the 

opinion  of  all  confirmed  reactionaries  it  was  high  time, 
for  already  the  worst  fears  of  Plehve  gave  promise  of  reaHzation. 
The  newer  industrial  classes  were  proving  themselves  a  real 
menace  to  the  maintenance  of  Russian  autocracy. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  opposition  to 
the  autocracy  which,  under  the  watchful  eye  and  vigorous  action 
New  Forms  P^^hve  and  the  secret  police,  had  lain  dormant  since 
of  Opposi-  the  later  days  of  Alexander  II,  began  to  reassert  itself 
Autocraqr^    more  or  less  openly  and  in  many  different  ways. 

Most  important  of  all,  so  far  as  numbers  were  con- 
cerned, was  the  opposition  of  many  large  landowners  and  peas- 
ants to  what  they  deemed  the  disproportionate  emphasis 
1  Landed  ^^^^  ^^^^  allowed  Witte  to  put  upon  indus- 
ciasses  trial  and  commercial  development.  These  landed  in- 
Favors^^^  terests,  powerfully  intrenched  in  the  local  zemstvos, 
Shown  to  brought  such  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  government 
Qass^es^     that  Witte  had  finally  invited  committees  of  the 

zemstvos  in  1 902-1 903  to  make  recommendations  to 
the  ministry  as  to  what  reforms  —  particularly  agricultural 
reforms  —  should  be  undertaken  by  the  tsar.  Though  the 
various  zemstvo  committees  were  hampered  by  the  government 
in  every  conceivable  manner,  more  than  four  hundred  out  of  a 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


477 


total  of  seven  hundred  prepared  reports  pronouncedly  hostile  to 
existing  institutions  :  many  asked  for  a  national  repre- 
sentation,  freedom  of  the  press,  and  guarantees  of  indi-  Zemstvo 
vidual  liberties.    It  was  the  blame  heaped  by  Plehve  Reports, 
and  Pobedonostsev  upon  Witte  for  the  hostile  tone  of  ^^^^ 
these  reports  that  directly  caused  the  latter's  withdrawal  from 
the  ministry  in  1903. 

A  second  source  of  opposition  to  the  autocracy  was  the  diffu- 
sion in  the  'nineties  of  Karl  Marx's  SociaHst  teachings  among  the 
new  industrial  proletariat  by  such  radicals  as  the  novel-  2.  Wage- 
list  Maxim  Gorky.    The  strength  of  the  SociaHst  Earners 

,  .        ,  .  1    •       1  Influenced 

propaganda  was  m  the  great  factories  and  m  the  by  Marxian 
constant  migrations  of  workmen  from  one  factory  to  SociaUsm 
another.  A  "Workmen's  Social  Democratic  party"  was  defi- 
nitely organized  in  1898  with  a  program  similar  to  that  of  for- 
eign Socialist  parties ;  and,  though  persecuted  by  the  «  g^^j^ 
government  and  torn  by  internal  dissensions,  the  Democrats" 
Russian  party  inspired  a  succession  of  dangerous  ^^^^^ 
strikes  and  imparted  to  thousands  of  wage-earners  a  lively  desire 
for  political  democracy.  Marxian  Socialism  appealed  in  Russia 
not  only  to  day  laborers  in  the  cities  but  also  to  many  poverty- 
stricken  or  landless  peasants,  who  organized  a  ''Socialist  Revolu- 
tionary party,"  with  a  platform  that  included  the    ^  . 

r      •       r   11  1       111  1  1   •    1-  .  Socialist 

confiscation  of  all  large  landed  estates  and  their  divi-  Revoiution- 

sion  into  small  individual  holdings,  and  with  a  pol- 

1111  .1  1  •  Kr^^  Country 

icy  that  bordered  on  violence  and  terrorism.  After 

1900  the  Socialist  Revolutionaries  grew  faster  than  the  Social 

Democrats. 

A  third  source  of  opposition  to  Russian  autocracy  was  the 
growth  of  a  new  liberalism,  championed  on  the  one  hand  by 
merchants,  factory-owners,  and  other  business  men, 
who  believed  that  their  economic  condition  would  be  classes 
bettered  by  setting  limits  to  the  arbitrariness  of  auto-  stirred  by 
cratic  ministers  and  by  establishing  some  system  of  LiberaUsm 
representative  government,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  by 
enlightened  nobles  and    radical  litterateurs   and  intellectual 
liberals,  such  as  Professor  Milyukov,  who  through  study,  reading, 
or  travel  had  been  brought  into  sympathetic  touch  with  the 
political  institutions  of  western  Europe.    These  men  styled 


478  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


themselves  ''Liberators/'  and  their  movement  centered  in  the 
The  "Lib-  Universities.  In  1902  they  began  the  pubKcation  of  a 
erators"  paper  called  ''Liberation"  at  Stuttgart  in  Germany; 
and  in  1904  they  organized  the  "Union  of  Liberators"  as  a 
political  party. 

A  fourth  source  of  opposition  to  the  existing  regime  in  Russia,  — 
a  reflex  of  Pan-Slavism,  —  was  the  intense  ill-feeling  and  deter- 
mined national  protests  of  Poles,  Jews,  Finns,  Lithu- 
tionof'°^*'  ^^i^^s,  and  Germans  of  the  Baltic  provinces,  against 
the  Lesser  the  principles  and  practices  of  "  Russification."  Each 
Nationalities  these  subject  peoples  would  make  alHances  with 

to     RuSSlfi-  r        ♦  r  •  1 

cation"  any  faction  of  Russians  who  might  assail  and  destroy 
the  autocracy.  Many  Jews  drifted  into  Socialism. 
Most  Poles  sympathized  with  the  endeavors  of  the  "Liberators." 
And  in  the  case  of  Finland,  native  Finns  and  Swedes  made 
common  cause  in  the  struggle  which  they  maintained  from 
1899  to  1905  for  the  restoration  of  the  Finnish  Constitution 
and  for  the  cessation  of  Russian  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  grand-duchy. 

Against  all  these  forces  of  opposition,  Plehve  and  other  loyal 
ministers  of  the  autocracy  kept  up  a  tireless  and  seemingly  effec- 
tive fight.  Plehve's  system  was  now  (i 903-1 904)  in  full  swing 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  entire  empire ;  domi- 
ciliary visits,  illegal  arrests  and  banishments,  and  the  suppression 
of  newspapers  were  the  order  of  the  day.  Any  person  was  liable 
to  be  apprehended  by  the  police  and  imprisoned  by  governmental 
order  who  was  merely  suspected  of  harboring  anti-Russian, 
Liberal,  or  SociaHst  opinions. 

THE  REVOLUTIONARY  MOVEMENT  OF  1905  AND  THE 
RUSSIAN  DUMA,  1906-1914 

To  the  system  of  Plehve,  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (i  904-1 905) 
was  a  rude  and  sudden  shock.    As  telegram  followed  telegram 

from  the  distant  fighting  front  in  Manchuria,  admit- 
o?the^^^*  ting  a  succession  of  Russian  defeats,  it  was  borne  in 
Russo-  upon  the  Russian  people,  as  never  before,  that  under 
Japanese  harsh  irresponsible  system  of  Plehve  incompetent 

generals  and  administrators  had  been  promoted,  and 
corruption  and  peculation  had  flourished.    The  parties  of  opposi- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  479 


tion  seized  quickly  upon  this  fact  and  utilized  it  to  precipitate  a 
revolutionary  movement  in  Russia  and  thereby  to  wring  some 
noteworthy  poHtical  concessions  from  the  Tsar  and  Autocrat 
Nicholas  II.  The  feehng  of  national  humiliation  changed  into  a 
vague  uneasiness,  which  gradually  gave  way  to  mutterings  and 
then  to  disorder.  On  28  July,  1904,  Plehve,  the  symbol  and 
incarnation  of  reactionary  autocracy,  was  blown  to  pieces  by  a 
bomb.  In  November  an  informal  assembly  of  eminent  members 
of  local  zemstvos  and  municipal  dumas  petitioned  the  tsar  to  reform 
the  political  system  by  guaranteeing  individual  Kberties,  extend- 
ing local  self-government,  and  estabhshing  a  national  representa- 
tive assembly. 

As  the  only  reply  of  the  tsar  to  these  forebodings  of  domestic 
tumult  was  the  promise  (December,  1904)  of  a  few  vague  reforms 
and  the  appointment  of  General  Trepoff ,  a  particularly 
objectionable  reactionary,  as  head  of  the  police,  the  iU^^ry° 
opposition  assumed  a  more  threatening  attitude.  Movement 
Members  of  the  professional  classes  held  poHtical  ban-  i^^"^^^*' 
quets  and  dehvered  inflammatory  speeches.  Work- 
ingmen  struck  in  Moscow,  Kovno,  Riga,  Vilna,  and  other  cities 
of  European  Russia.    At  Petrograd  a  procession  of  striking 
laborers,  headed  by  a  certain  priest,  Gapon  by  name,  was  fired 
upon  by  troops  while  on  its  way  to  present  a  petition  to  the  tsar, 
the  ''Uttle  father";  and  the  resulting  bloodshed  earned  for  the 
day  (22  January,  1905)  the  appellation  of  "Red  Sunday."  In 
the  rural  districts  bands  of  peasants  wandered  about  under  the 
influence  of  SociaHst  Revolutionary  leaders,  pillaging  and  burning 
the  mansions  of  noble  landlords  and  country  gentlemen.  The 
reactionary  Grand-Duke  Serge,  the  tsar's  uncle,  was  assassinated 
at  Moscow  on  17  February;  and  thenceforth  murders  of  promi- 
nent officials  became  common.    Armed  outbreaks  in  Poland 
and  in  the  Caucasus  were  put  down  only  by  the  vigorous  action 
of  Russian  soldiery.    The  state  railways  could  be  operated  only 
under  martial  law.    The  universities  were  closed. 

Unable  to  suppress  the  growing  disorders,  the  tsar  painfully 
and  falteringly  gave  heed  to  the  popular  clamors.  He  decreed 
religious  toleration  and  licensed  the  use  of  the  Polish  and  Lithu- 
anian languages  in  private  schools.  He  relaxed  the  enforcement 
of  anti-Jewish  legislation.    He  remitted  the  arrears  of  the  sums 


48o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


due  from  the  peasants  for  their  shares  in  the  communal  lands. 
He  agreed  to  put  the  trial  of  political  offenders  on  a  more  regu- 
Concessions  basis.  In  June,  1905,  in  reply  to  a  deputation  of 
of  Nicholas  a  congress  of  zemstvos,  he  promised  the  speedy  con- 
vocation  of  a  national  assembly.  In  August  he  pro- 
mulgated a  constitutional  law,  providing  for  the  creation  of  such 
an  assembly,  to  be  known  as  the  Imperial  Duma  and  to  counsel 
with  the  tsar  in  the  making  of  laws.  Then  he  dismissed  Pobe- 
donostsev,  Trepoff,  and  other  ultra-reactionary  ministers,  sum- 
moned Witte  to  be  the  first  premier  of  a  Russian  cabinet  under  the 
jjjg  new  regime,  and  on  30  October,  1905,  issued  his  most 

Manifesto  famous  manifesto.  The  October  Manifesto  con- 
i905^:*°Es-'^'  tained  guarantees  of  the  individual  liberties  of  con- 
tabiishment  science,  specch,  and  association ;  established  a 
of  the  Duma  jY^Q^^gj-g^^eiy  popular  franchise  for  the  election  of  the 
Duma ;  and  clearly  stated  that  henceforth  no  law  sh6uld  be 
valid  without  the  Duma's  consent.  Subsequently,  a  decree  of 
December,  1905,  virtually  granted  universal  manhood  suffrage, 
and  another  of  March,  1906,  made  provision  for  a  bicameral 
The  Council  national  legislature  by  designating  the  Duma  as  the 
of  the  Lower  House  and  by  transforming  the  old  Council  of 
Empu-e  State  into  an  Upper  House,  under  the  new  title  of 
Council  of  the  Empire,  half  of  whose  members  should  be 
appointed  by  the  tsar  and  half  elected  indirectly  by  certain 
privileged  classes. 

By  1906,  however,  the  revolutionary  wave  in  Russia  had  spent 
its  main  force,  and  thenceforth  it  began  slowly  but  certainly  to  re- 
cede.   The  conclusion  of  peace  with  Japan  (Septem- 
Se^Revoiu-  ^^^j  1 9^5)  put  an  end  to  the  series  of  disgraceful  de- 
tionary        feats  abroad  and  enabled  the  government  to  utiHze 
Movement,    ^j^^  army  to  restore  order  at  home.    Then,  too,  after 
nearly  two  years'  efforts  in  foreign  war  and  domestic 
upheaval,  many  Russians  began  to  long  for  peace  and  quiet  and 
for  the  economic  advantages  which  public  order  would  bring. 
Moreover,  the  revolutionary  elements  commenced  to  disintegrate 
and  to  waste  their  energies  in  factional  quarrels.  Not 
an^Tthe    ^^^Y       ^^c  Social  Democrats  and  Socialist  Revolu- 
Revoiution-   tionaries  maintain  separate  organizations  and  distinct 
"^^^  class  interests,  but  the  Liberals  —  professional  men 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  481 


and  zemstvo  members  —  divided  on  the  constitutional  question : 
a  radical  group,  organized  as  the  ''Constitutional  Democrats'* 
under  the  leadership  of  Professor  Milyukov  and  popularly  known 
as  the  *'  Cadets,"  refused  to  recognize  the  finaHty  of  the  The 
tsar's  decrees  and  demanded  that  the  first  Duma  "  Cadets " 
should  draw  up  a  constitution  that  would  give  Russia  a  thor- 
oughly democratic  parHament  with  supreme  legislative  powers  and 
with  perfect  control  of  the  sovereign  and  his  ministers ;  another 
group,  styled  the  ''Octobrists"  and  representing  the  The  "  Octo- 
more  conservative  Liberals,  especially  the  zemstvo  men,  " 
were  content  to  accept  the  famous  October  decree  of  the  tsar,  with 
its  provision  for  a  Duma  as  a  check  upon,  but  not  as  a  complete 
substitute  for,  the  autocracy.    The  Cadets  stood  for  constitu- 
tional government  based  on  the  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty ; 
the  Octobrists  stood  for  constitutional  government  based  on  the 
voluntary  consent  of  the  divinely  ordained  tsar.  Generally, 
too,  the  Cadets  championed  the  autonomy  of  Poland  and  a 
federal  form  of  government  for  the  empire,  while  the  Octobrists 
were  influenced  by  Pan-Slavic  ideals  and  devoted  to  the  patriotic 
policy  of  ''Russification."    Finally,  the  great  landlords,  alarmed 
by  the  prevalence  of  disorder  in  the  rural  districts  and  fearful 
lest  a  Liberal  Duma  should  confiscate  their  estates,  q^^^^^^^ 
began  to  cooperate  with  the  reactionary  court  faction,  tionof  the 
with  the  army  officers,  and  with  old-fashioned  Pan-Slav-  Reaction- 

.        ,  •         r     1  r        •        anes :  the 

ists,  to  resist  the  execution  of  the  recent  reforming  "Union  of 
decrees  and  to  maintain  the  autocracy  in  its  former  p^^^^p^^f,^^*" 
power  and  vigor.    These  reactionaries  organized  the 
''Union  of  the  Russian  People,"  which  early  in  1906  inaugurated 
an  active  campaign  in  behalf  of  the  traditional  regime.  And  to  the 
revolutionary  terrorism  which  had  characterized  Russia  in  1904- 
1905  succeeded  now  a  reactionary  terrorism.    The  "black  band" 
or  "black  hundreds,"  as  the  rufiian  agents  of  the  "Union"  were 
branded  in  popular  speech,  seemed  bent  on  the  exter-  Reactionary 
mination  of  the  radical  elements :  they  terrorized  the  Terrorism 
countryside  and  particularly  against  the  Jews  committed  whole- 
sale robbery  and  murder. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  tsar's  government  could  afford 
to  draw  back  somewhat  from  the  advanced  constitutional  posi- 
tion which  it  had  taken  in  1905.    In  the  decree  of  March,  1906, 

VOL.  II  — 21 


482  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


which  established  the  Council  of  the  Empire  as  the  upper  house 
of  the  proposed  parliament,  Nicholas  II  formally  excluded  from 
^,   „  .     parliamentary  discussion  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 

The  Mam-     ^      .  •;  .      .         r    i     i     •  i    •      i  t 

festo  of  empire  and  the  constitution  of  the  legislative  bodies ; 
ijo?-^'  declared  that  the  control  of  army,  navy,  and  foreign 
Limits  to  poHcy  was  an  exclusive  prerogative  of  the  tsar ;  gave 
of  ti^^Duma  P^^^^  imperial  ministers  to  issue  temporary 

laws  when  the  Duma  was  not  sitting;  reserved  the 
right  of  negotiating  loans  to  the  minister  of  finance;  and 
provided  that  if  the  parliament  should  not  pass  the  annual 
budget  the  government  might  substitute  the  estimates  of  the 
preceding  year.  Then  in  April,  1906,  the  tsar,  yielding  to  the 
terrorism  of  the  Black  Hundreds  and  to  the  entreaties  of  the 
reactionaries,  dismissed  Witte  from  the  premiership  and  ap- 
pointed as  his  successor  the  conservative  Goremykin,  with  Peter 
Stolypin  as  minister  of  the  interior.    Stolypin  (1862-1911)  ^  was 

^  .  the  ablest  man  in  the  new  ministry  and  the  most 
Stolypm,  .  „  .  ,    .  . 

Prime         prominent  oincial  from  1906  to  191 1.  Becoming 

1906-1911  pri^^  minister  in  July,  1906,  he  labored  to  maintain 
both  the  autocracy  and  the  Duma :  on  the  one  hand, 
he  resisted  the  pressure  from  the  extreme  reactionaries  to  aboHsh 
the  Duma  altogether;  on  the  other  hand,  he  punished  revolu- 
tionary crimes  with  a  severity  that  resembled  Plehve's. 

Meanwhile  the  first  Russian  parliament  had  been  chosen  and 
had  assembled  in  Petrograd  on  10  May,  1906.  A  fateful  question 
at  once  confronted  the  national  representatives  :  who 
Duma"^^*  would  be  master  of  the  country  —  the  Duma  or  the 
(1906) and  tsar's  ministers?  The  Cadets,  who  commanded  a 
t(f  Estabifsii  majority  in  the  Duma,  answered  the  former.  Goremy- 
Pariiamen-  kin,  Stolypin,  and  the  tsar  answered  the  latter.  The 
eminent"  Duma  prepared  to  enact  measures  looking  toward  the 
establishment  of  pure  parHamentary  government  and 
the  expropriation  of  the  landlords.  The  ministry  blocked  the 
measures  and  at  length  on  21  July,  1906,  dissolved  the  Duma  by 
imperial  decree  and  ordered  new  elections.    This  action  the 

^  Peter  Stolypin,  the  son  of  a  country  gentleman,  was  born  near  Moscow, 
served  in  various  grades  of  the  civil  administration,  and  as  governor  of  Saratov 
early  in  1906  attracted  the  favorable  attention  of  the  tsar  by  his  effective  repress 
sion  of  terrorism  and  disorder. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  483 


Cadets  refused  to  accept,  and,  in  imitation  of  the  celebrated  meet- 
ing in  the  tennis-court  at  Versailles  in  1789,  some  two  hundred 
members  of  the  first  Duma  adjourned  to  Viborg  in  Dissolution 
Finland,  where  they  drew  up  and  issued  a  manifesto  of  the  First 
calling  on  the  Russian  people  to  refuse  taxes  and  mili-  Jhe™ne?e1;- 
tary  service.     The  Viborg  Manifesto  produced  but  tuai  viborg 
feeble  response :    its  authors  were  disfranchised,  the 
Cadet  Clubs  were  closed,  the  few  attempts  at  armed  insurrection 
were  easily  suppressed,  and  special  courts  martial,  endowed  by 
the  government  with  summary  powers,  put  many  revolutionaries 
to  death  and  banished  some  35,000  persons  in  1906. 

The  opponents  of  autocracy,  despite  governmental  interference 
at  the  polls,  secured  a  majority  in  the  second  Duma,  which  met 
on  c;  March,  1007.    Again  there  was  the  same  ^'m/>a55^  ^ 

1  ,  o,,.,  The  Second 

between  the  ministry  and  the  Duma.    Stolypm  s  pro-  Duma 
posal  to  effect  land  reform  by  emancipating  the  .^J^^^)  and 

1     r    1        'n  .  .      Its  Failure  to 

peasants  from  the  control  of  the  village  communities  Preserve  its 
(mirs)  and  handing  over  to  them  the  crown  lands  and 
imperial  estates,  was  considered  too  mild  :  the  Duma 
demanded  the  complete  expropriation  of  all  great  landowners, 
the  abolition  of  the  field  courts  martial,  and  guarantees  of 
ministerial  responsibility  to  the  parliament.  The  Social  Demo- 
crats were  particularly  obstreperous  in  their  opposition  to  the 
government ;  the  prime  minister  accused  their  leaders  of  com- 
plicity in  a  treasonable  plot  to  suborn  the  army  and  peremptorily 
requested  the  Duma  to  deliver  them  over  to  arrest  and  punish- 
ment. The  Duma,  pleading  parliamentary  privilege,  refused  the 
request ;  and  the  tsar  dissolved  the  second  Duma  by  decree  of 
16  June,  1907. 

This  time  the  tsar,  in  flat  contradiction  to  his  former  decree 
of  October,  loot;,  fundamentally  altered  the  electoral  ^.    ,  . 

1  TIT  1  1  11.         1  1-  Dissolution 

law.  Most  elaborate  and  comphcated  machinery  of  the  Sec- 
was  now  set  up  for  elections  to  the  Duma,  to  the  ^^^^^ 

end  that  the  Lower  House  of  the  parliament,  as  well  tion  of  the 

as  the  Upper,  would  be  assured  a  clear  majority  ^3^*^^*}^^^ 

of  wealthy  Conservative  and  Pan-Slavist  members,  periai  De- 
The  provinces  of  central  Asia  were  disfranchised  al-  J""®' 
together  ;  the  representation  of  Poland,  Caucasia,  and 
Siberia  was  greatly  reduced  ;  the  electoral  districts  were  so  gerry- 


484  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


mandered"  as  to  incorporate  radically  inclined  cities  with  more 
populous  areas  of  conservative  agriculturists ;  and  by  a  class-sys- 
tem of  voting  great  landlords  were  given  a  controlling  influence. 

The  new  electoral  law  worked  as  the  tsar  and  Stolypin  had 
intended.  The  third  Duma,  chosen  in  accordance  with  its  pro- 
The  Third  "^^i^^^^  October,  1907,  was  composed  largely  of 
Duma  and  country  gentlemen  with  a  sprinkhng  of  merchants. 
^*/o^"F?*'.'^    The  majority,  made  up  of  Octobrists  and  Moderate 

of  stolypin  .  -11 

Conservatives,  were  resigned  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  Duma  as  a  consultative  body  and  were  quite  willing  to  recog- 
nize that  the  final  establishment  of  real  parliamentary  govern- 
ment in  Russia  would  be  the  result  only  of  a  slow  evolution  under 
the  benevolent  patronage  of  the  tsar  and  his  ministers.  The 
Cadets,  greatly  reduced  in  numbers,  though  still  under  the 
leadership  of  Professor  Milyukov,  consented  to  drop  their  obstruc- 
tionist tactics  and  to  play  the  role  of  constitutional  opposition. 
Only  a  few  Social  Democrats  and  small  irreconcilable  national 
groups,  on  the  one  side,  and  a  larger  faction  of  Extreme  Con- 
servatives, on  the  other,  preserved  an  open  and  uncompromising 
hostility  to  the  existing  regime. 

Until  1909  Stolypin's  government  devoted  major  attention  to 
the  restoration  of  internal  order,  to  the  punishment  of  political 

crimes,  and  to  the  strengthening  of  the  autocratic 
of^the^Revo-  P^wer  which  had  been  so  seriously  threatened  by  the 
lutionary  revolutionary  movement  of  1 904-1 905.  Revolution- 
1906-1909*'  violence  continued,  but  with  decreasing  effect: 

in  1 906-1 907  the  number  of  ofhcials  killed  or  wounded 
by  Terrorists,  according  to  public  reports,  was  413 1 ;  in  1908  it 
dropped  to  1009.  Sternly  Stolypin  coped  with  the  situation. 
The  signers  of  the  Viborg  Manifesto  were  arrested,  condemned 
to  three  months'  imprisonment,  and  permanently  deprived  of 
the  franchise.  The  Social  Democratic  members  of  the  second 
Duma,  who  had  been  accused  of  treason,  were  tried  behind  closed 
doors  and  thirty-one  were  sent  to  Siberia.  The  police  were 
empowered  to  impose  fines  or  to  imprison  up  to  three  months  any 
person  who  published  or  circulated  any  article  "arousing  a  hos- 
tile attitude  to  the  government."  In  the  three  years  from  1906 
to  1908  at  least  2300  political  offenders  were  put  to  death  and 
many  thousands  were  banished. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


485 


After  February,  1909,  there  was  a  steady  and  rapid  fall  in  the 
number  of  executions.  Martial  law  was  gradually  replaced  by 
milder  measures.  Greater  freedom  was  allowed  to  the  press  than 
had  obtained  under  Plehve.  And  the  Duma,  if  shorn  ^^^^ 
of  effective  control  over  the  ministry  and  over  public  nance  of  the 
finances,  still  remained  a  national  assembly,  counsel-  2"?*  * 

,  ,  -  .  .       .    ,     .        ,        .   .  National 

mg  the  tsar  and  from  tmie  to  time  inducing  the  minis-  consuita- 
ters  to  accept  amendments  to  their  legislative  pro-  5y®  ^ 

.       ^     \  1  •  1  1  Chamber 

posals.    In  the  Duma  the  Russian  people  possessed  a 
body  that  at  least  could  speak  for  the  nation  and  that  contained 
the  germ  of  political  democracy.    That  was  the  fruit  of  the 
Russian  Revolution  of  1905. 

Stolypin  did  not  live  to  see  the  completion  of  the  labors  of 
the  third  Duma.    As  one  of  the  isolated  outrages  in  the  last 
expiring  gasps  of  revolutionary  terrorism  he  was  Assassina- 
killed  in  September,  191 1,  in  the  imperial  theater  tionof 
at  Kiev,  by  the  dagger-thrust  of  a  Jewish  lawyer,  luccession*^ 
Kokovtsev,  his  successor  in  the  premiership,  was  an  of  Kokov- 
economist  of  European  reputation,  who  continued  his 
policies,  and,  in  addition,  introduced  salutary  reforms  in  the 
national  finances.    In  June,  191 2,  the  third  Duma  came  to  an 
end.    Since  1907  it  had  passed  several  noteworthy  bills.  One 
(passed  in  1909)  ratified  a  temporary  decree  of  Novem-  -y^^j-j^ 
ber,  1906,  empowering  the  peasants  to  become  owners  Third  Duma, 
of  their  allotments,  remitting  their  redemption  dues,  ^^^^^-igia 
and  practically  aboHshing  the  system  of  ownership  by  the  village 
community  (mir)  —  a  measure,  if  strictly  carried  out,  quite  as 
epochal  as  Alexander  II's  original  edict  of  emancipation  (1861). 
Another  bill  dealt  with  a  general  scheme  of  workingmen's  insur- 
ance; another,  with  the  reform  of  the  local  administration  of 
justice;  another,  with  the  extension  of  elementary  education 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Orthodox  Church.    In  fact,  the  third 
Duma  showed  unmistakable  zeal  in  supporting  patriotic  Pan- 
Slavist  proposals  whether  of  Stolypin  or  of  Kokovtsev.  Not 
only  were  the  laws  against  the  Jews  maintained  and  additional 
legislation  devised  to  crush  the  Polish  national  movement,  but 
the  Duma  approved  in  191 2  an  extraordinary  expenditure  of  half 
a  billion  roubles^  for  the  building  of  a  new  navy. 

*  A  Russian  rouble  is  worth  $0,515, 


486 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


The  fourth  Duma,  quietly  elected  in  191 2,  had  much  the  same 
political  complexion  as  its  predecessor,  and  played  much  the 

same  role.  It  quarreled  with  the  Council  of  the 
DumaTnd^  Empire  about  a  ministerial  proposal  for  the  further 
the  Orderly  Russificatiou "  of  Poland,  but  it  indorsed  govern- 
the^Com^^*  mental  recommendations  for  strict  regulation  of  the 
promise  be-  liquor  traffic  and  for  lengthening  the  legal  term  of 
tocracy^and  ^-ctive  service  in  the  infantry  from  three  to  three  and 
National  one-fourth  years  (1913).  When,  in  February,  1914, 
sentSion      Nicholas  II  replaced  Kokovtsev  by  the  septuagenarian 

Goremykin  as  prime  minister,  it  seemed  as  if  the 
political  organization  of  Russia  had  reached  a  normal  equilibrium 
that  could  paradoxically  but  properly  be  described  in  the  official 
almanac  as  *'a  constitutional  monarchy  under  an  autocratic 
tsar." 

In  one  part  of  the  tsar's  dominions  —  the  grand-duchy  of 
Finland  —  the  revolution  of  1905  had  produced  results  less 
The  Finnish  advantageous  to  the  principle  of  autocracy.  The 
Question,  dogged  and  determined  resistance  of  the  whole  Fin- 
1905-1914  people  to  the  tsar's  virtual  abrogation  of  their 

ancient  constitution  in  1899  had  culminated  in  November,  1905, 
in  a  ''national  strike."  The  railway,  steamship,  telephone,  and 
postal  services  were  suspended.  Helsingfors,  the  capital  of  the 
grand-duchy,  was  without  street-cars,  cabs,  and  lights,  and  no 
shops  except  provision  stores  were  open.  Nicholas  II,  shaken  by 
the  disastrous  outcome  of  the  Japanese  War  and  by  the  revolu- 
tionary movement  in  Russia,  capitulated  to  the  Finns  and  by 
decree  of  17  November,  1905,  restored  the  Finnish  Constitution. 
The  strike  ceased  at  once.  A  Diet  was  promptly  elected  —  the 
first  since  1899  —  and  met  in  December  :  it  sat  for  three  months 
_    „        and  drafted  a  new  constitution  for  Finland,  substitut- 

The  New 

Finnish  iug  a  single  Chamber  for  the  former  legislature  of  four 
Constitu-      Estates,  and  establishiner  proportional  representation 

tionofi9o6         :  ° /  /; 

and  universal  suffrage  anke  for  men  and  for  women. 
This  reform  of  the  Finnish  government  was  ratified  by  the  tsar 
in  1906.  Subsequently,  under  the  influence  of  Stolypin  and  the 
Pan-Slavists,  Nicholas  II  insisted  that  the  decision  in  all  Finnish 
questions  affecting  the  empire  must  rest  with  the  Russian  minis- 
try; and  new  efforts  to  curtail  the  power  of  the  Finnish  Diet 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  487 


just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Nations  aroused  the 
liveliest  apprehension  in  Finland. 

The  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  in  August,  1914,  witnessed 
a  mighty  demonstration  of  Russian  Pan-Slavism.  The  tsar, 
addressing  his  parliament,  testified  to  "the  tremen-  Russia  and 
dous  outburst  of  patriotic  sentiment,  of  love  and  the  War  of 
loyalty  to  the  throne,  which,  Hke  a  tempest,  traversed  Nations 
our  entire  land, "  and  went  on  to  say,  We  are  not  only  defending 
the  dignity  and  honor  of  our  country,  but  we  are  also  fighting  for 
our  Slavic  brothers,  the  Serbs,  our  co-religionists  and  kinsmen, 
and  at  this  moment  I  behold  with  joy  how  the  union  of  all  the 
Slavs  with  Russia  is  being  strongly  and  unremittingly  carried  to 
completion."  While  the  predominant  sentiment  in  Russia  was 
a  militant  combination  of  personal  fealty  to  the  tsar,  zeal  for  the 
national  Orthodox  Church,  and  pride  in  the  possession  of  Slavic 
as  opposed  to  Teutonic  culture,  at  the  same  time  the  Russian 
government  made  some  attempt  to  conciliate  discontented  minori- 
ties. The  struggle  with  the  Finnish  Diet  was  interrupted.  The 
Poles  were  solemnly  promised  a  restoration  of  their  kingdom  and 
the  grant  of  political  autonomy.  The  execution  of  the  laws 
against  Catholics  and  Lutherans  was  eased.  Even  the  Jews 
were  told  that  the  tsar  loved  them,  and  were  allowed  to  become 
officers  in  the  army. 


ADDITIONAL  READING 


General.  Elementary  narratives:  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since  181  j 
(1910),  ch.  xxix,  xxxi;  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development 
of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch.  xxviii;  J.  H.  Rose,  The  Development 
of  the  European  Nations,  1870-1  goo,  Vol.  I  (1905),  ch.  xi.  Broader  political 
surveys:  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  xxii,  and  Vol.  XII 
(1910),  ch.  xii,  xiii ;  Histoire  generate.  Vol.  XI,  ch.  xiv,  and  Vol.  XII,  ch.  xi ; 
Alfred  Rambaud,  Histoire  de  la  Russie  depuis  les  origines  jusqu^d  nos  jours, 
6th  ed.  rev.  and  completed  to  1913  by  Emile  Haumant  (1914),  ch.  xxxvi- 
xli,  a  scholarly  work  with  excellent  bibliographies  —  the  original  edition  of 
which  was  published  in  English  translation  in  three  volumes  (1881).  Valu- 
able descriptions  of  present-day  Russia:  Anatole  Leroy-Beaulieu,  The 
Empire  of  the  Tsars  and  the  Russians,  trans,  from  3d  French  edition  by  Z.  A. 
Ragozin,  3  vols.  (1893-1896),  admirable  particularly  in  deahng  with  re- 
ligious affairs  and  the  position  of  the  Russian  Church ;  Sir  D.  M.  Wallace, 
Russia,  new  ed.  (1908),  perhaps  the  best  general  treatment  of  Russian 


488  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


civilization;  Maurice  Baring,  The  Russian  People,  2d  ed.  (191 1),  clear, 
unbiased,  and  comprehensive ;  Leo  Wiener,  An  Interpretation  of  the  Russian 
People  (191 5),  brief  but  illuminating;  J.  Novicow,  The  Russian  People, 
a  Psychological  Study,  a  suggestive  essay  in  Alfred  Rambaud,  The  Expan- 
sion of  Russia,  2d  ed.  (1904) ;  H.  W.  Williams,  Russia  of  the  Russians 
(1914),  a  popular  account  by  a  former  Petrograd  correspondent  of  the  Man- 
chester Guardian;  Gregor  Alexinsky,  Modern  Russia,  Eng.  trans,  by 
Bernard  Miall  (1913),  a  comprehensive  but  partisan  survey  by  a  Russian 
Socialist  who  sat  in  the  second  Duma ;  Wolf  von  Schierbrand,  Russia,  her 
Strength  and  her  Weakness  (1904);  Alan  Lethbridge,  The  New  Russia: 
From  the  White  Sea  to  the  Siberian  Steppe  (191 5),  an  interesting  book  of 
travel;  Maxime  Kovalevsky,  Russian  Political  Institutions,  Eng.  trans. 
(1902),  historical  as  well  as  descriptive,  a  brief  resume  by  an  eminent 
Russian  scholar;  Wiatscheslaw  Gribowski,  Das  Staatsrecht  des  russischen 
Reiches  (191 2),  a  brief  but  sound  exposition  of  the  public  law  of  the  em- 
pire ;  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  Russia,  a  Hand- 
hook  on  Commercial  and  Industrial  Conditions,  prepared  by  J.  H.  Snod- 
grass,  U.  S.  consul-general  at  Moscow,  and  other  consular  officers,  and 
published  by  the  American  government  at  Washington  (1913) ;  W.  de 
Kovalevsky,  La  Russie  a  la  fin  du  XIX^  si'.cle  (1900),  prepared  in  con- 
nection with  the  Paris  Exposition  of  1900;  Maxime  Kovalevsky,  Le  regime 
Sconomique  de  la  Russie  (1898) ;  Gaetan  (Vicomte)  Combes  de  Lestrade, 
La  Russie  iconomique  et  sociale  a  Vavenement  de  S.  M.  Nicholas  II  (1896) ; 
August  von  Haxthausen,  Russian  Empire,  its  People,  Institutions,  and  Re- 
sources, Eng.  trans.,  2  vols.  (1856),  valuable  for  description  of  social  condi- 
tions at  the  time  when  the  work  was  written.  Much  useful  information 
concerning  conditions  in  the  twentieth  century  is  supplied  by  The  Russian 
Year  Book,  ed.  by  H.  P.  Kennard  (191 1  sqq.),  and  by  The  Russian  Review, 
a  journal  published  in  England  since  191 2. 

The  Expansion  of  Russia  and  "  Russification."  The  standard  treatise 
on  the  territorial  growth  of  Russia  since  181 5  is  F.  H.  Skrine,  The  Expansion 
of  Russia,  3d  ed.  (191 5);  and  additional  information  on  this  subject  is 
furnished  by  Geoffrey  Drage,  Russian  Afairs  (1904),  by  A.  J.  Beveridge, 
The  Russian  Advance  (1903),  by  M.  M.  Shoemaker,  The  Great  Siberian 
Railway  from  St.  Petersburg  to  Pekin  (1903),  and  by  the  books  cited  in  the 
bibliography  appended  to  Chapter  XXVII,  below.  Important  for  the 
development  of  Pan-Slavism  is  a  careful  study  of  the  reign  of  Alexander  III, 
of  whom  the  best  biographies  are:  Charles  Lowe,  Alexander  III  (1895); 
H.  G.  Samson  von  Himmelstjerna,  Russia  under  Alexander  III  and  in 
the  Preceding  Period,  trans,  from  German  by  J.  Morrison  (1893).  K.  P. 
Pob^donostsev,  the  famous  Procurator  of  the  Holy  Synod  under  Alexander 
III  and  Nicholas  II  and  the  stanch  champion  of  autocracy  and  "  Russi- 
fication," has  attempted  to  defend  the  regime,  of  which  he  was  so  con- 
spicuously a  part,  in  his  interesting  Reflections  of  a  Russian  Statesman, 
trans,  from  French  by  R.  C.  Long  (1898).  On  the  "  Russification  "  of 
particular  peoples,  consult:    Victor  Berard,  The  Russian  Empire  and 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  489 


Czarism,  Eng.  trans,  by  G.  Fox-Davies  and  G.  0.  Pope  (1905) ;  Israel 
Friedlaender,  The  Jews  of  Russia  and  Poland  (191 5) ;  Georg  Brandes, 
Poland,  a  Study  of  the  Land,  People,  and  Literature  (1903) ;  J.  R.  Fisher, 
Finlatui  and  the  Tsars,  i8og-i8gQ  (1899) ;  Henry  Norman,  All  the  Russias 
(1902),  presenting,  among  many  other  matters,  the  Russian  side  of  the 
Finnish  question;  W.  A.  Phillips,  Poland  (1915),  ch.  ix-xiii,  a  brief  account 
of  Polish  history  since  1862,  in  the    Home  University  Library." 

Revolutionary  Movements.  James  Mavor,  An  Economic  History  of 
Russia,  Vol.  II  (1914),  Books  IV-VII,  the  best  general  account  of  the  revolu- 
tionary movements,  with  special  reference  to  their  economic  aspects, 
particularly  good  on  the  agrarian  question  and  on  the  Industrial  Revolution 
in  Russia;  Ludwik  Kulczycki,  Geschichte  der  russischen  Revolution,  trans, 
from  Polish  into  German,  3  vols.  (1910-1914),  covering  the  years  1825- 
1900,  exhaustive,  sympathetic  with  the  revolutionaries,  and,  when  com- 
pleted, promising  to  become  a  standard  work;  Alphons  Thun,  Geschichte 
der  revolutiondren  Bewegungen  in  Russland  (1883),  useful  for  the  move- 
ments during  the  reign  of  Alexander  II ;  George  Kennan,  Siberia  and  the 
Exile  System,  4th  ed.,  2  vols.  (1897),  the  celebrated  work  of  an  American 
traveler  and  journalist,  highly  colored  but  probably  just  in  its  broad  out- 
lines; Peter  (Prince)  Kropotkin,  Memoirs  of  a  Revolutionist,  fascinating 
impressions  of  an  aristocrat  who  spent  his  youth  on  a  great  landed  estate 
in  Russia  and  who  subsequently  became  a  prominent  Anarchist  and  revolu- 
tionary ;  N.  V.  Gogol,  Dead  Souls,  the  famous  novel,  valuable  for  its  pic- 
tures of  social  unrest  in  Russia  under  Alexander  II,  Eng.  trans,  by  D.  J. 
Hogarth,  conveniently  published  in  "  Everyman's  Library  " ;  the  writ- 
ings of  S.  M.  Kravchinski,  an  active  revolutionist,  who  employed  the 
pseudonym  of  Sergius  Stepniak,  especially  Underground  Russia  (1883), 
Russian  Peasantry,  their  Agrarian  Condition,  Social  Life,  and  Religion 
(1905),  Career  of  a  Nihilist  (1901),  and  At  Dawn  of  a  New  Reign:  Study 
of  Modern  Russia:  King  Stark  and  King  Log  (1895)  5  Maxime  Kovalevsky, 
La  crise  russe:  notes  et  impressions  d'un  temoin  (1906),  observations  on  the 
revolutionary  movement  of  1905  by  an  eminent  Russian  scholar;  Paul  • 
Milyoukov,  Russia  and  its  Crisis  (1905),  based  on  lectures  delivered  in  the 
United  States,  pronouncedly  Liberal  in  tone ;  Konni  Zilliacus,  The  Russian 
Revolutionary  Movement,  Eng.  trans.  (1905),  the  work  of  a  well-informed 
Finn;  Bernard  Pares,  Russia  and  Reform  (1907),  an  important  work; 
G.  H.  Perris,  Russia  in  Revolution  (1905),  interesting  but  journalistic; 
W.  E.  Walling,  Russia's  Message  (1908),  a  Socialist's  view;  S.  N.  Harper, 
The  New  Electoral  Law  for  the  Russian  Duma  (1908),  a  valuable  study; 
Paul  Vinogradoff,  The  Russian  Problem  (19 14),  a  brief  but  suggestive 
lecture. 

For  the  Russo-Japanese  War  see  the  bibliography  appended  to  Chapter 
XXVII,  below.  For  the  foreign  policy  of  Russia  from  1871  to  19 14  and 
the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Nations  consult  Chapter  XXX,  below, 
and  the  bibliography  appended  thereto. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


THE  DISMEMBERMENT  OF  THE  OTTOMAN  EMPIRE,  1683-1914 

THE  OTTOMAN  EMPIRE  AND  ITS  DECLINE,  1683-1815 

Prior  to  1683  the  advance  of  the  Ottoman  Turks  had  been 
pretty  uniformly  successful.  In  Asia  they  had  established  them- 
Extent  of  selves  as  masters  of  Asia  Minor,  Armenia,  Syria, 
the  ottoman  Caucasia,  the  Euphrates  valley,  and  the  shore  of  the 
Empire,  1683  j^^^  Africa  their  conquering  armies  had  ap- 

propriated Egypt,  Tripoli,  Tunis,  and  Algeria.  In  Europe  they 
had  subjugated  the  Tatars  and  Cossacks  immediately  north  of 
the  Black  Sea ;  they  had  conquered  the  entire  Balkan  peninsula, 
including  present-day  Greece,  Bulgaria,  Rumania,  Bessarabia, 
Bukowina,  Transylvania,  Hungary,  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  and  Albania ;  they  had  even  exacted  tribute  from 
the  Austrian  Habsburgs;  they  had  made  the  Black  Sea,  the 
iEgean,  and  the  eastern  Mediterranean  their  own,  and  occupied 
the  islands  of  Cyprus,  Crete,  and  Rhodes,  as  well  as  the  smaller 
islands  of  the  JEgeaxi. 

The  immediate  occasion  of  the  reversal  of  Turkish  fortunes 
was  the  counter  success  of  the  expedition  led  by  John  Sobieski, 
the  patriot  Polish  kin?,  which  in  168^  relieved  the 

Failure  of      ,    ,   ^  .    .        r  tt-  1  1  i      i     i  'j 

the  Turks  to  beleaguered  city  of  Vienna  and  turned  back  the  tide 
Capture       Qf  Turkish  conquest.    But  the  real  cause  of  subse- 

Vienna,  1083  \. 

quent  Ottoman  disasters  was  the  decay  of  political  in- 
stitutions within  the  huge  empire  and  the  growing  weakness  of 
the  army  —  a  cause  which  has  been  explained  in  an  earlier  chap- 
ter.^ After  1683,  as  the  Turkish  tide  gradually  receded,  there 
slowly  reappeared  in  the  Balkans  independent  Christian  nations 
that  had  long  lain  submerged  under  Mohammedan  dominion. 
There  also  appeared  the  rising  ambitions  and  waxing  empires 

1  See  Vol.  I,  pp.  383  ff. 
490 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


of  the  Austrian  Habsburgs  and  the  Russian  tsars.  More  and 
more  wistfully  both  Austria  and  Russia  looked  southward,  in- 
tent upon  profiting  by  the  decline  of  Turkish  power.  Austrian 
And  thus  the  decline  of  Turkish  power  created  an  in-  and  Russian 
tense  rivalry  between  two  great  Christian  empires  menTaf*^*' 
and  complicated  the  international  politics  of  Europe  Turkish 
for  many  generations.  Expense 

By  the  treaty  of  Karlowitz  (1699)  the  Austrian  Habsburgs 
permanently  secured  the  greater  part  of  Hungary,  including 
Transylvania,  and  thenceforth  looked  with  longing 
eye  upon  the  other  Ottoman  provinces  in  the  Balkan  Q^j|^"* 
peninsula.    The  Russians,  no  less  eager  to  expand  at  Treaty  of 
the  expense  of  the  Turks,  by  the  treaty  of  Kuchuk 
Kainarji  (1774)  obtained  Azov  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Don.    By  the  latter  treaty  the  Tatars  who  inhabited  the  coast- 
lands  north  of  the  Black  Sea  —  from  the  Caspian  to  the  Dniester 
—  were  made  practically  independent  of  Turkey,  and  Russian 
the  Sublime  Porte  (as  the  foreign  office  of  the  Otto-  Gains: 
man  Empire  is  magniloquently  styled)  recognized  ^udiuk^ 
Russia  as  the  protector  of  certain  Orthodox  churches  Kainarji, 
in  Constantinople.    Before  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  ^'^'^^ 
century  Catherine  II  of  Russia  had  seized  the  Crimea  (1783), 
extended  her  sway  over  the  ''independent"  Tatars,  and  pushed 
the  Russian  frontier  westward  to  the  Dniester  (1792). 

During  the  period  of  the  French  Revolution  and  Napoleonic 
Wars,  Turkey  was  repeatedly  threatened,  —  when  Napoleon 
suddenly  invaded  Egypt  (1798),  when  Russia  and  Turkey  dur- 
Great  Britain  opened  hostihties  (1807),  when  rebel-  ing  the  Era 
lion  lifted  its  head  in  Serbia,  in  Adrianople,  and  in  ^'^n^po^®®^ 
other  parts  of  the  empire.  But  Europe  was  then  more  concerned 
with  her  own  intestine  wars  than  with  the  Eastern  Question,  and 
in  the  confusion  Turkey  regained  Egypt,  although  compelled  to 
cede  Bessarabia  (181 2)  to  the  ever-advancing  Russians,  thus 
moving  the  Russian  frontier  from  the  river  Dniester  southward 
to  the  river  Pruth. 

In  spite  of  these  losses  the  dominions  of  the  sultan  still  formed 
a  noble  empire,  with  its  heart  in  Asia  Minor  and  its  head  at  Con- 
stantinople, and  with  arms  stretching  westward  through  Egypt, 
Tripoli,  Tunis,  and  Algeria  to  touch  Morocco,  southward  to  cm- 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


brace  the  Gulf  of  Aden  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  eastward  to  reach 
Persia  and  the  Caspian,  and  northward  to  resist  the  Russians  at 
The  Otto-  river  Pruth  and  the  Austrians  at  the  Save.  Over 

man  Empire  this  vast  realm  ruled  the  padishah,  ''King  of  Kings," 
m  1815  Shadow  of  God,"  or,  as  the  Europeans  called  him, 
the  sultan  —  claiming  to  be  the  oldest  male  of  the  royal  house 
of  Othman,^  and  the  khalif  or  supreme  ecclesiastical  lord  of  all 
Islam.  Notwithstanding  his  resounding  titles  the  sultan  was 
so  notoriously  victimized  by  his  numerous  wives,  so  depend- 
ent upon  his  grand  vizier  (prime  minister)  and  divan  (council 
of  ministers),  so  completely  at  the  mercy  of  his  professional 
army  —  the  Janissaries,  —  that  his  arbitrary  authority  was  as 
often  disregarded  as  enforced.  This  was  especially  true  of  the 
outlying  provinces,  like  Egypt,  where  the  governors  (pashas) 
resembled  tributary  princes  more  than  administrative  offi- 
cials. Everywhere  the  administration  was  paralyzed  by  in- 
subordination and  corruption.  Officials  purchased  their  ap- 
pointment and  used  their  powers  shamelessly  to  enrich 
themselves  by  illegal  extortions. 

The  worst  effects  of  the  sultan's  misgovernment  were  felt  by 
his  Christian  subjects.    It  must  be  remembered  that  when  the 
.      Turks  first  invaded  the  Near  East,  they  had  found 

The  Chris-  .    .  .... 

tian  "  Cat-  numerous  Christians  and  Jews  Hvmg  in  Egypt,  in  Syria 
Sultan*  and  in  Armenia,  and  a  solid  Christian  population  in  the 
Balkan  peninsula.  With  all  the  ardor  of  a  zealous  Mo- 
hammedan the  Turk  believed  that  he  should  valiantly  fight  for 
his  religion,  should  put  to  the  sword  all  heathen  idolators,  and 
should  strive  to  subjugate  all  Christian  and  Jewish  peoples. 
Consequently  the  victorious  Turkish  armies  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury had  spared  the  lives  of  conquered  Christians  but  had 
exacted  heavy  tribute.  A  few  of  the  Christians  embraced  the 
Mohammedan  faith,  and  thereby  gained  admission  to  the  ruling 
class.  But  the  vast  majority  remained  Christians,  and  the 
Turks  made  slight  attempt  to  convert  them.  Rather,  the  sultan 
recognized  the  Christian  bishops,  —  above  all,  the  (Greek  Ortho- 
dox) patriarch  of  Constantinople,  —  as  the  spokesmen  and  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Christian  population.  The  conquered  Chris- 
tian races  thus  became  a  submerged  people,  separated  from  the 

^  See  Vol.  I,  p.  23. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  493 


Turks  by  religion,  by  language,  by  costume,  by  manners,  and, 
most  of  all,  by  hatred.  For  the  Turks  prided  themselves  on 
being  valiant  warriors  and  Mohammedans;  they  looked  down 
with  infinite  scorn  upon  Christian  peasants  and  tradesmen :  the 
Christians  were  cattle  —  rayahs  —  fit  for  nothing  better  than 
to  obey  and  to  enrich  the  Turk.  It  was  little  wonder  that  the 
Christians  regarded  their  arrogant  conquerors  with  hatred.  The 
ill-feeling  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  under  the  corrupt 
misgovernment  of  the  Turks,  rapacious  tax-collectors  were  al- 
lowed to  demand  what  they  would  from  the  peasantry,  and 
heartlessly  to  enforce  their  unreasonable  demands,  if  necessary 
by  seizing  the  peasant's  crops,  or  by  forcing  the  peasant  to  watch 
his  harvest  rot  on  the  ground.  Moreover,  unruly  bands  of 
brigands  and  irregular  bodies  of  soldiery  terrorized  the  country 
and  repeatedly  robbed  the  peasants.  Worst  of  all  were  the  occa- 
sional outbursts  of  religious  fanaticism.  Sometimes  with  prov- 
ocation, and  sometimes  without,  the  Turks  would  fall  upon 
Christian  \'illagers,  slaughter  men,  women,  and  children,  and 
enrich  themselves  with  plunder. 

The  situation  was  most  acute  in  the  Balkan  peninsula,  where 
the  Turks,  even  including  converts  from  Christianity,  were 
overwhelmingly  outnumbered  by  the  rayahs,  except 
in  the  northeastern  part  of  Bulgaria,  in  Albania,  and  ^ous^Situa- 
in  the  vicinity  of  Constantinople  and  Adrianople.  tion  in  the 
The  bulk  of  the  population  in  what  are  now  Greece,  p^^^^ia 
Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Rumania  belonged  to  the  Greek 
Orthodox  Church,  the  church  which  had  definitely  broken  with 
the  Roman  Catholic  pope  in  1054.    At  the  head  of  the  Greek 
Orthodox  Church  was  the  patriarch  of  Constantinople,  appointed 
by  the  sultan.    The  Russian  Church,  it  is  worth  noting,  while 
governed  by  its  own  synod,  formed  another  branch  of  the 
Orthodox  Church ;  and  the  Russian  emperors  consistently  re- 
garded themselves  as  co-religionists  and  natural  protectors  of  all 
the  Greek  Orthodox  Christians. 

It  would,  therefore,  have  been  easy,  religion  alone  con- 
sidered, for  the  Greek  Orthodox  majority  in  what  are  now 
Greece,  Serbia,  Bosnia,  Macedonia,  Bulgaria,  and  Rumania,  to 
have  revolted  unitedly  and  with  the  friendly  support  of  the 
Russians  against  the  Mohammedan  Turks. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


The  Near  Eastern  Question,  however,  was  not  to  be  answered 
so  easily.    As  an  indirect  effect  of  the  French  Revolution,  the 
sentiment  of  national  and  racial  patriotism  entered 

Balkan  ♦     i    i     •  i       •        .       .      f       .  , 

Races  and  particularly  into  the  situation  m  the  mneteenth  cen- 
SftieT  ^^^^  transferred  the  emphasis  from  religion  to 
nationality.  Consequently  the  struggles  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  were  to  be  essentially  wars  for  national  inde- 
pendence and  aggrandizement,  rather  than  crusades  against  the 
"  infidel."  What  had  long  been  considered  by  the  Turks  as  the 
herd  of  Christian  ''cattle"  began  to  split  into  four  or  five  major 
groups.  Those  who  were  once  all  Christian  rayahs  oppressed 
by  their  common  enemy,  the  Turk,  now  insisted  that  they  were 
Serbs,  or  Bulgars,  or  Rumans,  or  Greeks,  or  Albanians.  The 
new  enthusiasm  for  nationality  was  an  echo  of  what  was  going 
on  among  Italians,  Germans,  Poles,  and  Czechs.  But  in  the 
Balkan  peninsula  races  were  so  endlessly  intermingled  that  the 
principle  of  nationalism,  instead  of  simplifying  matters,  prepared 
the  way  for  bitter  jealousies  and  fratricidal  wars. 

Since  the  very  dawn  of  history  the  Balkan  peninsula  had  been 
a  dumping-ground  for  diverse  races.  Again  and  again  barbarian 
hordes  from  the  north  and  east  had  invaded  the  peninsula,  and 
each  succeeding  invasion  had  left  the  blood  of  the  Balkan  peoples 
more  mongrel,  their  languages  more  confused,  and  their  gaudy 
costumes  more  diversified.  Nevertheless,  intermixed  as  the 
races  were,  at  least  four  considerable  "nations"  rose  in  European 
Turkey  during  the  nineteenth  century  and  asserted  their  right 
to  independent  national  existence. 

The  stalwart  Serbs  or  Servians  traced  their  descent  from  the 
Serbo-Croat  invaders  who  swarmed  into  the  peninsula  about 
I.  The  the  seventh  century  a.d.  These  Serbo-Croat  immi- 
Serbs  grants  left  colonies  in  Macedonia,  in  Bulgaria,  and 
even  in  Greece,  but  settled  more  thickly  in  the  northwestern 
part  of  the  peninsula,  just  south  of  the  Danube.  A  few  embraced 
the  Mohammedan  religion  and  became  aristocratic  landowners. 
The  Serbo-Croatsin  D alma tia,  northwestern  Bosnia,  and  Croatia- 
Slavonia  were  converted  to  the  Roman  Catholic  faith.  The 
majority  of  the  Serbo-Croats  in  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Herzegovina, 
and  southern  Bosnia,  however,  remained  Greek  Orthodox  Chris- 
tians.   These  are  the  Serbs  of  to-day.    They  belong  to  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


Slavic  group  of  peoples,  and  are,  therefore,  kinsfolk  of  the  Rus- 
sians, Poles,  Czechs,  Ruthenians,  and  Slovenes. 

The  Bulgars  or  Bulgarians  speak  a  Slavic  language  somewhat 
similar  to  that  of  the  Serbs.  Slavic  blood  —  if  there  be  such  a 
thing  —  flows  in  their  veins,  too,  but  with  many  ad-  2.  The 
mixtures.  About  the  fourth  century  a.d.,  Slavic  Bulgars 
farmers  had  settled  among  the  ancient  Thracian  inhabitants  of 
the  land.  Then  had  come  the  fierce  Bulgars,  Asiatic  tribesmen 
like  the  Turks,  conquering  the  Slavs,  then  adopting  the  Slavic 
customs  and  language.  Finally  had  come  the  Turks.  The  mix- 
ture of  these  many  elements  produced  the  Bulgarian  ''nation,'' 
which  now  inhabits  the  kingdom  of  Bulgaria,  Eastern  Rume- 
lia,  parts  of  the  Dobrudja,  and  most  of  the  interior  of  Macedonia. 

The  Rumans,  Vlachs,  or  Wallachs,  are  likewise  a  mixed  race, 
ha\ing  absorbed  Gothic,  Tatar,  and  Slavic  invaders;  they 
claim,  however,  to  be  descended  from  the  ancient  ^  TheRu- 
Roman  inhabitants  of  Dacia ;   they  call  themselves  mans  or 
Romans  or  Rumans,  and  their  language  is  based  upon  ^^^^^ 
Latin  in  somewhat  the  same  way  as  are  French,  ItaHan,  and 
Spanish.    The  present  kingdom  of  Rumania  (Moldavia  and 
Wallachia)  includes  less  than  seven  million  Rumans,  but  were  all 
the  Rumans  to  be  united  in  one  state,  Austria-Hungary  would 
have  to  give  up  Transylvania,  Bukowina,  and  part  of  Hungary ; 
Russia  would  have  to  cede  Bessarabia ;  and  the  Rumans  would 
then  form  a  national  state  with  a  population  of  twelve  million. 

In  the  southern  reaches  of  the  peninsula,  on  the  islands  of  the 
iEgean,  and  on  the  ^gean  coasts  of  Macedonia,  Thrace,  and 
Asia  Minor,  dwells  a  fourth  nation,  no  less  mixed  in  ^  -pj^^ 
origin  and  even  more  boastful  of  its  traditions.    The  Greeks  or 
modern  Greeks  may  have  in  their  veins  very  little  of 
the  blood  of  the  historic  Spartans  and  Athenians ;  they  may  in 
great  part  be  descended  from  Slavic  immigrants  of  the  eighth 
century,  or  even  from  the  slaves  of  the  ancient  Greeks ;  their 
national  costume,  with  its  red  cap,  flowing  white  sleeves,  white 
kilt,  velvet  jacket,  white  hose,  and  pointed  red  shoes,  was  un- 
questionably borrowed  from  Albanian  tribesmen  rather  than 
from  Periclean  Athens.    And  there  are  considerable  settlements 
of  Albanians  and  Rumans  in  the  heart  of  the  Greek  peninsula 
itself.    Nevertheless,  the  Greeks  consider  themselves  the  heirs 


496  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  ancient  Hellas ;  they  call  themselves  Hellenes ;  and  a  more 
passionate  national  patriotism  than  theirs  does  not  exist.  Nine 
millions  of  these  new  Hellenes,  many  of  them  wealthy  merchants, 
learned  scholars,  and  able  statesmen,  cherish  the  dream  of  a 
new  and  greater  Hellas,  including  the  Asiatic  coasts  of  the 
^gean,  and  the  islands,  as  well  as  the  Greek  peninsula.  This 
is  what  Hellenic  patriots  have  called  their  ''Great  Idea." 

Besides  these  four  major  nationalities  and  the  Ottoman  Turks, 
there  are  scattered  throughout  the  Balkan  peninsula  three  other 
5.  The  peculiar  peoples.  There  are  first  of  all  the  Albanian 
Albanians  mountaineers,  already  referred  to  in  connection  with 
the  Greeks.  The  origin  of  this  proud  and  warlike  race  is  a 
matter  of  conjecture ;  their  language  is  a  composite  of  Rumanian, 
Turkish,  Greek,  Slavic,  and,  possibly,  ancient  lUyrian.  They 
believe  themselves  to  be  one  nation  —  the  Skipitari  (''eagle's 
brood").  Several  facts  militate  against  the  success  of  an  inde- 
pendent Albanian  state,  however.  The  dialect  of  the  northern 
or  Gheg  tribes  is  all  but  unintelligible  to  the  southern  Albanian 
or  Tosc.  The  majority  are  Mohammedans  in  religion,  but  the 
strong  Greek  Orthodox  and  Roman  Catholic  minorities  cannot 
be  disregarded.  Moreover,  there  are  Greeks,  Serbs,  and  Bulgars 
in  the  district  known  as  Albania;  and  there  are  many  thou- 
sands of  Albanians  in  Greece  and  in  Serbia  and  scattered  settle- 
ments even  in  Italy. 

The  Gypsy  tinkers  who  wander  about  the  peninsula,  and  the 
numerous  Jewish  money-lenders  and  shop-keepers 
and  Jews  compHcate  the  situation  but  have  no  great  ambition 
to  become  independent  Balkan  nations. 

Among  the  Serbs,  Hellenes,  Bulgars,  and  Rumans,  the  senti- 
Nationaiist  ment  of  national  patriotism  exerted  a  most  powerful 
Propaganda  influence  in  the  nineteenth  century.  In  every  case 
the  nationalist  propaganda  worked  along  three  channels. 

First  of  all,  each  nation  must  have  its  own  language  and  litera- 
ture. To  this  end  Greek  scholars  revived  the  study  of  classical 
I  Literary  diXid,  as  a  result  of  their  labors,  the  modern 

literary  language  of  Greece  resembles  more  or  less 
closely  the  language  of  Demosthenes.  Similarly,  patriotic  Serbs 
in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  began  to  write  in  the 
Serb  language,  to  prepare  the  first  Serb  grammar  and  diction- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  497 


ary.  With  equal  pride,  Rumanian  authors  began  to  eliminate 
Slavic  words  from  their  vocabulary,  and,  by  conforming  their 
language  more  closely  to  Latin,  sought  to  emphasize  their  sup- 
posed Roman  ancestry.  Finally,  there  was  a  Bulgarian  Uterary 
revival,  which  in  1835  produced  the  first  Bulgarian  grammar. 
Each  literary  revival  implied  also  the  establishment  of  schools 
for  cultivation  of  the  national  language  and  for  the  inculcation 
of  patriotism. 

Hardly  less  important  was  the  ecclesiastical  aspect  of  nation- 
alism. So  long  as  all  the  Balkan  peoples  were  simply  down- 
trodden Christian  rayahs,  they  might  properly  be  rep-  2.  Ecciesi- 
resented  at  Constantinople  by  the  Greek  Orthodox  asticai 
patriarch.  When  the  Serbs,  Rumans,  and  Bulgars  awoke  to 
national  consciousness,  however,  they  could  no  longer  bear  to 
be  called  Greek  Christians,  or  tolerate  the  authority  of  the 
Greek  patriarch,  —  especially  since  the  Greeks  utilized  this 
ecclesiastical  advantage  as  a  means  of  disseminating  Hellenic 
speech  and  ideals.  Consequently  each  nation  insisted  that  its 
church  should  be  autocephalous,  —  that  is,  while  remaining 
Orthodox  in  doctrine  and  ritual,  each  national  church  should 
administer  its  affairs  and  appoint  its  clergy  independently. 
During  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  Serb  and  Ru- 
manian churches  achieved  autonomy  and  were  recognized  as 
autocephalous  branches  of  the  Orthodox  Church  in  1878.  Even 
the  Greeks  nationalized  their  church,  as  a  result  of  the  patriarch's 
unsympathetic  attitude  toward  the  Greek  revolt  of  1821-1829. 
Among  the  Bulgars  the  results  of  the  movement  were  unique : 
by  decree  of  the  sultan  (1870)  the  Bulgarian  church  was  placed 
under  an  exarch,  whom  the  indignant  patriarch  of  Constanti- 
nople for  more  than  forty  years  has  refused  to  recognize.  Thus 
the  Orthodox  Church  in  the  Balkan  countries,  just  as  in  Russia, 
was  subordinated  to  the  national  state. 

The  most  intense  activity  of  nationalist  agitators  was,  how- 
ever, neither  educational  nor  ecclesiastical,  but  political.  In 
their  political  propaganda,  the  nationalists  found  in  poutjcai 
history  a  veritable  arsenal  of  potent  arguments. 
Nothing  would  so  fire  the  patriotism  of  the  Greeks  as  an  appeal 
to  the  glorious  past :  remembering  how  a  handful  of  Athenians 
had  once  repelled  the  Persian  hordes,  or  how  Hellenism  had 

VOL.  n  —  2  K 


498  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


reigned  triumphant  in  the  never-to-be-forgotten  splendor  of  the 
Byzantine  Empire,  —  remembering  this,  how  could  modei:n 
Hellenes  remain  under  the  ignominious  yoke  of  Turkish 
despotism  ? 

Likewise  the  Serbs  fed  their  patriotism  on  glorious  traditions. 
Back  in  the  fourteenth  century  a  great  Serb  monarch,  Stephen 
Dushan  by  name,  had  ruled  a  mighty  empire,  including  Albania, 
Macedonia,  Epirus,  and  Herzegovina,  as  well  as  Serbia  proper. 
Why  should  not  the  nineteenth  century  witness  a  reawakening 
of  the  Serbs,  a  restoration  of  Stephen  Dushan's  Serbian  empire? 
Not  a  whit  less  proud  were  the  Bulgars,  who  boastingly  referred 
to  the  prowess  of  the  Bulgar  Tsar  Simeon  (893-927)  and  the 
puissance  of  Ivan  Asen  II  (1218-1241).  Nor  were  the  Ruman 
inhabitants  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  to  be  outdone.  They, 
too,  had  once  been  a  powerful  nation,  and  under  Stephen  the 
Great  of  Moldavia  (145  7-1 504)  had  warred  mightily  against  the 
Turks. 

Firm  in  the  belief  that  what  their  ancestors  had  done,  they 
too  could  accomplish,  the  patriots  of  each  nationality  clamored 
first  of  all  for  emancipation  from  the  Turk,  and  secondarily  for 
the  aggrandizement  of  the  nation.  Some  less  enthusiastic 
peasants  and  business  men  might  not  always  thrill  with  the  same 
lofty  ambition ;  nevertheless,  the  peasant  was  only  too  ready  to 
fight  against  the  hated  Turkish  oppressors  who  imposed  heavy 
taxes ;  and  the  business  man  was  persuaded  that  industry  would 
flourish  better  under  an  enlightened  national  government  than 
under  the  unprogressive  rule  of  the  half-civilized  Turk.  The 
new  nations  would  imitate  their  fellow-Europeans,  building  rail- 
ways, safeguarding  commerce  from  brigandage,  and  protecting 
rather  than  scorning  the  enterprising  industrial  capitalist. 

THE  GREAT  POWERS  AND  THE  DISMEMBERMENT  OF 
TURKEY  IN  EUROPE,  1815-1886 

The  nationalist  agitation  among  the  Balkan  peoples  could 
have  but  one  issue,  —  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey  in  Europe. 
It  was  a  painful  process,  the  amputation  of  member  after  mem- 
ber of  the  feeble  Ottoman  Empire,  and  more  than  a  century  was 
required  for  its  completion. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


499 


We  may  begin  with  the  revolt  of  the  Serbs.    A  small  section 
of  the  Serb  nation,  the  indomitable  mountaineers  of  Montenegro, 
had  been  at  war  with  the  Turks  for  over  four  cen-  ^  ^^^^ 
turies ;  their  bishop-princes  at  Cetigne  had  long  been  pendence  of 
practically  independent,  when  in  1799  a  grudging  Montene- 
recognition  of  Montenegrin  independence  was  wrung  '^^^ 
from  the  Turks.   Five  years  later  their  brother-Serbs  in  Serbia  rose 
in  rebellion,  with  Karageorge  ('^ Black  George")  as  their  leader, 
expelled  the  Turks,  and  defied  the  sultan.    After  a  brief  period 
of  triumph,  "Black  George"  himself  suffered  defeat  at  2. Autonomy 
the  hands  of  the  Turks,  and  Serbia  was  reconquered  of  Serbia, 
for  the  sultan.    Again  the  Serbs  rebelled  in  181 5,  this 
time  with  Milosh  Obrenovich  at  their  head.    Although  the  sul- 
tan was  allowed  to  keep  Turkish  garrisons  in  the  Serbian  for- 
tresses, Serbia  obtained  the  formal  grant  of  self-government  with 
Milosh  as  hereditary  prince  (1830). 

Close  upon  the  heels  of  Milosh's  insurrection  followed  the 
Greek  Revolt  (1821-1829).    How  the  Greeks  gallantly  fought 
for  their  independence ;  how  their  revolt  was  regarded 
by  Christians  as  a  crusade,  by  Liberals  as  a  war  for  oreek^Re- 
Uberty,  by  patriots  as  a  war  for  nationalism,  by  voit(i82i): 
poets  as  the  rejuvenescence  of  Athens ;  how  Russia,  pendent^ 
France,  and  Great  Britain  joined  in  the  war  against  Heiienk 
Turkey,  —  all  this  we  have  told  in  another  place. ^  ^32^°™* 
Turkey  was,  of  course,  defeated  and  the  victorious 
Greeks  established  a  republican  form  of  government.  The 
Great  Powers,  however,  could  hardly  sanction  republicanism  and 
nationalism  in  the  case  of  the  Greeks,  while  at  the  same  time 
liberalism  and  nationalism  were  under  the  ban  in  Europe.  So 
the  disappointed  Greeks  had  to  give  up  their  republic  and  reluc- 
tantly consent  to  be  governed  by  a  Bavarian  prince,  who  was 
crowned  as  King  Otto  I  of  Greece  in  1833.    The  German  advisers 
and  German  soldiers  whom  King  Otto  imported  to  carry  out 
his  thoroughly  German  and  despotic  ideas  of  government  were 
only  a  shade  less  unpopular  with  the  Greek  people  than  the 
Turks  had  been.    Worse  still,  the  Hellenes  of  Crete,  of  Chios, 
Lemnos,  and  Lesbos,  of  Asia  Minor,  of  the  Ionian  Islands,  of  the 
northern  iEgean,  of  Epirus,  and  of  Thessaly  were  left  entirely 

^  See  above,  pp.  47  ff. 


500  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


outside  of  the  new  kingdom.  The  Greek  peninsula  south  of  a 
line  drawn  from  the  gulf  of  Arta  to  the  gulf  of  Lamia,  and  the 
Cyclades,  —  this  was  but  the  mutilated  torso  of  Hellas.  Only 
one  thing  had  been  gained  —  the  emancipation  of  a  small  part 
of  Greece  from  the  Turks. 

The  war  (1821-1829)  which  produced  the  Greek  kingdom  had 
another  important  result.    It  strengthened  the  influence  of 

Auton  Russia  in  the  Near  East.  The  treaty  which  Russian 
omyofThe  armies  forced  the  Porte  to  sign  at  Adrianople  (1829) 
Rumanian    j^q^  Q^dy  recognized  Greek  independence  but  confirmed 

Provinces        .       ,       ,  ri-»/riT«  i 

under  Rus-  the  already  existmg  autonomy  of  the  Moldavian  and 
ti^n  1829^^'  W^ll^-chian  principalities  (the  provinces  which  were 
one  day  to  be  united  as  Rumania)  under  a  thinly 
veiled  Russian  protectorate.  In  addition,  Georgia  and  other 
provinces  of  the  Caucasus  were  surrendered  to  Russia,  and  the 
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Russian  consuls  over  Russian  traders  in 
Turkey  was  recognized.  The  treaty  of  Adrianople  was  a  triumph 
for  Russia. 

The  steady  advance  of  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkan  penin- 
sula, of  which  the  treaty  of  Adrianople  was  but  one  instance, 
The  Relent-  result  of  persistent  and  patient  efforts  on  the 

less  Ad-  part  of  the  Russian  tsars.  Ever  since  the  days  of 
Russiain  Peter  the  Great  (1689-17 25),  the  rulers  of  Russia  had 
the  Near  striven  to  obtain  a  "window  on  the  Mediterranean." 
^*st  First  they  had  won  a  foothold  at  Azov ;  then  little  by 

nttle  the  northern  coast  of  the  Black  Sea  had  fallen  into  their 
power ;  and  by  1829  the  relentless  Russian  advance  was  threaten- 
ing Armenia  at  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  Mol- 
da\da  at  the  western  end.  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  had  become 
practically  Russian  protectorates,  and  might  at  any  moment  be 
annexed  to  the  ever-growing  empire.  Throughout  the  entire 
Balkan  peninsula  Russian  agents  were  at  work  inculcating  the 
idea  that  in  the  tsar  of  Russia  the  struggling  Balkan  nationalities 
possessed  a  powerful  friend,  an  ally  against  the  Turk.  The 
Slavic  Serbs  and  Bulgars  were  taught  to  regard  Russia  as  the 
great  Slavic  nation,  the  "big  brother"  of  the  Slavic  nations  in 
the  Balkans.  To  Greeks,  Serbs,  Bulgars,  and  Rumans  alike, 
the  tsar  was  represented  as  the  protector  of  the  Orthodox  Church, 
and  the  Russian  Christians  as  co-religionists  of  the  Balkan  Chris- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


tians.  The  tendency  was  not  difficult  to  perceive  :  the  Russian 
tsars  aimed  to  take  the  sultan's  place  in  the  Balkan  peninsula. 
Whether  the  Balkan  nations  should  be  formally  incorporated  into 
the  Russian  Empire,  or  whether  they  should  be  bound  to  Russia 
only  by  gratitude,  by  community  of  rehgion,  of  race,  and  of 
interests, — in  either  case  Russia  would  dominate  the  Near  East. 

Until  1829  the  Russian  policy  had  been  to  dismember  the 
Ottoman  Empire  and  to  dominate  those  provinces  which  could 
not  immediately  be  annexed  by  the  tsar.  In  the  The  Russian 
pursuit  of  this  ambition,  the  Russian  government  had  PoUcy  and 
cleverly  obtained  the  support  first  of  one  Power,  then  S^thet)?her 
of  another.  Back  in  the  eighteenth  century  the  Aus-  Great 
trian  Habsburgs  had  repeatedly  made  common  cause 
with  Russia,  believing  Turkey  to  be  the  enemy  of  both ;  and 
Catherine  II  had  actually  proposed  to  Joseph  II  that  Russia 
and  Austria  should  divide  Turkey  in  Europe  between  them,  as 
they  had  partitioned  Poland.  The  wars  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion prevented  the  fruition  of  this  bold  plot.  Then,  in  the 
Napoleonic  Era,  the  tsar  had  interviewed  the  Corsican  at  Tilsit 
(1807),  and  the  two  emperors  had  agreed  to  divide  the  world 
between  them,  Napoleon  taking  the  West,  and  Alexander  tak- 
ing most  of  Turkey  and  India.  Instead  of  sharing  the  world, 
however,  the  two  sovereigns  speedily  came  to  blows ;  and  when 
in  181 2  Russia  was  able  to  annex  Bessarabia,  Great  Britain 
rather  than  Napoleon  was  to  be  thanked.  Still  later,  when  the 
Greek  Revolt  broke  out,  France  and  Great  Britain  joined  with 
Russia  to  crush  Turkey,  although  Russia,  rather  than  either 
France  or  Great  Britain,  was  the  chief  gainer  by  the  war. 

Shortly  after  the  Greek  Revolt,  Tsar  Nicholas  I  adopted  an 
entirely  new  policy.  Instead  of  the  arch-enemy,  he  became  the 
friend  of  the  sultan.  This  change  of  front  did  not  mean  that 
Nicholas  I  had  abandoned  his  ambition.  He  had  simply  decided 
that  more  was  to  be  gained  by  dominating  than  by  destroying 
the  Ottoman  Empire ;  he  would  support  the  Turkish  sultan, 
and  the  sultan  would  become  the  protege  of  Russia.  The  idea 
was  a  shrewd  one,  but  in  some  way  or  other  it  failed  to  work 
out  to  the  tsar's  satisfaction,  and  in  disgust  he  reverted  to  the 
older  plan  of  dismembering  the  Ottoman  Empire.  In  1844, 
therefore,  Nicholas  went  to  London  hoping  to  persuade  the 


502 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


British  government  that  Turkey,  ''the  sick  man  of  Europe," 
could  not  live  much  longer;  hence  Great  Britain  should  seize 
Crete  and  Egypt  while  Russia  wrested  the  Balkan  provinces 
from  the  feeble  grasp  of  the  dying  Ottoman  Empire.  To  be 
sure,  the  Balkan  provinces  would  not  be  annexed  by  Russia: 
they  would  become  autonomous  under  Russian  ''protection," 
so  the  tsar  ingenuously  promised ;  but  the  British  ministry  re- 
mained unconvinced  and  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
scheme. 

Despite  this  rebuff,  Tsar  Nicholas  held  fast  to  his  determina- 
tion and  awaited  a  favorable  opportunity  to  fall  upon  Turkey 
and  drive  the  Ottomans  out  of  Europe.  He  did  not 
Crimean  have  long  to  wait.  In  1850  a  quarrel  between  Roman 
War  (1854-  Catholic  and  Orthodox  monks  about  the  Holy  Places 
TempOT-ary  Palestine  afforded  an  excuse  for  asserting  that  all 
Check  to  Orthodox  Christians  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  been 
Advance  placed  under  Russian  protection  by  the  treaty  of 
Kuchuk  Kainarji  (1774).  How  France  and  Great 
Britain,  alarmed  by  Russia's  aggressiveness,  came  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  sultan  and  crushed  Russia  in  the  Crimean  War  (1854- 
1856),  we  have  already  made  clear  in  a  previous  chapter.^  As  a 
result  of  the  war,  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  denied  the  right  of 
Russia  to  protect  Christians  in  Turkey,  freed  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia  from  Russian  interference,  restored  a  strip  of  Bessa- 
rabia from  Russia  to  Moldavia,  established  free  navigation  of 
the  Danube,  and  neutralized  the  Black  Sea. 

By  freeing  them  from  Russian  domination,  the  treaty  of 
Paris  enabled  the  Rumans  in  the  two  quasi-independent  prin- 
cipalities  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  to  realize  their 
Union  of  long-cherished  dream  of  a  united  national  existence. 
andWs^  ^^^^       Powers  of  Europe  sought  to  thwart  the 

lachia  as  ambition  of  the  Ruman  nation,  as  they  had  disap- 
fseT*^*'  pointed  the  Greeks  in  1832.  A  European  diplomatic 
congress  in  1858  resolved  to  prevent  the  unification  of 
the  two  Ruman  states,  although  no  one  could  doubt  that  the 
Rumans  themselves  desired  to  form  a  united  nation.  Nothing 
daunted,  the  separate  representative  assemblies  of  both  prin- 
cipalities proceeded  to  choose  Alexander  John  Cuza  simultane- 

^  See  above,  pp.  162 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  503 


ously  to  be  prince  of  Moldavia  and  of  Wallachia.  The  grudging 
consent  of  the  Powers  to  this  step  was  gained  two  years  later,  and 
in  1862  the  union  of  the  two  states  was  completed  by  the  establish- 
ment of  a  united  ministry  and  a  united  assembly.  Rumania 
was  united  and  all  but  completely  independent  of  Turkey. 

For  ten  years  after  the  Crimean  War,  Great  Britain  essayed 
to  perform  the  r61e  formerly  played  by  Russia,  the  r61e  of  pre- 
siding over  the  destinies  of  the  Balkan  Christians,  paramount 
Great  Britain,  rather  than  Russia,  induced  the  sultan  influence 
to  withdraw  his  garrisons  from  the  Serbian  fortresses  Bri?^*Li 
(1867).    It  was  to  Great  Britain  that  the  Greeks  the  Balkans, 
turned  in  1862,  after  deposing  their  unpopular  King  ^^55-1865 
Otto;   the  British  government  practically  chose  ICing  Otto's 
successor,  Prince  William  George  of  Schleswig-Holstein-Sonder- 
burg-Gliicksburg,  who  became  George  I,  ''King  of  the  Hellenes" 
(1863).    The  popularity  of  Great  Britain  in  Greece  was  still 
further  enhanced  when  the  British  government  handed  over  the 
Ionian  Islands  ^  to  the  Greek  kingdom. 

In  spite  of  the  seeming  dominance  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
Balkans,  the  Russian  Tsar  Alexander  II  (1855-1881)  had  no 
intention  of  remaining  permanently  in  the  background.  Renewal  of 
As  soon  as  Russia  had  recovered  from  the  Crimean  Russian  in- 
War,  Alexander  began  once  more  to  interfere  in  the  in^thrBai- 
affairs  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  with  a  view  to  regain-  kans,  1865- 
ing  what  his  country  had  lost  in  that  war  —  prestige,  ^^^^ 
a  commanding  influence  in  the  Balkans,  and  a  slice  of  Bessarabia. 
In  1865  the  tsar  gave  encouragement  to  rebellion  in  Crete.  In 
1870  he  helped  the  Bulgars  to  obtain  ecclesiastical  independence. 
In  187 1  —  in  the  midst  of  the  Franco-German  War  —  he  secured, 
with  the  aid  of  Bismarck,  the  right  to  refortify  Sebastopol  and 
to  maintain  a  Russian  fleet  on  the  Black  Sea.    Finally,  he 
decided  to  make  war  on  Turkey. 

It  was  easy  for  the  tsar  to  find  justification  for  war.    In  1875- 
1876  popular  uprisings  in  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  and  j)jgQj.jjgj.g 
Bulgaria  had  been  cruelly  suppressed  by  the  Turks,  in  the  otto- 
and  many  native  Christians  had  been  butchered  by  ^g^^^J^y^®* 
fanatical  Moslems.    These  "Bulgarian  atrocities"  ex- 
cited tremendous  foreign  indignation  against  Turkey  not  only 

*  The  Ionian  Islands  had  been  a  republic  under  British  protection  since  181 5. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


in  Russia  but  also  in  western  Europe.  Little  Montenegro  and 
Serbia  actually  took  up  arms  in  support  of  their  suffering  fellow- 
Christians.  The  Ottoman  government  at  Constantinople  seemed 
to  be  drifting  rapidly  toward  dissolution.  Its  treasury  was 
bankrupt,  its  administration  paralyzed.  Within  a  single  year 
two  sultans  were  deposed,  and  a  usurper  mounted  the  throne  in 
the  person  of  Abdul  Hamid  II  (i 876-1 909). 

In  the  desperate  crisis  of  his  country's  affairs,  Abdul  Hamid 
promulgated  a  liberal  constitution  (1876)  for  the  whole  Ottoman 
Empire,  vainly  imagining  that  a  brave  pretense  of 
Russo-Turk-  HberaHsm  on  his  part,  however  insincere,  would 

ish  War,  ^  ^  . 

1877-1878  satisfy  Europe  and  prevent  the  Powers  from  mter- 
vening  to  protect  the  Balkan  Christians.  The  tsar, 
however,  as  the  special  protector  of  Orthodox  Christians,  would 
not  be  so  easily  outwitted,  and  on  24'April,  1877,  Russia  declared 
war  on  the  sultan. 

Immediately  a  Russian  army  invaded  Turkey  from  the  north, 
crossing  the  Danube  in  June,  1877.  To  its  surprise,  the  invad- 
ing army  encountered  fierce  and  effective  resistance  at  the  hands 
of  the  Turks,  ensconced  in  the  stronghold  of  Plevna,  in  Bulgaria, 
just  south  of  the  Danube.  Twice  in  July,  and  again  in  Sep- 
tember, the  Russian  infantry  was  hurled  back  by  Plevna's 
Turkish  defenders.  Finally,  however,  after  the  Russians  had 
settled  down  to  besiege  the  place,  the  brave  Turkish  commander, 
Osman  Pasha,  seeing  his  men  slowly  starving  to  death,  attempted 
a  desperate  sortie.  The  attempt  failed  and  Osman  surrendered 
with  40,000  men.  In  January,  1878,  a  second  overwhelming 
defeat  befell  the  Turks,  and  another  Turkish  army  of  some 
36,000  men  was  forced  to  surrender.  Serbian  and  Montenegrin 
troops  now  boldly  advanced  into  Turkish  territory;  Bulgars 
enlisted  in  the  Russian  army;  Rumanian  troops  had  already 
given  invaluable  aid  to  the  Russians.  The  Turkish  soldiers  had 
fought  gallantly,  their  Krupp  cannon  had  performed  good  serv- 
ice, but  faulty  generalship  had  done  its  fatal  work  and  nothing 
could  now  check  the  triumphant  Russian  advance.  Adrianople 
fell  on  16  January;  and  the  Russian  army  marched  on  towards 
Constantinople.    In  a  panic  of  fear  the  Turks  sued  for  peace. 

The  treaty  of  San  Stefano,  concluded  3  March,  1878,  was  a 
sad  confession  of  Turkey's  humiliation  and  at  the  same  time  a 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  505 


triumph  for  the  Slavs.  The  sultan  was  to  recognize  the  com- 
plete independence  of  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Rumania,  with 
increased  territories :  an  autonomous  tributary  prin-  ^  , . 

r  T»   1       •  1  11  111  Turkish 

cipahty  of  Bulgana  was  to  be  created,  bounded  by  Defeat  and 
the  Danube,  the  Black  Sea,  the  ^Egean,  and  Albania ;  Russian 

f  1  •    1  •  •     Success : 

sweepmg  reforms  were  to  be  carried  out  m  Bosma  the  Treaty 
and   Herzegovina:    the   straits    (Dardanelles   and  ?^^*^„^*f" 

-r^       1         \  1  1,     .  fano,  1878 

Bosphorus)  were  to  be  open  at  all  times  to  peace- 
ful commerce ;  and  the  Turkish  forts  along  the  Danube 
were  to  be  destroyed.  These  provisions,  so  favorable  to  the 
Balkan  Slavs  —  Bulgars  and  Serbs,  —  would  make  Bulgaria 
and  Serbia  forever  the  grateful  debtors  of  their  '^big  brother" 
Russia.  For  his  own  share  in  the  spoils,  the  tsar  was  to  receive 
part  of  Armenia,  a  large  war  indemnity,  and  a  strip  of  the  Do- 
brudja  (which  he  planned  to  exchange  with  Rumania  for  the  val- 
uable territory  of  Bessarabia). 

The  satisfaction  with  which  the  Tsar  Alexander  II  regarded 
the  terms  of  San  Stefano  was  equaled  only  by  the  wrath  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  and  British  governments.  Lord 
Beaconsfield  (Benjamin  Disraeh),  as  the  head  of  the  of^Great^^ 
British  cabinet  and  an  advocate  of  a  vigorous  foreign  Britain  and 
poHcy,  was  not  at  all  inchned  to  sit  tamely  by  while  Hungiy  to 
Russia  made  herself  supreme  in  the  Near  East.    Even  the  Terms 
more  emphatic  was  the  Habsburg  emperor,  Francis  stelano 
Joseph,  whose  dreams  of  Austro-Hungarian  expan- 
sion in  the  Balkans  would  not  allow  either  the  creation  of  strong 
Balkan  states  or  the  extension  of  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkan 
peninsula.    The  war  indemnity,  moreover,  could  not  be  paid  by 
the  bankrupt  sultan  for  years  to  come,  and  would  give  Russian 
ofl&cials  a  standing  excuse  for  interfering  with  the  Ottoman 
government.    Determined  to  prevent  such  a  catastrophe,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  ministry  asserted  that  if  any  alteration  were 
to  be  made  in  the  Balkan  situation,  it  would  involve  a  revision 
of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856),  and  could  only  be 
accomplished  by  the  consent  of  those  Powers  —  Great  Britain, 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  France,  Italy,  Russia,  and  Turkey 
—  which  had  sworn  to  uphold  the  treaty  of  Paris.  Foreseeing 
that  this  contention  would  allow  him  to  take  a  hand  in  the 
Balkan  question,  Lord  Beaconsfield  heartily  indorsed  it.  Bis- 


5o6  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


marck,  conscious  that  Germany  could  lose  nothing  and  might  at 
least  gain  prestige,  gave  Austria-Hungary  and  Great  Britain  his 
support  in  demanding  that  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  should  be 
The  Con-  submitted  for  ratification  to  the  Powers  which  had 
gress  of  signed  the  treaty  of  Paris.  The  tsar,  of  course,,  feared 
Berlin,  1878  ^j^^^  ^  congress  of  jealous  diplomats  would  revise  the 
treaty  of  San  Stefano  in  such  manner  as  to  rob  him  of  the  fruits 
of  victory.  Lord  Beaconsfield,  however,  by  threatening  Russia 
with  war,  induced  the  unwilling  tsar  to  submit  the  whole  question 
to  the  congress,  which  was  held  in  Berlin  during  the  summer  of 
1878. 

The  diplomats  who  assembled  at  Berlin  did  not  attempt  to 
^  bring  about  a  just,  reasonable,  and  permanent  settle- 
Revision  of    ment  of  the  Near  Eastern  Question.    They  were  too 

the  Treaty  ....  ^     ,      ^  .  .  . 

of  San  ste-  patriotic  lor  that.    Each  was  too  intensely  concerned 

interests^^  in  the  advantage  which  his  own  country  might  derive 

of  Austria-  from  the  situation.    They  revised  the  treaty  of  San 

Hungary  Stefano,  not  in  the  interests  of  justice  and  equity, 

and  Great      ,        .     '        .  .    .        .  , 

Britain  but  m  the  interests  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Great 
Britain.  Therefore,  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  upon  which 
the  congress  agreed,  13  July,  1878,  was  little  more  than  an  arbi- 
The  Treaty  trary  and  elaborate  compromise  between  the  con- 
ofBerUn,  fiicting  interests  of  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
'^^^  Great  Britain. 

Russia  was  permitted  to  regain  the  Rumanian  strip  of  Bessarabia 
north  of  the  Danube  delta  and  east  of  the  Pruth,  which  she 
I.  Russian  had  lost  by  the  Crimean  War,  Rumania  being  forced 
Gains  console  herself  for  the  loss  of  Bessarabia  by  annex- 

ing most  of  the  Dobrudja,  a  barren  region  south  of  the  Danube 
delta.  Russia  also  retained  Ardahan,  Kars,  and  Batoum,  the 
Armenian  districts  at  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  Black  Sea 
allotted  to  the  tsar  by  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano. 

In  order  to  offset  Russia's  gains,  Austria-Hungary  was  given 
the  right  to  occupy  and  administer  the  Turkish  provinces  of 
2  Austro-  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  to  keep  garrisons  and 
Hungarian  maintain  military  and  commercial  roads  in  the  adja- 
ofBos^a''-''  cent  Turkish  sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar.  Montenegro, 
Herzego-  moreover,  was  compelled  to  concede  extensive  com- 
vina,  1878    mej-Q^l  privileges  to  Austria-Hungary. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  507 


Great  Britain's  share  in  the  spoils  was  allotted  by  a  separate 
Anglo-Turkish  Convention  (4  June,  1878),  which  practically 
formed  a  part  of  the  Berlin  agreement.    Russia  was  B^tish 
not  to  be  allowed  further  aggrandizement  in  Asia  occupation 
Minor  :  to  this  Great  Britain  pledged  herself.    On  the  ^g^^^"*^' 
other  hand,  the  sultan  solemnly  promised  to  introduce 
radical  reforms  in  the  government  of  his  Christian  subjects  ;  and 
as  a  pledge  of  his  good  intentions  he  permitted  Great  Britain  to 
hold  and  administer  the  island  of  Cyprus. 

In  their  treatment  of  the  Balkan  nationalities,  the  Berlin 
diplomats  were  neither  generous  nor  far-sighted.     The  *'Big 
Bulgaria"  for  which  the  tsar  had  stipulated  in  the 
negotiations  at  San  Stefano,  was  divided  by  the  Berlin  4-  Auton- 
treaty  into  three  separate  parts.    The  northern  por-  g^^^' 
tion  became  the  autonomous  Christian  principality  (1878) : 
of  Bulgaria  paying  tribute  to  the  sultan.    The  middle  ofTJiSi, 
portion  —  the  province  of  Eastern  Rumelia  —  was  Eastern 
left  ''under  the  direct  military  and  poHtical  control  f^^^"*' 
of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan,  under  conditions  Macedonia 
of  administrative  autonomy,"  with  special  provision 
for  the  appointment  of  a  Christian  governor.    The  third  part, 
comprising  Macedonia  and  the  vilayet  of  Adrianople,  was  again 
put  fully  under  Turkish  rule.    This  cruel  blow  to  the  national 
ambition  of  the  Bulgars  was  dehvered  because  Austria-Hungary 
feared  that  a  strong  Bulgarian  state,  friendly  to  Russia,  might 
block  the  path  of  future  Habsburg  expansion  toward  the  ^Egean. 

As  in  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano,  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Monte- 
negro were  recognized  as  completely  independent  states,  with 
increased  territories.    But  by  the  treaty  of  BerHn  ^  j^^^^, 
these  states  were  burdened  with  a  portion  of  the  sul-  pendence  of 
tan's  debts.    Rumania  was  offended  by  the  Russian  sei?u^*and 
annexation  of  Bessarabia ;  Serbia  was  alarmed  at  the  Montene- 
extension  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  protectorate  over  ^^^^ 
the  Serbs  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina ;  Montenegro,  although 
happy  to  gain  the  port  of  Antivari  on  the  Adriatic,  was  irritated 
by  the  provisions  which  made  Antivari,  so  far  as  all  naval  pur- 
poses were  concerned,  practically  an  Austrian  port. 

Greece  alone  of  the  Balkan  nations  profited  by  the  revision  of 
the  treaty  of  San  Stefano.   By  that  treaty  Greece  had  been  prom- 


5o8  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ised  nothing,  but  as  a  result  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin  she  ob- 
^  ^    .       tained  a  considerable  extension  of  territory.    The  new 

6.  Cession  a    r     >      ^      r        t  ^ 

of  Thessaly   boundary  was  not  definitely  fixed,  however,  until  1881, 
1881^^^*^**    when  Thessaly  was  formally  annexed  to  the  Hellenic 
kingdom. 

The  treaty  of  Berlin  left  Turkey  still  in  Europe,  with  a  strip 
of  territory  including  Constantinople,  Adrianople,  Rumelia 
7  Paper  (Macedonia),  Eastern  Rumelia,  Albania,  Epirus,  and 
Reforms  for  Novi-Bazar.  The  tottering  empire  of  the  Turk  was 
1878*^'  propped  up  a  little  longer  by  British  diplomacy, 

or,  if  need  be,  by  British  arms.  The  Christians  in 
Macedonia  were  to  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  sultan,  even  after 
the  Bulgarian  atrocities  of  1876  had  shown  what  kind  of  treat- 
ment the  Christian  subjects  of  the  sultan  might  expect.  To  save 
themselves  from  reproach  on  this  score,  the  diplomats  at  Berlin 
inserted  in  the  treaty  of  1878  various  clauses  which  would  appear 
to  reform  the  Turkish  administration  and  to  safeguard  the  Chris- 
tian rayahs  against  Mohammedan  oppression.  But  reforms  on 
paper  were  not  reforms  in  practice,  and  the  subsequent  history 
of  Turkey  in  Europe  was  no  credit  to  the  statesmanship  of  the 
men  who  designed  the  treaty  of  Berlin. 

Hardly  seven  years  elapsed  from  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of 
Berhn  until  the  treaty  was  flagrantly  violated.    The  Bulgars  in 

Eastern  Rumelia,  who  had  never  acquiesced  in  the 

Subsequent  .  t-.        t  r 

Modification  arbitrary  separation  of  Eastern  Rumelia  irom  the 
SeSement^  principality  of  Bulgaria,  effected  the  bloodless  revo- 
lution of  PhiKppopolis  (18  September,  1885),  by  which 
the  two  Bulgar  states  were  united.     Prince  Alexander  of 

1.  incorpo-  Bulgaria  was  joyously  hailed  in  Philippopolis  as  the 
ration  of      sovereign  of  united  Bulgaria.    None  of  the  Powers 

Eastern  ^.r      t       n  •  i      -i       i     i  i  -n.  i 

RumeUa  hf ted  a  linger  to  pumsh  the  bold  Bulgarian  maneuver, 
into  the       Only  little  Serbia,  jealous  of  her  sister  state,  declared 

Principality  ,  ii  i       i  r  i 

of  Bulgaria,  war ;  but  the  Bulgars  proved  themselves  better  lighters, 
^^^5  and  peace  was  restored  the  following  year. 

Some  twenty-three  years  later,  in  1908,  the  treaty  of  Berlin 

2.  Creation  was  Still  further  disregarded,  when  the  Bulgarian 
E^domof  prince,  repudiating  the  sultan's  suzerainty,  declared 
Bulgaria,      himself  an  independent  king  (tsar).    At  the  same 

time  (1908)  Austria-Hungary  formally  annexed  the 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  509 

Turkish  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  in  which  by  the 
treaty  of  Berlin  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  been  au- 

,      .     ,  ,  •      ic     r  3-  Annexa- 

thorized  merely  to  carry  out  certain  reforms.  donofBos- 
Finally,  in  1012-1013,  the  Balkan  nations,  defying  niaandHer- 

X-  T  1  T   -1    1  1     •        1  zegovmato 

European  diplomacy,  divided  up  Macedoma,  the  Austna- 
sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar,  and  Epirus;  an  autonomous  ^'^g^^^' 
principaHty  of  Albania  was  created ;  and  Turkey  in 
Europe  was  restricted  to  a  narrow  zone  about  Constantinople 
and  Adrianople.    These  later  steps  in  the  dismember-  ^  Almost 
ment  of  European  Turkey  will  shortly  receive  closer  Complete 
attention ;  but  for  the  present  let  us  turn  aside  for  a  ance^o?"" 
moment  to  see  how  the  sultan  lost  control  of  Crete  European 
and  of  his  provinces  in  Africa.  Turkey,  1913 


THE  AUTONOMY  OF  CRETE  AND  LOSS  OF  THE  TURKISH 
POSSESSIONS  IN  AFRICA 

At  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  island  of  Crete 
was  a  Turkish  vilayet  or  province.  Two  circumstances  then 
embittered  the  lot  of  the  island.  First  of  all,  the  Crete  in 
Orthodox  Christians  who  constituted  a  majority  of 
the  population  were  almost  continually  oppressed  by  their 
Mohammedan  rulers  and  were  periodically  engaged  in  bloody 
conflict  with  their  Mohammedan  neighbors.  Secondly,  while 
Crete  was  a  separate  Turkish  vilayet,  the  Cretans,  both  Moham- 
medan and  Christian,  spoke  the  Greek  language  and  were  bound 
to  Greece  by  a  sense  of  common  nationahty.  From  these  two 
circumstances  resulted  a  long  series  of  disastrous  insurrections 
and  massacres.  Oddly  enough,  the  Powers  of  Europe  through- 
out the  century  persistently  added  to  the  confusion  by  coming 
to  the  aid  of  the  Mohammedans  as  against  the  Christians,  and 
by  supporting  the  sultan's  sovereignty  as  against  the  nationalist 
aspirations  of  the  Cretan  Hellenes. 

When  in  182 1  the  Greeks  on  the  mainland  revolted,  the  Greeks 
in  Crete  joined  in  the  insurrection.  But  at  the  end  of  the  war, 
the  Powers  decided  that  Crete  should  be  left  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  instead  of  being  joined  to  the  new  kingdom  of  Greece.^ 

^  Crete  was  placed  under  the  administration  of  Mehemet  Ali,  Turkish  viceroy  of 
Egypt.    See  below,  p.  512. 


5IO  *  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


For  a  time  Crete  was  quiet,  under  the  beneficent  rule  of  an  ex- 
ceptionally statesmanlike  governor,  Mustafa  Pasha  (183  2-1 85  2), 
Repeated  hardly  left  the  island  when  Crete  again 

Cretan  fell  into  anarchy.  The  Congress  of  BerHn  (1878) 
agYinst  vainly  attempted  to  settle  the  question  by  establish- 
Turkey,  ing  in  Crete  a  sort  of  constitutional  government,  which 
1821-1897  Yi2id  been  promised  by  the  sultan  in  the  ''Organic 
Statute"  of  1868.  The  sultan,  however,  intended  nothing  of  the 
kind,  and  in  1889  he  placed  Crete  again  under  the  despotic  rule 
of  a  Mohammedan  vali  or  governor.  In  1896  a  new  insurrec- 
tion compelled  the  sultan  to  promise  reforms,  but  within  a  few 
Graco-  months  the  insincerity  of  his  promises  became  ap- 
Turkish  parent,  and  again  civil  war  was  the  order  of  the  day. 
War,  1897  rpj^-g  ^.j^g  kingdom  of  Greece  intervened,  sending 
warships  and  an  army  to  assist  the  Cretan  insurgents  (1897). 
On  the  mainland  the  Greeks  were  defeated  by  the  Turks  and 
compelled  to  abandon  their  enterprise.  And  the  Powers,  stub- 
bornly and  blindly,  as  ever,  stepped  in  to  declare  that  Greece 
must  not  annex  Crete,  that  Crete  must  remain  under  the  sultan's 
suzerainty.    The  Powers  were  willing,  however,  that  the  Cretans 

should  have  self-government  in  local  aJBfairs,  and  pro- 
Autonomy  claimed  the  autonomy  of  Crete(December,  1897).  Not 
18^^^**'  were  the  Cretans  satisfied.    In  1905  insurgents  led 

by  Eleutherios  Venezelos  declared  the  union  of  their 
island  with  Greece,  and  the  Cretan  assembly  assented,  but  the 
Powers  again  intervened  to  uphold  the  sultan's  sovereignty. 
This  time  they  conceded  that,  while  Crete  should  remain  an 
autonomous  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  king  of  Greece 
should  appoint  a  high  commissioner  (1906)  to  rule  the  island, 
and  Greek  officers  should  drill  the  Cretan  gendarmerie  and  militia. 
The  desire  of  the  Cretans  for  union  with  Greece  was  now  irre- 
sistibly aroused.  In  1908  they  again  voted  union;  but  the 
question  was  left  unsettled  until  in  191 2  Cretan  deputies  were 
Union  of  admitted  to  the  parliament  at  Athens,  the  Turkish  flag 
Crete  with  at  Canea  (in  Crete)  was  hauled  down,  and  by  the 
Greece,  1913  ^^^^ity  of  London,  30  May,  191 3,  Turkey  renounced 
all  sovereignty  over  Crete.  The  national  aspirations  of  Crete 
were  at  last  satisfied  when  in  December,  1913,  Constantino, 
king  of  the  Hellenes,  took  possession  of  the  island  at  Canea  and 
solemnly  hoisted  the  flag  of  the  Hellenic  kingdom. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  511 


The  first  of  the  African  provinces  to  be  lost  by  Turkey  was 
Egypt.  The  authority  of  the  sultan's  viceroy  or  ''pasha"  in  Egypt 
had  repeatedly  been  set  at  naught  during  the  eight-  Egypt  in 
eenth  century  by  the  ''beys"  or  commanders  of  the 
unruly  soldiers  called  Mamelukes.  Even  more  alarming  than 
Mameluke  conspiracies  had  been  the  invasion  of  Egypt  in  1798 
by  Napoleon.  To  be  sure,  the  French  general  insisted  that  he 
was  merely  fighting  against  the  Mamelukes  in  order  that  the 
power  of  the  sultan  might  be  more  firmly  estabHshed ;  but  the 
sultan  sorely  mistrusted  Napoleon's  motives,  declared  war,  and, 
with  the  aid  of  the  British  forces,  drove  the  French  out  of  Egypt. 
The  real  danger  was,  however,  neither  from  the  Mamelukes  nor 
from  the  French,  but  from  an  Albanian  adventurer,  Mehemet 
AU  by  name.  From  his  birthplace  at  Kavala,  on  the  northern 
coast  of  the  ^Egean  Sea,  Mehemet  AH  ^  first  voyaged  to  j^j^jj^j^^^ 
Egypt  with  a  regiment  of  Albanian  tribesmen  who  had  au  Pasha 
volunteered  to  fight  for  the  sultan  against  Napoleon,  ^g^*^^*' 
Amidst  the  anarchy  that  followed  the  expulsion  of  the 
French,  Mehemet  AH  by  lending  the  aid  of  his  redoubtable 
Albanian  warriors  first  to  one  faction  and  then  to  another,  soon 
became  the  controlHng  factor  in  Egyptian  politics,  and  induced 
the  sultan  to  appoint  him  as  "  pasha  "  (1805).  The  Mamelukes 
who  disputed  his  power  were  outwitted,  defeated,  and  ruthlessly 
massacred.  Mehemet  AH  was  as  shrewd  as  he  was  unscrupulous 
and  bold.  During  the  first  two  decades  of  his  rule  as  governor, 
he  consoHdated  his  power,  reorganized  his  army  on  European 
Hnes  with  the  aid  of  French  miHtary  officers,  created  a  navy, 
filled  his  treasury  with  tax  receipts  and  reveitues  from  govern- 
mental commercial  monopoHes,  developed  the  cotton  industry, 
and  conquered  Upper  Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  Sudan.  Then 
he  was  ready  to  extend  his  power  abroad.  The  opportunity 
came  in  1821,  when  the  Greek  revolt  broke  out,  and  the  panic- 
stricken  suitan  caUed  on  his  vassal,  Mehemet  AH,  for  aid,  promis- 
ing as  reward  the  "  pashaHks  "  or  governorships  of  Morea  (part  of 
the  Greek  mainland)  and  Syria.  In  response  to  the  sultan's 
appeal,  Mehemet  sent  his  son  Ibrahim  with  a  splendid  army  to 
subjugate  the  Greek  insurgents.  As  we  have  already  seen,  the 
Powers  of  Europe  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Greeks,  and  Mehemet 

*  1 769-1 849. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


won  neither  Morea  nor  Syria,  but  only  the  island  of  Crete 
Between  the  Pasha  Mehemet  Ali,  who  was  sorely  disappointed 
to  be  cheated  of  Syria,  and  the  Sultan  Mahmud  II,  who  grew 
Hostilities  daily  more  jealous  of  his  powerful  and  ambitious 
between  vassal,  relations  strained  to  the  breaking  point.  In 
Aii^anTthe  ^^3^  Mehemet  Ali  ambitiously  sent  his  son  Ibrahim 
Sultan,  with  an  Egyptian  army  to  invade  Syria.  Angrily  the 
1831-1841  sultan  declared  Mehemet  a  rebel.  In  the  war  that  en- 
sued the  well-trained  Egyptian  soldiers  carried  everything  before 
them  and  triumphantly  marched  on  Constantinople.  Despair- 
ing, the  sultan  accepted  the  aid  of  a  Russian  fleet  and  Russian 
troops  to  defend  his  capital  from  the  Egyptian  army.  Intricate 
negotiations  ensued  between  the  sultan,  the  pasha,  and  Russia, 
France,  and  Great  Britain,  with  the  result  that  Mehemet  AH 
gained  the  governorship  of  Syria,  Damascus,  and  Aleppo,  to- 
gether with  the  district  of  Adana  (1833). 

For  a  brief  period  the  pasha  of  Egypt,  while  paying  regular 
tribute  to  the  sultan  was  practically  monarch  of  a  vast  empire, 
stretching  from  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Nile  river  to 
Aii^'' Hered-  Antioch  and  Adana.  But  the  Syrians  presently  rose 
itaryGov-  in  revolt  and  in  1839  the  sultan  again  attempted  to 
Egypt,  1841  crush  the  proud  pasha.  Again  Mehemet's  armies  were 
victorious,  and  once  more  Russia  interfered,  this  time 
in  concert  with  Great  Britain  on  behalf  of  the  sultan.  Me- 
hemet was  now  forced  to  relinquish  Syria,  Damascus,  Aleppo, 
and  Adana.  As  compensation  he  was  given  the  pashaHk 
of  Egypt  as  an  hereditary  possession  (1841).  The  dynasty  of 
Mehemet  Ali  thus  became  hereditary  rulers  of  Egypt,  virtually 
independent^  although  paying  tribute  to  the  Ottoman  sultan. 
Tlie  defection  of  Egypt  was  accomplished. 

Twenty-five  years  later  (1866)  a  descendant  of  Mehemet  Ali 
"Khedive  assumed  the  title  of  khedive,  which  was  borne  by  the 
of  Egypt,"  ruler  of  Egypt  until  19 14,  when  he  adopted  the  title 
^^^^  of  sultan  and  was  recognized  by  Great  Britain  and 

Fmnce  as  absolutely  independent  of  Turkey.^ 

Meanwhile  Algeria,  farther  west  on  the  African  coast,  was 
passing  under  the  control  of  France.    Turkish  power  had  never 

^  The  history  of  Egypt  from  1866  to  1914  will  be  taken  up  in  the  chapter  on  the 
Partition  of  Africa.    See  below,  pp.  626  S. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  513 

been  very  secure  in  Algeria,  for  in  the  seventeenth  century  the 
Turkish  pasha  had  been  supplanted  by  a  ''dey"  chosen  by 
the  lawless  Barbary  pirates  of  the  Algerian  coastland,  Algeria 
who  preyed  on  European  commerce  in  the  Mediter-  under  the 
ranean  and  made  a  regular  business  of  capturing  ^^^^ 
Christian  voyagers  for  ransom  or  for  slavery.    Somewhat  later, 
as  piracy  declined,  the  dey  himself  came  under  the  domination 
of  a  mihtary  society  —  the  janissaries — who  elected  and  deposed 
him  at  will.    Still  Algeria  was  nominally  a  part  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire. 

In  1830  a  French  expedition  was  dispatched  against  Algiers 
to  punish  the  insolence  of  the  dey,  who  had  not  only  fired  on  a 
French  vessel  in  the  harbor  of  Algiers,  but  had  also  struck  the 
French  consul  in  the  face,  thus  adding  insult  to  injury.  French 
troops  conquered  Algiers,  deported  the  dey,  and  expelled  the 
janissaries.  For  the  next  few  years  the  French  were  uncertain 
whether  to  conquer  the  whole  country,  or  to  withdraw  altogether ; 
they  compromised  by  leaving  garrisons  in  a  few  Algerian  sea- 
ports and  thus  putting  an  end  to  the  nuisance  of  Barbary  piracy. 
When  the  French  government  finally  decided  to  conquer  Algeria, 
they  were  confronted  by  a  tireless  and  formidable  ^^^^^^ 
enemy  in  the  person  of  Abd-el-Kader,  a  Mohamme-  quest  of  Al- 
dan potentate  who  boasted  the  title  of  "  amir  "  and  ^e^^'  '^^o- 
commanded  the  loyalty  of  the  restless  Arab  tribesmen 
in  the  interior.  With  ten  thousand  regular  soldiers  and  five 
times  as  many  untrained  but  courageous  Arab  horsemen, 
the  amir  in  1839  declared  a  holy  war  against  the  Christians. 
Once  Abd-el-Kader  was  defeated  and  driven  into  Morocco 
but  again  he  returned,  eloquent  and  fearless  as  ever,  to  harass 
the  French  armies.  He  was  fighting  against  fate,  however ; 
and  at  last  in  1847  ^^e  gallant  warrior  surrendered.  Algeria 
was  a  colony  of  France.^ 

The  French  next  turned  towards  Tunis  (or  Tunisia) ,  the  prov- 
ince immediately  east  of  Algeria,  including  the  site  of  ancient 
Carthage.  Tunis,  like  Algeria,  had  been  conquered  by  Tunis  under 
the  Turks  in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  had  subse-  ^^^^ 
quently  been  ruled  by  leaders  of  the  janissaries.  In  1705  a 
Cretan  adventurer,  Hussein  ben  Ali,  was  set  up  by  the  troops 

*  For  the  subsequent  history  of  Algeria,  see  below,  pp.  629,  631. 
VOL.  II  —  2  L 


514  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

as  ruler  of  Tunis.  While  Hussein  remained  nominally  subject  to 
the  sultan,  he  became  practically  an  independent  prince  with 
the  title  of  "  bey  "  of  Tunis,  and  his  dynasty  still  rules  in  name 
French  French  became  real  masters  of 

Occupation  Tunis  in  1 88 1  when  a  French  army  marched  eastward 
i8^i"^^'  from  the  Algerian  frontier  to  the  Tunisian  capital,  forc- 
ing the  terrified  bey  to  accept  the  protectorate"  of 
France,  that  is,  to  allow  French  officials  to  control  his  govern- 
ment. In  vain  the  indignant  sultan  might  protest  that  Tunis 
was  by  right  a  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire ;  his  protests  were 
ignored  by  the  French  government  and  Tunis  remained  a  pro- 
tectorate of  France. 

To  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Africa  there  remained  thereafter 
only  the  vilayets  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.^  Tripoli,  including 
Tripoli  Cyrenaica,  which  had  been  conquered  by  the  Turks 
Trans-  in  the  sixteenth  century,  was  governed  from  17 14  to 
the^tfdian^  1 83 5  by  hereditary  princes,  who,  though  in  reaHty 
Colony  of  independent,  still  called  themselves  pashas  of  the  sul- 
Libya,  191 1-  tan  and  paid  tribute  to  the  Ottoman  government.  The 
power  of  the  TripoHtan  pashas  received  a  serious  blow 
early  in  the  nineteenth  century  when  the  United  States  made 
war  on  Tripoli  to  put  an  end  to  Tripolitan  piracy.  Weakened  by 
the  war  with  the  United  States,  and  by  civil  war  as  well,  Tripoli 
in  1835  was  again  brought  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Otto- 
man government.  In  1875  the  eastern  part  of  Tripoli  was 
erected  into  a  separate  province,  the  vilayet  of  Cyrenaica.  A 
quarrel  between  Turkey  and  Italy,  however,  resulted  in  the 
annexation  of  both  vilayets  by  a  decree  of  the  Italian  govern- 
ment, 5  November,  191 1,  confirmed  by  the  treaty  of  Ouchy, 
18  October,  191 2,  which  terminated  the  Turco-Italian  War. 
Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  became  the  Italian  colony  of  Libya. 
Obedient  to  the  command  of  the  Koran,  which  forbade  the 
cession  to  infidels  of  territory  belonging  to  the  khalif,  the 
Porte  refused  formally  to  recognize  the  annexation ;  but  actually 
the  sultan  retained  in  Tripoli  only  his  rehgious  authority.  The 
dismemberment  of  Turkey  in  Africa  was  complete. 


Egypt  was  still  a  dependency  of  the  empire  in  theory  but  hardly  so  in  fact. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  515 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  THE  BALKAN  NATIONS  AND  THE  AT- 
TEMPT TO  REJUVENATE  TURKEY,  1832-1912 

By  the  disintegration  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Africa  and 
Europe,  the  historian's  task  is  rendered  more  difficult,  for,  instead 
of  one  empire,  he  is  confronted  by  half  a  dozen  states,  Balkan 
each  making  a  history  of  its  own.    The  affairs  of  Nations 
Greece,  of  Rumania,  of  Serbia,  of  Montenegro,  and  of  g^p^^^gfy^ 
Bulgaria  must,  therefore,  command  attention,  coun- 
try by  country ;  and  then  the  course  of  events  within  the  muti- 
lated Ottoman  Empire  may  be  followed  down  through  the  bloody 
War  of  the  Balkans  (1912-1913)  and  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War 
of  the  Nations. 

First  of  all,  let  us  turn  to  the  nation  which  first  won  complete 
independence,  —  the  kingdom  of  the  Hellenes.    We  left  the 
Greeks  in  1832  bemoaning  the  small  extent  of  the  Modern 
new  Greek  kingdom  and  lamenting  the  coronation  as  ^^^^^e 
''king  of  the  Hellenes"  of  an  absolutist  prince  imported  from 
Germany.    Notwithstanding  his  unpopularity.  King  Otto  kept 
his  seat  upon  a  shaky  throne  for  thirty  years.    Then,  in  1862, 
he  was  deposed  by  his  rebelHous  subjects,  and  in  the  King  Otto, 
following  year  the  Greek  Assembly  chose  the  second  1833-1862 
son  of  King  Christian  IX  of  Denmark  to  become  king  of  the 
Hellenes  with  the  title  of  George  1.    Shortly  after  his  succession 
the  new  king,  who  firmly  beHeved  that  his  strength  congtitu. 
lay  in  cultivating  the  love  of  his  subjects,  consented  tionai 
to  a  thoroughly  democratic  constitution,  the  consti-  under  King 
tution  of  1864,  by  which  the  entire  legislative  power  George  i, 
was  vested  in  a  single  representative  chamber,  the  Bule.  ^^^3-1913 
The  Bule  consisted  of  184  representatives,  elected  by  universal 
manhood  suffrage,  for  the  term  of  four  years.    This  constitution 
remained  in  effect  until  191 1,  when  a  new  constitution  came  into 
force,  whegsby  a  sort  of  second  chamber  or  council  of  state  was 
created. 

After  the  achievement  of  democratic  governnjent  in  1864, 
Greece  made  steady  progress  politically,  intellectually,  and,  most 
of  all,  materially.  As  one  prosperous  decade  succeeded  another, 
population  multiplied ;  hill  and  valley  were  once  more  covered 
with  olive  trees,  with  currant  bushes,  with  the  vine,  and  with 


Si6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


grain  fields ;  a  thousand  miles  of  railway  were  built ;  a  hundred 
busy  factories  sprang  up  at  Athens ;  a  firm  financial  foundation 
was  assured  to  the  young  kingdom ;  and,  most  impressive  of  all, 
enterprising  Greek  merchant  vessels  were  plying  in  large  num- 
bers to  Egypt,  to  Syria,  to  Asia  Minor,  among  the  ^gean  Islands, 
and  even  past  Constantinople  into  the  Black  Sea. 

Amazing  as  were  these  achievements  of  their  Uttle  kingdom, 
still  greater  aspirations  filled  the  hearts  of  Hellenic  patriots. 
,.T         .    Less  than  half  of  all  the  Hellenes  had  been  incor- 

NatlOnalist  ^  .         ^  r     ^       -r^    ^^  i 

Aspirations  porated  into  the  kmgdom  of  the  Hellenes ;  more  than 
Greeks  ^^^^  millions  were  yet  to  be  emancipated  from  for- 
eign rule  and  joined  to  Greece.  In  Epirus,  in  Salonica, 
in  the  ^gean  Islands,  there  were  Greeks  waiting  to  be  freed  from 
Turkish  oppression,  and  the  Cretans  more  than  once  showed 
themselves  eager  to  form  part  of  Hellas.  Once,  in  1897, 
Greece  waged  an  heroic  but  unsuccessful  war  against  Turkey  in 
behalf  of  Crete.  These  nationalist  ambitions  went  hand  in 
hand  with  economic  motives :  Crete  and  the  ^gean  Islands 
were  necessary  to  give  Greek  commerce  supremacy  in  the  yEgean 
Sea ;  if  the  northern  Greek  frontier  could  be  extended  to  include 
Salonica,  Greece  would  not  only  gain  an  advantageous  seaport, 
but  would  also  be  able  to  carry  out  the  project  —  long  thwarted 
by  Turkey  —  of  Hnking  up  the  Greek  railway  system  with 
Salonica  and  with  the  great  railway  to  Belgrade,  Vienna,  and 
the  West.  Crete,  Salonica,  and  the  ^gean  Islands  could  be 
wrested  from  Turkey  only,  by  war.  For  war  Greece  then 
prepared. 

What  Bismarck  did  for  Germany,  and  Cavour  for  Italy,  was 
accomplished  for  Greece  by  Eleutherios  Venezelos  (1864-  ), 
Venezelos  ^  wonderful  organizer,  an  able  statesman,  and  an 
ardent  patriot,  who  had  won  fame  in  Crete  as  a  cham- 
pion of  union  with  Greece,  and  had  been  called  to  Greece  first 
as  an  adviser,  then  (in  19 10)  as  prime  minister  of  the  Greek 
government.  With  the  help  of  French  and  British  commis- 
sioners, army  and  navy  were  effectively  reorganized.  Public 
finance  was  reformed.  By  skillful  diplomacy  Venezelos  made 
sure  that  in  the  next  war  against  Turkey,  Greece  should  not 
fight  hopelessly  alone  as  in  1897  but  with  the  united  support  of 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia.    His  achievements  need  no  other  com- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


517 


mentary  than  the  facts  of  the  Balkan  War  of  1912-1913,  in 
which  Greece  did  fight  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Serbia,  Bul- 
garia, and  Rumania,  and  from  which  Greece  finally  issued  trium- 
phant, having  almost  doubled  her  territory  by  the  acquisition  of 
Crete,  most  of  the  yEgean  Islands,  southern  Epirus  Expansion 
(Janina),  and  a  large  slice  of  Macedonia.    Salonica,  of  Greece, 
the  peninsula  of  Chalcidice,  and  the  coast  as  far  east  '^'^ 
as  Kavala  (opposite  the  island  of  Thasos)  were  hers.  From 
2,700,000  her  population  was  increased  to  about  4,700,000.  The 
puny  state  of  1832,  struggling  for  existence,  had  become  a  strong 
nation,  a  greater  Greece. 

During  the  course  of  the  war.  King  George  I  of  Greece  was 
struck  down  by  an  assassin's  bullet  while  walking  in  the  streets 
of  Salonica,  18  March,  1913.    His  death  was  sin-  King  Con- 
cerely  lamented  by  most  Greeks ;   yet  even  in  the  stantine, 
dark  hour  of  mourning  a  ray  of  light  appeared; 
for  the  son  who  succeeded  King  George  was  adored  by  the 
nation  as  the  successful  leader  of  the  Greek  army  in  the  Balkan 
War.    By  an  odd  turn  of  history,  this  new  sovereign  of  Greece, 
who  led  his  people  triumphantly  against  the  hated  Turks,  bore 
the  name  of  Constantine  I ;  as  if  indeed  a  new  Constantine  had 
been  raised  up  to  avenge  that   unhappy  Constantine  of  the 
fifteenth  century,  the  last  of  the  Greek  emperors,  who,  griev- 
ously wounded  by  Turkish  weapons,  fell  fighting  long  ago  in  the 
streets  of  imperial  Constantinople. 

By  the  treaty  of  Berlin  (1878),  as  we  have  seen,  Rumania 
achieved  independence,  but  on  three  irritating  conditions, 
(i)  Although  Rumania  had  loyally  assisted  Russia  in  j^^^^^j^j^  ^^^^ 
the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-1878,  Rumania  had  to  independent 
give  up  to  the  tsar  that  strip  of  Bessarabia  which  the  ^g^^g^^^*^^*^' 
Rumans  since  1856  had  considered  their  own.  The 
compensation  which  Rumania  received  in  the  Dobrudja  did  not 
at  all  allay  the  smart  of  the  wound  inflicted  by  the  tsar's  in- 
gratitude. (2)  Another  article  of  the  Berlin  treaty  providing  for 
religious  equality  in  Rumania  aroused  even  more  resentment 
because  the  Rumans  were  unwilling  to  allow  the  Jews,  who  were 
already  hated  for  their  shrewdness  as  money-lenders,  to  own 
land.  The  Rumans  pretended  to  obey,  but  in  eff"cct  nullified 
the  article,  and  only  a  few  of  the  260,000  Rumanian  Jews  were 


51 8  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ever  endowed  with  the  rights  of  citizens.  (3)  As  a  third  condi- 
tion of  obtaining  independence,  Bismarck  insisted  that  Rumania 
should  buy  the  Rumanian  railways  which  were  owned  by  Ger- 
man speculators. 

Reluctantly  Rumania  promised  compliance  with  these  provi- 
sions, and  in  return  was  recognized  by  the  Powers  as  an  independent 
Rumania  a  principality.  In  1 88 1  the  ministry  decided  to  declare 
Kingdom,  Rumania  a  kingdom.^  Consequently  Prince  Charles,^ 
^^^^  —  scion  of  the  princely  German  family  of  HohenzoUern- 

Sigmaringen,  and  relative  of  the  Prussian  king,  —  who  in  1866 
had  been  elected  prince  of  Rumania,  received  on  22  May,  1881, 
the  new  kingly  crown,  wrought  of  steel  from  Turkish  cannon 
captured  at  Plevna. 

The  new-born  kingdom  had  three  chief  problems  to  face. 
First  of  all,  the  Rumanians  sadly  remembered  that  four  millions 
Nationalist  mo^e  of  their  kinsmen  were  still  in  bondage,  those 
Aspirations  in  Bessarabia  to  the  tsar,  and  those  in  Transylvania, 
Rumans  Bukowina,  and  southeastern  Hungary  to  the  Habs- 
burgs ;  the  numerous  Kutzo-Vlachs  scattered  through- 
out Macedonia  were,  moreover,  supposed  to  be  of  Ruman 
nationality,  and  Rumanian  nationalists  bitterly  resented  the 
attempts  of  Greek  enthusiasts  to  ^'Hellenize"  Macedonia. 
More  or  less  bound  up  with  this  ^'national  problem,"  was  an 
international  difficulty.  While  the  Rumans  would  gladly  have 
annexed  the  portions  of  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  inhabited 
by  their  kinsfolk,  they  feared  to  offend  either  Power.  Public 
opinion  wavered  between  seeking  the  friendship  of  Russia  or  of 
Austria-Hungary,  and  remaining  aloof  from  both. 

Third,  and  most  important,  was  the  problem  of  developing 
Rumania  into  a  prosperous,  powerful,  and  progressive  nation. 
Material  thing,  a  thrifty  and  independent  farmer-class 

Progress  of  had  to  be  created.  A  beginning  had  been  made  in 
Rumama  ^g^^  when  Prince  Cuza  abolished  feudalism,  con- 
fiscated the  vast  estates  owned  by  monasteries,  and  bestowed 

^The  constitution  of  the  newly  erected  kingdom,  originally  drafted  in  1866, 
and  subsequently  amended  in  1879  and  1884,  provided  for  a  parliament,  the  two 
houses  of  which  are  elected  by  a  class-system  resembling  somewhat  the  three- 
class-system  of  Prussia. 

Charles  married  Princess  Elizabeth  of  Wied,  who  was  famed  in  literature  as 
"Carmen  Sylva."    Charles  died  in  1914  and  "  Carmen  Sylva  "  in  1916. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  519 


upon  each  peasant  family  a  farm  ranging  from  7i  to  15  acres  in 
size.  Four  million  acres  were  thus  distributed  to  400,000  peasant 
families.  But  the  farms  were  so  small  that  their  owners  still 
found  it  necessary  to  work  part  of  the  time  for  the  wealthy  men 
who  owned  large  estates,  and  to  borrow  money  from  Jewish 
money-lenders.  In  1889  the  government  sold  off  the  state 
domains  —  one-third  of  the  total  area  —  in  small  parcels  to 
peasants.  As  a  result  there  were  in  191 2  about  a  million  small 
landowners  with  less  than  25  acres  apiece,  owning  almost  one- 
half  the  land ;  while  a  few  thousand  large  proprietors  owned  the 
remaining  half.  Rich  black  soil,  and  the  introduction  of  modern 
agricultural  implements,  —  iron  plows,  steam  threshers,  and 
reaping  machines,  —  gave  Rumania  high  rank  among  the 
grain-growing  countries  of  the  world;  but  the  peasantry  still 
remained  so  poor  that  in  1907  an  agrarian  insurrection  broke  out. 
The  government  took  warning  and,  after  restoring  order,  passed 
new  measures  to  better  the  lot  of  the  farmer. 

The  prosperity  of  Rumania  was  also  furthered  by  the  develop- 
ment of  rich  mineral  resources,  of  industry,  and  railways.  For- 
eign capitalists  (among  them  the  Rockefellers)  were  encouraged 
to  open  up  Rumanian  oil-wells  and  coal-mines.  Factories  were 
founded  and  new  industries  fostered.  The  first  short  railway, 
opened  in  1869,  was  the  forerunner  of  the  2100  miles  of  railway 
owned  by  the  state  in  191 3. 

These  and  other  economic  reforms,  such  as  the  introduction 
of  the  gold  standard,  laid  a  sure  foundation  for  the  military 
power  which  the  Rumanian  government  steadily  sought  to  up- 
build. For  its  size,  the  little  kingdom  possessed  an  extremely 
formidable  army,  equipped  with  modern  arms,  and  numbering 
in  peace  100,000  men,  in  war  500,000.  This  was  the  largest  army 
boasted  of  by  any  of  the  Balkan  states,  as  Rumania  also  pos- 
sessed the  most  numerous  population. 

Serbia's  history  as  an  independent  state  was  less  happy. 
Milan  Obrenovich,  who  was  recognized  as  an  independent  prince 
by  the  treaty  of  Berlin  (1878),  and  later  became  King  Serbia, 
Milan  (1882),  was  a  nephew  of  that  Prince  Milosh  1878-1914 
Obrenovich  who  in  1830  had  won  autonomy  for  Serbia.  Unfor- 
tunately the  royal  family  was  allied  by  tradition  with  the  aris- 
tocratical  faction  in  Serbia  against  the  vastly  more  popular 


520 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Radical  party.  Moreover,  plots  against  the  king  were  continu- 
ally being  hatched  by  rival  claimants  to  the  throne,  who  sym- 
Dynastic  pathized  with  the  Radicals  and  derived  their  name  and 
^^^^  claim  from  Karageorge  —  that  "Black  George,"  the 

man  of  the  people  who  had  been  prince  of  Serbia  from  1804  to 
1 8 13.  Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  the  Obrenovich  and 
Karageorge  families  continually  conspired  against  one  another, 
alternately  in  and  out  of  power.  To  this  dynastic  feud,  Serbia 
owed  the  periodic  political  upheavals  which  retarded  her  growth, 
and  two  brutal  assassinations  —  one  in  1868,  the  other  in  1903 
—  which  stained  her  history. 

King  Milan,  then,  was  an  Obrenovich.  For  a  decade  after 
1878  he  became  steadily  more  unpopular.  In  order  to  redeem 
Serbian  finances  from  chaos  he  had  to  levy  heavier  taxes.  Yet 
more  unfortunate  than  the  taxes  was  his  war  on  Bulgaria  (1885). 
The  war  was  not  only  unjust,  as  a  shameless  attempt  to  ruin 
or  at  least  to  extort  concessions  from  Serbia's  newly  united 
sister-state ;  the  war  was  not  even  successful.  Within  two  weeks 
the  Bulgars  had  repelled  the  attack  and  were  advancing  on 
Serbia  with  an  army  of  55,000  men.  Serbia  was  able  to  conclude 
peace,  without  loss,  thanks  to  the  kindly  intervention  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  diplomacy ;  but  the  fact  remained  that  King  Milan 
had  led  the  Serbian  armies  to  defeat.  Shrewdly  enough,  he 
endeavored  to  regain  favor  by  granting  of  his  own  free  will  a 
very  liberal  constitution  (1889),  and  abdicating  the  throne  two 
months  later.  Milan's  son,  Alexander,  was  a  mere  boy,  unable 
to  cope  with  the  situation.  Once  he  had  to  call  his  father  back 
Assassina  ^^^^  Paris  to  prevent  a  political  crisis  in  Serbia.  A 
tion  of  the  few  years  later  Alexander  made  a  sudden  about-face, 
FamUy"i903  ^"^^^^  father,  and  transferred  his  affections  from 
Austria-Hungary  to  Russia.  This  bold  move  only 
spurred  on  to  greater  activity  the  enemies  of  Alexander  and  of 
his  wife.  Queen  Draga,  who  was  even  more  bitterly  hated.  Con- 
spirators were  already  at  work.  The  plot  matured;  king, 
Accession  queen,  ministers  of  state,  and  fifty  other  persons  were 
of  King  murdered  early  in  the  morning  of  11  June,  1903. 
Peter  rpj^^  regicides  placed  Peter,  grandson  of  Karageorge, 
upon  the  throne,  and  restored  the  liberal  constitution  of 
1889. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  521 

After  the  accession  of  King  Peter,  popular  attention  was  once 
more  centered  upon  nationalism.    Serbia's    Great  Idea"  pos- 
sessed the  hearts  and  minds  of  patriots,  who  hoped  to 
unite  into  one  glorious  empire  the  Serbs  of  Serbia,  ^bmon 
Montenegro,  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Novi-Bazar,  and  and  Expan- 
northwestern  Macedonia.    To  such  patriots  Austria-  sg^i^* 
Hungary  appeared  as  Serbia's  arch-enemy,  especially 
when  in  1908  the  Austro-Hungarian  government  annexed  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina.    Serbian  patriotism  would  not  be  satisfied 
until  Serbia  had  fought  first  with  Bulgaria  and  Greece  to  despoil 
Turkey,  then  quarreled  with  Bulgaria  over  the  spoils,  and  finally 
furnished  the  occasion  for  the  War  of  the  Nations. 

The  other  Serb  state,  little  Montenegro,  secured  by  the 
treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878  a  bit  of  Adriatic  coast  land,  including 
the  port  of  Antivari,  and  recognition  as  an  independent  Montene- 
principality.    Under  the  benevolent  despotism  of  gro,  1878- 
tljeir  monarch.  Prince  Nicholas,  the  Montenegrins  ad-  '^^'^ 
vanced  in  prosperity,  industry,  and  education,  although  they  still 
remained  for  the  most  part  intractable  mountaineer-herdsmen. 
The  progressive  character  of  the  Montenegrin  government  was 
well  illustrated  when  in  1905  Prince  Nicholas  granted  a  demo- 
cratic constitution  and  created  a  parliament,  called  the  Skupsh- 
tina,  as  in  Serbia,  and  elected  by  universal  manhood  suffrage. 
What  he  lost  in  autocratic  power,  Prince  Nicholas  gained  in 
dignity,  for  on  28  August,  1910,  he  assumed  the  title  of  king. 

Although  the  Bulgars  in  northern  Bulgaria  were  forced  to 
wait  until  1878  for  autonomy,  and  until  1885  for  national  union 
with  the  Bulbars  in  Eastern  Rumelia,  their  subse-  _  ,  . 

,  .  1       n     •   r    •  Bulgana  an 

quent  progress  and  prosperity  was  hardly  inferior  to  Autonomous 
that  of  Greece  or  Rumania.    It  is  true  that  in  191 2  ^g^g^P^^*^' 
the  Bulgarian  people  were  still  a  nation  of  peasants, 
among  whom  modern  agricultural  methods  made  slow  progress ; 
but  the  millions  of  small  farmers  were  independent  and  had  no 
great  landlords  to  fear.    Coal  and  iron  mines  were  being  de- 
veloped, and  infant  industries  showed  signs  of  rapid  Material 
growth.    Commerce  with  other  nations  more  than  Deveiop- 
tripled  in  value  between  1887  and  191 1.    With  rail- 
ways  the  advance  was  even  more  striking.    There  was  in  1878 
but  a  single  line  of  railway,  137  miles  long;  in  191 1  Bulgaria 


522  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


boasted  1200  miles  of  state-owned  railways  and  400  miles  of 
telegraph.  With  the  advance  of  commerce  and  railways  the 
growth  of  population  almost  kept  pace,  with  the  result  that  the 
nation  which  in  1888  numbered  less  than  3,200,000  numbered  in 
1910  at  least  4,300,000.  The  number  of  schools  was  much  more 
than  doubled  between  1878  and  1910.  Free  public  libraries  were 
founded  in  the  cities.  Bulgaria  was  becoming  a  civilized  Euro- 
pean nation. 

The  greatest  obstacle  to  internal  progress  in  Bulgaria  was  the 

spirit  of  national  patriotism.    Patriotism  demanded  the  main- 

„  .  tenance  of  an  army  which  in  times  of  peace  (ign) 

Nationalist  11,         y  ,  f  , 

Aspirations    numbered  about  00,000  men,  and  necessitated  an  ex- 

of  the  Bui-    penditure  of  more  than  eight  millions  of  dollars  a  year. 

Patriotism  held  up  the  idea  of  a  great  Bulgaria,  which 
would  include  Adrianople  and  Macedonia,  and  dominate  the 
peninsula,  —  an  ideal  which  kept  Bulgaria  in  constant  difficul- 
ties with  foreign  powers  and  brought  about  a  disastrous  war  in 
19 13.  The  proud  and  independent  spirit  of  the  Bulgars  also 
caused  Russia,  once  the  champion  of  Bulgaria,  to  adopt  a  de- 
cidedly unfriendly  attitude.  In  1883  Prince  Alexander  of  Bul- 
Russian  In-  garia,  by  refusing  to  be  the  tool  of  Russian  officials, 
terference  ^j-gt  excited  the  anger  of  the  tsar.  Consequently 
Russia  attempted  two  years  later  to  prevent  the  union  of  Bulgaria 
and  Eastern  Rumelia.  Though  foiled  in  this  attempt,  Russian 
influence  was  used  to  foment  rebellion  against  the  obstinate 
Prince  Alexander,  with  the  result  that  a  conspiracy  was  hatched 
and  in  1886  the  prince  was  forced  at  pistol's  point  to  abdicate 
the  throne.  In  choosing  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Saxe-Coburg- 
Prince  Gotha  to  succeed  Alexander,  the  Bulgars  opposed 
Ferdinand  ^j^g  desires  and  disregarded  the  advice  of  the  tsar,  who 
declared  Ferdinand  to  be  a  usurper.  Ferdinand,  however,  clung 
to  his  throne,  and  for  almost  seven  years  allowed  his  remarkable 
and  domineering  minister,  Stefan  Stambolov  (1854-1895),  to 
stamboiov    ^^^^  Russia.    Unquestionably  Stambolov  was  able; 

he  has  been  called  the  ^'Bulgarian  Bismarck";  but 
by  his  tyrannical  methods  of  government  he  made  himself  so 
bitterly  hated  that  he  fell  from  power  in  1894  and  was 
assassinated  in  the  following  year.  Stambolov  had  been  the 
soul  of  Bulgarian  nationalism  in  his  refusal  to  be  subservient  to 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  523 


Russia;  with  Stambolov  dead,  and  Prince  Ferdinand  anxious 
to  patch  up  his  quarrel  with  the  tsar,  the  Bulgarian  govern- 
ment was  able  to  sue  for  Russia's  friendship  with  complete 
success.    The  reconciliation  bore  fruit  some  years  g^jg^^^^^ 
later  when  Russia  indulgently  allowed  Prince  Fer-  independent 
dinand  to  cast  off  the  sultan's  suzerainty,  to  declare  ^|*^°™' 
Bulgaria  an  independent  kingdom  on  5  October,  1908, 
and  to  style  himself  the  ''Tsar  of  the  Bulgars."    Of  the  catas- 
trophe to  which  the  inordinate  patriotism  of  the  Bulgars  finally 
led  —  in  the  Balkan  War  of  191 3  —  we  shall  speak  when  we 
later  consider  that  war. 

While  Rumania,  Greece,  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  even  little 
Montenegro  were  rapidly  assimilating  European  civilization  and 
becoming  miniature  reproductions  of  the  great  Euro-  pj^^^g 
pean  nations,  Turkey  was  making  similar  but  piti-  Reform  of 
ably  feeble  efforts.    Yet  in  1878  the  future  of  Turkey 
seemed  full  of  promise.    The  treaty  of  Berlin  pro-  Empire, 
vided  for  an  international  commission  to  outline  a  pro- 
gram  of  reforms  in  European  Turkey.    German  experts  were 
to  reorganize  Ottoman  finance ;  Enghsh  officers  were  to  reform 
the  police  and  report  abuses.    And  parliamentary  government 
had  been  promised  by  the  liberal  constitution  of  1876. 

The  dream  of  reform  was  soon  dissipated.  Sultan  Abdul 
Hamid  II  had  never  been  sincerely  disposed  to  constitutional 
government.    He  was  bent  rather  on  exalting  his  own  , 

All        1111       •  •     11  11  Abdul 

power.    Although  he  had  originally  usurped  the  Hamid  n 
throne,  Abdul  Hamid  was  none  the  less  emphatic  in  (1876-1909) 

.        ,        ...  ,  -  ,  .        ,  ,      and  the 

reasserting  the  reugious  character  of  his  rule,  as  the  Abandon- 
sovereisni  intrusted  by  Allah  with  the  military  leader- 

,  "i  Reform 

ship  of  the  Faithful,  the  successor  on  earth  of  Moham- 
med.   Instead  of  imitating  European  monarchs,  he  became  all 
the  more  an  oriental,  living  in  the  royal  park  (Yildiz  Kiosk), 
maintaining  the  customary  harem,  and  punctiliously  observing 
the  rites  of  Islam.    It  was  no  marvel,  then,  that  the 

...  Abrogation 

Wily  Turk  immediately  nullified  the  reforms  he  had  of  the  Con- 
promised.    The  constitution  of  1876  and  the  parlia-  Jg^*^®°®' 
ment  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  hardly  been  an- 
nounced when  they  were  suspended  (1878).    No  parliament  met 
^igain  in  Constantinople  for  thirty  years.    And  meanwhile  Abdul 


524  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Hamid  continued  to  concentrate  his  autocratic  power ;  he  ap* 
pointed  personal  favorites  as  ministers  of  state,  and  by  means 
of  wholesale  corruption  and  systematic  espionage  endeavored  to 
maintain  his  arbitrary  rule. 

Despite  his  wily  diplomacy  and  unscrupulous  cunning,  Abdul 
Hamid  was  perpetually  in  difficulties.    First,  the  public  debt  in- 
creased to  such  alarming  proportions  that  in  1881 

Difficulties  ^.^         ^      ,     ^  ^ 

of  Abdul  Turkey  s  European  creditors,  mostly  French,  stepped 
R^^e^  in  to  insure  the  payment  of  interest  on  their  invest- 
ments, and  established  an  international  commission 
to  supervise  Turkish  finances.  Next,  Tunis  was  taken  by  France. 
Then  the  province  of  Eastern  Rumelia  was  united  to  Bulgaria 
(1885).  Then  there  were  massacres  in  Asia  Minor  (1894-1895), 
where  the  Mohammedan  Kurds  hated  their  Christian  neighbors, 
the  Armenians.  More  than  a  hundred  thousand,  possibly  two 
hundred  thousand,  Armenian  villagers  fell  beneath  the  swords 
of  Moslem  fanatics;  and  even  in  Constantinople  several  thou- 
sands of  Christians  were  slain.  The  wholesale  slaughter  of 
Armenian  Christians  was  doubtless  viewed  by  the  sultan  with 
satisfaction  rather  than  with  apprehension ;  but  in  the  long  run 
it  aroused  public  sentiment  in  Europe  against  the  Turks  and 
hastened  the  downfall  of  the  sultan.  Armenia  was  still  in  up- 
roar, when  Crete  was  seized  with  revolutionary  convulsions 

(1896)  ,  which  resulted  in  a  war  between  Turkey  and  Greece 

(1897)  .  In  the  war  Turkish  armies  were  victorious,  but  a  few 
years  later  Crete  fell  practically  into  the  hands  of  the  Greek 
kingdom.  Arabia  was  in  constant  revolt.  Anarchy  reigned  in 
Albania,  where  the  sultan's  officials  found  it  all  but  impossible 
to  enforce  the  laws  and  to  collect  the  taxes.  Worst  of  all  was  the 
ferment  in  Macedonia,  where  Greeks,  Serbs,  Bulgars,  and 
Rumans  were  carrying  on  rival  nationalist  agitations  and  with 
their  fihbustering  exploits  kept  the  country  in  turmoil.  An 
especially  vigorous  Macedonian  upheaval,  caused  by  the  Bulgars 
in  1903,  resulted  in  foreign  intervention;  and  the  sultan  reluc- 
tantly consented  to  new  reform  schemes,  which  were  never  fully 
executed. 

The  Ottoman  Empire  in  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury seemed  on  the  point  of  collapse,  with  mutiny  in  Arabia 
and  anarchy  in  Albania,  with  Crete  in  the  control  of  Greece, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  525 


and  foreigners  interfering  in  the  administration  of  Mace- 
donia, with  an  enormous  public  debt,  with  railways,  mines, 
and  banks  in  the  hands  of  foreign  capitalists,  with  Balkan 
nations  and  European  Powers  greedily  regarding  the  Ottoman 
provinces. 

"The  Sick  Man  of  Europe,"  as  Turkey  had  so  often  been 
called,  was  apparently  tottering  to  his  end.    There  was,  how- 
ever, a  group  of  politicians  who  dared  dream  of  reju- 
venating Turkey.    Some  of  their  number  were  ad-  ^/'^^^g^^*^® 
vanced  in  years,  but  all  were  "  Young  Turks  "  in  the  ex-  forming 
uberance  of  patriotism.    Many  had  studied  in  Euro-  ^^^*y 

.  .       .  .  ,  ,    ,         within  the 

pean  umversities,  m  Pans  most  commonly,  and  there  ottoman 
under  the  influence  of  European  civilization  had  con-  ^^^^young 
ceived  the  project  of  modernizing  Turkey.    They  Turks " 
would  win  parliamentary  government  for  their  home 
land.    In  education,  in  science,  in  industry,  Turkey  would  be 
transformed  into  a  progressive  state,  vying  with  European 
nations.    Above  all,  they  would  induce  their  compatriots  to 
forget  religious  differences  in  a  spirit  of  national  patriotism  — 
that  "fraternity"  of  allegiance  to  a  common  flag.  Albanians, 
Armenians,   Bulgars,   Arabs,  —  all   would   be   treated  with 
justice,  and  all  would  become  Turks,  "Young  Turks."  It 
was  a  counterpart  in  Turkey  of  the  nationahst  agitations 
which  had  already  created  a  Greece,  a  Serbia,  a  Rumania, 
and  a  Bulgaria. 

Shrewdly  enough,  the  Young  Turks  avoided  all  violence  until 
they  were  absolutely  sure  that  the  army  would  support  them. 
Then  with  swiftness  and  certainty  they  struck  the 
blow,  the  coup  d'etat  of  1908.    On  23  July,  1908,  the  J^J^f^^^^ 
constitution  of  1876  was  proclaimed  at  Salonica  by  juiy,  1908; 
the  central  body  of  the  Younsr  Turks,  the  so-called  Com-  Estabiish- 

rTT-  .i   T.*^.      -r.  ment  of 

mittee  of  Union  and  Progress,  with  Major  Enver  Bey  constitu- 
at  its  head.    Two  army  corps  threatened  to  march  ^^7' 

.        ,.ri         1  1      111  1  ernment  in 

on  Constantinople  if  the  sultan  should  deny  the  con-  Turkey 
stitution.    Terrified,  Abdul  Hamid  hastily  issued  an 
imperial  decree,  officially  restoring  the  constitution  of  1876.  A 
few  opponents  of  the  coup  were  assassinated,  the  press  was 
emancipated,  a  Liberal  statesman,  Kiamil  Pasha,  was  appointed 
grand  vizier,  and  Turkey  was  a  constitutional  monarchy. 


526  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


This  disturbance  was  seized  upon  by  Austria-Hungary  as  an 
occasion  for  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  By 
Loss  of  treaty  of  Berlin  (1878) ,  Austria-Hungary  had  been 

Bosnia  and  given  a  protectorate  over  the  two  provinces  and  the 
!rtn"*i9o8     ^'^^^^     station  military  garrisons  in  Novi-Bazar.  The 

Austro-Hungarian  government  now  proceeded  to  vio- 
late the  treaty  by  announcing  early  in  October,  1908,  that 
the  Dual  Monarchy  would  annex  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  at 
the  same  time  withdraw  her  garrisons  from  the  sanjak  of  Novi- 
Bazar.  On  7  October,  1908,  the  annexation  was  officially  decreed 
by  Emperor  Francis  Joseph.  Almost  simultaneously,  Ferdi- 
nand of  Bulgaria,  who  realized  that  Austria-Hungary's  violation 
Loss  of  treaty  would  draw  attention  from  his  own 

Suzerainty  action,  declared  Bulgaria  (including  Eastern  Rumelia) 
garia^iQoS    ^^^i^^^X  independent  of  Turkey  and  assumed  the  title 

of  tsar.  Helplessly  but  slowly  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment acquiesced  in  what  it  could  not  prevent  and  recognized 
Bulgarian  independence  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  annexation 
of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  as  accomplished  facts.  Small  comfort 
was  derived  from  the  indemnities  which  Turkey  thereupon 
received  —  $11,000,000  from  Austria-Hungary  and  $24,000,000 
from  Bulgaria. 

To  make  matters  worse  for  the  constitutional  government  of 
Kiamil  Pasha,  Albania  became  more  turbulent  in  the  spring  of 
Continued  ^9°9  ^^^^  ever,  the  Kurdish  troops  in  Asia  Minor 
Disorders  in  revolted,  fresh  massacres  of  Armenians  were  reported, 
Turkey  mutiny  broke  out  in  Arabia,  and  the  quarrels  of  na- 
tionalities in  Macedonia  became  so  serious  that  the  government 
decided  to  disarm  the  Macedonian  population.  The  Christian 
portion  of  the  population  ceased  to  support  the  Young  Turk 
Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  and  organized  instead  the 
Liberal  Union.  The  grand  vizier,  who  was  a  Liberal  rather 
than  a  Young  Turk,  became  increasingly  hostile  to  the  Com- 
mittee. A  counter-revolution  against  the  Young  Turks  was  set 
on  foot  in  Constantinople  and  received  the  approbation  of  Sul- 
tan Abdul  Hamid  II.  Then  it  was  that  the  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress  decided  on  a  bold  course.  An  army  of  25,000 
men  was  sent  against  Constantinople.  After  less  than  a  day's 
fighting  Shevket  Pasha  and  his  troops  occupied  the  capital  in 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  527 

the  name  of  the  Committee,  25  April,  1909.    The  parliament, 
now  calling  itself  a  National  Assembly,  resolved  on  the  de- 
position of  Abdul  Hamid,  who  was  bundled  off  to  ugp^^gj^j^^ 
Salonica.     Mohammed  V,  Abdul  Hamid's  younger  of  Abdul 
brother,  was  chosen  to  succeed  to  the  throne,  and  on  Hamid  11, 
10  May,  1909,  received  the  famous  sword  of  Othman. 

The  revolution  of  1909  established  parHamentary  government 
in  the  Ottoman  Empire  on  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  constitu- 
tion of  1876.    Although  Mohammedanism  remained 
the  state  reHgion,  and  the  sultan  remained  the  chief  tionaUst 
of  Islam,  all  Turkish  subjects,  Christian,  Jewish,  or  Policies  of 
Mohammedan,  were  guaranteed  equal  rights  before  xw-ks*""^ 
the  law  and  at  the  polls.    The  sultan  was  henceforth 
to  be  as  much  a  constitutional  monarch  as  King  George  of  Eng- 
land ;  the  government  was  to  be  carried  on  by  a  grand  vizier 
(prime  minister)  and  ministers  responsible  to  a  popularly  elected 
parliament.    But  the  revolution  did  not  estabhsh  the  liberties 
of  the  Christian  nationaHties.    For  it  speedily  became  all  too 
clear  that  constitutional  government  was  a  less  important  item 
of  the  Young  Turk  program  than  nationahsm.    By  making  the 
Turkish  language  official,  by  standardizing  education,  by  plant- 
ing new  Moslem  colonies  in  Macedonia,  by  using  violence  and 
bribery  to  influence  elections,  by  forbidding  pubHc  meetings,  by 
repressing  anti-Ottoman  agitation,  by  practically  excluding  Chris- 
tians from  civil  offices,  by  disarming  the  Macedonian  villagers, 
—  by  these  and  numberless  tokens  the  Young  Turks  signified 
their  intention  to  weld  all  races  into  a  Turkish  nation,  to  ''Otto- 
manize"  the  Turkish  Empire.    Resentfully  the  Bulgars,  Greeks, 
and  Serbs  in  Macedonia  regarded  the  new  poKcy  of  "Otto- 
manization,"  and,  forgetting  their  own  quarrels,  they  now  made 
common  cause  against  the  Turk.    Greece,  Bulgaria,  and  Serbia 
began  to  draw  more  closely  together  with  the  object  opposition 
of  protecting  the  Christians  in  Macedonia.    On  13  in  Mace- 
March,  191 2,  a  treaty  of  alKance  was  secretly  signed  by  fh^- 
Serbian  and  Bulgarian  plenipotentiaries ;  late  in  May,  kan  Aiu- 
Greece  and  Montenegro  were  likewise  bound  in  alKance  " 
to  their  sister  Balkan  states;   and  military  conventions  were 
drawn  up,  stipulating  how  many  troops  each  state  of  the  ''Bal- 
kan AlHance"  should  put  in  the  field- if  war  should  ensue. 


528  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Meanwhile  the  Turco-Italian  War,  coming  like  a  thunderbolt 
from  a  clear  sky,  had  caused  consternation  in  Constantinople. 
The  Turco-  September,  191  r,  the  Italian  government  had 

Italian  War,  announced  its  intention  to  seize  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica. 
19H-1912  rpj^^  ^j^^^  followed  was  confined  mostly  to  irregular 
but  fierce  hostilities  between  the  Italian  expeditionary  armies 
on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  Turkish  garrisons 
and  Arab  tribesmen  under  the  leadership  of  Enver  Bey  in  Africa. 
During  the  course  of  the  war,  Italy  seized  Rhodes,  Patmos,  and 
ten  other  i^^gean  islands  (the  Dodecanesos),  and,  when  peace 
was  finally  concluded  by  the  treaty  of  Lausanne  (signed  at 
Ouchy,  18  October,  191 2),  Italy  not  only  gained  the  African 
vilayets  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  but  in  addition  acquired  the 
right  to  hold  the  twelve  islands  until  Turkey  should  have  com- 
pleted the  evacuation  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica. 

THE  BALKAN  WARS,  1912-1913  " 

It  was  during  the  spring  and  summer  of  191 2,  while  Turkey 
was  still  harassed  and  weakened  by  the  war  with  Italy,  that  the 
^,   ^        Balkan  states  concluded  the  alliance  referred  to  above, 

The  Ques-  _  ,  .  i      r  t  i 

tionof  and  began  to  press  more  vigorously  for  radical  re- 
Macedonia    forms  in  Macedonia.    They  were  encouraged  by 

and  Albania  .  .       ,      .      *         .  ^  . 

mutinous  outbreaks  m  Albama  and  by  the  seeming 
success  of  the  Albanians  in  obtaining  extensive  concessions. 
Popular  sentiment  was  inflamed  by  news  that  the  Turks  had 
massacred  Christians  in  several  Macedonian  villages.  When 
the  mobilization  of  troops  by  the  allies  and  by  Turkey,  early  in 
October,  191 2,  gave  warning  that  a  conflict  was  at  hand,  the 
governments  of  the  Great  Powers  ^  jointly  informed  the  Balkan 
allies  that  they  would  be  displeased  by  war,  that  they  would 
persuade  Turkey  to  carry  out  the  reforms  promised  by  the 
Berhn  Treaty  of  1878,  that  in  any  case  the  Balkan  allies  could 
gain  no  new  territory  by  war,  since  the  Powers  "would  not  per- 
mit at  the  end  of  the  conflict  any  modification  of  the  territorial 
status  quo  in  European  Turkey."  Nevertheless,  Montenegro 
promptly  declared  war  on  Turkey  and  called  on  Serbia,  Greece, 

^  For  an  account  of  the  general  attitude  and  alignment  of  the  Great  Powerf, 
see  below,  pp.  706-710 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  529 


and  Bulgaria  to  join  in  a  ''holy  war  against  the  cruel  and  in- 
fidel Turk."    The  reply  of  these  states  was  the  dispatch  of  a  last 
appeal  —  an  ultimatum  —  to  the  Porte,  demanding 
autonomy  for  Macedonia  under  European  governors,  ^o^s^bia, 
But  the  Turkish  government,  relying  upon  the  pledge  Greece,  and 
of  the  Great  Powers,  refused  to  reUnquish  control  of  j^k^^war 
Macedonia,  and  angrily  recalled  the  Turkish  diplo-  on  Turkey, 
matic  representatives  from  Athens,  Belgrade,  and  ^glf^^^' 
Sofia  (October,  191 2).    Turkey,  with  perhaps  400,000 
soldiers,  was  opposed  by  Bulgaria  with  an  estimated  war  army 
of  350,000,  Serbia  with  250,000,  Greece  with  150,000,  and  Monte- 
negro with  30,000. 

The  first  stage  of  the  Balkan  War  was  characterized  every- 
where by  victories  of  the  alHed  armies,  superior  to  the  Turks  in 
organization,  in  training,  and  in  equipment.  Insuffi- 
cient  food  provisions,  cholera,  and  inabiHty  promptly  paign  of  the 
to  put  her  armies  in  the  field  were  hardly  less  fatal  to  ^^^^"^ 
Turkey  than  was  the  deadly  artillery  fire  of  the  Bulgarians. 
Nevertheless,  the  Turkish  armies  fought  bravely  and  stubbornly. 
In  Thrace  the  fiercest  battles  were  contested.    There  the  Bul- 
garian army,  advancing  southward,  encountered  the  Turkish 
forces  on  a  fine  stretching  eastward  from  Adrianople  to  Kirk- 
Kilisse.     Adrianople,  with  its  frowning  fortresses,  Luie  Burgas 
long  resisted  capture.    But  at  Kirk-Kihsse  the  Bulgars  i  November, 
triumphed  and  drove  back  the  eastern  wing  of  the 
Turkish  army.    Leaving  part  of  their  forces  to  besiege  Adri- 
anople, the  Bulgars  again  advanced  south  and  administered  a 
decisive  defeat  to  the  enemy  in  the  greatest  battle  of  the  war. 
Four  days  the  battle  raged  (29  October-i  Novem- 
ber) along  the  front  of  twenty-two  miles,  stretching  the^De- 
from  Lule  Burgas  to  Bunar  Hissar.    Fifty  thousand  fensive  be- 
men  fell  on  the  field,  wounded  or  dying.    The  Turks  stantinopie 
retreated  to  Tchorlu,  and  thence  to  Tchataldja. 
There,  but  a  few  miles  distant  from  Constantinople,  the  shattered 
Turkish  forces  drew  up  to  make  their  last  stand. 

Meanwhile,  the  Greek  navy  had  occupied  the  island  of  Lem- 
nos,  and  an  army  led  by  the  Greek  crown  prince  had  ^^le 
advanced  north  from  Thessaly  and  had  captured  the  Western 
important  city  of  Salonica  early  in  November.  Serbian 

VOL.  II  —  2  M 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


armies,  cooperating  with  the  Bulgar  ''army  of  the  west,'^  had 
overrun  Macedonia,  capturing  Pristina,  Uskub,  and  Monastir 
Successes  rapid  succession.  Victorious  Serbian  and  Monte- 
of  Greeks  negrin  forces  had  occupied  Novi-Bazar  and  Durazzo. 
and  Serbs  ^j^^  Montenegrins  had  begun  the  investment  of 

Scutari.  Such  was  the  desperate  pHght  of  Turkey  when  an 
armistice  was  concluded,  3  December,  191 2,  preparatory  to  the 
conclusion  of  peace. 

At  the  peace  conference,  which  met  in  London,  three  trouble- 
some disputes  arose :  Turkey  would  not  relinquish  Adrianople 
Unsuccess-  Bulgaria  demanded ;  Turkey  also  refused  to  cede 
fui  Negotia-  all  the  ^gean  Islands  to  Greece ;  and  the  alUes  by  in- 
Renewed  sisting  on  a  war  indemnity  threatened  to  ruin  both 
Hostuities,  the  Ottoman  treasury  and  the  European  creditors  of 
^^^^  the  Ottoman  Empire.    Despairing  of  an  agreement, 

the  allies  withdrew  their  deputies  from  the  conference.  With 
urgent  solicitation  the  Powers  persuaded  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment to  yield  on  the  question  of  ceding  Adrianople  to  Bulgaria, 
but  on  the  very  next  day,  23  January,  1913,  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment and  the  pacific  Kiamil  Pasha  were  violently  overthrown 
by  the  Young  Turks,  who  set  up  a  new  cabinet  with  the  motto 
''no  surrender."  The  coup  d^etat  could  have  but  one  result, 
the  resumption  of  hostilities.  On  3  February  the  conflict  was 
reopened.  The  Bulgars,  camping  all  winter  before  the  Tchataldja 
line  of  trenches,  were  unable  to  advance  farther  on  Constan- 
tinople, but  at  least  they  kept  the  main  Turkish  army  bottled 
up  while  the  other  armies  of  the  allies  besieged  Adrianople,  Janina 
(in  Epirus),  and  Scutari  (in  northern  Albania).  On  6  March, 
Janina  was  captured  by  the  Greeks ;  and  on  26  March,  Shukri 
Pasha,  the  gallant  defender  of  Adrianople,  surrendered  that  city 
with  its  garrison  of  30,000  men  to  the  Serbo-Bulgar  army.  In 
April,  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Greece  agreed  to  an  armistice  with 
Turkey.  The  plucky  Montenegrins,  however,  continued  to 
besiege  Scutari,  despite  pleas  and  threats,  until  that  town  was 
surrendered  on  23  April. 

The  fall  of  Scutari  almost  precipitated  a  great  European  war. 
For  the  six  Great  Powers  had  already  decided  that  Scutari 
should  be  included  in  Albania,  which  they  proposed  to  make  an 
autonomous  state.    Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  had  been  so  em- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  531 


phatic  on  this  point  that  Serbia  had  been  compelled  regretfully 
to  withdraw  her  troops  from  the  coveted  Adriatic  port  of 
Durazzo.    Now,  on  i  May,  Austria-Hungary  threat-  Montene- 
ened  war  if  Montenegro  should  retain  Scutari,  and  her  gro,  Albania, 
threat  was  backed  by  Italy  and  Germany.    Loud  cries  nationaT^ 
went  up  in  Russia,  where  enthusiastic  Pan-Slavists  CompUca- 
called  upon  the  tsar  to  protect  the  Httle  Slav  state 
against  Austria-Hungary  and  to  uphold  Montenegro's  occupa- 
tion of  Scutari.    Just  in  time  to  avert  war  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Russia,  King  Nicholas  of  Montenegro  withdrew 
his  troops  peaceably  from  Scutari  and  an  international  force  of 
marines  marched  into  the  disputed  city. 

Peace  negotiations  were  once  more  resumed,  this  time  with 
greater  success.    On  30  May,  1913,  a  treaty  was  jYieTreaty 
signed  at  London  by  representatives  of  all  the  bellig-  of  London 
erents.    Turkey  gave  up  all  territory  west  of  a  Hne  [^^^^f^' 
drawn  from  Enos  on  the  ^Egean  Sea  to  Midia  on  the  Turkey 
Black  Sea,  and  Hkewise  ceded  Crete  to  Greece.    The  ?J^°''?°?„ 

'  Nearly  All 

boundaries  of  autonomous  Albania,  the  status  of  the  her  Euro- 
iEgean  Islands,  and  the  final  financial  settlements  p^*^ 

sessions 

were  to  be  adjusted  later  by  the  Great  Powers. 

The  treaty  of  London  marked  the  triumph  of  the  allied  Balkan 
states  over  Turkey.  Within  eight  months  they  had  all  but 
expelled  the  Turk  from  Europe.  No  sooner  was  their  Quaj^eis 
victory  assured,  however,  than  the  allies  fell  to  quar-  among  the 
reling  over  the  spoils,  Bulgaria  demanding  the  chief  fules  over 
share,  —  two- thirds  of  the  conquered  territory, —  the  Turkish 
Greece  and  Serbia  protesting.  Presently  the  public  ^^^^ 
learned  that  the  secret  treaty  of  aUiance  signed  by  Serbia 
and  Bulgaria  in  March,  191 2,  contained  an  agreement  whereby 
Bulgaria  was  to  annex  the  greater  part  of  Macedonia, 
including  even  Monastir,  while  Serbia  would  content  herself 
with  a  small  slice  of  Macedonia  and  a  large  portion  of 
Albania.  But  the  Powers  had  blocked  Serbia's  designs  on 
Albania,  thus  diminishing  Serbia's  gains.  Bulgaria  would  re- 
ceive more  than  had  been  contemplated  at  the  time  the  treaty 
was  signed,  while  Serbia  would  receive  much  less.  In  view  of 
these  facts,  Serbia  demanded  a  new  apportionment.  Pride  in 
their  recent  spectacular  feats-of-arms,  and  perhaps  a  vain  hope 


532  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  obtaining  Austro-Hungarian  support,  led  the  Bulgars  to  refuse 
the  demand,  and  enthusiastically  to  embark  on  a  new  war. 

In  the  ensuing  second  Balkan  War — the  war  against  Bulgaria 
—  Serbia  was  joined  by  the  Montenegrins,  who  were  ever  ready 

to  assist  Serbia,  and  by  the  Greeks,  who  were  no  less 
Montene-  jealous  of  Bulgaria.  Shortly  after  the  opening  of  hos- 
gro,  Greece,  tilities,  two  more  enemies  attacked  the  Bulgarian 
mania  Make  kingdom.  The  Rumanian  government  had  enviously 
War  on  Bui-  watched  the  Balkan  states  dividing  Macedonia  among 
Juiy^'i9i3^~  them;   the  Rumans  had  long  been  jealous  lest  the 

rapidly  growing  Bulgarian  nation  should  overshadow 
Rumania ;  and  they  seized  this  occasion  to  gratify  their  greed 

for  new  territory  and  at  the  same  time  to  attack  their 
oTTurkey^  rival.  Finally,  Turkey  entered  the  arena  against 
into  the  War  Bulgaria,  hoping  to  regain  at  least  a  portion  of  what 
B^garia  ^^^t  by  the  treaty  of  London,  especially  the 

city  of  Adrianople. 
The  fighting  began  late  in  June,  19 13,  between  Greek  and 
Bulgarian  soldiers,  although  war  was  not  officially  declared  until 
Defeat  of  5  July.  In  Macedonia  occurred  most  of  the  engage- 
the  Bulgars  nients.  The  Greek  armies  in  southern  Macedonia 
pushed  northward  up  the  Struma  River,  aiming  straight  at  Sofia, 
the  Bulgarian  capital ;  while  Serbians  and  Montenegrins,  west 
of  the  Struma,  closed  in  upon  the  Bulgars  at  Kotchana  and 
threatened  to  descend  upon  Sofia  by  way  of  the  Bulgarian  town 
of  Kostendil.  From  the  southeast  advanced  Enver  Bey  with  a 
Turkish  army,  which  reoccupied  Adrianople  on  22  July.  Most 
alarming  of  all  was  the  rapid  triumphal  march  of  the  splendid 
Rumanian  troops  to  within  twenty  miles  of  Sofia.  Perceiving 
his  enemies  close  in  from  every  side.  King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria 
sued  for  peace,  and  the  "July  War,"  so  disastrous  for  his  coun- 
try, was  ended. 

Peace  was  concluded  by  the  delegates  of  Bulgaria,  Rumania, 
Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Greece,  who  signed  the  treaty  at 
Bucharest  on  10  August,  19 13.  Turkey  was  ignored.  By  the 
treaty  of  Bucharest,  Bulgaria  was  compelled  to  relinquish  her 
claims  on  the  western  part  of  Macedonia  and  to  cede  a  strip  of 
Bulgarian  territory  to  Rumania.  Rumania  thus  pushed  her 
southern  frontier  southward  to  include  Turtukai  on  the  Danube 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  533 


and  Baltchik  on  the  Black  Sea.    Serbia  enlarged  her  share  of 
Macedonia  by  appropriating  ]Monastir,  Kotchana,  and  Istib ; 
and,  in  addition,  she  annexed  half  of  the  sanjak  of 
Novi-Bazar,  and  the  Macedonian  towns  of  Prisrend,  The  Treaty 
Uskub,  and  Pristina.    The  rich  prize  of  Salonica,  to-  j.gg^ 
gether  with  all  the  i^^gean  coast  west  of  the  Mesta  gust,  1913, 
River,  and  the  territory  between  Monastir  on  the  partmonof 
north  and  Thessaly  on  the  south,  fell  to  Greece.  Macedonia 
Greece  also  extended  her  northwestern  frontier  to  in-  B^kan*^^ 
elude  Janina,  the  southern  district  of  Epirus,  and  states 
annexed  the  island  of  Crete.    Montenegro's  share  in 
the  spoils  was  later  determined ;  it  embraced  the  western  half  of 
the  sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar.    Bulgaria's  portion,  although  sadly 
diminished,  was  still  considerable.    To  Bulgaria  was  allotted  a 
strip  of  Macedonia  with  the  town  of  Strumitza  as  its  south- 
western corner,  and  western  Thrace  with  some  seventy  miles  of 
seacoast  on  the  i^^gean  between  the  Mesta  and  Maritza  rivers. 

It  remained  for  Bulgaria  to  settle  with  Turkey  the  question 
of  Adrianople  and  the  position  of  Bulgaria's  southeastern  fron- 
tier.   The  Turks,  ha\'ing  reoccupie^  Adrianople,  were 
determined  to  retain  it,  despite  Bulgaria's  protests.  The  Treaty 
despite  the  recent  treaty  of  London,  despite  the  unan-  ®^  , 

1  r    1     -rt  stantinople, 

imous  but  weak  remonstrances  of  the  Powers.  Con-  29  Septem- 
sequently  Bulgaria,  rather  than  risk  a  third  war, 

yielded  to  the  Turkish  demands.    By  the  treaty  of  Turkish 

London,  the  Turkish  boundary  had  been  fixed  at  a  Recovery  of 

Adrianople 

straight  line  from  Enos  on  the  i^gean  to  Midia  on  the  from  the 
Black  Sea.    By  the  Turco-Bulgarian  treaty  of  Con-  ^^igars 
stantinople  (29  September,  19 13)  the  Enos-Midia  line 
was  made  to  bulge  out  so  as  to  include  Adrianople  and  Kirk- 
Kilisse.    In  consequence  of  this  arrangement,  Bulgaria  had  no 
access  by  railway  to  her  new  i^gean  coast,  except  through 
Turkish  territory  via  Adrianople,  or  by  a  roundabout  route 
through  Greek  and  Serbian  country. 

Albania  and  the  Mgesin  Islands  remained  perplexing  prob- 
lems.   As  for  the  latter,  Greece  claimed  and  actually  occupied 
all  of  the  ^gean  Islands  except  the  twelve  Sporades  Question  of 
held  by  Italy.    The  reluctance  of  Turkey,  however,  the  iEgean 
definitely  to  renounce  all  claim  on  the  islands,  inspired 


534  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  Greeks  with  a  fear  that  at  the  earliest  opportunity  Turkey 
would  make  war  on  Greece  and  recapture  the  islands.  The 
Balkan  Wars  embittered  the  relations  between  Greece  and  Tur- 
key and  at  the  same  time  gave  rise  to  a  bitter  rivalry  between 
Greece  and  Italy. 

As  for  Albania,  the  Powers  had  agreed,  at  the  emphatic  behest 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  to  erect  that  little  state  into  an 
Albania  an  independent  principality.  They,  therefore,  in  1914 
Independent  sent  Prince  William  of  Wied,  a  German  prince  and  a 
Principality  j.q[^^[yq  Qf  queen  of  Rumania  to  rule  as  first  prince 
or  mpret  of  Albania.  It  was  indeed  a  shaky  throne  that  Prince 
WilKam  ascended.  Half  of  the  Albanians  were  Moslems,  and  so 
vigorously  did  they  resent  subjugation  to  a  Christian  prince 
that  they  rose  in  armed  rebellion.  To  add  to  his  difficulties,  the 
mpret  was  confronted  on  the  north  by  Montenegro,  ever  anxious 
to  regain  Scutari,  on  the  east  by  Serbia,  ever  longing  for  a  port 
on  the  Adriatic,  and  on  the  south  by  Greece,  ever  desirous  of 
Epirus,  —  three  enemies  who  would  gladly  divide  his  little  prin- 
cipality among  them.  Little  wonder  it  was,  then,  that  shortly 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  in  19 14  Prince  William  fled 
from  his  turbulent  realm. 

The  two  wars  of  1912-1913  constituted  an  epochal  step  in  the 
solution  of  the  Balkan  question ;  they  wrested  from  the  Turk 
Results  of  four-fifths  of  his  former  European  territory  and  divided 
the  Balkan  it  among  the  independent  Christian  nations,^  giving  to 
^^^^  Greece  17,000  square  miles,  to  Serbia  15,200,  to  Bul- 

garia 9600,  to  Montenegro  2100;  forming  11,000  square  miles 
into  an  independent  Albania ;  and  leaving  Turkey  in  Europe  less 
than  11,000  square  miles,  an  area  only  slightly  larger 
G^lTof^^  than  Maryland.  As  regards  population,  Rumania 
Greece  and  with  7,500,000  inhabitants  still  remained  greater 
s^ates^^^^  than  any  Balkan  state;  Bulgaria  with  4,800,000  in- 
habitants now  had  to  count  on  the  rivalry  of  Greece, 
with  4,700,000 ;  Serbia  with  4,500,000  was  almost  as  important 
as  Greece;  Albania  contained  800,000  unruly  mountaineers, 
and  Montenegro  half  a  milHon ;  and,  finally,  Turkey-in-Europe 
could  muster  only  1,900,000  inhabitants,  a  population  two-fifths 

*  Greece  increased  her  territory  by  68  per  cent ;  Bulgaria,  29  per  cent ;  Serbia. 
82  per  cent;  Montenegro,  62  per  cent. 


^C.Malia 

S"/  ^SMI.Nikolaos 
'SSJCER.GO 


I  ^.^  v-'  I  c 

THE  0TT03IAN  EMPIRE  ^.cer.gct 

Ci"  C.i'pada 

C.Busan  l\  C?f 


AND  THE 

BALKAN  STATES 
1914 

Scale  of  Miles 
0      26     50  10(1 


I    ">   <i>   — -^KBu'ieB, 

\     "7  Occupied  bjn^ly!^ 


_  150  200 

Acquisitions  of  New  Territoi  y  shown  in  darker  tints 
20^  22^ 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  535 


that  of  Bulgaria.    Against  these  gains  must  be  balanced  the 
terrible  cost.    At  the  very  least,  two  hundred  thousands  of 
soldiers  had  laid  down  their  Hves  in  the  two  wars ;  ^  Loss  in 
and  the  public  moneys  expended  in  maintaining  and  Men  and 
moving  troops  must  have  exceeded  $1,500,000,000. 
Peaceful  villagers,  women,  and  old  men  had  been  wantonly 
butchered  or  cruelly  abused  by  Greek  as  well  as  by  Bulgarian 
soldiers.    The  Balkan  nations  emerged  from  the  July  War  ex- 
hausted, yet  hating  each  other  with  indescribable  bitterness : 
the  Bulgar  now  hated  Greek  or  Serb  more  furiously  than  formerly 
he  had  detested  the  Turk. 

Another  result  of  the  Balkan  Wars  was  to  emphasize  the  Asi- 
atic, rather  than  the  European,  character  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Though  deprived  of  all  real  sovereignty  in  Africa  and 
restricted  in  Europe  to  Constantinople,  Adrianople,  ma'nEm"** 
and  a  Httle  surrounding  territory,  Turkey  still  embraced  pire  Largely 
Asia  Minor,  Armenia,  Kurdistan,  Syria,  Mesopotamia,  ^^^Sa*^*^ 
and  Arabia,  —  an  aggregate  Asiatic  area  of  approxi- 
mately 700,000  square  miles  and  a  population  of  about  twenty- 
one  millions.     That  the  Turks  retained  any  land  in  Europe 
was  due  not  so  much  to  their  mihtary  prowess,  although  their 
armies  were  still  formidable,  as  to  the  endless  quarrels  among 
the  Balkan  nations  and  to  the  support  which  several  Great 
Powers  continued  to  give,  in  their  own  interests,  to  the  Ot- 
toman Empire. 

Throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  as  we  have  seen,  rival 
nationahst  ambitions  had  embittered  the  relations  among  the 
Christian  states  of  the  Balkans.    Temporarily  re-  i^tensi 
pressed  by  the  formation  of  the  Balkan  Alliance  and  fication  of 
the  ensuing  joint  attack  upon  Turkey,  these  same 
ambitions  naturally  reasserted  themselves  as  soon  as  among  the 
Turkish  power  collapsed  in  Europe.    The  Balkan  g^^^*^ 
treaties  of  1913  did  not  partition  the  conquered 
Turkish  provinces  —  Macedonia  and  Thrace  —  along  national 
cleavages.    Indeed,  it  was  quite  impossible  so  to  divide  the 
country  north  of  the  ^gean,  for  Greek,  Serb,  Bulgar,  Turkish, 
and  even  Vlach  (Ruman)  villages  were  scattered  everywhere, 
and  not  infrequently  it  was  difficult  to  distinguish  the  nationahty 
of  a  Macedonian  villager.    Not  only  did  the  Bulgars  hope  in 


536 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  future  to  add  to  their  state  some  of  the  portions  of  Mace- 
donia assigned  in  1913  to  Greece  and  Serbia,  but  the  Greeks  and 
Serbs  hkewise  had  but  whetted  their  territorial  appetites.  The 
Greeks  aspired  all  the  more  zealously  to  reclaim  the  ^Egean 
Islands  still  held  by  Italy  and  to  wrest  from  the  Ottoman  Empire 
at  the  earhest  opportunity  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  and  possibly 
Constantinople.  The  Serbs  began  to  talk  more  openly  and  more 
eloquently  of  taking  from  Austria-Hungary  the  Slav  provinces 
of  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Croatia-Slavonia,  and  Dalmatia,  of 
uniting  Montenegro  with  Serbia,  and  of  estabhshing  a  Greater 
Serbia.  Even  the  Rumans  cherished  more  fondly  their  dream 
of  incorporating  their  Ruman  brethren  of  Bessarabia  (in  Russia) 
and  of  Transylvania,  Bukowina,  and  southern  Hungary  (sub- 
ject to  the  Habsburg  Empire)  into  a  Greater  Rumania.  For  a 
time  after  the  Balkan  Wars,  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Rumania  seemed 
to  be  able  to  cooperate,  but  Bulgaria  was  naturally  indisposed  to 
any  further  satisfaction  of  the  nationahst  aspirations  of  her  rivals ; 
and  a  pronounced  success  of  any  one  was  bound  to  provoke  the 
jealousy  of  all  the  other  Balkan  states.  And  such  a  situation 
was  favorable  primarily  to  the  Turks. 

Likewise  in  the  conflicting  interests  of  the  Great  Powers  the 
Turkish  government  found  a  certain  amount  of  security  for 
5  Rival  itself.  Of  the  Great  Powers,  Russia  and  Austria- 
interests  of  Hungary  had  been  since  the  seventeenth  century  the 
Powers  in  chief  enemies  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  but  their  poH- 
the  Near      cies  by  1913  were  sharply  antagonistic  to  each  other. 

On  the  one  hand  was  the  ambition  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  statesmen  to  extend  the  Habsburg  Empire,  at  the 
expense  of  Serbia  and  Greece,  from  Bosnia  to  Salonica  on  the 
Austria-  ^gean.  The  Habsburgs,  driven  from  Italy  by  Cavour 
Hungary  g^j^^  from  Germany  by  Bismarck,  would  obtain  com- 
pensation by  reaching  southward  and  building  an  empire  of 
mixed  races,  in  which  Slavs  would  predominate.  On  the  other 
Russia  hand  was  the  magnificent  dream  of  Russian  Pan- 
Slavism.  Russia,  the  Pan-Slavists  declared,  was 
bound  to  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Bulgaria  by  the  closest  affec- 
tion and  sympathy,  for  Serbs,  Bulgars,  and  Russians  alike  speak 
Slavic  languages  and  adhere  to  the  Orthodox  Christian  faith. 
This  sentiment,  becoming  increasingly  popular  in  Russia,  threw 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM 


that  Power  more  and  more  into  antagonism  with  Austria- 
Hungary.  For  if  Russia  should  encourage  the  Sla\dc  nations 
of  the  Balkans,  Austro-Hungarian  progress  towards  Salonica 
would  be  blocked  by  a  strong  Serbia.  Worse  still,  if  Russia 
should  unite  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Bulgaria  with  herself  in  a 
Slavic  confederation  or  in  a  Pan-Slavic  empire,  the  Serbo- 
Croats,  Czechs,  and  Poles  in  Austria-Hungary  and  the  Poles 
in  Germany  might  be  attracted  as  Slavs  to  the  great  and 
powerful  Pan-Slavic  combination. 

Athwart  this  major  rivalry  between  Russia  and  Austria- 
Hungary  lay  peculiar  interests  of  the  other  Great  Powers.  All 
of  them  had  important  financial  investments  to  safe-  Great 
guard  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  in  the  Balkan  states,  Britain 
for  German  and  Itahan  capitaHsts  had  vied  with  British  and 
French  in  making  public  loans  to  the  governments  in  the  Near 
East  and  in  securing  concessions  for  internal  development. 
Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  Great  Britain  had  repeatedly 
championed  Turkey  against  Russian  aggression,  largely  because 
of  fear  lest  British  merchants  trading  with  India  might  be  dis- 
comfited were  a  strong  power  like  Russia  to  gain  control  of  the 
Balkan  peninsula,  of  the  Dardanelles,  and  of  Asia  Minor.  Simi- 
larly, France  had  long  supported  the  Ottoman  Empire  ^^.^^^^ 
against  Russia,  not  only  because  French  speculators 
who  held  Turkish  bonds  desired  to  guarantee  their  investments 
by  maintaining  the  Turkish  government  on  a  firm  basis,  but 
also  because  France  was  traditionally  the  protector  of  Roman 
Catholic  Christians  in  the  East.    From  the  close  of  q^^^^^^^^ 
the  nineteenth  century,  Germany  was  taking  a  promi- 
nent position  in  the  councils  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The 
German  government  befriended  the  Porte  and  encouraged 
Austria-Hungary  to  checkmate  Russia,  and  at  the  same  time 
secured  permission  for  German  capitaHsts  to  build  important 
railways  in  Turkey,  as,  for  example,  the  Bagdad  railway;  and 
German  officers  drilled  the  Ottoman  army.    Although  ^^^^ 
Italy,  Hke  Germany,  was  an  ally  of  Austria-Hungary 
from  1882  to  191 5,  Italians  deprived  Turkey  of  Tripoh  and  of 
several  islands  in  the  ^F^gean,  obtained  valuable  concessions  in 
Asia  Minor  and  Syria,  and  made  no  secret  of  their  wish  to  extend 
Italian  influence  over  Albania. 


538  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


By  the  time  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (1912-1913),  British  and 
French  interests  in  the  East  appeared  to  be  menaced  less  by 

Russia  than  by  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany.  The 
ttie^Baikan  letter  Powers  were  working  hand  in  glove :  Germans 
Wars  upon  were  arming  and  drilHng  the  Turkish  troops  and  secur- 
nationaT  ^^S  major  share  of  new  concessions  in  the  Ottoman 
Relations  Empire,  while  Austria-Hungary  was  curbing  the  Serbs 
Powers'^^^*  and  increasing  her  political  and  economic  influence  in 

Macedonia.  In  the  course  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  there- 
fore, France  and  Great  Britain  tended,  on  the  whole,  to  back 
Russia  and  the  Balkan  states  against  Turkey  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  Between  these  clashing  international  interests  and 
sympathies  the  results  of  the  Balkan  Wars  afforded  a  temporary 
compromise.  On  one  side,  the  Russians  were  proud  of  the 
expansion  of  the  Balkan  states  at  the  expense  of  Turkey.  On 
the  other  side,  Austria-Hungary,  with  the  support  of  her  allies, 
succeeded  in  preventing  the  access  of  Serbia  to  the  Adriatic  and 
in  creating  a  new  principality  under  Austro-Italian  influence. 

The  compromise  was  only  temporary,  for  with  the  almost 
complete  disappearance  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe 
there  now  loomed  large  in  the  minds  of  the  Balkan  peoples 

—  especially  Serbs  and  Rumans  —  the  heterogeneous 
Wars^T^nd  empire  of  the  Habsburgs.  Before  the  Balkan  Wars 
to  Turn  the  Near  Eastern  Question  concerned  the  dismember- 
fronTthe^  ment  of  Turkey ;  henceforth  it  was  connected  with  the 
Dismember-  dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary.  Rumans  re- 
ottoman  membered  that  a  dissolution  of  the  Habsburg  Empire 
Empire  to  might  add  populous  territories  to  their  kingdom. 
DissohitTon*  Serbs  transferred  their  hatred  from  their  former 
oftheHabs-  southern  neighbors  to  their  present  northern  neigh- 
burg  Em-     ^^^^        bestirred  themselves  to  build  the  Greater 

Serbia  out  of  the  ruins  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Even 
Italians  who  aspired  to  continue  the  work  of  Cavour  and  Gari- 
baldi and  to  complete  their  national  unification  would  have  to 
wrest  Trieste  and  Trent  from  Austria-Hungary.  It  was  cer- 
tainly a  result  of  Austro-Hungarian  policy  in  the  Balkans,  par- 
ticularly during  the  Balkan  Wars,  that  the  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand,  heir  to  the  throne  of  the  Habsburg  Empire,  was  as- 
sassinated at  Sarajevo,  the  capital  of  Bosnia,  on  28  June,  1914, 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  539 


by  Serb  conspirators  possessed  of  the  passion  of  nationalism. 
And  most  certainly  it  was  as  a  phase  of  the  Near  Eastern  Ques- 
tion that  the  Great  War  of  19 14  began  —  Serbia,  connection 
Montenegro,  and  Russia,  with  the  support  of  France  of  the 
and  Great  Britain,  in  arms  against  Austria-Hungary  Que*sSn 
backed  by  Germany.    In  view  of  the  international  with  the 
situation  created  by  the  Balkan  Wars  it  was  well-nigh 
inevitable  that  both  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  should  throw  in  their 
lot  with  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  and  that  Italy  should 
add  her  strength  to  that  of  the  opposing  combination  in  a  pa- 
triotic hope  of  settling  the  fate  not  only  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
but  also  of  the  empire  of  the  Habsburgs. 


ADDITIONAL  READING 

The  Near  Eastern  Question,  Descriptive  and  Historical.  Elementary 
narratives:  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815  (1910),  ch.  xxviii;  J.  H. 
Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II 
(1907),  ch.  xxix.  More  detailed  accounts:  Cambridge  Modern  History, 
Vol.  X  (1907),  ch.  xvii,  on  Mehemet  Ali,  Vol.  XI  (1909),  ch.  ix,  on  Russia 
and  the  Levant  to  1852,  and  ch,  xxii,  on  the  Balkan  lands  to  1870,  Vol.  XII 
(1910),  ch.  xiv,  on  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  Balkan  peninsula,  and 
ch.  XV,  on  Egypt  and  the  Sudan,  1 841-1907 ;  Histoire  gSnSrale,  Vol.  X, 
ch.  xxvi,  Vol.  XI,  ch.  vi,  xv,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  xii,  xiv,  to  1900;  William  Miller, 
The  Ottoman  Empire,  1801-igij  (1913),  an  excellent  up-to-date  account  of 
the  dismemberment  of  the  Turkish  Empire  and  of  the  rise  of  the  Christian 
Balkan  states;  fidouard  Driault,  La  question  d^ orient  depuis  ses  origines 
jusqu'd  nos  jours,  6th  ed.  (19 13),  perhaps  the  clearest  and  best  general 
history  of  the  whole  Eastern  Question  with  its  wide  ramifications;  J.  H. 
Rose,  The  Development  of  the  European  Nations,  iSyo-igoo,  Vol.  I  (1905), 
ch.  vii-x,  valuable  chapters  on  the  Eastern  Question,  the  Russo-Turkish 
War  of  1877-1878,  the  Berlin  Congress,  and  the  making  of  Bulgaria;  Luigi 
Villari  (editor).  The  Balkan  Question:  the  Present  Condition  of  the  Balkans 
and  of  European  Responsibilities  (1905),  important  studies  of  the  situation 
at  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century  by  a  group  of  distinguished  scholars 
and  pubHcists  representing  many  nationalities  and  interests ;  T.  E.  Holland 
(editor),  The  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question:  a  Collection  of 
Treaties  and  Other  Public  Acts  (1885) ;  T.  G.  Djuvara,  Cent  projets  de 
partage  de  la  Turquie,  12S1-1QIJ  (1914),  the  important  contribution  of  a 
Rumanian  diplomatist,  contains  among  others  many  recent  treaties  and 
diplomatic  documents;  Sir  Edward  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty 
since  1S14,  4  vols.  (1875-1891),  embracing  English  translations  of  the 
major  treaties  from  1814  to  1891 ;  Pierre  Albin,  Les  grands  traitSs  politiques, 


540  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


recueil  des  principaux  textes  diplomatiques  depuis  1815  jusqu'd  nos  jours 
(191 2),  especially  useful  for  the  later  period;  W.  E.  Curtis,  The  Turk  and 
his  Lost  Provinces  (1903) ;  Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  Germany,  France, 
Russia,  and  Islam,  Eng.  trans.  (1914) ;  A.  Schopoff,  Les  rSformes  et  la 
protection  des  chretiens  en  Turquie,  i673-igo4  (1904) ;  Antonin  Debidour, 
Histoire  diplomatique  de  V Europe,  1814-1878,  2  vols.  (1891) ;  Theodor  von 
Sosnosky,  Die  Balkanpolitik  Oesterreich-Ungarns  seit  1866,  2  vols.  (1913- 
1914). 

Turkey  in  the  Nineteenth  and  Twentieth  Centuries.  General  histories : 
Stanley  Lane-Poole,  The  Story  of  Turkey  (1897),  a  well-organized  and  well- 
written  summary  in  the  "  Story  of  the  Nations  "  Series ;  Nicolae  Jorga, 
Geschichte  des  osmanischen  Reiches,  Vol.  V  (1913),  the  best  and  most  up-to- 
date  account,  part  of  a  monumental  work  unfortunately  not  translated 
from  the  German ;  Sir  Edward  Creasy,  History  of  the  Ottoman  Turks  from 
the  Beginning  of  their  Empire  to  the  Present  Time  (1877),  based  on  the 
classical  German  work  of  Von  Hammer,  which  is  in  ten  volumes,  and  con- 
tinued to  1876;  E.  A.  Freeman,  The  Ottoman  Power  in  Europe:  its  Nature, 
its  Growth,  and  its  Decline  (1877).  Recent  descriptions:  Richard  Davey, 
The  Sultan  and  his  SuhjeUs,  new  ed.  rev.  and  cont.  to  date  (1907) ;  Sidney 
Whitman,  Turkish  Memories  (19 14),  the  outcome  of  several  prolonged 
visits  to  Turkey,  covering  a  period  of  twelve  years,  from  1896  to  1908, 
marked  by  sympathy  for  the  Turks.  On  the  Turkish  Revolution  of  1908- 
1909 :  C.  R.  Buxton,  Turkey  in  Revolution  (1909) ;  G.  F.  Abbott,  Turkey 
in  Transition  (1909) ;  J.  L.  Barton,  Daybreak  in  Turkey,  2d  ed.  (1908) ; 
Ernst  Jackh,  Der  aufsteigende  Halhmond  (191 1),  an  extremely  interesting 
German  appreciation  of  the  military  and  economic  reforms  of  the  Young 
Turks;  Rene  Pinon,  U  Europe  et  la  Jeune  Turquie:  les  aspects 
nouveaux  de  la  question  dVrient  (1911).  For  an  instructive  series  of 
sketches  of  the  leaders  and  governors  and  foreign  interests  of  Egypt,  see 
A.  E.  P.  Brome  Weigall,  A  History  of  Events  in  Egypt  from  17Q8  to 
IQ14  (191 5);  consult  also  the  bibliography  appended  to  Chapter  XXIX, 
below. 

Greece  and  the  Balkan  States.  General :  H.  N.  Brailsford,  Macedonia, 
its  Races  and  their  Future  (1906) ;  William  Miller,  The  Balkans:  Roumania, 
Bulgaria,  Servia,  and  Montenegro,  2d  ed.  (1908),  a  handy  volume  in 
the  "  Story  of  the  Nations "  Series ;  Nevill  Forbes  and  others,  The 
Balkans:  a  History  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  Greece,  Rumania,  Turkey  (191 5); 
Andre  Cheradame,  Douze  ans  de  propagande  en  faveur  des  peuples  bal- 
kaniques  (1913),  a  review  of  Balkan  history  from  1900  to  1912.  On  Greece : 
William  Miller,  Greek  Life  in  Town  and  Country  (1905) ;  Lewis  Sergeant, 
Greece  in  the  Nineteenth  Century :  a  Record  of  Hellenic  Emancipation  and 
Progress,  1821-1897  (1897) ;  Greece  in  Evolution,  studies  prepared  under 
the  auspices  of  the  French  League  for  the  Defense  of  the  Rights  of  Hellen- 
ism, Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  G.  F.  Abbott  (1909) ;  R.  A.  H.  Bickford-Smith, 
Greece  under  King  George  (1893) ;  P.  F.  Martin,  Greece  of  the  Twentieth 
Century  (1913).    On  Serbia:  Alfred  Stead  (editor),  Servia  by  the  Servians 


DEMOCRACY  AND  NATIONALISM  541 


(1909),  an  estimate  of  Serbia  and  the  Serb  nationality  from  the  pens  of 
representative  Serbs ;  Prince  and  Princess  Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich,  The 
Servian  People,  their  Past  Glory  and  their  Destiny,  2  vols.  (1910),  encyclopedic, 
including  history  and  description ;  W.  M.  Petrovitch,  Serbia,  her  People,  His- 
tory, and  Aspirations  (191 5).  On  Montenegro:  F.  S.  Stevenson,  A  History 
of  Montenegro  (191 2) ;  P.  Coquelle,  Histoire  du  Montenegro  et  de  la  Bosnie 
depuis  les  origines  (1895).  On  Bulgaria:  Guerin  Songeon,  Histoire  de  la 
Bulgarie  depuis  les  origines  jusqu^d  nos  jours,  48j~igij  (1913),  clear  and 
succinct ;  Edward  Dicey,  The  Peasant  State :  an  Account  of  Bulgaria  in 
iSg4  (1894),  admirable  both  for  society  and  for  government ;  A.  H.  Beaman, 
M.  Stamhulof  (1895),  a  good  biography  of  a  famous  Bulgarian  statesman. 
On  Rumania:  Oscar  Brilliant,  Roumania  (1915),  an  exhaustive  description 
of  present-day  Rumania  by  a  professor  in  the  University  of  Bucharest ; 
Nicolae  Jorga,  Geschichte  des  rumdnischen  V olkes  im  Rahmen  seiner  Staats- 
bildungen,  2  vols.  (1905),  a  great  national  history;  G.  Benger,  Roumania 
in  I  goo.  Eng.  trans,  by  A.  H.  Keene  (1900) ;  Sidney  Whitman,  Reminis- 
cences of  the  King  of  Roumania  (1899) ;  Pompiliu  Eliade,  Histoire  de  r esprit 
public  en  Roumanie  au  XIX^  siecle.  Vol.  I  (1905),  1821-1828,  and  Vol.  II 
(1914),  1828-1834  ;  Frederic  Dame,  Histoire  de  la  Roumanie  contemporaine 
depuis  Vavenement  des  princes  indigenes  jusqu' a  nos  jours,  1 822-1  goo  (1900) ; 
Andre  Bellessort,  La  Roumanie  cojttemporaine  (1905). 

The  Tripolitan  and  Balkan  Wars,  1911-1913.  On  the  Tripolitan  War 
of  1911-1912:  Sir  Thomas  Barclay,  The  Turco-Italian  War  and  its  Prob- 
lems, with  appendices  containing  the  chief  state  papers  bearing  on  the 
subject  ,  .  .  and  with  an  additional  chapter  on  Moslem  Feeling  by  Ameer 
Ali  (191 2);  W.  K.  McClure,  Italy  in  North  Africa:  an  Account  of  the 
Tripoli  Enterprise  (1913).  On  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913:  W.  M. 
Sloane,  The  Balkans:  a  Laboratory  of  History  (1914),  a  survey  of  the  prob- 
lems and  diplomacy  affecting  the  Great  Powers  as  well  as  the  Balkan 
States;  J.  G.  Schurman,  The  Balkan  Wars,  igi2-igij  (1914),  an  excellent 
summary;  Hermenegild  Wagner,  With  the  Victorious  Bulgars  (1913),  a 
newspaper  correspondent's  graphic  picture  of  the  Balkan  lands  and  es- 
pecially of  the  Bulgarian  campaign  against  the  Turks;  Ellis  Ashmead- 
Bartlett,  With  the  Turks  in  Thrace  (1913),  the  work  of  a  special  corre- 
spondent of  the  London  Daily  Telegraph  ;  D.  J.  Cassavetti,  Hellas  and  the 
Balkan  Wars  (1914) ;  Balkan  Treaties,  igi2-igi3,  a  valuable  collection  of 
the  treaties  of  alliance  and  of  peace,  in  the  "  American  Journal  of  Inter- 
national Law,"  Vol.  VIII,  no.  i,  supplement;  Report  of  the  International 
Commission  to  Inquire  into  the  Causes  and  Conduct  of  the  Balkan  Wars, 
published  by  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace  (1914) ; 
I.  E.  Gueshoff,  The  Balkan  League,  Eng.  trans.  (191 5),  a  Bulgarian  state- 
ment. On  the  immediate  results  of  the  Balkan  Wars:  B.  G.  Baker, 
The  Passing  of  the  Turkish  Ejnpire  in  Europe  (1913) ;  G.  M.  Trevclyan, 
The  Servians  and  Austria  (1914),  very  partial  to  the  Serb  case ;  M.  J.  Bonn 
(editor),  Die  Balkanfrage  (1914),  a  collection  of  ten  articles  by  German 
professors  on  various  phases  of  the  new  Balkan  situation;  R.  W.  Seton- 


542 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Watson,  The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the  Habshurg  Monarchy  (191 1), 
a  clear  statement  of  the  conflicting  ambitions  of  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary 
as  they  existed  between  the  Habsburg  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  the  out- 
break of  the  Balkan  Wars ;  Marion  I.  Newbigin,  Geographical  Aspects  oj 
Balkan  Problems  in  their  Relation  to  the  Great  European  War  (191 5). 


PART  V 
NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


PART  V 

NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

The  general  purpose  of  the  preceding  chapters  has  been  to 
portray  the  development  of  democratic  government  and  the 
rise  of  national  patriotism  among  the  peoples  of  Europe,  and 
incidentally  to  furnish  some  account  of  the  more  significant 
events  in  the  recent  history  of  each  European  nation.  Every- 
where we  have  seen  the  Industrial  Revolution  at  work,  creating 
factories  and  railways,  and  adding  to  the  wealth  and  importance 
of  the  bourgeoisie.  Likewise  the  influence  of  the  French 
Revolution  has  been  universally  apparent  in  the  decline  of  the 
feudal  nobility  and  in  the  ascendancy  of  the  popular  notions 
of  nationaHsm  and  democracy.  Both  the  Industrial  and  French 
Revolutions  have  combined  to  give  business  interests  and 
bourgeois  ideals  a  paramount  position  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
most  European  nations. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  study  the  operation  of  these 
same  business  interests  and  bourgeois  ideals  on  a  far  grander 
scale,  as  they  have  determined  in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth 
centuries  the  course  of  international  diplomacy  and  directed  the 
current  of  European  intercourse  with  Asia,  Africa,  and  America. 


VOL.  n  —  3  N 


545 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

THE  NEW  IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  SPREAD  OF  EUROPEAN 
CIVILIZATION  IN  ASU 

THE  OLD  COLONIAL  MOVEMENT  AND  THE  NEV^ 
IMPERIALISM 

The  old  colonial  movement,  dating  from  the  epochal  voyages 
of  Columbus  and  of  Vasco  da  Gama/  seemed  to  have  lost  much 
of  its  vitaHty  in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen-  ^  „ 

rr^    1  1        T  •  T     1  •  1   1     1  /-  1  Decline  of 

tury.  To  be  sure,  the  reugious  zeal  which  had  figured  the  Old 
so  conspicuously  in  the  earher  Spanish,  Portuguese,  Colonial 

,  „        ,        1     •       •  .        1  .      ,1  Movement: 

and  French  colonization,  continued  to  manifest  itself  CoUapse  of 
in  missionary  endeavors,  although  no  longer  with  Mercantu- 
energetic  governmental  support.  But  the  other 
motive  for  colonization,  the  economic  motive,  had  met  with  severe 
discouragement.  The  colonial  rivalry  of  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries,  especially  the  contest  between  Holland 
and  England  ,2  and  the  world-conflict  of  France  and  Great 
Britain^  in  the  eighteenth  century  had  been  largely  inspired 
by  the  mercantiUst  doctrine  that  colonies  were  beneficial  and 
necessary  to  the  mother-country.  MercantiHst  statesmen  ^  in 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  had  confidently  culti- 
vated and  carefully  regulated  colonial  commerce  with  the  two- 
fold object  of  creating  a  favorable  balance  of  trade  and  rendering 
the  nation  economically  independent  of  foreign  countries.  This 
mercantilist  theory,  however,  was  undermined  late  in  the  eight- 
eenth century  by  the  sharp  criticisms  of  Turgot  and  Adam  Smith. 
The  new  political  economy  taught  by  Turgot  and  Smith  was 
summarized  in  the  two  French  words,  laisser-Jaire.  Of  course 
it  took  a  goodly  number  of  years  for  the  doctrines  of  political 


»  See  Vol.  I,  ch.  ii. 
•Sec  Vol.  I,  ch.  ix. 


2  See  Vol.  I,  pp.  243  f.,  278. 

<  See  Vol.  I,  pp.  63  f.,  239  f.,  322  ff.,  338,  400  flf. 

547 


548  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


economists  to  bear  fruit  in  practical  politics ;  in  fact,  it  may  be 
stated  that  the  long  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  struggle  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  France  (1793-1815)  was  in  the  nature 
of  a  contest  for  mercantilist  ends.  But  France  was  defeated, 
and  in  Great  Britain  the  enthusiastic  exponents  ^  of  laisser-f aire 
subsequently  became  so  influential  that  they  were  able  to  pro- 
cure the  repeal  of  the  old  Navigation  Laws  (1849),  to  sweep 
away  multifarious  customs  duties,  and  triumphantly  to  pro- 
claim the  inauguration  of  an  era  of  Free  Trade. 

Colonial  revolts,  moreover,  seemingly  proved  mercantilism  to 
be  as  disastrous  in  practice  as  it  was  unsound  in  theory.  Great 
Britain  lost  her  thirteen  American  colonies  by  attempting  to 
enforce  the  mercantilist  trade  regulations  of  the  ^'old  colonial 
system."  Early  in  the  nineteenth  century  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America  likewise  revolted  from  the  mother-country,  and 
Brazil  established  its  independence  of  Portugal  (1822).  These 
disasters,  following  in  the  train  of  long  and  expensive  colonial 
wars,  only  confirmed  the  conviction  in  the  minds  of  European 
statesmen  that  expending  money  and  blood  to  acquire  new 
colonies  was  unwise  and  unjustifiable.  Richard  Cobden,  the 
famous  English  Free-Trade  orator,  even  went  so  far  as  to  declare 
(1849),  we  do  not  draw  in  our  horns,  this  country,  with  all 
its  resources,  will  sink  under  the  weight  of  its  extended  empire." 
John  Bright  was  no  less  outspoken  in  condemning  imperialism 
and  maintaining  that  the  cost  of  acquiring  and  defending  colonies 
was  more  than  their  worth.  Gladstone  was  not  so  radical  a 
''Little  Englander,"  but  he  was  decidedly  reluctant  to  extend 
the  British  dominions. 

In  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  old  colonial 
movement  seemed  to  be  discredited.  Let  us  briefly  review 
Achieve  what  prior  to  181 5  had  been  its  achievements,  (i) 
ments  of  Spain  had  overlaid  with  a  veneer  of  Spanish  Christian 
J®  ^!*^,       culture  Mexico,  Central  America,  most  of  South 

Colonial  ,       .  ,  .  , 

Movement  America  (excepting  Brazil),  Cuba,  Puerto  Rico,  and 
1815*^  the  Philippine  Islands,  —  all  of  which  she  was  to  lose 

in  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century.   (2)  Portugal 
not  only  had  obtained  footholds  in  southeast  and  southwest 

^  Such  men  as  Huskisson,  Cobden,  Bright,  Peel,  Gladstone.  See  above,  pp.  82- 
8s,  91  ff.,  112  ff.,  279  f. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


549 


Africa,  but  also  had  created  a  new  Portuguese  nation  across 
the  Atlantic  in  Brazil.  (3)  The  Dutch  were  interested  chiefly 
in  exploiting  East  Indian  Islands  (Java,  Sumatra,  Borneo, 
Celebes,  the  Moluccas,  and  New  Guinea) ;  Dutch  Guiana  or 
Surinam  (in  South  America)  was  comparatively  unimportant; 
and  the  Dutch  settlement  of  Cape  Colony  in  South  Africa,^ 
like  the  Dutch  settlement  on  the  Hudson  River,^  had  fallen 
into  the  grasp  of  Great  Britain.  (4)  France  had  planted  colonies 
in  North  America  but  had  lost  them,  the  French  settlements 
in  the  Mississippi  valley  being  absorbed  by  the  United  States,^ 
and  those  in  the  St.  Lawrence  valley  by  Great  Britain ;  of  her 
once  magnificent  colonial  empire,  France  retained  only  five 
posts  in  India  to  remind  her  of  Dupleix's  grandiose  schemes, 
Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  in  the  West  Indies,  French  Guiana, 
and  several  small  islands;  and  the  creation  of  a  new  French 
empire  was  only  faintly  foreshadowed  by  feeble  efforts  in  Mada- 
gascar and  on  the  western  coast  of  Africa.  (5)  Great  Britain, 
having  profited  by  the  losses  of  Holland  and  France,  had  at- 
tained the  proud  position  of  the  foremost  colonial  and  maritime 
power.  She  had  laid  the  foundations  of  empire  in  India,  con- 
quered Ceylon  from  the  Dutch,  and  started  the  settlement  of 
Australia ;  scant  success  had  attended  her  colonizing  enterprises 
on  the  African  coast  at  Sierra  Leone  and  Gambia,  but  in  South 
Africa  she  had  annexed  the  Dutch  Cape  Colony;  Malta  and 
Gibraltar  insured  her  position  in  the  Mediterranean ;  in  South 
America  she  had  taken  part  of  Guiana  from  the  Dutch  (1803) ; 
she  had  a  foothold  on  Honduras ;  Bermuda,  the  Bahamas, 
Jamaica,  Trinidad,  and  other  islands  in  the  West  Indies  were 
hers,  as  well  as  New  Brunswick,  Nova  Scotia,  Newfoundland, 
and  Prince  Edward  Island,  Upper  and  Lower  Canada,  and  the 
Hudson  Bay  Territory. 

In  summary,  we  may  say  that  the  most  conspicuous  achieve- 
ment of  the  old  colonial  movement  had  been  the  discovery  and 
Europeanization  of  the  New  World.  Shght  had  been  the  prog- 
ress, however,  in  the  Europeanization  of  Asia.    Russia  had 

*  Cape  Colony  was  conquered  by  Great  Britain  in  1806.  See  Vol.  I,  pp.  575  f. 
'"New  Amsterdam"  was  conquered  by  England  in  1664.    See  Vol.  I,  pp. 

243  f.,  301. 

•  "Louisiana"  was  purchased  by  the  United  States,  1803. 


550  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


long  been  groping  her  way  eastward  over  the  ice-fields  and 
steppes  of  Siberia,  but  China  and  Japan  had  not  yet  been  opened 
up."  Hardly  any  attempt  had  been  made  to  penetrate  the 
interior  of  Africa,  the  ''Dark  Continent."  And  even  in  America, 
the  vast  plains  west  of  the  Mississippi,  the  trackless  Northwest 
Territory,  and  the  tangled  forests  of  the  upper  Amazon,  were 
still  left  in  the  undisturbed  possession  of  savage  aborigines.  To 
the  "new  imperialism"  of  the  later  nineteenth  and  early  twen- 
tieth century  was  left  the  work  of  spreading  the  English  language 
over  Canada  and  all  the  United  States,  and  the  Russian  tongue 
over  all  northern  Asia,  of  exploring  and  partitioning  Africa, 
opening  up  China,  modernizing  Japan,  consolidating  British 
India,  developing  Australia  from  an  insignificant  penal  station 
into  a  thriving  commonwealth,  exploring  the  frozen  polar  regions, 
and  founding  the  new  French,  German,  and  Italian  colonial 
empires. 

By  the  "New  Imperialism"  we  mean  the  awakening  of  a  new 
interest  in  colonization,  during  the  nineteenth  century,  especially 

since  1870,  and  the  marvelous  progress  which  has 
Imperialism  since  been  made  in  the  Europeanization  of  the  world, 
and  the  In-  It  would  not  be  far  from  the  truth  to  say  that  the 
Revolution    New  Imperialism  was  the  most  significant  feature 

in  the  history  of  the  last  half-century.  The  move- 
ment received  its  impulse  from  the  Industrial  Revolution  and 
the  French  Revolution.  The  former  produced  the  railway,  the 
steamship,  the  telegraph,  and  the  telephone,  which  annihilated 
distance  and  made  the  occupation  of  distant  colonies  infinitely 
more  feasible,  their  commerce  more  valuable,  their  adminis- 
tration easier.  The  Industrial  Revolution  also  enhanced  the 
value  of  colonies  as  markets  for  manufactures  and  as  sources  of 
supply  for  raw  materials  and  foodstuffs.  In  yet  another  way 
the  Industrial  Revolution  imparted  a  mighty  impetus  to  imperial- 
ism by  creating  a  class  of  capitalists  who  were  willing  to  invest 
their  money  in  colonial  enterprises;  for  the  business  men  who 
had  realized  fortunes  from  their  factories  or  railways  at  home 
were  ever  eager  to  increase  their  wealth  by  building  railways, 
organizing  industries,  or  developing  mines  in  Africa,  South 
America,  or  Asia. 

The  debt  of  the  New  Imperialism  to  the  French  Revolution 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


551 


was  twofold.    In  the  first  place,  the  French  Revolution,  and 
the  subsequent  insurrections  inspired  by  the  French  Revolution, 
meant  in  a  general  way  the  victory  of  the  bourgeoisie  ^Tench 
over  feudalism  and  divine-right  monarchy,  and  en-  Revolution 
abled  the  bourgeoisie  to  control  the  government  j^p^^^g^ 
for  the  benefit  of  its  own  interests,  that  is,  business 
interests.  These  business  interests,  as  we  shall  presently  explain 
more  fully,  demanded  colonial  expansion.    In  the  second  place, 
the  French  Revolution  led  to  the  development  of  such  an  intense 
spirit  of  national  patriotism  that  all  classes  were  proud  to  assist 
in  making  any  colonial  acquisition  which  might  add  to  the  glory, 
extent,  and  power  of  their  nation. 

In  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  when  the  harvest 
of  the  industrial  and  political  revolutions  was  ripening  to  ma- 
turity, the  new  spirit  of  imperialism  began  to  find  ^,  ^ 

•  T      T?     ^     A     ^     '      '      T^-       V    -u  TheConta- 

expression.     In   England,   Benjamm  Disraeu  her-  gionofim- 

alded  the  new  imperialist  movement  by  buying  for  ^^f^^^' 
the  British  government  176,602  hundred-dollar  shares  ^  ^^^^ 
in  the  Suez  Canal  (1875)  and  by  proclaiming  Victoria  ^'empress 
of  India"  (1876).  A  generation  later,  Joseph  Chamberlain  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  an  enthusiastic  party  pledged  to  strengthen 
the  British  Empire.  Meanwhile  the  Third  French  Republic 
had  set  itself  with  such  zeal  to  seek  compensation  for  the  loss  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  that  within  thirty  years  three  and  one-half 
million  square  miles  of  territory,  with  twenty-six  million  inhabit- 
ants, had  been  added  to  its  empire.  Imperially-minded  Ham- 
burg merchants  converted  Bismarck  to  their  views  in  1884,  and 
the  recently-founded  German  Empire  speedily  acquired  a  milUon 
square  miles  and  fourteen  milKon  subjects  in  Africa  and  Oceanica. 
Italy  had  no  sooner  achieved  national  unification  than  she,  too, 
entered  into  the  scramble  for  colonial  dominion.  Russia,  Japan, 
the  United  States,  Portugal,  and  Spain  annexed  new  territories. 
Even  the  diminutive  kingdom  of  Belgium  acquired  in  the  Congo 
a  colonial  empire  eighty  times  as  large  as  the  mother-country. 
Before  entering  upon  a  detailed  account  of  the  „ 

.        .     .         r    ^  ,.1  •        •  1      Motives  for 

foundation  of  these  new  colonial  empires,  it  may  be  the  New 
well  to  examine  the  economic,  the  patriotic,  the  imperialism, 
missionary  motives  which  explain  the  astonishing 
colonial  activity  of  the  hundred  years  from  1815  to  1915. 


552  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Consider  first  the  economic  motives  for  acquiring  colonies. 
We  have  seen  how  many  Free  Traders  held  that  colonies  were  of 
I  The  little  economic  benefit  to  the  mother-country.  In  the 
Economic  sccond  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  however,  a 
Motive  pronounced  reaction  set  in  against  the  thorough- 
going free-trade  doctrines.  Whereas  the  free  traders  had  been 
chiefly  anxious  to  emancipate  business  from  restrictive  and 
burdensome  government  regulations,  the  new  school  demanded 
that  the  government  should  positively  protect  and  fostei*  the 
infant  industries  of  a  nation,  especially  by  imposing  heavy 
customs-duties  on  imports,  so  as  to  give  domestic 

"Protec-  .  .    ^       '  ,  ^ 

tion"  and  manufactures  an  important  advantage  over  im- 
Markets  po^ted  foreign  products  in  the  home  market.  This 
idea  of  industrial  ''protection"  was  easily  applied  to 
colonies.  The  protectionists  argued,  in  somewhat  the  same  way 
as  the  seventeenth-century  mercantilists  had  argued,  that  a 
colony  would  usually  buy  manufactures  from  and  sell  raw 
materials  to  the  mother-couniry ;  hence,  the  more  colonies  a 
nation  possessed,  the  wider  mark^^t  there  would  be  for  its  manu- 
factures ;  the  wider  the  market  for  its  manufactures,  the  greater 
would  be  the  expansion  of  the  natioi:'s  industries;  and  indus- 
trial expansion  would  bring  wealth  to  the  nation,  earn  profits 
for  the  manufacturer,  and  furnish  employment  for  the  laborer. 
According  to  these  "  neo -mercantilists,"  high  protective  tariffs 
and  active  colonial  expansion  would  go  hand  in  hand.  The  last 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  which  witnessed  the  adoption 
of  high  protective  tariffs  by  every  great  industrial  nation  (with 
the  exception  of  the  United  Kingdom),^  was  the  very  period  in 
which  colonial  expansion  proceeded  most  rapidly.  One  of  the 
clearest  illustrations  of  the  connection  between  imperialism  and 
tariff  protection  was  afforded  in  1898  when  Canada,  having  pre- 
viously adopted  a  high  protective  tariff,  announced  that  hence- 
forth the  duties  on  imports  from  Great  Britain  would  be  a  fourth  ^ 
less  than  those  on  imports  from  other  countries.    Or,  again,  by 

*  It  should  be  noted  that,  although  Great  Britain  deemed  it  advantageous  to 
adhere  to  free  trade  as  far  as  the  commerce  of  the  United  Kingdom  was  con- 
cerned, the  British  colonies  established  protective  tariffs. 

2  In  1900,  the  preferential  treatment  was  increased  from  a  fourth  to  a  third. 
It  affected  the  whole  British  Empire,  not  merely  the  United  Kingdom. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


553 


the  French  Tariff  Act  of  1892,  while  import  duties  were  levied 
on  foreign  goods  imported  into  French  colonies,  French  goods 
were  to  be  admitted  free.  These  two  concrete  instances  are 
sufficient  to  indicate  the  manner  in  which  the  possession  of 
colonies  might  be  advantageous  to  the  trade  and  industry  of  a 
nation. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  easy  to  prove  by  statistics  that  this 
advantage  in  colonial  trade  is  much  smaller  than  might  be  sup- 
posed. In  1 9 13  Canada  purchased  only  twenty  per  cent  of 
her  total  imports  from  the  United  Kingdom;  whereas  Argen- 
tina, which  is  not  a  colony  of  Great  Britain  at  all,  obtained  more 
than  thirty  per  cent  of  her  imports  from  the  United  Kingdom. 
France  enjoyed  less  than  a  third  of  the  total  trade  of  her  colony 
of  Indo-China.  The  trade  of  Canada  was  more  valuable  to 
Germany  than  that  of  all  the  German  colonies.  In  reply  to  this 
criticism,  it  is  possible  to  instance  a  few  colonies  like  the  Dutch 
East  Indies,  the  trade  of  which  is  largely  in  the  hands  of 
the  mother-country.  But  the  value  of  such  trade  w€s  usually 
more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  actual  expenditure  of  the 
mother-country  for  the  acquisition,  administration,  and  defense  of 
the  colony.  For  example,  when  the  total  trade  of  Germany  with 
German  Southwest  Africa  in  1913  amounted  only  to  28,600,000 
marks,  it  is  difficult  indeed  to  understand  how  the  profit  would 
make  up  the  deficit  of  12,140,000  marks  which  Germany  had  to 
pay  for  the  government  of  the  colony.  Colonial  trade,  more- 
over, was  a  very  small  item  in  the  total  foreign  trade  of  a  nation. 
Thus  Germany  in  1913  exported  to  France  alone  almost  fourteen 
times  as  much  as  to  all  the  German  colonies  put  together. 
From  such  figures  the  inference  is  plain  that  as  far  as  com- 
mercial privileges  were  concerned,  many  colonies  were  of 
little  or  no  advantage  to  the  mother-country.  In  other 
words,  the  industrial  and  commercial  prosperity  of  a  nation 
could  hardly  be  said  to  depend  essentially  upon  the  number  of 
its  colonies. 

The  real  economic  reason  for  imperialism  was  not  so  much 
the  conmiercial  advantage  which  colonies  might  afford  to  the 
mother-country,  as  the  opportunities  for  gain  which  colonial 
enterprises  offered  to  individuals  in  the  mother-country.  In- 
vestments in  colonial  mines,  rubber  forests,  plantations,  and  rail- 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ways  yielded  interest  at  anywhere  from  five  to  fifty  per  cent. 
The  large  profits  to  be  gained  from  colonial  investments  natu- 
Private  ^^^^^  attracted  capitahsts ;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that 
Investments  men  with  their  money  invested  in  colonies  should  be- 
and  Private  come  eloquent  advocates  of  a  vigorous  colonial  and  na- 

ProfitS  IT  •nil  r  1  1. 

val  policy,  especially  when  the  expense  of  such  a  policy 
would  be  borne  by  the  taxpayers  of  the  nation  at  large.  In 
every  important  nation  there  were  to  be  found  a  group  of  bankers 
who  were  interested  in  colonial  finance,  liquor  dealers  who  sup- 
pHed  the  natives  with  alcohoHc  drinks  often  of  an  inferior  grade, 
a  handful  of  importers  who  speciaHzed  in  colonial  wares,  and  a 
larger  number  of  bourgeois  speculators  who  owned  shares  in 
some  colonial  mine  or  industry.  All  these  people  were  ardent 
imperiahsts.  The  influence  which  investments  have  exercised 
in  promoting  imperiahsm  were  revealed  in  191 1,  when  the 
German  government  manifested  great  interest  in  Morocco, 
largely  because  the  Mannesmann  Brothers  were  financially  in- 
terested in  Moroccan  mines.  To  cite  another  case,  the  begin- 
nings of  British  rule  in  Egypt  may  be  traced  directly  to  the 
desire  of  the  British  government  to  safeguard  the  Egyptian  in- 
vestments of  certain  capitalists. 

The  comparatively  small  number  of  business  men  with  actual 
economic  interests  at  stake  usually  found  it  an  easy  matter  to 
2.  The  Pa-  S^^^  popular  support  for  a  poUcy  of  imperial  expan- 
triotic  sion.  Patriotic  to  a  fault,  the  vast  majority  of  peo- 
Motive  ^ere  always  ready  to  applaud  the  annexation  of 

new  territory.  If  the  new  territory  happened  to  be  a  sparsely 
Colonies  settled  region,  it  would  serve  as  an  outlet  for  emi- 
Nationai  gration  from  the  mother-country;  if  densely  popu- 
Powerand  lated,  the  new  dependency  was  probably  sadly  in 
Prestige  need  of  European  culture  and  orderly  government ;  if 
only  a  barren  island,  the  new  colony  would  at  least  be  a  valuable 
coaHng-station  for  the  navy.  And  in  any  case,  the  average 
citizen  felt  a  warm  glow  of  satisfaction  when  he  beheld  the 
ever-larger  blotch  of  red,  or  yellow,  or  purple  that  depicted  on 
the  map  ''our  Empire."  The  American  who  was  quite  certain 
of  the  necessity  of  conferring  the  benefits  of  American  civiliza- 
tion upon  unwilHng  FiUpinos,  was  inspired  by  the  same  pa- 
triotic egotism  which  convinced  the  German  of  Germany's  world- 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


555 


mission,  and  moved  the  Englishman  to  talk  of  the  ''white  man's 
burden."  To  every  patriot  it  seemed  obvious  that  the  "manifest 
destiny"  of  his  nation  was  to  expand,  to  rule  ''inferior  races," 
to  become  a  World  Power.  Patriotic  sentiment  of  this  variety 
was  invariably  favorable  to  aggressive  imperiaHsm. 

In  this  connection  an  additional  word  should  be  said  about 
the  popular  argument  for  colonies  as  an  outlet  for  surplus  popu- 
lation. The  problem  of  providing  for  "surplus  colonies  for 
population"  became  pressing  in  the  nineteenth  cen-  Surplus 
tury  with  the  rapid  increase  of  population  after  the  ^^'p^**^^ 
Industrial  Revolution.  The  population  of  Germany,  for  instance, 
increased  from  41,058,792  in  1871  to  64,925,993  in  1910  —  a 
gain  of  almost  twenty-four  millions.  The  appaUing  growth  of  the 
"slum"  sections  in  most  European  cities  and  the  misery  of  the 
working  classes  seemed  to  bear  out  the  theory  of  the  British 
economist,  Malthus,  that  population  tended  to  increase  more 
rapidly  than  the  means  of  subsistence.  To  prove  conclusively 
that  Europe  was  burdened  with  a  surplus  of  population,  one 
had  only  to  point  out  the  fact  that  in  the  second  half  of  the  cen- 
tury about  nine  million  persons  emigrated  from  the  British  Isles ; 
that  during  the  nineteenth  century  more  than  six  milHon  Ger- 
mans became  emigrants.  To  ardent  nationalists  it  seemed  a 
pity  that  these  emigrants  should  be  lost  to  the  nation  by  settHng 
in  some  foreign  country,  Uke  the  United  States,  abandoning 
their  native  language  and  surrendering  their  allegiance  to  "the 
old  country."  To  remedy  this  sad  state  of  affairs,  each  nation 
should  provide  itself  with  colonies,  into  which  its  surplus  popu- 
lation might  overflow,  exactly  as  some  of  the  superabundant 
population  of  Great  Britain  had  overflowed  to  Canada  and 
Austraha.  Some  patriots  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that  a  vig- 
orous nation  with  a  high  birth  rate  had  a  moral  right  to  conquer 
new  territory  for  its  rapidly  enlarging  population.  Hence, 
imperialism,  the  conquest  of  more  colonies,  was  justifiable  if  not 
morally  necessary. 

Although  the  "surplus  population"  argument  still  carries 
great  weight  with  the  public,  in  practice  it  has  not  worked  out 
very  well.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Germany  had  acquired  a 
million  square  miles  of  colonial  territory,  in  1913  out  of  a  total 
of  25,843  German  emigrants,  19,124  sought  homes  in  the  United 


556 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


States,  5537  in  Canada,  359  in  Australia,  140  in  Brazil.  In  that 
year  more  Germans  were  living  in  the  British  colony  of  Canada 
than  in  all  the  German  oversea  dominions.  Clearly  the  German 
colonies  had  failed  to  attract  German  immigrants.  Perhaps 
Germany  had  been  particularly  unfortunate  in  acquiring  only 
tropical  colonies,  unfit  for  European  habitation.  But  even  Great 
Britain,  with  all  her  colonies  in  every  climatic  zone,  still  sent  to 
the  United  States  in  the  year  1913  more  than  88,000  emigrants ; 
and  within  twenty-five  years  after  1870  almost  three  milHon  citi- 
zens of  the  United  Kingdom  settled  in  the  United  States  rather 
than  in  the  British  colonies. 

Along  with  the  economic  and  patriotic  motives  for  imperial- 
ism, there  has  pretty  generally  been  a  rehgious  incentive.  The 
3  The  desire  to  convert  heathen  peoples  ^o  Christianity  has 
ReUgious  been  a  striking  characteristic  of  the  Christian  Church 
Motive  ages.   St.  Paul,  the  apostle  who  evangelized  Asia 

Minor  and  Greece;  St.  Patrick,  the  ''apostle  of  Ireland"  in  the 
fifth  century;  St.  Boniface,  who  carried  Christianity  to  the 
Germans  in  the  eighth  century;  St.  Methodius,  the  pioneer  of 
missionaries  among  the  Slavs  in  the  ninth  century;  the  Fran- 
Roman  ciscan  friars  who  ventured  into  China  as  emissaries 
Catholic  of  the  Catholic  Church  in  the  thirteenth  century; 
Missions  Francis  Xavier,  the  Spanish  Jesuit  of  the  sixteenth 

century,  who  converted  thousands  by  his  preaching  in  India 
and  Japan,  —  these  were  only  the  more  famous  among  thousands 
of  zealous  missionaries  of  the  Christian  Church.  Missionary 
motives  were  at  least  in  part  responsible  for  the  Commercial 
Revolution.  Columbus,  indeed,  regarded  himself  as  a  mission- 
ary. The  colonial  expansion  of  Europe  was  accornpanied,  and 
to  a  considerable  extent  promoted,  by  the  expansion  of  Roman 
Catholic  missions,  which  were  efficiently  organized  under  the 
central  control  of  the  papal  Congregation  of  the  Propaganda, 
organized  by  Pope  Gregory  XV  in  1622.  The  Jesuits,  and  the 
Dominican  and  Franciscan  friars,  preaching,  baptizing,  teaching, 
and,  if  need  be,  dying  for  the  faith,  converted  most  of  the  natives 
of  Latin  America,  Christianized  part  of  the  Philippines,  and 
established  important  Christian  communities  in  India,  China, 
Japan,  in  Africa,  and  in  Polynesia.  Among  the  numerous 
organizations  for  CathoUc  foreign  missions,  special  mention 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


557 


should  be  made  of  the  international  Society  for  the  Propaga- 
tion of  the  Faith,  which  was  founded  at  Lyons  in  1822  and 
had  collected  for  missions  by  the  year  1910  more  than 
$78,000,000.  In  1 910  there  were  more  than  11,000  missionary 
priests  (including  some  5000  native  priests)  at  work  in  Asia, 
Africa,  and  Australasia. 

Until  the  nineteenth  century,  the  various  Protestant  sects 
took  comparatively  Httle  part  in  the  conversion  of  the  heathen. 
The  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the  Gospel  in  New  Protestant 
England  (1649),  the  isolated  endeavors  of  a  few  clergy-  Missions 
men,  the  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the  Gospel  in  Foreign 
Parts  (1701),  and  the  remarkable  work  of  the  Moravians  (1731- 
1732),  foreshadowed  but  did  not  inaugurate  the  era  of  Protestant 
missionary  enthusiasm.  Just  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  the  formation  by  William  Carey  of  a  Baptist  Society 
for  Propagating  the  Gospel  among  the  Heathen"  (1792),  the 
organization  of  the  London  Missionary  Society  (1795)  by  Presby- 
terians and  CongregationaHsts,  and  the  establishment  of  the 
(Anglican)  Church  Missionary  Society  (1799),  indicated  the 
awakening  interest  in  proselytism  that  was  to  characterize  the 
nineteenth  century.  Thenceforward  missionary  societies,  large 
and  small,  of  every  sect  and  of  every  nationality,  numbering 
into  the  hundreds,  were  formed  for  the  promotion  of  foreign 
missions.  Mission  study  clubs  and  periodical  publications 
sprang  into  existence  for  the  purpose  of  disseminating  informa- 
tion about  the  quaint  customs  or  outlandish  manners  of  the 
heathen  folk  to  whom  Bibles,  missionaries,  medicine,  and  civi- 
lized clothes  were  being  sent. 

The  importance  of  this  missionary  movement  in  stimulating 
imperialism  can  hardly  be  exaggerated.  Many  earnest  Chris- 
tians, who  might  otherwise  have  disapproved  colonial  Missions 
expansion,  became  enthusiastic  when  they  considered  and 
that  the  propagation  of  the  faith  might  be  promoted  ^™p®"*^*^™ 
by  annexing  the  territory  in  question.  In  Africa,  and  in  the 
islands  of  the  South  Sea,  time  and  again  an  enterprising  mis- 
sionary-explorer led  the  way  first  for  merchants  and  then  for 
soldiers.  ''The  first  raising  of  the  flag  of  Germany  on  the  soil  of 
Africa  grew  out  of  the  need  of  protecting  the  Rhenish  mission- 
aries in  Namaqualand  (German  Southwest  Africa)."  Again, 


558  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


when  Germany  seized  Kiao-chau  in  China,  it  was  to  avenge 
the  murder  of  two  German  missionaries.  Or,  in  the  case  of 
Great  Britain,  when  the  British  East  Africa  Company  was 
about  to  abandon  its  unprofitable  territory  in  the  region  of 
Lake  Victoria  Nyanza,  in  1891,  the  Church  Missionary  Society 
paid  the  Company  £15,000  to  hold  the  territory  another  year, 
in  the  hope  —  which  was  fulfilled  in  1893  —  that  the  British 
government  might  then  be  induced  to  assume  responsibihty  for 
the  country. 

Missionaries  have  done  much  to  further  the  work  of  imperial- 
ism, but  it  is  doubtful  whether  imperialism  has  furthered  the 
work  of  the  missionaries.  Not  only  have  there  been  cases  where 
missionary  activity  has  been  directly  discouraged  by  the  govern- 
ment, for  fear  that  the  awakening  of  reHgious  antipathies  might 
lead  to  political  unrest,  as  in  India  and  in  Egypt ;  but  far  more 
harmful  to  the  propagation  of  Christianity  has  been  the  shame- 
less immorality  and  cruelty  exhibited  by  European  officials  and 
traders  in  their  dealings  with  the  subject  peoples.  While  the 
missionary  was  preaching  the  Christian  precepts  of  charity,  un- 
selfishness, purity,  and  temperance,  stern  government  officials 
were  practicing  ruthless  severity,  avaricious  commercial  cor- 
porations were  enriching  themselves  by  forcing  the  natives  into 
virtual  slavery,  licentious  soldiers  were  giving  free  rein  to  their 
vicious  passions,  European  liquor  agents  were  supplying  the 
natives  with  cheap  gin.  The  barbarous  methods  pursued  by 
European  rubber  merchants  in  compelling  the  negroes  of  central 
Africa  (notoriously,  but  by  no  means  exclusively,  in  the  Congo 
Free  State)  to  collect  rubber  for  commercial  purposes,  were  cal- 
culated to  inspire  bitter  hatred  rather  than  grateful  respect  for 
Christian  civilization. 

The  aim  of  this  brief  general  discussion  of  the  New  Imperialism 
has  been  to  suggest  the  underlying  motives  —  economic,  pa- 
Summary  triotic,  and  religious  —  which  have  been  largely  respon- 
sible for  the  partition  of  Africa,  the  appropriation  of 
the  South  Sea  Islands,  the  spread  of  European  civilization  in  Asia, 
and  the  development  of  the  Americas  in  the  century  1815-1915. 
In  the  course  of  the  following  chapters  the  thoughtful  student  will 
discern  for  himself  many  illustrations  and  new  impHcations  of 
the  tendencies  which  have  been  outlined  in  this  section. 


•      NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM  559 


As  regards  the  moral  justification  or  the  alleged  economic 
necessity  for  recent  imperialism,  the  student  must  form  his 
own  conclusions.  There  is  one  reflection,  however,  imperialism 
without  which  this  discussion  would  be  incomplete,  and 
and  with  which  this  section  may  appropriately  be  ^^^^^'^^^^^ 
closed, — namely,  the  effect  of  this  imperiaUsm  upon  the  two 
cardinal  principles  of  nineteenth-century  politics, — nationalism 
and  democracy.  In  an  earlier  paragraph  we  suggested  that 
nationahsm,  or  patriotic  pride,  was  one  of  the  causes  of  im- 
periahsm,  and.  that  triumph  of  national  sentiment  in  Germany, 
in  Italy,  in  France  was  accompanied  by  colonial  aggrandizement. 
The  very  nations  that  had  prized  national  freedom  more  highly 
than  life  itself,  became  destroyers  of  freedom  in  Africa  and 
Asia.  At  the  very  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  which  was 
preeminently  the  century  of  nationahsm,  Great  Britain  defied 
nationahsm  by  her  conquest  of  the  two  Boer  republics  in  South 
Africa  (i 899-1 902).  Italy,  having  liberated  herself  from  Austria- 
Hungary,  attempted  to  subjugate  the  free  nation  of  Abyssinia. 
It  is  a  strange  paradox  that  those  who  most  cherished  their  own 
national  independence,  should  least  regard  that  of  others.  To 
this  unhappy  inconsistency  we  may  trace  not  only  the  origin  of 
a  cynical  attitude  towards  the  ideal  of  Nationahsm,  but  also  the 
rise  of  that  bitter  imperial  and  mihtaristic  ^  rivalry  between 
the  Great  Powers,  which  culminated  in  the  War  of  the  Nations. 

The  effect  of  imperiahsm  on  Democracy  has  been  no  less 
deleterious.    In  deahng  with  their  colonial  possessions,  even 
the  most  democratic  nations  have  thrown  Democracy  ^^^^^ 
overboard.    The  general  type  of  modern  colonial  imperialism 
government  has  been  the  autocratic  rule  of  a  magis-  Democ- 
trate,  or  "governor-general,"  appointed  by  the  home 
government  and  responsible  to  the  home  government  rather 
than  to  the  colony.    The  so-called  ''legislative  councils"  which 
existed  in  many  colonies  had  no  real  control  of  the  government, 
and  were  as  a  rule  only  partly  elective.   In  most  German  colonies 
not  even  this  shadow  of  representative  government  was  found. 
The  reason  for  this  repudiation  of  democracy  is  obvious.  The 
barbarous  tribes  of  the  South  Sea  Islands,  the  uncivilized  negroes 
of  Uganda,  or  the  cannibal  tribes  of  Dahomey,  could  hardly  be 

*  Sec  below,  pp.  687  II. 


56o  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


intrusted  with  the  ballot.  In  India  and  in  Egypt,  where  the 
level  of  civilization  was  much  higher,  the  illiteracy  of  the  vast 
majority  of  the  population  would  furnish  an  excuse  for  undemo- 
cratic bureaucracy.  But  even  were  it  possible,  through  the  dif- 
fusion of  education,  to  overcome  this  practical  obstacle,  there 
would  still  remain  the  fundamental  difficulty,  that  if  the  in- 
habitants of  the  colonies  had  their  way,  beyond  peradventure 
of  a  doubt  they  would  in  almost  every  case  put  an  end  to  the 
domination  of  the    mother  country."  ^ 

THE  PARTIAL  DISMEMBERMENT  AND  THE  POLITICAL 
REGENERATION  OF  THE  CHINESE  EMPIRE 

The  narrative  of  the  achievements  of  nineteenth-century 
imperialism  —  the  narrative  to  which  the  foregoing  section  was 
an  explanatory  preface  —  may  well  begin  with  a  study  of  the 
effects  of  European  imperiaHsm  upon  Asia,  the  oldest  and  largest 
of  continents.  Throughout  the  ages  European  adventurers  and 
merchants  had  been  attracted  by  the  wealth,  fascinated  by  the 
civiHzation,  and  awed  by  the  vastness  of  Asia;  but  the  spread 
of  European  civilization  in  the  Far  East  had  made  small  progress 
prior  to  the  nineteenth  century.  Russia  had  appropriated  the 
bleak  expanse  of  Siberia ;  portions  of  India  had  been  brought 
under  British  domination ;  Dutch  traders  had  estabhshed  them- 
selves in  the  East  Indies,  and  Spanish  missionaries  in  the  Philip- 
pine Islands.  Elsewhere  the  influence  of  Europe  had  not  been 
strongly  felt.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  however,  the  powerful 
pressure  of  European  imperialism  revolutionized  China,  Japan, 
and  Persia,  and  in  effect  reduced  the  whole  of  Asia  to  a  posi- 
tion of  either  political  or  economic  dependence  upon  Europe. 
For  convenience,  we  shall  first  depict  the  course  of  events  in  the 
Chinese  Empire  and  its  dependencies,  then  the  awakening  of 
Japan,  the  expansion  of  Russia,  and  the  predicament  of  Persia.^ 

The  greatest  and  probably  the  most  ancient  of  Oriental  states 
was  the  Empire  of  China.    In  territorial  extent  and  in  popula- 

1  To  the  sweeping  generalizations  of  this  paragraph,  exception  must  be  made  in 
respect  of  certain  self  governing  colonies  "  in  the  British  Empire,  notably  Canada, 
Newfoundland,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa.    See  below,  ch.  xxix. 

2  For  the  British  Empire  in  Asia  —  India  and  its  dependencies  —  see  below, 
pp.  662-672. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


tion  the  Chinese  Empire  was  approximately  equal  to  the  whole 
of  Europe.  The  bulk  of  the  three  hundred  milHons  of  people 
lived  along  the  great  river  valleys  of  the  Huang-ho  j^e  Ancient 
and  the  Yangtsze-kiang,  and  were  included  within  the  Chinese 
eighteen  provinces  of  China  proper,  which  territorially  ^^P""® 
constituted  about  one-third  of  the  entire  empire.  There  for  cen- 
turies —  possibly  forty  or  fifty  centuries  —  the  short,  slant- 
eyed  yellow  men  had  lived  and  labored,  carefully  cultivating 
their  tiny  farms  (three  acres  was  considered  a  good  farm),  eating 
their  rice  or  millet,  fishing  in  the  great  rivers,  or  saiHng  their 
picturesque  ''junks,"  flying  their  kites  for  sport,  weaving  fabrics 
of  silk  and  cotton  for  the  loose  trousers  and  wide-sleeved  jackets 
which  men  and  women  alike  wore,  offering  sacrifices  at  their 
ancestral  tombs,  manufacturing  exquisite  porcelain,  painting 
curious  and  delicate  pictures,  and  fashioning  quaint  vases  of 
bronze.  The  Chinese,  proud  of  their  own  ancient  culture,  were 
prone  to  despise  all  foreigners  as  barbarians.  Of  European  civi- 
lization, of  railways,  of  steam-engines,  they  were  bUssfully 
ignorant,  until  comparatively  recently.  Before  the  nineteenth 
century  few  Europeans  could  gain  admission  to  the  ''Celestial 
Empire."  Only  the  bold  missionaries  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church  and  occasional  enterprising  traders  had  disturbed  the 
complacent  stagnation  of  Chinese  civiHzation. 

Back  in  the  thirteenth  century,  Marco  Polo  had  sojourned  at 
the  magnificent  court  of  Kublai  Khan,  the  Mongol  emperor  of 
China.  At  an  even  earHer  date,  Franciscan  friars  g^jy 
had  been  sent  into  the  Far  East  by  Pope  Innocent  IV,  tercourse 
and  in  the  fourteenth  century  they  had  estabhshed  Europe 
a  Christian  Church  in  Pekin,  as  well  as  in  other  Chinese 
cities.  From  the  sixteenth  century,  despite  all  obstacles,  Roman 
Catholic  missionaries  continued  their  work  in  China,  making 
many  converts.  In  the  sixteenth  century,  Portuguese  merchants 
had  made  their  appearance  in  the  China  Sea  and  had  built  their 
warehouses  at  Macao  (south  of  Canton)  for  the  trade  in  silks 
and  tea.  The  following  century,  the  seventeenth,  had  seen 
Dutch  traders  established  on  the  island  of  Formosa,  and  British 
at  Canton.  The  Chinese  trade  was  extremely  precarious,  how- 
ever ;  it  was  only  barely  tolerated  by  the  Chinese  government. 
The  merchants  who  visited  China  were  harassed  by  unfriendly 

VOL.  II — 2  0 


562 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Chinese  officials,  burdened  by  heavy  taxes,  and  not  always 
secure  in  their  lives  and  property.  Until  well  into  the  nineteenth 
century,  China  remained  practically  closed  to  Europeans. 

In  the  course  of  that  century,  and  especially  after  1870,  China's 
self-sufficient  isolation  was  disturbed  in  three  ways,  (i)  The 
Chinese  government  found  itself  powerless  to  prevent  European 
merchants  from  trafficking  in  Chinese  seaports,  Christian  mis- 
sionaries from  preaching  their  gospel,  and  foreign  capitaUsts  from 
building  railways,  opening  mines,  and  erecting  factories  within 
China.  (2)  Outlying  provinces  and  tributary  states  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  fell  into  the  hands  of  foreign  nations.  (3)  Euro-" 
pean  ideas  began  to  affect  many  of  the  Chinese  people  profoundly 
and  to  react  powerfully  upon  the  political  life  of  the  nation. 
Let  us  see  how  this  came  about. 

In  the  first  of  these  directions,  i.e.  in  the  opening  up  of  China 
to  European  merchants  and  missionaries,  an  important  stride 
^        was  made  in  1840,  when  the  so-called  Opium  War  was 

The  Open-  '    .     .  .        ^i  . 

ing  of  China  waged  by  Great  Britam  agamst  Chma.  It  grew  out 
to  Foreign        ^  quarrel  between  the  Chinese  erovernment,  which 

Commerce:    ,     ,         ,      .     ,     ,       .  .  r 

the  Opium  had  prohibited  the  importation  of  opium,  and.  the 
'^40-  British  traders  at  Canton,  who  insisted  on  smuggling 
opium  from  India  into  China.  In  June,  1840,  a 
British  fleet  attacked  the  Chinese  coast  and  captured  the  cities 
of  Canton,  Amoy,  Ningpo,  Shanghai,  and  Chin-kiang.  Finally 
the  emperor  was  compelled  to  sign  the  treaty  of  Nanking 
(1842),  whereby  the  four  ports  of  Amoy,  Ningpo,  Foochow,  and 
•  Shanghai,  in  addition  to  Canton,  were  thrown  open  to  foreign 
traders;  the  island  of  Hongkong  (near  Canton)  was  formally 
ceded  to  Great  Britain ;  and  China  promised  to  pay  $21,000,000 
as  a  war  indemnity.  Curiously  enough,  the  opium  question 
which  had  occasioned  the  war  was  left  unsettled.  The  fruits  of 
Great  Britain's  victory  were  speedily  shared  by  traders  of  other 
nations,  —  American,  French,  Belgian,  Prussian,  Dutch,  and 
Portuguese,  —  who  during  the  next  decade  gained  the  privilege 
of  trading  at  the  treaty  ports.  In  fifteen  years  (1842-1856) 
China's  tea-export  doubled  and  the  export  of  silk  increased  from 
3000  to  56,000  bales. 

The  next  step  in  the  opening  up  of  China  was  the  Second 
Chinese  War  (i 856-1 860),  waged  by  France  and  Great  Britain, 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


565 


the  former  to  avenge  the  murder  of  a  missionary,  the  latter  be- 
cause the  crew  of  a  ship  sailing  under  the  British  flag  had  been 
seized  and  jailed  as  pirates  by  a  Chinese  official,  Second 
Canton  was  again  taken  by  the  British.  French  and  Chinese 
EngHsh  forces  captured  the  Taku  forts  and  proceeded  Jgeo^^the" 
up  the  Pei-ho  River  towards  the  imperial  capital,  Treaties  of 
Pekin,  by  way  of  Tientsin.  At  Tientsin  they  were  "^^^^^^"^ 
met  by  commissioners  of  the  emperor,  with  whom  the  treaty  of 
Tientsin  (1858)  was  negotiated.  Hardly  had  the  treaty  been 
signed,  however,  when  some  British  ships  were  treacherously 
fired  upon  by  Chinese  forts.  Warlike  operations  were  resumed 
by  the  alHed  forces,  which  now  pushed  their  way  up  to  the  very 
gates  of  Pekin.  There  a  brother  of  the  emperor  induced  them 
to  conclude  peace  (i860).  China  was  to  pay  a  war  indemnity 
of  8,000,000  taels.  The  (modified)  treaty  ^  of  Tientsin  was  now 
finally  ratified,  by  which  Great  Britain  received  a  foothold  on 
the  mainland  next  to  Hongkong ;  six  new  ports  (including 
Tientsin)  were  opened  to  trade,  in  addition  to  the  five  already 
existing  treaty  ports  ;  foreign  ministers  might  reside  at  Pekin ;  the 
privilege  of  traveling  in  the  interior  was  conceded  to  Europeans ; 
and  Christian  missionaries  were  not  only  to  be  tolerated,  but 
even  protected  by  the  Chinese  government.  The  traffic  in 
opium,  moreover,  was  legally  recognized  under  a  revised  tariff. 

By  the  events  of  1 840-1 860  China  had  been  thrown  open  to 
European  commerce^  and  to  Christian  missionaries.  The  in- 
vasion of  China  by  European  capitalists,  and  the  beginnings  in 
China  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  were  to  come  at  a  later  date. 
We  shall,  therefore,  leave  them  for  subsequent  consideration, 
while  we  turn  to  the  second  phase  of  the  Chinese  question  —  the 
partial  dismemberment  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

Within  an  empire  so  vast  and  so  loosely  knit  together  as  that 
of  China,  there  could  not  fail  to  be  a  tendency  to  disintegra- 
tion, especially  when  energetic  foreign  nations  were  eager  to 
hasten  the  process  with  a  view  to  their  own  gain.  The  Chinese 
emperor  was  first  of  all  sovereign  of  the  eighteen  Chinese  pfov- 

^  Or  rather  the  treaties  of  Tienstin  :  one  with  France,  one  with  Great  Britain. 

^  Henceforth  Chinese  foreign  trade  was  to  advance  with  enormous  rapidity, 
to'the  value  of  188,123,877  taels  in  1887;  437,959,675  lads  in  1901 ;  674,988,988 
taels  in  1905;  and  in  1913  to  1,149,513,642  lads  ($842,018,611). 


564  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


inces,  with  their  1,500,000  square  miles  and  300,000,000  inhab- 
itants :  a  vast  realm  stretching  from  Manchuria  and  Mongoha 
The  Extent  north  to  Tonkin  and  Burma  on  the  south, 

of  the  and  from  the  China  Sea  on  the  east  to  Tibet  on  the 
Emp^r  west.  In  addition,  the  emperor  was  lord  of  Man- 
about         churia  to  the  north  of  China  proper.    The  three 

Manchurian  provinces,  extending  over  almost  400,000 
square  miles,  and  including  some  12,000,000  inhabitants,  had 
been  united  to  China  when  in  the  seventeenth  century  an 
China  ambitious  Manchu  chieftain  had  supplanted  the  na- 
Proper  ^^y^  dynasty  of  Chinese  emperors.  Since  the  seven- 
teenth century,  China  had  been  ruled  by  Manchu  emperors,  who, 
Manchuria  wsiy,  introduced  the  custom  of  wearing  the 

hair  in  a  long  queue  or  pigtail. 
Besides  the  eighteen  provinces  of  China  and  the  three  prov- 
inces of  Manchuria,  the  Chinese  emperor  also  exercised  control, 
The  Fringe  varying  degree,  over  a  fringe  of  tributary  and 
of  Quasi-  subject  states  surrounding  China  proper.  Korea,  the 
&tat?s^^^^^*  peninsula  between  the  Sea  of  Japan  and  the  Yellow 

Sea,  had  for  many  centuries  been  a  kingdom  tribu- 
tary to  China  and  partaking  of  Chinese  civihzation,  a  kingdom 

„  somewhat  smaller  than  Great  Britain  and  about  one- 

Korea 

third  as  populous.  Still  further  north,  the  valley 
of  the  Amur  River  was  until  i860  claimed  by  China.  To  the 
Mongolia  northwest  was  the  vast  territory  of  Mongoha,  with 
almost  seven  times  as  many  acres  as  France,  but  with 
fewer  people  than  Paris.  Inner  Mongoha,  bounded  by  the  desert 
of  Gobi,  China,  and  Manchuria,  was  under  the  direct  control  of 
the  Manchu  emperors  of  China;  Outer  Mongoha,  stretching 
westward  to  the  Tarbagatai  Mountains,  was  too  distant  to  be 
easily  ruled  from  Pekin,  and,  although  a  Chinese  agent  was 
SinMang  maintained  at  Urga,  the  hereditary  khans  were  al- 
most independent.  South  of  Mongoha  and  with  its 
center  directly  west  of  Pekin,  was  the  enormous  province  of  Sin- 
kiang  (including  Chinese  Turkestan,  Kuldja,  Zungaria,  and  other 
Tibet  territories).  Sin-kiang  was  administered  by  Chinese 
officials  with  native  subordinates.  Tibet,  south  of  Sin- 
kiang  and  west  of  China,  was  a  region  equally  vast  and  sparsely 
populated.    At  the  capital  city  of  Tibet,  Lhasa  (a  httle  town  of 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


56s 


15,000  inhabitants),  dwelt  the  Dalai  Lama,  whom  the  Tibetans 
regarded  as  their  supreme  religious  head  and  civil  authority. 
Chinese  authority  in  Tibet  was  represented  by  a  few  Chinese 
officials  and  by  Chinese  garrisons.  Between  Tibet  and  India 
were  the  two  small  states  of  Nepal  and  Bhutan,  of  which  the 
latter  was  entirely  independent  and  the  former  only  occasionally 
sent  envoys  with  presents  to  Pekin.  Further  southward  lay 
the  kingdoms  of  Burma,  Siam,  Cambodia,  and  Annam  (includ- 
iner  Cochin-China  and  Tonkin),  all  of  which  at  the  ^  ^ 

°    .         .     .        .  ,        ^'  .  Indo-China 

opemng  of  the  mneteenth  century  were  practically 
independent  states,  although  China  still  claimed  Burma,  Siam, 
and  Annam  as  vassals.  Finally,  to  the  east  of  China  lay  the 
islands  of  Hainan,  Formosa,  and  the  Liukiu  group.  The  first 
was  part  of  the  Chinese  province  of  Kwangtung.  Formosa  had 
been  conquered  by  the  Chinese  in  the  seventeenth  century. 
And  the  Liukiu  archipelago  had  been  paying  tribute  to  China 
since  the  fourteenth  century. 

From  all  sides,  Russia,  Japan,  and  Great  Britain  pressed  in 
on  this  fringe  of  states  bordering  China  proper.     From  the 
north  China  was  menaced  by  Russian  expansion.  Foreign 
Russian  settlements  were  made  on  the  island  of  Aggression 
Sakhalin.   The  region  north  of  the  Amur  River,  coveted  by  Rus- 
sian statesmen  since  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  was 
finally  annexed  to  Russian  Siberia  by  the  treaties  of  j^^^^j^ 
1858  and  i860,  when  also  the  coast  district  south  of  the 
Amur,  east  of  the  Ussuri  River,  and  north  of  Korea,  was  added 
to  the  Russian  dominions.    Russia  next  encroached  on  Chinese 
territory  in*  the  extreme  west  by  annexing  the  fertile  Kuldja 
district  in  the  province  of  Sin-kiang,  at  a  time  when  China  was 
embarrassed  by  a  revolt. 

Meanwhile  the  progressive  little  island  empire  of  Japan  was 
beginning  to  claim  a  share  in  the  spoliation  of  the  Chinese 
Empire.    In  1874  Japan  annexed  the  Liukiu  archi- 
pelago and  then  turned  covetous  eyes  toward  Man-  ^e^chtno- 
churia  and  Korea.    First  of  all,  Japan  recognized  Japanese 
Korea  as  an  independent  kingdom  (1876).   Then,  by  ^5 
continual  interference  in  Korean  affairs,  the  Japanese 
embroiled  China  in  a  series  of  quarrels.    Finally,  when  China 
sent  troops  to  Korea,  at  the  invitation  of  the  king,  and  reasserted 


566  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


her  claims  to  suzerainty  over  the  kingdom,  a  body  of  Japanese 
soldiers  seized  the  king  and  prepared  for  war  with  China  (1894). 
The  war,  known  to  history  as  the  Chino- Japanese  War  of  1894- 
1895,  was  simply  a  succession  of  catastrophes  for  over-confident 
China.  The  dwarfs,"  as  the  Chinese  had  contemptuously 
styled  their  foemen,  in  less  than  six  months  routed  the  Chinese 
forces  in  Korea,  invaded  Manchuria,  captured  Port  Arthur, 
supposedly  impregnable,  demoralized  the  Chinese  navy,  and 
captured  the  naval  stronghold  of  Wei-hai-wei.  The  triumphant 
Treaty  of  Japanese  forces  were  ready  to  advance  on  Pekin 
Shimono-  when  peace  was  made  by  the  treaty  of  Shimonoseki, 
seki,  189s  April,  1895.  In  addition  to  a  war  indemnity  of 
$157,940,000,  Japan  obtained  from  China  the  title  to  the  island 
of  Formosa  and  to  the  Liao-tung  peninsula,  including  the  coveted 
naval  base  of  Port  Arthur,  and  important  commercial  conces- 
sions. Wei-hai-wei,  moreover,  was  to  be  held  by  Japan  until  the 
treaty  stipulations  had  been  faithfully  executed.  China  re- 
nounced all  claim  to  the  kingdom  of  Korea,  which  now  grad- 
ually passed  under  the  tutelage  of  Japan. 

Japan's  gains  were  Russia's  grievance.  For  Russian  expan- 
sionists had  hoped  eventually  to  annex  Manchuria,  Korea,  and 
„  .  .     ^    Port  Arthur,  thereby  giving  to  Russia  an  ice-free 

Revision  of  .  '  °  . 

the  Treaty  outlet  in  the  Far  East  and  predommance  m  northern 
of  Shi-        Asia.    To  this  ambition  the  treaty  of  Shimonoseki 

monOSekl  ii     i     i    r  rr-n        -n*  • 

by  Russia,  Spelled  defeat.  The  Russian  government,  therefore, 
Germany,     resolved  to  tear  up  the  obnoxious  treaty.   It  was  not 

and  France       .  ,  , 

difficult  to  gain  the  cooperation  of  Germany  and 
France,  for  both  Powers  were  anxious  to  increase  their  prestige 
in  the  Far  East,  and  both  were  jealous  of  the  upstart  Japan. 
Professing  their  alarm  lest  the  cession  of  Port  Arthur  might  lead 
to  the  ultimate  disintegration  of  the  ancient  Chinese  Empire, 
Russia,  France,  and  Germany  advised  Japan  to  surrender  her 
conquests  on  the  mainland.  This  "friendly  advice"  Japan  could 
not  dare  to  ignore.  Compliantly  the  Japanese  government  re- 
turned all  except  Formosa  to  China,  receiving  in  return  an  addi- 
tional indemnity  of  $23,700,000.  But  the  Japanese  were  fu- 
riously disappointed,  and  they  long  remembered  who  had  cheated 
Japan  of  the  fruits  of  victory. 
Japanese  resentment  was  still  further  aroused  when  the  three 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


567 


Powers,  who  in  order  to  despoil  Japan  had  posed  as  the  friends 
of  China,  now  proceeded  to  help  themselves  to  Chinese  territory. 
The  Germans  in  1897  seized  the  bay  of  Kiao-chau  in 
the  province  of  Shan-tung,  with  the  flimsy  excuse  that  Germany 
only  in  this  manner  could  Germany  obtain  satisfaction  France, 
for  the  murder  of  two  German  missionaries  in  China,  ^g^^^gs' 
The  real  intention  of  the  Germans  became  clear, 
however,  when  they  extorted  a  ninety-nine-year  lease  of  Kiao- 
chau  and  began  to  fortify  the  place  as  a  base  for  German  power 
in  the  pro\dnce  of  Shan-tung.    France  secured  (1898)  a  similar 
lease  of  Kwang-chow  Wan,  a  valuable  bay  on  the  mainland 
opposite  the  island  of  Hainan,  which,  it  was  believed,  would  also 
come  under  French  rule  eventually.   But  it  was  Russia  that 
profited  most  richly  by  the  coup.   Russian  influence  became  all- 
powerful  in  Pekin;    and   Russian  capitalists  loaned  China 
$80,000,000.  Russia  secured  the  right  to  carry  her  trans-Siberian 
railway  across  Chinese  Manchuria  to  Vladivostok,  —  a  right 
which  practically  gave  Manchuria  into  Russia's  hands,  since  Rus- 
sian infantry  and  cavalry  would  accompany  the  railway  into 
Manchuria.    Furthermore,  Russia  obtained  a  lease  (1898)  of  Port 
Arthur  and  the  neighboring  harbor  of  Talien-wan,  which  were  im- 
mediately linked  up  by  railway  with  the  trans-Siberian  system. 
The  telegraph  lines  of  Korea  were  likewise  connected  with  the 
Siberian  lines.  Obviously  Russia  once  more  regarded  Manchuria, 
Korea,  and  the  Liao-tung  peninsula  as  her  "sphere  of  influence." 

These  gains  of  Russia,  France,  and  Germany  excited  British 
jealousy  to  such  a  pitch  that  the  British  government  ^ 

1  11        1  •    1   /  r.  r.\     -I      1      1  r  ttt  •  Intervention 

demanded  and  occupied  (1898)  the  harbor  of  Wei-  of  Great 
hai-wei,  from  which  the  British  could  keep  a  watch-  Britain  and 

f  1  1  -rT        A     1  Anglo- 

lul  eye  upon  the  aggressive  Russians  m  Port  Arthur  Japanese 
and  the  energetic  Germans  in  Kiao-chau.    A  few  Alliance, 
years  later  Great  Britain  concluded  an  alliance  with 
Japan  (1902),  to  protect  Manchuria  and  Korea  from  the  ever 
more  menacing  Russian  encroachments. 

As  it  became  ever  clearer  that  the  Russian  government  in- 
tended practically  to  annex  Manchuria,  the  resentful  The  Russo- 
Japanese  resolved  to  check  their  rival  by  force  of  warri904- 
arms.    The  result  was  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904-  1905 
1905)-    Victory  attended  the  Japanese.    By  the  treaty  of 


568 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Portsmouth  (5  September,  1905)  Russia  acknowledged  her 
complete  defeat  by  surrendering  to  Japan  the  lease  of  Liao-tung, 
Treaty  of  including  Port  Arthur,  by  recognizing  Japanese  inter- 
Ports-  ests  as  supreme  in  Korea,  and  by  yielding  to  Japan 
Russ^n  some  500  miles  of  railway.^  Manchuria,  aside  from 
Check  and  the  Liao-tung  peninsula,  was  to  be  evacuated  by  both 
?Xs^^^  Japan  and  Russia,^  restored  to  the  civil  administration 
of  China,  and  preserved  as  a  sort  of  neutral  zone. 

Not  long  after  the  war  Japan  and  Russia  came  to  an  under- 
standing, and  agreed  to  substitute  a  policy  of  cooperation  for 
Japan  in  ^^^^^  former  rivalry.  On  the  basis  of  this  under- 
Korea  and  standing,  Japan  and  Russia  henceforth  worked  to- 
Mcmgoiia  gather  harmoniously.  With  a  free  hand  Japan  pro- 
ceeded to  assume  control  of  Korea's  foreign  affairs,  to 
force  reforms  upon  the  Korean  government,  to  depose  the  Korean 
monarch,  and  finally  to  annex  Korea  (1910).  Russia,  on  the 
other  hand,  turned  her  attention  to  another  portion  of  the 
Chinese  Empire,  the  vast  region  of  Mongolia.  Merchants, 
Cossacks,  and  filibusters  rapidly  weaned  Outer  Mongolia  from 
its  allegiance  to  China.  In  191 2,  while  China  was  torn  by  a  repub- 
lican revolution,  the  Outer  Mongolians,  with  Russian  encourage- 
ment, repudiated  Chinese  rule  and  sought  the  protection  of 
Russia.  In  vain  Chinese  patriots  protested.  On  5  November, 
1 91 3,  the  Chinese  government  reluctantly  agreed  to  a  treaty 
with  Russia,  giving  the  Russians  extensive  privileges  in  Outer 
MongoUa  and  retaining  for  China  only  a  hollow  pretense  of 
suzerainty  over  the  province. 

While  Russia  and  Japan  were  encroaching  upon  the  northern 
territories  of  China,  Great  Britain  and  France  were  making  similar 
The  French  i^roads  upon  the  fringe  of  quasi-independent  states  in 
in  indo-  the  south.  In  1 86 2  France  had  secured  a  foothold  on  the 
China  Indo-Chinese  peninsula,  when,  after  making  war  upon 
the  native  king  of  Annam,  who  was  ruler  of  Cochin- China  and 
Tonkin,  the  French  obtained  three  provinces  of  Cochin-China 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Mekong  River.  The  very  next  year  (1863) 
the  French  established  their  protectorate  over  the  neighboring 

^  For  other  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  Portsmouth,  as  well  as  for  a  more  detailed 
account  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  see  below,  pp.  583  ff. 
^  With  the  exception  of  small  railway  guards. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


569 


kingdom  of  Cambodia,  which  had  been  hard  pressed  to  maintain 
its  independence  against  the  Siamese  on  the  west  and  the  Anna- 
mese  on  the  east.  In  1867  the  French  annexed  the  three  remain- 
ing provinces  of  Cochin-China.  The  kingdom  of  Annam,  to- 
gether with  its  dependency  of  Tonkin,  was  the  next  object  of 
French  ambition.  To  Tonkin,  then,  France  sent  her  troops 
(1882),  ostensibly  to  put  down  the  piratical  bands  which  infested 
the  region,  and  presently  announced  that  Tonkin  was  a  French 
protectorate.  Against  this  high-handed  procedure,  the  Chinese 
government  strenuously  remonstrated,  inasmuch  as  China 
claimed  to  be  suzerain  over  Annam  and  Tonkin.  Remon- 
strances proving  of  no  avail,  China  took  up  arms.  The  war 
that  followed  was  by  no  means  a  triumph  for  France ;  and 
when  peace  was  concluded  in  1885,  China  sustained  her  claim  to 
suzerainty,  although  France  was  allowed  to  establish  a  protec- 
torate over  Armam  and  Tonkin.  France  had  thus  acquired 
between  1862  and  1885  sovereignty  over  Cochin-China  and  a 
protectorate  over  Cambodia  and  Annam  (including  Tonkin),  — 
the  entire  eastern  half  of  the  Indo-Chinese  peninsula.  Her 
subsequent  acquisition  of  Kwang-chow  Wan  (1898),  in  the 
Chinese  province  of  Kwang-tung,  pointed  to  the  extension  of 
French  influence,  if  not  ultimate  French  sovereignty,  over  the 
Chinese  territory  surrounding  the  gulf  of  Tonkin,  i.e.,  the 
island  of  Hainan,  the  southern  part  of  the  province  of  Kwang- 
tung,  and  possibly  the  province  of  Kwang-si. 

Great  Britain  on  the  southwest  completed  the  circle  of  foreign 
aggressors  upon  Chinese  soil.    Step  by  step  the  British  had 
established  their  supremacy  in  India,  until  late  in  the  -pj^^  British 
nineteenth  century  they  began  to  look  eastward  and  in  Burma 
northward  for  further  conquests.    To  the  east  of  ^^^^^ 
India  lay  the  kingdom  of  Burma,  rich  in  forests,  in  fertility,  in 
minerals.    To  be  sure,  Burma  was  a  tributary  state  of  China  ; 
but  no  such  consideration  weighed  upon  the  British  when  in 
1885  they  invaded  the  country,  deposed  King  Theebaw,  and 
annexed  his  dominions  to  the  British  crown.    To  the  north  of 
India  lay  the  independent  states  of  Nepal  and  Bhutan,  and  the 
vast  Chinese  dependency  of  Tibet,  with  its  stores  of  salt,  soda, 
potash,  gold,  iron,  and  borax,  awaiting  development.    It  was 
not  necessary  formally  to  annex  Nepal  and  Bhutan :  they 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


naturally  became  quasi-independent  proteges  of  the  British. 
In  Tibet,  however,  the  British  encountered  obstinate  opposition 
on  the  part  of  the  Chinese,  who  were  determined  not  to  let 
Tibet  slip  out  of  their  grasp.  Nevertheless,  China  was  unable 
to  prevent  the  British  in  1904  from  negotiating  directly  with 
the  Tibetan  government  at  Lhasa  for  concessions  to  British- 
Indian  traders,  and  when  in  191 2  the  Chinese  government* at- 
tempted to  treat  Tibet  as  a  Chinese  province,  Great  Britain 
insisted  that  China  was  no  more  than  nominal  suzerain  of  Tibet. 
Encouraged  by  Great  Britain's  attitude,  the  Tibetans  rose  in 
rebellion  against  China,  expelled  all  Chinese  soldiers  and  officials 
from  their  country,  and  defeated  the  small  expeditionary  armies 
sent  out  from  China.  Diplomatic  negotiations  led  to  the  formu- 
lation of  a  convention  in  191 4,  whereby  Tibet  was  to  be  divided 
into  Outer  and  Inner  Tibet,  China  retaining  a  mere  fiction  of 
suzerainty  over  the  whole  territory  and  engaging  not  to  inter- 
fere at  all  in  the  affairs  of  Outer  Tibet.  Upon  the  refusal  of 
the  Chinese  government  to  ratify  this  Convention,  Great 
Britain  gave  notice  that  China  would  be  deprived  of  whatever 
advantages  remained  to  her  in  Tibet.  The  ultimate  fate  of 
Tibet  could  hardly  be  in  doubt ;  China  would  find  her  nominal 
suzerainty  but  a  thin  thread  whereby  to  secure  Tibet  against 
the  mighty  attraction  which  had  aheady  drawn  Burma  into 
the  British  Empire. 

Let  us  briefly  review  the  events  thus  far  chronicled.  The 
ancient  Empire  of  China  was  thrown  open  to  merchants  and 
missionaries  during  the  period  from  the  beginning  of 
of  Foreign    the  Opium  War  in  1840  to  the  close  of  the  Second 
Encroach-     Chinese  War  in  i860,  by  which  wars  certain  "treaty 

ments  on  ,,  i  ,     r      •  ... 

the  Chinese  ports  Were  Opened  to  foreign  commerce,  missionaries 
Empire,  gained  at  least  a  theoretical  claim  to  protection  by 
I  40  1914  government,  and  Europeans  were  given  the  right 

to  travel  in  China.  During  the  next  period,  from  i860  to  1914, 
China  saw  her  dependencies  one  by  one  falling  prey  to  aggres- 
Territoriai  ^^^^  foreign  nations:  —  Amur  to  Russia  (i860),  the 
Liukiu  archipelago  to  Japan  (1874),  Kuldja  to  Russia 
(1881),  Annam  to  France  (1885),  Burma  to  Great  Britain  (1885), 
Formosa  to  Japan  (1895),  the  Liao-tung  peninsula  to  Japan 
(1895),  then  to  Russia  (1898),  then  to  Japan  (1905),  Korea  to 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


571 


Japan  (annexed  1910),  Outer  Mongolia  to  Russia  (1913),  Outer 
Tibet  to  Great  Britain  (1914).  Outer  Mongolia  and  Tibet,  to 
be  sure,  still  remained  formally  under  Chinese  suzerainty,  but 
there  was  little  question  that  they  would  ultimately  be  appro- 
priated, the  one  by  Russia,  the  other  by  Great  Britain.  The 
^'foreign  devils"  had,  moreover,  wrested  from  China  a  number 
of  valuable  seaports.  Macao,  long  since  occupied  by  the  Portu- 
guese, was  in  1887  ceded  to  them ;  Hongkong  in  1842  was  ceded 
to  Great  Britain;  Port  Arthur  was  first  ceded  to  Japan  (1895), 
then  leased  to  Russia  (1898),  then  to  Japan  (1905) ;  Kiao-chau 
was  leased  to  the  Germans,  Wei-hai-wei  to  the  British,  and 
Kwang-chow  Wan  to  the  French. 

Since  1840  the  nature  of  the  foreign  interests  in  China  had 
fundamentally  changed.  At  first  the  European  nations,  while 
showing  concern  for  the  safety  of  Christian  mission-  commercial 
aries  in  China,  had  been  intent  upon  securing  com-  and 
mercial  privileges.  The  Far  Eastern  Question  had 
been  simply  a  scramble  in  which  each  nation  sought  to  obtain 
advantages  for  its  merchants,  believing  that  by  increasing  its 
trade,  the  nation  as  a  whole  would  enrich  itself.  In  the  latter 
period,  and  especially  after  1895,  industrial  interests  began  to 
take  their  place  beside  the  commercial.  For  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution was  making  itself  felt  even  within  the  sacred  precincts  of 
the  Celestial  Empire.  The  ''Son  of  Heaven,"  as  the  emperor 
was  reverently  styled,  had  so  far  lost  his  abhorrence  of  European 
civilization  that  he  now  disported  himself  in  a  steam  yacht,  and 
his  ancient  palace  was  radiant  with  the  brilliance  of  electric  lights. 
The  first  steam  railway,  constructed  in  1875-1876,  had  been 
torn  up  by  indignant  Chinese  officials  and  dumped  in  the  mud 
on  the  forlorn  shores  of  Formosa.  But  ten  years  had  not  elapsed 
before  another  and  more  successful  railway  was  begun,  and  rail- 
way construction  proceeded  in  such  earnest  that  by  19 14  China 
had  6000  miles  of  railway  in  operation,  and  2300  miles  under 
construction.  Telegraphs,  too,  spread  like  a  network  over  the 
country.  Factories,  as  well,  were  being  erected,  since  in  1895 
China  had  granted  foreigners  permission  to  engage  in  the  textile 
industry.  At  the  end  of  1914  there  were  forty-five  textile  mills, 
with  1,250,000  spindles,  besides  some  5000  power  looms  and 
numerous  mills  for  grinding  grain.  Mines,  moreover,  were  being 


572 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


exploited  by  British,  Japanese,  German,  and  Chinese  capitalists, 
and  were  yielding  treasures  of  coal,  iron,  tin,  and  copper. 

To  the  wistful  eyes  of  European  capitalists,  China  appeared 
as  an  inexhaustible  storehouse  of  wealth.  Her  soil  was  laden 
with  minerals  and  oil,  her  countless  inhabitants  were 
onnflu^*^  sober,  industrious,  and  accustomed  to  give  great 
ence  "  in  labor  for  small  reward.  To  the  Europeans  who  could 
Empke^^^^  build  and  own  China's  railways,  who  could  set  the 
Chinese  masses  to  work  digging  in  mines  and  toiling 
in  factories,  untold  fortunes  would  accrue.  Little  wonder  was 
it,  then,  that  in  each  European  country  there  appeared  a  group 
of  wealthy  men,  eager  to  invest  their  capital  in  Chinese  enter- 
prises and  insistent  in  urging  their  particular  government  to  ob- 
tain for  them  special  privileges  in  China.  The  decade  of  1895- 
1905  was  marked  by  the  growth  of  this  spirit.  Concessions  to 
build  railways  or  to  work  mines  were  extracted  from  the  Chinese 
government  by  various  governments  acting  in  behalf  of  their 
speculators.  For  a  time  it  was  assumed  that  in  order  properly 
to  safeguard  the  railways,  factories,  and  mines  owned  by  its  own 
citizens  in  China,  each  European  Power  would  have  to  mark 
out  a  ''sphere  of  influence"  in  the  Chinese  Empire.  Great 
Britain  would  take  the  broad  valley  of  the  Yangtsze-kiang  for 
British  capitalists  to  develop ;  France  would  take  Kwang-tung ; 
Germany,  part  of  Shan-tung ;  Russia  and  Japan  would  divide 
the  north  between  them.  Within  its  own  ''sphere  of  influence" 
each  nation  would  maintain  order,  and  protect  and  encourage 
its  industrial  capitalists  in  operating  railways,  mines,  and  mills. 
Perhaps  the  Powers  would  one  day  politically  annex  their  spheres 
of  influence,  thus  dividing  China  among  them. 

Aside  from  the  financial  advantage  to  be  gained  by  European 
speculators,  the  most  powerful  argument  for  the  partition  of 
Backward  China  was  the  inefficiency,  corruption,  and  unpro- 
ness  of  the  gressive  character  of  the  Chinese  government.  The 
Chinese       Manchu  emperor  was  a  divine-right  monarch  of  the 

Government  .       ^  .       .  _ 

type  which  had  gone  out  of  fashion  in  Europe.  The 
officials  who  actually  conducted  the  imperial  administration  — 
they  were  called  "mandarins"  by  Europeans  —  were,  it  is  true, 
the  foremost  scholars  of  the  reahn,  chosen  through  competitive 
written  examinations  on  Chinese  literature,  ethics,  and  history. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


573 


To  Europeans  resident  in  China,  however,  the  mandarins  ap- 
peared to  be  dishonest,  unprogressive,  and  absolutely  hostile  to 
western  civilization.  Therefore,  it  was  urged,  China  would 
never  become  Europeanized  while  the  mandarin  bureaucracy 
and  the  Manchu  monarchy  remained  in  power. 

In  no  respect  was  Chinese  conservatism  more  disastrous  than 
in  the  refusal  of  the  Chinese  government  to  adopt  European 
methods  of  warfare.  After  a  British  officer.  Major  Charles 
George  Gordon,  had  organized  a  body  of  Chinese  troops  into  an 
''Ever  Victorious  Army,"  which  crushed  a  serious  rebellion^  at 
Nanking  (1853-1864),  the  emperor  still  was  foolhardy  enough 
to  disband  the  ''Ever  Victorious  Army"  and  continue  in  the  old 
way.  The  overwhelming  defeat  of  China  by  the  Europeanized 
army  of  Japan  in  the  Chino- Japanese  War  (i 894-1 895)  demon- 
strated conclusively  that,  if  China  was  to  preserve  her  national 
existence,  she  must  borrow  European  weapons  and  tools. 

The  lesson  of  the  Chino-Japanese  War  was  fully  appreciated 
by  Emperor  Kwang-su.^   With  all  the  enthusiasm  of  youth  — 
he  was  still  in  his  twenties  —  Kwang-su  espoused  the 
cause  of  reform,  and  with  the  advice  of  liberal-minded  EdktTof 
philosophers  endeavored  to  retrieve  China's  disgrace.  Emperor 
In  the  year  1898  the  young  emperor  issued  a  series  of  ^^g^^"^"' 
remarkable  decrees,  by  which  he  commanded  colleges 
to  be  established  for  European  learning,  the  army  and  the  civil 
service  to  be  reorganized,  the  government  to  be  reconstituted 
with  ministerial  departments  of  mechanics  and  railways,  and 
means  of  internal  communication  to  be  extended.  Kwang-su 
regarded  himself  as  the  Chinese  counterpart  of  Peter  the  Great. 
Edicts,  however,  did  not  suffice  to  Europeanize  China.  They 
merely  infuriated  the  powerful  party  of  reactionaries  who  hated 
everything  European  and  who  now  conspired  with  Kwang-su's 
aunt,  the  Dowager  Empress  Tzu-hsi,  to  overthrow  the  Euro- 
peanizing  emperor.    Yuan  Shih-kai,  leader  of  the  army,  gave 
military  support  to  the  conspirators.  On  the  night  of  20  Septem- 

^  The  T'ai-p'ing  rebellion,  instigated  by  the  half-Christian  fanatic  Hung  Hsin 
Ch'uan. 

2  Kwang-su,  emperor  of  China,  born,  1872;  ascended  the  throne  at  the  age  of 
three  years,  1875;  began  to  govern,  1889;  superseded  by  Dowager  Empress  Tzu- 
hsi,  1898;  died,  1908. 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ber,  1898,  soldiers  occupied  the  emperor's  palace,  and  on  the 
following  day,  Kwang-su,  being  practically  a  prisoner,  resigned 
the  government  into  the  hands  of  his  aunt. 

The  Dowager  Empress  Tzu-hsi,^  who  for  the  ensuing  ten 
years  (1898- 1908)  ruled  in  the  stead  of  the  retired  emperor, 
TheReac-  ^  woman  of  truly  remarkable  energy,  ambition, 

tion  under  and  abihty.  She  delighted  in  diplomacy  and  thor- 
Tzu-hsi  oughly  enjoyed  the  business  of  governing.  She  was, 
moreover,  the  most  powerful  champion  of  the  old  order,  the  most 
formidable  opponent  of  European  innovations.  One  of  her  first 
acts  as  regent  was  to  command  six  young  reformers  to  be  executed. 
Kwang-su's  reform  edicts  she  quickly  cancelled.  One  of  her 
edicts,  appearing  in  the  Pekin  Gazette,  declared  with  more  truth 
than  discretion  that  ''the  various  Powers  cast  upon  us  looks  of 
tiger-like  voracity,  hustling  each  other  in  their  endeavors  to  be 
the  first  to  seize  upon  our  innermost  territories,"  and  exhorted 
the  Chinese  to  "let  no  one  think  of  making  peace,  but  let  each 
strive  to  preserve  from  destruction  and  spoHation  his  ancestral 
home  and  graves  from  the  ruthless  hands  of  the  invader." 

Encouraged  by  the  dowager's  attitude,  reactionaries  through- 
out China  gave  free  vent  to  their  hatred  of  foreigners.  Taking 
the  name  of  an  earlier  secret  society  —  the  "Order 
^ Boxer  "  Literary  Patriotic  Harmonious  Fists  "  (/  /jo  Ch'iian), 
Anti-Foreign  or  "  Boxers,"  —  the  more  violent  reactionaries  began 
^goo^^^^'  2,n  organized  campaign  against  the  Christian  mis- 
sionaries who  would  wean  the  Chinese  from  their 
ancient  religion,^  the  foreigners  who  would  run  railways  through 
grave-yards,  the  reformers  who  by  adopting  Western  ideals 
would  anger  the  gods  of  China.  The  growth  of  the  Boxer  move- 
ment could  be  measured  during  1899  ^9^^  the  increasing 
frequency  of  anti-Christian  outbreaks,  wholesale  murders  of 
missionaries,  and  plundering  of  Christian  communities.  The 
climax  was  reached  in  June  and  July,  1900,  when  the  empress 
determined  on  "war  to  the  knife"  against  foreigners.  The 
German  minister  was  shot  down  in  the  streets  of  Pekin.  Scores 

^The  Dowager  Empress,  Tzu-hsi  (i  834-1 908),  consort  of  the  Emperor  Hsien- 
feng  (1850-1861),  regent  from  1861  to  1889  and  from  1898  to  1908. 

2  In  point  of  fact  there  were  several  religions  in  China,  —  ancestor-worship, 
Buddhism,  and  Taoism ;  but  in  the  minds  of  the  masses  all  three  were  blended, 
with  a  strong  admixture  of  Confucian  ethical  teaching. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM  575 


of  Christian  missionaries  were  murdered  in  the  provinces.  Pekin 

was  for  two  months  a  battlefield,  where  foreigners,  cooped  up 
in  the  foreign  legations,  resolutely  defended  themselves  against 
the  attacking  Boxers.  To  the  rehef  of  the  foreigners  besieged  in 
Pekin  came  in  August  an  international  expedition  (10,000 
soldiers  of  Japan,  4000  Russians,  3000  British,  2000  Americans, 
and  a  smaller  number  of  French  and  German  troops),  putting 
the  Chinese  troops  to  rout  and  the  imperial  court  to  flight.  The 
victorious  Europeans  were  now  in  a  position  to  dictate  terms. 
China  was  compelled  to  pay  indemnities  to  the  various  Powers, 
amounting  in  all  to  something  more  than  $320,000,000;  and 
additional  privileges  were  conceded  to  European  commerce. 

The  entry  of  foreign  troops  into  Pekin  in  August,  1900,  had 
registered  the  failure  of  reaction.   The  Empress  Tzu-hsi,  how- 
ever reluctantly,  admitted  the  necessity  of  reform,  j^^^g^g^j 
The  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  was,  there-  Movement 
fore,  an  era  of  reforms.    A  commission  was  sent  for  Reform 

11  1  »         1 .      1^  China 

abroad  to  study  European  governments.  A  parlia- 
mentary constitution  for  China  was  promised.  The  opium 
traffic  was  prohibited.  The  antiquated  system  of  education  for 
officials  was  swept  away  (i 902-1 906) ;  many  temples  were  con- 
verted into  colleges ;  and  careful  attention  was  given  to  natural 
science,  European  history,  geography,  political  economy,  inter- 
national law,  and  foreign  languages. 

Even  these  reforms  were  not  radical  enough  to  satisfy  the 
Young  China  Party,  a  revolutionary  organization  strikingly 
similar  to  ^Mazzini's  historic  ''Young  Italy."    Many  gy^Yatsen 
of  these  radicals  had  been  educated  abroad ;   some  and  the 
had  embraced  the  Christian  faith;  and  all  hoped  to 

'  .  Revolution 

make  China  a  progressive  repubhc.  Their  leader. 
Sun  Yat-sen,  a  doctor  of  medicine  and  a  Christian  in  religion, 
while  compelled  to  live  in  exile,  worked  incessantly  for  the  success 
of  the  repuhHcan  movement.  Alarmed  by  the  progress  of  revo- 
lutionary propaganda,  the  imperial  government  offered  sweeping 
concessions  to  the  radical  demands,  called  an  Assembly  in  19 10, 
and  promised  to  establish  constitutional  parliamentary  govern- 
ment Put  the  followers  of  Sun  Yat-sen  would  agree  to  no  com- 
promise with  the  odious  Manchu  autocracy.  In  October,  191 1, 
they  took  up  arms  against  the  Manchus.  They  captured  Nanking 


576  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


and  made  that  city  the  capital  of  their  provisional  republic. 
Sun  Yat-sen  returned  from  exile  to  become  president.  The 
crowning  success  of  the  Revolution  was  achieved  on  12  Febru- 
ary, 191 2,  when  the  boy-emperor^  abdicated  the  throne,  putting  an 
end  to  the  Manchu  dynasty  which  had  ruled  China  for  267  years. 

The  new  republic  was  organized  not  under  the  inspiration  of 
Sun  Yat-sen,  who  had  engineered  the  Revolution,  but  rather 

under  the  influence  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  who  had  upheld 
me*n?onhe  monarchy  to  the  last  —  an  able  general  and  a 
Chinese  shrewd  politician.  Yuan  Shih-kai  believed  in  a  modern 
fpiT^^^^'      system  of  education,  material  progress,  and  a  Euro- 

peanized  army ;  as  opposed  to  Sun  Yat-sen,  however, 
he  wished  so  far  as  possible  to  conserve  the  spirit  and  forms  of 
Presidency  monarchical  regime.  Superseding  Sun  Yat-sen 

of  Yuan  as  head  of  the  provisional  government,  Yuan  soon 
Shih-kai  disclosed  his  distaste  for  parliamentary  government 
and  insisted  that  the  National  Assembly,  which  he  had  convoked 
to  draft  a  constitution,  should  not  make  the  president  subordi- 
nate to  parliament.  He  defied  the  National  Assembly,  moreover, 
by  negotiating  a  loan  of  $125,000,000  with  five  foreign  Powers 
(Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  Russia,  and  Japan),  and  by 
agreeing  that  the  five  Powers  should  appoint  advisers  to  super- 
intend Chinese  finances.  The  patriotic  radicals,  who  strenuously 
resented  Yuan's  usurpation  of  power  and  accused  him  of 
truckling  to  foreign  interests,  angrily  instigated  a  rebellion  in 
the  southern  provinces  during  the  summer  of  1913.  The  rebel- 
lion failed,  however,  leaving  Yuan  more  powerful  than  ever. 
Having  been  elected  president  of  the  republic  for  five  years,  6 
October,  191 3,  he  shortly  proceeded  to  dissolve  the  National 
Assembly,  to  abolish  the  provincial  assemblies,  and  to  inaugu- 
rate a  series  of  conservative  reforms.  It  was  beheved  that 
China  was  drifting  rapidly  back  toward  monarchical  absolutism, 
and  there  were  repeated  protests,  riots,  and  insurrections  on  the 
part  of  republicans  in  the  southern  provinces,  but  the  sudden 
death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  June,  191 6,  served  to  promote  Vice- 
President  Li  Yuan-hung  to  the  presidency  and  to  promise  that 
China  would  go  forward  as  a  frank  and  enthusiastic  imitator  of 
Western  nations. 

^  The  six-year-old  Hsiian  T'ung.    His  father,  Prince  Chun,  had  been  regent. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


577 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  JAPAN 

Not  far  east  of  the  Chinese  coast  Hes  a  small  island  empire, 
the  story  of  whose  awakening  affords  both  a  violent  contrast 
with,  and  an  enHghtening  commentary  upon,  the  Contrast 
disheartening  disasters  of  China.  For  the  Japanese 
awoke  in  time  to  the  advantages  of  European  civiKzation  and 
easily  became  the  successful  imitators  and  rivals,  instead  of  the 
miserable  prey,  of  Western  nations. 

Modern  intercourse  between  Japan  and  Europe  began  in  the 
year  1542,  when  by  chance  a  Portuguese  sailing-vessel  was  blown 
to  the  coast  of  one  of  the  smaller  T  apanese  islands.  Fnendiy 
On  board  were  three  Portuguese  adventurers,  the  Reception 
first  Europeans  to  visit  Japan.   To  their  surprise,  they  ers^n^he^ 
were  welcomed  with  charming  courtesy  by  the  natives.  Sixteenth 
who  were  in  appearance  under-sized  Chinamen,  alert, 
inquisitive,  affable,  and  intensely  interested  in  the  foreigners' 
firearms.    Later  visitors  to  the  Japanese  islands  were  received 
in  the  same  hospitable  manner,  whether  they  came,  like  the 
Portuguese  merchants,  for  purposes  of  trade,  or  Hke  Francis 
Xavier  and  other  Jesuit  missionaries,  to  convert  the  Japanese 
to  Christianity.    Within  thirty-two  years  a  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  had  embraced  Catholic  Christianity. 

Then  suddenly  the  ruler  of  Japan,  Hideyoshi,  became  alarmed 
at  the  number  and  power  of  the  Christians  and  fearful  lest  the 
Christian  converts  might  some  day  join  with  the  The  Closing 
foreigners  in  overthrowing  what  they  regarded  as  a 
heathen  government.  Missionaries  were  curtly  Seventeenth 
ordered  out  of  the  country  (1587) ;  in  159 1  more  than  Century 
20,000  converts  were  killed ;  yet  the  Christian  sect  temporarily 
increased.  The  statement  that  280,000  native  Catholic  Chris- 
tians suffered  martyrdom  in  Japan  between  1587  and  1635  is 
probably  an  exaggeration,  but  it  gives  some  idea  of  the  method 
by  which  Hideyoshi  and  his  immediate  successors  attempted  to 
stamp  out  the  hated  rehgion.  Even  Christian  merchants  fell 
under  suspicion  and  were  forbidden  to  enter  Japan.  Only  a  few 
Dutch  traders  were  allowed  to  carry  on  commerce  in  Japanese 
goods,  and  that  commerce  was  carefully  Hmited.    From  the 

VOL.  II  —  2  P 


578  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  until  the  middle  of  the  nin^ 
teenth  century,  Japan  shut  herself  off  from  the  world. 

Japan's  two  long  centuries  of  sullen  seclusion  came  to  an  end 
in  July,  1853,  when  Commodore  Perry  with  four  United  States 

warships  steamed  into  Uraga  Bay  near  Yokohama, 
Open^ng^o/  bringing  sewing  machines  and  other  wonderful  in- 
japanto  vcntions  as  samples  of  what  the  West  could  offer  to 
avUiza"  Japan,  and  bearing  grim  cannon,  the  like  of  which  the 
tion:  Japanese  had  not  yet  seen.    The  islanders  could  not 

vStf  1853    ^^i^  impressed  by  the  advantages  of  European 

civilization;  they  could  not  blind  themselves  to  the 
fact  that  in  the  arts  of  peace,  and  more  especially  in  the  arts  of 
war,  much  was  to  be  learned  from  the  foreigners.  Without 
much  difficulty  Perry  was  able  to  secure  a  treaty  (1854)  by  which 
Japan  promised  (i)  to  shelter  whatever  American  seamen  might 
be  driven  by  storm  or  shipwreck  to  the  Japanese  coast,  (2)  to 
permit  foreign  vessels  to  obtain  provisions  in  Japan,  and  (3)  to 
allow  American  merchantmen  to  anchor  in  the  ports  of  Shimoda 
and  Hakodate.  Similar  privileges  were  speedily  obtained  by 
Great  Britain,  Holland,  and  Russia.  Four  years  later,  another 
American,  Townsend  Harris,  induced  the  ruler  of  Japan  to  sign 
a  new  treaty,  throwing  the  port  of  Yokohama  open  to  American 
commerce.  Again  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Holland,  and  France 
followed  suit. 

The  prince  who  signed  these  commercial  treaties  in  the  name 
of  Japan  was  theoretically .  not  the  sovereign  of  the  country, 
Opposition  but  only  the  hereditary  chief-officer  (shogun)  of  the 
of  the         emperor  or  mikado.    Ever  since  1336,  however, — 

*  °  the  space  of  more  than  five  centuries  —  the  shoguns 
had  exercised  almost  regal  powers,  while  the  mikados,  who  were 
revered  as  the  sacred  descendants  of  Ninigi,  grandson  of  the  sun- 
goddess  Amaterasu,  resided  in  the  imperial  city  of  Kioto,  sub- 
limely indifferent  to  the  actual  government  of  the  country. 
The  Shogun  Many  of  the  most  eminent  "  daimios  "  (feudal  princes), 
M'k^d  ^^^^  heen  jealous  of  the  shogun,  would  have 

been  glad  to  assist  the  mikado  in  reasserting  his  long- 
dormant  powers.  Their  hatred  for  the  shogun  was  equaled  by 
their  detestation  of  foreigners.  When,  therefore,  the  shogun  signed 
treaties  opening  Japan  to  foreign  commerce,  the  daimios  accused 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


579 


him  of  a  double  crime,  of  admitting  ^'barbarians"  upon  the 
sacred  soil  of  Japan,  and  of  failing  to  obtain  the  mikado's  consent 
for  the  exercise  of  sovereign  power.  So  widespread  was  this 
sentiment  that  the  shogun's  prestige  was  hopelessly  undermined. 
It  was  only  a  question  of  time  before  the  mikado,  who  now  per- 
sonified Japanese  patriotism,  would  cease  being  a  puppet  em- 
peror and  would  resume  the  powers  his  fathers  had  delegated  to 
the  ancestors  of  the  discredited  shogun. 

Two  events  were  to  effect  a  profound  alteration  in  the  attitude 
of  the  mikado's  party  towards  foreigners.  The  first  was  the 
bombardment  of  the  Japanese  town  of  Kaeroshima  ^  ^ 

-r»  •  •  1  1         •  T     •       r  Influence  of 

(1863)  by  a  British  squadron  m  retaliation  for  the  western 
murder  of  a  British  subject  on  Japanese  soil.  The  fg^^^^g^'^ 
second  was  the  bombardment  of  Shimonoseki  (1864) 
by  a  combined  British,  French,  Dutch,  and  American  fleet  to 
punish  a  daimio  who  had  fired  on  foreign  vessels.  The  effective- 
ness of  Western  gunnery,  as  demonstrated  on  these  two  occa- 
sions, offered  convincing  proof  that  Japan  would  never  be  able 
to  expel  the  foreigners,  or  even  to  protect  herself  from  them,  until 
the  Japanese  possessed  cannon  of  equal  caliber.  Consequently, 
some  of  the  daimios  who  had  most  bitterly  reviled  the  bar- 
barians" suddenly  reversed  their  former  poHcy  and  declared 
that,  since  Japan  could  not  possibly  expel  the  Westerners,  she 
must  admit  them  freely,  learn  their  secrets,  and  excel  them  in 
their  own  arts.  Only  in  this  fashion  could  Japan  preserve  her 
place  as  a  nation.  Thus  it  came  about  that  a  group  of  daimios, 
who  had  censured  the  shogun  for  concluding  treaties  with  the 
foreigners,  now  most  ardently  advocated  the  opening  up  of 
Japan  to  European  civilization.  They  retained,  however,  their 
enmity  for  the  shogun  and  insisted  that  the  powers  of  government 
wrongfully  usurped  by  him  should  be  restored  to  the  mikado, 
the  rightful  sovereign  of  Japan. 

The  final  step  in  the  awakening  of  Japan  —  the  Revolution 
of  1868  —  resulted  from  (i)  the  agitation  of  the  daimios  against 
the  shogun,  (2)  the  conviction  that  Japan  must  assimi- 
late  Western  civilization,  and  (3)  a  revival  of  Shinto-  Japanese 
ism,  which  was  regarded  as  the  national  religion,  and  ^g^^^^g^g' 
which  inculcated  reverence  for  the  divinely  descended 
mikado.   It  was  carried  out  by  a  small  band  of  young  reformers, 


58o  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


some  of  them  great  nobles,  some  of  them  without  rank,  but  all 
of  them  ambitious  to  carve  out  a  glorious  career  for  their  country 
and  for  themselves.  The  first  stage  of  the  Revolution  was 
End  of  the  accomplished  peacefully  in  the  year  1867,  when 
Shogunate  Yoshinobu,  last  of  the  shoguns,  divining  the  weakness 
of  his  position,  voluntarily  resigned  the  office  which  the  mem- 
bers of  his  illustrious  family  (the  Tokugawas)  had  held  for  two 
hundred  and  sixty  years.  Yoshinobu's  magnanimous  action 
enabled  the  youthful  Mikado  Mutsuhito,  a  boy  fifteen  years 
old,  who  succeeded  to  the  throne  in  1867,  to  become  actual  as 
well  as  titular  monarch  of  Japan.  The  memorable  reign  of  Mu- 
tsuhito (1867-1912),  thus  happily  inaugurated,  was  fitly  desig- 
nated the  ''Enlightened  Rule." 

Yoshinobu's  rivals  were  not  yet  satisfied;  they  desired  so 
completely  to  crush  the  ex-shogun  that  never  again  would  he 
Abolition  of  be  able  to  assert  authority.  In  1868,  therefore,  they 
Feudalism  niade  war  against  him  and  against  his  vassals  and  so 
successfully  that  he  was  forced  to  retire  into  private  life,  re- 
taining only  a  portion  of  his  lands  and  not  a  vestige  of  his  former 
greatness.  Then,  just  as  they  had  compelled  Yoshinobu  to  sur- 
render his  privileges  to  the  mikado,  the  chief  daimios  voluntarily 
surrendered  their  own  feudal  rights,  possessions,  and  honors 
into  the  hands  of  the  youthful  ruler.  Lesser  lords  followed. 
By  this  remarkable  act  of  patriotism,  feudalism  in  Japan  was 
abolished,  an  imperial  decree  of  July,  187 1,  announcing  that 
"The  clans  (or  feudal  jurisdictions)  are  aboKshed,  and  pre- 
fectures are  estabHshed  in  their  place."  In  compensation  for 
their  feudal  rights,  the  great  nobles  received  high  governmental 
offices  and  ample  salaries.  By  the  abolition  of  feudaHsm,  three 
fundamental  reforms  were  made  possible,  (i)  The  peasants, 
freed  from  servile  dues,  became  the  owners  of  the  land  they 
til-led  and,  henceforth,  paid  regular  land-taxes.  (2)  Fighting, 
once  the  privilege  of  an  hereditary  warrior-caste,  became  now 
the  privilege  and  the  duty  of  all.  A  truly  national  army  and  a 
modern  navy  were  created,  recruited  by  compulsory  military 
service,  drilled  by  European  officers,  and  equipped  with  Euro- 
pean arms.  (3)  Government,  hitherto  paralyzed  by  quarrels 
between  the  shogun  and  the  other  daimios,  was  now  concentrated 
in  the  hands  of  the  mikado's  officials,  becoming  at  once  more 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


centralized  and  more  efficient.  From  his  quasi-religious  seclu- 
sion in  the  sacred  city  of  Kioto,  the  mikado  now  ventured  forth 
as  the  enlightened  ruler  of  a  civiHzed  Japan,  and  established 
his  capital  at  Yedo,  the  former  seat  of  the  shoguns,  wliich  was 
now  renamed  Tokio. 

His  intention  to  make  Japan  a  Europeanized  nation  and  a 
World  Power,  the  young  mikado  signified  by  the  unprecedented 
act  of  freely  receiving  in  audience  the  representa-  Europeani- 
tives  of  foreign  Powers  and  by  commanding  his  sub-  zationof 
jects  to  treat  all  foreigners  as  friends.    In  every  ^^^^ 
respect  the  mikado  and  his  advisers  strove  to  make  Japan  the 
equal  of  Western  states,  —  by  patronizing  Western  learning,  by 
creating  a  university  at  Tokio,  by  establishing  public  schools 
in  which  the  EngHsh  language  formed  part  of  the  curriculum, 
by  aboUshing  the  privileged  position  of  Buddhism,  by  granting 
liberty  to  all  rehgions,  by  sending  a  commission  abroad  to  inform 
foreign  nations  of  Japan's  change  of  heart  and  to  study  Euro- 
pean institutions.    Codes  of  civil  and  criminal  law,  based  on 
French  and  German  models,  were  adopted.   What  appeared  to 
be  the  most  advantageous  characteristics  of  each  European 
government  were  synthesized  in  a  written  constitu-  ^^^^^^j^^ 
tion,  which  was  promulgated  in  1889.    Under  the  tionaiGov- 
constitution,  the  first  Japanese  parliament,  consisting  j^p^^^^gg^ 
of  a  popular  and  an  aristocratic  chamber,  was  con- 
vened in  1890.    In  order  to  insure  a  strong  and  stable  govern- 
ment, the  executive  power,  as  also  the  deciding  voice  in  legisla- 
tion, was  left  to  the  emperor. 

Meanwhile  the  Japanese  were  eagerly  assimilating  the  material 
and  martial  civilization  of  Europe.    The  first  railway  line, 
covering  eighteen  miles,  from  Tokio  to  Yokohama,  ^j^gj^^j^g 
was  officially  opened  in  1872;  by  1914  there  were  trial  Revo- 
6000  miles  of  railway,  almost  entirely  owned  by  the  j!^^^^ 
state.    Within  fifteen  years  after  the  repeal  of  the  law 
which  prohibited  the  construction  of  sea-going  ships,  Japan  had 
138  such  vessels,  and  by  19 14  her  merchant  marine  included 
2072  steamers,  each  above  20  tons  (France  then  had  only  1857 
steamers)  plying  not  only  in  her  home  waters,  but  also  to 
Europe,  to  America,  to  Australia,  to  Bombay,  and  to  China. 
Mining  was  developed,  at  first  under  the  supervision  of  Western 


582  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


experts,  until  in  1913  some  230,000  Japanese  miners  were  an- 
nually producing  coal,  copper,  iron,  and  other  minerals  to  the 
total  value  of  $65,000,000.  The  cotton  industry,  which  had  no 
existence  in  Japan  prior  to  1880,  developed  so  rapidly  that  in 
1914  the  cotton  mills  of  Japan  contained  2,402,573  busy  spindles, 
turned  out  annually  545,738,547  pounds  of  yarn,  and  gave  em- 
ployment to  22,000  men  and  95,000  women.  Similarly  in  the 
weaving  industry,  the  introduction  of  power  looms  increased 
the  annual  output  eight  hundred  per  cent  between  1890  and 
1901.  As  one  result  of  her  industrial  development,  Japan's 
foreign  commerce,  which  in  1877  amounted  to  a  meager  $25,- 
000,000,  rose  by  1890  to  almost  $70,000,000 ;  by  1900  to  almost 
$250,000,000;  by  1910  to  more  than  $450,000,000;  and  by 
1 913  to  $680,000,000,  having  been  multipHed  twenty-seven-fold 
within  thirty-six  years. 

The  foregoing  figures  eloquently  testify  to  the  fact  that  in 
the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  Japan  became  a 

modern  industrial  nation.  And  as  the  Industrial 
of*th^  Revolution  in  Europe  had  produced  discontented  fac- 
industrial  tory-hands  and  prosperous  capitalists,  so  also  in  Japan. 
S^japan*^    In  1906,  for  example,  we  know  that  there  were  in 

Japan  some  9000  joint-stock  companies  and  partner- 
ships, controlling  paid-up  capital  to  the  amount  of  five  hundred 
millions  of  dollars.  The  members  of  these  9000  companies 
were  Japan's  capitahsts,  her  bourgeoisie.  And  just  as  the 
capitalists  of  the  British  Isles  fostered  the  idea  of  empire,  so 
also  in  the  Japanese  islands  there  were  to  be  found  wealthy 
advocates  of  imperialism.  To  the  spirit  of  imperialism  in  Japan 
two  other  factors  contributed :  namely,  the  extraordinary 
patriotism  of  the  Japanese  people,  and  the  fact  that,  to  the 
statistician  at  least,  Japan's  four  principal  islands  (Nippon, 
Shikoku,  Kiushiu,  and  Hokkaido),  with  their  scanty  area  of 
140,000  square  miles,  seemed  to  afford  too  little  space  for  fifty 
millions  of  people.  Consequently,  Japan,  imitating  the  Western 
nations  even  in  this  respect,  entered  upon  a  career  of  territorial 
expansion. 

The  Japanese  naturally  turned  their  eyes  toward  the  peninsula 
of  Korea,  just  west  of  their  islands.  We  know  already  how  the 
Japanese,  by  recognizing  Korea  as  independent  of  China  and 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


583 


by  advocating  a  policy  of  reform  and  progress  for  the  peninsula, 
came  into  conflict  with  China.    In  the  resulting  Chino- Japanese 
War  (1894-1895)  the  newly  organized  Japanese  army  Japanese 
by  its  courage  and  training  more  than  made  up  for  impenaUsm 
some  advantages  which  the  Chinese  possessed  in  equipment; 
and  the  remarkable  success  of  the  Japanese  forces  seemed  ample 
vindication  of  the  policy  of  imitating  Europe.    At  ^ 
the  close  of  the  war,  Russia,  France,  and  Germany  China, 
compelled  Japan  to  restore  Port  Arthur  and  the  Liao-  ^^^4-1895 
tung  peninsula  to  China ;  but  Japan  still  retained  the  island  of 
Formosa  (about  four  times  as  large  as  the  island  of  Crete)  and 
an  indemnity  of  about  $180,000,000  as  the  fruits  of 
a  victory  which  had  cost  her  $100,000,000  and  the  ^^^Irmo^ 
lives  of  4000  men.     Korea,  moreover,  while  not 
yet  absorbed  by  Japan,  was  definitely  detached  from  China. 

In  the  years  that  followed  the  Chino- Japanese  War,  it  ap- 
peared that  Russia  forced  Japan  to  restore  Port  Arthur  to  China 
only  in  order  that  Russia  might  later  acquire  the  port 
herself;  and  it  became  painfully  obvious  that  Man- 
churia  and  Korea  would  fall  into  Russian  hands  unless  Japanese 
something  radical  was  done.    Therefore,  Japan  fought 
Russia.    For  this,  her  first  struggle  with  a  Western 
Power,  Japan  was  well  prepared.    Since  the  establishment  in 
1868  at  Tokio  of  an  arsenal  for  small-arms,  Japan  had  erected 
an  arsenal  at  Osaka,  powder-factories,  military  and  naval  col- 
leges, iron-works  at  Nagasaki,  a  naval  dockyard  at  Yokosuka, 
and  factories  capable  of  turning  out  twelve-inch  guns.  The 
army  had  been  doubled  since  the  Chinese  War  and  its  equip- 
ment improved,  until  in  1904  there  were  180,000  men  in  arms, 
with  more  than  600,000  trained  soldiers  in  reserve.    To  the 
first  Japanese  steam-gunboat,  constructed  in  1866,  many  had 
been  added,  so  that  Japan  entered  the  war  with  6  modern 
battleships,  8  armored  cruisers,  80  torpedo  boats,  19  destroyers, 
and  44  other  cruisers.    Japan's  preparedness  for  war,  together 
with  the  wonderful  endurance  and  daring  of  the  Japanese 
soldiers,  and  the  ardent  spirit  of  patriotism  permeating  the  whole 
government  and  nation,  determined  the  issue  of  the  conflict. 

Three  days  after  the  opening  of  hostilities  (February,  1904) 
Vice-Admiral  Togo  surprised  one  Russian  squadron,  damaged 


584  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


it  badly,  and  bottled  it  up  in  Port  Arthur  Bay.  Six  months 
later,  this  Russian  squadron,  venturing  forth  from  Port  Arthur, 
met  a  decisive  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Togo.  Almost  simul- 
taneously, another  Japanese  squadron  defeated  the  second 
Russian  squadron,  which  had  Vladivostok  for  its  base.  Mean- 
while on  land.  General  Kuroki  with  one  Japanese  army  had 
crossed  from  Korea  into  the  Liao-tung  peninsula  after  a  desperate 
struggle  on  the  banks  of  the  Yalu  River  (i  May,  1904) ;  General 
Oku  with  a  second  army  had  landed  just  north  of  Port  Arthur, 
defeating  the  Russians  at  Nanshan  (26  May)  and  Telissu  (14-15 
June) ;  and  the  combined  Japanese  forces  under  the  supreme 
Battle  of  command  of  Marshal  Oyama,  by  the  battle  of  Liao- 
Mukden,  yang  (2  September)  forced  the  Russian  commander- 
February-     in-chief  Kuropatkin  to  retreat  on  Mukden,  consider- 

March,  1905  i  iriT*  •       !  * 

ably  to  the  north  of  the  Liao-tung  pemnsula.  At 
Mukden,  between  25  February  and  10  March,  1905,  was  fought 
the  greatest  battle  of  the  war.  Three  hundred  thousand  soldiers 
of  Japan  there  met  an  equal  Russian  force.  Though  the  Russian 
army  was  not  surrounded  and  captured,  as  perhaps  the  Japanese 
general  intended,  nevertheless,  it  was  forced  to  retreat  thoroughly 
demoralized,  and  with  a  loss  of  almost  100,000  men.  The 
Japanese  losses  were  half  as  great. 

Meanwhile  General  Nogi  had  attacked  the  force  of  47,000 
Russians  who  were  ensconced  behind  the  formidable  fortifica- 
Siege  and  ^^^^  Voit  Arthur.  During  three  weeks  in  August, 
Capture  of  1904,  General  Nogi  had  sacrificed  1 5,000  of  his  men  in  a 
Arthur  ^^^^  attempt  to  carry  Port  Arthur  by  storm ;  but  then, 
settling  down  to  a  siege,  he  had  finally  triumphed  on 
2  January,  1905,  when  Port  Arthur  capitulated,  half  of  the 
Russian  garrison  having  been  killed,  seriously  wounded,  or 
disabled  by  disease.  Port  Arthur  cost  the  Japanese  58,000  in 
killed  and  wounded,  besides  34,000  sick.  In  a  last  attempt  to 
retrieve  her  fortunes,  Russia  sent  her  Baltic  fleet  to  the  Far  East, 
but  in  a  famed  battle  Admiral  Togo  met  and  completely  annihi- 
lated the  oncoming  fleet  in  the  Sea  of  Japan  (27  May,  1905). 

Both  combatants  were  ready  for  peace.  Russia  still  had 
enormous  resources,  but  was  distracted  by  internal  unrest  and 
discouraged  by  the  long  Hst  of  defeats.  Japan,  while  thus  far 
victorious,  was  near  exhaustion,  and  could  not  hope  to  invade 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


the  vast  territory  of  her  enemy.    At  the  suggestion  of  the  presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  Japan  and  Russia  sent  plenipoten- 
tiaries to  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  where  a  treaty  victory  of 
of  peace  was  signed  on  5  September,  1905.    The  terms  Japan:  The 
have  already  been  noted  in  so  far  as  they  affected  Portsmouth, 
China ;  but  besides  gaining  the  lease  of  the  Liao-  5  Septem- 
tung  peninsula  and  freeing  Korea  and  Manchuria 
from  Russian  influence,  Japan  obtained  the  payment  of  ?ome 
$20,000,000  and  the  cession  of  the  southern  half  of 
Sakhalin,  an  island  north  of  Japan,  which  had  been  ^aSaUn 
acquired  by  Russia  from  Japan  in  1875. 

The  war  with  Russia  gave  Japan  standing  as  a  World  Power. 
Within  half  a  century  the  little  island  empire  had  learned  what 
Europe  had  to  teach,  had  entered  upon  a  career  of 
expansion,  had  defeated  a  European  Power.    Yet  iiiiance^^^^ 
another  source  of  gratification  was  the  alliance  with  with  Great 
Great  Britain,  formed  first  in  1902,  and  subsequently  f^**^"' 
strengthened.    The  Emperor  Mutsuhito  might  well 
boast  that  his  country  was  now  received  as  a  friend  and  an  equal 
by  a  Western  nation.    The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  was  later, 
as  it  will  appear,  to  bear  fruit  in  the  War  of  the  Nations. 

So  long  as  Japan  and  Russia  were  jealous  rivals,  neither 
would  allow  the  other  to  appropriate  Manchuria  or  Korea.  But 
after  the   Russo-Japanese  War  the    two  governments  came 
to  an  amicable  agreement,  the  details  of  which  were 
not  divulged :  it  appeared,  nevertheless,  to  apportion  Annexation 
Korea  to  Japan.    At  any  rate  Japan  annexed  Korea  ®^  Korea, 
in  1 910  without  protest  from  Russia.    The  territory 
thus  acquired,  about  twice  as  large  as  Ohio  and  almost  three 
times  as  populous,  was  valuable  not  only  as  a  granary  to  Japan, 
for  Korea  is  a  farming  country,  but  also  as  a  market  for  Japanese 
goods  and  a  field  of  enterprise  for  Japanese  capitalists.    In  19 13 
some  twenty  million  dollars'  worth  of  merchandise,  constitut- 
ing more  than  half  of  Korea's  imports,  were  purchased  from 
Japanese  merchants.    Five  banks  in  Korea  had  already  been 
established  by  Japanese  capitalists,  and  promising  mines  were 
being  developed.    Korea  was  renamed  "  Chosen." 

In  taking  leave  of  the  progressive  little  island-empire  of  the 
East,  it  is  impossible  not  to  risk  a  comparison  with  the  island 


586 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


empire  of  the  West.  Somewhat  superior  in  area  and  population 
to  the  British  Isles,  Japan  is  as  yet  greatly  inferior  to  them 
Japan  a  economic  and  imperialistic  development.  The 

Europeaniz-  Japanese  Empire  controlled  in  1913  a  commerce  worth 
ing  Nation  |58o,ooo,ooo  annually,  yet  that  was  less  than  one-tenth 
the  magnitude  of  British  commerce ;  the  Japanese  merchant 
marine  totaled  more  than  two  million  tons,  less  than  a  ninth 
that  of  the  British  Empire ;  and  in  territorial  expansion  Japan's 
Empire  is  but  in  its  infancy,  compared  to  the  greatest  of  modern 
empires.  Nevertheless,  Japan  has  made  a  remarkable  begin- 
ning in  territorial  expansion,  in  commerce,  in  shipping,  in  indus- 
try. Once  for  all,  Japan  has  proved  that  an  Oriental  people 
may  assimilate  the  material  civilization  of  Europe.  In  one  impor- 
tant respect  Japan  remains  an  Oriental  nation  —  in  respect  of 
religion;  although  by  1905  missionaries  had  won  60,000  con- 
verts to  Roman  Catholic  Christianity,  27,000  to  the  Russian 
Orthodox  Church,  11,000  to  the  Anglican  Church,  and  39,000 
to  the  various  Protestant  sects,  in  all  about  137,000,  a  number 
which  has  since  been  considerably  increased.  On  the  material 
side,  however,  Japan  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  European 
nation ;  her  factories,  her  discontented  working  classes,  her  capi- 
talists, her  army,  her  navy,  her  government,  her  laws,  —  all 
bear  witness  to  the  assimilation  of  Western  civilization  in  Japan. 


RUSSIAN  EXPANSION  IN  ASIA 

In  many  regions  of  Asia  a  national  awakening  like  that  of 
Japan  would  be  quite  impossible.  For  example,  in  the  limitless 
Russian  half-frozen  tracts  of  northern  Asia,  and  in  the  rugged 
Expansion  mountain-country  of  Central  Asia  peopled  by  wander- 
Pacificand  semi-barbarian  tribes,  there  could  be  little  exten- 
indian  sion  of  European  civilization  except  by  the  deliberate 
Oceans  purpose  of  some  Great  Power.  In  this  kind  of  im- 
perialism— in  gradually  conquering  and  more  or  less  civilizing 
vast  stretches  of  sparsely  peopled  territory — Russia  stands 
first.  Over  the  whole  of  northern  and  west-central  Asia,  the 
Russian  tsars  have  gradually  extended  their  control,  thus  par- 
tially compensating  themselves  in  Asia  for  their  failure  in  Europe 
to  gain  satisfying  outlets  to  the  seas.    Toward  two  oceans 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


587 


Russian  progress  in  Asia  has  been  chiefly  directed :  straight 
eastward  Russians  have  marched  to  the  Pacific,  occupying 
Siberia  and  menacing  Mongolia,  Manchuria,  and  Korea  on  their 
way ;  to  the  southeast  the  Russian  frontier  has  less  rapidly  been 
pushed  forward,  at  the  expense  of  Turkey,  Persia,  and  the  inde- 
pendent tribes  of  Central  Asia,  only  to  find  the  British  Empire 
blocking  the  path  to  the  Indian  Ocean. 

The  Russian  progress  through  Siberia  to  the  Pacific  was 
begun  in  1579,  when  the  first  Cossack  adventurer  crossed  the 
Ural  Mountains  eastward,  and  it  culminated  when  in  occupation 
1638  Okhotsk  was  reached  on  the  sea  of  Okhotsk  Siberia 
opening  out  into  the  Pacific  Ocean.  It  is  needless  here  to  repeat 
the  story  told  in  an  earlier  chapter.^  Into  the  boundless  ter- 
ritory thus  claimed  for  Russia  flocked  roving  bands  of  Cossack 
frontiersmen,  gold-seekers,  fur-hunters,  traders,  political  out- 
laws, and  discontented  serfs.  Siberia,  they  discovered,  was  not 
a  land  of  ''milk  and  honey."  The  north  was  an  inhospitable 
expanse  of  marshes,  frozen  in  winter ;  forests  of  central  Siberia 
might  delight  the  hunter  but  not  the  farmer ;  and  while  in  the 
south  farming  was  possible,  extreme  heat  in  summer  and  biting 
cold  in  winter  made  life  unpleasant.  Nor  was  the  Russian 
desire  for  a  Pacific  port  satisfied  with  Okhotsk,  ice-bound  in 
winter.  Hoping  to  discover  more  fertile  farm-lands  and  seeking 
for  a  better  sea-port,  Russian  explorers,  adventurers,  and  settlers 
began  in  the  seventeenth  century  to  invade  the  valley  of  the 
Amur  River,  in  northern  Manchuria,  which  was  then  held  by 
the  emperor  of  China.  In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century 
an  adventurer  planted  the  Russian  flag  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Amur;  forts  were  built  along  the  river's  banks;  and  in  i860 
China  helplessly  yielded  the  whole  region  north  of  the  Amur, 
and  in  addition  the  coast  province  south  of  the  Amur  and  east 
of  the  Ussuri  River.  At  the  southern  point  of  her  new  territory, 
Russia  now  established  Vladivostok,  "Dominator  of  the  East," 
looking  out  upon  the  Sea  of  Japan.  In  1875  the  island  of  Sa- 
khalin, to  the  north  of  that  sea,  was  acquired  from  Japan. 
From  Bering  Strait  in  the  north  to  the  border  of  Korea  in  the 
south,  Russia  controlled  the  Pacific  coast. 

Not  yet  were  the  Russians  content.    From  Siberia  they 
^  See  Vol.  I,  p.  367. 


588  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


looked  longingly  southward.  Korea,  Manchuria,  and  Mongolia, 
if  they  could  be  acquired,  would  afford  access  to  the  Yellow  Sea 
^   , .         and  to  the  precious  trade  of  China.    Even  before  the 

Looking  . 

Southward  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  Russian  merchants  had 
sU)wia        begun  to  settle  in  the  cities  of  Chinese  Manchuria. 

After  1895,  when  Russia  intervened  to  keep  Japan 
out  of  southern  Manchuria,  it  appeared  inevitable  that  Manchu- 
ria, with  its  naval  base  at  Port  Arthur,  and  possibly  Korea  also, 
would  ultimately  fall  under  Russian  domination.  Japan,  however, 
by  the  war  of  1 904-1 905,  forced  the  Russians  to  renounce  Port 
Arthur  and  Korea.  By  a  different  route  Russia  thenceforth 
sought  to  reach  the  Yellow  Sea.  West  of  Manchuria  and  south 
of  Siberia,  lay  the  great  Chinese  dependency  of  Mongolia,  extend- 
ing westward  to  Central  Asia,  and  eastward  almost  to  the  Yellow 
Sea.  Possession  of  Mongolia  would  bring  the  Siberian  frontier 
close  to  Pekin.  Into  Mongolia  Russian  merchants  and  Cossacks 
poured,  with  the  result  that  in  1913  all  Outer  or  Western  Mon- 
golia, while  still  recognizing  China  as  overlord,  had  become  prac- 
tically a  Russian  protectorate,  in  which  Russian  merchants  were 
free  to  establish  their  warehouses  exempt  from  customs  duties. 

While  in  northern  Asia  Russia  had  been  constantly  extending 
her  Siberian  frontier,  far  to  the  west  and  south  in  the  region  of 
^    .         the  Caspian  Sea  and  Turkestan  another  hne  of  Rus- 

Russian  , 

Expansion  sian  advance  had  been  pursued.  From  the  year  1554, 
p^a*n  ReS>n  ^^^^  Ivan  the  Terrible  gained  in  Astrakhan  a  foot- 
hold on  the  Caspian  Sea,  the  Russians  had  been  en- 
deavoring to  convert  the  Caspian  into  a  Russian  lake.  On  the 
west  of  the  Caspian,  the  half-independent  tribes  inhabiting 
the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Caucasus,  some  owing  allegiance  to  the 
shah  of  Persia,  others  to  the  Turkish  sultan,  had  during  the 
course  of  the  nineteenth  century  (prior  to  1878)  been  conquered 
and  annexed  by  Russia,  in  spite  of  the  heroic  resistance  offered 
by  the  Circassian  mountaineers  on  the  northern  slope  of  the 
Caucasus  range.  On  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Caspian,  Russia 
liad  also  advanced  southward,  compelHng  the  shah  of  Persia 
to  renounce  his  claim  to  all  territory  north  of  Ashurada,  Askabad, 
and  Sarakhs,  which  three  towns  were  acquired  by  Russia  in  184 1, 
1 88 1,  and  1885  respectively.  Between  Russia  and  the  southern, 
ocean  there  remained  only  Persia. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


Persia,  the  seat  of  an  ancient  empire,  had  been  for  centuries 
an  independent  Mussulman  state,  ruled  by  a  shah  or  king.  Dur- 
ing the  nineteenth  century  the  pressure  upon  Persia  p^^.^.^ 
from  Russia  on  the  north  and  from  the  British  on  the 
southeast  ever  increased.    Early  in  the  twentieth  century,  Rus- 
sian influence  seemed  to  have  gained  the  upper  hand,  inasmuch 
as  Russian  merchants  in  Persia  were  protected  by  a  Russian 
favorable  commercial  treaty  (1902),  and  Russian  Aggression 
capitaHsts  secured  valuable  investments.    For  example,  Rus- 
sian capitalists  in  1900  loaned  $12,000,000  to  Persia.^  Russian 
capitaHsts  also  undertook  to  construct  roads  in  northwestern 
Persia.    The  British  merchants,  on  the  other  side,  who  traded 
in  southern  Persia  and  the  gulf  of  Aden,  as  well  as  in  India, 
feared  lest  Russia  might  gain  control  of  all  Persia  and  British 
impair  their  trade.    Consequently,  British  diplomacy  Aggression 
was  set  in  action,  with  the  result  that  on  31  August,  1907,  a 
convention  or  agreement  was  signed  by  the  British  and  Russian 
governments,  whereby  the  northern  half  of  Persia  was  assigned 
as  Russia's  ''sphere  of  influence,"  and  the  southeastern  corner 
as  that  of  the  British.    In  the  Russian  sphere  of  influence 
Great  Britain  would  seek  no  commercial  or  poHtical  concessions ; 
similarly  Russia  would  respect  the  British  region;  between  the 
two  lay  a  ''neutral"  zone.    At  the  same  time,  Russia  recognized 
the  special  interests  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Persian  Gulf. 

Meanwhile  internal  conditions  in  Persia  had  become  alarmingly 
turbulent.  Bandits  were  everywhere,  and  brigandage  was  a 
regular  business.  One  shah  had  been  assassinated  in  ^he  Persian 
1896.  Another,  fearing  that  the  patriotic  party  of  Revolution, 
Persian  Nationalists  would  revolt  against  his  absolut- 
ism,  his  misgovernment,  and  his  subservience  to  foreign  interests, 
had  endeavored  to  conciliate  the  NationaHsts  by  granting  a 
constitution  (5  August,  1906)  which  created  a  Persian  parlia- 
ment or  Mejliss.  The  Nationalists,  however,  remained  re- 
calcitrant, and  in  1 908-1 909  engineered  a  revolution,  deposed 
Shah  Mohammed  AH  Mirza,  and  set  up  his  eleven-year-old 
son  Sultan  Ahmad  Mirza  as  shah.  The  new  government  was 
Uttle  better.    It  could  not  prevent  Russia  from  stationing 

^  Actually,  only  some  $10,000,000,  or  85  per  cent  of  the  face  value,  was  advanced 
in  cash. 


590 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


troops  (191 1)  in  the  northern  Persian  provinces  of  Azerbaijan 
and  Khorasan;  it  signed  away  railway  concessions  and  mining 
rights  (1913)  to  British  and  Russian  companies;  it  could  not 
maintain  order.  Persia  fell  still  more  under  foreign  control 
when  in  191 2-1 913  the  government  contracted  new  loans  from 
Russian  and  British  capitahsts.  A  few  brave  souls  still  dared 
to  hope  that  Persia  like  Japan  would  awake  from  her  lethargy 
and  embrace  European  civilization  of  her  own  accord;  others 
deemed  such  an  event  impossible,  since  Russian  and  British 
^  ^.     ^     interests  kept  Persia  in  bondage.    Such  was  the  view 

Continued  \  *        •  i  i 

Russian  of  Morgan  W.  Shuster,  an  American,  who  acted  as 
Tutefage^^  financial  adviser  to  the  Persian  government,  and  caused 
a  great  sensation  in  191 1  by  declaring  that  anarchy 
and  misgovernment  in  Persiu  were  in  no  slight  degree  due  to  the 
selfish  policies  pursued  by  the  British  and  Russian  governments 
with  regard  to  the  ''weakened,  war-cursed  country  of  Persia." 
Meanwhile,  Persia  continued  to  be  a  profitable  field  of  invest- 
ment for  British  and  Russian  financiers,  and  Russian  merchants 
continued  to  monopolize  three-fifths  of  Persia's  foreign  trade,^ 
while  most  of  the  remainder  fell  into  British  hands. 

Russian  expansion  southward,  as  a  glance  at  the  map  will 
show,  was  not  confined  to  surrounding  the  Caspian  and  infiltrat- 
ing Persia ;  it  spread  out  eastward  into  Central  Asia, 
and^the*^^  seeking  to  reach  India  and  the  Arabian  Sea  by  en- 
Angio-  circling  Persia  to  the  eastward.  Just  east  of  Persia 
FrontTer  independent  state  of  Afghanistan;  to  the 

northeast  extended  the  high  plateaus  of  Western 
Turkestan,  divided  among  numerous  khanates  or  petty  princi- 
palities, and  merging  into  the  mountainous  western  frontier  of 
the  Chinese  Empire.  By  means  of  tactful  diplomacy,  and  by 
dint  of  occasional  hard  fighting,  the  Russians  during  the  nine- 
teenth century  won  all  of  Western  Turkestan  for  the  tsar,  in- 
cluding the  basins  of  the  Aral  Sea  and  Lake  Balkash,  including 
also  a  part  of  Kuldja,  appropriated  from  China  (1881),  and 
stretching  south  to  Persia  and  Afghanistan.  The  two  little 
states  of  Khiva  and  Bokhara,  though  they  appear  on  the  map 
to  be  independent,  in  reality  formed  part  of  the  Russian  Em- 
pire.   The  rapid  progress  of  Russia  into  Central  Asia  gave  the 

^  Amounting  in  1913  to  about  $100,000,000. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


591 


British  in  India  cause  for  alarm ;  for  it  had  more  than  once 
been  suggested  that  from  Turkestan  the  Russians  might  advance 
southward  into  Afghanistan  and  the  Punjab,  to  despoil  the 
British  of  India.  The  British,  therefore,  endeavored  to  pre- 
serve Afghanistan  as  a  buffer  state  between  their  empire  and  that 
of  the  Russians.  After  repeated  interventions  in  Afghanistan, 
among  them  the  disastrous  expedition  of  1841,  which  was  anni- 
hilated by  the  Afghans,  the  British  government  set  up  in  1880 
a  prince  or  "  amir  "  who  agreed  to  let  Great  Britain  control  his 
foreign  relations.  Russian  aggression,  however,  continued  to 
threaten  the  outlying  possessions  of  the  Afghan  amir  in  the 
northwest,  where  Russia  captured  Merv,  Panjdeh,  and  Kushk 
(1885-1887),  and  in  the  northeast,  where  Russia  gained  a  posi- 
tion on  the  commanding  Pamir  plateau  in  1895.  At  last,  in 
1907,  an  agreement  was  reached,  Russia  receiving  equal  com- 
mercial opportunities  in  Afghanistan  while  allowing  Great 
Britain  to  control  Afghanistan's  foreign  affairs,  and  both  Powers 
promising  not  to  annex  or  occupy  any  part  of  the  country.  Thus 
the  Russian  advance  toward  the  Indian  Ocean  was  blocked  by 
Great  Britain,  much  as  in  the  Far  East  the  Russian  designs  on 
Manchuria  were  thwarted  by  Japan. 

Despite  these  checks,  the  achievements  of  Russia  in  Asia  are 
impressive  in  their  very  vastness.  In  Asia  the  tsar  had  gained 
an  empire  of  six  million  square  miles,  three  times  the  The  Russian 
size  of  European  Russia,  or  equal  to  all  of  Europe  plus  Empire  in 
two-thirds  of  the  United  States.  Of  this  huge  terri- 
tory  the  immediate  value  was  less  imposing.  Only  two  per  cent 
of  Turkestan  was  under  cultivation,  and  the  Siberian  grainfields 
were  in  19 13  less  than  a  tenth  as  extensive  as  those  of  European 
Russia.  Nor  was  the  Asiatic  empire  of  great  commercial  value ; 
in  1 9 13  the  commerce  carried  on  through  Russia's  Asiatic  frontier 
amounted  to  less  than  $130,000,000.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
to  be  observed  that  Russian  colonists,  pouring  into  Siberia  at 
the  rate  of  200,000  a  year,  may  well  reclaim  great  areas  for 
agriculture;  and  in  both  Siberia  and  Turkestan  rich  mineral 
resources  await  development.  More  than  a  score  of  steam- 
power  factories  have  already  been  erected  in  Turkestan.  Of 
still  greater  significance  for  the  future  is  the  extension  of  rail- 
ways.   The  Siberian  railway,  a  tremendous  undertaking,  begun 


592 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


in  1 89 1,  now  links  up  Moscow  and  Petrograd  with  Vladivostok, 
Port  Arthur,  and  Pekin.  Another  great  Russian  railway  trav- 
erses Turkestan,  sending  off  unfinished  shoots  toward  Herat 
in  Afghanistan  and  toward  Chinese  Sin-kiang.  Still  further 
extensions  of  the  Russian  railway  system  into  Persia  and  across 
Mongolia  are  already  in  project.  And  railways,  be  it  ever  re- 
membered, are  the  arteries  of  trade  and  the  sinews  of  empire. 


SURVEY  OF  THE  RIVAL  EMPIRES  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Thus  far  we  have  seen  how  one  ancient  empire  —  the  Chinese 

—  began  to  crumble  away ;  how  another  Asiatic  empire  —  the 
Imperialism  Japanese  —  awoke  to  greatness ;  how  an  enormous 
in  Asia  and  Russian  empire  expanded  over  northern  and  Central 
Australasia  'pj-^g  Other  great  empire  in  Asia  —  the  British 

—  will  be  reserved  for  special  treatment  in  a  following  chapter.^ 
At  this  point,  therefore,  we  may  conveniently  pause  to  survey 
the  extent  and  position  of  these  and  lesser  empires,  —  French, 
Dutch,  German,  American,  and  Turkish,  —  in  the  Far  East  on 
the  eve  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  (August,  1914). 

Greatest  in  territorial  extent  was  the  Russian  Empire,  sweep- 
ing from  the  Ural  Mountains  east  to  Bering  Strait  and  the 

1  Russian    ^^^^^^^      northern  borders  washed  by  the  icy  waters 

of  the  Arctic  Ocean,  its  southern  frontier  bordering 
on  Korea,  Manchuria,  Mongolia,  Afghanistan,  Persia,  and  Turk- 
ish Armenia.  For  the  future  expansion  of  that  mighty  empire, 
Outer  Mongolia  and  northern  Persia  were  already  marked. 

Predominant  in  southern  Asia  and  Australasia  was  the  British 
Empire,  beside  whose  wealth  the  bleak  plains  of  Russian  Siberia 

2  British     shrank  into  insignificance.    To  Great  Britain  belonged 

the  populous  peninsula  of  India,  reaching  northward  to 
the  Himalayas,  with  the  Ganges  valley  on  the  east,  the  Indus  on 
the  west.  To  the  west  of  India  lay  Baluchistan,  partly  ap- 
propriated; Afghanistan,  still  half -independent ;  and  a  "sphere 
of  influence"  in  southeastern  Persia.  To  the  north,  British 
merchants  and  British  influence  were  penetrating  the  mountain 
principalities  of  Nepal  and  Bhutan,  and  crossing  the  Himalayas 
into  Tibet.  To  the  east,  Burma  had  been  annexed ;  the  Feder- 
1  See  below,  pp.  662-672. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


593 


ated  Malay  States  were  under  British  protection;  and  the 
Straits  Settlements,  at  the  southern  tip  of  the  Malay  peninsula, 
commanding  the  busy  strait  of  Malacca,  belonged  to  the  British 
crown.  In  China,  the  British  possessed  Hongkong,  leased 
Wei-hai-wei,  and  regarded  the  Yangtsze  valley  as  a  British 
''sphere  of  influence."  Foothold  also  had  been  gained  in  Arabia 
at  Aden.  Of  islands,  the  British  possessed  Ceylon,  northern 
Borneo,  a  third  of  New  Guinea,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and 
Tasmania,  not  to  mention  a  host  of  smaller  ones. 

Much  smaller  were  the  Asiatic  possessions  of  France.  In 
India,  France  still  held  five  of  her  former  trading  posts  —  Pon- 
dicherry,  Karikal,  Chandarnagar,  Mahe,  and  Yanaon  ^^Qj^ch 
—  aggregating  196  square  miles.  The  chief  French  col- 
ony, comprising  the  eastern  half  of  the  Indo-Chinese  peninsula, 
was  Indo-China.  The  five  states  of  Indo-China  —  Annam,  Cam- 
bodia, Cochin-China,  Tonkin,  and  Laos  —  were  more  than 
equal  in  area  to  the  mother-country  and  were  governed  by  a 
French  governor-general,  who,  with  the  aid  of  some  10,000 
European  soldiers,  kept  the  native  population  in  order.  Through 
the  bank  of  Indo-China,  with  an  authorized  capital  of  36,000,000 
francs,  French  investors  were  engaged  in  financial,  commercial, 
industrial,  and  mining  enterprises.  To  the  w^est  of  Indo-China 
lay  the  independent  state  of  Siam,  squeezed  in  as  a  buffer  state 
between  British  Burma  and  French  Indo-China.  Northward 
there  might  be  room  for  expansion,  especially  since  France  al- 
ready occupied  the  port  of  Kwang-chow  Wan  on  lease  from 
China. ^ 

The  Dutch  colonial  empire  —  transferred  from  the  Dutch 
East  India  Company  to  the  government  in  1798  — had  suffered 
considerable  losses  during  the  Revolutionary  and  Na-  jy^^xch 
poleonic  Wars,  but  still  embraced  a  number  of  large 
and  valuable  islands  hing  southeast  of  Asia.^  Java  alone  was 
almost  four  times  larger  than  Holland  and  supported  more  than 
four  times  the  population ;  Sumatra  was  larger  than  California, 
Celebes  than  Nebraska;  Montana  might  be  placed  within  the 
Dutch  portion  of  New  Guinea;  and  Borneo  (of  which  the 

*  France  also  possessed  the  islands  of  New  Caledonia  and  Tahiti  in  the  Pacific. 
'  To  these  possessions  near  the  Asiatic  continent  must  be  added  the  few  remain- 
ing Dutch  holdings  in  the  New  World  —  Dutch  Guiana  and  Curasao. 
VOL.  II  —  2  Q 


594  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

British  owned  only  the 'northern  coastland)  was  larger  than  all 
France.  Of  the  total  population  of  the  islands,  about  equal 
to  that  of  France,  only  some  80,000  were  Europeans.  Spices, 
coffee,  cinchona,  tobacco,  sugar,  and  indigo  made  the  Dutch 
East  Indies  exceedingly  valuable  possessions,  and  their  com- 
merce amounted  in  1913  to  more  than  $475,000,000.  Although 
the  Dutch  imposed  no  burden  on  traders  of  other  nations, 
Dutch  merchants  were  able  to  monopolize  the  bulk  of  this  lucra- 
tive trade. 

Comparatively  a  newcomer,  Germany  had  gained  on  the 
continent  of  Asia  only  200  square  miles  about  the  bay  of  Kiao- 
chau  in  China.    There  the  Germans  had  constructed 

5.  German  ^ 

a  model  town,  a  huge  dry-dock,  and  first-class  fortifica- 
tions. Obviously  Kiao-chau  could  be  valuable  only  as  a  naval 
base,  as  a  port  (its  commerce  in  19 13  exceeded  $50,000,000),  and 
as  a  center  from  which  German  influence  might  radiate  in  the 
Chinese  province  of  Shan-tung.  In  the  Pacific  Ocean  Germany 
had  acquired  the  Bismarck  Archipelago  (1884),  the  Marshall 
Islands  (1885),  the  Caroline  Islands  (1899),  the  Pelew  Islands 
(1899),  the  Marianne  or  Ladrone  Islands^  (1899),  and  two  of 
the  Samoan  Islands  (1899),  —  all  little  better  than  coaling 
stations.  Much  more  important  was  Kaiser  Wilhelmis  Land, 
the  northeastern  section  (70,000  square  miles)  of  New  Guinea, 
which  was  annexed  to  Germany  at  the  same  time  that  Great 
Britain  annexed  the  southeastern  third  of  the  island  (1884). 
At  that  time  the  island  was  quite  wild  and  peopled  by  brown- 
skinned,  frizzly-haired  savages.  Kaiser  Wilhelms  Land  was 
given  in  charge  to  a  German  commercial  company,  which  not 
only  developed  a  promising  commerce  and  introduced  cotton  and 
tobacco-growing,  but  received  from  the  German  government 
$100,000  when  in  1899  the  company  surrendered  its  administra- 
tive powers.  In  19 13  the  German  Empire  was  pa}dng  some 
$400,000  a  year  to  defray  the  cost  of  government  in  New  Guinea 
and  neighboring  islands. 

While  disavowing  any  intention  of  gaining  a  Far  Eastern 
empire,  the  United  States  of  America  had  as  a  matter  of  fact 
gained  colonial  possessions  in  the  Far  East.    The  Hawaiian  Is- 

1  Excepting  Guam,  the  largest  of  the  group,  which  was  ceded  by  Spain  to  the 
United  States  (1898). 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


595 


lands  in  the  mid-Pacific,  acquired  in  1898,  were  a  stepping  stone 
to  other  tiny  islands  or  '^coahng  stations"  in  the  Pacific,  and 
finally  to  the  Phihppine  Islands,  taken  from  Spain  by  ^  American 
the  war  of  1898.  Over  eight  milHon  native  FiHpinos, 
mostly  Christians,  the  United  States  government  forcibly  ex- 
tended its  power,  after  two  years  of  continuous  fighting.  In 
order  to  preserve  the  democratic  traditions  of  the  United  States, 
in  1907  a  Philippine  Assembly  was  instituted;  but  its  upper 
chamber  was  appointed  by  the  United  States  government,  and, 
although  the  lower  chamber  was  supposed  to  be  representative, 
it  was  elected  by  100,000  voters  out  of  a  population  of  8,000,000. 

It  was  often  declared  in  the  United  States  that  eventually 
the  Filipinos  would  be  granted  their  independence ;  on  the  other 
hand  it  may  be  observed  that  the  American  merchants,  who 
in  1 9 13  possessed  the  Hon's  share  ($52,000,000)  of  Philippine 
trade,  would  not  Hghtly  renounce  their  profits  in  order  to  gratify 
the  Filipinos'  desire  for  independence.  To  these  merchants, 
and  to  those  who  engaged  in  Chinese  commerce,  might  be 
ascribed  the  growth  of  an  imperialistic  spirit  which  regarded 
the  Philippines  as  an  American  colony,  demanded  protection 
for  "American  interests"  in  the  Far  East,  and  insisted  that 
China  should  have  an  ''open  door"  to  merchants  of  all  nations, 
especially  to  those  of  the  United  States. 

Finally,  it  is  not  inappropriate  here  to  call  attention  once  more 
to  the  fact  that  the  imperiahstic  ambitions  of  Western  nations 
inevitably  conflicted  with  the  national  sentiments  of      .  . 

A  •    •  1        rxAi     T  .    .      7-  Asiatic 

Asiatic  peoples.  The  J  apanese,  tremendously  patriotic, 
had  made  sufficient  progress  in  the  arts  of  peace  and  of  war  to 
repel  aggression.  The  Chinese  resented  but  were  scarcely  able 
to  prevent  attacks  on  their  territory  and  interference  with  their 
liberty;  and  the  party  of  progress  and  reform  in  China,  which 
would  fain  emulate  Japan,  found  its  task  of  renovating  China 
enormously  increased  by  the  vexatious  interference  of  Euro- 
pean capitaHsts,  who  insisted  on  supervising  Chinese  finances, 
and  by  the  attempts  of  European  diplomats  to  detach  China's 
outlying  provinces.  Persia,  too,  was  held  more  or  less  in  lead- 
ing-strings, or  rather  in  harness,  by  Russia  and  Great  Britain. 
The  insignificant  states  of  Siam,  Nepal,  Bhutan,  Afghanistan, 
and  Oman,  while  retaining  nominal  independence,  had  mostly 


596  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


fallen  under  the  shadow  of  European  influence.  Last  of  all, 
and  not  to  be  forgotten,  was  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Asia,  in- 
cluding Asia  Minor,  reaching  east  through  Armenia  and  Kur- 
distan to  the  Trans-Caucasian  provinces  of  Russia,  extending 
down  the  valley  of  the  Euphrates  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and 
stretching  another  arm  southward  to  include  Syria  and  Pales- 
tine and  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Red  Sea,  thus  half-encircling 
the  desert  plateau  of  Arabia,  which  was  peopled  by  independent 
and  wandering  tribes.  The  southern  end  of  the  Arabian  penin- 
sula, it  may  be  remarked,  from  Aden  (which  the  British  occupied 
in  1839)  to  Oman,  was  regarded  as  a  British  ''sphere  of  influence.'' 

ADDITIONAL  READING 

The  New  National  Imperialism.  General.  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A. 
Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch,  xxx,  an 
elementary  but  useful  survey  of  the  expansion  of  Europe  in  the  nineteenth 
century;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  xxv,  a  clear 
account  of  recent  geographical  explorations  and  discoveries ;  P.  S.  Reinsch, 
World  Politics  at  the  End  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1900),  an  illuminating 
study  of  certain  economic  and  diplomatic  forces  underlying  the  new  im- 
perialism, with  special  reference  to  the  Far  Eastern  Question,  and,  by  the 
same  author.  Colonial  Government  (1902)  and  Colonial  Administration 
(1904),  convenient  handbooks  of  the  political  institutions  of  the  new  im- 
perialism ;  J.  A.  Hobson,  Imperialism:  a  Study  (1902),  a  suggestive  criticism 
of  modern  imperialism  on  economic  grounds;  S.  P.  Orth,  The  Imperial 
Impulse  (191 6),  essays  on  the  new  imperialism  as  exemplified  by  Germany, 
Great  Britain,  France,  Belgium,  and  Russia ;  D.  S.  Jordan,  Imperial  De- 
mocracy :  a  Study  of  the  Relation  of  Government  by  the  People,  Equality  he- 
fore  the  Law,  and  Other  Tenets  of  Democracy,  to  the  Demands  of  a  Vigorous 
Foreign  Policy  and  Other  Demands  of  Imperial  Dominion  (1899) ;  W.  C. 
Webster,  A  General  History  of  Commerce  (1903) ;  J,  W.  Root,  Colonial  Tariffs 
(1906),  good  for  the  study  of  colonial  economics;  H.  C.  Morris,  The  His- 
tory of  Colonization,  2  vols.  (1908),  a  convenient  comprehensive  outline; 
E.  A.  Pratt,  The  Rise  of  Rail-Power  in  War  and  Conquest,  i8jj-igi4  (1916)  ; 
A.  G.  Keller,  Colonization,  a  Study  of  the  Founding  of  New  Societies  (1908) ; 
M.  B.  Synge,  A  Book  of  Discovery:  the  History  of  the  World's  Exploration, 
from  the  Earliest  Times  to  the  Finding  of  the  South  Pole  (191 2)  ;  Alexander 
Supan,  Die  territoriale  Entwicklung  der  europdischen  Kolonien  (1906),  a  brief 
German  survey  ;  Veit  Valentin,  Kolonialgeschichte  der  Neuzeit  (191 5),  another 
brief  sketch  from  the  German  point  of  view ;  Alfred  Zimmermann,  Die 
europdischen  Kolonien,  5  vols,  (i 896-1 903),  an  elaborate  history  of  the 
colonial  undertakings  of  Spain,  Portugal,  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Holland,  well  supplied  with  maps  and  bibliographies ;  Paul  Leroy-Beaulieu, 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


597 


De  la  colonisation  chez  les  peuples  modernes,  6th  ed.,  2  vols.  (1908),  a 
standard  French  history ;  and,  particularly  for  British  imperialism  in  the 
nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  consult  the  bibliography  appended  to 
Chapter  XXIX,  below.  For  the  relation  of  Protestant  missions  to  impe- 
rialism see  the  important  work  of  J.  S.  Dennis,  Christian  Missions  and 
Social  Progress,  3  vols.  (1897-1906),  and  the  suggestive  survey  of  R.  E. 
Speer,  Missions  and  Modern  History,  a  Study  of  the  Missionary  Aspects  of 
some  Great  Movements  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  2  vols.  (1904) ;  the  Cath- 
olic Encyclopcedia  contains  a  vast  amount  of  reliable  information  on  the 
similar  relationship  of  Roman  Catholic  missions. 

The  Far  Eastern  Question.  General.  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since  18 15 
(1910),  ch.  XXX,  a  clear  political  outline;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol. 
XI  (1909),  ch.  xxviii,  on  China  and  Japan  from  1815  to  1871,  Vol.  XII 
(1910),  ch.  xvii-xix,  on  the  Far  East,  the  regeneration  of  Japan,  and  the 
Russo-Japanese  War ;  Histoire  generate.  Vol.  X,  ch.  xxvii,  xxviii.  Vol.  XI, 
ch.  XX,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  xxiv,  xxv;  Sir  R.  K.  Douglas,  Europe  and  the  Far 
East,  ijo6~igi2,  new  ed.  rev.  and  cont.  by  J.  H.  Longford  (1913),  the 
best  historical  summary;  fidouard  Driault,  La  question  d^extreme  Orient 
(1908),  an  admirable  French  book,  stating  the  question  clearly  and  fairly; 
P.  S.  Reinsch,  Intellectual  and  Political  Currents  in  the  Far  East  (191 1), 
devoted  largely  to  educational  and  political  matters  in  China  and  Japan ; 
T.  F.  Millard,  America  and  the  Far  Eastern  Question  (1909),  an  examination 
of  those  elements  in  the  Eastern  Question  which  seemed  to  concern  the 
United  States;  Pierre  Leroy-Beaulieu,  The  Awakening  n,'  the  East  — 
Siberia,  Japan,  China,  Eng.  trans,  by  Richard  Davey  (1900),  a  readable 
narrative;  Alexis  Krausse,  The  Far  East:  its  History  and  its  Questions, 
2d  ed.  (1903),  with  appendix  of  important  documents;  G.  N.  C.  (Earl) 
Curzon,  Problems  of  the  Far  East,  rev.  ed.  (1896),  a  well-known  work  on 
Japan,  China,  and  Korea ;  Lancelot  Lawton,  Empires  of  the  Far  East,  a 
Study  of  Japan  and  of  her  Colonial  Possessions,  of  China  a?td  Manchuria, 
and  of  the  Political  Questions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  2  vols.  (191 2). 

China.  The  best  introduction  to  the  study  of  China  is  afforded  by  the 
writings  of  H.  A.  Giles,  a  very  eminent  authority  on  all  things  Chinese, 
China  and  the  Chinese  (1902),  China  and  the  Manchus  (191 2),  and  The 
Civilization  of  China  (191 1)  in  the  "Home  University  Library."  Brief 
but  already  out-of-date  histories  are  those  of  E.  H.  Parker,  China,  her 
History,  Diplomacy,  and  Commerce,  from  the  Earliest  Times  to  the  Present 
Day  (1901),  and  Sir  R.  K.  Douglas,  The  Story  of  China  (1901)  in  the  **  Story 
of  the  Nations  "  Series.  Special  studies  of  importance:  H.  B.  Morse,  The 
International  Relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire:  the  Period  of  Conflict,  1834- 
i860  (19 10);  Henri  Cordicr,  Les  expeditions  de  Chine  de  1857-58  et  de 
i860:  histoire  diplomatique,  notes  et  documents^  2  vols,  (i 905-1 906),  and, 
by  the  same  author,  a  famous  French  student  of  the  languages  and  history 
of  the  Oriental  peoples,  Histoire  des  relations  de  la  Chine  avec  les  puissances 
occidentales ,  3  vols.  (1901-1902),  covering  the  period  from  1861  to  1902; 
J.  O.  P.  Bland  and  E.  Backhouse,  China  under  the  Empress  Dowager,  being 


598  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  History  of  the  Life  and  Times  of  Tzu  Hsi  (1910) ;  P.  W.  Sergeant,  The 
Great  Empress  Dowager  of  China  (1910) ;  W.  F.  Mannix  (editor),  Memoirs 
of  the  Viceroy  Li  Hung-Chang  (1913),  suggestive  but  not  very  informing; 
Vladimir  {pseud.),  The  China- Japan  War  (1895) ;  A.  R.  Colquhoun,  China 
in  Transformation  (1898) ;  P.  H.  Clements,  An  Outline  of  the  Politics  and 
Diplomacy  of  China  and  the  Powers,  i8g4.-igo2  (191 5),  an  admirable  re- 
view of  the  causes  and  suppression  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion  ;  several  memoirs 
of  missionaries  in  China,  such  as  A.  J.  Brown,  New  Forces  in  Old  China 
(1904),  A.  H.  Smith,  China  in  Convulsion,  2  vols.  (1901),  and  W.  A.  P. 
Martin,  The  Awakening  of  China  (1907) ;  H.  B.  Morse,  The  Trade  and 
Administration  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  new.  ed.  (191 3),  a  useful  work  by  a 
Commissioner  of  Customs  for  the  Chinese  government ;  P.  H.  Kent,  The 
Passing  of  the  Manchus  (191 2),  a  history  of  the  outbreak  of  the  republican 
revolution  related  with  great  fairness ;  J.  O.  P.  Bland,  Recent  Events  and 
Present  Policies  in  China  (191 2);  J.  S.  Thompson,  China  Revolutionized 
(1913) ;  James  Cantlie  and  C.  S.  Jones,  Sun  Yat  Sen  and  the  Awakening 
of  China  (1912);  Edmond  Rottach,  La  Chine  en  revolution  (1914).  Use- 
ful for  most  recent  events  in  China  is  The  China  Year  Book,  ed.  by  H.  T, 
M.  Bell  and  H.  G.  W.  Woodhead  (1912  sqq.). 

Japan.  The  best  general  history  in  English  is  that  of  F.  Brinkley  and 
Baron  Kikuchi,  A  History  of  the  Japanese  People  from  the  Earliest  Times 
to  the  End  of  the  Meiji  Era  (191 5),  containing,  as  appendices,  the  Japanese 
Constitution  of  1889,  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  of  1905,  and  the 
Treaty  of  Portsmouth.  Briefer  and  less  satisfactory  histories  are  those  of 
J.  H.  Longford,  The  Evolution  of  New  Japan  (1913),  and  David  Murray, 
The  Story  of  Japan  (1904)  in  the  "  Story  of  the  Nations  "  Series.  W.  E. 
Grifhs,  Matthew  Calhraith  Perry :  a  Typical  American  Naval  Officer  (1887) 
is  an  interesting  biography  of  the  American  who  "  opened  up  "  Japan. 
•  On  Japanese  government :  Toyokichi  lyenaga,  The  Constitutional  Develop- 
ment of  Japan,  i8jj-i88i  (1891),  brief  but  scholarly;  P.  S.  Reinsch,  In- 
tellectual and  Political  Currents  in  the  Far  East  (191 1),  including  an  excellent 
chapter  on  political  parties  and  parliamentary  government  in  Japan; 
Japanese  Government  Documents,  i867~i88g,  published  by  the  Asiatic 
Society  of  Japan  (1914),  presenting  English  translations  of  all  the  essential 
documents  —  laws,  constitutions,  ordinances,  rescripts  —  for  the  history 
of  the  transition  from  the  feudal  to  the  modern  and  representative  system ; 
Theophile  GoUier,  Essai  sur  les  institutions  politiques  du  Japon  (1903). 
Discussion  of  social  and  political  life  :  G.  W.  Knox,  Japanese  Life  in  Town 
and  Country  (1904) ;  W.  E.  Griffis,  The  Mikado's  Empire,  loth  ed.  (1903), 
and,  by  the  same  author.  The  Japanese  Nation  in  Evolution:  Steps  in  the 
Progress  of  a  Great  People  (1907) ;  Henry  Dyer,  Japan  in  World  Politics 
(1909) ;  Count  Okuma  (editor).  Fifty  Years  of  New  Japan,  Eng.  trans,  ed. 
by  M.  B.  Huish,  2  vols.  (1909),  an  encyclopedic  work  prepared  by  foremost 
native  authorities.  An  elaborate  history  of  Japan  is  now  (1916)  in  prepara- 
tion, by  James  Murdoch,  of  which  two  volumes  have  appeared  —  Vol.  I, 
From  the  Origins  to  the  Arrival  of  the  Portuguese  in  1542  (1910),  and  Vol.  II, 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


599 


The  Century  of  Early  Foreign  Intercourse,  1542-1651  (1903) ;  another  im- 
portant history  is  that  in  French,  by  the  Marquis  de  La  Mazeliere,  Lc 
Japon:  histoire  et  civilisation,  5  vols.  (1907-1910),  from  earliest  times  to 
1 9 10.  Useful  for  most  recent  events  in  Japan  is  The  Japan  Year  Book 
(1905  sqq.). 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  of  1904-1905,  Kanichi  Asakawa,  The  Russo- 
Japanese  Conflict,  its  Causes  and  Issues  (1904),  an  excellent  statement, 
favorable  to  the  Japanese ;  A.  S.  Hershey,  The  International  Law  and 
Diplomacy  0}  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1906) ;  Charles  Ross,  The  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  igo4-igos,  Vol.  I  (1912);  A.  N.  (General)  Kuropatkin, 
The  Russian  Army  ajul  the  Japanese  War,  partial  Eng.  trans,  by  A.  B. 
Lindsay,  2  vols.  (1909),  the  apology  of  the  Russian  commander;  Sir  Ian 
Hamilton,  A  Staff  Officer's  Scrap-Book  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
2  vols.  ( 1 905-1 907) ;  The  Russo-Japanese  War,  prepared  by  the  Historical 
Section  of  the  German  General  Staff  and  translated  into  English  by  Karl 
von  Donat,  5  vols,  in  6  (1908-1910),  a  technical  and  truly  monumental 
work. 

Russia  in  Asia.  F.  H.  Skrine,  The  Expansion  of  Russia,  3d  ed.  (191 5), 
an  accurate  survey  of  the  Russian  advance  in  Asia  since  181 5 ;  J.  H.  Rose, 
The  Development  of  the  European  Nations,  iSjo-igoo,  Vol.  II  (1905), 
ch.  ii,  iii,  ix,  on  the  Central  Asian  Question,  the  Afghan  and  Turkoman 
campaigns,  and  Russia  in  the  Far  East ;  G.  F.  Wright,  Asiatic  Russia, 
2  vols.  (1902),  a  standard  work  on  the  geography,  society,  and  poHtical 
organization  of  the  Russian  conquests  and  occupations;  Alexis  Krausse, 
Russia  in  Asia:  a  Record  and  a  Study,  I^j8-i8gg  (1899),  a  severe  indict- 
ment of  Russian  policies  and  methods;  Vladimir  (pseud.),  Russia  on  the 
Pacific,  atui  the  Siberian  Railway  (1899) ;  Alfred  Rambaud,  The  Expansion 
of  Russia :  Problems  of  the  East  atui  Problems  of  the  Far  East,  2d  ed.  (1904) ; 
J.  F.  Baddeley,  The  Russian  Conquest  of  the  Caucasus  (1908) ;  H.  G.  C. 
Perry- Ayscough  and  R.  B.  Otter-Barry,  With  the  Russians  in  Mongolia 
(1914)  ;  Armin  \ambery,  Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Latuls:  a  Comparison 
of  the  Methods  adopted  by  England  and  Russia  in  the  Middle  East  (1906). 

Miscellaneous.  On  French  Indo-China:  J.  G.  Scott,  France  and 
Tongking:  a  Narrative  of  the  Campaign  of  1884  atui  the  Occupation  of  Further 
India  (1885);  J.  M.  A.  dc  Lanessan,  La  colonisation  franqaise  en  Indo- 
Chine  (1895) ;  Albert  Gaisman,  Uoeuvre  de  la  France  au  Tonkin  (1906). 
On  Persia:  P.  M.  Sykes,  A  History  of  Persia,  2  vols.  (1915),  an  excellent 
account  by  one  thoroughly  familiar  with  present-day  Persia ;  W.  M.  Shuster, 
The  Strangling  of  Persia:  a  Record  of  European  Diplomacy  and  Oriental 
Intrigue  (191 2) ;  E.  G.  Browne.  The  Persian  Revolution  of  igoj-igog  (1910), 
good  also,  incidentally,  on  the  Turkish  Revolution  of  1908.  For  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  sec  bibliography  appended  to  C'haptcr  XXVI,  above, 
and  for  the  British  I^mpire  in  Asia  consult  the  bibliography  accompanying 
Chapter  XXIX,  below. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 


THE  SPREAD  OF  EUROPEAN  CIVILIZATION  IN  AMERICA  AND 

IN  AFRICA 

The  religious,  economic,  and  patriotic  motives  which  sent  out 
Christian  missionaries,  merchant  adventurers,  and  conquering 
armies  from  Europe  to  Asia,  and  the  amazing  rapidity  with  which 
these  emissaries  of  Western  civilization  made  their  way  among 
the  highly-civiHzed  but  unprogressive  peoples  of  the  Orient, 
furnished  the  theme  of  the  foregoing  chapter.  In  the  present 
chapter,  the  actors  remain  the  same  —  missionaries,  capitalists, 
settlers,  and  soldiers;  but  the  scene  shifts,  first  to  America, 
which  has  been  known  to  Europe  for  more  than  three  centuries, 
and  later  to  Africa,  which  continent,  all  except  the  Mediterranean 
coastland,  was  until  the  nineteenth  century  largely  uncivilized 
and  unexplored. 

THE  EUROPEANIZATION  OF  AMERICA 

In  the  history  of  America  no  fact  is  more  important  than 
this  —  that  whereas  in  the  year  1 500  the  two  American  conti- 
nents  were    inhabited    by   tribes   of  red-skinned 

Contrast        //t    t        n  <•     i  •  i 

between        Indians,    some  of  whom  were  savages  roammg  the 

1500  and      wilderness,  some  were  cannibals,  while  others  of  less 
1914  ...  .  .... 

primitive  habits  dwelt  in  well-built  cities ;  m  the  year 

1 914  we  find  the  same  two  continents  peopled  by  civilized  nations, 
European  in  manners,  in  culture,  in  language,  and  largely  Euro- 
pean in  descent.  The  New  World  has  become  a  ^'New  Europe." 
Instead  of  merely  conquering  America,  as  they  conquered  Burma, 
the  British  had  come  by  hundreds  of  thousands  to  make  their 
homes  in  America,  to  create  a  New  England  on  the  western 
shore  of  the  Atlantic.  Similarly,  the  Frenchmen  and  Spaniards 
had  tried  to  create  a  ''New  France,"  or  a  ''New  Spain."  This 
was  the  old  colonialism. 

600 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


6oi 


Its  results  are  a  familiar  story,  (i)  North  of  the  Great 
Lakes  was  established  a  British  dominion/  with  almost  five 
millions    of    English-speaking    inhabitants,    about  _  , 

1  •  1  111  1  Results  of 

1,800,000  speaking  rrench,  and  only  about  one  hun-  the  oid 
dred  thousand  representatives  of  the  Indian  tribes  poioniaiism 

-  ,  -       ^  111  1  /\rT^i"i  Amenca 

from  whom  the  country  had  been  taken.  (2)  The 
country  south  of  the  Great  Lakes  and  north  of  the  gulf  of  Mexico 
was  settled  by  men  of  many  nations  —  Frenchmen,  Spaniards, 
Swedes,  Dutchmen,  Scotchmen,  and  Englishmen;  later  it 
received  milUons  of  negro  slaves  from  Africa,  and  immigrants 
from  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Poland,  Bohemia,  Scandinavia, 
and  Greece;  yet  it  was  united  under  one  federal  government 
and  its  many  races  were  fused  into  one  nation,  a  nation  pre- 
dominantly English  in  speech,  customs,  and  law.  (3)  The 
eastern  portion  of  South  America,  once  a  colony  of  Portugal, 
remained  Portuguese  in  culture,  although  politically  it  became 
the  separate  nation  of  Brazil.  (4)  The  rest  of  the  New  World, 
including  Mexico,  Central  America,  most  of  the  West  Indies, 
and  all  of  South  America  except  Brazil  and  Guiana,  was  colo- 
nized by  Spaniards ;  and  its  Indian  population  for  the  most  part 
became  Cathob'c  Christian  and  mingled  with  the  Spanish. 
Spanish  America  together  with  Brazil,  —  that  is,  nearly  all  of 
the  New  World  south  of  30°  north  latitude,  — inherited  ''Latin" 
or  ''Romance"  languages  (Spanish  and  Portuguese),  embraced 
the  faith  of  the  Roman  Catholic  or  Latin  Church,  and,  there- 
fore, has  been  aptly  styled  "Latin  America,"  just  as  France, 
Belgium,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Italy  collectively  have  been 
designated  "Latin  Europe." 

The  achievement  of  the  old  colonialism  of  the  sixteenth, 
seventeenth,  and  eighteenth  centuries  was,  briefly,  to  plant  in 
America  ofT-shoots  of  European  nations.  Far  differ-  ^j^g  -^^^ 
ent  are  the  fruits  of  the  new  imperiaHsm,  for  the  imperialism 
essence  of  modern  imperiaHsm  is  the  quest  of  profit-  ^  ^®"ca 
able  investments  for  capital,  rather  than  of  farms  and  new  homes 
for  settlers.  What  fruits  this  new  imperialistic  movement  of  the 
last  half-century  may  have  borne  in  America,  and  what  may  be 

^  As  a  part  of  the  British  Empire,  Canada  receives  attention  in  the  following 
chapter.  See  below,  pp.  643  ff.  Northeast  of  the  great  British  dominion  lay 
the  Danish  settlements  of  Greenland  and  Iceland. 


6o2 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  outstanding  features  of  the  histories  of  the  several  European- 
American  nations,  we  shall  attempt  concisely  to  indicate.^ 

As  regards  the  United  States,  mention  may  here  be  made 
only  of  three  significant  features  :  territorial  expansion,  economic 
Territorial  expansion,  and  the  beginnings  of  world  imperialism. 
Expansion  The  coursc  of  territorial  expansion  was  amazingly 
United  rapid.  The  United  States  which  in  1783  won  inde- 
states,  pendence  from  Great  Britain,  spread  westward  into 
1803-1853  ^Yie  broad  plains  of  the  Mississippi  (purchased  from 
France  in  1803),  annexed  Florida  in  182 1,  took  possession  of 
Texas  in  1845,  acquired  undisputed  possession  of  the  Oregon 
country  in  1846,  and  (i 848-1 853)  wrested  from  Mexico  ^  that 
expanse  of  territory  which  now  constitutes  the  states  of  Cali- 
fornia, Nevada,  Utah,  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  and  a  part  of 
Colorado.  Into  the  fertile  plains  of  the  Middle  West,  and  on  to 
the  wonderful  gold-lands  of  the  Pacific  coast  flowed  westward  a 
constant  stream  of  caravans,  until  from  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Pacific  was  one  nation.  Many  of  the  Indians  were  killed,  many 
succumbed  to  the  white  man's  "  fire-water,"  and  most  of  the 
rest  were  cooped  up  in  reservations. 

Meanwhile,  since  1830,  McCormick  reapers,  steam  railways, 
iron  foundries,  and  cotton  factories  had  been  working  mightily 
to  expand  the  industries  of  the  growing  nation  and  to 
Revo-"  together  its  extensive  and  diversified  territories, 

lution  in  the  A  never-faiHng  influx  of  immigrants  from  Europe 
St^te^  furnished  an  abundant  supply  of  cheap  labor  for 
the  new  factories  and  mines.  Fortunes  were  made 
almost  overnight,  millionaires  appeared,  then  multi-millionaires. 
The  United  States  emerged  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century  as  a  great  industrial  nation,  with  infant  industries  grow- 
ing to  gigantic  proportions,  with  business  men  seeking  the  most 
profitable  investment  for  vast  masses  of  capital.  As  in  European 
countries  certain  types  of  business  men  had  raised  the  cry  for 
imperialism,  so  also  in  the  United  States  there  began  to  be  heard 
a  clamor  for  the  acquisition  of  new  territories.    The  new  expan- 

1  Reference  to  the  British  possessions  in  America  will  be  omitted  in  this  chapter, 
being  reserved  for  Chapter  XXIX. 

2  A  small  strip  of  the  territory  was  purchased  in  1853,  but  the  greater  part  was 
taken  from  Mexico  by  the  war  of  1 846-1 848. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM  603 

sion  was  not  to  be  a  matter  of  colonizing  lands  adjacent  to  the 
United  States,  but  of  acquiring  distant  possessions  in  a  climate 
which  rendered  extensive  European  civilization  more  difficult. 

Alaska,  purchased  from  Russia  in  1867,  was  the  first  distant 
territory  to  be  annexed,  but  can  hardly  be  taken  as  the  beginning 
of  imperialism,  for  Alaska  became  a  genuine  colony  United 
with  white  men  in  the  majority.    The  real  start  was  states  and 
made  in  1898.    In  that  year  the  United  States  an-  J^p^j.j^.gjjj 
nexed  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  lying  some  2000  miles  off 
the  western  American  coast  and  constituting  a  convenient  station 
on  the  way  to  the  Far  East.    In  that  year  also  the  United  States 
made  war  on  Spain,  with  the  result  that  in  1898  Spain  was  forced 
to  cede  Puerto  Rico,  Guam,  and  the  Philippine  Islands  to  the 
United  States,  and  to  withdraw  from  Cuba.    At  one  stroke  the 
United  States  became  a  power  in  the  West  Indies  and  in  the  Far 
East. 

The  government  at  Washington  now  took  new  interest  in 
Chinese  affairs,  asserted  that  for  American  commerce  an  "  open 
door  "  in  China  must  be  maintained,  and  that  the  ^,   „  .  , 

^1  •  .  1       1 .  1        1      rr^i      The  Umted 

Chmese  Empire  must  not  be  dismembered.    The  states  a 
acquisition  in  part  of  the  Samoan  Islands  (i 899-1 900)  ^^^^ 
still  further  strengthened  the  position  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Pacific.    With  ever  greater  ardor  imperiaHsts 
demanded  that  the  United  States  should  protect  "  her  interests 
in  the  Pacific,"  that  she  should  retain  the  Philippines  as  the 
nucleus  of  a  future  empire  in  the  Far  East,  that  she  should  enter 
unreservedly  into  the  costly  game  of  imperialistic  rivalry  and 
world  poHtics. 

While  acquiring  new  domains  for  herself  in-  the  Far  East,  the 
United  States  continued  to  deny  the  right  of  European  _ 

.      1  TT         The  Monroe 

nations  to  acquire  new  territory  in  the  Western  Hem-  Doctrine 
isphere.    This  policy  had  been  formulated  in  1823  by  i^p^J^j^i^g^j 
President  Monroe,  who  declared  that  the  American  con-  of  the 
tinents  were  ''henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  sub-  u^*ed 

States 

jects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European  Powers." 

The  famous  Monroe  Doctrine  ^  was  first  designed  to  pre- 


^  See  above,  pp.  25  f.  It  was  reasserted  in  an  emphatic  manner  by  President 
Cleveland  in  order  to  prevent  alleged  British  encroachment  on  the  Venezuelan 
frontier  of  British  Guiana  (1895). 


6o4  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


vent  the  re-conquest  of  the  Latin-American  colonies  which  had 
revolted  from  Spain. ^  Subsequently,  while  the  government 
continued  to  pose  as  the  benevolent  protector  of  the  weaker 
nations  in  the  New  World,  business  men  of  the  United  States 
invested  ever  more  heavily  in  Latin-American  countries,  buying 
bonds  of  Nicaragua,  obtaining  possession  of  Mexican  silver- 
mines,  building  up  huge  business  enterprises,  such  as  the  banana 
trade  in  Costa  Rica,  and  purchasing  broad  plantations,  as  in  the 
tobacco-lands  of  Cuba.  Their  business  activities  and  their 
claims  as  creditors  inevitably  involved  these  business  men  in 
Latin-American  politics,  and,  in  order  to  protect  their  property 
from  rioters  or  insurgents,  they  had  frequently  to  call  upon  the 
navy  and  army  of  the  United  States.  For  example,  in  1913- 
1914,  when  revolutionary  disorders  menaced  their  property  in 
Mexico,  the  Dominican  Republic,  and  Haiti,  American  investors 
insistently  demanded  that  United  States  warships  and  soldiers 
be  sent  to  ^'restore  order"  in  the  troubled  states.  In  Cuba, 
which  after  the  Spanish- American  War  of  1898  was  created  a 
republic  under  American  protection,  the  United  States  not  only 
stepped  in  (1906)  to  prevent  a  revolution  but  actually  governed 
the  island  for  three  years.  Again,  in  Nicaragua,  where  New 
York  bankers  had  heavily  invested,  the  United  States  established 
a  virtual  protectorate. 

Even  more  significant  was  the  construction  of  the  Panama 
canal.  The  right  to  dig  a  canal  ^  across  the  isthmus  of  Panama 
The  Panama  had  been  acquired  from  the  republic  of  Colombia  by  a 
Canal  French  syndicate,  which  offered  in  1902  to  sell  its 
equipment  and  right  of  way  to  the  United  States  for  $40,000,000. 
To  this  arrangement  the  Colombian  government  refused  its 
•assent  (1903),  thus  blocking  the  whole  project.  Then  suddenly 
a  revolution  broke  out  on  the  isthmus  of  Panama  against  Colom- 
bia, a  revolution  which  the  United  States  warships  prevented 
Colombia  from  crushing,  and  which  resulted  in  the  establishment 

^  It  was  also  directed  against  the  further  extension  southward  of  the  Russian 
territory  of  Alaska. 

2  By  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  (1850)  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
had  agreed  not  to  construct  any  canal  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans 
except  as  a  joint  enterprise ;  this  treaty  was  superseded  in  1901  by  the  Hay-Paunce- 
fote  treaty,  which  enabled  the  United  States  alone  to  construct  a  canal,  but  pro- 
vided that  the  canal  should  be  open  to  ships  of  all  nations  on  equal  terms. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


605 


of  a  diminutive  republic  of  Panama  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States.  From  the  new  republic,  the  United  States 
immediately  obtained  the  coveted  "canal  zone,"  for  the  sum  of 
$10,000,000  and  an  annual  payment  of  $250,000.  Work  on  the 
canal,  begun  in  1907,  proceeded  so  rapidly  that  in  19 14  all  was 
complete.  By  constructing  the  canal,  the  United  States  had 
given  to  world  commerce  an  invaluable  short-cut  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific ;  but  in  admiring  the  achievement  it  is 
well  to  remember  that  the  canal  was  also  designed  to  facilitate 
the  passage  of  American  warships  to  the  Pacific  in  case  of  a  war 
in  the  Far  East,  that  possession  of  the  canal  still  further  excited 
the  ambition  of  American  imperialists  for  aggrandizement  in 
Central  America,  that  the  republic  of  Colombia  resentfully 
regarded  the  United  States  as  having  encouraged,  if  not  as  having 
instigated,  the  secession  of  Panama,  and  that  the  canal  had  cost 
the  taxpayers  of  the  United  States  almost  $400,000,000. 

The  Latin-American  states  developed  less  rapidly  than  their 
great  northern  neighbor,  for  they  were  handicapped  by  three 
circumstances :  (i)  there  were  not  enough  European  slower 
settlers  in  Latin  America ;  (2)  for  this  and  for  geo-  ^^^^^^^ " 
graphic  reasons,  Latin  America  was  saddled  with  a  Latin 
landed  aristocracy ;  and  (3)  lacking  capital,  as  well  as  America 
population,  much  of  Latin  America  became  financially  dependent 
upon  Europe  and  the  United  States.    These  three  conditions 
deserve  a  little  closer  attention. 

Once  again  let  it  be  repeated,  not  settlers  seeking  homes  had 
come  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  to  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  America,  but  missionaries  seeking  converts, 
adventurers  seeking  wealth,  and  soldiers  of  fortune  {^^ow°^ 
eager  for  glory.    The  soldiers  had  performed  a  num-  Colonialism 
bcr  of  brilliant  exploits  in  the  sixteenth  century,  such  America 
as  the  conquest  of  Mexico  and  the  conquest  of  Peru, 
earning  fame  by  their  hardihood  and  shame  for  their  cruelty. 
The  adventurers  had  acquired  rich  gold  and  silver  mines  in 
which  they  compelled  unwilling  natives  to  work,  and  fertile  plan- 
1. 1 'Jons  which  were  often  cultivated  by  negro  slaves  imported 
from  Africa.    The  missionaries,  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  aid 
of  higher  Spanish  ofTicials  had  endeavored  to  shield  the  Indians 
from  the  cruelty  of  fortune-hunters  and  so  genuine  had  been  their 


6o6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


missionary  zeal  that  the  bulk  of  the  natives  had  embraced  the 
Roman  Catholic  Christian  faith.  One  of  the  converted  Indians 
had  even  attained  the  dignity  of  a  saint  in  the  Catholic  Church  — 
Saint  Rose  of  Lima ;  many  had  adopted,  along  with  the  religion 
of  the  white  man,  his  manners  and  customs,  and  had  inter- 
married freely  with  the  Spaniards  and  Portuguese ;  others  had 
remained  half-savage  and  were  but  half-hearted  Christians ; 
still  others  were  complete  savages,  untamable  and  wild.  These 
facts,  already  familiar  to  us,  have  once  more  been  rehearsed 
because  they  explain  a  fundamental  feature  of  Latin-American 
society,  —  the  existence  of  half-civilized  negro  and  Indian  lower 
classes  side  by  side  with  highly  civilized  upper  classes  of  pure 
European,  or,  more  frequently,  of  mixed  descent. 

That  the  Spaniards  who  came  to  the  New  World  were  not 
inferior  in  culture  to  the  English  colonists  of  Massachusetts,  we 
may  infer  from  the  facts  that  the  first  universities  in 

European 

Culture  in  America  were  founded  by  the  Spaniards,  that  the  first 
America      pnnting-press  in  the  New  World  was  set  up  in  Mexico 

(1535),  that  even  before  1800  astronomers  of  Mexico 
City  had  won  world-wide  fame.  In  art,  in  literature,  in  archi- 
tecture, in  all  the  graces  and  refinements  of  polite  society,  Latin 
America  has  given  proof  of  a  high  degree  of  civilization.  But 
the  comparatively  large  proportion  of  ignorant  natives  and 
shiftless  negroes  in  Latin-American  countries  operated  to  re- 
tard political  and  economic  progress. 

In  achieving  political  independence,  for  example,  the  Latin- 
American  nations  lagged  behind  the  United  States  by  almost  half 

a  century.  The  revolt  of  Brazil  from  Portugal,  and  of 
ment  of'  Spanish  colonies  from  Spain,  did  not  take  place 

Political  until  the  decades  of  18 10-1830.  During  these  his- 
ence^in^^"  ^^^^^  decades  were  established  nine  independent  na- 
Latin  tions  I    the  United  Mexican   States,   the  Central 

^8^0-1*^903    American  Federation,  Great  Colombia,  Peru,  Bolivia, 

the  empire  of  Brazil,  Paraguay,  the  United  Provinces 
of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  (Argentine  Confederation),  and  Chile. 
In  the  West  Indies,  H^aiti  had  already  revolted  from  France  (1804) 
and  conquered  Santo  Domingo  (1822),  the  other  part  of  the 
Haitian  island,  once  a  Spanish  colony.  These  states,  com- 
prising nearly  all  of  America  south  of  the  United  States, 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


607 


were  subsequently  split  up  and  reorganized  until  the  map  of 
Latin  America  assumed  its  present  appearance,  with  twenty 
independent  republics.      First  of  all,  Uruguay,  a 
state  slightly  smaller  than  Nebraska,  after  a  bitter  Latln^^^ 
struggle    won  its  independence   (1828)   from   the  American 
United  Provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata,  resisted  ^83^^°^ 
the  aggression  of  Brazil,  and  was  constituted  a  free 
republic  in  1830.      Next  came  the  break-up  of  the  Great 
Colombia  which  had  been  established  in  18 19  by  the  heroic 
efforts  of  Simon  Bolivar,^  the  great  revolutionary 
hero.    Bolivar,  sadly  enough,  lived  just  long  enough  LatlZ^^^*^. 
to  see  his  Great  Colombia  split  up  into  the  three  American 
states  of  Venezuela  (1829),  Ecuador  (1830),  and  f^f^^^^ 
Colombia.^     Had  he   lived   73   years   longer,  he 
might  have  witnessed  the  secession  of  yet  another  state  from 
Colombia,  the  little  republic  of  Panama  (1903).    The  Central 
American  Federation  showed  a  similar  tendency  toward  dis- 
integration, and  in  the  years  1 838-1 847  became  divided  into  the 
five  diminutive  repubhcs  of  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua, 
Salvador,  and  Costa  Rica.    In  1844,  also,  the  eastern  part  of 
Haiti  became  the  Dominican  RepubHc  (Santo  Domingo).  The 
Cuban  republic,  estabhshed  in  1902,  and  Panama,  in  1903, 
complete  the  roll-call   of  twenty   Latin-American  Remnants 
nations.    There  remained  on  the  South  American  con-  of  European 
tinent  the  three  small  sections  of  Guiana,  belonging  Latin"^^*" 
respectively  to  Great  Britain,  Holland,  and  France;  America, 
in  Central  America,  British  Honduras  still  obeyed  '^^"^ 
foreign  rule ;  and  in  the  West  Indies  the  Bahamas,  Jamaica, 
Barbados,  the  Leeward  and  Windward  islands,  Trinidad,  and 
Tobago,  all  belonged  to  Great  Britain;  France  retained  Mar- 
tinique and  Guadeloupe;  the  Dutch  had  Curasao  and  a  few 
islets ;  while  St.  Thomas,  St.  John,  and  St.  Croix  were  possessed 
by  the  Danes ;  and  Puerto  Rico,  larger  than  Delaware,  was 
ruled  by  the  United  States. 

»  1783-1830. 

'Colombia  was  successively  called  "the  Republic  of  Colombia"  (1819-1831), 
"the  Republic  of  New  Granada"  (1831-1858),  "the  Granadine  Confederation" 
(1858-1861),  "the  United  States  of  New  Granada"  (1861-1863),  "the  United  States 
of  Colombia"  (1863-1886),  and  "the  Republic  of  Colombia"  (since  1886). 


6o8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Independence  achieved,  the  real  troubles  of  the  La  tin- American 
nations  began.    The  masses  of  half-Europeanized  natives  and 

negroes,  lacking  the  traditions  of  self-government,  and 
mentd  "^^^y  imperfectly  comprehending  the  principles  of 
Problems  in  democracy  and  of  law,  fell  easily  under  the  domination 
America  politicians  and  military  dictators.    Especially  in 

the  smaller  countries  politics  was  simply  a  lucrative 
game  of  a  handful  of  men.  Changes  in  government  were  effected 
more  often  by  "revolutions"  than  by  regular  balloting.  In 
"  Revo-  the  negro  republic  of  Haiti,  which  by  the  way  received 
lutions  "  culture  from  France  rather  than  from  Spain,  ''rev- 

olution" succeeded  "revolution"  ever  since  the  time  of  Jean 
^^.^  Pierre  Boyer,  who  ruled  the  island  despotically  until 

1843.  Turbulent  have  been  the  politics  of  Santo  Do- 
mingo, also,  except  during  the  enlightened  but  autocratic  rule  of 
Santo  President  Ulises  Heureaux  (1882-1899).  In  the  five 
Domingo  Central  American  republics  of  Guatemala,  Honduras, 
Salvador,  Nicaragua,  and  Costa  Rica,  frequent  revolutions  and 
Central  wars  attended  the  struggles  between  the  Conservatives 
America  g^j^^j  Liberals,  between  the  Clericals  and  Anti-Clericals. 
Again  and  again  ill-starred  attempts  were  made  to  revive  the 
federation  of  the  five  states.  These  troubles  were  increased 
by  the  intrigues  of  foreign  adventurers  in  Central  America. 
For  instance,  in  1855  a  California  journalist  by  the  name  of 
William  Walker,  with  fifty-six  American  "soldiers  of  fortune," 
made  himself  practically  master  of  Nicaragua,  and  was  financially 
supported  by  a  group  of  American  capitalists  who  had  business 
interests  in  Nicaragua.  Agents  of  another  American  capitalist, 
Cornelius  Vanderbilt,  aided  combined  forces  from  the  other 
Central  American  states  to  expel  Walker.  Another  upheaval 
occurred  in  1885,  when  Rufino  Barrios,  the  Liberal  president  of 
Guatemala,  attempted  unsuccessfully  to  gain  control  of  all 
Central  America.  Again  in  1906  Central  America  was  disturbed 
by  a  civil  war  in  which  foreigners  again  played  a  prominent  part. 
It  is  only  fair  to  remark  that  while  intrigue  and  factional  strife 
were  distressing  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Salvador,  and  Guatemala, 
comparative  peace  and  prosperity  settled  down  in  Costa  Rica, 
the  one  Central  American  state  in  which  the  Spanish  element 
was  not  hopelessly  outweighed  by  the  Indian  population. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


609 


In  South  America,  as  in  Central  America,  some  of  the  states, 
where  the  Indian  aborigines  had  been  imperfectly  assimilated  to 
Spanish  civilization,  were  kept  in  constant  turmoil  by  ^  ,    , . 

,         .    .  r        1  T  •  •  11  Colombia 

the  mimic  warfare  between  politicians  and  by  so- 
called  ''revolutions"  in  which  little  blood  was  usually  spilled, 
but  much  excitement  was  manifested.    In  Colombia  the  chief 
disturbances  were  caused  by  the  Liberals  and  An ti- Clericals, 
who  continually  plotted  to  overthrow  the  govern-  y^^^^^^^^^ 
ment.    Venezuela  was  torn  by  civil  strife  between  the 
advocates  of  a  centralized  government  and  the  supporters  of  a 
loose  federal  system,  —  the  latter  triumphing.    Although  possess- 
ing the  forms  of  democratic  government,  Venezuela  was  ruled 
by  a  few  unscrupulous  military  leaders,  one  of  whom,  Antonio 
Guzman  Blanco,  maintained  himself  almost  twenty  years  (1870- 
1889),  sometimes  as  president  and  sometimes  as  the  power  be- 
hind the  president.    Following  the  overthrow  of  Blanco  (1889), 
a  series  of  ''revolutions"  occurred,  until  in  1900  the  notorious 
General  Cipriano  Castro  came  into  power.    After  eight  years 
he  too  was  ousted,  and  new  disturbances  were  precipitated. 
In  Ecuador,  where  a  comparatively  small  percentage  of  ^^^^^^^ 
the  population  was  thoroughly  imbued  with  Spanish 
civilization,  civil  wars  were  frequent  and  military  leaders  were 
able  to  make  themselves  practically  dictators.    Although  a  few 
of  these  dictators  were  pronounced  Clericals,  notably  Garcia 
Moreno,  the  greater  number  were  Anti-Clericals,  who  introduced 
divorce,  civil  marriage,  and  religious  equality,  who  forbade  the 
establishment  of  new  monasteries  or  convents,  and  who  con- 
fiscated for  the  state  all  church  property. 

Peru,  the  land  of  gold,  silver,  and  copper,  was  for  a  time 
ruled  by  commanders  who  had  fought  in  the  war  of  independ- 
ence, and  who  by  their  rivalries  caused  occasional  dis-  ^ 

Peru 

turbances.  Twice  Peru  was  engaged  in  war  with  Chile. 
The  first  time  Chile  intervened  to  break  up  a  confederation  which 
had  been  formed  by  Peru  and  Bolivia  under  the  latter's  remark- 
able president,  Andres  Santa  Cruz,  who  proudly  boasted  his 
descent  from  the  Incas,  ancient  Indian  rulers  of  Peru.  The 
second  war  was  waged  in  1 879-1 883  with  the  help  of  Bolivia 
against  Chile,  and  resulted  in  a  complete  triumph  for  the 
Chileans,  the  cession  to  Chile  of  Bolivia's  seacoast,  as  well 

VOL.  II  —  2R 


6io 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


as  the  annexation  by  Chile  of  the  Peruvian  province  of  Tara- 
paca,  also  rich  in  guano  and  nitrate,  and  the  occupation  by 
Bolivia        Chile  of  the  Peruvian  provinces  of  Tacna  and  Arica. 

Bolivia,  uneven  country  of  mountains,  swamps,  and 
plains,  deserves  little  mention;  we  may  observe  simply  that 
political  disturbances,  frequent  from  1825  to  1884,  thereafter 
became  rare.  Southeast  of  Bolivia  lies  the  smaller  inland  state 
Paraguay  Paraguay,  in  which  the  proportion  of  white  inhab- 
itants and  the  degree  of  civilization  were  probably 
lower  than  in  any  other  region  of  South  America.  Between  1814 
and  1870  Paraguay  was  despotically  ruled  by  a  single  family, 
one  member  of  which,  Francisco  Lopez,  involved  his  country  in 
a  disastrous  war  with  Brazil,  Uruguay,  and  Argentina  (1864- 
1870),  a  war  which  exterminated  the  majority  of  Paraguay's 
population  and  saddled  the  country  with  a  huge  war  debt  of 
$200,000,000.  Lopez  was  killed  in  battle  (1870),  and  a  demo- 
cratic constitution  was  then  adopted.  Since  that  time  Paraguay 
has  slowly  recuperated,  though  repeatedly  disturbed  by  revo- 
Uruguay  lutionary  agitation.  Uruguay,  the  smallest  inde- 
pendent state  in  South  America,  was  long  dominated 
by  contending  cliques  of  more  or  less  unscrupulous  poKticians, 
but  more  recently  has  grown  very  prosperous  and  has  tried  many 
interesting  experiments  in  social  reform  and  poHtical  democracy. 

The  greatest  of  the  Latin-American  states,  the  most  pros- 
perous, and  probably  the  best  governed,  are  the  Argentine 
The  Republic,  Brazil,  and  Chile  —  the  so-called  *'A-B-C" 

"  A-B-C"  Powers.  Although  during  its  first  half-century  of 
Powers  independence  Argentina  was  vexed  by  foreign  war  as 
well  as  by  internal  dissensions,  since  1825  the  republic,  with  a 
constitution  copied  from  the  United  States,  has  made  amazing 
Argentina  advances  in  material  prosperity,  in  orderly  govern- 
ment, in  population  (from  1,830,000  in  1869  to 
7,500,000  in  1913),  in  art,  in  science,  in  military  and  naval 
power ;  and  its  capital,  the  beautiful  Buenos  Aires,  has  become 
in  size  the  metropolis  of  the  southern  hemisphere,  in  culture  a 
second  Paris. 

Brazil,  after  enjoying  for  five  decades  (i 840-1 889)  the  benev- 
olent rule  of  the  kindly  Emperor  Pedro  II,  was  constituted  a 
federal  republic,  —  the  United  States  of  Brazil.    Against  Presi- 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM  6n 

dent  Peixoto,  who  attempted  to  rule  despotically,  and  whose 
administration  was  marred  by  scandalous  corruption,  an  insur- 
rection broke  out  in  1893,  but  was  suppressed  with  g^.^^^ 
stem  severity.    Since  then  Brazil  has  prospered  in 
peace  and  has  welcomed  immigrants  from  Europe  by  thousands, 
especially  Portuguese,  Italians,  and  Germans. 

Chile,  the  long,  narrow  country  west  of  the  Andes,  early 
achieved  political  stability.  In  1833  the  Chileans  formed  a 
strongly  centralized  republican  government,  which 
under  Conservative  auspices  promoted  education,  arts, 
and  financial  prosperity.  Two  Liberal  presidents  —  Santa 
Maria  (1881-1886)  and  Jose  Balmaceda  (1886-1891) — intro- 
duced radical  reforms  and  attacked  the  privileges  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  but  by  establishing  a  virtual  dictatorship 
Balmaceda  provoked  a  revolution  in  1891,  which  ended  in  his 
defeat  and  suicide.  Admiral  Montt,  leader  of  the  insurgents, 
was  almost  unanimously  chosen  in  a  free  election  as  the  next 
president,  and  the  subsequent  history  of  Chile  was  distinguished 
by  peace,  order,  and  prosperity. 

Not  only  did  the  "A-B-C"  Powers  appear  by  1914  to  have 
achieved  domestic  tranquillity,  but  in  their  international  rela- 
tions, complicated  by  vexatious  boundary  disputes,  they  had 
given  evidence  of  a  very  real  desire  to  substitute  arbitration  for 
war.  For  example,  a  boundary  dispute  between  Argentina  and 
Chile  in  1898  might  well  have  caused  a  bloody  struggle,  had  not 
the  two  nations  amicably  agreed  to  submit  their  conflicting  claims 
to  peaceful  arbitration.  The  pacific  influence  of  the  ''A-B-C" 
Powers  was  splendidly  exemplified  in  1913  when  they  offered 
themselves  as  peacemakers  to  avert  a  threatened  war  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico. 

A  few  pages  back  we  referred  to  three  circumstances  as  hin- 
drances to  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  Latin  America,  the  first 
being  the  large  proportion  of  imperfectly  civiHzed  pianta 
Indians,  negroes,  and  half-breeds,  which  rendered  tion  System 
democratic  government  exceedingly  difficult.    It  is  \"  ^^^}^ 

1  •  1     •  1  1  1     r    1  •  America 

now  nigh  time  to  take  up  the  second  of  these  circum- 
stances, the  persistence  of  a  landed  aristocracy.    Partly  because 
most  of  the  countrv  was  better  suited  either  to  stock-raising  on 
a  large  scale,  or  to  raising  coffee,  cotton,  and  tobacco  on  large 


6l2 


« 

HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


plantations,  than  to  division  into  small  farms ;  partly  because 
it  was  easy  to  obtain  the  cheap  labor  of  Indians  and  the  slave 
labor  of  imported  African  negroes  on  great  ranches  and  planta- 
tions ;  and  partly  because  many  influential  families  had  obtained 
the  grant  of  vast  estates  in  colonial  times,  there  grew  up  in  Latin 
America  a  powerful  and  wealthy  land-holding  aristocracy,  on 
whose  estates  labored  negroes,  Indians,  and  the  poorer  class  of 
mixed  race.  Where  negroes  were  numerous,  as  in  Brazil  and  in 
the  West  Indies,  they  were  generally  emancipated  during  the 
nineteenth  century.  In  other  countries  the  farm-laborers  or 
''peons,"  being  mostly  ignorant  Indians,  were  held  in  a  position 
somewhat  similar  to  that  of  the  medieval  serf.  They  worked 
on  the  estates  of  great  land-holders;  they  possessed  for  them- 
selves no  land  or  only  a  little  patch  of  poor  soil ;  they  frequently 
were  obliged  to  remain  on  the  same  estate  whether  they  would 
or  no ;  they  were  often  saddled  with  debts  handed  down  from 
generation  to  generation;  they  were  always  extremely  poor; 
and  quite  commonly  they  were  improvident,  inclined  to  vice, 
and  easily  led  into  armed  revolt. 

Such  was  preeminently  the  case  in  Mexico.  Being  discon- 
tented with  their  miserable  lot,  the  peons  were  in  a  state  of 
The  Situa-  chronic  rebellion.  Under  the  leadership  of  Benito 
tion  in  Juarez,  a  full-blooded  Indian,  they  had  rallied  to  expel 
Mexico  Emperor  Maximilian  and  his  French  soldiers  from 
Mexico  in  the  'sixties ;  ^  but  Juarez  had  shown  more  energy  in 
attacking  the  Catholic  Church  than  in  caring  for  the  welfare  of 
the  peon.  Porfirio  Diaz,  the  successor  of  Juarez,  who  by  mili- 
tary force  made  himself  supreme  in  Mexico  and  by  ruthless 
severity  maintained  himself  as  president,  really  as  dictator,  of 
Mexico  almost  continuously  from  1877  to  1911,  was  less 
hostile  to  the  Catholic  Church  and  not  at  all  interested  in  the 
peon.  Under  Diaz  agrarian  revolts  were  sternly  suppressed. 
But  when  age  loosened  his  grip  on  the  government,  the  peons 
again  began  to  stir.  Their  successful  revolution  in  191 1  put 
into  the  presidential  chair  Francisco  Madero,  who  was  a  wealthy 
man  himself  but  pledged  to  better  the  lot  of  the  poor  agricultural 
laborers.  A  nephew  of  Porfirio  Diaz,  however,  took  up  arms 
against  Madero;  a  new  revolution  was  starxd;  and,  after  the 

^See  above,  pp.  177  f. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


613 


execution  or  murder  of  Madero,  one  of  Madero's  generals, 
Victoriano  Huerta,  who  had  joined  young  Diaz,  became  provi- 
sional president.  A  bloody  and  protracted  civil  war  then  ensued 
between  Provisional  President  Huerta's  forces  and  the  so-called 

ConstitutionaUsts,"  led  by  Venustiano  Carranza  and  by  the 
dashing  Indian  bandit,  Francisco  Villa,  claiming  to  represent 
the  down-trodden  peons  and  denouncing  Huerta's  violations  of 
the  constitution.  In  1914  the  Constitutionalists  triumphantly 
entered  Mexico  City,  but  instead  of  granting  the  promised  land 
reforms  the  two  leading  ''reformers,"  Villa  and  Carranza, 
shortly  fell  to  quarreling  and  plunged  their  country  again  into 
disgraceful  civil  wars. 

The  case  of  Mexico  is  cited  as  an  extreme  example  of  Latin 
America's  land  problem.  The  third  difficulty  under  which 
Latin  America  labored  —  her  lack  of  financial  re-  „ 

,  .  .       .      ^  .  Economic 

sources  —  remams  to  be  considered.  For  various  Dependence 
reasons,  some  of  which  may  already  be  clear,  South  ^^^j^^ 
and  Central  America  failed  to  keep  pace  with  Europe 
and  the  United  States  in  industrial  development,  in  business 
organization,  and  in  banking ;  consequently  when  railways  were 
to  be  built,  industrial  enterprises  launched,  warships  purchased, 
canals  constructed,  or  an  extraordinary  expenditure  incurred, 
there  being  insufficient  funds  at  home,  the  La  tin -American  gov- 
ernments necessarily  borrowed  money  in  London,  „  . 

^  Foreign 

New  York,  or  Paris.    For  example,  Nicaragua  bor-  Loans  to 
rowed  in  France  12,500,000  francs  in  1905;    the  ^^^.^ 
central  government  of  Brazil  owed  London  creditors 
(1913)  some  £91,600,000;  Honduras  borrowed  between  1867 
and  1870  some  $25,000,000,  and,  being  unable  to  pay  the  annual 
interest,  allowed  interest-arrears  to  accumulate  to  the  amount  of 
$35,000,000.    Altogether  the  Latin- American  states  officially 
owe  several  bilHons  of  dollars  to  Europe,  that  is,  they  pay  annually 
many  miUions  of  dollars  interest  or  tribute  to  European  financiers. 
Should  any  country  refuse  to  pay  its  debt,  warships  from  Europe 
or  from  the  United  States  would  be  sent  to  enforce  payment  as 
they  did  in  the  case  of  Venezuela  in  1903  ;  or  officials  from  the 
United  States  might  assume  the  right  to  collect  customs  duties 
and  therewith  pay  the  interest,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Dominican 
Republic  (1904). 


6i4  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 

Yet  more  staggering  sums  were  invested  and  more  enormous 
profits  realized  by  foreign  business  men,  who,  instead  of  loan- 
Foreign  money  to  Latin-American  governments,  obtained 
Investments  from  those  governments  the  right  to  work  mines, 
America  build  factories,  construct  railways,  collect  rubber,  cut 
timber,  or  export  bananas.  For  example,  the  fab- 
ulous wealth  of  many  Mexican  mines  went  to  swell  the  profits 
of  mine-owners  in  New  York  City;  the  great  oil-wells  of  Vera 
Cruz,  Mexico,  produced  enormous  quantities  of  petroleum  but  to 
enrich  certain  business  men  in  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain;  from  the  gold  mines  of  Esmeraldas,  Ecuador,  $250,000 
worth  of  precious  metal  was  dug  out  in  19 10  for  a  few  investors 
of  the  United  States ;  in  the  rubber  forests  of  the  upper  Amazon 
there  were  toiling  an  army  of  Indians,  collecting  rubber  for  the 
English  speculators  who  owned  stock  in  the  Peruvian  Amazon 
Company.  A  British  syndicate,  Pearson  and  Son  Ltd.,  was  in 
1 9 13  endeavoring  to  obtain  the  very  important  privilege  of 
exploiting  the  oil-wells  of  Costa  Rica,  Colombia,  and  Ecuador. 
Then,  too,  there  were  the  banks.  In  Argentina,  for  instance, 
there  were  British,  Spanish,  German,  French,  and  Italian  banks, 
with  a  total  capital  which  certainly  would  exceed  $60,000,000. 
Such  facts,  so  often  overlooked,  most  eloquently  bespeak  the 
economic  dependence  of  Latin  America  upon  the  United  States 
and  Europe;  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  they  prove  that 
South  America,  although  politically  independent,  is  paying  heavy 
tribute  to  financiers  in  London,  in  Paris,  and  in  New  York. 
British  investors,  it  was  asserted  in  1914,  annually  realized 
$160,000,000  in  South  America  on  capital  investments  totahng 
more  than  three  billion  dollars.  The  domination  of  Latin  America 
by  foreign  capitalists,  who  controlled  a  great  part  of  her  economic 
activities,  who  were  not  without  a  powerful  influence  upon  her 
pohtics,  and  who  were  backed  by  the  might  of  their  several 
governments,  constitutes  the  effect  upon  Latin  America  of  the 
new  capitalistic  imperialism. 

T  THE  PARTITION  OF  AFRICA 


From  America  we  turn  to  Africa,  the  other  great  continent 
discovered  by  Europeans  in  the  fifteenth  century,  and  colonized 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


m  more  recent  times.  Of  course  the  Mediterranean  coast  and 
Egypt,  which  had  formed  part  of  the  ancient  Roman  Empire,  had 
long  been  known  to  Christendom,  and  feared  too,  be-  ^^^^^^ 
cause  since  the  Arab  conquest  of  the  seventh  century  the  Middle 
all  the  northern  edge  of  Africa  had  become  a  strong-  ^^^^ 
hold  of  Mohammedanism,  and,  in  the  sixteenth  century,  of  piracy. 
Not  only  the  northern  coastland  but  also  the  eastern  shores  of 
Africa  had  been  visited  in  the  Middle  Ages  by  Arab  traders  and 
warriors,  who  communicated  their  Mohammedan  rehgion  and 
in  some  cases  their  language,  customs,  and  costume  to  the 
native  whites  (''Libyans"  or  "Berbers")  of  northern  Africa, 
and  to  the  brown-skinned,  frizzly-haired  ''Hamites"  of  Somali- 
land  on  the  East  African  coast.  Even  as  far  south  as  Sofala, 
on  the  east  coast,  and  as  far  inland  as  Timbuctu,^  in  the 
Sahara,  Arab  tribesmen  carried  their  culture.  But  of  this, 
Europe  was  ignorant. 

The  vast  continent  which  lay  south  of  Egypt,  TripoH,  Tunis, 
Algeria,  and  Morocco  was  first  made  known  to  Europe  by  Portu- 
guese explorers  in  the  fifteenth  century.  The  roman-  j^e  Portu- 
tic  story  of  Portuguese  exploration  needs  not  to  be  guese  in 
retold  here.^  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  Portuguese  were  ^'"^^ 
amazed  at  the  size  of  the  continent,  and  astonished  to  find  naked, 
savage,  black  or  brown  men  who  hunted  strange  beasts  in  the 
tropical  African  forests.  In  the  extreme  south  were  short 
yellowish-brown  people  (Bushmen  and  Hottentots)  who  made 
crude  attempts  to  till  the  soil  and  to  raise  cattle.  Coming  up 
the  east  coast,  after  rounding  the  Cape,  the  Portuguese  were  no 
less  astounded  to  meet  Arab  traders,  and  dehghted  to  discover 
the  Coptic  Christian  kingdom  of  Abyssinia,  which  they  helped 
to  defend  against  Mohammedan  onslaughts.  Heroic  Portu- 
guese explorers  and  missionaries,  undaunted  either  by  the  deadly 
fevers  of  the  tropics  or  by  the  cannibalistic  customs  of  many  negro 
tribes,  explored  the  Zambesi  and  Congo  rivers.  They  intro- 
duced the  pineapple,  tobacco,  arrowroot,  the  sweet-potato, 
sugar-cane,  onions,  guava,  pigs,  ducks,  and  many  other  things 
useful  and  pleasant.    Trading-posts  were  founded  in  many  ports. 

'  Timbuctu,  first  visited  by  an  Arab  traveler  in  1352,  became  a  Moslem  city 
in  1591. 

^  See  Vol.  I,  pp.  49  ff. 


6i6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


But  try  as  it  might,  the  petty  Portuguese  kingdom  could  not 
monopoHze  or  effectively  control  so  enormous  a  continent. 

Great  Britain,  France,  and  Holland  became  the  successful 
rivals  of  Portugal  in  Africa.  By  1870  the  Portuguese  could 
claim  only:  (i)  Portuguese  East  Africa  (Mozambique  and 
Zambesia),  a  fertile  territory  eight  times  as  large  as  Portugal, 
rich  in  coal,  gold,  ivory,  and  rubber;  (2)  Angola  or  Portuguese 
West  Africa,  with  900  miles  of  coast,  south  of  the  Congo  River, 
and  valuable  for  its  rubber;  (3)  Portuguese  Guinea,  a  small 
district  in  the  extreme  west ;  and  (4)  the  island  of  St.  Thomas, 
Prince's  Island,  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  the  Azores,  and  the 
Madeira  Islands,  lying  off  the  west  coast  of  Africa. 

The  Dutch  began  seriously  to  compete  with  the  Portuguese 
in  Africa  in  the  seventeenth  century,  when  they  acquired  various 
The  Dutch  posts  along  the  coast  from  Cape  Blanco  to  the  gulf  of 
m  Africa  Guinea,  and  established  a  colony  at  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  in  South  Africa.  The  West  African  posts  proved  valuable 
in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  as  depots  for  the 
slave  trade ;  from  them  the  Dutch  exported  four  or  five  millions 
of  negro  slaves  for  servile  labor  in  America.  Into  South  Africa, 
however,  the  Dutch  came  as  settlers  rather  than  as  slavers,  and 
instead  of  exporting  slaves  actually  imported  negroes  from  the 
Gold  Coast  for  service  on  South  African  farms. 

The  number  of  Dutch  farmers  or  "Boers"  was  probably 
more  than  10,000  ^  when  the  colony  was  conquered  from  Holland 
by  Great  Britain  (1806)  ^  in  the  course  of  the  Napole- 
and  the*^^^  wars.  The  Boers  were  so  sorely  dissatisfied  under 
Dutch  in  British  rule  —  they  bitterly  resented  the  emancipation 
before^87o*  of  their  negro  slaves  in  1834  —  that  they  abandoned 
Cape  Colony  in  thousands  and  sought  new  homes  north 
of  the  Orange  River,  or  in  Natal,  northeast  of  Cape  Colony.  This 
wholesale  migration  of  183  6-1 840  has  become  famous  in  history 
as  the  "  Great  Trek. "  Even  in  Natal  and  the  region  north  of  the 
Orange  River  the  shadow  of  the  British  flag  fell  upon  them,  for  in 
1843  Natal  was  annexed  by  Great  Britain,  and  in  1848  the  Orange 

^  There  were  also  small  minorities  of  Germans  and  French  Huguenots. 

2  The  British  first  seized  Cape  Colony  in  1795,  but  returned  it  in  1803;  they 
occupied  the  colony  again  in  1806,  and  in  1814  paid  £6,000,000  as  compensation 
to  the  Dutch. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


617 


River  State  (between  the  Orange  and  Vaal  rivers).  In  the  fol- 
lowing decade,  however,  the  Boer  settlement  in  Transvaal  (north 
of  the  Vaal  River)  and  the  Orange  River  State  obtained  their 
independence.  The  situation  in  1870,  then,  was  this  :  the  Boer 
repubHcs  of  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State  were  independent, 
and  the  former  Dutch  settlements  of  Natal  and  Cape  Colony 
were  under  British  rule. 

Besides  South  Africa,  Great  Britain  had  acquired  very  little 
African  territory  prior  to  1870.    The  British  posts  on  the  Gold 
Coast  and  at  the  mouth  of  the  Gambia  River  in  western  British 
Africa  had  been  important  chiefly  as  centers  of  the  Posts  in 
slave-trade  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centu-  ^^^^  ^"^^ 
ries.    Sierra  Leone  had  originated  as  a  colony  for  freed  slaves. 

France  Hkewise  had  established  posts  for  the  slave  traffic 
on  the  West  African  coast,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Senegal  River, 
and  had  seized  neighboring  Dutch  estabhshments  in  The  French 
the  seventeenth  century.  Louis  XIV,  moreover,  had  in  Africa 
nominally  annexed  the  large  island  of  Madagascar ;  '^^^ 
but  before  1870  the  French  had  practically  abandoned  the  island. 
In  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  France  was  interested 
in  Egypt,  not  only  because  Napoleon  had  made  an  attempt  to 
conquer  the  country,  but  also  because  the  Turkish  viceroy, 
Mehemet  AH,  allowed  French  officers  to  organize  his  army  and 
navy;  but  Egypt  was  in  no  sense  a  French  colony.  Between 
181 5  and  1870,  however,  France  did  acquire  two  important 
African  colonies.  The  lesser  of  these  was  Gabun,  now  a  part  of 
French  Equatorial  Africa.    The  greater  was  Algeria. 

French  rule  in  Algeria  dated  from  the  last  year  of  the  reign  of 
Charles  X  (1830),  when  an  insult  administered  by  the  native 
dey  to  the  French  minister  had  evoked  a  punitive  ex-  pj-ench 
pedition  from  France  and  had  led  to  a  French  mihtary  Conquest 
occupation  of  Algiers  and  the  deposition  of  the  dey.  ^^sena 
Thenceforth,  despite  the  native  resistance  brilliantly  led  by 
Abd-el-Kader,  which  cost  France  heavily  throughout  the  reign 
of  Louis  Philippe,  and  despite  subsequent  bitter  revolts  which 
lasted  almost  continuously  from  1864  to  187 1,  the  French  were 
steadily  pressing  their  conquests  and  bringing  the  whole  of 
Algeria  under  subjection.^ 

^  For  further  details  of  the  French  conquest  of  Algeria,  see  above,  p.  513. 


6i8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


The  foregoing  paragraphs  must  have  made  it  clear  that  before 
the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  comparatively  little 
progress  had  been  made  in  the  partition  of  Africa. 
oMhe^Afri-  ^his  was  in  no  small  part  due  to  the  fact  that  the  slave- 
can  Slave-  trade,  which  flourished  in  Africa  until  the  nineteenth 
1850^' century,  did  not  encourage  Europeans  to  penetrate  into 
the  interior,  since  they  might  better  establish  trading 
stations  on  the  coast,  where  they  could  purchase  the  negroes  from 
Arab  slave-dealers.  In  1807,  however,  Great  Britain,  the 
greatest  slave-trading  nation,  aboHshed  the  shameful  traffic.^ 
Other  countries  followed  the  British  example,  until  before  1850 
the  wholesale  shipping  of  negro  slaves  from  Africa  by  European 
traders  had  practically  ceased.  The  aboHtion  of  the  slave-trade 
was  extremely  important  in  its  results.  Henceforth  the  interest 
of  Europe  in  Africa  was  to  be  in  material  commodities  rather 
than  in  human  beings. 

The  abolition  of  the  slave-trade,  moreover,  was  accompanied 
by  an  awakening  of  rehgious  and  humanitarian  zeal  for  the  wel- 
^  ,  fare  of  the  natives.    Africa  must  be  explored,  the  war 

Exploration  .         ,       1  ^  ^  .   ,  .  , 

against  the  slave-trade  must  be  earned  even  mto  the 
darkest  recesses  of  the  Dark  Continent,  and  the  negroes  must  be 
reclaimed  for  Christianity,  civilization,  and  commerce.  Mission- 
aries and  intrepid  explorers  penetrated  to  the  very  heart  of  the 
Dark  Continent,  bringing  back  romantic  tales  of  trackless  forests 
traversed,  of  mighty  lakes  and  rivers  discovered,  of  brown- 
skinned  "Pygmies"  four  feet  tall,  of  cannibal  orgies,  of  elephants, 
zebras,  crocodiles,  of  monstrous  snakes,  and  of  gigantic  apes. 
Many  missionaries,  CathoHc  and  Protestant,  with  great  zeal 
made  their  way  where  never  white  man  had  been  seen  before, 
and  preached  to  the  natives ;  but  the  great  work  of  exploration 
in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  inspired  by  other  than 
missionary  motives.  David  Livingstone,  a  famous  Scotch  ex- 
plorer, was,  it  is  true,  sent  to  Africa  in  1840  by  a  Protestant 
missionary  society ;  but  he  speedily  became  more  explorer  than 
evangehst;  instead  of  converting  the  negroes  he  would  "open 
up  the  country"  for  others ;  and  in  1857  severed  his  connection 
with  the  missionary  society.  By  his  wonderful  transcontinental 
journey  through  the  upper  Zambesi  valley,  by  his  courage  in 

1  Denmark  had  previously  taken  a  similar  step. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


619 


facing  danger,  by  his  kindliness  to  the  natives,  by  his  stirring 
denunciations  of  the  slave-trade,  and  finally  by  his  mysterious 
disappearance  in  the  very  heart  of  the  African  wilderness,  Living- 
stone aroused  the  sympathetic  interest  of  the  entire  world. 
PubHc  opinion  was  still  more  excited  when  James  Gordon  Bennett, 
a  New  York  newspaper  man,  sent  out  his  cleverest  reporter  to 
look  for  Livingstone,  and  when  that  reporter,  Henry  Morton 
Stanley,  not  only  found  Li\ingstone,  but  discovered  the  course 
of  the  Congo  River  and  explored  the  great  lakes  of  Central  Africa 
(1871-1877).  The  thrilling  story  of  Stanley's  trip  Through  the 
Dark  Continent,  published  in  book  form,  enthralled  the  imagina- 
tion and  decorated  the  center-table  of  many  a  bourgeois  in  Eng- 
land and  America.  In  person  Stanley  urged  upon  business 
men,  in  England,  in  Germany,  the  value  of  Central  Africa 
(Congo)  as  a  field  for  commercial  enterprise. 

No  one  understood  Stanley  so  well  as  did  Leopold  II,  king 
of  the  Belgians,  nor  did  any  one  act  with  such  quick  decision 
to  seize  the  opportunity  for  gain.  In  1876  Leopold  j^^^^^^^n 
held  an  informal  conference  of  all  the  Powers  at  and  the 
Brussels,  explained  the  commercial  possibilities  of  ^^Jf^^" 
Central  Africa,  and  formed  an  ''International  Associa- 
tion for  the  Exploration  and  Civilization  of  Africa,"  with  com- 
mittees in  each  country  and  headquarters  at  Brussels.  The 
Belgian  committee,  however,  was  the  most  active,  and  in  1878 
a  new  committee,  practically  a  Belgian  commercial  company,  was 
formed  for  the  development  of  the  Congo  valley.  This  commit- 
tee, financed  by  the  shrewd  Leopold,  became  the  so-called  '' Inter- 
national Association  of  the  Congo";  it  employed  Stanley  to 
found  Belgian  stations  and  to  make  treaties  with  the  native 
chieftains  of  the  Congo  (1880- 1884).  In  spite  of  the  rival  claims 
of  Portugal  and  France,  King  Leopold  obtained  for  his  "Inter- 
national Association"  complete  control  of  the  Congo  region  and 
a  recognized  status  as  an  independent  neutral  state,  although  the 
conference  of  the  Powers  which  met  in  Berlin  during  the  winter 
of  1 884- 1 88  5  stipulated  for  the  free  navigation  of  the  Congo 
River,  free  commerce,  the  suppression  of  slave-trading,  and  the 
protection  of  missionaries,  scientists,  and  explorers  in  the  Congo. 
In  1885  Leopold  became  personal  sovereign  of  the  new  state,  called 
''Congo  Free  State,"  towards  the  development  of  which  he  con- 


620 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


tributed  millions  from  his  personal  estate.  Presently  he  reaped 
his  reward.  For  himself  and  his  family  he  carved  out  a  vast 
estate,  the  Domaine  de  la  couronne,  almost  ten  times  as  large  as 
Belgium,  embracing  the  choicest  ''rubber  country"  of  the  Congo 
River,  and  yielding  rich  returns  from  the  forced  labor  of  the  natives 
who  collected  the  rubber.  Other  lands,  too,  were  seized  by  the 
state  as  ''vacant  lands,"  and  exploited  for  rubber,  ivory,  and 
palm-oil,  either  directly  or  through  concessionaire  ^  companies  in 
which  Leopold's  associates  were  heavily  interested.  Some  idea 
of  the  increasing  value  of  these  enterprises  may  be  gained  from 
the  fact  that  the  rubber  exported  from  the  Congo  was  worth  in 
1886  some  $30,000  and  in  1910  some  $10,000,000  a  year,  not  to 
speak  of  ivory  and  palm-oil.  All  this  while,  however,  the  natives 
of  the  Congo,  instead  of  being  "civilized,"  were  being  forced  to 
work  practically  as  slaves  collecting  ivory  and  rubber  for  the 
enrichment  of  Leopold  and  his  fellow-investors.  To  be  sure, 
several  hundred  Christian  missionaries  were  endeavoring  to  win 
converts,  but  the  state  authorities  seemed  to  show  greater  interest 
in  promoting  business  than  in  furthering  Christianity.  Finally, 
after  the  scandalous  condition  of  the  Congo  had  aroused  violent 
criticism  in  Belgium  and  evoked  stern  warnings  from  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  the  British  foreign  minister,  reforms  were  introduced,  the 
territory  of  the  Congo  Free  State  was  annexed  to  Belgium  (1908) 
and  placed  under  control  of  the  Belgian  parliamentary  govern- 
ment, and  Leopold  surrendered  his  vast  Congo  estate  in  return 
for  liberal  compensation. 

Meanwhile,  France,  Great  Britain,   Germany,  Italy,  and 
Spain  had  been  drawn  into  the  game  of  founding  empires  in 
J  Africa  and  were  following  Leopold's  lead.  Ardent 

Motives  and   ^,    .    .         ,         ,     ,         .  f .        ^ .  ,       .  , 

Men  in  the  Christians  hoped  that  Ainca  might  thus  be  more 
Africa^^  easily  reclaimed  from  paganism ;  other  altruistic 
citizens,  whose  faith  was  more  in  "  civiHzation"  than  in 
Christianity,  talked  enthusiastically  about  the  mission  of  Europe 
in  bringing  civilization  to  the  Dark  Continent ;  still  other  and  less 
thoughtful  people  found  pleasure  in  seeing  great  blocks  of  the 

1  A  concessionaire  company  is  a  business  corporation  which  has  received  as  a 
"concession"  from  the  government  the  special  and  monopolistic  right  of  carrying 
on  a  certain  industiy,  collecting  rubber,  or  mining  for  a  certain  metal,  in  a  specified 
district. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


621 


African  map  labeled  ''British"  or  "German/'  and  referring  with 
swelling  pride  to  "our  African  Empire."  But  the  prime  movers 
were  business  men,  who  knew  that  the  opening  up  of  Africa  meant 
big  business  opportunities,  who  formed  companies  for  the  develop- 
ment of  African  colonies,  and  who  not  infrequently  made  fortunes 
in  African  enterprises.  Such  an  one  was  Cecil  Rhodes  (1853- 
1902).  As  a  young  man  he  had  found  riches  in  the  Cecil 
famous  Kimberley  diamond  fields  of  South  Africa ;  he  ^^^des 
had  acquired  a  controlHng  interest  in  several  big  South  African 
mining  companies ;  and  he  had  conceived  the  project  of  extending 
British  rule  from  Cape  Colony  northward  to  the  Mediterranean. 
It  was  Cecil  Rhodes  who  gained  Bechuanaland  for  Great  Britain ; 
it  was  Cecil  Rhodes  who  controlled  the  British  South  Africa 
Company  which  ruled  over  the  extensive  territory  now  called  in 
his  honor  Rhodesia.  During  his  Hfetime  he  enjoyed  power  as 
the  leading  man  in  South  Africa,  as  well  as  enormous  wealth 
derived  from  South  African  mines ;  and  at  his  death  he  left 
pro\'ision  for  175  scholarships  at  Oxford  to  be  bestowed  upon 
select  young  men  of  America,  Germany,  and  the  British  colonies, 
thus  fostering  the  idea  of  the  British  empire  and  perpetuating 
his  own  name  as  the  donor  of  the  "Rhodes  Scholarships." 

Cecil  Rhodes  may  serve  as  type  of  the  men  who  gained  African 
empires  for  European  nations.  As  an  example  of  the  manner 
in  which  such  empires  were  gained,  the  case  of  German  j^^^^^^^^ 
Southwest  Africa  is  typical.  With  the  exception  of  and  German 
Walfisch  Bay,  which  was  occupied  by  the  British  in  ^f^*^^^^* 
1878,  the  southwestern  coast  of  Africa  from  Cape  Frio 
to  the  Orange  River  was  until  1883  still  under  the  sway  of  inde- 
pendent chieftains.  In  that  year  a  German  merchant,  Liideritz 
by  name,  with  Bismarck's  consent,  sent  an  agent  to  establish  a 
trading-post  at  Angra  Pequefia  or  "Liideritz  Bay."  Quietly  and 
quickly  the  agent  persuaded  the  native  chieftains  to  make  treaties 
with  him  and  to  cede  to  him  large  sections  of  coastland.  Mean- 
while German  diplomats  had  made  sure  that  Britain  would  not 
seriously  object  to  the  formation  of  a  German  colony  in  South- 
west Africa.  In  1884,  therefore,  the  German  government  took 
over  the  territories  which  Liideritz  had  privately  acquired, 
from  the  Orange  River  northward  to  26°  S.  latitude ;  and  the 
adjoining  territory  from  26°  S.  latitude  northward  to  Cape  Frio 


62  2  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


was  declared  to  be  a  German  protectorate,  excepting  the  British 
district  around  Walfisch  Bay.  In  this  manner  German  Southwest 
Africa  was  founded.  In  a  similar  manner  other  colo- 
Partkion  ^^^^  ^cre  acquired  by  Germany,  and  by  Italy,  France, 
of  Africa  and  Great  Britain.  On  the  gulf  of  Guinea,  Kamerun 
'EighUes  '''^^  Togoland,  for  instance,  were  obtained  for  Ger- 
many in  1884  by  the  adventurous  traveler,  Dr. 
Nachtigal,  who  journeyed  along  the  coast  making  'treaties" 
whereby  native  chieftains  placed  themselves  under  the  protec- 
tion" of  Germany.  Hot  on  Dr.  Nachtigal's  trail  followed  a 
British  consul,  who  in  the  same  way  acquired  the  region  around 
the  Niger  delta  for  Great  Britain.  Again,  in  eastern  Africa, 
there  landed  in  1884  three  enterprising  young  Germans  with 
plenty  of  German  flags  and  blank  treaty  forms,  to  lay  the  founda- 
tions of  German  East  Africa.  In  almost  every  case,  territory 
thus  acquired  was  given  over  into  the  hands  of  a  chartered  com- 
pany, and  among  the  prominent  members  of  the  company  were 
usually  to  be  found  the  few  individuals  —  Hke  Rhodes  and 
Liideritz  —  who  had  been  active  in  winning  the  territory. 

Acquiring  African  territories  in  this  manner  was  so  easy  that 
ambitious  EngHshmen  began  to  talk  of  extending  the  British 
Colossal  Empire  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  in  the  south  to 
"  Deals "  in  Cairo  at  the  mouth  of  the  Nile  in  the  north,  and 
Territory  Started  to  build  a  'Xape  to  Cairo"  railway;  French 
expansionists  began  to  dream  of  a  French  Empire, 
stretching  in  a  broad  belt  across  the  Sahara  from  ocean  to  ocean ; 
and  German  enthusiasts  to  think  how  they  might  carve  out  large 
slices  of  Africa  for  Germany.  Obviously  these  conflicting  ambi- 
tions could  not  all  be  reaHzed ;  compromise  was  necessary,  and  a 
friendly  agreement  between  the  nations  concerned  as  to  how  they 
should  partition  Africa  among  themselves.  A  number  of  such 
compromises  and  agreements  or  "deals"  were  made,  assigning 
great  blocks  of  half-explored  territory  to  one  nation  or  to  another 
as  spheres  for  conquest.    Several  deserve  mention. 

First  of  all  should  be  noted  the  international  conference  at 
Berlin  (1884-1885),  which  practically  recognized  the  possession  of 
the  Congo  region  by  Leopold  II  and  his  ''International  Associa- 
tion" ;  the  same  conference  laid  down  the  rule  that  any  Power, 
in  annexing  African  territory,  must  notify  the  other  Powers  of 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


623 


the  fact.  The  next  important  move  in  the  game  was  made  by 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  in  1890,  when  they  agreed  that 
(i)  Great  Britain  should  be  allowed  to  connect  her 
spheres  of  influence  in  the  Nile  valley  with  her  already  German 
existing  colony  on  the  coast  of  East  Africa,  by  assum-  African 
ing  a  protectorate  over  the  domains  of  the  negro  ^^gT^^^^' 
king  of  Uganda.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  how 
Egypt,  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan,  or  upper  valley  of  the  Nile, 
Uganda,  and  British  East  Africa,  all  destined  to  be  dominated  by 
Great  Britain,  formed  a  magnificent  empire,  sweeping  from  the 
Mediterranean  up  the  Nile  to  Lake  Victoria  Nyanza  and  opening 
out  upon  the  Indian  Ocean.  But  the  British  ambition  to  obtain 
a  continuous  stretch  of  territory  from  Eg}^t  to  South  Africa 
had  to  be  renounced,  since  German  East  Africa  was  extended 
inland  to  the  border  of  Belgian  Congo,  thus  effectually  separating 
British  South  Africa  and  Rhodesia  from  British  East  Africa  and 
Uganda.  (2)  Great  Britain  also  obtained  by  the  agreement  of 
1890  a  protectorate  over  the  islands  of  Zanzibar  and  Pemba, 
which  lay  off  the  coast  of  German  East  Africa  and  which  belonged 
to  the  sultan  of  Zanzibar,  Germany  receiving  in  return  the 
island  of  Heligoland  in  the  German  corner  of  the  North  Sea. 
(3)  By  this  same  ''deal"  of  1890  the  boundary  was  adjusted  in 
Western  Africa  between  the  German  protectorate  of  Kamerun 
and  the  British  district  of  Nigeria ;  the  Kamerun  was  extended 
inland  to  Lake  Chad,  and  Germany  was  given  a  free  hand  in  the 
central  Sudan  northeast  of  Kamerun,  with  the  understanding  that 
Germany  would  seek  no  territory  in  the  western  upper  Nile 
valley.  (4)  Yet  another  article  of  the  agreement  gave  German 
Southwest  Africa  a  narrow  arm  of  territory  reaching  eastward 
to  the  Zambesi  River. 

Hardly  less  important  than  the  Anglo-German  arrangement 
of  July,  1890,  was  the  Anglo-French  understanding 
of  August,  1890,  whereby  Prance  was  allowed  to  es-  JJ^enfh^^^ 
tabHsh  a  protectorate  over  the  island  of  Madagascar  ^  African 
—  larger  than  all  France  ;  French  influence  was  rccog-  oflsgo^^^ 
nized  as  supreme  in  the  burning  Sahara ;  and  the 
territory  of  northern  Nigeria  between  the  Niger  River  and  Lake 

^Madagascar  became  a  French  colony  in  1896,  and  the  native  queen  was  de- 
ported. 


624 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Chad  was  allotted  to  Great  Britain.  This  agreement,  however, 
by  no  means  ended  the  rivalry  of  French  and  British  in  northern 
and  central  Africa ;  for  the  French,  having  conceived  the  idea 
of  a  vast  North  African  empire,  were  anxious  to  dominate  the 
Sudan  —  as  the  region  south  of  the  Sahara  is  called  —  through- 
out its  entire  sweep  from  Cape  Verde  on  the  west  to  the  moun- 
tains of  Abyssinia  on  the  east.  Most  of  the  western  Sudan  the 
French  had  already  overrun  ;  in  1894  they  induced  Germany  to 
leave  the  central  Sudan  to  France ;  they  then  turned  to  the 
eastern  Sudan,  which  constitutes  part  of  the  Upper  Nile  basin. 
The  British,  on  the  other  hand,  regarded  this  region,  the  ''Anglo- 
Egyptian  Sudan,"  as  their  own  preserve,^  although  it  had  not 
yet  been  conquered.  Consequently,  when  in  1898  a  French 
expedition  from  French  Congo,  under  the  lead  of  Captain  Mar- 
chand,  entered  the  Upper  Nile  valley  and  raised  the  French  flag 
at  the  famous  but  swampy  post  of  Fashoda  on  the  Nile,  the 
British  were  highly  indignant.  A  British-Egyptian  force  hurried 
south  to  Fashoda  from  Khartum.    War  was  in  the  air. 

ine 

Fashoda  Then  gracefuUy  France  gave  way,  renouncing  her 
Incident  and  ^^im  to  Fashoda  and  to  the  Ando-EervTDtian  Sudan, 

the  Anglo-        .  .  i     •  i         r  •  i  •  i 

French  givmg  up  the  idea  of  a  transcontmental  empire,  but 
of^SpQ^^^*    receiving  in  return  the  undisputed  right  to  occupy  the 

kingdom  of  Wadai  in  the  central  Sudan,  and  thus  to 
Knk  up  French  Congo  with  the  French  possessions  in  north- 
western Africa.  This  was  the  famous  Anglo-French  declaration 
of  1899,  which  paved  the  way  for  more  cordial  relations  between 
the  French  and  British  in  Africa  and  likewise  in  Europe. 

A  further  understanding  was  reached  by  Great  Britain  and 
France  in  1904,  when  France  allowed  Egypt  to  become  practically 
The  Anglo  ^  British  protectorate,  and  in  return  Great  Britain 
French  designated  Morocco  as  a  proper  sphere  for  French 
^sreemcnt    ambition.    Italy  had  already  agreed   (1901)  that 

France  should  have  a  free  hand  in  Morocco,  provided 
that  Italy  should  have  Tripoli.  Germany,  hov/ever,  in  1905 
raised  a  protest,  and  in  order  to  settle  the  "Moroccan  Question" 

1  King  Leopold  of  Belgium  also  coveted  possession  of  the  Upper  Nile,  and  in 
1892  sent  expeditions  from  Congo  Free  State,  hoping  to  gain  the  province  of  Bahr- 
el-Ghazal ;  but  in  the  end  he,  too,  gave  way  before  his  more  powerful  competitors 
—  the  British. 


i 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


625 


a  general  international  conference  met  at  Algeciras  in  1906. 
The  next  year  French  armies  in  Morocco  endeavored  to  quell  a 
native  insurrection.  Claiming  that  some  German 
residents  in  Morocco  were  endangered,  Germany  in  Moroccan 
191 1  suddenly  dispatched  the  cruiser  Panther  to 
Agadir,  on  the  coast  of  Morocco,  to  protect  German  interests. 
The  French  were  angered  by  this  interference  ;  but  by  ceding  to 
Germany  a  large  section  of  French  Equatorial  Africa,  the  French 
government  averted  war  and  obtained  Germany's  consent  to  the 
estabhshment  of  a  French  protectorate  over  Morocco.  Next 
France  had  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Spain,  for  Spain  was 
also  interested  in  Morocco.  Finally  in  191 2  the  affair  was  settled, 
Spain  retaining  a  narrow  strip  along  the  northern  coast  and  a 
small  in  closure  or  enclave"  on  the  southwestern  coast  at  Ifni, 
France  establishing  a  protectorate  over  the  remainder  —  the 
greater  part  of  Morocco,  —  and  140  square  miles  at  Tangier  being 
erected  into  an  ''international  zone." 

One  other  international  transaction  in  African  territory  de- 
serves mention,  and  that  is  the  Anglo-Portuguese  treaty  of  189 1. 
For  years  Portuguese  imperiaHsts  had  planned  to  push 
the  boundaries  of  Portuguese  West  Africa  (Angola)  portu^e^se 
and  Portuguese  East  Africa  (Mozambique)  inland  until  African 
they  should  meet,  thus  forming  a  broad  band  quite 
across  the  continent.    For  this  scheme  Portugal  had 
in  1886  obtained  the  consent  of  France  and  Germany.    But  the 
British  protested,  and  Cecil  Rhodes,  who  for  patriotic  and  busi- 
ness reasons  was  eager  to  extend  the  British  dominions,  founded 
the  British  South  Africa  Company  to  gain  control  of  the  upper 
Zambesi  valley,  just  west  of  Portuguese  East  Africa.  Unable 
to  resist,  Portugal  reluctantly  consented  to  the  British  occupation 
of  the  country  now  known  as  Rhodesia,  lying  between  Angola 
and  Mozambique,  and  extending  north  to  Lake  Tanganyika. 

Having  familiarized  ourselves  with  a  few  typical 
men  and  instances  in  the  partition  of  Africa,  which  European 
took  place  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  cen-  Africa°i?  *° 
tury,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  review  the  results  1914 
of  the  partition,  and  to  take  up  in  turn  the  African 
empires  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Germany,  Portugal, 
Spain,  and  Belgium.    First  comes  the  British  Empire. 

VOL.  II  —  2  s 


626  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


As  a  result  of  her  participation  in  the  scramble  for  African 
possessions,  Great  Britain  could  boast  in  1914  that  one-third  of 
^  Africa,  with  a  population  of  fifty  millions,  was  under 

British  British  domination.^  The  value,  the  government, 
hi°Afrka°^^  and  Something  of  the  nature  of  these  possessions  will 

be  considered  in  detail  in  the  following  chapter  on  the 
British  Empire;  only  their  location  and  extent  concern  us  at 
present.    At  the  southern  end  of  the  continent  were  the  four 

thriving  colonies  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  Natal, 
South  Africa  Transvaal,  and  Orange  River  Colony,  self-governing, 

united  (since  1910)  in  the  Union  of  South  Africa," 
embracing  an  area  twice  as  large  as  France,  and  supporting  a 
population  of  about  1,300,000  white  and  4,700,000  colored 
inhabitants.  Two  of  these  four  provinces  —  Transvaal  and 
Orange  River  Colony  —  had  been  colonized,  as  we  have  seen, 
by  Boers  who  had  ''trekked"  northward  from  the  Cape  in  order 
to  escape  British  rule,  who  had  fought  vaHantly  in  1899-1902 
for  their  independence,  and  who  finally  had  been  defeated  and 
Bechuana-  incorporated  in  the  British  Empire.  North  of  the 
land  South  African  Union  extended  Bechuanaland,  —  part 

colony,  part  protectorate,  —  a  vast  tableland  of  275,000  acres, 
with  more  than  two  square  miles  to  each  inhabitant,  and  more 

than  70  natives  to  every  European.    Stretching  still 

farther  northward  across  the  Zambesi  valley  was 
Rhodesia,  bounded  on  the  north  by  Belgian  Congo  and  German 
East  Africa,  comprising  a  territory  three  and  one-half  times  as 
large  as  the  British  Isles,  inhabited  by  some  26,000  white  pioneers 
and  sixty  times  as  many  uncivilized  negroes.  The  foregoing 
colonies,  together  with  the  smaller  crown  colonies  of  Basutoland 
and  Swaziland,  and  the  Nyasaland  Protectorate,  gave  Great 
Britain  an  unbroken  sweep  of  territory  in  southern  Africa  from 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  to  Lake  Tanganyika. 

A  second  colossal  slice  of  Africa  allotted  to  Great  Britain  was 
the  Nile  valley.  British  interest  in  this  region  had  been  excited 
Egypt         t)y  Napoleon's  ill-starred  Egyptian  expedition  (1798), 

and  stimulated  in  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury by  British  explorers  who  traced  the  hitherto  unknown 

^  These  figures  include  Egypt  and  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan.  For  a  more 
detailed  account  of  the  British  Empire,  see  below,  ch.  xxix. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


627 


course  of  the  Upper  Nile.  But  while  Eg>pt,  as  a  practically 
independent  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  had  been  ruled  by  the 
able  Mehemet  Ali  (pasha  of  Egypt  from  181 1  to  1848)  and  his 
descendants,  the  "khedives"  of  Egypt,  Great  Britain  had  allowed 
the  French  to  become  influential  in  Egypt.  So  it  happened  that 
the  Suez  Canal  (1869),  that  monumental  feat  of  engineering,  was 
constructed  by  French  rather  than  by  British  capitalists.  British 
statesmen,  notably  Disraeli,  argued  that  since  the  Suez  Canal 
commanded  the  all-sea-route  by  way  of  the  Red  Sea  to  India, 
Great  Britain  as  mistress  of  India  should  also  be  mistress  of  the 
canal;  and  when  in  1875  the  hard-pressed  khedive,  who  held  a 
large  block  of  the  canal  company's  stock,  offered  to  sell,  the  Brit- 
ish government  purchased  his  canal  shares  for  about  $20,000,000. 
The  Suez  Canal  itself  was  later  declared  to  be  equally  open  to  all 
nations  (1888).  But  meanwhile  Great  Britain  had  gained  control 
of  Egypt  so  that  the  waterway  ran  practically  through  British 
territory.  It  came  about  in  this  way.  Discovering  the  Egyp- 
tian treasury  to  be  about  bankrupt,  France  and  Great  Britain 
in  1877  established  a  ''Dual  Control"  over  Egypt,  i.e.  a  French- 
man supervised  Egyptian  public  expenditures  while  an  EngKsh- 
man  took  charge  of  the  revenues.  Ismail,  the  then  khedive,  so 
bitterly  opposed  this  interference  with  his  affairs  that  British  and 
French  diplomats  induced  the  Turkish  sultan  to  exert  his  author- 
ity as  overlord  of  Egypt  and  depose  Ismail  (1879).  Ismail's 
son,  Tewfik,  submitted  more  tamely  to  the  Dual  Control.  Pres- 
ently, however,  a  new  and  fierce  anti-foreign  movement  of  the 
Arab  soldiers,  led  by  Arabi  Pasha,  furnished  an  excuse  for  armed 
intervention;  and  while  the  French  government  remained  in- 
active. Great  Britain  sent  forces  which  crushed  the  insurrection 
(1882).  Henceforth  the  British  were  supreme  in  Egypt;  the 
Dual  Control  was  repbxcd  by  an  English  financial  ''adviser"; 
and  the  khedive  of  Egypt,  although  remaining  in  theory  a  vassal 
of  the  Turkish  sultan,  was  in  practice  the  puppet  of  British 
commissioners. 

The  12,000  square  miles  of  fertile  land  on  the  banks  and 
delta  of  the  Lower  Nile,  and  the  390,000  square  miles  of  surround- 
ing desert,  which  together  constitute  Egypt,  were  not  enough 
for  Great  Britain.  South  of  Egypt  lay  even  vaster  stretches  of 
desert,  traversed  by  the  thin  ribbon  of  rich  Nile-land;  still 


628  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


farther  south  where  the  mighty  river  branched  out  east  and 
west,  comparatively  productive  regions  were  still  unconquered. 
The  Anglo-  Country  from  Egypt  south  to  Uganda  was  con- 

Egyptian      quered  between  1882  and  1900  by  combined  British 

and  Egyptian  forces,  brought  under  the  joint  rule 
or  ^'condominium"  of  Great  Britain  and  Egypt,  and  labeled 
*'the  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan,"  but  only  after  much  blood  was 
spilled  in  subduing  the  fanatical  Mohammedan  Arabs  (led  by 
their  monks  or  "Dervishes"),  and  after  much  diplomacy  was 
expended  in  removing  the  rivalry  of  the  French,  who  had  also 
coveted  the  region  of  the  Upper  Nile. 

The  main  source  of  the  Nile  is  Lake  Victoria,  or  Victoria 
Nyanza.  Just  north  of  Victoria  Nyanza,  and  south  of  the  Anglo- 
Uganda       Egyptian  Sudan,  lay  the  negro  kingdom  of  Uganda, 

which  was  allotted  to  the  British  in  1890  and  estab- 
lished as  a  British  protectorate  a  few  years  later.  While  the 
native  king  —  "His  Highness  the  Kabaka"  —  still  retained  his 
throne,  justice  and  finance  were  controlled  by  the  British  gover- 
nor. Uganda  was  the  connecting  Unk  between  the  Anglo- 
British  Egyptian  Sudan  on  the  north  and  British  East  Africa 
East  Africa  the  Southeast.  The  British  East  Africa  Protecto- 
rate, including  an  area  larger  than  France,  gave  Great  Britain  a 
splendid  front  upon  the  Indian  Ocean  —  a  front  which  was  still 
further  strengthened  by  Great  Britain's  protectorate  (1890)  over 
the  East  African  islands  of  Zanzibar  and  Pemba,  and  by  British 
possession  (18 10)  of  the  Seychelles  Islands,  Mauritius,  and 
Rodriguez.  The  corner  of  Africa  which  juts  out  east  from  the 
Nile-Uganda-East  Africa  line  of  British  possessions  was  in  the 
main  occupied  by  the  independent  Christian  kingdom  of  Abys- 
British  sinia  and  the  Italian  colonies  of  Eritrea  and  Somali- 
Somaiiiand  land;  but  a  portion  about  as  large  as  Missouri  was 
held  by  Great  Britain,  including  ahnost  the  whole  southern 
shore  of  the  gulf  of  Aden. 

In  western  Africa  the  British  possessions  were  detached  and 
scattered.  Farthest  north  was  British  Gambia,  a  mere  foot- 
Gambia       ^^^^  where  the  Gambia  river  enters  the  Atlantic  just 

south  of  Cape  Verde.  Farther  down  the  coast  lay  the 
small  territory  of  Sierra  Leone,  governed  partly  as  a  crown  colony 
and  partly  as  a  protectorate.    On  the  northern  coast  of  the  gulf 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


629 


of  Guinea  were  two  larger  British  colonies.    The  westernmost, 
Gold  Coast,  included  334  miles  of  the  shore  line,  sien-a 
The  easternmost,  Nigeria,  was  a  loosely  organized  Leone 
protectorate  over  some  seventeen  miUions  of  negroes  and 
over  an  area  almost  equal  to  the  combined  area  of  ^^^^  ^^^^^ 
Washington,    Oregon,   and   California.    Along  the 
whole  stretch  of  coast  from  Nigeria  south  to  British  South  Africa, 
there  was  no  British  colony,  except  a  few  hundred  j^jg^j^^ 
square  miles  around  Wal&sch  Bay,  surrounded  by 
German  Southwest  Africa. 

One  is  tempted  to  say  that  Great  Britain  was  the  greatest 
gainer  by  the  partition  of  Africa.    But  in  sheer  territorial  ex- 
panse the  French  dominion  ^  in  the  Dark  Continent  ^  French 
was  even  more  imposing.    For  every  square  mile  in  the  Possessions 
mother-country,  France  could  point  to  twenty  square  ^  ^^^^ 
miles  in  Africa.    As  we  are  aware,  the  French  at  the  opening 
of  the  nineteenth  century  had  to  their  credit  a  foothold  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Senegal  River,  a  shadowy  claim  to  the  immense 
island  of  Madagascar,  the  small  island  of  Mauritius,  and  a  dis- 
astrous expedition  to  Egypt.    In  18 10  Mauritius  was  surren- 
dered to  Great  Britain.    As  the  nineteenth  century  wore  on, 
however.  Frenchmen  began  to  take  a  more  active  interest  in 
African  enterprises.    During  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe  (1830- 
1848)  Algeria  was  painfully  conquered  for  France.  ^^^^^ 
French  explorers  scoured  western  Africa,  and  French 
settlements  were  established  along  the  Ivory  and  Guinea  coasts 
(1843).    The  great  development  came  after  the  Franco-Prussian 
war  when  conspicuous  Republican  politicians  sought  in  Africa  to 
retrieve  the  misfortunes  of  France  in  Europe.    In  188 1 
Tunis,^  just  east  of  Algeria,  was  occupied  by  French 
troops.    In  the  region  of  the  Senegal,  expeditions  were  sent 
inland  as  far  as  Timbuctu  (1893),  claiming  both 

the  Senegal  and  the  Niger  valleys  for  France.    From  French 
the  Ivory  Coast  the  French  dominion  was  pushed  north-  ^^^^ 
ward,  across  dense  forests,  to  connect  with  the  Niger  valley, 
French  Guinea,  and  Senegal.    Dahomey,  a  narrow  wedge  between 
British  Nigeria  and  German  Togoland,  conquered  in  1892,  gave 

*  For  the  French  Empire  in  Africa,  see  also  above,  pp.  160,  347  f.,  512  ff. 

*  See  above,  pp.  513  f. 


630 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


yet  another  arm  reaching  from  the  Niger  to  the  sea.  Between 
German  Kamerun  and  the  Congo  River  another  French  trading 
colony,  at  first  confined  to  the  coast  at  Gabun,  had  expanded 
towards  the  interior  until  in  1899  French  Congo 
Congo*  reached  the  Shari  River  and  Lake  Chad.  French 
Congo,  Dahomey,  Ivory  Coast,  French  Guinea,  Sene- 
gal, Algeria,  and  Tunis,  —  all  were  the  seaward-stretching  arms  of 
the  great  French  West  African  empire,  with  its  heart  in  the  burn- 
ing sands  of  the  Sahara.  From  Algiers  one  could  travel  south- 
ward over  the  Algerian  hills,  across  the  desert  wastes  of  Sahara, 
over  the  dreary  plains  and  woodlands  of  Wadai  in  the  central 
Sudan,  and  into  the  tropical  forests  of  French  Congo,^  —  all  was 
Morocco  French  territory.  Last  of  all,  the  independent  Moham- 
medan state  of  Morocco  was  mostly  swallowed  up  by 
the  mighty  French  empire;  in  191 2  the  sultan  of  Morocco  sub- 
mitted to  a  French  protectorate,  i.e.  allowing  a  French  official,  a 
"resident-general,"  to  rule  his  country. 

French  dominion  in  Congo  and  West  Africa  did  not  mean  any 
rapid  spread  of  Christianity ;  for  the  French  government,  hostile 
to  the  Church  at  home,  hindered  rather  than  helped 
Character-  missionaries  in  the  colonies.    Nor  did  it  mean 

istics  of  immediate  "  civilization  "  ;  for  the  savages  of  the  Ivory 
West^Africa  Coast  still  occasionally  indulged  their  cannibalistic 
tastes.  Nor  could  the  possessions  be  said  to  be 
''colonies,"  when,  for  example,  in  French  Guinea  there  were 
hardly  more  than  a  thousand  Europeans,  and  those  mostly 
officials  and  traders  rather  than  colonists.  Only  in  the  three 
northern  territories  was  the  climate  attractive  to  French  settlers. 
Algeria,  the  best  developed  of  French  colonies,  had  almost  450,000 
inhabitants  of  French  descent,  and  230,000  of  Spanish,  Italian, 
Maltese,  and  Jewish  descent;  but  even  in  Algeria  the  natives 
(Berbers  and  Arabs)  outnumbered  the  colonists  almost  six 
to  one.  French  rule  did  mean  exploitation  —  industrial  and 
commercial.  The  external  trade  of  French  West  Africa,  in- 
cluding the  colonies  of  (i)  Senegal,  (2)  Upper  Senegal  and 
Niger,  (3)  Guinea,  (4)  Ivory  Coast,  (5)  Dahomey,  and  (6)  Mauri- 

^  Before  191 1.  It  is  important  to  note  that  in  191 1,  however,  by  ceding  a  large 
section  of  French  Congo  to  Germany,  the  territorial  connection  between  lower 
French  Congo  and  the  interior  was  severed. 


NATION.\L  IMPERIALISM  ^  631 


tarda,  doubled  in  the  ten  years  1 895-1 904.  The  trade  of  Tunis 
almost  tripled  in  twenty  years.  To  France  —  for  most  of  the 
trade  was  with  France  —  the  colonies  sent  fruits,  pakn-oil, 
peanuts,  rubber,  mahogany;  from  French  merchants  they 
bought  cotton  clothing,  spirits,  and  various  manufactured  articles. 
French  capitaKsts  established  the  Bank  of  West  Africa  with 
millions  of  capital  to  make  loans  for  the  construction  of  railways 
and  development  of  industries.  Thousands  of  miles  of  railway 
and  telegraph  were  constructed  by  French  financiers,  with  interest 
on  their  capital  guaranteed  by  the  government.  In  Algeria 
and  Tunis,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  in  Morocco,  where  climate  and 
natural  resources  were  inviting,  a  more  advanced  development 
was  attained.  The  waving  fields  of  grain,  the  hillside  vineyards, 
the  luxuriant  olive-groves  might  remind  the  colonist  of  his  for- 
mer home  in  France.  Oranges  and  pomegranates,  dates  and  figs, 
were  likewise  Algerian  products.  Nor  should  we  forget  the  ninety- 
odd  mines  of  Algeria,  which  annually  yielded  to  concessionaire 
companies  ten  million  dollars'  worth  of  iron,  zinc,  lead,  and 
phosphates.  All  this  meant  profits  for  certain  French  speculators 
and  business  men ;  while  the  French  people  at  large  paid  in  taxes 
some  four  million  dollars  a  year  to  maintain  troops  in  West 
Africa,  and  an  even  larger  amount  to  support  troops  in  Algeria 
and  to  pay  interest  to  stock-holders  of  the  Algerian  railways. 

French  occupation  also  meant  strong  undemocratic  govern- 
ment. Tunis  was  autocratically  ruled  by  a  representative  of  the 
French  foreign  office.  Senegal,  Guinea,  Ivory  Coast,  Dahomey, 
Upper-Senegal-and-Niger,  were  under  non-elective  French  lieu- 
tenant-governors, subject  to  a  governor-general.  Even  in  Algeria, 
which  regularly  sent  three  senators  and  six  deputies  to  the  French 
National  Assembly,  only  a  small  minority  of  the  population  had  a 
voice  in  choosing  its  ''representatives"  ;  and,  although  ''Delega- 
tions" or  chambers  representing  natives  as  well  as  colonists  regu- 
larly met  at  Algiers  to  discuss  local  affairs,  they  had  little  control 
over  the  powerful  governor-general.  The  natives  of  Africa,,  it 
seemed,  were  unfit  to  enjoy  democracy.  If  the  French  rule  was 
despotic,  it  at  least  had  the  merit  of  being  fairly  firm.  It  took 
almost  half  a  century  (1830-187 1)  thoroughly  to  subjugate 
Algeria ;  much  blood  was  shed  in  Wadai ;  constant  warfare  was 
being  waged  in  1914  against  the  rebellious  natives  of  Morocco; 


632 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


but  wherever  the  French  established  their  power,  they  endeavored 
with  success  to  prevent  tribal  wars,  to  maintain  order,  and  to 
encourage  the  arts  of  peace. 

Besides  her  vast  territories  in  northwestern  Africa,  with 
which  we  have  just  now  been  concerned,  France  had  also  impor- 
French  tant  posscssions  on  the  eastern  side  of  Africa.  French 
Somaiuand  Somaliland  (acquired  1864-1884)  at  the  head  of  the 
gulf  of  Aden,  and  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  Red  Sea,  was 
very  small  in  area,  but  great  in  strategic  value.  The  island  of 
Madagascar,  on  the  other  hand,  lying  260  miles  off  the  East 
Mada-  African  coast,  was  greater  in  size  than  in  value, 
gascar  Although  the  island  is  almost  a  thousand  miles  in 
length,  its  population  amounted  (1913)  to  only  3,250,000  and  its 
commerce  to  $20,000,000.  Madagascar,  we  may  observe,  was 
never  officially  occupied  by  the  French  until  1894-1895,  when 
victorious  French  arms  enforced  a  French  protectorate,  which 
was  subsequently  (1896)  converted  into  a  formal  colony. 

Italian  imperialism  began  in  a  very  modest  way  in  1870  when 
an  Italian  steamship  company  purchased  the  port  of  Assab,  on 
3  Italian  southwestern  shore  of  the  Red  Sea,  just  north  of 

Possessions  what  is  now  French  Somaliland.  Twelve  years  later 
in  Africa  Italian  government  took  Assab  over  as  a  colony ; 

and  with  Assab  as  a  nucleus,  Italy  built  up  the  colony  which  is 
now  called  Eritrea.  The  lowlands  of  Eritrea  made  good  pas- 
Eritrea  plateau  in  the  northern  part  was  fertile,  and 
pearl  fisheries  were  profitable ;  nevertheless,  instead  of 
bringing  in  revenue,  Eritrea  cost  the  Italian  taxpayers  each  year 
more  than  a  miUion  dollars.  A  second  Italian  colony  was  estab- 
lished in  1889  further  south  on  the  coast,  east  and  southeast  of 
Italian  Abyssinia.  This  was  Italian  Somaliland,  larger  than 
SomaiUand  Italy.  Pushing  inland,  both  Eritrea  and  Italian 
Somaliland  encroached  upon  the  Christian  but  primitive  kingdom 
of  Abyssinia  (Ethiopia).  The  Italians  made  no  secret  of  their 
eagerness  to  gain  control  of  the  attractive  Abyssinian  highlands, 
the  altitude  of  which  rendered  the  cHmate  almost  temperate, 
although  the  country  lay  wholly  within  the  torrid  zone.  Between 
1889  and  1896  Italy  even  claimed  that  Abyssinia  was  an  Italian 
protectorate.  To  such  a  pretension,  however,  the  Abyssinians 
would  not  submit,  and  under  the  leadership  of  their  emperor 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


633 


(or  negus)  Menelek,  they  made  war  against  Italy.  At  Adowa 
(1896)  Menelek  inflicted  such  a  crushing  defeat  on  the  Italian 
forces  that  in  the  same  year  Italy  gave  up  her  attacks  on  the 
independence  of  Abyssinia.  In  1906,  we  should  observe,  Italy, 
France,  and  Great  Britain  agreed  to  respect  Abyssinia's  freedom. 

Defeated  in  her  designs  on  Abyssinia,  Italy  next  turned  to 
Tripoli,  a  Turkish  province,  on  the  northern  coast  of  Africa. 
In  1 90 1  the  French  government  agreed  not  to  oppose  this  new 
ambition.  Consequently,  in  191 1  an  Italian  army  invaded 
Tripoli,  and,  after  a  year  of  fighting,  Turkey  was  forced  to  sur- 
render both  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  which  two  pro-  ^^.^^^ 
vinces  became  the  Italian  colony  of  Libya. ^  But  even 
after  the  war  between  Turkey  and  Italy  was  ended,  Italy  still 
had  to  maintain  armies  in  Libya ;  for  the  Arab  tribesmen  of  the 
interior — superb  horsemen,  daring  warriors,  and  zealous  Moham- 
medans —  continued  a  kind  of  irregular  warfare  against  the 
Italians.  Supporting  troops  in  Libya  was  tremendously  expen- 
sive ;  it  was  said  to  cost  something  like  $200,000  a  day.  The 
total  expense  of  acquiring  the  new  colony  soon  surpassed  the 
$200,000,000  mark ;  and,  in  addition,  new  millions  had  to  be 
spent  on  harbor  improvements,  docks,  and  railways,  before  Libya 
could  become  a  valuable  possession.  Some  parts  of  Libya  were 
indeed  fertile  and  fruitful;  but  most  of  the  interior  was  little 
more  than  an  expanse  of  desert,  dotted  here  and  there  with 
palm-trees  and  oases,  and  traversed  by  merchant  caravans,  but 
not  at  all  adapted  to  colonization. 

Although  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy,  —  not  to  speak  of 
Holland,  Spain,  and  Portugal,  —  had  all  entered  the  field  before 
Germany,  so  energetically  did  Germany  push  her  ^  German 
claims  that  within  six  years  (1884- 1890)  four  impor-  Possessions 
tant  sections  of  Africa  were  won  for  the  German 
Empire.    Even  the  smallest  of  the  German  colonies  in  Africa 
—  Togo  —  was  larger  than  the  American  state  of  ^^^^ 
Maine.    Togo  was  too  near  the  equator  to  attract 
German  colonists,  but  it  gave  German  commerce  a  convenient 
post  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  gulf  of  Guinea,  and  annually 
exported  more  than  $900,000  worth  of  palm-products  and  cotton. 
Kamerun,  just  at  the  bend  of  the  gulf  of  Guinea,  was  a  more  im- 

*  See  above,  pp.  514,  528. 


634 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


portant  colony.  Gradually  its  boundaries  were  extended  back 
into  the  richly  forested  mountain-country  until  Lake  Chad  and 
Kamerun  Shari  River  were  reached ;  and  a  hundred  thousand 

square  miles  of  French  Congo  were  added  to  Kamerun 
in  191 1,  giving  Germany  a  foothold  on  the  Ubangi  and  Congo 
rivers.  The  most  important  product  of  Kamerun,  as  of  Togo, 
was  palm-oil;  but  rubber  was  also  obtained  from  its  tropical 
forests,  and  a  considerable  amount  of  ivory ;  moreover  the 
Germans  were  beginning  to  establish  plantations  for  the  cultiva- 
tion of  cocoa,  coffee,  rubber,  and  spices,  by  negro-labor. 

Further  down  along  the  western  coast  was  German  Southwest 
Africa,  acquired  in  1884.  In  1890  Germany  gained  an  additional 
German  ^^^^P  territory  which  connected  German  Southwest 
Southwest  Africa  with  the  Zambesi  River,  thus  enabling  German 
Africa  merchants  to  tap  the  trade  of  the  Zambesi  valley. 
German  Southwest  Africa  was  from  the  first  an  expensive  colony, 
requiring  an  expenditure  by  Germany  of  more  than  a  million  dol- 
lars every  year.  It  is  estimated  that  Germany  spent  $75,000,000 
and  sacrificed  the  lives  of  5000  German  soldiers  and  settlers 
in  order  to  crush  a  native  rebellion  in  1 903-1 907.  This  was  all 
the  more  discouraging  because  the  lack  of  rain  made  the  whole 
southern  part  of  the  colony  a  desert  land,  and  this  was  the  only 
part  of  German  Africa  outside  the  tropics.  But  German  South- 
west Africa  suddenly  rose  in  value  when  diamonds  were  discovered 
near  Liideritz  Bay  in  1908  in  sufficient  quantities  to  yield  about 
$5,000,000  a  year. 

The  largest  and  most  populous  of  the  four  German  colonies 
was  German  East  Africa,  with  a  population  fifty  per  cent  larger 
German  than  that  of  New  England,  and  an  area  eight  times 
East  Africa  that  of  New  York  State.  Wedged  in  between  British 
East  Africa  and  Portuguese  East  Africa,  the  Germany  colony  was 
naturally  bounded  on  the  east  by  the  Indian  Ocean  and  on  the 
west  by  the  three  great  lakes  of  Victoria,  Tanganyika,  and  Nyasa. 
German  East  Africa  was  acquired  through  the  enterprise  of  three 
young  Germans  who  made  treaties  in  1884  with  the  native 
chieftains,  and  was  taken  under  protection  of  the  German  govern- 
ment in  1885 ;  a  strip  along  the  coast  had  to  be  purchased  from 
the  sultan  of  Zanzibar  at  the  price  of  $1,000,000 ;  and  the  bound- 
aries were  fixed  by  agreement  with  Great  Britain,  Portugal, 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


635 


and  the  Congo  Free  State.  In  East  Africa,  as  in  Southwest 
Africa,  the  Germans  encountered  fierce  resistance  and  frequently 
resorted  to  cruel  measures.  One  governor  did  not  hesitate  to 
put  women  to  death,  but  he  was  later  condemned  for  misusing 
his  authority.  Matters  reached  a  crisis  in  1905,  when  the  natives, 
who  resented  being  forced  to  labor  on  German  plantations,  rose 
in  a  general  rebellion.  More  than  100,000  perished  before  the 
rebellion  was  crushed.  This  attitude  of  the  negroes  and  Arabs  in 
German  East  Africa  is  worth  noticing  because  this  was  a  typical 
tropical  colony,  largely  unfit  for  colonization,  and  could  be 
developed  only  by  hiring  or  forcing  the  natives  to  work  at  the 
rubber-trees,  coffee-plantations,  and  banana-groves. 

In  general,  four  aspects  of  the  German  rule  in  Africa  may 
well  be  noticed,  (i)  First  of  all,  the  German  territories  were  not 
suitable  for  colonization,  because  they  were  either  too 
hot,  as  Kamerun,  or  too  dry,  as  German  Southwest  Aspects  of 
Africa.  (2)  Secondly,  the  value  of  these  possessions  German 
lay  chiefly  in  their  mines,  their  rubber,  their  rare  [^Africa^™ 
timber,  their  ivory,  their  palm-oil ;  and  also  in  the  pos- 
sibility that  in  the  future  they  might  produce  great  quantities  of 
cotton,  coffee,  cocoa,  tobacco,  and  other  tropical  products  which 
had  become  veritable  necessities  in  Europe.  In  this  hope  the 
German  government  established  experimental  stations  to  pro- 
mote the  cultivation  of  such  products ;  and  many  private  individ- 
uals established  large  plantations  with  negroes  to  do  the  work. 
It  thus  became  clear  above  all  that  the  Germans  must  transform 
the  negroes  from  lazy  savages  into  industrious  and  obedient 
toilers.  (3)  Thirdly,  as  might  be  expected  in  territories  where  a 
handful  of  white  men  had  to  rule  millions  of  discontented  negroes, 
the  government  was  absolutely  undemocratic.  In  each  colony 
the  supreme  authority  was  vested  in  an  imperial  governor, 
responsible  not  to  the  people  but  to  the  colonial  office  at  Berlin. 
It  was  government  primarily  in  the  interest  of  German  imperial- 
ism, and  secondarily  for  the  protection  of  German  merchants 
and  investors ;  the  interests  of  the  natives  were  least  considered. 
(4)  Fourthly,  as  for  civilizing"  the  natives,  the  government 
established  a  few  schools  in  each  colony;  in  Togo,  for  example, 
there  were  two  government  schools  with  312  pupils.  At  that 
rate,  it  would  be  slow  work  civilizing  a  million  natives.  The 


636  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


missionaries,  however,  were  doing  somewhat  better;  in  Togo 
they  had  368  schools  with  14,600  pupils.  And  in  all  German 
Africa  there  were  in  19 13  about  160,000  negro  children  receiv- 
ing some  kind  of  an  education. 

Portugal,  Belgium,  and  Spain  also  possessed  territories  in 
Africa.  We  have  already  treated  the  Belgian  Congo,  as  well  as 
the  Portuguese  colonies  of  Guinea,  Portuguese  West 
Possessions  Africa,  and  Portuguese  East  Africa.  Only  Spain 
of  Portugal,  remains.  Spain  in  1885,  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  con- 
and^SpSn  ference,  declared  a  Spanish  protectorate  over  a  por- 
tion of  the  coast  between  Cape  Bojador  and  Cape 
Blanco;  later  the  coast  between  Bojador  and  Morocco  was 
included ;  this  territory  now  constitutes  the  Rio  de  Oro  and  Adrar 
colonies,  and  is  administered  by  the  Spanish  governor  of  the 
Canary  Islands.  Spain  also  claimed  part  of  the  Guinea  coast, 
and  after  long  disputes  secured  a  small  strip  of  territory  (Rio 
Muni),  which  since  191 1  has  been  surrounded  on  the  land 
side  by  German  Kamerun.  In  Morocco,  also,  Spain  obtained  the 
northern  coast  and  a  small  district  on  the  western  coast  at  Ifni. 

There  yet  remained  two  independent  states  in  Africa,  un- 
appropriated by  Europeans.    One  was  the  ancient  empire  of 
Abyssinia  or  Ethiopia,  Christian  since  the  fourth  cen- 
ind^pendent  t^ry,  and  now  hemmed  in  on  every  side  by  British, 
states  in      French,  and  Italian  possessions.    By  an  agreement  be- 

1  Abyssinia  ^^^^^  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy,  the  independ- 

ence of  Abyssinia  was  assured,  although  in  the  spheres 
of  industry  and  finance  the  Abyssinians  became  more  or  less 
dependent  upon  British  and  French  capitalists.    The  other 

2  Liberia     ii^d^pendent  state,  Liberia,  was  established  in  the 

nineteenth  century  by  the  settlement  of  former  negro 
slaves,  mostly  from  the  United  States,  and  was  organized  in 
1847  as  a  free  republic  like  the  United  States.  In  this  remarkable 
negro  republic  —  approximately  the  size  of  Virginia  —  were 
included  about  50,000  civilized,  Christian,  English-speaking 
negroes,  together  with  about  two  millions  of  unci\ilized  negroes, 
some  of  whom  still  roamed  as  naked  caimibals  through  the  tropi- 
cal forests  in  the  heart  of  Liberia.  The  Liberians  had  such  vexa- 
tious boundary  disputes  with  the  neighboring  French  and  British 
colonies  that  in  19 10  President  Taft  offered  to  send  American 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


637 


officials  to  take  charge  of  the  Liberian  army,  to  collect  the  cus- 
toms, to  settle  boundary  disputes,  and  to  supervise  finance,  with 
the  cooperation  of  British,  French,  and  German  officials,  so  that 
Liberia  was  placed  partially  under  foreign  tutelage  without  be- 
coming a  mere  dependency  of  any  single  empire. 


ADDITIONAL  READING 

Latin  America.  General  works  of  history  and  description :  W.  R. 
Shepherd,  Latin  America  (1914),  in  the  "  Home  University  Library,"  the 
best  survey,  clear  and  accurate;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XII 
(1910),  ch.  xxi ;  F.  Garcia  Calderon,  Latin  America :  its  Rise  and  Progress, 
Eng.  trans,  by  Bernard  Miall  (1913),  a  valuable  work,  written  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  scholarly  Peruvian  diplomatist;  R.  P.  Porter,  The  Ten 
Republics  (191 1);  W.  H.  Koebel,  The  South  Americans  (191 5);  Arthur 
Ruhl,  The  Other  Americans:  the  Cities,  the  Countries,  and  especially  the 
People  of  South  America  (1908),  impressions  of  an  alert  traveler;  C.  R. 
Enock,  The  Republics  of  Central  and  South  America,  their  Resources,  In- 
dustries, Sociology  and  Future  (1913) ;  T.  C.  Dawson,  The  South  American 
Republics,  2  vols.  (1903-1904),  a  popular  historical  and  geographical  study 
of  each  of  the  South  American  countries  in  turn,  published  in  the  "  Story 
of  the  Nations  "  Series;  C.  E.  Akers,  A  History  of  South  America,  1854- 
1912,  2d  ed.  (1912),  sincere  but  ill-balanced  and  poorly  written;  James 
(Viscount)  Bryce,  South  America:  Observations  and  Impressions  (191 2), 
a  readable  account  of  the  impressions  produced  by  a  brief  visit.  An  in- 
dispensable book  of  reference  for  the  student  of  political  institutions  is 
J.  I.  Rodriguez,  American  Constitutions :  a  Compilation  of  the  Political 
Constitutions  of  the  Independent  Nations  of  the  New  World,  with  short  his- 
torical notes  and  various  appendixes,  2  vols,  (i 906-1 907),  in  the  language 
of  the  originals  with  Spanish  or  English  translation  in  parallel  columns. 
Trenchant  criticism  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  toward  the  Latin- 
American  republics  is  supplied  by  Hiram  Bingham,  The  Monroe  Doctrine: 
an  Obsolete  Shibboleth  (19 13). 

For  more  detailed  information  concerning  the  history  and  the  political, 
social,  and  economic  conditions  of  the  several  Latin-American  countries, 
the  volumes  in  the  "  South  American  Series,"  edited  by  Martin  Hume,  will 
be  found  generally  reliable:  W.  A.  Hirst,  Argentina  (1910) ;  Paul  Walle, 
Bolivia,  Eng.  trans,  by  Bernard  Miall  (1914) ;  Pierre  Denis,  Brazil,  Eng. 
trans,  by  Bernard  Miall  (191 1) ;  G.  F.  S.  Elliot,  Chile  (1909) ;  P.  J.  Eder, 
Colombia  (1913) ;  C.  R.  Enock,  Ecuador  (1914) ;  James  Rodway,  Guiana, 
British,  Dutch,  and  French  (1912);  C.  R.  Enock,  Mexico  (1909);  C.  R. 
Enock,  Peru,  2d  ed.  (1910) ;  W.  H.  Koebel,  Uruguay  (191 1);  and  L.  V. 
Dalton,  Venezuela  (1912).  Other  volumes  of  some  special  significance: 
Forbes  Lindsay,  Cuba  and  her  People  of  To-Day  (191 1),  interesting  descrip- 


638 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


tion  with  an  historical  introduction  and  with  appendices  of  importanli 
documents;  A.  G.  Robinson,  Cuba,  Old  and  New  (1915) ;  Stephen  Bonsai, 
The  American  Mediterranean  (191 2),  a  breezy  account  of  the  republics  in 
and  around  the  Caribbean  Sea;  Alcee  Fortier  and  J.  R.  Ficklen,  Central 
America  and  Mexico  (1907),  being  Vol.  IX  of  The  History  of  North  America, 
ed.  by  G.  C.  Lee  and  F.  N.  Thorpe ;  P.  F.  Martin,  Mexico  of  the  Twentieth 
Century,  2  vols.  (1907),  superficial  though  not  without  interest;  Arthur 
Bullard,  Panama,  the  Canal,  the  Country,  and  the  People,  new  ed.  (1914), 
popular  and  journalistic ;  Richard  Villafranca,  Costa  Rica  (1895) ;  W.  H. 
Koebel,  Argentina,  Past  and  Present  (1910).  For  the  earlier  history  of 
Latin  America  see  Chapters  II  and  XVII,  above,  and  the  accompanying 
bibliographies.  For  additional  titles  consult  the  helpful  pamphlet  of  P.  H. 
Goldsmith,  A  Brief  Bibliography  of  Books  in  English,  Spanish,  and  Portu- 
guese relating  to  the  Republics  commonly  called  Latin  American,  with  com- 
ments (191 5). 

The  Partition  of  Africa.  Brief  general  narratives :  CD.  Hazen,  Europe 
since  1815  (1910),  ch.  xxiii;  J.  H.  Rose,  The  Development  of  the  European 
Nations,  i8yo~igoo.  Vol.  II  (1905),  ch.  iv-viii,  especially  good  on  Egypt, 
the  Sudan,  and  the  Congo  Free  State ;  Histoire  gSnerale,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  xxvi, 
Le  partage  de  VAfrique,  iSyo-igoo,  by  R.  de  Caix  de  St.  Aymour ;  Sir  H.  H. 
Johnston,  The  Opening  Up  of  Africa  (191 1),  an  excellent  summary  in  the 
"Home  University  Library."  Standard  treatises:  Sir  Edward  Hertslet, 
The  Map  of  Africa  by  Treaty,  3d  edition,  completed  to  1908,  3  vols.  (1909), 
a  collection  of  treaties  in  EngHsh,  showing  how  the  "  Map  of  Africa  "  has 
been  changed  by  treaties  or  by  other  international  arrangements;  Sir 
H.  H.  Johnston,  A  History  of  the  Colonization  of  Africa  by  Alien  Races, 
new  rev.  ed.  (1913) ;  J.  S.  Keltic,  The  Partition  of  Africa  (1895) ;  N.  D. 
Harris,  Intervention  and  Colonization  in  Africa  (19 14),  not  so  authoritative 
as  Johnston  or  Keltie  but  more  detailed  on  the  period  since  1870.  On  the 
explorations:  Great  Explorers  of  Africa,  2  vols.  (1894),  an  interesting 
compilation;  Thomas  Hughes,  David  Livingstone  (1889),  a  brief  biography 
in  the  "  English  Men  of  Action  "  Series ;  W.  G.  Blaikie,  Personal  Life  of 
David  Livingstone  (1881) ;  David  Livingstone,  Missionary  Travels  and 
Researches  in  South  Africa,  25th  ed.  (i860),  and  Last  Journals  in  Central 
Africa  from  1865  to  his  death,  ed.  by  Horace  Waller  (1875) ;  and  the  writings 
of  Sir  H.  M.  Stanley,  How  I  found  Livingstone :  Travels  and  Adventures 
in  Central  Africa  (1872),  Through  the  Dark  Continent,  or  the  Sources  of  the 
Nile,  2  vols.  (1878),  In  Darkest  Africa,  new  ed.  (1897),  Congo  and  the 
Founding  of  its  Free  State,  2  vols.  (1885),  and  The  Autobiography  of  Henry 
M.  Stanley,  ed.  by  Dorothy  Stanley  (1909).  On  the  African  Empire  of 
the  French:  Roy  Devereux,  Aspects  of  Algeria:  Historical,  Political, 
Colonial  (191 2) ;  Victor  Piquet,  La  colonisation  frangaise  dans  VAfrique 
dunord:  Algerie — Tunisie  —  Maroc  (191 2);  Maurice  Wahl,  VAlgerie, 
4th  ed.  (1903) ;  EUis  Ashmead-Bartlett,  The  Passing  of  the  Shereefian 
Empire  (19 10),  a  popular  account  of  Morocco;  Andre  Tardieu,  Le  mystere 
d^Agadir  (191 2),  a  French  view  of  Franco-German  rivalry  in  Morocco  and 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


639 


Congo;  Annuaire  colonial,  an  official  French  publication,  annual  since 
1888,  gives  valuable  information  concerning  the  French  colonies.  For  other 
works  on  French  imperialism  see  the  bibliography  appended  to  Chapter 
XXIII,  above.  In  addition  to  works  on  German  imperialism  cited  in  the 
bibliography  of  Chapter  XXIV,  above,  consult  P.  E.  Lewin,  The  Germans 
and  Africa,  their  Aims  on  the  Dark  Continent  and  How  §iey  Acquired  their 
African  Colonies  (191 5).  For  the  British  colonies  in  Africa,  refer  to  the 
next  chapter  and  its  bibliography. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE 

In  1 9 14  approximately  one-fourth  of  the  earth's  habitable 
area  and  a  fourth  of  the  world's  population  were  embraced  by 
the  British  Empire.  No  better  sequel  could  be  found 
Greatest  to  the  foregoing  chapters  on  modern  imperialism 
Empire  ^^^^  ^  study  of  this  most  gigantic  product  of  colonial- 
ism with  its  perplexing  poHtical  and  economic  prob- 
lems. Larger  than  any  other  state  in  the  world,  nine  times 
the  size  of  the  German  Empire  (including  colonies) ,  and  consider- 
ably more  than  three  times  the  size  of  the  United  States,  by  its 
very  vastness  the  British  Empire  merits  attention.  Its  closest 
rival,  the  Russian  Empire,  boasted  in  19 14  only  three-quarters 
the  area  and  three-tenths  the  population. 

The  size  of  the  British  Empire  becomes  even  more  impressive 
when  compared  with  the  smallness  of  the  mother-country.  In 
area,  the  United  Kingdom  constituted  less  than  a  hundredth 
part  of  the  empire ;  in  population,  about  one-tenth.  Shorn 
of  its  colonies,  Great  Britain  would  have  been  a  comparatively 
small  state,  less  than  half  the  size  of  Texas,  with  less  than  three- 
quarters  the  population  of  Germany,  or  about  one-half  that  of 
the  United  States.  Indeed,  the  entire  EngHsh-speaking  people, 
if  we  exclude  the  United  States,  numbered  no  more  than  sixty 
millions,  whereas  there  were  sixty  millions  speaking  French, 
eighty  millions  speaking  German,  and  ninety  milhons  speaking 
Russian.  The  comparatively  small  size  of  the  British  nation 
proves  that  the  colossal  empire  was  not  produced  by  the  nor- 
mal increase  of  the  English-speaking  people.  In  the  entire 
empire,  there  were  only  sixty  milHon  white  inhabitants, 
three-fourths  of  whom  lived  in  the  British  Isles.  From  the 
remaining  fifteen  million  white  inhabitants  there  must  be  de- 
ducted 1,800,000  Canadians  of  French  origin,  500,000  Cana- 

640 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


641 


dians  of  other  nationalities,  700,000  South  Africans  of  Dutch 
and  German  extraction.  It  appears,  then,  that  there  were 
hardly  more  than  twelve  milhons  of  really  British  settlers 
in  aU  the  British  colonies."  For  every  one  of  the  British 
colonists  there  were  more  than  thirty  dusky-skinned  "  natives 
subject  to  British  rule.  Three  hundred  and  fifteen  milHon 
Asiatic  Indians,"  forty  milHon  blacks,  six  million  Arabs,  six 
milUon  Malays,  a  million  Chinese,  a  milhon  Polynesians,  and 
a  hundred  thousand  red  (Canadian)  Indians,  overwhelmingly 
outnumbered  the  British  in  the  empire. 

The  British  Empire  was  a  heterogeneous  collection  of  people 
of  every  race,  representing  every  phase  of  culture  from  cannibal- 
ism to  Cambridge,  inhabiting  lands  of  the  most  diverse  climates, 
professing  five  great  and  innumerable  lesser  rehgions,  and  in- 
habiting important  territories  in  five  of  the  world's  six  conti- 
nents.^ By  its  very  nature  such  an  empire  must  be  a  highly 
complex  and  inharmonious  organization,  the  more  so,  since  its 
constituent  parts  were  added  one  by  one,  some  by  conquest, 
some  by  mere  occupation,  some  by  settlement.  The  expansion 
of  "Greater  Britain"  was  guided  by  no  consistent  policy,  unless 
the  constant  shifting  of  poHcies  be  itself  a  policy.  It  has  indeed 
been  well  said  that  the  British  Empire  was  built  up  in  a  fit  of 
absence  of  mind.  So  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  instead  of  con- 
forming to  a  single  standard  type,  the  British  possessions  were 
of  many  varieties,  and  could  be  classified  only  with  consid- 
erable difficulty  in  three  major  groups  —  (i)  the  self-governing 
colonies ;  (2)  the  crown  colonies,  possessing  few  or  no  rights 
of  self-government,  the  chartered  companies,  and  the  protec- 
torates; (3)  India.  We  shall  treat  each  of  the  three  classes 
in  turn. 

SELF-GOVERNING  COLONIES 

The  self-governing  colonies  included  a  trifle  more  than  half 
of  the  territory  possessed  by  Great  Britain.  It  would  be  most 
misleading,  however,  to  say  that  half  of  the  British  colonies  en- 
joyed the  proud  privilege  of  governing  themselves ;  for  in  re- 
spect of  population  the  self-governing  colonies  constituted  only 

'  Asia,  Africa,  Australasia,  North  America,  and  Europe.    Even  in  South 
America  tbere  was  the  small  colony  of  Guiana. 
VOL.  n  —  a  T 


642 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


a  twentieth  part  of  the  British  colonial  empire.  Self-government 
was  a  special  privilege  conferred  by  Great  Britain  upon  a  very 
Seif-Gov-  small  minority  of  her  colonial  subjects,  not  a  natural 
ernment  the  right  granted  freely  to  all.  Moreover,  one  cannot 
PrivUegYof   ^^i^  impressed  by  the  fact  that  this  privileged 

"  White  "  minority  was  exclusively  of  European  stock  :  that 
Colonies  ^j^^  colonies  enjoying  home  rule  were  precisely  the 
colonies  in  which  large  numbers  of  Europeans  had  settled  — 
Canada,  Newfoundland,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  Union 
of  South  Africa.  In  none  of  these  colonies  did  the  native  popu- 
lation amount  to  more  than  five  per  cent  of  the  whole,  except 
in  South  Africa  ;  and  even  South  Africa  had  over  a  million  white 
inhabitants.^  Outside  of  the  self-governing  colonies,  there  were 
but  a  few  thousand  white  men  in  all  the  British  dominions.^ 
Self-government,  in  short,  was  enjoyed  by  almost  all  the 
''white"  colonies,  and  by  none  other.  And  since  Great  Britain 
alone  of  all  the  European  Powers  possessed  ''white"  colonies, 
colonial  self-government  existed  only  within  the  British  Empire.^ 
In  order  to  understand  how  the  white  colonies  of  Great  Britain 
obtained  the  right  of  ruling  themselves,  it  is  necessary  to  refer 
^,  „    ,    once  more,  let  us  hope  for  the  last  time,  to  the  old 

The  Royal         i     .  1  r  1       a        •         V.       1  • 

Governor  colonial  system.  Before  the  American  Revolution, 
and  the  British  colonies  had  developed  a  mixed  form  of 

Colonial  T     .  1  •        1  •  1  n 

Assembly  colonial  government,  m  which  the  royal  governor  of 
o^d^System  ^^^^  province  or  colony  was  the  appointee  and  official 
representative  of  the  British  Crown,  and  the  elective 
assembly  was  the  champion  of  local,  colonial  interests.  There 
was  usually  also  a  legislative  council,  which  constituted  the 
upper  house  of  each  colonial  legislature,  and  was  as  a  rule  both 
appointed  and  controlled  by  the  royal  governor.  The  colonial 
assembly,  like  the  English  House  of  Commons,  had  originally 
held  the  purse-strings  of  the  government  and  had  attempted  to 
use  its  financial  powers  for  the  purpose  of  asserting  the  right  to 
frame  the  laws  and  to  control  the  administration.    As  a  result. 


^  They  formed  more  than  20  per  cent  of  the  population. 

2  The  Falkland  Islands  and  the  Mediterranean  colonies  were  "white"  but  not 
self-governing ;  in  the  W est  Indies  also  there  were  a  fairly  large  number  of  white 
settlers. 

3  Except  in  the  Danish  colony  of  Iceland. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


643 


there  had  been  constant  quarrels  between  governor  and  assembly. 
The  struggle  had  ended  in  the  complete  triumph  of  the  colonial 
legislatures  in  the  thirteen  American  colonies  which  revolted 
from  the  mother-country.  But  in  the  other  colonies,  in  Canada 
for  example,  the  contest  continued  until  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century. 

Canada  had  not  been  given  an  elective  assembly  by  the  Quebec 
Act  of  1774,  but  only  a  council  appointed  by  the  crown,  for  the 
reason  that  the  people  of  Canada  were  then  mostly  q^^^^^^^^ 
French  and  were  presumably  neither  accustomed  to  Govern- 
representative  government  nor  loyal  to  Great  Britain.  ^774- 
After  the  American  Revolution,  however,  Ontario  re- 
ceived such  large  numbers  of  Scotch  and  Scotch-Irish  immigrants 
in  addition  to  LoyaHst  refugees  from  the  United  States,  that 
WilHam  Pitt  thought  it  necessary  to  pass  a  Constitutional  Act 
in  1 791,  separating  Upper  Canada  (or  Ontario),  which  was 
entirely  British,  from  Lower  Canada  (or  Quebec),  which  was 
overwhelmingly  French,  and  establishing  an  elective  assembly 
in  each  of  th^  two  provinces.    Pitt's  scheme  failed.    Not  only 
were  the  French  and  British  elements  in  Canada  inflamed 
against  each  other,  but  also  in  each  of  the  provinces  the  old 
quarrel  arose,  whether  the  royal  governor  or  the  colonial  assembly 
was  to  control  the  ministers  who  conducted  the  government.^ 
In  Lower  Canada,  where  the  antagonism  was  intensified  by 
the  fact  that  the  Assembly  was  mainly  French  and  the  governor 
EngUsh,  the  arbitrary  acts  of  the  governor  infuriated  the  French 
or  popular  party  and  brought  about  the  Rebellion  of  1837. 
Almost  simultaneously  the  reform  party  in  Upper 
Canada  resorted  to  arms.    The  rebellion  was  easily  Canadian 
crushed,  but  it  succeeded  in  calling  attention  to  Can-  ^g®^^^®^°°  °^ 
ada's  grievances  and  aroused  the  British  government 
to  send  a  High  Commissioner  to  redress  them.    Lord  Durham, 
who  was  selected  for  this  difficult  mission,  perceived  at  once 
that  radical  reforms  were  needed,  and  with  characteristic  im- 
petuosity he  started  out  to  exercise  all  the  arbitrary  powers  of 
a  dictator  in  pacifying  Canada.    When  the  British  government 

^  In  Lower  Canada  the  upper  chamber  of  the  le??islature  was  aj^pointed  by  the 
governor  and  joined  with  him  in  opposing  the  lower,  elective  chamber.  In  Upper 
Canada  the  upper  chamber  sympathized  with  the  lower. 


644 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


refused  to  uphold  him  in  this  course  and  revoked  his  ordinance 
banishing  certain  rebel  leaders,  Lord  Durham  angrily  resigned, 
Lq^jI  returned  home  in  a  huff,  and  published  a  lengthy  re- 

Durham's  port.  The  report  is  famous  in  British  colonial  his- 
Report,  1839  iQYy^  because  in  it  two  fundamental  principles  of  Great 
Britain's  later  policy  were  clearly  enunciated.  In  the  first 
place  Lord  Durham  contended  that  the  colonies  already  possess- 
ing representative  institutions  should  be  granted  responsible 
governments,  i.e.  should  be  permitted  to  manage  their  own 
affairs  through  ministries  responsible  to  the  several  colonial 
assemblies.  Lord  Durham  realized  that  his  plan  for  conferring 
responsible  government  on  the  colonies  would  emancipate  them 
from  the  control  of  the  royal  governor  and  of  the  mother-country, 
except  in  a  few  matters  like  foreign  policy,  over  which  the  colonial 
government  would  have  no  power.  But  he  maintained  that 
with  self-government  the  colonies  would  be  more  loyal,  having 
fewer  causes  of  complaint  against  the  mother-country.  In  the 
second  place.  Lord  Durham  pleaded  for  the  unification  of  Upper 
and  Lower  Canada,  so  that  French  Lower  Canada  would  be 
dominated  by  British  Upper  Canada.  Ultimately,  he  hoped, 
all  of  British  North  America  might  be  confederated  into  one 
united  colony.  These  two  principles  —  responsible  self-govern- 
ment and  colonial  confederation  —  were  destined  to  triumph  not 
only  in  Canada,  but  in  far-off  AustraHa  and  South  Africa  as 
well. 

In  accordance  with  Lord  Durham's  recommendation.  Upper 
and  Lower  Canada  were  at  once  united  (1840).  Seven  years 
Responsible  l^tcr  his  son-in-law,  Lord  Elgin,  became  governor  of 
Government  Canada  and  put  into  practice  the  other  recommenda- 
?anada  and  ^i^^'  ^^^^  royal  governor  should  choose  his  cabinet 
other  from  the  majority  party  in  the  assembly,  thus  recog- 
Coiomes  nizing  the  principle  of  responsible  government.  It  is 
significant  that  Lord  Elgin  gave  Canada  responsible  government 
(which  amounted  to  self-government)  just  a  year  or  so  after 
the  Free  Traders  in  England  had  repealed  the  Corn  Laws  (1846) 
and  dealt  a  staggering  blow  to  the  old  mercantilist  theory  of 
trade  and  colonies.  Almost  immediately  the  same  freedom  to 
control  their  own  government  was  granted  to  the  other  North 
American  colonies  of  New  Brunswick,  Nova  Scotia,  and  Prince 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


645 


Edward  Island.  Before  i860,  Newfoundland,  and  the  Austra- 
lasian colonies  of  New  South  Wales,  Victoria,  Tasmania,  South 
Australia,  and  Queensland  had  Hkewise  been  accorded  responsible 
governments.  Subsequently  Cape  Colony  (1872),  Western  Aus- 
tralia (1890),  Natal  (1893),  Transvaal  (1906),  and  the  Orange 
River  Colony  (1907)  were  added  to  the  list  of  self-governing 
colonies,  the  two  last-mentioned  provinces  having  been  promised 
self-government  by  the  terms  of  the  Boer  capitulation  at  the 
close  of  the  Boer  War  (1899-1902). 

Pessimistic  patriots  saw  only  a  foolhardy  altruism  in  this 
extension  of  responsible  self-government  to  all  of  Great  Britain's 
important  white  colonies  in  the  years  from  1847  to  1907,  espe- 
cially when  the  colonies  used  their  freedom,  as  did  Canada  in 
1859,  to  lay  taxes  on  imports  from  the  mother-country.  But 
the  Liberal  statesmen  who  had  definitely  committed  Great 
Britain  to  Free  Trade  in  the  momentous  years  1846-1849, 
looked  upon  colonial  autonomy  as  no  more  than  the  logical 
consequence  of  Liberal,  laisser-faire  principles,  and  prophesied 
that  the  extension  of  freedom  would  only  magnify  the  greatness 
and  promote  the  prosperity  of  the  Empire.  Self-government, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  did  have  just  this  effect  in  stimulating  the 
patriotism  of  the  white  colonies.  Now  that  the  mother-country 
no  longer  irritated  them  by  interfering  in  their  local  affairs, 
Canada  and  Australasia  became  enthusiastically  loyal  to  the 
British  crown,  and  realized  as  never  before  that  they  were 
indeed  fortunate  at  so  Kttle  cost  to  themselves  to  enjoy  the  pro- 
tection of  the  world's  mightiest  Empire  and  to  share  in  its 
prestige. 

As  Canada  had  been  the  first  colony  to  obtain  a  responsible 
government,  so  also  Canada  was  the  pioneer  in  another  important 
movement,  the  formation  of  confederations  among  the  EstabUsh- 
self-crovernins:  colonies.    In  1867  the  hitherto  separate  °? 

1     •         f  -v T       -r.  •  1  1  -KT         <-.•••!   Dominion  of 

colomes  of  New  Brunswick  and  Nova  Scotia  joined  Canada, 
with  Quebec  and  Ontario  to  form  a  confederation  ^^^7 
with  the  style  of  the  "  Dominion  of  Canada."  The  Dominion 
was  formally  organized  under  the  British  North  America  Act 
of  1867,  passed  by  the  British  Parliament  at  Westminster;  but 
the  plan  had  originated  in  Canada  and  had  been  fully  formu- 
lated by  a  convention  at  Quebec  in  1864.    The  government  of 


646 


HISTORY  or  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  Dominion  was  a  rough  copy  of  the  British  government, 
with  the  governor-general  instead  of  the  king,  a  senate  (appointed 
by  the  governor-general  for  life)  in  place  of  the  House  of  Lords, 
and  an  elective  House  of  Commons,  to  which  the  cabinet  of 
ministers  was  responsible.  Although  each  of  the  four  provinces 
preserved  its  separate  legislature,  there  was  Httle  question  of 

states'  rights"  in  Canada.  With  the  terrible  example  of  the 
United  States  in  civil  war  close  at  hand,  the  framers  of  the 
Canadian  constitution  carefully  limited  the  powers  of  the  prov- 
inces, in  order  that  the  supremacy  of  the  federal  government 
might  never  be  challenged.  Nova  Scotia,  to  be  sure,  desired 
to  withdraw  from  the  Dominion,  but  the  British  government 
firmly  refused  to  countenance  any  such  secession,  and  the  unity 
of  the  Dominion  was  maintained. 

Under  the  auspices  of  the  Conservative  Party,  whose  leader, 
Sir  John  Macdonald,  was  premier  from  1867  to  1891  (excepting 
TheExpan-  years  1873-1878),  the  miHtia,  postal  system, 

sion  of  civil  service,  banking,  and  currency  of  the  Dominion 
Canada  were  placed  upon  a  sound  basis;  a  protective  tariff 
was  established  for  the  benefit  of  Canadian  industries ;  and  the 
westward  expansion  of  Canada  to  the  Pacific  was  accomplished. 
The  growth  of  the  Dominion  was  amazingly  swift.  First  from 
the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  extensive  territories  west  of  Ontario 
were  purchased  (1869) ,  out  of  which  the  new  province  of  Manitoba 
was  carved;  then  British  Columbia  (1871)  and  Prince  Edward 
Island  (1873)  were  brought  into  the  Dominion;  finally  a  decree 
of  1878  proclaimed  that  all  British  North  America  —  with  the 
sole  exception  of  stubborn  Newfoundland,  which  remains  to  this 
day  a  separate  colony,  —  belonged  to  the  Dominion.  The  rich 
mines  and  fertile  prairies  of  western  Canada  attracted  a  steady 
stream  of  settlers,  particularly  after  the  construction  of  the 
Canadian  Pacific  Railway  (1886),  and  the  resulting  marvelous 
economic  development  of  the  west  received  political  recognition 
by  the  creation  of  two  new  prairie  provinces.  Alberta  and  Sas- 
katchewan, in  1905. 

Notwithstanding  the  evident  success  of  the  confederating 
movement  in  Canada,  the  Australian  colonies  hesitated  a  long 
time  before  they  finally  decided  to  form  a  similar  federal  union. 
During  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century,  six  self-governing 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


647 


colonies  had  appeared  in  Australasia  besides  the  original  colony 
of  New  South  Wales,  which  had  been  estabHshed  as  a  penal 
station^  in  1788,  and  had  since  developed  into  a  free,  TheAustra- 
prosperous  community  of  sheep-farmers,  mechanics,  lasian  Coio- 
and  miners,  endowed  with  self-government  (1855). 
Two  daughter-colonies  had  been  separated  from  New  South 
Wales,  —  on  the  north,  Queensland  (1859),  and,  on  the  south, 
Victoria  (1851).  Two  other  colonies.  South  Australia  (1836) 
and  Western  AustraKa  (1829),  had  been  founded  independently, 
thus  making  five  colonies  on  the  island  continent.  A  sixth 
colony  was  the  neighboring  island  of  Tasmania  or  Van  Die- 
men's  Land  (separated  from  New  South  Wales  in  1824).  And 
the  more  distant  islands  of  New  Zealand,  colonized  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  might  count  as  a  seventh.  At  the  opening  of 
the  nineteenth  century  the  introduction  of  sheep-raising,  and 
in  the  middle  of  the  century  the  discovery  of  gold,  had  enabled 
these  island-colonies  of  the  South  Pacific  to  spring  almost  in- 
stantaneously into  maturity. 

The  Australian  colonies  would  no  doubt  have  been  consolidated 
as  early  as  1885,  had  they  not  been  divided  on  the  tariff  ques- 
tion.   Victoria  and  the  other  colonies  had  adopted  -j-jj^^^g^^ 
a  protective  tariff,  while  New  South  Wales  clung  uan  Com- 
stubbornly  to  free  trade.    The  younger  colonies,  ^^^^^^^^^^ 
moreover,  were  reluctant  to  surrender  the  revenues 
they  obtained  from  their  separate  customs  duties.    But  the 
advantages  to  be  gained  by  confederation  —  especially  the 
advantage  of  concerted  action  in  excluding  Chinese  immigrants 
and  in  maintaining  British  supremacy  in  the  South  Pacific 
against  French  and  German  intruders  ^  —  finally  outweighed 
the  disadvantages.    After  long  discussion,  the  colonists  agreed 
upon  a  plan  of  confederation  which  was  enacted  by  the  British 
Parliament  as  the  Commonwealth  of  AustraKa  Act,  1900.  New 
Zealand,  being  separated  from  Australia  by  1200  miles  of  water, 
refused  to  join  the  Commonwealth,  just  as  the  island  of  New- 
foundland had  held  aloof  from  the  Dominion  of  Canada.  The 

*  No  more  convicts  were  shi{)pecl  to  New  South  Wales  after  1840. 

*  Germany,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  pursuing  an  ambitious  policy  in  Oceanica, 
having  acquired  Kaiser  Wilhelms  Land,  the  Bismarck  Archipelago,  and  the  Mar- 
shall Islands  (1884- 1885). 


648  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


other  six  colonies  became  States  in  the  Commonwealth,^  imdeif 
a  constitution  strongly  resembhng  that  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  The  federal  or  Commonwealth  legislature,  like  the 
United  States  Congress,  was  composed  of  a  Senate,  in  which 
each  state  had  the  same  number  (six)  of  seats,  and  a  House  of 
Representatives,  in  which  the  seats  were  distributed  according 
to  population.  The  High  Court  of  the  Commonwealth,  like 
the  American  Supreme  Court,  was  the  guardian  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. In  delegating  only  Hmited  powers  to  their  federal  govern- 
ment, moreover,  the  Australians  imitated  the  federal  structure 
of  the  United  States  rather  than  the  unitary  poKcy  of  Canada. 
In  two  important  respects,  however,  the  Australian  Common- 
wealth was  essentially  British.  Its  highest  magistrate  was  a 
governor-general,  appointed  theoretically  by  the  British  crown, 
really  by  the  ministry  of  the  United  Kingdom.  And  its  cabinet  of 
ministers  was  responsible  to  parhament  rather  than  to  a  presi- 
dent. It  is  also  worth  observing  that  AustraHa  was  more  demo- 
cratic than  the  United  States,  in  allowing  women  to  vote  and 
in  providing  for  constitutional  amendment  by  referendum. 

The  history  of  the  Commonwealth  may  be  summed  up  as 
the  search  for  solutions  to  five  problems,  (i)  The  problem  of 
AustraUan  defense,  which  will  be  considered  later.  (2)  The  ques- 
Probiems  ^[^y^^  states'  rights  has  proved  troublesome,  especially 
in  respect  of  the  financial  relations  between  the  Commonwealth 
and  the  States,  in  the  matter  of  industrial  legislation,  and  in 
regard  to  the  State  railways,  which  were  built  on  a  different 
gauge  in  the  different  States.  (3)  Difficulty  has  been  encoun- 
tered with  the  bicameral  form  of  legislature,  both  in  the  federal 
and  in  the  State  governments,  when  the  upper  chamber  has 
happened  to  oppose  the  lower.  (4)  Rural  development  has  been 
a  primary  concern  of  the  Government.  Irrigation  works  have 
been  constructed,  railways  built  into  the  interior,  and  all  manner 
of  inducements  offered  to  farmers,  in  the  hope  not  only  of  bring- 
ing undeveloped  land  under  cultivation,  but  also  of  creating 
a  rural  population  commensurate  with  the  overgrown  and 
trouble-giving  towns.  (5)  Most  interesting  of  all  has  been  the 
effort  of  AustraHa  to  cope  with  the  problem  of  poverty.  After 

^  Subsequently  the  Commonwealth  took  over  the  government  of  the  Northern 
Territory  of  Australia  (1911)  and  Papua  or  British  New  Guinea  (1905). 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


649 


a  furious  but  futile  fight  for  the  principle  of  the  "closed  shop  "  (in 
the  Great  Strike  of  1890),  the  workingmen  had  become  con- 
vinced that  they  must  use  the  ballot-box  as  well  as  the  _  .  ,  , 

1        •  1  •         1    •  -1  1       T    1        Social  and 

trade  union  to  achieve  their  economic  demands.  Labor  Labor 
parties  in  the  several  States  demanded  sociahstic  legis-  Legislation 

r   .  -r^  o  1  T7«        •  1       in  Australia 

lation.  Between  1890  and  1910  Victoria  passed  a 
series  of  laws  providing,  amongst  other  things,  for  the  creation  of 
trades  boards  to  regulate  the  wages  and  hours  of  industrial  labor ; 
Queensland  and  South  Australia  followed  suit,  while  New  South 
Wales  borrowed  a  somewhat  different  scheme  ^  from  New  Zea- 
land. The  federal  government  followed  the  lead  of  the  States, 
estabhshing  a  Federal  Arbitration  Court  in  1904  for  the  peace- 
ful settlement  of  interstate  industrial  disputes,  and  in  1908  pro- 
viding old  age  pensions  (ten  shilhngs  a  week)  for  poor  people 
over  sixty-five  years  of  age  or  invahds  over  sixty.  Possibly 
one  reason  for  the  wilhngness  of  the  Australians  to  experiment 
with  social  legislation  was  the  fact  that  the  Austrahan  railways 
had  been  constructed  and  operated  from  the  first  as  sociahstic 
enterprises.  Other  branches  of  industry  would  doubtless  have 
been  taken  over  by  the  government  and  a  much  more  effective 
regulation  of  business  would  have  been  introduced  by  Andrew 
Fisher,  a  former  Scotch  coal-miner,  who  became  Commonwealth 
prime  minister  in  1910  ^  with  a  Labor  cabinet  and  a  large  Labor 
majority  behind  him ;  but  he  could  not  induce  the  people  to 
pass  the  constitutional  amendments  which  would  give  the  Com- 
monwealth government  power  to  enact  the  Labor  party's  so- 
ciahstic program. 

The  other  Australasian  colony.  New  Zealand,  which  remained 
apart  from  the  Commonwealth,  might  be  regarded  as  a  confedera- 
tion in  itself ;  geographically  New  Zealand  is  a  group  Domin- 
of  islands  (two  large  and  numerous  small  islands) ;  ion  of  New 
while  poHtically,  New  Zealand  was  divided  until  1876 
into  six  provinces,  each  having  a  legislature.  In  1907,  at  any 
rate,  New  Zealand  was  styled  a  ''Dominion"  and  classed  with 
the  confederations  of  Canada  and  AustraHa.  During  the  last 
quarter-century  New  Zealand  has  attracted  world-wide  atten- 

1  An  arbitration  court  to  prevent  strikes,  to  fix  minimum  wage  rates,  and  to 
determine  the  number  of  working  hours. 

'  He  had  held  the  office  six  months  in  1908. 


650  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


tion  by  its  radical  experiments  in  political  and  economic  democ- 
racy.    New  Zealand's  radicalism  dates  from  the  year  1890, 

when  the  trade  unions,  excited  by  the  Great  Strike 
and  So^ciai  ^^^^  year,  entered  politics  with  the  purpose  of  using 
Democracy  their  powerful  organization  as  a  political  machine  in 
Zealand  interests  of  labor  and  democracy.     The  trade 

unions  elected  few  ''Labor"  representatives  to  parlia- 
ment, but  they  wielded  a  most  potent  influence  over  the  "Lib- 
eral" Party,  which,  thanks  to  workingmen's  votes,  held  office 
from  1 89 1  to  191 2.  Under  the  impulse  of  this  radical  movement, 
New  Zealand  extended  the  franchise  to  adult  women  and  thus 
stood  forth  as  one  of  the  pioneers  of  universal  suffrage.  Another 
constitutional  reform  was  the  democratization  of  the  Upper 
House  of  the  legislature,  whose  members  had  originally  been 
appointed  for  Hfe;  first  the  term  was  reduced  to  seven  years 
(1891),  and  finally  the  Upper  House  was  made  elective  on  the 
broad  basis  of  popular  suffrage  and  proportional  representation. 
More  remarkable  than  these  democratic  reforms,  however, 
were  the  socialistic  enterprises  of  the  government.  Govern- 
ment-owned railways,  government  hfe-insurance,  accident- 
insurance,  and  fire-insurance  offices,  and  government  coal-mines 
were  some  of  New  Zealand's  experiments  in  state-socialism. 
Notable  also  was  the  land-tax,  which  was  graduated  so  as  to 
fall  chiefly  on  great  landlords,  and  the  Advance  to  Settlers  Act 
(1894),  which  provided  government  loans  to  farmers.  An 
Industrial  Conciliation  and  Arbitration  Act  (1895)  created  a 
court  to  settle  disputes  between  trade  unions  and  capitalists. 
Pensions  were  given  to  aged  working-people  (1898),  and  com- 
pensation to  workingmen  injured  by  accident  (1900). 

The  confederation  of  four  British  colonies  in  South  Africa 
followed  nine  years  after  the  creation  of  the  AustraHan  Common- 
o  xt.  w  .     wealth.    The  previous  chapter  has  already  told  the 

South  Afnca  ^  111  r     1  iAr« 

story  how  Cape  Colony,  the  oldest  of  the  South  Afri- 
can settlements,  was  wrested  by  Great  Britain  from  the  Dutch 
(1806),  and  how  the  unsubmissive  Dutch  farmers  or  Boers, 
feeling  that  the  British  government  was  more  kindly  disposed 
toward  the  negroes  than  toward  themselves,  ''trekked"  to  Natal, 
to  Orange  Free  State,  and  to  the  Transvaal.  Cape  Colony 
had  been  given  responsible  government  in  1872,  a  year  after 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


651 


the  discovery  of  fabulous  wealth  in  diamond  mines.  Natal 
had  been  annexed  by  Great  Britain  in  1843,  separated  from  Cape 
Colony  ten  years  later,  and  granted  self-government  in  1893 ; 
by  the  close  of  the  century  the  British  settlers  in  Natal  outnum- 
bered the  Boers.  Meanwhile  the  Boer  repubHc  of  British  and 
Orange  Free  State/  since  the  recognition  of  its  inde- 
pendence  in  1854,  prospered  under  the  rule  of  its  president, 
John  Brand,  although  the  valuable  Klimberley  diamond  fields, 
discovered  in  Free  State  territory,  were  annexed  by  Great 
Britain  (187 1)  and  Orange  Free  State  received  therefor  only 
£90,000  indemnity.  The  other  Boer  repubUc,  the  "South 
African  RepubHc,"  was  organized  in  the  Transvaal  country  as  a 
result  of  a  further  ''trek"  on  the  part  of  the  Boers  (1848-1852), 
and  its  independence  was  recognized  by  Great  Britain  in  a 
treaty  known  as  the  "  Sand  River  Convention "  (1852) ;  in 
1877  it  was  annexed  by  a  British  commissioner ;  but  four  years 
later,  after  the  Transvaal  Boers  had  revolted  and  defeated  a 
small  British  force  at  Majuba  Hill  (1881),  Gladstone  virtually 
restored  their  independence.^  Unfortunately  the  Transvaal 
Boers  interpreted  Gladstone's  benevolent  concession  as  a 
cowardly  confession  of  Great  Britain's  weakness,  and  henceforth 
they  regarded  the  British  with  more  of  scornful  hatred  than 
of  respectful  fear.  The  Boers  even  dreamed  of  regaining  Cape 
Colony  and  establishing  Boer  supremacy  in  all  South  Africa. 
The  Afrikander  Bond  was  formed  to  promote  Boer  interests. 
The  relations  of  the  Boers  with  the  British  were  not  improved 
when  the  Transvaal  was  invaded  by  hordes  of  eager  British 
fortune-hunters  after  the  discovery  of  the  world's  richest  gold 
mines  in  the  Rand  region  of  the  Transvaal  (1886),  or  when  the 
British  shut  the  Transvaal  off  from  all  access  to  the  ocean  by 
annexing  Zululand  and  the  territory  just  south  of  Delagoa  Bay 
(which  was  Portuguese),  or  when  Dr.  Jameson  with  a  band  of 
British  mounted  police  rashly  attempted  a  filibustering  expe- 
dition against  the  Transvaal  (1895).    The  ''Jameson  Raid,"  as 

'Founded,  1836;  annexed  by  Great  Britain,  1848;  independent  again,  1854- 
1900. 

The  Pretoria  Convention  (1881)  gave  the  Transvaal  autonomy  under  British 
suzerainty ;  even  suzerainty  seemed  to  have  been  abandoned  by  the  London  Con- 
vention of  1884, 


652 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


the  invasion  was  called,  failed  miserably,  but  it  warned  the  Boers 
to  be  on  their  guard.  From  1895  to  1899  the  Transvaal  govern- 
ment, headed  by  that  hardy  old  Dutch  pioneer,  President  Paul 
Kruger,  became  steadily  more  hostile  to  the  British ;  while  the 
^'Uitlanders,"  or  British  miners  who  had  settled  in  the  Transvaal, 
cried  out  ever  more  loudly  against  the  unfriendly  and  oligarchi- 
cal Boer  government.  The  refusal  of  the  Boers  to  enfranchise 
the  Uitlanders  "  (except  after  seven  years'  residence)  was  one 
of  the  greatest  grievances. 

The  final  struggle  between  the  British  and  the  two  Boer 
Republics  began  in  1899  with  the  outbreak  of  the  South  African 
The  Boer  ^^.Y  (1899-1902).  At  the  outsct  the  Boers  took  the 
War,  1899-  offensive,  invading  Natal  and  striking  at  the  Kimber- 
ley  diamond  fields  of  Cape  Colony ;  but  British  reen- 
forcements  poured  into  South  Africa  until  finally  no  fewer  than 
350,000  men  had  been  put  into  the  field  under  the  able  command 
of  Lord  Roberts  (1832-1914)  and  Lord  Kitchener  (1850-1916). 
The  Boers  probably  never  had  more  than  40,000  men  in  the 
field  together.  Overwhelmed  by  sheer  force  of  numbers,  the 
republican  troops  had  to  retreat  and  on  5  June,  1900,  surrender 
their  capital  city  of  Pretoria.  Nevertheless  two  years  of  guerrilla 
warfare  were  required  before  the  last  irregular  bands  of  Boer 
riflemen  were  broken  up.  At  last  peace  was  made  in  May,  1902. 
By  the  terms  of  peace.  Great  Britain  promised  to  grant  respon- 
sible government  to  the  two  Boer  Republics  (Orange  Free  State 
and  the  Transvaal)  which  had  been  annexed  during  the  war. 
The  promise  was  carried  out  in  1906  as  regards  the  Transvaal 
and  in  1907  as  regards  the  Orange  Free  State. 

The  way  was  now  clear  for  the  confederation  of  South  Africa. 
Earlier  projects  of  union  had  met  shipwreck  either  by  reason  of 
The  Union  British  disapproval  or  because  of  Boer  nationalism, 
of  South  But  Britain  was  now  wilKng,  Boer  resistance  had  been 
Afnca,  1909  (,j.^g]^g(^^  union  was  imperatively  necessary  for 
the  estabhshment  of  uniform  tariffs,  for  the  administration  of 
interstate  railways,  and  for  the  adoption  of  a  vigorous  native 
policy.  An  intercolonial  convention  for  the  discussion  of  tariff 
questions  was  speedily  followed  by  agreement  upon  a  plan  of 
consolidation  which  was  ratified  by  the  British  Parliament  in 
September,  1909.    Cape  Colony,  Natal,  the  Transvaal,  and 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


653 


Orange  Free  State  became  provinces  in  the  Union  of  South 
Africa,  a  union  even  more  strongly  centralized  than  Canada. 
As  the  Boers  received  equal  rights  with  the  British  in  the  new 
Union,  both  in  respect  of  language  and  in  respect  of  pohtical 
pri\dleges,  the  Union  Parhament  and  the  ministry  responsible 
to  it  at  once  fell  under  the  control  of  the  ''South  African"  or 
Boer  party.  General  Louis  Botha,  who  had  so  vaHantly  fought 
against  Great  Britain,  became  the  first  premier  of  the  Union, 
and  the  British  or  Unionist  party  fell  naturally  into  the  position 
of  a  minority. 

Animosity  between  Boer  farmers  and  British  business  men 
continued  to  vex  the  Union  of  South  Africa ;  but  with  the  rapid 
development  of  the  mining  industry  still  more  serious  problems 
pressed  for  solution.  In  the  first  place,  the  government  had 
to  cope  with  a  \dolent  Syndicalist  agitation  among  the  British- 
born  skilled  laborers,  an  agitation  which  grew  even  more  violent 
after  the  Rand  strike  of  1913,  when  government  troops  had 
ruthlessly  shot  down  strikers  in  the  streets  of  Johannesburg. 
In  the  second  place,  the  Union  hved  constantly  in  fear  of 
native  uprisings.  In  a  colony  where  the  white  population  had 
been  forced  to  fight  almost  continuously  against  warlike  native 
tribes,  and  where  the  whites  were  still  outnumbered  by  the  ne- 
groes almost  four  to  one,  riotous  struggles  between  capital  and 
labor  and  division  between  Boers  and  British  might  easily  lead 
to  serious  native  insurrections.  The  situation  was  compli- 
cated, furthermore,  by  the  presence  in  South  Africa  of  over  two 
hundred  thousand  discontented  Asiatic  laborers  who  had  been 
imported  from  India. 

If  we  count  the  smaller  self-governing  colonies  of  Newfound- 
land and  New  Zealand  together  with  the  confederations  of 
Canada,  Australia,  and  South  Africa,  Great  Britain 
was  now  mistress  of  five  "colonial  nations"  whose  Brkish 
vast  territorial  extent  and  enormous  natural  resources  Control 
gave  promise  of  great  future  development.    Canada  oomimons 
and  Australia  were  rapidly  becoming  nations  in  a  very 
real  sense ;  each  had  its  national  flag,  its  national  army,  its 
national  tariff,  its  national  government.    The  authority  of  the 
mother-country  over  her  buxom  daughters  was  steadily  declin- 
ing.   Since  the  introduction  of  responsible  government,  the 


654  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


royal  governor  appointed  by  the  British  Crown  was  less  likely 
to  be  an  energetic  politician  than  a  distinguished  and  disinterested 
nobleman,  and  the  governor  tended  to  assume  in  the  colony 
somewhat  the  same  honorary  position  that  the  king  himself 
occupied  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  right  of  the  mother- 
country  to  veto  the  acts  of  colonial  parliaments,  the  right  of 
the  mother-country  to  control  foreign  relations,  and  the  right 
of  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  to  hear  appeals 
from  colonial  courts,  were  still  maintained  in  theory;  but  in 
practice  Great  Britain  rarely  interfered  with  the  legislative 
liberty  of  the  self-governing  dominions  and  frequently  permitted 
them  to  negotiate  independent  commercial  and  other  treaties 
with  foreign  nations;  and  the  right  of  judicial  appeal  was 
severely  curtailed  by  Canada,  Australia,  and  South  Africa.  In 
short,  the  political  connection  between  Great  Britain  and  her 
self-governing  colonies  was  very  slight. 

With  the  general  awakening  of  the  imperialistic  spirit  toward 
the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  there  appeared  in  Great 
„        Britain  a  movement  to  brinsj  "The  Dominions,"  as  the 

The  Move-        . .  .  i     •      ,  i  i    i  • 

mentfor  self-govermng  colomes  later  came  to  be  styled,  mto 
Imperial      closer  union  with  the  mother-country.  ''Imperial 

Federation  ■,      ■,       ^  .        .     .  ^ 

Umty  became  the  battle-cry  of  Umomst  statesmen 
who  hoped  to  strengthen  the  Empire  against  rival  imperial 
Powers,  especially  Germany;  the  cry  was  taken  up  by  British 
business  men  who  were  engaged  in  colonial  trade,  and  echoed 
by  loyal  British  hearts  in  mother-country  and  colonies  alike. 
Imperial  unity,  as  Joseph  Chamberlain  ^  pointed  out,  could  be 
secured  only  through  ''Imperial  Federation,"  that  is,  through 
the  recognition  of  the  Dominions  as  copartners  with  the  United 
Kingdom  in  a  sort  of  federal  empire.  This  ideal  of  Imperial 
Federation  could  be  approached  by  three  main  avenues :  im- 
perial preference,  imperial  conference,  and  imperial  defense. 

Imperial  preference  meant  simply  that  by  mutual  agreement 
the  United  Kingdom  as  well  as  the  Dominions  should  establish 
Imperial  a  protective-tariff  system  by  which  heavier  duties 
Preference  would  be  placed  on  imports  from  foreign  countries 
than  on  imports  from  British  lands.  Such  an  arrangement 
would  prevent  British  trade  from  falling  into  foreign  hands, 

^  See  above,  pp.  300  ff. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


65s 


and  would  cement  the  British  Empire  into  the  most  gigantic 
economic  unit  in  the  world.  British  industries  would  be  de- 
livered from  German  competition  in  supplying  the  colonial 
demand  for  manufactures.  Grain,  meat,  and  the  raw  materials 
so  vital  to  manufacturing  England  would  flow  in  a  plenteous 
stream  from  Great  Britain's  own  colonies.  England  would 
be  assured  of  her  food  supply,  and  the  Dotninions  would  be  cer- 
tain of  a  market  for  their  agricultural  products.  The  first  step 
toward  the  realization  of  this  roseate  dream  was  taken  by  Canada 
in  1897,  when  the  Dominion  allowed  imports  from  the  United 
Kingdom  a  reduction  of  one-eighth  of  the  general"  Canadian 
customs  tariff.  Canada  subsequently  increased  this  preference 
to  one-fourth  (1898),  and  even  to  one-third  (1900).  South  Africa, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand  followed  Canada's  example.  But 
the  United  Kingdom,  firmly  intrenched  in  her  free-trade  policy, 
absolutely  refused  to  meet  the  Dominions  halfway.  Joseph 
Chamberlain,  the  great  imperialist,  with  all  his  incisive  argu- 
ment, could  not  convert  England  from  Free  Trade,  he  could  not 
even  convert  his  own  Unionist  party  entirely.  The  advent  of 
the  Liberal  ministry  in  1905  marked  the  failure  of  Chamber- 
lain's agitation  in  Great  Britain  for  imperial  preference. 

Better  progress  was  made  along  the  second  route  to  Imperial 
Federation,  namely,  imperial  conference.  It  was  demanded 
that  the  United  Kingdom  should  give  the  Dominions  Imperial 
a  voice  in  imperial  affairs.  Although  each  had  a  Conference 
''high  commissioner"  to  represent  its  interests  in  London,  the 
Dominions  considered  it  humiHating  to  deal  with  their  ''co- 
partner" through  the  latter's  Colonial  Office,  and  they  resented 
the  fact  that  imperial  defense  and  foreign  policy  were  deter- 
mined by  the  cabinet  of  the  United  Kingdom  rather  than  by  a 
body  representing  the  empire.  The  Dominions  were  not  con- 
tent to  be  silent  partners.  At  least  a  partial  remedy  for  this 
complaint  was  found  in  the  Imperial  Conference.  The  first 
Imperial  Conference  was  a  meeting  of  representatives  of  the 
self-governing  colonies  held  at  London  on  the  auspicious  occasion 
of  Queen  Victoria's  Jubilee  in  1887.  Similar  conferences  were 
held  at  Ottawa  in  1894,  and  at  London  in  1897,  1902,  1907,  and 
191 1.  Especially  noteworthy  was  the  Conference  of  1907, 
which  arranged  for  regular  quadrennial  sessions  of  the  Imperial 


656 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Conference,  and  for  subsidiary  conferences  on  particular  matters. 
The  United  Kingdom  was  to  be  represented  in  the  Imperial 
Conference  no  longer  by  its  secretary  of  state  for  the  colonies, 
but  by  its  prime  minister,  just  as  the  Dominions  were  repre- 
sented by  their  respective  premiers.^  Since  the  Imperial  Con- 
ference possessed  no  constitutional  powers,  it  resembled  a 
congress  of  diplomats  rather  than  an  imperial  representative  as- 
sembly ;  nevertheless,  this  periodical  meeting  of  premiers  could 
not  fail  to  exercise  a  powerful  influence  in  harmonizing  the  inter- 
ests of  Great  Britain  and  her  Dominions.  Bolder  schemes  for 
the  regular  representation  of  the  Dominions  in  a  special  ''Im- 
perial Parliament"  or  in  the  Parliament  of  the  United  King- 
dom met  with  discouragement  because  no  basis  of  representa- 
tion was  discoverable  which  would  satisfy  both  the  Dominions 
and  the  mother-country,  nor  could  the  powers  of  such  an  Im- 
perial Parliament  be  easily  defined. 

One  of  the  chief  concerns  of  the  Imperial  Conferences  was 
imperial  defense.  Great  Britain  at  the  opening  of  the  twentieth 
Imperial  century  was  fairly  staggering  under  the  load  of  an 
Defense  enormous  naval  expenditu  ^e,  due  partly  to  acceleration 
of  naval  construction  necessitated  by  the  rapid  growth  of  foreign 
navies,  and  partly  to  the  higher  cost  of  battleships.^  Here  was 
an  opportunity  for  the  Dominions  to  prove  their  loyalty  and 
to  show  themselves  true  partners  in  the  Empire  by  sharing  the 
burden  of  imperial  defense.  New  Zealand  responded  by  contrib- 
uting a  battle-cruiser,  the  New  Zealand,  to  the  British  North 
Sea  Fleet.  South  Africa  contented  herself  with  a  small  annual 
money  contribution.  Australia,  actuated  as  much  by  local  as 
by  imperial  patriotism,  started  to  construct  a  separate  Aus- 
tralian fleet  unit,  including  one  first-class  battle-cruiser  and 
smaller  craft.  Canada  wavered.  AVhile  the  French-Canadian 
Liberal  leader,  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  was  in  power  (1896-1911), 
Canada  aspired  to  have  a  Dominion  navy,  built  in  her  own  ship- 
yards, manned  by  her  own  seamen,  controlled  by  her  own  gov- 
ernment. But  the  Conservative  cabinet  of  Sir  Robert  Borden, 
coming  into  power  in  191 1,  decided  instead  of  building  a  separate 
fleet  to  contribute  £7,000,000  for  the  addition  of  three  battle- 

^  Other  ministers  were  also  permitted  to  attend. 

2  The  first  Dreadnought,  launched  in  1906,  cost  about  $9,000,000. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


6S7 


ships  to  the  British  navy.  As  this  plan  was  vetoed  by  the 
Canadian  Senate,  Canada  did  nothing.  Thus  the  Dominions 
were  of  some  assistance,  but  not  of  much  importance,  in  bearing 
the  burden  of  imperial  naval  defense.  The  chief  difficulty 
seemed  to  be  that  Great  Britain  wanted  a  concentrated  navy  for 
use  against  Germany,  whereas  the  Dominions  were  strongly 
inclined  to  prefer  local  navies  for  the  gratification  of  local  pride, 
for  the  protection  of  local  commerce,  for  the  profit  of  local 
shipbuilders. 

In  military  matters  there  was  less  disagreement.  The  Domin- 
ions required  little  urging  to  establish  local  armies.  In  the 
Boer  War,  Canada,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand  zealously  dis- 
patched troops  to  fight  for  Great  Britain  in  South  Africa.  Thanks 
to  systems  of  military  training  installed  after  the  Boer  War, 
the  Dominions  were  able  to  render  even  more  material  aid  to 
the  mother-country  in  the  War  of  the  Nations. 


THE  CROWN  COLONIES 

The  second  group  of  British  dependencies  —  the  Crown  Colo- 
nies —  stood  in  marked  contrast  to  the  first  in  three  respects. 
First,  whereas  in  the  group  of  colonies  just  considered 
the  elective  colonial  assemblies  had  obtained  virtually  ^^^tlro^m 
complete  control  of  the  government  through  respon-  Seif-Gov- 
sible  ministries,  in  the  Crown  Colonies  representative  coiMdes 
assemblies  were  either  entirely  lacking  or  quite  power- 
less.   Secondly,  whereas  the  self-governing  colonies  were  settled 
largely  by  people  of  British,  or,  at  any  rate,  of  European  stock, 
the  Crown  Colonies,  on  the  other  hand,  contained  relatively  few 
British  inhabitants.    Thirdly,  the  self-governing  colonies  were 
situated  mostly  in  the  temperate  zones  and  were  suitable  for 
important  agricultural  and  industrial  development  by  Europeans ; 
most  of  the  Crown  Colonies,  on  the  contrary,  were  situated 
within  the  tropics,  and  many  were  small  island  naval  posts  or 
coaHng  stations. 

A  considerable  number  of  British  Crown  Colonies  were  located 
in  the  West  Indies.  Some  of  these,  notably  Barbados  and  the 
Bahamas,  still  preserved  the  old  form  of  colonial  government,  in 
which  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature  was  elected  but  could 

VOL.  n  —  2U 


658 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


not  control  the  '^executive  council"  or  ministry.  Similar  rep- 
resentative bodies  had  formerly  existed  in  Jamaica,  and  in 
The  British  British  Honduras,  but  they  had  been  abolished  in 
West  Indies  ^355  ^^id  1870  respectively,  and  the  modern  form  of 
Crown  Colony  government  installed,  with  a  legislative  council" 
wholly  or  partly  appointed  by  the  crown.  Whether  this  legisla- 
tive council  included  some  members  elected  by  the  colony,  as  in 
Jamaica,  in  the  federated  Leeward  Islands,  and  in  British  Guiana, 
or  was  entirely  nominated,  as  in  Trinidad,  British  Honduras,  and 
the  various  Windward  Islands,  it  was  plain  that  the  balance  of 
power  rested  with  officials  of  the  British  government,  rather 
than  with  the  colonists.  Possibly  the  negroes  who  labored  on 
the  sugar-plantations  of  the  West  Indies  under  the  direction 
of  a  few  thousand  wealthy  white  plantation-owners  were  not 
fit  for  self-government;  or  perhaps  Great  Britain  was  more 
anxious  to  retain  direct  control  over  the  West  Indies  —  valuable 
both  as  plantation-colonies  and  as  coaling-stations  —  than  to 
satisfy  the  poHtical  aspirations  of  the  islanders. 

The  Crown  Colonies  in  Africa  were  inhabited  entirely  by 
negroes,  and  none  of  them  enjoyed  representative  government. 

The  legislative  councils  in  the  torrid  West- African 
Crown  colonies  of  Gold  Coast,  Nigeria,  Gambia,  and  Sierra 
Colonies  in  Leone  were  wholly  appointive ;  and  Basutoland  and 
Asia*^^  Swaziland  in  South  Africa  were  autocratically  ruled 
by  British  commissioners  without  legislative  councils. 
In  the  Asiatic  Crown  Colonies  as  a  rule  a  few  members  of  the 
legislative  council  were  elected  either  by  the  colony  at  large, 
as  in  the  populous  island  of  Ceylon,  or  by  the  chambers  of  com- 
merce, as  in  Hong  Kong  or  in  the  Straits  Settlements. 

The  list  of  Crown  Colonies  also  included  a  number  of  small 
islands  like  Mauritius,  valued  as  coaling-stations  or  naval 
Naval  bases.^  Five  of  these  were  situated  in  the  temperate 
stations  zones  and  inhabited  by  whites,  thus  forming  exceptions 
to  the  general  rule  that  Crown  Colonies  were  torrid  regions  with 
colored  inhabitants.  The  five  included  (i)  the  impregnable  rock- 
fortress  of  Gibraltar  with  its  adjacent  town  of  about  twenty 
thousand  Spanish-speaking  inhabitants;  (2)  the  mid-Mediter- 

1  Some  of  these  posts  were  not  regular  Crown  Colonies,  but  were  administered 
by  the  naval  authorities,  —  Ascension,  for  example. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


659 


ranean  naval  station  of  Malta  with  its  200,000  peasants  and 
townspeople  speaking  an  Italian  dialect ;  (3)  the  Mediterranean 
island  of  Cyprus/  with  its  quarrelsome  population  of  Greeks  and 
Turks ;  (4)  the  Falkland  Islands  (southeast  of  South  America) 
with  their  Scottish  settlers ;  and  (5),  no  less  important  as  a  naval 
base  than  as  a  winter-resort,  the  Bermuda  Islands  with  12,000 
colored  and  7000  white  inhabitants.  Although  the  white  in- 
habitants of  these  five  colonies  might  have  been  capable  of  self- 
government,  they  were  not  granted  that  privilege.  In  Gibraltar 
the  governor  was  an  autocrat ;  in  the  Falkland  Islands  he  was 
restrained  merely  by  an  appointive  legislative  council ;  in  Malta 
only  a  minority  of  the  legislative  council  was  elective  (since  1849), 
and  in  Cyprus  only  two- thirds ;  in  the  Bermudas  the  house  of 
assembly  was  elective,  to  be  sure,  but  the  upper  chamber  of  the 
legislature  was  appointive,  and  the  ministry  took  its  orders 
from  the  governor. 

In  the  same  general  class  with  the  Crown  Colonies  we  may 
place  the  protectorates  and  the  territories  administered  by 
Chartered  Companies,  which,  like  the  Crown  Colonies,  chartered 
were  usually  tropical  in  climate,  non-European  in  re-  Companies 
spect  of  population,  and  non-representative  in  government.  The 
Chartered  Company  was  a  favorite  form  of  colonial  organization 
in  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  in  the  seven- 
teenth century,  but  it  was  better  suited  for  the  acquisition  of 
new  territories  than  for  the  government  of  old,  and  consequently 
many  chartered  colonies  were  transformed  into  Crown  Colonies, 
so  that  by  the  year  1914  the  only  British  colonies  remaining 
under  Chartered  Companies  were  Rhodesia  and  North  Borneo. 
Rhodesia,  a  vast  tract  of  undeveloped  territory  north  of  the 
Transvaal,  including  some  good  agricultural  land  and  promising 
gold-fields,  was  originally  acquired  for  Great  Britain,  thanks  to 
the  energy  of  Cecil  Rhodes,  who  organized  the  British  South 
Africa  Company  (1889),  and  in  whose  honor  the  company's 
territory  was  named  Rhodesia.  The  British  North  Borneo 
Company  was  slightly  older,  having  been  chartered  in  1882  ; 
and  it  had  continued  to  govern  North  Borneo  even  after  the 

^Formerly  a  Turkish  possession,  "occupied"  and  governed  by  Great  Britain, 
while  nominally  remaining  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  from  1878  to  1914,  and 
formally  annexed  by  Great  Britain  in  1914. 


66o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


territory  was  declared  a  British  protectorate  (1888).  The  actual 
government  in  both  Rhodesia  and  North  Borneo  strongly 
resembled  that  of  a  Crown  Colony,  with  partially  representative 
legislative  councils,  and  with  governors  appointed  by  the  com- 
pany in  place  of  royal  governors. 

The  protectorates  were  more  numerous  than  the  chartered 
colonies.  As  a  rule,  a  protectorate  was  established  wherever 
Protecto-  Great  Britain  found  it  easier  to  adapt  native  institu- 
rates  tions  to  British  rule  than  to  destroy  them.  The 

scepter  was  left  in  the  hand  of  the  native  potentate,  but  it 
was  wielded  in  behalf  of  British  interests  and  at  the  behest  of 
an  all-powerful  British  Resident  Commissioner.  Thus  the 
Malay  States  (on  the  Malay  peninsula  in  southeastern  Asia), 
placed  under  British  "protection"  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
were  still  ruled  by  their  sultans,  who  were  bound  to  follow  the 
''advice"  of  British  Residents.  Similar  protectorates,  as  the 
next  section  will  make  clear,  still  existed  in  India.  The  most 
extensive,  however,  were  in  Africa.  British  East  Africa  (includ- 
ing Uganda,  Zanzibar,  and  Pemba),  Nyasaland,  Somaliland, 
Bechuanaland,  and  the  extensive  "hinterlands"  (inland  regions) 
of  Nigeria,  Gambia,  and  Sierra  Leone,  were  all  protectorates. 
Some  of  these  had  become  practically  Crown  Colonies,  while 
others  preserved  their  former  governments,  as  Zanzibar  its  Arab 
sultan,  Bechuanaland  its  native  chieftains,  and  Buganda  (in 
Uganda)  its  king  —  ''His  Highness  the  Kabaka."  These  tropi- 
cal African  protectorates,  mostly  unfit  for  white  settlement,  were 
important  chiefly  on  account  of  the  rubber,  the  ivory,  the  palm- 
oil,  and  the  cloves  which  they  produced. 

Egypt,  probably  the  most  important  of  Great  Britain's  African 
possessions,  did  not  become  formally  a  British  protectorate 
until  the  outbreak  of  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
Turkey  in  1 914.  For  more  than  thirty  years,  however, 
Egypt  had  been  practically  a  British  protectorate,  while  remain- 
ing theoretically  a  vassal  state  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  During 
the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  was  explained  in  the 
foregoing  chapter,^  the  Turkish  viceroys  of  Egypt  had  become 
virtually  independent  monarchs  and  assumed  the  title  of  Khe- 
dive; then  a  reckless  Khedive  by  plunging  his  country  into 

^  See  above,  pp.  626  ff. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


66i 


bankruptcy  had  given  his  French  and  English  creditors  an 
excuse  for  establishing  the  so-called  Dual  Control  of  France 
and  Great  Britain  over  Egyptian  finances ;  a  few  years  later, 
British  troops  had  been  landed  to  suppress  a  rebellion  in  Egypt 
(1882),  and  the  Dual  Control  had  been  replaced  by  the  single 
control  of  a  British  Financial  Adviser  (1883).  From  1883  to 
1 914  Egypt  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  British  protectorate. 
At  first  the  British  government,  under  Gladstone's  leadership, 
was  inclined  to  regard  the  occupation  of  Egypt  as  a  temporary 
affair;  but  in  time  British  statesmen  came  to  believe  that  the 
possession  of  Egypt  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  British 
Empire,  because  the  main  artery  of  the  Empire,  the  route  to 
India  and  Australasia,  passed  through  Egypt  by  way  of  the 
Suez  Canal,  which  was  constructed  by  a  French  company 
between  1859  and  1869.  Great  Britain  had  purchased  a  con- 
trolling interest  in  the  canal  in  1875. 

Under  the  energetic  administration  of  able  British  financial 
advisers,  such  as  Lord  Cromer  and  Lord  Kitchener,  many  abuses 
were  done  away  with,  praiseworthy  reforms  were  instituted  for 
the  benefit  of  the  downtrodden  fellahin  or  peasantry,  finances 
were  put  on  a  solid  footing,  the  administration  of  justice  was 
reformed,  and  profitable  irrigation  works  were  undertaken,  cul- 
minating in  the  construction  of  the  magnificent  Assuan  Dam 
( 1 898-1 902).  A  representative  assembly,  moreover,  was  cre- 
ated (1883),  and  in  1913  legislative  powers  in  addition  to  a  veto 
on  new  taxes  were  intrusted  to  the  assembly.  Notwithstanding 
this  enlightened  and  comparatively  liberal  treatment,  the  Egyp- 
tians were  discontented.  Like  the  Germans,  like  the  Italians, 
like  the  Turks,  the  educated  Egyptians,  especially  the  young 
men  who  had  studied  abroad,  felt  the  stirrings  of  a  national 
patriotism.  Arabi  Pasha's  insurrection  of  1882  had  been 
crushed  to  the  ground,  but  the  echoes  of  his  slogan,  "Egypt 
for  the  Egyptians,"  had  never  died  away.  British  rule  might 
be  benevolent,  but  it  was  foreign  rule  and  therefore  intolerable. 
This  was  the  spirit  which  inspired  the  Egyptian  Nationalist 
agitators  to  present  a  petition  for  liberty  to  the  Prince  of  Wales 
at  Cairo  in  1906.  But  petitions  and  propaganda  were  alike 
useless,  as  long  as  Great  Britain  could  maintain  a  sufficient  army 
in  Egypt. 


662 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


One  of  the  results  of  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt  was 
the  re-conquest  of  the  Sudan,  that  vast  region  to  the  southward, 
which  had  been  incited  to  revolt  by  a  Mohammedan  religious 
fanatic,  the  ''Mahdi"  or  ''Messiah,"'  and  was  independent  of 
Egypt  from  1885  to  1898.  The  Sudan  was  won  back  by  Sir 
Herbert  (later,  Lord)  Kitchener,  "Sirdar"  or  commander  of  the 
reorganized  Egyptian  army,  between  1896  and  1898.  The  joint 
rule  or  "  Condominium  "  of  Great  Britain  and  Egypt  was  im- 
posed upon  the  Sudan  in  1899.  The  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan 
was  not  a  valuable  territory,  but  its  possession,  implying  the 
control  of  the  Upper  Nile,  was  considered  vitally  necessary  for 
the  prosperity  and  safety  of  Egypt. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  INDIA 

The  greatest  of  all  British  possessions  remains  to  be  consid- 
ered. Although  less  than  half  the  size  of  Canada,  India  was 
Importance  justly  entitled  to  rank  first,  because  it  contained  forty 
of  India  times  the  population  of  Canada;  because  four-fifths 
of  the  population  of  the  entire  British  colonial  empire  were 
included  within  this  one  Asiatic  dependency;  because  India's 
trade  with  the  United  Kingdom,  worth  more  than  half  a  bilKon 
dollars  a  year,  far  exceeded  that  of  any  other  colony.^  For 
every  square  mile  of  territory  in  the  United  Kingdom,  India 
could  show  fifteen;  and  as  the  British  Isles  had  only  45,000,000 
inhabitants  as  against  India's  315,000,000,  every  man,  woman, 
and  child  in  the  United  Kingdom  might  have  been  said  to  possess 
seven  subjects  in  India.  North  and  South  America  put  together 
had  only  half  as  many  people  as  India. 

The  conquest  of  this  tremendous  empire  by  a  handful  of  Brit- 
ish merchant-adventurers  would  have  been  absolutely  impossible 
Geographi-  ^™  facts.    In  the  first  place.  Great  Britain 

cai  Divisions  had  the  advantage  of  a  more  aggressive  and  progres- 
of  India  g.^^  civiHzation,  which  implied,  among  other  less 
obvious  things,  the  possession  of  deadly  firearms,  marvelous 

^  In  1 913  the  total  commerce  (excluding  shipments  of  treasure)  between  India 
and  Ceylon  and  the  United  Kingdom  amounted  to  $650,000,000.  No  other 
colony  or  country  in  the  world  purchased  so  large  an  amount  of  British  merchan- 
dise as  India. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


663 


machines,  and  medical  science.  In  the  second  place,  India  was 
divided.  Geographically  India  fell  into  three  well-defined 
regions  —  the  triangular  peninsula-plateau  of  southern  India 
(usually  called  the  Deccan),  the  broad  belt  of  lowlands  formed 
by  the  Ganges  and  Indus  river  valleys  to  the  north  of  the  Dec- 
can,  and  still  further  north  the  mountainous  region  of  the  lofty 
Himalayas.  Racial  divisions  corresponded  roughly  to  the  geog- 
raphy, the  so-called  Dravidians  dwelling  in  the  j^^^^^ 
Deccan,  the  Hindus  in  the  lowland  belt  (''Hindustan  "), 
and  the  descendants  of  Mohammedan  (Arab,  Afghan,  and 
Persian)  invaders  in  the  mountainous  north;  but  in  many 
localities  the  different  races  lived  side  by  side  in  neighborly 
hostility.    There  were  dozens  of  distinct  vernacular  „  . 

,  T  .  .  IT  Religions 

languages.  Religious  antagomsms  accentuated  the 
racial  and  geographical  divisions.  About  two- thirds  of  the 
entire  population  followed  the  Brahmanic  or  orthodox  Hindu 
religion,  with  its  polytheistic  theology,  its  reverence  for  the 
sacred  cow,  its  pilgrimages,  its  Brahmanical  hierarchy,  its  rigid 
caste  system.  Three  heretical  sects  —  the  Buddhists  (10,700,- 
000,^  mostly  in  Burma),  the  Jains  (1,250,000),  and  the  Sikhs 
(3,000,000,  in  the  Punjab  province)  — had  split  off  from  Hinduism 
just  as  the  Protestant  sects  from  Roman  Catholicism,  though 
much  earlier.  Orthodox  and  heretical  Hindus  alike,  as  well  as 
the  more  primitive  pagan  tribesmen  (10,000,000),  were  constantly 
coming  into  contact  with  the  Mohammedans,  whose  strongholds 
were  the  northern  fringe  of  provinces  —  Sind,  the  Punjab,  the 
Frontier  Province,  Kashmir,  East  Bengal,  and  Assam,  —  but 
whose  energetic  and  ambitious  emissaries  had  penetrated  almost 
every  part  of  the  peninsula.  The  Mogul  Emperors  of  India,  as 
will  be  remembered,  were  descendants  of  a  Mohammedan  in- 
vader of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  their  provincial  lieutenants 
(nawabs)  were  likewise  Mohammedans.  The  Mogul's  viceroy  in 
the  Deccan,  the  nizam  of  Hyderabad,  was  also  a  Mohammedan 
prince.  But  long  before  the  nineteenth  century,  the  Mogul's 
power  had  declined  ;  his  nawabs  and  nizams  no  longer  Political 
respected  his  authority,  and  the  numerous  Hindu  rajas  Dissensions 
who  had  once  been  his  vassals  became  independent  princelings. 
Particularly  the  confederated  Mahratta  princes,  commanding  a 

^  Census  of  191 1. 


664 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


powerful  Hindu  nation  of  central  India,  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury mocked  and  menaced  the  Mogul's  lordship.  Thus,  politi- 
cal dissensions  reduced  India  to  impotence  and  enabled  the 
British  to  extend  their  dominion  over  the  country  little  by  little, 
by  subtle  intrigue  or  by  piecemeal  conquest. 

Previous  chapters  ^  have  traced  the  rise  of  the  first  English 
establishments  in  India,  notably  the  trading-posts  at  Surat 
Career  of  (^^^^)'  Madras  (1640),  at  Bombay  (1662),  and  at 
the  East  Calcutta  (1686),  and  the  bitter  conflict  between  the 
Company      French  and  the  British,  culminating  in  the  decisive 

defeat  of  the  French  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  (1756- 
1763).  After  the  Seven  Years'  War,  being  rid  of  French  rivalry, 
the  English  East  India  Company  embarked  on  a  career  of  con- 
stant warfare  and  conquest. 

A  succession  of  able  and  ambitious  empire-builders,  acting 
in  the  Company's  interest,  built  up  story  by  story  the  stupen- 
Empire-  dous  Structure  of  the  British  Indian  Empire.  Robert 
BuUders  Clivc  (govcmor  of  Bengal  from  1758  to  1760,  and 
from  1765  to  1767),  a  man  whose  melancholy  moods  alternated 
with  fits  of  fierce  energy,  was  the  real  founder  of  the  empire. 
^^^^  He  established  British  prestige  on  a  sure  footing  in 

Bengal,  the  province  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ganges,  by 
defeating  at  Plassey  (1757)  the  monstrous  army  mustered 
against  him  by  the  local  nawab.  In  CHve's  time,  too,  the 
Mogul  emperor  was  defeated,  captured,  and  compelled  to  cede 
to  the  Company  the  revenues  of  Bengal,  Behar,  and  Orissa 
Warren  provinces  (1765).  Warren  Hastings  (governor-gen- 
Hastings  gj-al  from  1774  to  1785),  that  somewhat  unscrupulous 
but  undoubtedly  capable  successor  of  Clive,  fought  the  Mahrat- 
tas,  who  were  aided  by  French  soldiers  of  fortune,  and  fended  off 
the  attacks  of  Hyder  Ali,  the  warlike  Mohammedan  sultan  of 

Mysore,  who  threatened  to  wipe  out  the  British  posts 

m  the  south.  Lord  Cornwams  (1786-1793;,  01 
American  fame,  continued  the  war  against  Mysore,  now  ruled 
by  Hyder  All's  son,  Tippoo. 

From  1798  to  1805  the  military  genius  of  the  marquess  of 
Wellesley  (elder  brother  of  the  duke  of  Wellington)  was  em- 
ployed in  India.    Tippoo  met  defeat  and  death  at  his  hands 

*  See  Vol.  I,  ch.  ii,  ix,  x. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


66s 


(1799)  and  an  infant  Hindu  raja  was  substituted  on  the  throne 
of  Mysore  as  the  puppet  of  the  British.  Next,  Wellesley  con- 
cluded an  alliance  with  the  nizam  of  Hyderabad,  ^^y^^j^y 
Mohammedan  viceroy  of  the  Deccan,  and  brought 
under  British  administration  the  Camatic  and  Tanjore  (on  the 
coast,  opposite  Ceylon),  as  well  as  the  districts  of  Rohilkhand 
and  the  Doab,  on  the  upper  Ganges.  Wellesley  also  defeated 
the  Mahrattas  and  annexed  Orissa.  Such  extensive  —  and  ex- 
pensive —  military  operations  were  highly  distasteful  to  the 
businesslike  directors  of  the  Company,  and  they  ordered  the 
next  governors  to  be  less  aggressive.  But  the  mar-  ^j^^ 
quess  of  Hastings  (governor  from  1813  to  1823)  was  Marquess  of 
compelled  to  adopt  a  martial  policy  in  defense  of  the 
Company's  territory.  He  fought  and  subdued  the  brave  Gurkha 
nation  of  Nepal.  He  finally  (181 7- 181 8)  shattered  the  trouble- 
some Mahratta  confederacy  of  central  India,  and  annexed  part 
of  its  lands  (around  Bombay).  He  made  the  Hindu  rajas  of 
Rajputana  (just  east  of  the  Indus)  his  vassals.  When  Lord 
Hastings  returned  to  Europe,  all  India  from  the  Indus  to  the 
Ganges  was  dominated  if  not  actually  governed  by  the  East 
India  Company,  excepting  Sind  and  the  Punjab  in  the  north- 
west. Sind  was  conquered  in  1843.  The  Punjab  was  annexed 
in  1840  by  Lord  Dalhousie,^  the  last  of  the  great  _  „ 

•1-11  r       •  11         1  r     1  11  Dalhousie 

empire-builders,  after  its  gallant  defenders,  who  be- 
longed to  the  Hindu  sect  of  Sikhs,  had  been  defeated  in  two 
bloody  wars.     Under  British  rule,  the  Punjab  enjoyed  great 
prosperity,  and  the  Sikhs  became  the  most  loyal  British  soldiers. 

The  Deccan  and  the  lowland  belt  of  India  fcrmed  a  compact 
empire.  But  the  third  geographical  region,  the  northern  fringe 
of  mountains,  was  deemed  necessary  for  protection  against  in- 
vasion from  the  north,  particularly  for  protection  against 
Russia.  On  the  northeast,  Assam  was  wrested  from  Burma 
(1824),  then  Lower  Burma  (1852)  and  finally  Upper  Burma 
(1886)  were  conquered.  The  mountain-states  of  Bhutan  and 
Nepal,  while  not  actually  annexed,  virtually  became  vassals  of 
British  India.  Tibet,  further  north,  although  nominally  be- 
longing to  China,  accorded  special  privileges  to  the  British  by 
a  treaty  of  1904,  and  was  clearly  included  within  the  British 

*  Governor-general  from  1848  to  1856. 


666 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


sphere  of  influence.^  West  of  Tibet,  the  province  of  Kashmir 
became  a  British  protectorate  (1846).  The  North  West  Frontier 
Province  was  organized  in  1901.  Afghanistan,  after  two  wars  ^ 
with  the  British,  was  left  as  a  dependent  buffer-state  between 
the  British  and  Russian  Empires;  in  its  foreign  relations  Af- 
ghanistan was  placed  under  British  tutelage  and  protection, 
but  in  domestic  affairs  the  Afghan  ameer  remained  an  inde- 
pendent despot.  Baluchistan,  lying  between  India  and  Persia, 
was  brought  more  definitely  under  British  domination.  In 
1854  the  khan  of  Baluchistan  promised  always  '^to  act  in  sub- 
ordinate cooperation"  with  India;  a  considerable  part  of  Balu- 
chistan was  formally  incorporated  into  British  India  (1887),  the 
rest  remaining  under  native  rulers,  who  were  controlled  by  Brit- 
ish agents.  Thus  from  Burma  to  Baluchistan  India  was  pro- 
tected by  an  almost  unbroken  line  of  mountain  ramparts. 

Having  acquired  an  empire  in  India,  the  British  had  to  invent 
a  government  for  it.  Originally,  as  we  remember,  England  was 
Indian  Gov-  represented  in  India  by  a  simple  trading  corporation, 
ernment  the  East  India  Company.  When  the  oflBicials  of  that 
Britfsh*East  Company,  in  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
India  began  to  behave  like  Indian  nawabs,  interfering  in 
Company  politics,  accepting  or  extorting  huge  sums  of 

money  ^  from  native  potentates,  organizing  armies,  fighting 
wars,  and  exercising  despotic  power  in  quite  an  Oriental  fashion, 
British  statesmen  at  home  raised  loud  protests,  and  demanded 
that  the  shamefully  corrupt  administration  of  the  East  India 
The  Regu-  Company  should  be  reformed  and  regulated.  By  the 
latingAct  Regulating  Act  of  1773  a  council  of  four  members, 
of  1773  nominated  by  ParHament,  was  estabHshed  at  Cal- 
cutta to  restrain  the  company's  representative,  the  governor- 
general,  from  arbitrary,  immoral,  or  indiscreet  action.  This 
scheme  simply  resulted  in  quarrels  between  the  governor-general 
(W^arren  Hastings)  and  the  council ;  and  WilHam  Pitt,  who  be- 
came prime  minister  in  1783,  drew  up  a  more  effective  measure,  the 
famous  India  Act  of  1784.  Not  only  were  the  governor-general 
and  higher  officials  of  India  henceforth  to  be  nominated  by  the 

1  See  above,  pp.  569  f . 

2  The  first  Afghan  war  from  1838  to  1842,  the  second  from  1878  to  1880: 
'  Robert  Clive  thus  made  himself  a  millionaire. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


667 


British  ministry,  but  furthermore  a  special  State  Department 
or  Board  of  Control,  with  a  cabinet  minister  at  its  head,  was 
to  supervise  Indian  affairs  from  London.  On  these  The  India 
lines  India  continued  to  be  governed  until  1858,  ^^84 
with  the  ministerial  ''India  Office"  at  London  exercising  a 
more  or  less  rigorous  control  over  the  otherwise  autocratic  gov- 
ernor-general. Between  1784  and  1858  a  series  of  far-reaching 
reforms  were  achieved  by  enhghtened  governors-general.  Lord 
CornwalHs  put  an  end  to  the  extortions  of  revenue-collectors  in 
Bengal  by  fixing  the  rates  of  the  land-tax  permanently  at  a 
moderate  figure.  The  marquess  of  Hastings  began  the  organiza- 
tion of  native  education  and  smiled  benevolently  on  the  first  na- 
tive newspaper.  Lord  Wilham  Bentinck  (governor-general  from 
1828  to  1835  ),  who  attempted  to  abolish  the  practice  of  ''suttee,"^ 
has  been  praised  as  a  reformer  who  ''infused  into  Oriental  des- 
potism the  spirit  of  British  freedom."  ^  Lord  Dalhousie  placed 
the  civil  service  on  a  competitive  basis,  granted  government  aid 
to  schools,  and  organized  a  pubhc  works  department  to  carry 
out  far-reaching  plans  for  railway  and  canal  construction. 

The  British  were  complacently  congratulating  themselves  upon 
the  benevolent,  enlightened  character  of  their  rule  in  India,  when 
of  a  sudden  there  burst  forth  in  the  vicinity  of  Delhi  Sepoy 
a  fierce  rebellion,  which  spread  like  wildfire  throughout  Mutiny, 
the  length  and  breadth  of  the  Ganges  valley,  jeopard-  ^^^"^ 
izing  the  very  existence  of  the  British  power  in  Hindustan. 
Several  reasons  might  be  assigned  for  the  insurrection.  Bitter 
discontent  had  been  caused  by  British  interference  with  Indian 
social  and  religious  customs.  Reforms  that  suited  British  ideas 
of  progress  and  justice  were  odious  to  Oriental  minds.  Native 
princes,  moreover,  who  had  been  deposed  from  their  thrones, 
and  the  Great  Mogul,  who  still  forlornly  pretended  to  hold 
court  at  Delhi,  longed  for  revenge.  Then,  too,  the  native 
troops  —  there  were  less  than  40,000  British  soldiers  and  more 
than  250,000  native  troopers  or  "Sepoys"  in  the  East  India 
Company's  employ  —  were  infuriated  by  insults  to  their  reli- 

^  "Suttee"  is  the  word  applied  to  the  Hindu  practice  of  widows*  cremating 
themselves  on  the  funeral  piles  of  their  husbands. 

2  Quoted  from  the  extravagant  panegyric  composed  by  Macaulay  and  graven 
on  Bentinck's  statue  at  Calcutta. 


668  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


gious  prejudices.  The  Hindu  Sepoy  had  a  superstitious  repug- 
nance to  sea-voyages,  but  he  was  sometimes  compelled  to  cross 
the  sea  to  fight  in  Burma  and  in  China.  Furthermore,  a  new 
kind  of  greased  cartridge  was  introduced  which  had  to  be  bitten 
before  it  was  used.  The  Hindus  believed  the  grease  contained 
the  fat  of  cows  and  could  not  be  used  without  sacrilege,  since  the 
cow  was  a  sacred  animal.  The  Mohammedans,  who  abhorred 
swine,  suspected  that  the  grease  was  pig's  fat  and  feared  to  bite 
the  cartridges  lest  they  should  be  defiled  thereby.  Hindus 
and  Mohammedans  ahke  were  furious. 

The  great  mutiny  began  on  lo  May,  1857,  when  a  native 
cavalry  regiment  at  Meerut,  rather  than  use  the  greased  car- 
tridges, rebelliously  left  its  barracks  and  galloped  off  to  the  ancient 
imperial  capital  of  Delhi  to  offer  the  Mogul  their  services  in 
overthrowing  the  British.  Quickly  the  mutiny  became  general 
throughout  the  Ganges  provinces  and  central  India.  In  many 
places  the  populace  made  common  cause  with  the  Sepoys.  At 
Cawnpore  hundreds  of  European  residents  and  British  soldiers 
were  treacherously  massacred.  At  Lucknow  the  Enghsh  garri- 
son was  besieged  by  a  host  of  rebels.  At  Delhi  the  aged  Mogul 
was  triumphant.  As  soon  as  the  gravity  of  the  situation  was 
realized,  the  British  government  hurried  reenforcements  to  India, 
and  the  British  troops,  with  the  aid  of  loyal  Sikh  and  Gurkha 
regiments,  undertook  to  reconquer  the  country.  Delhi,  Cawn- 
pore, Lucknow,  were  won  back.  By  the  summer  of  1858  the 
mutiny  was  practically  crushed,  although  not  completely  until 
April,  1859.  Terrible  punishment  was  meted  out  to  the  muti- 
neers. Many  were  shot  from  the  mouths  of  cannon.  The 
feeble  old  Mogul  emperor  was  exiled  to  Rangoon,  and  his  sons 
were  shot  down  in  cold  blood  by  a  British  officer.  "No  muti- 
neer," said  one  of  the  leading  British  officials  at  the  time,  ''ever 
surrenders ;  for  directly  he  is  caught  he  is  shot  or  hanged." 

The  disastrous  Sepoy  mutiny  sealed  the  doom  of  the  anti- 
quated East  India  Company.  After  257  years  of  existence, 
the  Company  had  outlived  its  usefulness.  It  had  already  been 
shorn  of  many  of  its  powers,  and  had  lost  its  monopoly  of 
Oriental  commerce.^    Now,  in  the  year  1858,  the  Company's 

^The  Company  had  been  deprived  in  1813  of  its  monopoly  except  with  regard 
to  tea  and  the  Chinese  trade ;  even  these  vestiges  of  commercial  monopoly  had 
been  swept  away  by  the  Charter  Act  of  1833. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


669 


remaining  powers  were  taken  over  by  the  British  Government 
India  became  a  Crown  dominion,  and  the  East  India  i^^^^ 
Company  ceased  to  exist,  except  solely  for  the  func-  Transferred 
tion  of  receiving  from  the  government  and  distribut-  company  to 
ing  to  the  stockholders  the  io|  per  cent  of  yearly  the  Crown, 
dividend  on  its  capital  stock  of  £6,000,000.  ^^^^ 

The  same  Act  of  Parhament  —  the  Better  Government  of  In- 
dia Act,  1858  —  vested  the  supreme  control  of  Indian  affairs 
in  a  cabinet  officer,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  Government 
assisted  by  a  small  council  sitting  in  London.  The  o^i^^ia 
actual  administration  was  henceforth  to  be  conducted  by  a 
viceroy,  appointed  by  the  British  ministry  to  represent  the  Crown 
in  India,  and  assisted  by  an  Executive  Council  or  cabinet  and  a 
Legislative  Council.  Subordinate  to  the  central  government, 
which  had  its  seat  at  Calcutta,^  there  were  provincial  govern- 
ments, some  with  governors  and  nominated  councils,  some  with 
chief  commissioners  and  no  councils.  There  were  also  more 
than  six  hundred  native  states,  comprising  two-fifths  the  area 
and  two-ninths  the  population  of  India,  ruled  by  their  Hindu 
and  Moslem  potentates,  under  British  protection  and  supervision, 
but  not  under  direct  British  administration. 

For  half  a  century  this  system  continued  in  force,  with  few 
changes,  except  that  the  Queen  was  in  1877  proclaimed  Empress  of 
India.    Toward  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  pouticai 
however,  a  Nationalist  movement  appeared  in  India,  Unrest  in 
which  enlisted  the  sympathies  of  those  educated  natives  JheTnd?an 
who  had  studied  the  European  political  ideal  of  national  CouncUs 
democracy,  and  demanded  representative  government 
for  India.    As  a  concession  to  this  agitation,  two  Indians  were 
appointed  on  the  council  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  one  on 
the  Executive  Council  of  the  viceroy.    The  Indian  Councils 
Act  (1909)  was  an  attempt  to  reconcile  the  Indian  desire  for 
representative  government  with  the  British  determination  to 
rule.    Twenty-five  of  the  sixty-eight  members  of  the  viceroy's 
legislative  council  were  to  be  elected ;  in  six  of  the  nine  great 
provinces,  into  which  India  was  then  divided,^  the  provincial 

*  Until  19 1 2,  when  the  seat  of  government  was  transferred  to  the  ancient  capital- 
city  of  Delhi. 

^In  consequence  of  administrative  changes  in  191 2,  India  is  now  (1916) 


670 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


councils  were  to  contain  majorities  of  non-official  members,  in 
some  cases  appointed,  in  others  elected,  to  represent  the  natives ; 
the  three  remaining  provinces  were  to  be  ruled  by  British  chief 
commissioners  without  councils. 

Notwithstanding  these  seemingly  liberal  concessions,  the 
Indian  Councils  Act  failed  to  satisfy  the  Hindu  agitators,  who 
complained  because  the  provincial  councils  had  no  more  power 
than  debating  clubs,  because  the  majority  of  the  viceroy's 
council  was  still  composed  of  appointed  members  and  officials, 
because  Mohammedans  were  given  separate  representation. 
Only  a  sham  of  representative  government  was  being  granted 
to  India,  they  said.  In  order  to  stifle  the  rancorous  fault-find- 
ing which  filled  the  native  newspapers,  the  government  resorted 
in  1 9 10  to  stern  measures  curtailing  the  freedom  of  the  press, 
subjecting  the  mails  to  censorship,  and  forbidding  seditious 
meetings.  Still  the  Hindu  and  Moslem  malcontents  continued 
to  hold  their  separate  national  congresses  and  to  agitate  for 
constitutional  reform ;  riots,  assassinations,  and  rumors  of 
conspiracies  continued  to  disquiet  the  British  bureaucracy; 
and  although  in  191 1  the  Durbar  or  ceremonial  coronation  of 
King  George  V  as  Emperor  at  Delhi  passed  off  without  untoward 
incident,  one  year  later  the  viceroy  barely  escaped  assassination. 

In  all  the  preceding  paragraphs  we  have  well-nigh  lost  sight 
of  the  economic  considerations  which  inspired  the  British  to 

cherish  their  Indian  Empire,  and  the  economic  devel- 
Advanteges  opment  which  constituted  the  most  striking  feature 
of  India  to  of  British  rule.  While  cunning  Indian  artificers  con- 
BrSin        tinned  to  produce  the  fine  fabrics,  the  filmy  shawls, 

and  the  quaint  trinkets  of  wrought  metal  or  carved 
ivory,  which  were  so  eagerly  sought  by  Europeans,  these  artistic 
manufactures,  gems,  spices,  and  gold  were  overshadowed  in 
importance  by  staple  products  of  the  soil.  Under  British  aus- 
Agricuiturai  P^^^^  colossal  irrigation  canals  were  dug,  so  that  the 

fertile  soil  could  regularly  be  utiHzed  where  the  rain- 
fall was  shght  or  irregular.    One-sixth  of  the  total  crop  area  was 

divided  into  fifteen  provinces:  Madras,  Bombay,  Bengal,  United  Provinces  of 
Agra  and  Oudh,  the  Punjab,  Burma,  Bihar  and  Orissa,  Central  Provinces  and 
Berar,  Assam,  North  West  Frontier  Province,  Ajmer-Merwara,  Coorg,  Baluchi- 
stan, Delhi,  and  the  Andaman  and  Nicobar  Islands.  The  first  nine  have  pro- 
vincial councils. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


671 


irrigated  land.  The  country  was  covered  with  a  network  of 
railways  —  more  than  thirty-three  thousand  miles  in  all  —  mak- 
ing it  possible  for  inland  provinces  to  market  their  crops.  Besides 
millet,  pulse,  and  sugar-cane,  which  were  largely  consumed 
at  home,  India  began  to  produce  enormous  quantities  of  rice, 
coffee,  tea,  opium,^  cotton,  and  jute,  for  export  to  foreign  coun- 
tries. The  Punjab  province  became  a  great  wheat-country, 
so  that  in  191 2  the  annual  exports  of  wheat  exceeded  $40,000,000. 
As  most  of  the  wheat  went  to  the  United  Kingdom,  India  was 
accounted  one  of  the  foremost  sources  of  Great  Britain's  food 
supply.^ 

The  wheat-supply  in  itself  furnished  —  for  many  British 
statesmen  —  a  sufficient  reason  why  Great  Britain  should  rule 
India.    Other  economic  interests  there  were,  too,  ^ 

Commercial 

hardly  less  influential  in  confirming  the  same  conclu- 
sion. Of  India's  rapidly  grooving  commerce,  which  had  in- 
creased by  four  or  five  hundred  per  cent  since  the  Sepoy  Mutiny, 
Britain  enjoyed  almost  a  monopoly.^  The  United  Kingdom 
exported  to  India  almost  ten  times  as  much  merchandise  as  did 
the  rival  industrial  nation  of  Germany.^  Three-fourths  of 
India's  sea-borne  trade  was  carried  under  the  British  flag. 
The  merchants  and  shippers  engaged  in  this  commerce  were 
naturally  enthusiastic  in  favor  of  British  political  supremacy 
in  India,  which  insured  British  commercial  supremacy.^ 

Moreover,  certain  industries  in  Great  Britain  depended  ma- 
terially upon  the  command  of  the  Indian  market.  Cotton  manu- 
facturers and  the  iron  industries  were  chiefly  concerned,  inas- 
much as  India  purchased  annually  $200,000,000  ^  worth  of  cot- 

^  Opium,  a  government  monopoly,  brought  a  net  revenue  of  £4,500,000  into 
the  Indian  treasury  in  the  year  1912-1913. 

2  In  191 2  the  United  Kingdom  imported  over  25,000,000  cwt.  of  wheat  from 
India,  more  than  from  any  other  country.  In  1913,  however,  Canada  and  the 
United  States  surpassed  India  as  wheat-providers. 

'  Sixty-four  per  cent  of  the  private  merchandise  imported  by  India  in  1913  was 
from  the  United  Kingdom. 

*  1910. 

^  India's  tariff  did  not  show  a  preference  to  British  goods.  That  would  hardly 
have  been  necessary,  for  British  supremacy  was  secured  by  the  presence  of  so  many 
British  officials  and  merchants  in  India,  the  preeminence  of  English  over  other 
foreign  languages,  and  possibly  government  influence. 

'  Figures  for  1913-1914.  That  India,  instead  of  selling  cotton  goods  to  Europe 
as  in  past  centuries,  should  now  be  importing  such  enormous  quantities  from 


672 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


ton  goods,  and  $125,000,000  worth  of  iron  and  steel,  machinery, 
and  railway  materials,  mostly  from  Great  Britain.  Little 
wonder  then  that  cotton  and  iron  magnates  were  interested  in 
British  India.  Furthermore  there  were  the  capitalists,  large  and 
small,  who  had  invested  in  Indian  government  securities  (of 
which  some  $600,000,000  were  held  in  England),  or  in  Indian 
railways  (which  represented  a  capital  of  over  $1,500,000,000, 
partly  held  by  the  government,  however),  or  in  some  of  the  241 
cotton  factories,  the  61  jute  mills,  or  the  22  breweries  in  India, 
or  in  the  promising  oil-fields  and  coal-mines  (which  produced 
16,000,000  tons  in  1913).  Such  speculators  were  very  prone 
to  dilate  upon  the  civilizing  mission  of  England  in  India.  Aglow 
with  altruism,  they  recounted  the  benefits  conferred  upon  India 
by  her  British  masters,  the  abolition  of  widow-suicide  (''suttee"), 
the  prevention  of  infanticide,  the  codification  of  law,  the  reUef 
of  famines,  the  improvement  of  sanitation,  the  irrigation  of 
parched  fields,  the  construction  of  splendid  roads  and  railways, 
the  hushing  of  inter-tribal  wars  under  the  beneficent  regime  of 
the  Pax  Britannica.  Some  even  persuaded  themselves  that 
Great  Britain  was  a  sort  of  kindly  schoolmistress,  teaching 
civiHzation  to  her  class  of  rather  backward  Hindu  scholars  and 
preparing  them  for  the  noble  but  difficult  task  of  governing  them- 
selves according  to  Anglo-Saxon  notions.  In  justice  to  India, 
however,  it  should  be  remarked  that  Great  Britain  as  yet 
appeared  more  anxious  to  promote  her  own  economic  interests 
than  to  educate  the  native  population;  in  1912-1913,  the 
government  of  India  was  spending  almost  $60,000,000  on  rail- 
way and  canal  construction  and  almost  $100,000,000  on  the 
army,  but  only  some  $30,000,000  was  appropriated  for  schools. 
It  was  hardly  surprising,  therefore,  that  of  the  total  population 
of  the  great  Indian  Empire  more  than  94  per  cent  could  neither 
read  nor  write. 

CONCLUSION 

The  remarks  just  passed  on  India  naturally  suggest  some 
reflections  upon  the  subject  of  British  imperiahsm  as  a  whole. 

Great  Britain,  may  be  ascribed  in  part  to  the  British  policy  of  taxing  Indian  ex- 
ports of  cotton  cloth.  The  decline  of  the  cotton  industry  in  India,  it  need  hardly 
be  observed,  has  spelled  ruin  to  thousands  of  Indian  hand-loom  weavers. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


673 


In  the  first  place,  it  cannot  be  denied  that,  excepting  the  one 
disaster  of  1776,  Great  Britain  had  been  wonderfully  successful 
as  an  imperial  Power.    No  other  colonizing  nation  „  . .  , 

11  •    1  1     r  1  Bntish 

owned  such  vast  areas  suitable  for  European  settle-  success  in 
ment.     No  other  empire  boasted  such  populous  de-  g^^^^g 
pendencies.    From  the  economic  point  of  view,  the 
British  Empire  was  the  most  colossal  combination  in  all  history. 
It  controlled  one-half  the  world's  annual  production  of  gold,  a 
third  of  the  world's  wool  supply,  a  third  of  the  coal,  a  fourth  of 
the  cotton,  a  fifth  of  the  wheat,  a  sixth  of  the  pig  iron.  Its 
navy  and  its  merchant  marine  were  by  far  the  largest  in  the 
world,  the  latter  being  equal  to  twice  the  sum  of  its  two  most 
formidable  rivals  —  Germany  and  the  United  States. 

Of  course,  this  economic  preeminence  of  the  British  Empire 
was  not  entirely  due  to  the  colonies.  But  at  least  thirty  per 
cent  of  the  United  Kingdom's  external  trade  was  with  .  ^  ^ 

Advantages 

the  colonies ;  and  the  colonies  furnished  a  market  for  to  British 
considerably  more  than  a  third  of  British  exports,  ^anu- 

.  lacturers 

Believing  that  the  loss  of  the  colonies  would  mean 
the  loss  of  a  large  part  of  the  colonial  trade,  and  hoping  that 
the  acquisition  of  new  colonies  would  augment  the  colonial 
trade,  British  manufacturers  felt  that  the  possession  of  an  enor- 
mous empire  was  vital  to  their  prosperity.  Imperialists  further- 
more pointed  out  that  about  a  quarter  of  industrial  England's 
food-imports  and  almost  a  third  of  her  imports  of  raw-materials 
came  from  British  possessions.  The  colonies  appeared  as  neces- 
sary to  England  as  the  tender  to  a  locomotive. 

A  less  obvious  advantage,  but  not  less  important,  was  that 
enjoyed  by  British  bankers  and  investors.    In  a  sense,  the 
British  Indian  Empire,  as  we  have  already  seen,  was  Advantages 
a  huge  business  enterprise  in  which  British  capitalists  to  British 
held  the  shares.    During  the  nineteenth  century,  and  ^*p***^^*^ 
more  especially  in  the  twentieth,  London  bankers  invested  Hter- 
ally  biUions  of  dollars  in  the  British  colonies.    BiUions  of  British 
capital  were  also  invested  in  foreign  countries,  but  the  British 
colonies  offered  a  more  favorable  field  for  investment,  not  only 
because  as  a  rule  richer  rewards  were  to  be  reaped,  but  also 
because  interest  was  oftentimes  guaranteed  by  the  government, 
yvhereas  interest  on  loans  to  the  independent  Latin-American 

VOL.  U— 2X 


674 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


countries,  for  example,  was  sometimes  difficult  to  collect.  Thu 
total  annual  income  from  British  capital  invested  abroad  could, 
of  course,  be  only  roughly  estimated,  but  it  was  computed  at 
over  one  and  one-half  bilhon  dollars. 

Thus,  although  the  British  government  derived  no  tribute 
from  its  imperial  dominions,  nevertheless  certain  private  citizens 
of  the  United  Kingdom  drew  enormous  profits  from 
"Parasites"        colonies.    Thcsc  invcstors  have  been  called  by  a 

of  British  ....  .  . 

Imperialism  brilliant  British  economist  ''the  parasites  of  imperial- 
ism." There  were  other  classes,  too,  which,  like  para- 
sites, obtained  their  Hving  from  imperialism.  First  and  fore- 
most, in  honor  and  dignity,  were  the  officials  sent  out  from  Lon- 
don to  act  as  governors,  commissioners,  councilors,  and  petty 
magistrates.  Men  of  university  training,  cultured  and  talented, 
found  in  this  imperial  bureaucracy  comfortable  salaries  and 
honorable  careers.  The  army  and  navy  offered  an  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  ambition,  along  with  greater  excitement.  And  all 
the  British  manufacturers  who  specialized  in  the  production  of 
military  suppHes,  soldier's  clothing,  battleships,  rifles,  bullets, 
flags,  and  a  thousand  and  one  other  imperial  necessities,  —  they 
too  might  be  reckoned  parasites  of  imperiaHsm. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  bring  out  the  importance  of  economic 
motives  in  British  imperiaHsm.  They  must  not  be  exaggerated. 
The  average  EngHshman  probably  had  no  direct  profit  to  gain 
from  the  Empire.  He  believed  it  to  be  true,  in  a  vague  way, 
as  he  had  so  insistently  been  told,  that  upon  the  Empire  the 
nation's  prosperity  depended  —  although  he  had  no  thorough 
understanding  of  economic  theories.  At  any  rate,  it  seemed 
a  glorious  thing  to  have  an  Empire  upon  which  the  sun  never 
went  down,  the  greatest  Empire  in  the  world. 

One  other  aspect  of  British  imperialism  is  worthy  of  notice 
—  its  dependence  on  sea-power.  One  has  only  to  glance  at 
the  map,  and  the  dependence  of  British  imperialism 
o?^*Sea^^^  upon  sea-power  becomes  clear.  The  five  greatest 
Power  "  to  states  of  the  Empire  he  in  five  separate  continents, 
Em^^^^  with  the  trackless  ocean  between.  Repeatedly,  as  in 
the  Indian  Mutiny  or  in  the  South  African  War,  Great 
Britain  has  had  to  hurry  troops  by  sea  to  subdue  a  rebellious 
colony  or  to  crush  a  stubborn  enemy.    If  a  Great  Power  at  war 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


675 


with  the  British  Empire  could  sink  the  British  navy,  it  would 
be  a  simple  matter  to  starve  out  England,  and  to  capture  the 
separate  colonies,  few  of  them  strongly  defended.  ReaHzing 
this,  the  British  government  was  careful  to  maintain  the  most 
powerful  navy  of  any  nation.  In  addition,  Great  Britain  pro- 
vided her  Empire  with  coaling  stations  and  naval  bases,  Hnk- 
ing  up  her  major  possessions.  The  route  through  the  Red  Sea 
to  India  and  Australasia  was  guarded  by  Gibraltar,  Malta, 
Cyprus,  Egypt,  Aden,  Sokotra.  In  every  corner  of  the  seven 
seas.  Great  Britain  had  a  station  for  her  fleet. 

The  cost  of  such  a  naval  estabhshment  was  staggering.  But 
it  was  considered  necessary  in  order  to  preserve  the  Empire. 
The  Empire,  indeed,  was  otherwise  a  frail  structure.  Its  only 
really  loyal  parts  were  the  "white"  Dominions,  and  they  were 
the  very  colonies  which  were  most  independent  of  the  mother- 
country.  In  Africa  and  in  India  Great  Britain  had  built  rail- 
ways, roads,  canals,  and  dams,  but  had  not  made  her  subject 
races  British  in  civihzation  or  in  loyalty.  If  by  rebellion  or 
by  foreign  war  the  British  were  expelled  from  Egypt  or  from 
India,  the  historian  might  safely  turn  prophet  in  predicting 
that  time  would  soon  leave  fewer  traces  of  British  rule  there  than 
imperial  Rome  has  left  in  England. 

ADDITIONAL  READING 

General.  Brief  outlines :  J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Develop- 
ment  of  Modern  Europe,  Vol.  II  (1907),  ch.  xxvii;  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe 
since  18 ij  (1910),  ch.  xxii;  Oscar  Browning,  A  History  of  the  Modern 
World,  Vol.  II  (191 2),  Book  IV;  A.  L.  Lowell,  The  Government  of  England 
Vol.  II  (new  ed.,  1912),  ch.  liv-lviii.  Good  one-volume  narratives:  W.  H. 
Woodward,  A  Short  History  of  the  Expansion  of  the  British  Empire,  i  joo- 
igii,  3d  ed.  (191 2);  E.  G.  Hawke,  The  British  Empire  and  its  History 
(191 1) ;  H.  E.  Egerton,  A  Short  History  of  British  Colonial  Policy  (1897) ; 
W.  P.  Greswell,  Growth  and  Administration  of  the  British  Colonies,  i8j/- 
i8gy  (1898);  W.  J.  Ashley  (editor),  British  Dominions:  their  Present 
Commercial  and  Industrial  Condition  (191 1);  A.  F.  Pollard  (editor),  The 
British  Empire:  its  Past,  its  Present,  and  its  Future  (1909);  Sir  Charles 
Lucas,  The  British  Empire  (191 5).  Standard  scries:  C.  P.  Lucas,  A  His- 
torical Geography  of  the  British  Colonies,  comprehensive  and  accurate,  ap- 
pearing first  in  1888  and  subsequently  enlarged  and  revised  by  various 
authorities  so  as  to  comprise  (1916)  6  volumes  in  12  — Vol.  I,  The  Mediter- 
ranean and  Eastern  Colonies,  Vol.  II,  The  West  Indies,  Vol.  Ill,  West  A frica, 


676  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Vol.  IV,  South  Africa  (3  parts),  Vol.  V,  Canada  and  Newfoundland  (4 
parts).  Vol.  VI,  Australasia  (2  parts) ;  A.  J.  Herbertson  and  O.  J.  R.  How- 
arth  (editors).  The  Oxford  Survey  of  the  British  Empire,  6  vols.  (1914), 
descriptive  rather  than  historical,  embracing  Vol.  I,  The  British  Isles  and 
Mediterranean  Possessions,  Vol.  II,  Asia,  Vol.  Ill,  Africa,  Vol.  IV,  America, 
Vol.  V,  Australasia,  Vol.  VI,  General  Survey;  A.  W.  Tilby,  The  English 
People  Overseas,  6  vols.  (1912-1914),  including  Vol.  I,  The  American  Colo- 
nies, 1583-1763,  Vol.  II,  British  India,  1600-1828,  Vol.  Ill,  British  North 
America,  iy6j-i86y,  Vol.  IV,  Britain  in  the  Tropics,  iszy-igio.  Vol.  V, 
Australasia,  1688-igii,  Vol.  VI,  South  Africa,  1486-igij;  British  Empire 
Series,  5  vols.  (1899-1902),  popular  descriptions;  All  Red  Series,  5  vols. 
( 1 909-1 9 1 2),  another  series  of  popular  descriptions  by  competent  authorities. 

Colonial  Government  and  Colonial  Federation.  Sir  Henry  Jenkyns, 
British  Rule  and  Jurisdiction  beyond  the  Seas  (1902) ;  Bernard  Holland, 
Imperium  et  Liber tas:  a  Study  in  History  and  Politics  (1901) ;  E.  J.  Payne, 
Colonies  and  Colonial  Federation  (1905) ;  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  Problems  of 
Greater  Britain  (1890),  and,  by  the  same  author,  The  British  Empire  (1899) ; 
Alpheus  Todd,  Parliamentary  Government  in  the  British  Colonies,  2d  ed. 
(1894) ;  Richard  Jebb,  Studies  in  Colonial  Nationalism  (1905),  and,  by 
the  same  author.  The  Imperial  Conference,  2  vols.  (191 1),  and  The  Britannic 
Question:  a  Survey  of  Alternatives  (1913) ;  J.  W.  Root,  Colonial  Tarifs 
(1906) ;  C.  J.  Fuchs,  The  Trade  Policy  of  Great  Britain  and  her  Colonies 
since  i860,  trans,  from  German  by  Constance  Archibald  (1905) ;  H.  E. 
Egerton,  Federations  and  Unions  within  the  British  Empire  (191 1) ;  C.  E.  A. 
Bedwell  (editor).  The  Legislation  of  the  Empire :  being  a  Survey  of  the  Legis- 
lative Enactments  of  the  British  Dominions  from  i8g8  to  igoy,  4  vols.  (1909) ; 
Sir  Charles  Bruce,  The  Broad  Stone  of  Empire:  Problems  of  Crown  Colony 
Administration,  2  vols.  (1910).  See  also  Sir  C.  P.  Lucas,  Greater  Rome  and 
Greater  Britain  (191 2);  and  the  suggestive  essays  of  James  (Viscount) 
Bryce  on  The  Ancient  Roman  Empire  and  the  British  Empire  in  India, 
and  The  Diffusion  of  Roman  and  English  Law  throughout  the  World, 
originally  published  in  his  Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence,  but  now- 
brought  out  in  a  separate  little  volume  (1914).  The  "  Round  Table  "  is  an 
organization  devoted  to  the  cause  of  imperial  federation  and  to  the  study  of 
problems  confronting  the  self-governing  colonies:  it  publishes  scholarly 
studies  and  an  admirable  journal. 

Special  Works  on  Canada.  A.  G.  Bradley,  Canada  (191 2),  a  convenient 
volume  in  the  "  Home  University  Library  " ;  Agnes  C.  Laut,  The  Canadian 
Commonwealth  (191 5),  in  "Problems  of  the  Nations"  Series;  W.  L. 
Griffith,  The  Dominion  of  Canada  (191 1),  in  the  "  All  Red  "  Series;  Sir  J.  G. 
Bourinot,  Canada  under  British  Rule,  1760-igoo  (1900),  and,  by  the  same 
author,  a  competent  writer  on  the  subject.  Manual  of  the  Constitutional 
History  of  Canada  from  the  Earliest  Period  to  igoi,  new  ed.  (1901) ;  C.  G.  D. 
Roberts,  History  of  Canada  (1897),  well-written,  compact,  and  valuable; 
William  Kingsford,  History  of  Canada,  10  vols.  (1887-1897),  an  exhaustive 
painstaking  work  covering  the  years  from  1608  to  1841 ;  H.  E.  Egerton  and 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM  677 

W.  L.  Grant,  Canadian  Constitutional  Developtnent,  shown  by  Selected  Speeches 
and  Despatches  (1907) ;  William  Houston  (editor),  Documents  illustrative 
of  the  Canadian  Constitution  (1891) ;  Frederick  Bradshaw,  Self -Government 
in  Canada  and  How  it  was  Achieved:  the  Story  of  Lord  Durham's  Report 
(1903) ;  S.  J.  Reid,  Life  and  Letters  of  the  First  Earl  of  Durham,  2  vols. 
(1906),  very  laudatory,  but  informing;  Lord  Durham's  Report  on  the  Af- 
fairs of  British  North  America,  ed.  by  Sir  C.  P.  Lucas,  3  vols.  (191 2); 
E.  S.  Montague  and  Bron  Herbert,  Canada  and  the  Empire,  an  Examina- 
tion of  Trade  Preferences  (1904) ;  J.  C.  Hopkins  (editor).  The  Canadian 
Annual  Review  of  Public  A  fairs  (1901  sqq). 

Special  Works  on  Australasia.  G.  W.  Rusden,  History  of  Australia,  3 
vols.  (1883),  and,  by  the  same  author,  History  of  New  Zealand,  3  vols. 
(1883),  standard  works  ;  J.  G.  Grey,  Australasia  Old  and  New  (1901) ; 
B.  R.  Wise,  The  Making  of  the  Australian  Commonwealth,  i8Sg~igoo: 
a  Stage  in  the  Growth  of  Empire  (1913) ;  H.  G.  Turner,  The  First 
Decade  of  the  Australian  Commonwealth :  a  Chronicle  of  Contemporary 
Politics,  igoi-igio  (191 1);  W.  H.  Moore,  Constitution  of  the  Common- 
wealth of  Australia  (1902) ;  A.  I.  Clark,  Studies  in  Australasian  Constitu- 
tional Law,  2d  ed.  (1905) ;  Frank  Parsons,  The  Story  of  New  Zealand  (1904) ; 
V.  S.  Clark,  The  Labor  Movement  in  Australasia:  a  Study  in  Social  Democ- 
racy (1906) ;  W.  P.  Reeves,  State  Experiments  in  Australia  and  New  Zea- 
land, 2  vols.  (1902) ;  H.  D.  Lloyd,  Newest  England  (1900), 

Special  Works  on  South  Africa.  F.  R.  Cana,  South  Africa  from  the 
Great  Trek  to  the  Union  (1909) ;  G.  E.  Cory,  The  Rise  of  South  Africa:  a 
History  of  the  Origin  of  South  African  Colonization  and  of  its  Development 
Towards  the  East  from  the  Earliest  Times  to  iSjy,  a  scholarly  work  projected 
in  4  vols.  (1910  sqq.) ;  G.  M.  Theal,  South  Africa  (1900)  in  "  Story  of  the 
Nations  "  Series;  R.  H.  Brand,  The  Union  of  South  Africa  (1909),  contain- 
ing the  constitution  and  an  account  of  its  adoption;  W.  B.  Worsfold, 
The  Union  of  South  Africa  (191  i2),  history  and  description,  in  the  "AU 
Red"  Series.  On  the  Boer  War:  James  (Viscount)  Bryce,  Impressions 
of  South  Africa  (1897),  useful  for  conditions  on  the  eve  of  the  struggle; 
Sir  A.  Conan  Doyle,  The  War  in  South  Africa,  its  Cause  and  Cofiduct 
(1902),  a  popular  narrative  from  the  British  standpoint;  J.  A.  Hobson, 
War  in  South  Africa,  its  Causes  a^id  Efects  (1900),  an  Englishman's 
bitter  indictment  of  the  policy  of  his  own  government ;  L.  S.  Amery 
(editor).  The  Times  History  of  the  War  in  South  Africa,  i8gQ-igo2,  7  vols. 
(1900-1909),  the  most  detailed  account;  Briton  and  Boer:  Both  Sides  of 
the  South  African  Question  (1900),  an  interesting  collection  of  papers  by 
James  (Viscount)  Bryce,  Sydney  Brooks,  and  other  eminent  persons ;  The 
Memoirs  of  Paid  Kruger,  Four  Times  President  of  the  South  African 
Republic,  Told  by  Himself,  ed.  by  A.  Schowalter,  and  Eng.  trans,  by  A. 
Teixeira  de  Mattos  (1902).  For  a  more  complete  bibliography  of  the  Boer 
War,  consult  the  American  Historical  Review,  Vol.  XH,  pp.  299-321. 

Special  Works  on  India.  Sir  T.  W.  Holderncss,  Peoples  and  Problems 
of  India  (191 2),  an  excellent  brief  treatise  in  the  "Home  University  Li- 


678 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


brary";  Sir  Henry  J.  S.  Colton,  New  India  (1907);  Sir  J.  B.  Fuller, 
The  Empire  of  India  (1913) ;  Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XH  (1910), 
ch.  xvi,  a  summary  of  political  and  military  events  since  1870,  written  by 
P.  E.  Roberts;  Cambridge  History  of  India,  projected  (1916)  in  6  vols.; 
The  Imperial  Gazetteer  of  India,  3d  ed.,  26  vols.  (1907-1909),  a  comprehen- 
sive survey  of  all  Indian  interests,  the  cooperative  work  of  a  number  of 
specialists;  Ramsay  Muir,  The  Making  of  British  India  (191 5),  covering 
the  years  1775-1858,  mostly  documentary;  D.  C.  Boulger,  India  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  (1901) ;  F.  S.  (Earl)  Roberts,  Forty-one  Years  in  India: 
from  Subaltern  to  Commander-in-Chief ,  29th  ed.  (1898) ;  G.  W,  Forrest, 
History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  reviewed  and  illustrated  from  Original  Docu- 
ments, 3  vols.  (1904-19 1 2),  full  and  accurate,  but  dry  and  poorly  arranged ; 
McLeod  Innes,  Sepoy  Revolt,  a  Critical  Narrative,  2d  ed.  (1897),  brief  and 
clear ;  Sir  J.  W.  Kaye,  History  of  the  Sepoy  War,  1857-1858,  completed  by 
G.  B.  Malleson,  3  vols.  (1879-1880),  a  standard  work;  Sir  John  Strachey, 
India:  its  Administration  and  Progress,  3d  ed.  (1903),  an  official  account 
and  apology;  Sir  Courtney  Ilbert,  The  Government  of  India,  3d  ed.  (191 5), 
an  authoritative  digest  of  the  constitutional  law  with  historical  introduction 
and  valuable  comments;  Panchanandas  Mukherji  (editor),  Indian  Con- 
stitutional Documents,  iY7^—igi5  (1915);  R.  C.  Dutt,  Economic  History  of 
British  India,  1757-18^7  (1902) ;  Sir  Theodore  Morison,  The  Economic 
Transition  in  India  {igii);  William  Digby,  'Prosperous^  British  India: 
a  Revelation  from  Official  Records  (1901),  a  bitter  arraignment  of  British 
rule  in  India;  Lovat  Eraser,  India  under  Curzon  and  After  (191 1),  an  ini- 
portant  contribution  to  recent  Indian  history. 

Special  Works  on  Egypt.  Earl  of  Cromer,  Modern  Egypt,  2  vols.  (1908), 
a  masterly  exposition  of  Egyptian  history  and  problems  since  1876  by  a 
scholar  who  was  the  British  official  representative  in  Egypt  for  27  years; 
A.  E.  P.  B.  Weigall,  A  History  of  Events  in  Egypt  from  I7g8  to  igi4  (1915) ; 
Edward  Dicey,  Story  of  the  Khedivate  (1902),  and,  by  the  same  author, 
Egypt  of  the  Future  (1906),  popular  accounts;  G.  W.  Steevens,  With 
Kitchener  to  Khartum,  4th  ed.  (1898) ;  W.  S.  Blunt,  Secret  History  of  the 
English  Occupation  of  Egypt  (1907),  and,  by  the  same  author,  a  severe 
critic  of  British  rule,  Gordon  at  Khartoum  (1911)- 

Special  Works  on  Malaysia.  Sir  F.  A.  Swettenham,  British  Malaya: 
an  Account  of  the  Origin  and  Progress  of  British  Influence  in  Malaya  (1907) ; 
Arnold  Wright  and  T.  H.  Reid,  The  Malay  Peninsula :  a  Record  of  British 
Progress  in  the  Middle  East  (191 2). 


CHAPTER  XXX 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS   (1871-1914)    AND   THE  OUTBREAK 
OF  THE  WAR  OF  THE  NATIONS 

THE  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE 

Peace  —  international  and  permanent  —  became  an  ideal  of 
many  distinguished  statesmen  of  the  nineteenth  century  whether 
Liberals  or  Reactionaries.    Had  all  Europeans  been 
devout  adherents  of  the  Catholic  Church,  it  might  cTurJh^or^ 
have  been  possible  to  have  reaUzed  that  ideal  under  Empire  to 
the  guidance  of  the  pope,  for  the  Catholic  Church  was  peace^ 
always  preaching  the  doctrine  of  "peace  on  earth  to 
men  of  good  will,"  but  the  disruption  of  the  Church  in  the  six- 
teenth century,  to  say  nothing  of  the  defection  of  the  Eastern 
Christians  in  earlier  ages,  prevented  the  pope  in  the  nineteenth 
century  from  maintaining  universal  peace.    Or,  had  all  civihzed 
men  been  under  the  temporal  authority  of  a  single  sovereign, 
such  as  a  Roman  emperor,  a  real  Pax  Romana  might  have  been 
revived,  but  with  the  long  decHne  and  final  extinction  in  1806 
of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  the  last  state  that  even  vaguely  laid 
claim  to  universal  secular  predominance,  hope  of  peace  by  means 
of  an  international  empire  vanished. 

What  the  Catholic  Church  and  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  failed 
to  do,  the  Tsar  Alexander  I  and  his  fellow  monarchs  sought  to 
achieve  by  means  of  the  European  agreements  framed 
at  the  time  of  the  downfall  of  Napoleon,  in  the  early 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century.    These  agreements  Europe " : 
constituted  a  ''Concert  of  Europe,"  which  formally 
recognized  that  the  various  nations  of  Europe  were  Peace  by 
united  as  one  family  by  ties  of  religion,  institutions,  and  Qf^go^g^lTgn 
culture,  and  which  solemnly  pledged  its  members  to  the  states 
preservation  of  ''public  peace,  the  tranquillity  of 
states,  the  inviolabiUty  of  possessions,  and  the  faith  of  treaties." 
The  "Concert  of  Europe"  in  theory  embraced  all  the  Christian 

679 


68o 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


states  of  the  entire  Continent,  but  in  practice  it  was  dominated 
and  directed  by  five  Great  Powers  —  Austria,  Russia,  Prussia, 
The  "Great  Great  Britain,  and  France,  How  the  Concert  of  Eu- 
Powers  "  j-QpQ  operated  from  1815  to  1830  has  been  related  in  an 
earlier  chapter  ^  and  likewise  how  it  came  to  grief  through  British 
secession  and  through  its  own  inability  to  reconcile  the  principles 
of  international  peace  and  the  sanctity  of  treaties  with  the  main- 
tenance of  order  and  tranquiUity  within  the  several  sovereign 
states. 

Despite  the  rather  early  lapse  of  the  formal  agreements  upon 
which  the  Concert  of  Europe  was  based,  the  idea  of  the  Concert 
was  never  wholly  lost.    With  greater,  rather  than  with 

Permanence  t  i      i  ?  i        •  i 

of  the  Idea,  less,  repugnance  did  rulers  and  peoples  view  the  possi- 
Organiza  bility  of  European  war,  especially  the  possibiHty  of 
tion,  of  a  war  between  the  Great  Powers.  On  only  four  brief 
of^Europe  occasions  in  the  whole  century  from  18 15  to  19 14  were 
wars  actually  fought  by  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe 
with  one  another:  (i)  Great  Britain  and  France,  on  one  side, 
against  Russia,  on  the  other  (i 854-1 856) ;  (2)  France  against 
Austria  (1859);  (3)  Prussia  against  Austria '  (1866) ;  and  (4) 
Prussia  against  France  ( 1870-187 1).  After  the  wars  of  1866 
and  1870,  Germany  naturally  fell  heir  to  Prussia's  membership 
in  the  Concert  of  Great  Powers,  and  new  Italy  became  a  si^^th 
Great  Power.  Early  in  the  twentieth  century  the  non-European 
nations  of  Japan  and  the  United  States,  by  reason  of  their  grow- 
ing importance  in  world  politics,  were  accorded  by  most 
writers  the  honorary  designation  respectively  of  seventh  and  of 
eighth  Great  Power,  and  were  admitted  for  many  purposes 
to  the  counsels  of  the  six  Great  Powers  of  Europe. 

Meanwhile  the  more  or  less  informal  Concert  of  Europe  was 
performing  valuable  ser\dce  in  crystallizing  international  soHdar- 
Services  of  seeking  to  prevent  war  or  to  alleviate  its 

the  Concert  miseries.  Thus  the  representatives  of  the  Great 
of  Europe  Powers  and  of  Turkey,  assembled  in  the  Congress  of 
Paris  to  conclude  the  Crimean  War,  signed  the  so-called  Declara- 
tion of  Paris  (1856)  for  the  protection  of  neutral  trade  in  times  of 
war.    The  Declaration,  which  was  subsequently  adopted  by 


*  See  above,  ch.  xvii,  especially  pp.  10-14,  46-57. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


68r 


most  civilized  governments/  consecrated  the  following  principles . 

Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished;  2.  The  neutral  flag 
covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contra-  Declaration 
band  of  war;  3.  Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  of  Pans, 
contraband  of  war,  are  not  Hable  to  capture  under  '^^^ 
the  enemy's  flag;   4.  Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must 
be  effective,  that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient  really 
to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy." 

In  1864  the  Great  Powers  signed  a  Convention  at  Geneva, 
Switzerland,  by  the  terms  of  which,  subject  to  certain  regulations, 
not'  only  wounded  soldiers  in  the  field  but  also  the  offi-  ^ 

•  1        n-     r        11  IT-  •  Geneva 

cial  staff  of  ambulances  and  their  equipment  were  Convention 
rendered  neutral,  the  former,  therefore,  no  longer  being  ^^^^ 
Hable  to  be  retained  as  prisoners  of  war,  nor  the  latter 
to  be  taken  as  prize  of  war.    For  the  execution  of  the  Geneva 
Convention,  an  International  Red  Cross  Society  was  organized, 
with  headquarters  at  Geneva,  with  branches  in  all  European 
countries,  and  with  an  international  flag  —  the  Swiss  flag  with 
colors  reversed.     In   1882,  largely  through  the  enthusiasm 
and  energy  of  Clara  Barton,  a  distinguished  American  philan- 
thropist, the  United  States  ratified  the  Geneva  Convention ;  and 
later  both  Turkey  and  Japan  estabHshed  local  branches  of  the 
Red  Cross  Society,  though  under  flags  sKghtly  modified  so  as  to 
satisfy  the  reHgious  scruples  of  their  non-Christian  inhabitants. 

In  1878  the  principle  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  was  invoked 
in  order  to  prevent  the  Russo-Turkish  War  from  precipitating 
a  much  vaster  struggle,  in  which  Great  Britain  and 
Austria-Hungary  might  easily  have  become  involved,  gress  of 
The  resulting  Congress  of  BerKn,^  attended  by  diplo-  ^^^^^^  ^j^^j 
mats  of  the  Great  Powers  and  of  Turkey,  effected  a  the  Concert 
compromise  between  conflicting  national  interests  ^^^^^ 
and  exercised  a  sort  of  joint  oversight  of  the  domestic 
affairs  of  Turkey,  Greece,  and  the  Balkan  states.    From  1878 
to  1 9 14  the  Concert  of  Europe  managed  to  maintain  some  sem- 

^  All  maritime  states  of  any  importance,  except  the  United  States  and  Spain, 
acceded  to  the  Declaration  of  Paris.  Even  Spain  acceded  to  the  Declaration  in 
1907,  and  the  United  States  acquiesced  in  a  Hague  Convention  of  1907  which  was 
of  the  same  general  tenor. 

'  See  above,  pp.  505  ff. 


682 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


blance  of  harmony  in  dealing  with  successive  phases  of  the  Near 
Eastern  Question.  In  1885  Austria-Hungary  was  allowed  to  put 
a  stop  to  Bulgarian  aggression  against  Serbia.  In  1897  the  Great 
Powers  arrested  Turkish  aggression  against  Greece ;  and  at  the 
same  time  Russia,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Ita'y  cooperated 
to  secure  autonomy  for  Crete  under  their  common  protection. 
Repeatedly  the  Great  Powers  acted  together  in  presenting  pro- 
tests to  the  sultan  against  massacres  of  Christians,  in  pressing 
upon  him  demands  for  internal  reforms,  and  in  collecting  debts 
from  him  or  obtaining  financial  concessions.  It  was  under  the 
auspices  of  the  European  Concert  of  Great  Powers  that  the  Balkan 
states  drew  up  their  treaty  with  Turkey  at  London  in  1913  and 
that  the  autonomous  principality  of  Albania  was  erected. 

Southeastern  Europe  was  not  the  only  field  of  concerted  action 
by  the  Great  Powers.  In  central  Africa  the  Congo  Free  State 
The  Con  organized  in  the  'eighties  under  joint  guarantees, 

cert  in  In  China,  troops  of  Russia,  Germany,  France,  Great 
Asia**°^  Britain,  and  Italy  cooperated  in  1900  with  those  of 
Japan  and  the  United  States  to  suppress  the  Boxer 
insurrection ;  ^  and  subsequently  the  Great  Powers  arranged 
among  themselves  "spheres"  of  economic  interest  in  eastern 
and  central  Asia. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  these  examples  of  international 
accord  on  the  part  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  were  but  a  token  of 
Growth  of  ^  very  deep  popular  interest  in  international  solidar- 
Popuiarin-  ity.  As  the  nineteenth  century  advanced  and  the 
aiSin*^°^"  Industrial  Revolution  progressed  and  the  most  differ- 
ent nationalities  and  the  most  diverse  locaHties  were 
knit  together  by  railways,  steamships,  telegraphs,  and  cables, 
the  number  and  importance  of  international  undertakings 
rapidly  increased.  There  was  the  prodigious  increase  of  foreign 
travel  and  foreign  trade.  There  was  the  remarkable  growth  of 
science  and  popular  education,  restricted  to  no  one  land  and  to 
no  one  nation.  There  was  the  marked  tendency  everywhere  to 
adopt  uniform  standards  of  clothing,  food,  and  architecture,  as 
well  as  of  Hterature,  science,  and  poHtics.  There  was  the  mul- 
tiplication of  international  societies  and  congresses.  Thirty 
nations  formed  the  Universal  Telegraph  Union  (1875) ;  twenty- 

1  See  above,  pp.  574  f. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


683 


three  adopted  a  convention  regarding  the  common  use  of  thi 
metric  system  of  weights  and  measures  (1875) ;  sixty  adhered 
to  the  Universal  Postal  Union,  which  was  formed  in  1878,  with 
headquarters  at  Bern  in  Switzerland;  five  joined  the  Latin 
Monetary  Union  (1865)  for  the  regulation  of  an  interchangeable 
coinage  for  the  countries  of  Latin  Europe ;  twenty  ratified  the 
Bern  Convention  of  1883  for  the  standardizing  of  patent  laws; 
and  twelve  signed  the  Bern  Convention  of  1887  providing  for 
practically  uniform  copyright  laws. 

The  international  character  of  the  problems  and  interests  of 
workingmen  throughout  the  world  was  stressed  not  only  by 
the  International  Congresses  of  the  SociaKsts,  but  also  by  inter- 
national organizations  of  the  several  cooperative  societies  and  of 
trade  unions.  Similarly,  earnest  advocates  of  democracy  organ- 
ized the  International  Parhamentary  Union  (1889),  and  agitators 
of  woman  suffrage  and  feminism  held  international  women's 
congresses.  Rehgion  felt  the  general  impulse  :  Protestant  Chris- 
tians of  a  hundred  divergent  creeds  and  of  a  thousand  shades  of 
individual  opinion  met  in  world  congresses  and  made  amicable 
agreements  for  the  parceling  out  of  heathen  lands  among  their 
several  local  bodies  for  missionary  purposes ;  among  the  Roman 
Catholics  a  series  of  annual  Eucharistic  Congresses  was  instituted 
in  1 88 1  and  drew  large  numbers  of  clergymen  and  laymen  now 
to  Paris,  now  to  London,  now  to  Jerusalem,  now  to  Montreal ; 
even  a  World's  Parliament  of  Religions  was  projected  and  actually 
convened.  For  the  advancement  of  learning  there  were  peri- 
odical world  conventions  of  distinguished  physicists,  chemists, 
biologists,  historians,  and  economists;  there  were  ''exchange 
professors"  between  the  universities  of  different  countries;  there 
was  developing  around  the  globe  a  community  of  intellectual 
interests,  the  product  of  what  a  distinguished  American  scholar 
has  termed  ''the  international  mind." 

It  was  natural  under  these  circumstances  that  to  many  thought- 
ful persons  the  idea  of  war  between  nations  should  seem  intoler- 
able.   An  EngHsh  Peace  Society  was  organized  as  Growth  of 
early  as  181 6  and  an  American  Peace  Society  —  a  Popular 
national  federation  of  local  and  state  societies  —  as  ^ 
early  as  1828.    The  first  peade  society  on  the  continent  of 
Europe  was  founded  at  Geneva  in  1828  and  the  second  at  Paris 


684  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


in  1 84 1.  Thenceforth,  especially  after  1878,  the  number  of 
peace  societies  increased  steadily,  until  in  19 14  there  were  about 
160  with  many  branches  and  large  membership.  International 
Peace  Congresses,  assembling  intermittently  and  spasmodically 
between  1843  1889,  became  regular  annual  events  after  the 
latter  date,  and  in  1891  permanent  headquarters  of  the  inter- 
national peace  movement  were  established  at  Bern.  Philan- 
thropic gentlemen  throughout  the  world,  such  as  the  Swedish 
Alfred  Nobel,^  and  the  Scotch- American  Andrew  Carnegie,^  the 
Frenchman  Baron  D'Estournelles  de  Constant,^  and  the  Russian 
Count  Leo  Tolstoy,^  freely  gave  pen  or  purse  to  the  propaganda 
of  pacifism.  A  host  of  pacifists  arose,  denouncing  war  as  a  rehc 
of  barbarism,  immoral,  un-Christian,  and  inimical  to  modern 
culture,  to  sound  economics  and  sound  politics.  To  the  new  gen- 
eration of  pacifists,  with  which  the  twentieth  century  opened,  it 
appeared  that  war  was  a  thing  of  the  past :  the  capitalists  of 
Anti-MUi-  every  country  had  too  many  foreign  investments  or  too 
tarism  much  foreign  commerce  to  allow  their  governments  to 
precipitate  war ;  the  laboring  classes  had  too  much  to  lose  from  a 
state  of  war  in  the  way  of  employment  and  wages,  and,  moreover, 
many  of  them  were  identified  with  international  Socialism ;  the 
intellectual  classes  were  too  ''enhghtened"  and  too  internation- 
ally minded  not  to  perceive  the  fallacies  in  all  arguments  and 
pretexts  for  war;  the  Christian  bodies  were  traditionally  com- 
mitted to  the  inculcation  of  the  principle  of  universal  peace. 

It  was,  therefore,  the  pacifists  who  backed  the  Concert  of 
Europe  in  its  efforts  to  prevent  war  or  to  mitigate  its  horrors. 
It  was  the  pacifists  who  encouraged  and  lauded  the  newer  tend- 

^  Alfred  Bernhard  Nobel  (1833-1896)  was  a  chemist  and  engineer,  whose  inven- 
tion of  dynamite,  cordite,  and  other  high  explosives  enabled  him  to  amass  an  im- 
mense fortune,  the  bulk  of  which  he  left  in  trust  for  the  establishment  of  five  prizes, 
each  worth  a  goodly  sum  and  awarded  annually  without  distinction  of  nationality; 
the  first  three  of  these  prizes  are  for  eminence  in  science,  the  fourth  for  excellence 
in  idealistic  literature,  and  the  fifth  for  the  greatest  service  to  the  cause  of  inter- 
national peace. 

2  Andrew  Carnegie  (1837-  )  drew  hberally  upon  the  fortime  that  he  had 
accumulated  in  the  iron  and  steel  business  in  order  to  endow  peace  societies 
and  to  build  a  Temple  of  Peace  at  the  Hague  and  a  Pan-American  Palace  at 
Washington. 

3  Born  in  1852,  a  Senator  of  the  French  Republic,  and  a  promiiient  publicist  in 
behalf  of  peace. 

*  The  famous  novelist  and  social  reformer  (iSaS'-igio), 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


685 


encies  of  nations  to  submit  their  quarrels  to  international  arbitra- 
tion. Repeatedly  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  showed 
their  wiUingness  to  arbitrate  their  disputes,  as  in  the  j^^gj.. 
case  of  the  Alabama  claims  (i87i-i872),of  the  Bering  national  Ar- 
Sea  controversy  (1892),  and  of  the  Alaskan  boundary 
(1903),  with  such  success  that  there  seemed  to  be  no  need  of 
fortifications  along  the  Canadian  frontier  and  the  possibility 
of  war  between  the  two  great  English-speaking  countries  ap- 
peared more  and  more  remote.  To  mention  but  a  few  of  the 
many  cases  of  international  arbitration,  —  the  pope  successfully 
arbitrated  a  colonial  controversy  between  Germany  and  Spain 
(1886) ;  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States  amicably 
composed  their  differences  in  Samoa  (1899) ;  Argentina  and  Chile 
submitted  their  long-standing  boundary  dispute  to  the  arbitra- 
tion of  the  British  king,  who  gave  judgment  in  1902  ;  France  and 
Germany  settled  the  Moroccan  crisis  of  1909  by  arbitration. 

At  the  same  time  the  pacifists  had  to  face  the  fact  that 
since  i860  there  had  been  an  astounding  growth  of  military  and 
naval  armaments  in  almost  every  nation.  Of  course  opposition 
most  advocates  of  national  armament,  themselves  in-  to  Heavy 
fluenced  by  the  pacific  spirit  of  the  age,  insisted  that 
such  armaments  were  strictly  defensive,  that  they  constituted 
mere  preparedness  against  dreadful  but  possible  eventualities 
and  were  the  surest  and  safest  pledge  of  lasting  peace.  Never- 
theless, foremost  pacifists  scented  danger  in  military  and  naval 
''preparedness,"  and  other  persons  who  were  not  professionally 
pacific  complained  of  the  growing  burdens  of  taxation  which  this 
''peace  insurance"  poHcy  necessitated.  A  conspicuous  plank 
in  the  pacifist  platform,  therefore,  was  the  demand  for  the 
limitation  of  armaments  by  international  agreement,  coupled 
with  the  plea  for  the  establishment  of  an  international  court  of 
arbitration.  Such  a  program  seemed  capable  of  reahzation  in 
the  fight  of  the  increasingly  pacific  mutual  relations  of  the  repub- 
lics on  the  American  continents,  especially  after  the  inauguration 
of  the  series  of  Pan-American  Conferences  (1889).  And  such  a 
program  appealed  strongly  to  various  European  statesmen,  har- 
assed by  the  constant  necessity  of  providing  funds  to  maintain 
the  positions  of  their  respective  nations  in  the  fiercely  competitive 
race  of  armaments. 


686  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


In  Augiist,  1898,  the  Tsar  Nicholas  II  of  Russia,  imitating 
the  pacifist  sentiments  of  the  Tsar  Alexander  I,  addressed  a  fa- 
mous rescript  to  all  independent  and  sovereign  states 
Hague*^^*  of  Europe  and  Asia  and  to  the  United  States  and 
Peace  Mcxico,  inviting  them,  with  the  concurrence  of  Queen 
^899^'^^^^^'  Wilhelmina  of  Holland,  to  send  representatives  to  The 
Hague  in  the  following  year  in  order  to  promote  in- 
ternational peace.  In  January,  1899,  the  tsar's  government 
defined  the  object  of  the  proposed  conference  as  an  attempt  to 
arrive  at  an  ''understanding  not  to  increase  for  a  fixed  period  the 
present  effectives  of  the  armed  military  and  naval  forces,  and  at 
the  same  time  not  to  increase  the  budgets  pertaining  thereto ; 
and  a  prehminary  examination  of  the  means  by  which  even  a 
reduction  might  be  effected  in  future  in  the  forces  and  budgets 
above  mentioned."  The  conference,  known  as  the  First  Hague 
Conference,  was  attended  by  representatives  of  twenty-six 
states  —  20  European,  4  Asiatic,  and  2  American  —  and  sat 
from  18  May  to  29  July,  1899.  The  Conference  was  important 
in  two  ways.  First,  it  showed  that  the  pacifists  were  mistaken  in 
supposing  that  all  governments  were  opposed  to  militarism ; 
apparently  the  spirit  of  national  and  racial  rivalry  was  still  much 
stronger  than  the  consciousness  of  common  interests;  and  the 
determined  attitude  of  several  delegates,  notably  those  of  Ger- 
many, blocked  every  attempt  of  the  Conference  to  arrive  at  an 
understanding  regarding  the  limitation  of  armaments.  Secondly, 
the  Conference  did  achieve  some  noteworthy  results,  though  of 
less  immediate  importance.  It  established  a  regular  tribunal  at 
The  Hague  to  which  international  disputes  might  be  referred  for 
adjudication.  It  directed  a  systematic  codification  of  the  laws 
and  customs  of  war.  It  adapted  the  principles  of  the  Geneva 
Convention  of  1864  to  the  newer  possibilities  of  maritime  war- 
fare. Moreover,  some  —  but  not  all  —  of  the  Powers  represented 
in  the  Conference  signed  promises  that  in  warfare  they  would 
not  use  asphyxiating  gases  or  poisoned  bullets  or  bullets  (''dum- 
dum") which  inflict  needlessly  torturing  wounds,  and  that  they 
would  not  launch  projectiles  and  explosives  from  balloons. 

In  1907,  upon  the  suggestion  of  President  Roosevelt  of  the 
United  States  and  the  formal  invitation  of  the  Tsar  Nicholas  II, 
a  Second  Peace  Conference  was  held  at  The  Hague,  this  time  rep- 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


687 


resenting  forty-four  states,  including  nineteen  American.  Again 
it  was  impossible  to  reach  any  sort  of  agreement  on  the  much- 
mooted  question  of  the  limitation  of  armaments,  but  second 
many  humane  amendments  were  made  to  the  laws  of  Hague 
maritime  and  land  war,  an  international  prize  court  ^^^^^^^^^J 
was  provided  for,  and  conventions  were  adopted  requir-  ^^'^ 
ing  a  formal  declaration  of  war  before  the  opening  of  hostilities 
and  restricting  the  employment  of  force  for  the  recovery  of  for- 
eign debts.  Finally,  the  Conference  recommended  to  the  Powers 
the  convocation  of  a  Third  Peace  Conference. 

It  began  to  look  to  optimistically  minded  pacifists  as  if  here 
was  a  real  beginning  of  an  organized  international  statC;,  with 
its  capitol  in  The  Hague,  with  its  regular  congresses,  ^j^^ 
with  its  statutes  and  codes,  with  its  permanent  court  Pacifist 
of  arbitration.    If  the  German  Empire,  the  United 
States,  and  Switzerland  were  successes  as  federal  states,  why 
should  not  an  International  Federation  of  the  World  be  practical 
and  successful?    Certainly,  the  Hague  Conferences  did  a  good 
deal  to  strengthen  public  opinion  in  favor  of  peaceful  methods  in 
the  solution  of  international  problems.    The  court  of  arbitration 
was  duly  instituted,  and  to  it  were  referred  between  1901  and 
1914  for  peaceful  adjustment  several  misunderstandings  which  a 
hundred  years  earlier  would  assuredly  have  led  to  war. 

But  the  view  of  the  pacifists  was  too  roseate.    They  saw  the 
first  flushes  of  a  glorious  dawn  of  human  justice  and  universal 
peace  and  failed  to  perceive  the  long  gruesome  shadows  Q^^g^^^^j^g 
which  stretched  close  to  them  from  a  miserable  mass  of  to  inter- 
earthly  obstructions  athwart  that  dawn.    The  chief  p^^^^^^g^ 
obstacles  to  the  full  realization  of  the  pacifists'  pro- 
gram were  five  in  number.    The  first  was  the  stubborn  and 
persistent  growth  of  the  spirit  of  nationalism  —  the  notion  that 
people  speaking  the  same  language  and  sharing  the  same  general 
customs  should  be  politically  united  as  nations,  —  a 
growth  not  arrested  in  the  nineteenth  century,  when  Nationalism 
Germany  or  Italy  was  unified,  but  continuing  in  the  and  Uncriti- 
twentieth  century,  by  means  of  literature  and  public  -^5^^^*"°* 
school  systems,  to  affect  French,  English,  Norwegians, 
Greeks,  Serbs,  Poles,  Irish,  Czechs,  and  many  other  nationalities, 
great  and  small.    Nationalism  emphasized  what  was  peculiar  to 


688 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


a  given  people  rather  than  what  was  common  to  all  peoples.  It 
was  exclusive  rather  than  inclusive.  And  when  nationalism 
was  embodied  in  a  state,  it  usually  gave  rise  to  a  dogmatic 
patriotism  which  rendered  such  a  state  not  only  intolerant  of 
any  diminution  of  its  internal  authority  but  extremely  jealous 
of  external  encroachments  upon  its  sovereignty.  The  national 
state  was  becoming  an  end  in  itself,  and  for  the  old  adage  that 
''the  king  can  do  no  wrong"  was  being  substituted  the  popular 
belief  that ''  the  state  can  do  no  wrong."  Many  a  patriot  talked 
about  ''rights,"  "dignity,"  and  "honor,"  just  as  duelists  used  to 
talk ;  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  point  out  the  incompatibility  of 
such  language  with  the  principle  of  compulsory  arbitration  of 
international  disputes. 

Secondly,  there  was  the  survival  from  earlier  times  of  grave 
territorial  questions,  which  could  hardly  be  submitted  to  peace- 
2  Survival  arbitration.  Such  was  the  question  of  Alsace- 
of  Grave  Lorraine,  the  provinces  which  had  been  wrested  from 
Problems^    France  by  German  prowess  in  187 1,  which  Frenchmen 

demanded  back,  and  which  Germans  would  not  think  of 
restoring.  Such,  too,  was  the  question  of  the  reestablishment  of 
an  independent  or  autonomous  Poland,  ardently  longed  for  by  all 
Polish  patriots,  but  bound  to  produce  the  gravest  consequence 
to  the  interrelations  of  Russia,  Germany,  and  Austria.  Such, 
likewise,  was  the  question  of  the  dismemberment  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  for  the  traditional  interests  of  the  Great  Powers  were 
notoriously  at  variance  with  one  another  and  also  with  the  na- 
tional sentiments  of  the  Balkan  peoples.  Such,  finally,  was  the 
question  of  the  disposal,  on  some  national  basis,  of  the  hetero- 
geneous population  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  of  Austria-Hungary. 
There  was  hardly  a  single  Power,  great  or  small,  which  was  not 
vitally  concerned  in  the  solution  of  some  territorial  problem. 

Thirdly,  the  rivalries  of  sovereign  states,  inspired  by  the 
sentiment  of  nationalism  and  intensified  by  material  questions 

of  territorial  boundaries,  were  rendered  even  more 
fstic^r^ta'-  acute  by  the  agitation  of  interested  capitalists  and 
tion  of  Par-  business-men,  who  demanded  and  received  from  their 
Classes       several  national  governments  protection  for  their 

foreign  trade  and  foreign  investments,  or  who  loaned 
money  to  their  governments,  or  who,  like  the  Krupps  in  Ger- 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


689 


many  or  the  Armstrongs  in  Great  Britain  or  the  Schneiders  in 
France  or  the  Du  Fonts  in  the  United  States,  manufactured  mu- 
nitions of  war.  It  was  the  ambition  and  to  the  personal  advan- 
tage of  these  able  and  influential  citizens  to  make  their  several 
national  states  powerful  enough  to  inspire  fear  and  respect  at 
home  and  abroad. 

Out  of  the  foregoing  obstacles  to  pacifist  propaganda  pro- 
ceeded a  fourth  obstacle  —  the  prevalence  of  militarism.  Prussia, 
always  a  military  state  par  excellence^  had  set  a  new 
pace  in  land  armaments  in  1862,  when,  thanks  largely  Growth*©! 
to  King  William  I  and  Bismarck,  she  introduced  com-  National 
pulsory  military  service  for  every  able-bodied  male  ^^^Titi^ 
citizen.    The  success  of  the  new  Prussian  military 
machine  in  effecting  the  political  unification  of  Germany  between 
1866  and  187 1  not  only  convinced  Germans  that  the  preservation 
of  their  national  union  depended  upon  the  continuance  of  the 
principle  of  compulsory  military  training  and  accordingly  saddled 
the  German  Empire  from  1871  to  1914  with  an  ever-growing 
burden  of  armaments,  but  also  helped  to  impress  Hke  convictions 
and  like  practices  upon  most  Great  Powers  and  upon  many  lesser 
states.    Austria-Hungary  followed  the  German  example  in  1868, 
France  in  1872,  Japan  in  1873,  Russia  in  1874,  and  Italy  in  1875. 
What  Germany  did  for  militarism  on  land.  Great  Britain  did  for 
navahsm.    Great  Britain,  long  the  foremost  maritime  Power,  did 
not  introduce  conscription  or  maintain  a  large  standing  army, 
but  she  built  an  enormous  fleet,  larger  than  any  two  other  navies 
put  together.    Gradually  other  Powers  strove  to  imitate  the 
British  example  on  the  high  seas,  and  even  the  United  States  en- 
tered into  the  competition,  until  in  1914  the  American  navy  ranked 
close  to  Germany's  and  ahead  of  the  French  and  Japanese.  The 
new  militarism  was  represented  by  statesmen  and  publicists  as 
making  for  peace  —  ^'national  defense"  —  but  it  cer-  " National 
tainly  rendered  the  diplomatists  of  the  Great  Powers  defense  " 
more  truculent  in  asserting  the  claims  of  their  nations  to  a  lion's 
share  in  the  spoils  of  the  world ;  it  fed  the  spirit  of  nationalism 
and  encouraged  the  activities  of  parasitic  manufacturers  of 
military  supplies;  and  it  produced  a  whole  crop  of  professional 
militarists  —  many  of  them  military  officers  or  ex-officers  —  who 
by  pointing  out  the  armed  strength  of  their  nation's  neighbors 

VOL.  U  —  2  Y 


690 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


caused  alarm  and  apprehension  at  home,  and  at  the  same  time 
by  bellicose  utterances  and  by  confident  references  to  "  the  next 
war"  inspired  distrust  and  hostility  abroad. 

Finally  came  numerous  philosophers,  scientists,  poets,  histori- 
ans, and  sociologists,  who  set  forth  an  intellectual  justification 
5  "  Scien-  nationalism  and  mihtarism.  Gradually  they  took 
tific "  justi-  over  the  scientific  hypothesis  of  evolution,  which  had 
Sonaiism  ^^^^  advanced  by  Darwin  and  popularized  by  Huxley 
and  MUi-  and  Spcnccr  just  about  the  time  of  the  political  uni- 
tansm  fications  of  Germany  and  Italy,  and  applied  it  not  only 
properly  to  the  field  of  biology  but  also  improperly  to  the  field 
of  sociology,  asserting  that  Spencer's  fine  phrase  of  "the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest"  was  particularly  applicable  to  the  rise  of 
nations.  Militarists  were  not  slow  to  utilize  a  supposedly  scien- 
tific doctrine  that  was  enunciated  by  scholars  and  that  was  sure  to 
secure  a  large  following  among  the  ignorant  and  half-educated 
masses  in  an  age  in  which  ''science"  was  fast  becoming  a  popular 
fetish.  Prominent  European  militarists,  with  the  authority  of 
their  newly  discovered  philosophy,  commenced  to  talk  less  of  the 
defensive  character  of  armaments  and  more  of  ''the  struggle  for 
existence"  and  of  the  advantages,  nay  the  downright  necessity, 
of  waging  war.  Persons  in  Great  Britain,  in  France,  in  Italy, 
in  Russia,  even  in  the  United  States,  preached  a  cult  of  war  —  a 
veritable  religion  of  valor  —  but  it  was  reserved  to  a  retired 
German  cavalry-generaP  in  191 2  to  state  most  clearly  the  mili- 
tarist's conception  of  war  in  the  light  of  the  new  philosophy  and 
science.  " '  War  is  the  father  of  all  things,' "  he  quoted,  and  then 
went  on  to  say,  "The  sages  of  antiquity  long  before  Darwin 
recognized  this.  The  struggle  for  existence  is,  in  the  life  of 
Nature,  the  basis  of  all  healthy  development.  All  existing  things 
show  themselves  to  be  the  result  of  contesting  forces.  So  in  the 
Ufe  of  man  the  struggle  is  not  merely  the  destructive,  but  the 
Hfe-giving,  principle.  .  .  .  War  gives  a  biologically  just  deci- 
sion. .  .  .  The  knowledge,  therefore,  that  war  depends  on 
biological  laws  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  every  attempt  to 

1  General  Friedrich  von  Bemhardi  (1849-  ),  whose  book  Germany  and  the 
Next  War,  though  by  no  means  representative  of  the  opinion  of  all  classes  in  Ger- 
many, attracted  much  attention  abroad  as  the  work  of  a  conspicuous  member  of 
that  military  caste  which  seemed  to  be  urging  Germany  to  war. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


691 


exclude  it  from  international  relations  must  be  demonstrably 
untenable.  But  it  is  not  only  a  biological  law,  but  a  moral 
obligation,  and,  as  such,  an  indispensable  factor  in  civilization." 
Thus  modern  science,  with  the  manifold  and  unquestionable 
blessings  which  it  has  conferred  upon  the  world,  contributed 
directly  to  raising  a  fifth  and  peculiarly  fateful  obstacle  to  paci- 
fism. Even  the  intellectual  classes  now  fell  to  quarreling  as  to 
the  biological  necessity  of  war,  and  while  they  quarreled  real 
war  of  proportions  hitherto  undreamed  of  was  preparing.  The 
Concert  of  Europe  was  passing  from  a  practicaHty  to  an  ideal, 
and  from  an  ideal  to  a  memory. 

In  order  to  understand  the  immediate  causes  of  the  Great  War 
of  the  Nations,  which  in  19 14  destroyed  at  least  temporarily 
even  the  semblance  of  a  Concert  of  Europe,  and  to  ^^^^^^ 
appreciate  the  alignment  of  the  Great  Powers  in  the  the  Concert 
war  and  the  questions  at  stake,  it  is  necessary  at  this  ?^  5?^,°p® 

.  1       r  .  rill  111  Diplo- 

pomt  to  turn  aside  from  our  review  of  the  develop-  matic  De- 
ment of  pacifism  and  militarism  and  to  take  up  in 
chronological  order  the  shifting  diplomatic  history  of  ^  ^  ^^^^ 
the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  from  1871  to  1914.    During  approxi- 
mately half  of  this  period,  the  chief  interest  of  international 
politics  centered  in  the  hegemony  of  Germany ;  during  the  second 
half  of  the  period  it  was  divided  between  two  rival  alHances  which 
managed  to  maintain  a  more  or  less  precarious  ''balance  of 
power." 

THE  HEGEMONY  OF  GERMANY,  1871-1890 
The  Franco-German  War  of  1870-1871  was  the  After  1870 

r  .  '  T   1  Great 

starting-point  of  a  new  era  m  European  diplomacy.  Britain 

Great  Britain,  it  is  true,  was  not  directly  or  immedi- 

ately  affected  by  the  war :  she  continued  to  hold  her  Maritime 

position  as  the  chief  commercial,  colonial,  and  indus-  Power 

trial  Power  in  the  world ;  and  the  prestige  and  overwhelming 

numerical  supremacy  of  her  navy  still  guaranteed  her 

that  proud  title  of  "mistress  of  the  seas"  which  she  Be"^es^ 

had  won  for  herself  in  the  long  scries  of  maritime  wars  Chief 

against  Spaniards,  Dutch,  and  Frenchmen.    But  on  poJjer"^^ 

the  Continent  the  war  had  far-reaching  consequences. 

France  was  abased.    Germany  was  united  and  exalted.    In  fact, 


692 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


from  the  very  moment  of  its  birth  the  German  Empire  was 
the  strongest  military  state  in  the  world. 

Bismarck,  who  served  as  chancellor  and  foreign  secretary  of 
the  German  Empire  from  187 1  to  1890,  was  undoubtedly  the 
Bismarck's  ^^^^^^S  Statesman  and  diplomat  of  Europe  through- 
Foreign  out  those  twenty  years.  His  international  policy, 
1871^^1890  broad  outlines,  was  simple  :  he  would  maintain 

and  develop  the  military  superiority  of  his  country; 
he  would  preserve  what  had  been  won  in  the  wars  of  1866  and 
1870-187 1,  but  he  would  oppose  further  German  conquests;  he 
would  resist  any  German  aggrandizement  in  southeastern  Europe 
which  might  arouse  the  hostility  of  Russia,  or  outside  of  Europe 
which  might  provoke  colonial  and  maritime  rivalry  with  Great 
Britain ;  he  would  keep  the  peace  and  he  would  compel  France 
to  keep  the  peace. 

France  was  the  one  country  which  Bismarck  could  afford  to 
fear.  In  France  the  popular  feeling  for  a  war  of  revenge  against 
The  Neces  Geunaiiy  was  particularly  acute  in  the  years  immedi- 
sityof'iso-  ately  following  the  disastrous  events  of  1870-187 1 ; 
lating  "  a,nd  Bismarck  was  amazed  at  the  rapidity  with  which 
the  French  paid  off  the  enormous  war  indemnity  that 
he  had  imposed  on  them,  and  at  the  zeal  with  which  they  re- 
formed their  army,  erected  powerful  new  fortifications,  and  intro- 
duced compulsory  military  service.  It  was  not  that  Bismarck 
feared  an  attack  upon  Germany  by  France  single-handed,  for  the 
relative  population  of  Germany  was  steadily  increasing  while 
that  of  France  was  waning,  but  he  did  clearly  perceive  the  possi- 
ble dangers  to  the  newly  created  German  Empire  of  a  war  of 
revenge  waged  by  France  with  the  active  assistance  of  one  or 
more  Great  Powers.  In  the  war  of  1870-187 1,  despite  lack  of 
efficient  leadership  and  organization,  the  French  had  fought 
valiantly  and  stubbornly,  but  they  had  fought  alone.  Were 
they  in  the  future  to  secure  military  support  from  Russia,  or 
Austria-Hungary,  or  Italy,  the  outcome  of  a  second  Franco- 
German  War  might  be  quite  different  from  the  first. 

So  Bismarck,  to  prevent  a  French  war  of  revenge,  set  out  to 
isolate  France  diplomatically,  to  deprive  her  of  potential  alHes 
and  supporters.  And  so  long  as  he  remained  chancellor,  suc- 
cess invariably  attended  German  diplomacy.    The  international 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


693 


situation  from  187 1  to  1890  was  peculiarly  favorable  to  Germany, 
and  the  astute,  and  not  too  high -principled,  chancellor  took  full 
advantage  of  it.    First  of  all,  he  adopted  a  most  con-  jj^^  Means 
ciliatory  attitude  toward  Austria-Hungary.    He  had  of  isolating 
purposely  been  lenient  in  dictating  terms  of  peace  to 
the  Habsburg  emperor  in  1866;  and  now  after  1871  the  in- 
ternal exigencies  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  the  desire  of  the 
Habsburg  family  to  recoup  their  losses  in  Italy  and  Bjgjjj^j.j.jj,g 
in  Germany  by  means  of  a  vigorous  poHcy  in  the  ConcUiation 
Balkans,  caused  the  governing  classes  of  Austria-Hun-  ^ungaS*" 
gary  to  lean  more  and  more  heavily  upon  the  strong 
miHtary  arm  of  Germany  and  the  dexterous  diplomatic  hand  of 
Bismarck.    Then,  too,  Bismarck  could  count  upon  the  friendship 
of  the  newly  formed  kingdom  of  Italy.    Many  ItaHans  had  not 
forgotten  how  the  French  left  them  in  the  lurch  in  the 
campaign  of  1859,  and  all  ItaHans  remembered  that  it 
was  through  an  alHance  with  Bismarck's  Germany  that  their 
kingdom  had  been  able  to  wrest  Venetia  from  Austria  in  1866. 
Moreover,  Italy  had  a  bitter  quarrel  with  the  papacy,  and  so  did 
Germany  in  the  'seventies  —  the  Kulturkampf,  —  while  France 
throughout  that  decade  was  governed  by  Clericals,  many  of 
whom  declared  it  a  national  French  duty  to  intervene  in  Italy 
for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  temporal  rule  of  the  pope.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  ItaKan  government  was  naturally  in- 
clined in  foreign  relations  to  favor  Germany  rather  than  France. 

In  respect  of  Great  Britain,  Bismarck  was  quite  willing  to  let 
well  enough  alone.  He  was  aware  of  the  spasm  of  jealousy 
that  passed  through  EngHsh  newspapers  and  periodi-  Great 
cals  as  the  result  of  the  unexpectedly  sudden  emergence  Britain 
of  Germany  as  a  Great  Power,  but  he  sedulously  avoided  giv- 
ing offense  to  British  susceptibiHties.  He  insisted  during  the 
war  of  1870-1871  upon  the  scrupulous  observance  of  Belgian 
neutraHty  —  an  object  always  dear  to  the  British  foreign  office, 
—  and  he  long  opposed  the  entrance  of  Germany  into  the  domain 
of  colonialism  ^  —  a  domain  always  considered  by  the  British 
public  to  be  their  own  private  sphere.    He  knew  that  Great 

'  In  the  'eighties  Bismarck  yielded  to  the  entreaties  of  German  imperialists  and 
patronized  the  acquisition  of  colonies  for  Germany, .though  always  seeking  to  avoid 
quarrels  with  Great  Britain.    See  above,  pp.  412,  621  ff. 


694 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Britain  had  constantly  recurring  quarrels  with  Russia  over  the 
Near  Eastern  Question  and  over  their  respective  imperialistic 
policies  in  Asia,  and  Hkewise  with  France  over  commercial  rela- 
tions and  over  colonial  expansion  in  Africa  and  Indo-China. 
He  knew  that  the  British  Liberals  were  much  interested  in  Italy : 
in  its  Liberal  politics  and  its  conflict  with  the  CathoUc  Church 
and  in  the  opportunities  it  offered  to  British  trade  and  invest- 
ment. He  knew  that  many  English  professors  admired  the  Ger- 
man people  and  extolled  the  "Teutonic  race"  that  had  produced 
the  two  leading  states  of  modern  Europe  —  Germany,  the  mas- 
ter of  the  Continent,  and  Great  Britain,  the  mistress  of  the  seas. 
He  knew  that  it  was  a  tradition  of  the  British  foreign  office  to 
avoid  entanghng  alliances  upon  the  continent  of  Europe  so 
long  as  British  maritime  supremacy  was  unquestioned.  From 
all  this  knowledge  Bismarck  convinced  himself  that  Germany 
need  not  fear  an  alliance  between  Great  Britain  and  France. 

Russia  was  more  doubtful.  Just  as  France  had  striven  for 
northeastern  expansion,  so  Russia  had  sought  southwestern  ex- 
Russia  tension ;  and  now  the  erection  of  a  powerful  military 
state  in  intervening  Germany  placed  an  effective  check 
upon  French  and  Russian  policies  alike.  Bismarck  perceived  that 
the  new  international  situation  created  by  the  estabHshment  of 
the  German  Empire  rendered  Russia  a  natural  ally  of  France  in 
any  attempt  to  weaken  that  empire.  But  several  circumstances 
enabled  the  clever  German  chancellor  to  forestall  a  Franco- 
Russian  alliance.  Politically,  autocratic  Russia  had  much  more 
in  common  with  conservative  Germany  than  with  repubhcan  and 
revolutionary  France.  Alexander  II,  the  Russian  tsar  (1855- 
1881),  was  mortally  afraid  of  NihiHsts  and  Anarchists  and  So- 
ciahsts,  who  were  reputed  to  have  learned  their  doctrines  in 
France ;  and  he  remembered  with  all  the  gratitude  of  a  senti- 
mental soul  how  Bismarck  had  offered  him  Prussian  aid  for  the 
suppression  of  the  Polish  insurrection  of  1863,^  and  how  again 
in  1 87 1  Bismarck  had  graciously  acquiesced  in  his  high-handed 
recovery  of  the  right  to  maintain  a  Russian  battle-fleet  on  the 
Black  Sea.^  Russia  felt  the  need  of  German  support  to  achieve 
her  ambition  in  the  Balkans  and  to  overcome  British  opposition 
to  the  expansion  of  her  Asiatic  empire. 

^  See  above,  pp.  188,  456  f .  2  See  above,  p.  204. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


695 


Of  these  factors  Bismarck  took  canny  account.    And  in  Sep- 
tember, 1872,  a  meeting  at  Berlin  of  the  Emperor  WilHam  I,  the 
Emperor-King  Francis  Joseph,  the  Tsar  Alexander  II,  xhiee 
and  their  several  ministers,  served  to  announce  to  the  Emperors' 

world  the  intimate  and  cordial  relations  existing  between  league, 

1872 

Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Russia.  Though  no 
formal  treaty  of  alliance  appears  to  have  been  concluded,  the 
members  of  this  so-called  "Three  Emperors'  League"  held  fre- 
quent conferences  between  1872  and  1876  and  repeatedly  ex- 
pressed sentiments  of  devotion  to  one  another.  In  1875  the 
members  of  the  German  general  staff,  especially  Moltke,  took 
fright  at  the  military  increases  in  France  and  demanded  that 
Germany  at  once  make  war  upon  France  before  the  French 
increases  should  become  effective,  but  Bismarck  dismissed  their 
importunities  with  a  sneer.  French  pubHcists  and  one  dis- 
tinguished Russian  diplomat  insisted  that  Bismarck  himself  had 
been  dissuaded  from  attacking  France  only  by  Russian  threats, 
but  this  was  emphatically  denied  by  Bismarck.  At  any  rate  the 
''Affair  of  1875  "  made  no  appreciable  ripple  on  the  serene  surface 
of  the  Three  Emperors'  League. 

A  more  serious  difficulty  for  Bismarck's  diplomacy  was  pre- 
sented by  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-1878.    The  triumph  of 
Russia  and  her  seeming  ability  to  dictate  a  settlement 
of  the  Balkan  Question  provoked  the  liveliest  appre-  ^^^^^^f' 
hension  in  Austria-Hungary  as  well  as  in  Great  BerUn 
Britain,  and  at  the  ensuing  Congress  of  Berlin  (1878)  and 

,  ,  °,        °         ^,        r    ..1  Temporary 

Bismarck  undertook  to  play  the  role  of     honest  waning  of 
broker"  in  apportioning  the  Turkish  spoils.^   By  re-  Russo-Ger- 

1-       iT^      .       1  111       1.  T^       .  Fnend- 

ducmg  the  Russian  share  and  by  handing  over  Bosma-  ship 
Herzegovina  to  the  Dual  Monarchy,  Bismarck  kept 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans  nicely  adjusted  between 
Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  and  thereby  he  aroused  the  enmity 
of  Russia  while  he  strengthened  the  friendship  of  Austria- 
Hungary.    The  Three  Emperors'  League  was  imperiled. 

In  order  to  guard  Germany  against  untoward  results  of  Russian 
ill-feeling,  Bismarck  in  October,  1879,  concluded  a  formal  though 
secret  treaty  of  defensive  alliance  ^  between  Austria-Hungary 

*  On  the  Russo-Turkish  War  and  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  see  above,  pp.  504  ff. 
'The  treaty,  concluded  in  1879,  was  not  published  until  1888. 


696  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


and  Germany,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  which  each 
^  ^    .       party  bound  itself  to  support  the  other  with  all  the 

Defensive  .,•  r  •  i.<..i 

Alliance  mihtary  forces  at  its  command  if  either  party  or 
between      ]^q^-\^  should  be  attacked  by  Russia  or  by  another 

Germany  1      1     i  i      t-*  • 

and  Austria-  1  ower  backed  by  Russia. 

Hungary,  Then,  in  order  still  further  to  offset  the  threatened 
1879  . 

defection  of  Russia  from  the  Three  Emperors'  League, 

Bismarck  turned  his  attention  to  Italy.  Italy,  as  has  been  re- 
marked, was  already  naturally  well  disposed  toward  Germany, 
Italian  traditionally  hostile  to  Austria-Hungary, 

Hostility  and  it  seemed  an  almost  impossible  task  to  bring  her 
to  France  .^^^  ^j^^^  alHance  with  the  two  Teutonic  states  so  long 
as  the  Italian-speaking  communities  of  Trent  and  Triest  remained 
subject  to  the  Habsburg  emperor  and  so  long  as  Italy  and  the 
Dual  Monarchy  entertained  rival  ambitions  of  mastery  in  the 
Adriatic  and  in  Albania.  Nevertheless,  the  ItaHan  government 
was  fearful  of  the  effects  of  the  internationally  isolated  position 
of  their  country  and  anxious  to  prevent  foreign  intervention 
in  behalf  of  the  pope;  and  in  1881  the  Italian  people  were 
astounded  and  angered  by  French  occupation  of  Tunis,  the  re- 
gion of  ancient  Carthage,  just  across  from  Sicily,  which  patriots 
had  marked  as  the  most  appropriate  field  for  ItaHan  imperial- 
ism.^ In  the  midst  of  the  Franco-Itahan  quarrel,  Italy  responded 
cordially  to  the  overtures  of  Bismarck,  agreed  to  banish 
an ti- Austrian  propaganda,  and  in  May,  1882,  signed  secret 
treaties  of  alliance  with  Germany  and  with  Austria-Hungary. 

These  treaties  created  the  famous  Triple  Alliance. 
Formation  Their  terms  have  never  been  pubHshed  in  full,  but  it 
Aiiiance"^^^  is  safe  to  say  that  they  were  defensive  in  character, 
(1882):  each  party  promising  the  others  military  assistance 
Austria^^'  2,gainst  attacks  by  outside  Powers,  that  they  were 
Hungary,  directed  mainly  against  fears  of  French  or  Russian 
and  Italy  aggression,  and  that  they  were  binding  for  only  a  speci- 
fied term  of  years.  The  Triple  AlHance,  first  formed 
in  1882  for  five  years,  was  subsequently  renewed  for  continuous 
periods  in  1887,  in  1891,  in  1902,  and  in  1912,  lasting  at  least  on 
paper  until  May,  191 5,  when  Italy  denounced  her  alHance  with 
Austria-Hungary  though  still  preserving  the  formal  agreement 

^  See  above,  pp.  514,  629. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


697 


with  Germany.  Certainly  for  a  generation  after  1882  the  Triple 
Alliance  preserved  the  peace  of  central  Europe  and  restrained 
France  from  embarking  on  a  war  of  revenge  against  Germany. 
Bismarck  considered  it  a  diplomatic  masterpiece. 

In  the  meantime,  relations  between  Germany  and  Russia 
sensibly  improved.    The  assassination  of  the  Tsar  Alexander  II 
by  Nihilists  in  1881  and  the  accession  of  the  ultra- 
reactionary  Alexander  III  precluded  any  immediate  r^sso-^^ 
understanding  between  Russia  and  democratic  France.  German 
Meetings  of  the  Three  Emperors'  League  accordingly  fggi-Tsgi 
went  on  as  before,  and  in  1884  Russia  and  Germany 
actually  concluded  a  secret  three  years'  convention  by  which 
they  mutally  promised  a  friendly  neutraHty  in  case  one  or  the 
other  should  be  assailed.    Though  chfficulties  in  the  Balkans 
between  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  in  188 5-1 886  ^  caused  the 
tsar  to  withdraw  from  the  informal  Three  Emperors'  League, 
nevertheless  Russia  made  no  immediate  advances .  to  France 
and  in  1887  renewed  her  mihtary  convention  with  Germany 
for  another  three  years.    In  fact,  the  tsar  quite  sternly  frowned 
upon  the  attempt  of  General  Boulanger  ^  in  188 7-1 888  to  incite 
the  French  people  to  undertake  their  long-heralded  war  of  revenge 
against  Germany. 

Thus  between  187 1  and  1890,  by  means  of  the  Three  Emperors' 
League  and  the  Triple  AlHance,  and  thanks  to  the  detached  posi- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  Bismarck  had  been  able  to  isolate 
France  diplomatically  and  to  secure  the  hegemony  of  success 
Germany  in  international  politics. 


THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER,  1890-1914 

The  date  of  Bismarck's  retirement  from  office  (1890)  marked 
a  change  in  the  international  position  of  Germany.  Caprivi, 
who  succeeded  him  as  imperial  chancellor,  did  not  Reasons  for 
think  it  advisable  to  preserve  the  Three  Emperors'  Lessened 
League  or  to  continue  the  special  Russo- German  con-  betwee?^^ 
vention.    He  feared  that  Germany's  freedom  of  ac-  Russia  and 
tion  would  be  seriously  restricted  by  her  obligations, 
on  the  one  hand  to  Austria-Hungary  and  to  Italy,  and  on  the 
*  See  above,  pp.  520,  523.  »  See  above,  pp.  352  f. 


698  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


other  hand  to  Russia,  especially  since  the  rivalry  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  was  becoming  ever  more  acute 
in  the  Balkans.  He  also  feared  that  by  supporting  Russia, 
Germany  would  be  dragged  into  colonial  quarrels  with  Great 
Britain. 

The  Russian  government,  likewise,  was  averse  from  continuing 
the  friendly  understanding  with  Germany.    The  decade  of  the 
'nineties  was  characterized  in  Russian  history  ^  by  the 

Formation  i      r  oi     •  i      i  t 

of  the  Dual  rapid  growth  of  Pan-Slavism,  the  leading  exponents 
Alliance  which,  championed  by  the  Tsars  Alexander  III  and 

between 

Russia  and  Nicholas  II,  were  determined  to  purge  ''holy  Russia"  of 
1891-189S  Teutonic  influence,  and  by  the  simultaneous  develop- 
ment of  the  Industrial  Revolution.  Russian  citizens 
both  in  pubHc  and  in  private  life  began  now  to  borrow  large 
sums  of  money  from  French  capitaHsts  in  order  to  build  rail- 
ways, erect  factories,  or  open  mines.  Financial  needs  grad- 
ually overcame  Russian  antipathy  to  the  democratic  poHtics 
of  France,  and  little  by  Httle  democratic  France  and  autocratic 
Russia  drifted  into  an  alliance.  A  French  squadron  paid  a  visit 
to  Cronstadt  in  1891  :  the  tsar  ordered  the  Marseillaise  to  be 
played,  and  listened  to  it  standing.  In  1893  a  Russian  squadron 
made  a  return  visit  at  Toulon :  the  tsar  and  the  president 
exchanged  felicitous  telegrams,  the  tsar  referring  to  ''the  bonds 
that  unite  the  two  countries."  In  1896  Nicholas  II  was 
received  in  Paris  with  much  honor  and  rejoicing,  and  in  1897 
the  French  president  visited  the  tsar  at  Petrograd.  Of  the 
exact  steps  by  which  the  friendship  of  the  two  nations  was 
transformed  into  a  defensive  alHance  between  the  two  govern- 
ments little  is  actually  known,  but  it  appears  that  a  diplomatic 
protocol  for  an  alliance  was  signed  in  1891  and  that  a  military 
convention  was  agreed  upon  in  1894.  At  any  rate,  in  1895 
the  French  premier  spoke  publicly  of  an  alliance  existing  between 
France  and  Russia.  Though  the  precise  terms  of  the  so-called 
Dual  Alliance  have  never  been  published,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
close  friendly  relations  were  established  between  the  two  Powers 
and  that  in  all  important  international  affairs  in  Europe  they 
sought  to  act  in  accord  with  each  other.  It  is  equally  certain 
that  for  some  years  Russia  was  the  predominant  partner,  and 

^  See  above,  pp.  460,  465-469,  473  f. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


699 


that,  in  accordance  with  the  pacific  tendencies  of  the  tsar,  she 
systematically  exerted  a  restraining  influence  on  France. 

Thus,  in  the  'nineties,  a  sort  of  balance  of  power  was  sub- 
stituted in  international  poKtics  for  the  earlier  hegemony  of 
Germany  and  isolation  of  France.    Henceforth,  for 
several  years,  there  were,  on  the  one  side,  the  Triple  ^f^^^^ 
AlHance  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Italy,  between 
and,  on  the  other  side,  the  Dual  AlHance  of  Russia  ^"^1^?,?** 

Dual  Alli- 

and  France,  with  Great  Britain  inclined  to  pretty  ances 
strict  neutrality  between  the  rival  combinations. 

As  the  'nineties  advanced,  it  became  increasingly  obvious 
that  Germany  could  no  longer  count  on  any  particularly  friendly 
cooperation  with  Great  Britain.    The  British  govern-  ^ 

r  n    1  1        1      ^         Aloofness  of 

ment  from  1895  to  1905  was  controlled  by  the  Con-  Great 
servative  party,  the  party  that  traditionally  extolled  fg^^^^j^^^ 
imperialism,  a  big  navy,  and  a  vigorous  foreign  poHcy. 
It  was  the  time  when  the  marquess  of  SaUsbury,  as  foreign  sec- 
retary, was  furthering  British  colonial  and  economic  interests 
throughout  the  world ;  when  Joseph  Chamberlain  was  carrying 
on  his  agitation  within  the  United  Kingdom  for  imperial  expan- 
sion and  federation ;  when  Cecil  Rhodes  was  engaged  in  colossal 
empire-building  in  Africa;  when  Rudyard  Kipling,  the  priest 
and  psalmist  of  the  new  dispensation,  was  chanting  songs  about 
"Tommy  Atkins"  and  ''The  White  Man's  Burden."  These 
British  Conservatives  and  ImperiaHsts  took  fright  at  the  great 
growth  of  German  industry  and  commerce  in  the  „ 

,    .    ,     .  ,  ,    .         .  r  '    ^  ^  '   ^       ^         •         i  RcaSOnS  fof 

eighties  and  mneties,  a  fright  which  the  simultaneous  Growing 

emergence  of  Germany  as  a  colonial  Power  naturally  ^g^^^^^^ 

did  not  moderate.^    Then,  too,  when  Germany  under  Great 

the  influence  of  Emperor  WiUiam  II  began  at  the  close  ?"tain  and 

Germany 

of  the  nineteenth  century  to  construct  a  large  navy  and 
to  compel  Great  Britain,  if  she  was  to  maintain  her  maritime 
supremacy,  to  quicken  her  naval  construction  and  enormously 
to  increase  her  expenditure,  the  former  amicable  relations 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  gave  way  to  popular  jeal- 
ousy, recriminations,  and  fear.  During  the  Boer  War  ^  (1899- 
1902)  the  British  were  especially  aroused  by  the  more  or  less 

^  On  these  aspects  of  German  history,  see  above,  pp.  421  ff. 
*  See  above,  p.  652. 


700 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


open  favor  and  sympathy  which  the  emperor  and  official  classes 
of  Germany  showed  to  the  Boers.  Thenceforth,  despite  con- 
stant efforts  on  the  part  of  peace  advocates  both  in  Germany 
and  in  Great  Britain,  the  two  peoples  drifted  further  and  furthei 
apart.  Too  many  Germans  called  England  the  ''robber-state'^ 
and  imputed  to  her  government  a  desire  to  isolate  Germany 
and  to  prevent  Germany  from  exercising  an  influence  in  world 
politics.  On  the  other  hand,  too  many  Englishmen  suspected 
the  German  government  of  an  ambition  to  rule  the  world  and 
to  oppose,  as  Spaniards,  Dutch,  and  French  in  earlier  centuries 
had  tried  to  oppose,  the  maritime  interests  of  Great  Britain. 

Nevertheless,  the  strained  relations  between  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  did  not  make  at  once  for  any  special  cordiality 

between  Great  Britain  and  the  Dual  AlHance.  One  of 
between  cMef  reasons  why  Russia  had  allied  herself  with 

Great  Brit-  France  was  a  desire  to  secure  French  support  in  her  al- 
Russia^       most  incessant  quarrels  with  Great  Britain  over  the 

Ottoman  Empire,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  the  parti- 
tion of  China.  In  fact,  it  was  against  Russian  aggression  in 
Formation  China,  rather  than  against  German  ambitions,  that 
of  the  Aiu-  Great  Britain  concluded  in  1902  the  defensive  alHance 
tween^Great  with  Japan. ^  Nor  did  any  rapprochement  seem  pos- 
Britain  and  sible  between  Great  Britain  and  France.  These  two 
Japan,  1902  p^^^j-g  ^^j-^  traditional  rivals  in  commerce  and  in- 
dustry ;  and  the  vigorous  acquisition  of  colonies  by  the  Third 

Republic  since  1880  served  to  accentuate  imperialistic 
Rivalry  rivalry  between  them  and  to  raise  many  serious 
Greir^  territorial  questions  in  Africa  and  in  Indo-China.  As 
Britain  and  late  as  1 898  France  and  Great  Britain  were  on  the 
France        verge  of  war  over  a  dispute  as  to  their  respective 

spheres  of  influence  in  the  Egyptian  Sudan. ^ 
Continental  publicists  were  not  lacking  in  1 899-1 900  who  ad- 
vocated a  grand  alliance  of  Germany,  Russia,  and  France  —  a 
welding  of  the  Triple  and  Dual  Alliances  —  in  order  to  give  aid 
to  the  Boers  and  to  set  limits  to  the  further  expansion  of  the 
British  Empire ;  and  there  were  rumors  that  the  German  gov- 

^  See  above,  p.  585.  The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  was  strengthened  in  1905,  and 
renewed,  with  minor  changes,  in  191 1. 

2  The  so-called  Fashoda  Incident.    See  above,  p.  624. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


701 


emment  had  opened  negotiations  looking  toward  such  an  end. 
Whatever  may  be  the  truth  concerning  the  rumors,  nothing  came 
of  them.    Germany  would  not  restore  Alsace-Lorraine  ^^^^^^^ 
to  France  as  the  price  even  of  a  grand  alHance  against  catmty  of  a 
Great  Britain,  and  without  Alsace-Lorraine  France  ^^^^^ 
would  not  hsten  to  German  proposals.    Under  these  against 
circumstances,  Great  Britain  was  enabled  to  reap  the 
reward  of  her  struggle  vrith  the  Boers,  but  rightly  or 
wrongly   British  ill-feehng  was  thenceforth  directed  rather 
against  Germany  than  against  France. 

At  this  point  appeared  on  the  stage  of  international  politics 
a  famous  French  statesman  and  diplomat,  Theophile  Delcasse, 
who,  taking  nice  advantage  of  changed  circumstances,  Dgicasse 
became  the  guiding  spirit  between  1898  and  1907  in  the  Nemesis 
altering  the  balance  of  power  and  in  effecting  an  iso-  Bismarck 
lation  of  Germany  almost  as  complete  as  the  isolation  to  which 
Bismarck  formerly  had  condemned  France.  Delcasse  proved 
himself  a  veritable  Nemesis  of  Bismarck. 

Theophile  Delcasse  was  connected  with  the  French  color ial 
oflSce  from  1893  to  1898,  and  served  as  French  minister  of  for- 
eign affairs  continuously  from  1898  to  1905.  In  the  HisDipio- 
form.er  capacity  he  showed  himself  an  ardent  and  able  matic  Work 
imperialist,  and  in  the  latter  capacity  a  shrewd  and  France 
far-sighted  diplomatist.  He  was  a  warm  friend  of  the  Dual 
Alliance  and  always  enjoyed  the  trust  and  respect  of  the  tsar. 
He  hated  Germany  with  all  the  ardor  of  a  French  nationalist, 
and  repudiated  every  suggestion  of  a  possible  Franco-Gern:r.n 
rapprochement  so  long  as  Alsace-Lorraine  was  held  by  Ger- 
many. To  recover  Alsace-Lorraine  was  the  one  great  object 
of  his  diplomacy.  To  realize  this  ambition  he  believed  that 
France  would  need  the  support,  or  at  least  friendly  neutrality, 
of  some  Great  Power  in  addition  to  Russia.  Accordingly,  while 
remaining  most  loyal  to  the  Russian  alliance,  he  adopted  a 
conciliatory  attitude  toward  Great  Britain.  Becoming  foreign 
minister  of  France  in  the  midst  of  the  crisis  in  Franco-British 
relations  occasioned  by  the  Fashoda  Incident,  he  promptly 
and  courageously  averted  the  danger  of  war  by  surrendering  all 
French  claims  in  the  Egy])tian  Sudan  to  Great  Britain.  Then, 
taking  advantage  of  the  increasing  strain  in  the  relations  between 


702 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Great  Britain  and  Germany,  he  opened  negotiations  with  Great 
Britain  in  1903  for  the  settlement  of  all  outstanding  colonial 
and  commercial  disputes  between  the  two  Powers.  His  over- 
tures were  welcomed  by  the  British  government,  especially 
by  King  Edward  VII,  who  incidentally  was  fond  of 
of^'the  Tn-  Paris  and  whom  Frenchmen  Hked,  and  resulted  in  the 
tente  Cor-  conclusion  in  April,  1 904,  of  several  conventions  affecting 
tyveen^  Franco-B  ritish  relations  in  Egypt,  Morocco,  Newfound- 
France  and  land,  Siam,  Nigeria,  and  the  New  Hebrides.  These 
Brhain,  1904  conventions  not  only  gave  Great  Britain  free  rein  in 
Egypt  and  France  in  Morocco,  but  marked  the  end  of 
several  centuries  of  intense  colonial  rivalry  and  paved  the  way 
for  the  development  between  1904  and  i9i4of  particularly  friendly 
relations  between  the  peoples  and  governments  of  Franc.e  and 
Great  Britain,  —  the  so-called  Entente  Cordiale. 

The  Franco-British  Entente,  as  inaugurated  in  1904,  was  not 
an  alHance  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  for  there  were  no 
Inter  formal  promises  of  military  or  naval  support ;  but,  by 

national  removing  the  causes  of  friction  between  the  two  coun- 
ttue^Russo  ^ri^Sj  conventions  of  1904  made  it  possible  for  the 
Japanese  British  and  French  governments  thenceforth  to  con- 
War,  1904-  (iuct  their  foreign  policies  in  harmony.  The  Russo- 
Japanese  War  of  1 904- 1 90 5  ^  put  a  severe  strain  on 
the  Entente  and  on  Delcasse's  diplomacy,  because  it  was  a  war 
between  Russia,  the  ally  of  France,  and  Japan,  the  ally  of  Great 
Britain.  But  in  fact  the  outcome  of  the  war  proved  to  be  ad- 
vantageous to  the  Entente.  The  defeat  of  Russia  caused  most 
Englishmen  to  lose  their  former  fear  and  distrust  of  the  Slavic 
Great  Power,  and  increased  the  desire  of  the  French  to  strengthen 
their  foreign  alHances.  Consequently,  in  1907,  after  Delcasse's 
Conclusion  retirement  from  the  French  foreign  office,  though  quite 
of  the  in  accord  with  his  policy,  the  British  and  Russian 
Entente  governments  managed  to  arrive  at  a  mutual  under- 
(1907) :  standing  ^  concerning  their  disputed  spheres  of  influence 
R^usTia  and  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  China,  and  to  sign  con- 
Great  '  ventions  which  practically  transformed  the  Entente 
Bntain  Cordiole  between  France  and  Great  Britain  into  the 
Triple  Entente  between  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain. 
1  See  above,  pp.  583  ff.  2  See  above,  pp.  589,  591. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


Japan,  also,  was  brought  into  harmonious  relations  with  the 
Entente  Powers,  not  only  by  means  of  the  renewal  in  japan's 
191 1  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  between  Japan  and  Great 
Britain,  but  also  by  means  of  the  amicable  Russo-  Triple 
Japanese  convention  of  19 10  respecting  Manchuria.^  Entente 

One  other  diplomatic  policy  of  Delcasse's  deserves  mention  — 
the  policy  of  reconciling  French  foreign  interests  with  those  of 
Spain  and  Italy.  The  astute  French  foreign  minis-  French 
ter  negotiated  with  the  Spanish  government  the  delim-  ConciUation 
itation  of  Franco-Spanish  spheres  of  influence  in  ^^^^^^ 
Morocco,  and  secured  from  Italy  full  recognition  of  the  French 
protectorate  over  Tunis  on  condition  that  Italy  should  be  ac- 
corded by  France  free  rein  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.^ 

Meanwhile  German  publicists,  army  officers,  and  other  patriots 
were  viewing  with  alarm  the  growing  international  isolation  of 
their  country.    Italy  was  suspected  of  lukewarmness  jg^i^^j^jj^f 
in  her  friendship  for  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  Germany 
Russia  was  in  formal  alliance  with  France.    Great  g^^g^y"^" 
Britain  was  in  an  Entente  Cordiale  with  France  and 
with  Russia.    Japan  was  in  formal  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 
Only  Austria-Hungary  remained  a  stanch  friend  and  ally  of 
Germany. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  German  government  labored 
from  1907  to  1914  to  break  up  the  Triple  Entente  by  diplomatic 
maneuvers,  to  strengthen  Austria-Hungary  and  in-  ^ 

,  .      .  ^        ,  ^      ^    ^       .      ,  German 

crease  her  prestige  in  southeastern  Europe,  to  wm  the  PoUcy 
Ottoman  Empire  as  a  friend  and  ally,  and,  by  means  Result- 

•     •  .  ing  Inter- 

of  mihtary  threats,  to  insist  upon  Germany's  right  to  national 
participate  on  the  same  basis  as  other  Great  Powers  Crises, 
in  world  commerce  and  foreign  investment.  The 
new  German  policy  did  not  undo  Delcasse's  work,  but  it 
produced  periodic  crises  in  the  relations  between  the  Triple 
Entente  and  the  Teutonic  Powers  —  crises  which  grew  more 
and  more  threatening  to  the  preservation  of  any  semblance 
of  a  Concert  of  Europe  and  more  and  more  indicative  of  an 
impending  war  of  huge  dimensions.    These  crises  had  to  do 
alternately  with  the  Moroccan  Question  and  with  the  Near 
Eastern  Question. 

*  See  above,  p.  585.  ^  See  above,  p.  633. 


704 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


In  the  case  of  Morocco  ^  the  German  government  felt  itself 
aggrieved  that  Delcasse  had  taken  it  upon  himself  to  arrange 
The  political  and  economic  control  of  that  tempes- 

Moroccan  tuous  and  brigand-ridden  country  simply  by  agree- 
Question  ^lents  between  France  and  Spain  and  Great  Britain, 
without  consulting  Germany.  To  be  sure,  Morocco  was  contigu- 
ous to  the  French  Empire  in  Africa  and  to  Spanish  posts  on 
the  Mediterranean,  and  it  seemed  to  Delcasse  that  the  pres- 
ervation of  order  within  Morocco  was  therefore  a  practical 
concern  only  of  Spain  and  France.  But  despite  the  fact  that 
most  of  the  foreign  commerce  of  Morocco  was  with  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Spain,  German  capitalists  had  secured  economic 
concessions  within  the  sultanate,  and  they  enlisted  the  support 
of  their  government  in  an  endeavor  to  prevent  France  from 
establishing  a  political  protectorate  over  Morocco  that  might  con- 
fer economic  privileges  upon  French  capitalists  to  the  exclusion  of 
themselves. 

The  first  Moroccan  crisis  was  precipitated  on  31  March,  1905, 
—  exactly  three  weeks  after  the  decisive  defeat  of  the  Russians 
First  Japanese  in  the  battle  of  Mukden,^  —  when 

Moroccan  the  Emperor  William  II  landed  at  Tangier  and  in  a 
^uiam  II  vigorous  Speech  declared  that  he  came  to  visit  the 
at  Tangier,   sultan  of  Morocco  as  an  independent  sovereign  in 

whose  lands  all  Powers  were  to  hold  the  same  footing 
and  enjoy  the  same  rights.  France,  against  whom  the  speech 
was  directed,  could  not  then  hope  to  oppose  German  pretensions 
because  of  the  military  collapse  of  her  ally,  Russia ;  and  accord- 
ingly she  surrendered  to  Germany,  sacrificed  her  able  foreign 
minister  Delcasse,  and  agreed  to  submit  the  whole  Moroccan 
Question  to  an  international  congress.    The  Congress,  meeting 

at  Algeciras  in  Spain  from  January  to  April,  1906, 
Algeciras  reached  a  compromise  whereby  the  territorial  integ- 
^^^sress,     j^iiy  Qf  Morocco  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  native 

sultan  were  affirmed,  certain  internal  reforms  were 
devised  of  an  administrative  and  financial  nature,  the  ^'open 
door"  was  guaranteed  to  the  merchants  and  investors  of  all  the 
signatory  Powers,  and  France  and  Spain  were  authorized  to 
instruct  and  officer  a  native  police  force. 

*  See  above,  p.  630.  }  See  above,  p.  584. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


70s 


Civil  war  in  Morocco  and  outrages  against  foreigners,  espe- 
cially Frenchmen,  caused  the  French  government  to  land  marines 
at  Casablanca  in  August,  1907.    Germany  repeatedly  second 
expostulated  against  the  continued  presence  of  French  Moroccan 
troops  in  Morocco;  and  in  September,  1908,  an  at-  Affair  of 
tempt  on  the  part  of  the  German  consul  at  Casablanca  Casablanca, 
to  protect  from  arrest  a  number  of  deserters  from  the 
French  foreign  legion  precipitated  a  second  grave  crisis,  which 
was  successfully  passed  in  1909  by  reference  of  the  questions 
at  stake  to  the  Hague  Tribunal.    The  conclusion  of  a  special 
Franco-German  convention  in  February,  1909,  seemed  to  pre- 
clude future  misunderstandings  between  these  Powers  :  „ 
^  111-  •     1        1    The  Franco- 

Germany  put  on  record  that  her  interests  m  the  sul-  German 

tanate  were  ''only  economic,"  and,  France  agreeing 

to  ''safeguard  economic  equality,"  Germany  under-  - 

took  not  to  impede  the  political  interests  of  France  in  Morocco. 

But  the  Franco-German  agreement  of  1909  was  so  distasteful 
to  German  patriots  that  Prince  von  Biilow,  the  German  chan- 
cellor who  had  negotiated  it,  was  forced  out  of  office, 
and  his  successor,  Bethmann-Hollweg,  sought  the  jyjoroccan 
earliest  opportunity  to  nullify  it.    The  opportunity  Crisis:  the 
was  afforded  by  the  military  occupation  of  Fez,  the  denf/iQii"" 
Moroccan  capital,  by  the  French  in  191 1.    In  July, 
the  German  government  dispatched  a  warship  to  the  Moroccan 
port  of  Agadir,  ostensibly  to  safeguard  the  mining  property  of 
German  capitalists,  but  with  a  significant  hint  that  the  warship 
would  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  conditions  were  sufficiently 
settled  to  admit  of  French  withdrawal  from  Fez.    The  gravity 
of  the  international  situation  was  felt  throughout  Europe,  and 
military  preparations  were  hurried  forward  both  in  Germany 
and  in  France.    Russia  was  not  yet  sufficiently  recovered  from 
the  Japanese  War  to  be  of  much  assistance  to  France,  but  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  the  British  foreign  secretary,  declared  that  his 
country  would  support  France.    The  German  govern-  Franco 
ment  apparently  did  not  desire  war  and  contented  it-  German 
self  with  concluding  a  second  Franco-German  conven-  ^^^^^^^^^^ 
tion  (November,  191 1),  whereby  Germany  promised 
not  to  oppose  the  establishment  of  a  French  protectorate  over 
Morocco  and  France  agreed  to  maintain  the  "open  door"  in 

VOL.  II  —  2  z 


7o6  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Morocco  and  to  cede  two  strips  of  the  French  Congo  to 
Germany.  Although  France  was  thus  enabled  in  191 2  to  settle 
the  political  question  of  Morocco  satisfactorily  to  herself  and 
B'tterness  Spain,  the  Agadir  crisis  of  191 1  served  to  increase 
between  the  fear  and  hatred  of  the  French  for  the  Germans, 
GermanT^  who,  in  their  opinion,  had  ''blackmailed"  them  out 
of  rich  portions  of  the  French  Congo,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  served  to  consolidate  the  friendship  of  France  and  Great 
Britain.  On  their  side,  the  Germans  believed  that  their  legiti- 
mate interests  in  Morocco  had  been  prejudiced  and  their  posi- 
tion as  a  World  Power  jeopardized  by  the  joint  machinations  of 
the  French  and  the  British. 

Even  more  disquieting  to  pacifists  than  the  Moroccan  crises 
were  the  almost  simultaneous  crises  in  the  Near  East,  where 
_    „        Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  instead  of  France  and 

The  Near 

Eastern  Germany,  were  the  protagonists.  But  while  in  the 
Question,     (>g^gg  Qf  Morocco,  Russia,  on  account  of  her  weakened 

military  position,  was  able  to  give  but  little  effective 
support  to  her  French  ally,  in  the  case  of  the  Near  Eastern  crises 
Germany  had  economic  motives  and  powerful  military  means 
for  backing  Austria-Hungary.  There  was  little  doubt  from 
the  opening  of  the  twentieth  century  that  various  Austro-Hun- 
garian  capitalists  and  patriots  favored  the  political  and  economic 
expansion  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  a  southerly  direction  through 
Bosnia  and  Macedonia  to  Salonica  on  the  ^Egean,  or  that 
Teutonic  German  patriots  and  capitalists  cherished  the  idea  of 
PoUcy  ''Germanizing"  the  Balkan  states  and  the  Ottoman 
East^         Empire.    So  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  acting 

in  perfect  harmony,  gradually  extended  their  political 
and  economic  influence  in  southeastern  Europe.  In  1898  the 
HohenzoUern  king  of  Rumania  conceded  direct  railway  com- 
munication through  his  territories  from  Berlin  and  Vienna  to 
Constantinople.  In  1899  Emperor  William  II  ostentatiously 
visited  the  sultan  of  Turkey,  and  a  German  company  obtained 
a  concession  for  the  construction  of  a  railway  across  Asia  Minor, 
Armenia,  and  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates, 
to  Bagdad  and  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  Austrian  influence 
was  paramount  at  the  Serbian  court  from  the  Congress  of  Ber- 
lin (1878)  to  the  assassination  of  King  Alexander  in  1903 ;  and 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


Prince  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  a  German  by  birth,  was  long 
estranged  from  Russia  and  dependent  upon  Austria-Hungary. 
The  king  of  Rumania  was  a  kinsman  of  the  German  emperor, 
and  the  wife  of  the  future  King  Constantine  of  Greece  was  a 
sister  of  William  11.  In  a  word,  the  Teutonic  Powers  began  to 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  Russian  ambition  of  ousting  the  Turks 
from  Europe  and  ruling  at  Constantinople ;  the  Teutonic  Powers 
began  to  buttress  the  Turk,  to  train  his  army,  to  exploit  his 
country,  and  to  seek  to  minimize  both  Russian  and  British  influ- 
ence in  southeastern  Europe. 

In  1903  the  Balkan  policy  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
received  a  check.  A  palace  revolution  at  Belgrade  put  an  end  to 
the  rule  of  the  pro-Austrian  dynasty  in  Serbia  and  brought  to 
the  throne  the  King  Peter  who  vigorously  supported  the  nation- 
alist propaganda  of  the  Serbs  and  loyally  depended  upon  Russia.^ 

The  first  serious  crisis  in  the  Near  Eastern  Question  affect- 
ing the  new  Balance  of  Power  between  the  Triple  Alliance 
and  the  Triple  Entente  occurred  in  1908,  when  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, taking  advantage  of  an  internal  revo-  g^g*g^*" 
lution  in  Turkey,  formally  incorporated  the  Serb-  crisis: 
speaking   provinces   of   Bosnia   and   Herzegovina,  ^^^g^g^^^®^ 
thereby  violating  a  provision  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin  Herzegovina 
of  1878  and  arousing  a  storm  of  wrath  and  indignation  g^^g^*y 
in  the  Serb  countries  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro.^  1908 
Russia  immediately  took  steps  to  back  the  Serb  states 
and  to  resist  the  Austro-Hungarian  aggression,  but  in  the  midst 
of  Russian  mobilization  Germany  announced  (1909)  her  firm 
intention  of  giving  full  military  support  to  Austria-Hungary. 
Russia,  still  not  fully  recovered  from  the  Japanese  War  and  her 
own  internal  revolutionary  movement,^  thereupon  ^  ,   .  . 

.       ,      1  •  T   T       1    1  Submission 

gave  way,  acquiescmg  m  the  high-handed  treaty-  of  Russia 
violation  and  even  obtaining  from  Serbia  a  solemn  Serbia, 
promise  in  the  future  not  to  tolerate  any  anti-Austrian  '^^^ 
demonstrations  or  propaganda.    Nevertheless,  the  Pan-Slavists 
of  Russia  did  not  forget  the  humiliation  of  their  country  at 

*  For  the  Balkan  policy  of  Russia,  see  above,  p.  536.  In  recent  times,  Russian 
policy  in  the  Balkans  has  been  intimately  associated  with  the  growth  of  Pan-Slav- 
ism, which  is  briefly  discussed  on  pp.  465  ff.,  above. 

^  See  above,  pp.  521,  526. 

'  See  above,  pp.  478  ff. 


7o8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


Teutonic  hands  in  1 908-1 909;  under  their  influence  the  Russian 
government  began  to  reorganize  its  army,  to  construct  strategic 
railways,  and  to  do  everything  in  its  power  to  insure  Russia 
against  a  like  humiliation  in  the  future. 

A  second  crisis  in  the  Near  East  was  at  least  threatened  by 
the  Tripolitan  War,  which  Italy  waged  against  Turkey  in  191 1- 

1912.^  Russia  was  not  directly  concerned  in  the 
Second  struggle,  but  it  was  obvious  to  students  of  interna- 
Eastern  tional  politics  that  the  war  was  distasteful  to  Ger- 
Crisis:  the  many  as  well  as  to  Austria-Hungary,  both  of  which 
Trrpohtan  ^gj-g  endeavoring  to  bolster  up  Turkish  power,  and 
between  that  it  was  bound  sooner  or  later  to  produce  the 
Tm-key,^  gravest  conscquences,  not  only  in  the  Near  East  but 
1911-1912     throughout  Europe.    In  the  first  place  it  increased 

the  desire  of  Italian  imperialists  for  the  further  eco- 
nomic and  political  expansion  of  their  country  in  Albania,  in  the 
^gean,  and  in  Asia  Minor,  thereby  bringing  Italy's  policy  in  the 
Near  East  into  sharp  conflict  with  that  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
weakening  Italy's  adherence  to  the  Triple  AlHance.  Secondly, 
Resulting  quite  naturally  from  the  foregoing,  the  war  showed 

Inter-  a  possible  community  of  world  interests  between  Italy 
national       ^^^d  the  Powcrs  of  the  Triple  Entente.  And  thirdly  and 

most  significantly  of  all,  the  Tripolitan  War  was  the 
immediate  forerunner,  and  in  a  measure  the  cause,  of  the  Balkan 
War  of  1912-1913,  out  of  which  emerged  the  gravest  international 
crises  that  had  ever  confronted  the  European  Balance  of  Power. 

In  the  course  of  the  Balkan  War  Austria-Hungary  adopted  a 
most  unyielding  attitude  toward  Serb  ambitions.^    On  threat 

of  war,  in  which  she  was  backed  by  Germany,  she 
Eastern^*^  deprived  Montenegro  of  the  important  town  of  Scu- 
Crisis:  the    tari  and  obliged  Serbia  to  evacuate  various  Adriatic 

towns  which  the  Serbs  had  conquered  from  the  Turks. 

Also,  by  securing  the  sanction  of  the  Great  Powers  for 
the  erection  of  an  autonomous  Albania  under  a  German  prince, 
Anti  Serb  effectually  prevented  Serbia  from  obtaining  any 

Policy  of  outlet  to  the  sea.  Only  the  positive  refusal  of 
Hungiy      Italy  to  Cooperate  with  her  caused  Austria-Hungary 

to  abandon  a  project  to  attack  Serbia  forthwith. 
1  See  above,  pp.  514,  528,  633.  2  See  above,  pp.  530!.,  534. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM  709 

The  year  1913  —  the  year  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Balkan 
War  —  witnessed  an  unprecedented  outburst  of  national  mili- 
tarism. Germany  put  all  Europe  in  a  panic  ^  by  pre- 
paring  an  army  bill  which  proposed  to  raise  the  peace  gendered  by 
footing  of  the  empire  from  656,000  men  to  870,000  {^^ter-"^^ 
and  to  make  an  extraordinary  military  expenditure  of  national 
almost  a  billion  marks.  Immediately  France  replied 
to  the  German  challenge  by  increasing  the  term  of  active  mili- 
tary service  from  two  to  three  years.  The  German  bill  was 
accepted  by  the  Reichstag  on  30  June,  1913,  three  year  of 
weeks  before  the  passage  of  the  counter-measure  by  Military 
the  French  parliament.  Russia,  the  ally  of  France,  ^^^^^^^^'^ 
and  Austria-Hungary,  the  ally  of  Germany,  likewise 
gave  attention  to  military  ''preparedness."  In  July,  1913, 
the  Russian  Duma  authorized  a  new  army  budget  and  the  length- 
ening of  active  military  service  from  three  to  three  and  a  quarter 
years;  General  JofTre,  the  French  commander-in-chief,  visited 
Russia  in  August,  1913,  to  confer  on  the  reorganization  of  the 
Russian  army.  Austria-Hungary  introduced  a  new  scheme 
whereby  her  peace  footing  was  increased  from  463,000  to 
560,000 ;  and  enormous  sums  were  appropriated  for  the  provision 
of  up-to-date  artillery.  Italy  introduced  many  military  reforms 
and  Great  Britain  greatly  increased  her  expenditures  for  naval 
purposes.  Even  the  smaller  states  of  the  Low  Countries  and  of 
the  Balkan,  Iberian,  and  Scandinavian  peninsulas  caught  the 
contagion  of  the  army  fever.  The  most  ominous  feature  of  all 
this  military  preparation  was  the  fear  and  hatred  it  inspired. 
France  introduced  three-year  service  because  she  feared  the 
German  army,  with  its  splendid  corps  at  strategic  points  on  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  frontier.  When  little  Belgium  introduced  uni- 
versal military  service  and  planned  to  create  a  field  army  of 
150,000  in  addition  to  garrisons  of  130,000  men,  the  argument 
was  advanced  that  the  recent  construction  of  German  railways 
leading  to  the  Belgian  frontier,  without  obvious  economic 
purpose,  signified  that  Germany  was  preparing  to  transport 
troops  into  and  through  Belgium  in  case  of  a  Franco-German 


^  It  should  be  remarked  that  many  Germans  were  undoubtedly  panic-stricken 
themselves  by  the  contemporaneous  activity  of  Russian  Pan-Slavists.  See  above, 
pp.  425  f.,  468  f.,  485,  487. 


7IO  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


war.  Similarly  Germany  was  alarmed  by  the  projection  of 
new  Russian  railways  which  would  facilitate  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion against  Germany.  And  in  the  spring  of  19 14  a  veritable 
panic  was  created  in  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  press 
by  a  series  of  newspaper  articles  commenting  on  the  Russian 
preparations  which  would  be  perfected  in  191 6  or  191 7.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  prominent  Petrograd  journal  declared  in  June, 
1 914,  that  ''France  and  Russia  do  not  desire  war,  but  Russia 
is  prepared  and  hopes  that  France  will  likewise  be  prepared." 

Slowly  but  surely  the  trend  of  international  relations  between 
1890  and  1 91 4  showed  that  the  principle  of  the  balance  of 
Upsetting  power  between  two  great  combinations  —  the  Alliance 
the  Balance  Powers  and  the  Entente  Powers  —  was  incompatible, 
of  Power  ^^Yy  with  the  claim  to  European  hegemony  which 

Germany  had  put  forth  and  in  large  part  substantiated  between 
187 1  and  1890,  but  also  with  the  older  theory  and  effective 
operation  of  a  Concert  of  Europe.  The  diplomatic  grouping  of 
the  Powers  in  two  mutually  hostile  coalitions  by  19 14  had  greatly 
intensified  the  nationalism  and  the  militarism  of  every  Euro- 
pean state,  had  given  vindictive  color  to  the  economic  and  colo- 
nial rivalries  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  had  placed  the  nations 
of  Europe  in  such  a  perilously  delicate  position  that  a  compara- 
tively trivial  occurrence  was  sufficient  to  tip  the  balance  of 
power  and  to  precipitate  an  almost  universal  war. 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  OF  THE  NATIONS, 

1914-1915 

At  the  beginning  of  191 4  the  powder-magazines  throughout 
Europe  were  pretty  well  stocked,  and  the  tiny  spark  which  set 
them  off  was  the  assassination  by  Serb  conspirators, 
tionofthe  on  28  June,  of  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand, 
Franc^^^  nephew  of  the  Emperor-ELing  Francis  Joseph  and 
Ferdinand,  heir  to  the  Habsburg  throne,  together  with  his  wife, 
28  June,  while  on  the  archduke's  first  official  visit  to  Sarajevo, 
the  capital  of  Bosnia.  The  assassination  caused  a  tre- 
mendous outburst  of  indignation  throughout  Austria-Hungary 
and  Germany.  For  on  Francis  Ferdinand  many  hopes  had  been 
pinned.    His  piety  had  made  him  a  favorite  with  the  Roman 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


711 


Catholics ;  his  loyalty  to  the  German  alliance  augured  well  for 
the  future  maintenance  of  the  international  soHdarity  of  the  two 
great  Teutonic  Powers ;  his  vigorous  patriotism  and  its  Sig- 
his  conscientious  fulfillment  of  administrative  duties  ^^ific^^ce 
were  guarantees  of  the  continued  integrity  and  stability  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy  after  the  demise  of  the  aged  Francis 
Joseph.  Moreover,  Francis  Ferdinand  was  supposed  to  favor 
a  special  policy  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary  toward  the 
Slavs  of  southeastern  Europe  :  to  him  was  attributed  the  leader- 
ship in  a  scheme  to  transform  the  Dual  Monarchy  into  a  Triple 
Monarchy,  in  which  the  Serbs  of  Bosnia  and  the  Serbo-Croats 
of  Croatia-Slavonia  and  probably  the  Slovenes  would  constitute 
an  autonomous  entity  resembling  Austria  and  Hungary;  and 
to  him,  therefore,  was  imputed  by  patriotic  Serbians  and  Mon- 
tenegrins the  inspiration  of  the  hostile  attitude  which  Austria- 
Hungary  had  taken,  especially  since  1908,  toward  the  territorial 
expansion  of  the  two  independent  Serb  kingdoms. 

Certainly  the  Serbs  disliked  Francis  Ferdinand  immensely 
and  certainly  from  1908  to  1914  they  organized  secret  societies 
in  Bosnia  as  well  as  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro  and  con- 
ducted a  deliberate  propaganda  with  the  more  or  less  ^et^een 
avowed  object  of  disrupting  the  Habsburg  Empire.^  Austna- 
Naturally,  then,  when  the  official  investigation  of  ^d^Serbia 
the  Sarajevo  assassination  indicated  that  the  plot 
had  been  carried  out  by  youthful  Bosnians,  inspired  by  the 
revolutionary  secret  societies  of  the  Serbs  and  with  the  conniv- 
ance of  at  least  two  officials  of  the  kingdom  of  Serbia,  the  indig- 
nation of  Germans  and  Magyars  against  Serbia  knew  no  bounds. 
The  government  of  Austria-Hungary  solemnly  affirmed  that  the 
very  existence  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  depended  upon  putting  an 
end  once  for  all  to  Serbian  machinations,  and  with  practical 
unanimity  the  press  of  Germany  declared  that  Austria-Hungary's 
welfare  was  Germany's  welfare.    But  by  the  same  token  and 
with  equal  unanimity  the  press  of  Russia  declared  that  Serbia's 
welfare  was  Russia's  welfare.    A  new  crisis  —  and  a  most  seri- 
ous one  —  had  arisen  in  the  Balkans. 

*  On  the  feeling  of  the  Serbs  against  the  Dual  Monarchy,  see  above,  p.  538. 
Many  Germans  and  Magyars  insisted  that  the  Serb  propaganda  was  inspired  and 
directed  by  Russian  Pan-Slavists  with  the  connivance  of  the  Russian  government. 
On  Pan-Slavism,  see  above,  pp.  468  f. 


712  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


On  23  July,  1914,  Austria-Hungary  presented  an  ultimatum 
to  Serbia,  couched  in  the  most  peremptory  terms :  its  spirit 
The  Per  ^^^^  Outraged  government,  exasperated 

emptory      beyond  endurance  and  determined  to  crush  all  Pan- 

Austria*  ^^^^  plotting  regardless  of  international  usage  or  of 
Hungary  to  Constitutional  formalities.  The  ultimatum  alleged 
July  ^%i4  failing  to  suppress  anti-Austrian  conspiracies, 

Serbia  had  violated  her  promise  of  1909  to  ''live  on 
good  neighborly  terms"  with  Austria-Hungary,  and  had  com- 
pelled the  Austro-Hungarian  government  to  abandon  its  atti- 
tude of  benevolent  and  patient  forbearance,  to  put  an  end  "to 
the  intrigues  which  form  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  tranquillity 
of  the  monarchy,"  and  to  demand  effective  guarantees  from  the 
Serbian  government.  As  definite  guarantees  of  good  behavior 
Serbia  was  called  upon  to  suppress  anti-Austrian  publications 
and  societies,  to  discharge  such  governmental  employees  as  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government  should  accuse  of  anti-Austrian 
propaganda,  to  discard  an ti- Austrian  text-books  from  the  Ser- 
bian educational  system,  "to  accept  the  collaboration  in  Serbia 
of  representatives  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  government  for  the 
suppression  of  the  subversive  movement  directed  against  the 
territorial  integrity  of  the  monarchy,"  and  to  signify  uncondi- 
tional acceptance  of  these  and  the  other  Austro-Hungarian 
demands  within  forty-eight  hours. 

Thenceforth  events  marched  rapidly.  Russia,  France,  and 
Great  Britain  at  once  cooperated  in  requesting  Austria-Hungary 
to  extend  the  time-limit  of  the  ultimatum  in  order 
Reply  Un-^  that  the  whole  question  might  be  submitted  to  general 
satisfactory  international  negotiation,  but  this  joint  request  Aus- 
Hungary*"  tria-Hungary  promptly  declined.  On  25  July  Serbia 
replied  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,  promising 
to  comply  with  such  demands  as  did  not  seem  to  impair  her 
independence  and  sovereignty,  and  offering  to  refer  all  disputed 
points  to  the  Hague  Tribunal  or  to  the  Great  Powers.  Austria- 
Hungary  pronounced  the  reply  evasive  and  unsatisfactory, 
broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Serbia,  and  started  the 
mobilization  of  her  army.  The  Serbians  removed  their  capital 
from  Belgrade  to  Nish  and  began  a  counter-mobilization.  War 
was  clearly  impending  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia. 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


713 


But  a  much  vaster  and  more  terrible  war  was  also  impending. 
The  Russian  government  professed  to  beUeve  that  Austria- 
Hungary  was  planning  to  impair  the  sovereignty,  if  ggj-jji^ 
not  to  reduce  the  territory,  of  Serbia,  and  that  an  Backed 
Austro-Hungarian  campaign  against  Serbia  would  ^y^"^^** 
consolidate  Teutonic  power  in  the  Balkans  and  deprive  Russia 
of  all  influence  in  southeastern  Europe.    On  the  other  hand, 
Germany  insisted  that  the  quarrel  was  one  which  concerned 
Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia  alone  :  she  consistently  ^^^^^ 
opposed  the  repeated  efforts  of  Russian,  British,  Hungary 
French,  and  even  Italian,  diplomats,  to  refer  the  Jacked  by 

'  .  .       ,       ^  '         ,  Germany 

quarrel  to  an  mternational  congress  or  to  the  Hague 
Tribunal,  and,  mindful  of  the  success  of  her  former  military 
threats  in  1909  and  in  191 2-1 9 13,  she  again  in  July,  19 14,  de- 
clared unequivocally  that  if  Russia  should  come  to  the  assistance 
of  Serbia,  she  would  support  Austria-Hungary  with  all  the  armed 
forces  at  her  command.    Probably  the  chief  reason  that  actuated 
Germany  to  assume  such  a  determined  position  was  a  belief 
that  Russia  in  1914  would  yield  without  fighting,  as  she  had 
done  in  the  earlier  Balkan  crises  in  1909  and  in  1912-1913.  It 
was  known  in  Germany  that  the  Russian  military  reforms  were 
not  yet  completed ;  and  it  was  likewise  known  that  outbreak  of 
each  one  of  the  Entente  Powers  was  embarrassed  War  at  Time 
by  domestic  difficulties  —  Russia  by  a  serious  and  aW?  to^the 
violent  strike  in  Petrograd,  France  by  an  alarming  Triple 
popular  opposition  to  the  new  three-year  military  law 
and  by  a  scandalous  murder  trial  of  political  importance  at 
Paris,  and  Great  Britain  by  the  menace  of  civil  Austria- 
war  in  Ireland.    Under  these  circumstances,  Aus-  ^"^^^j^^ 
tria-Hungary  formally  declared  war  against  Serbia  28  July, 
(28  July,  1914).  ^914 

But  this  time  Teutonic  diplomacy  appeared  to  have  mis- 
judged the  temper  of  Russia  and  to  have  overreached  itself. 
The  Russian  government  refused  to  be  intimidated,  q^^^^^ 
and  on  the  day  following  the  Austro-Hungarian  decla-  vs.  Russia, 
ration  of  war  against  Serbia  the  mobilization  of  the  ^  August, 
Russian  army  was  begun.    On  i  August  the  frantic  ^^'^ 
endeavors  of  various  diplomats  to  arrive  at  some  peaceful  solu- 
tion of  the  Serbian  problem  were  suddenly  and  rudely  arrested 


714  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


by  the  outbreak  of  war  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Germany 
had  presented  a  twelve-hour  ultimatum  to  Russia,  demanding 
immediate  and  complete  demobilization;  Russia  had  refused  to 
comply ;  and  Germany  had  declared  war. 

Germany  knew  that  war  with  Russia  was  practically  certain  to 
involve  France.  She  knew  that  France  was  the  sworn  ally  of 
Germany  R^ssia.  She  appreciated  the  popular  feeling  in 
vs.  France,  France  that  common  cause  must  be  made  with  Russia 
3  August,  jj^  order  to  preserve  international  prestige  and  to 
^^^^  recover  Alsace-Lorraine.    Accordingly,  on  the  very 

day  of  delivering  the  ultimatum  to  Russia,  Germany  demanded 
to  know  within  eighteen  hours  what  would  be  the  French  po- 
sition. France  gave  a  non-committal  answer  and  began  mo- 
bihzation.  And  on  3  August,  1914,  Germany  declared  war 
against  France. 

Thus,  within  a  week  of  the  declaration  of  hostilities  by  Aus- 
tria-Hungary against  Serbia,  four  Great  Powers  were  in  a  state 
Italy  Pro-  —  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  opposed  to 

claims  Neu-  Russia  and  France.  The  attitude  of  the  other  two 
traiity  Great  Powers  of  Europe  —  Great  Britain  and  Italy  — • 
did  not  long  remain  in  doubt.  Italy  promptly  proclaimed  her 
neutraHty,  on  the  ground  that  the  war  was  not  defensive  on  the 
part  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  but  offensive,  and 
that  therefore  she  was  not  bound  to  give  assistance  to  her  allies. 
Great  Britain,  however,  appeared  more  hesitant.  The  British 
people  certainly  had  sympathy  for  France  and  little  love  for 
Hesitation  Germany,  and  the  British  government  had  already 
of  Great  informed  Germany  that,  while  their  countr}^  was  not 
Britain  bound  by  treaty  obligations  to  help  France  or  Russia, 
they  could  not  promise  in  case  of  war  to  observe  neutrality. 
By  2  August  the  British  government  had  gone  further  and  had 
announced  that  they  would  not  tolerate  German  naval  attacks 
on  the  unprotected  western  coast  of  France.  And  on  4  August 
occurred  an  event  which  decided  Great  Britain  to  enter  the  war 
on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France. 

On  2  August  —  twenty-four  hours  before  the  formal  declara- 
tion of  war  by  Germany  against  France  —  German  troops  were 
set  in  motion  toward  the  French  frontier,  not  directly  against  the 
powerful  French  border  fortresses  of  Verdun,  Toul,  and  Belfort, 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


715 


but  toward  the  neutral  countries  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium, 
which  lay  between  Germany  and  less  well-defended  districts  of 
northern  France.  Both  Germany  and  France  had  signed  trea- 
ties to  respect  the  neutrality  of  these  ^'buffer  states,"  Germany's 
and  France  had  already  announced  her  intention  of  violation  of 
adherinsf  loyally  to  her  treaty  engasrements.     But  Belgian 

\        \   n  ^  'AT  V  Neutrality 

on  2  August  German  troops  occupied  Luxemburg, 
despite  protests  from  the  grand-duchess;  and  on  the  same  day 
the  German  government  presented  an  ultimatum  to  Belgium 
demanding  the  grant  within  twelve  hours  of  permission  to  trans- 
fer German  troops  across  that  country  into  France,  promising, 
if  permission  were  granted,  to  guarantee  Belgian  independence 
and  integrity  and  to  pay  an  indemnity,  and  threatening  that, 
if  the  little  state  should  in  any  way  resist,  Germany  would  treat 
her  as  an  enemy  and  that  "the  decision  of  arms"  would  deter- 
mine the  future  relations  of  Belgium  to  Germany.    The  Belgian 
government  characterized  the  ultimatum  as  a  gross 
violation  of  iu  ternational  law  and  not  only  refused  Germany 
categorically  to  grant  Germany's  request  but  appealed  4^AuSt™* 
at  once  to  Great  Britain  to  assist  in  upholding  the  neu-  1914 
trality  of  Belgium. 

The  neutrality  of  Belgium  had  always  been  a  cardinal  point 
in  the  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain.    The  British  had  fought 
against  Napoleon  I  in  part  because  of  the  annexation 
of  Belgium  by  France,  and  they  had  opposed  the  Britain  vs 
threatened  aggression  of  Napoleon  III  against  the  Germany, 
Httle  kingdom;  they  were  not  Hkely  to  view  with  \g^^^^' 
pleasure  German  attacks  on  Belgium  or  its  possible 
incorporation  into  the  German  Empire.    On  4  August,  there- 
fore, when  news  was  received  in  London  that  German  troops 
had  actually  crossed  the  border  into  Belgium,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
the  British  foreign  secretary,  dispatched  an  ultimatum  to  Ger- 
many, requiring  assurances  by  midnight  that  Germany  would 
respect  Belgian  neutraUty.    Germany  refused,  on  the  ground 
of  military  necessity,  and  Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  German 
chancellor,  with  evidence  of  anger  and  disappointment,  rebuked 
Great  Britain  for  making  war  just  for  *'a  scrap  of  paper."  The 
next  day,  Mr.  Asquith,  the  British  prime  minister,  announced 
that  a  state  of  war  existed  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 


7i6 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


On  7  August  little  Montenegro  joined  her  fellow-Serb  state 
of  Serbia  against  Austria-Hungary.  Then  Japan  h)ecame  a 
Montene-  party  to  the  war,  partially  to  fulfill  her  treaty  obUga- 
gro  vs.  Aus-  tions  to  Great  Britain  and  partially  to  avenge  herself 
garyfy^'  Germany,  for  the  Japanese  had  not  forgotten  the 

August,  German  Kaiser's  slighting  references  to  them  in  the 
^^'"^  past,  nor  the  part  Germany  had  played  in  preventing 

Japan  from  retaining  Port  Arthur  in  1895  after  the  Chino- Japanese 
War.  Accordingly,  on  17  August,  Japan  presented  an  ultimatum 
to  Germany,  demanding  that  the  latter  Power  should  immedi- 
ately withdraw  all  warships  from  Chinese  and  Japanese  waters 
and  deliver  up  the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chau  before 
15  September,  ''with  a  view  to  the  eventual  restora- 
japanvs.  tion  of  the  same  to  China."  Upon  the  refusal  of 
Aug^s^t?^'  German  government  to  comply  with  the  terms  of 

1914  her  ultimatum,  Japan  forthwith  declared  war  (23 

August,  1 9 14). 

Against  the  combination  of  so  many  foes,  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary welcomed  support  from  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Entrance  of  Turkey,  having  purchased  two  fugitive  German  war- 
Turkey  as  ships  and  being  inspired  by  the  Young  Turk  faction 
AUy!°No-  ^ith  a  hope  of  recovering  at  least  part  of  what  she 
vember,  had  lost  in  the  Balkan  War,  bombarded  Russian 
^^^^  Black  Sea  ports  on  29  October,  1914;  consequently 

a  state  of  war  was  proclaimed  between  Russia  and  Turkey ;  and 
on  5  November  France  and  Great  Britain  declared  war  against 
Turkey. 

As  the  war  progressed  popular  feeling  in  Italy  reached  a  high 
pitch.  ItaHan  patriots  felt  that  their  country  should  take  ad- 
itaiyvs  vantage  of  the  embarrassments  of  Austria-Hungary 
Austria-  m  order  to  wrest  from  the  latter  country  the  Italian- 
Hungary,  23  speaking  districts  of  Trent  and  Triest,  and  they 

May,  1915     ,  ,  1  1  1    .  \_ 

brought  such  pressure  to  bear  on  their  government 
that  at  length  on  4  May,  191 5,  Italy,  despite  the  eager  activity 
of  German  diplomats,  denounced  her  treaty  of  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary  and  on  23  May  declared  war  against  her 
former  ally. 

Further  formal  declarations  of  war  between  the  nations  al- 
ready engaged  in  hostilities  completed  the  ahgnment,  at  th^ 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


717 


close  of  the  first  year  of  the  huge  struggle,  of  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  Turkey  against  Russia,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  Japan,  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro.^  Moreover, 
in  August,  19 1 5,  popular  factions  both  in  Greece  and 
in  Rumania  were  urging  their  Germanophile  sover-  ^^^ers 
eigns  to  enter  the  war  against  the  Teutonic  allies,  and  at  War  in 
Bulgaria  appeared  wiUing  to  sell  her  national  support  to  ^^i^^*' 
whichever  side  would  best  secure  territorial  gains  to 
her  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia.    Even  neutral  states  like  Switzer- 
land, Holland,  and  the  Scandinavian  kingdoms  found  it  neces- 
sary or  expedient  to  keep  large  bodies  of  troops  under  arms  and 
ready  for  any  emergency. 

Such  was  the  international  situation  created  by  the  War  of 
the  Nations.    The  mihtary  and  naval  operations  during  the 
first  year  of  the  struggle  gave  evidence  that  the  two  y^gjeg^jgn^s 
opposing  combinations  were  fairly  evenly  matched  in  to  Make 
resources,  in  prowess,  and  in  determination,  and  that  j^^^^y^"^^ 
the  war  would  be  not  only  terribly  expensive  but  hor- 
ribly destructive  and  long  drawn  out.    There  was  no  sign  that 
either  Germany  or  Austria-Hungary  would  consent  to  make 
peace  separately ;  and  on  the  other  side.  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia  mutually  engaged  on  5  September,  19 14,  not  to 
conclude  peace  separately  nor  to  demand  terms  of  peace  without 
the  previous  agreement  of  each  of  the  others.    To  this  engage- 
ment Japan  became  a  party  on  19  October,  1914,  and  Italy 
announced  her  adherence  on  i  December,  191 5,  thus  creating 
virtually  a  new  Quintuple  Entente. 

Over  the  mihtary  and  naval  operations  of  the  Great  War  it 
is  not  our  purpose  to  tarry.    N(^  one  could  predict  with  any 
accuracy  when  they  would  be  brought  to  a  close,  and  ^he  Great 
only  with  their  close  could  the  historian  properly  re-  War  the 
view  them  and  sort  out  the  important  from  the  unim-  Ei-rand^he 
portant.    No  one  could  doubt,  however,  that  on  the  Beginning 
ruins  of  the  Great  War  would  be  builded  a  new 
Europe  and  perhaps  a  new  world.    As  the  War  of  the  Nations 
marked  the  close  of  one  period  of  the  world's  history,  so  it  was 
bound  to  mark  the  beginning  of  another. 

^  Subsequently,  Bulgaria  entered  the  war  on  the  Teutonic  side  (14  October, 
1915),  and  Portugal  joined  the  opposing  combination  (9  March,  1916). 


7i8 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


And  here  is  the  proper  place  to  set  limits  to  our  present  study. 
Since  those  days  at  the  opening  of  the  sixteenth  century  we 
Conclusion  ^^^^  followed  the  long  and  involved  story  of  Europe 
down  to  the  War  of  19 14.  We  have  watched  the  de- 
velopment of  a  remarkable  state-system :  Great  Britain,  slowly 
but  steadily  forging  ahead  to  a  preeminent  position  in  maritime 
and  colonial  dominion;  Germany,  painfully  consolidating  her 
lands  and  exalting  her  military  power  on  the  Continent;  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, apparently  ever  defeated  and  ever  rallying  from 
defeat  to  obtain  new  prestige  for  the  hoary  Habsburg  family; 
France,  risen  to  sudden  greatness  on  the  Continent,  on  the  seas, 
and  in  colonial  enterprise,  as  suddenly  put  down,  and  again  in 
the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  rising  to  new  greatness 
with  a  strange  youthful  exuberance ;  Russia,  coming  out  of  the 
East  to  learn  of  the  West  and  to  assume  a  mighty  position  in  the 
councils  of  the  world ;  Italy,  shaking  off  her  centuries-old  foreign 
masters,  gathering  herself  together,  and  essaying  to  play  the 
r61e  of  a  Great  Power;  the  slow  waning  of  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire before  the  waxing  power  of  lesser  nationahties ;  Spain  and 
Sweden,  regretfully  abandoning  world  careers  for  which  they 
were  not  naturally  suited  to  follow  the  gentler  but  no  less  fruit- 
ful paths  of  peace.  We  have  Hkewise  watched  the  long  drama 
of  European  expansion:  the  explorations  and  discoveries,  the 
trade  and  missions,  the  erection  of  a  mercantilist  colonial  system 
and  its  destruction,  the  rapid  growth  in  the  nineteenth  century 
of  a  new  imperialism,  the  Europeanization  of  America,  of  Asia, 
of  Africa,  and  of  the  isles  of  the  seven  seas.  We  have  witnessed 
the  constant  shifting  of  social  distinction  from  clergy  and 
nobility  to  bourgeoisie  —  the  middle  class  —  that  enriched  itself 
from  the  Commercial  Revolution,  that  helped  to  unfrock  priests 
in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  and  to  dethrone  kings 
in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  that  reaped  the 
richest  profits  from  the  Industrial  Revolution,  and  that  placed 
its  own  peculiar  impress  on  the  whole  civilization  of  the  nine- 
teenth and  twentieth  centuries.  Also  we  have  heard  from 
peasants  and  particularly  from  town  laborers  murmurings  and 
mutterings  that  in  the  nineteenth  century  grew  in  frequency 
and  dissonance  and  that  might  in  the  twentieth  century  bode 
no  good  to  the  bourgeoisie.    We  have  observed  the  breakdown 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


719 


3f  divine-right  monarchy  and  the  lessening  frequency  of  wars 
waged  solely  for  dynastic  aggrandizement,  as  the  thunders 
of  the  French  Revolution  reverberated  throughout  Europe 
and  its  lightnings  smote  all  peoples  with  the  electric  fire  of 
democracy  and  nationalism.  And  if  we  have  been  aHve  to 
intellectual  developments,  we  have  noticed  the  disruption  of 
the  Catholic  Church  in  the  sixteenth  century,  the  subsequent 
disintegration  and  revolutionizing  of  Protestantism,  the  rise  of 
deism  and  skepticism,  of  reHgious  indifference  and  toleration, 
the  continued  exertions  of  CathoKcs  to  repair  the  ravages  of 
the  faithless,  the  growth  of  a  spirit  of  progress  in  material  well- 
being,  the  increasing  popular  devotion  to  experimental  and 
applied  science  and  to  those  philosophical  speculations  about 
science,  such  as  Darwinism,  which  in  the  nineteenth  and  twen- 
tieth centuries  gave  new  complexion  to  man's  ideas  concerning 
the  physical  and  spiritual  world  about  him. 

Out  of  all  these  factors  in  the  evolution  of  European  civili- 
zation during  the  span  of  some  four  hundred  years  has  come  the 
War  of  the  Nations.  It  is  the  product,  at  once  inevitable  and 
ironical,  of  materialistic  science,  of  rivalries  in  the  state-system, 
of  conflicting  ambitions  of  divers  social  classes,  and  of  the  po- 
tent operation  everywhere  of  the  principles  of  democracy  and 
nationahsm.  The  past  has  made  the  present  war.  But  as 
inevitably  will  the  present  war  contribute  new  factors  and  modi- 
fications of  the  old  to  generations  yet  unborn.  The  war  is  not 
a  perfect  break  in  human  history,  though  it  substitute  a  ^'new 
regime"  for  an  ''old  regime"  ;  and  in  all  probability  the  problems 
of  the  future  will  be  fully  comprehended  only  in  connection  with 
the  history  of  the  four  hundred  years  that  has  constituted  the 
subject-matter  of  this  book. 


ADDITIONAL  READING  ^ 

Internationalism  and  Pacifism,  C.  D.  Hazen,  Europe  since  1815  (Vpio), 
ch.  xxxii,  a  brief,  clear  statement  of  the  rise  of  internationalism  ;  J.  B.  S^ptt, 
The  Hague  Peace  Conferences  of  i8gg  and  igoj,  2  vols.  (1909),  texts  and 
comment,  elaborate  and  authoritative ;  W.  1.  Hull,  The  Two  Hague  Corby 
Jcrences  and  their  Contributions  to  International  Law  (1908),  less  pretentious 
than  the  preceding,  but  useful;  A.  P.  Higgins,  The  Hague  Peace  Confer- 
ences and  Other  International  Conferences  concerning  the  Laws  and  Usages 


720 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


of  War  (1909),  a  convenient  resume  of  the  achievements  of  various  inter- 
national conferences  from  that  of  Paris  in  1856  to  that  of  London  in  1909; 
J.  W.  Foster,  Arbitration  and  The  Hague  Court  (1904),  a  suggestive  essay; 
G.  G.  Wilson  (editor),  The  Hague  Arbitration  Cases  (1915),  containing  the 
complete  text  of  the  fifteen  cases  decided  before  the  Tribunal  of  Arbitra- 
tion at  The  Hague  since  1899,  with  English  translation ;  Cambridge  Modern 
History,  Vol.  XII  (1910),  ch.  xxii,  by  Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  on  the  modern 
law  of  nations  and  the  prevention  of  war;  N.  M.  Butler,  International 
Mind:  an  Argument  J  or  the  Judicial  Settlement  of  International  Disputes 
(1913),  temperate  and  illuminating;  E.  B.  Krehbiel,  Nationalism,  War  and 
Society{igi6),£L  scholarly  and  clear  syllabus  of  the  growth  of  internationahsm ; 
R.  N.  A.  Lane  (pseud.  Norman  Angell),  The  Great  Illusion,  new  ed.  (1914),  a 
brilliant  defense  of  the  thesis  that  "  it  has  become  a  physical  impossibihty 
for  any  nation  to  benefit  by  military  conquest  " ;  George  Nasmyth,  Social 
Progress  and  the  Darwinian  Theory  (1916),  an  attack  upon  the  "scientific" 
justification  of  war;  G.  H.  Perris,  A  Short  History  of  War  and  Peace  (191 1), 
a  handy  volume  in  the  "  Home  University  Library  "  ;  H.  N.  Brailsford,  The 
War  of  Steel  and  Gold,  a  Study  of  the  Armed  Peace  (1914) ;  F,  W.  Hirst,  The 
Political  Economy  of  War  (1915),  a  cursory  economic  history  of  the  chief 
wars  of  the  world  from  the  seventeenth  to  the  twentieth  century,  with 
special  attention  to  war-debts  and  to  the  trade  in  armaments ;  D.  S.  Jordan, 
War  and  Waste:  a  Series  of  Discussions  of  W^ar  and  War  Accessories  (1913) ; 
D.  S.  and  H.  E.  Jordan,  War's  Aftermath  (1914),  a  study  of  the  effect  of 
the  American  Civil  War  and  of  the  Balkan  Wars  on  the  quality  of  sub- 
sequent generations;  Charles  Plater  (editor),  A  Primer  of  Peace  and  War: 
the  Principles  of  International  Morality  (191 5),  a  clear  statement  of  the 
Catholic  position ;  Clara  Barton,  The  Red  Cross :  a  History  of  this  Re- 
markable International  Movement  in  the  Interest  of  Humanity  (1898) ;  P.  H. 
Epler,  The  Life  of  Clara  Barton  (191 5),  laudatory  and  interesting.  Helpful 
for  the  further  study  of  pacifism  are  the  numerous  pamphlets  published  by 
the  "  American  Association  for  International  Conciliation  "  (New  York) 
and  by  the  "  World  Peace  Foundation  "  (Boston). 

Militarism.  Typical  pleas  for  military  might:  Homer  Lea,  The  Day 
of  the  Saxon  (1912) ;  J.  A.  Cramb,  Germany  and  England  (1914),  and,  by 
the  same  author.  The  Origins  and  Destiny  of  Imperial  Britain  and  Nine- 
teenth-Century Europe  (191 5);  Friedrich  von  Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the 
Next  War,  Eng.  trans,  by  A.  H.  Powles  (191 2).  For  refutations,  or  at- 
tempted refutations,  of  the  doctrines  of  Norman  Angell  and  F.  W.  Hirst, 
cited  above,  consult  A.  T.  Mahan,  Armaments  and  Arbitration,  or,  The 
Place  of  Force  in  the  International  Relations  of  States  (191 2) ;  J.  H.  Jones, 
The  Economics  of  War  and  Conquest  (191 5) ;  and  G.  G.  Coulton,  The 
Main  Illusions  of  Pacificism  (19 16).  For  a  scientist's  justification  of  war 
on  the  basis  of  biology,  see  Karl  Pearson,  National  Life  from  the  Standpoint 
of  Science  (1901). 

International  Relations,  1871-1914.  An  illuminating  little  volume, 
setting  forth  the  basic  correlation  of  modern  patriotism,  business,  and 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


721 


diplomacy,  is  Walter  Lippmann,  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy  (191 5).  On  the 
general  history  of  international  relations  since  187 1 :  Charles  Seignobos, 
A  Political  History  of  Europe  since  1814,  Eng.  trans,  ed.  by  S.  M.  Macvane 
(1900),  ch.  xxvii,  xxviii;  J.  H.  Rose,  The  Development  of  the  European 
Nations,  1870-igoo,  Vol.  II  (1905),  ch.  i,  and,  by  the  same  author,  The 
Origins  of  the  War  (1914) ;  Histoire  generate,  Vol.  XII,  ch.  xiii,  xv;  W.  M. 
Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power:  a  Study  of  International  Politics  from  Sadowa 
to  Kirk-Kilisse  (1913) ;  Gottlob  Egelhaaf,  Geschichte  der  neuesten  Zeit 
iSii~igi2,  4th  ed.  (1913),  Book  I,  ch.  vii-x,  Book  II,  ch.  xiii,  xv,  xvii; 
Arthur  Singer,  Geschichte  des  Dreibunds  (1914) ;  Andre  Tardieu,  France 
and  the  Alliances:  the  Struggle  for  the  Balance  of  Power  (1908) ;  Ernest 
Lemonon,  U Europe  et  la  politique  britannique,  1882-igii,  2d  ed.  (191 2) ; 
Ernst  (Count)  zu  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  auswdrtige  Politik,  1888- 
igij  (1914) ;  Bernhard  von  Bulow,  Imperial  Germany,  Eng.  trans,  by 
Marie  A.  Lewenz  (1914),  pp.  3-123  ;  Francis  Delaisi,  The  Inevitable  War 
(191 5)  ;  Pierre  Albin,  Les  grands  traites  politiques :  receuil  des  principaux  textes 
diplomatiques  depuis  181 5  jusqu'd  nos  jours,  2d  ed.  (191 1).  Special  phases : 
Rene  Pinon,  France  et  Allemagne,  i8'/o~igij,  new  ed.  (1913) ;  Albert  Billot, 
La  France  et  Vltalie:  histoire  des  annees  troubles,  i88i~i8gg,  2  vols.  (1905) ; 
Sir  Thomas  Barclay,  Thirty  Years:  Anglo-French  Reminiscences,  1 8/6-1  go6 
( 1 9 1 4) ;  G .  H .  Perris ,  Our  Foreign  Policy  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 's  Failure  ( 1 9 1 2 ) , 
a  pacifist's  protest  against  England's  entangling  ententes ;  Sir  Harry  Johnston, 
Common  Sense  in  Foreign  Policy  (1913) ;  Valentine  Chirol,  The  Middle  Eastern 
Question  (1903) ;  E.  G.  Browne,  The  Persian  Revolution  of  igoj-igog  (1910), 
containing  a  critical  account  of  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  1907  in 
regard  to  Persian  affairs ;  Andre  Tardieu,  La  conference  d^Algesiras:  histoire 
diplomatique  de  la  crise  marocaine,  3d  ed.  (1909),  and,  by  the  same  author, 
Le  mystere  d'Agadir  (191 2);  Gustav  Diercks,  Die  Marokkofrage  und  die 
Konferenz  von  Algeciras  (1906) ;  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  La  politique  de  I'Squilibre, 
igoy-jgii  (191 2);  Fiene  Alhin,  La  guerre  allemande :  d^ A gadir  d  Sarajevo, 
igii-igi4  (191 5) ;  H.  A.  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Europe,  igii~igi4:  the 
Story  of  the  Recent  European  Diplomatic  Crises  and  Wars  and  of  Europe's 
Present  Catastrophe  (1914) ;  R.  W.  Seton-Watson,  The  Southern  Slav  Question 
and  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  (191 1),  and,  by  the  same  author,  The  Balkans, 
Italy,  and  the  Adriatic  (191 5) ;  A.  R.  and  Mrs.  E.  M.  C.  Colquhoun,  The 
Whirlpool  of  Europe,  Austria- Hungary  and  the  Habsburgs  (1907) ;  Theodor 
von  Sosnosky,  Die  Balkanpolitik  Oesterreich-Ungarns  seit  1866,  2  vols.  (1913- 
1914) ;  European  Politics  during  the  Decade  before  the  War  as  Described  by 
Belgian  Diplomatists  (191 5),  selections  from  the  reports  of  Belgian  repre- 
sentatives in  London,  Berlin,  and  Paris,  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  in 
Brussels,  1905-1914,  issued  in  original  French  and  in  English  translation  by 
the  German  Foreign  Office. 

The  War  of  the  Nations.  Bibliographies :  F.  W.  T.  Lange  and  W.  T. 
Berry,  Books  on  the  Great  War  (1914  sqq.) ;  A.  Maire  and  A.  Pcreire,  Les 
sources  de  Vhistoire  de  la  guerre  europeenne  (191 5  sqq.) ;  Die  deutsche  Kriegs- 
literatur,  pub.  by  Hinrichs,  Leipzig  (1914  sqq.).    Of  the  countless  books, 


VOL.  n  — 3A 


722 


HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


pamphlets,  and  articles  which  have  been  written  about  the  war,  only  time 
and  thorough  criticism  will  prove  the  relative  worth.  The  following  bib- 
liography is  offered  not  as  an  exhaustive  catalogue  but  simply  as  a  select 
list  which  may  be  found  useful  alike  by  teachers  and  by  students.  It  is 
perhaps  needless  to  add  that  every  reader  must  guard  against  generaliza- 
tions and  uncritical  comments  in  which  even  reputable  historians  are  likely 
to  indulge  at  a  time  in  the  world's  history  so  fraught  with  extreme  national 
passions  as  the  present. 

Diplomatic  History  of  the  War.  A  handy  volume  published  by  Harrison 
and  Sons,  London,  contains  the  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents  Relating 
to  the  Outbreak  of  the  European  War,  including  the  British  White  Paper, 
the  French  Yellow  Book,  the  Russian  Orange  Book,  the  Belgian  Grey  Book, 
the  Serbian  Blue  Book,  the  German  Denkschrift,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book,  and  other  material,  carefully  indexed.  In  addition  to  these 
earlier  diplomatic  documents,  the  New  York  Times  and  the  "  American 
Association  for  International  Conciliation  "  have  made  available  to  the 
American  public  the  Italian  Green  Book,  the  Second  Belgian  Grey  Book, 
the  correspondence  of  the  United  States  government  with  the  belligerents, 
etc.  For  English  readers,  more  or  less  partisan,  but  fairly  reliable,  ac- 
counts of  the  diplomatic  maneuvers  preliminary  to  the  war  have  been 
written  by  J.  W.  Headlam,  History  of  Twelve  Days,  July  24- August  4,  igi4 
(191 5);  J.  H.  Rose,  The  Origins  of  the  War  (1914) ;  Arthur  Bullard,  The 
Diplomacy  of  the  Great  War  (1916) ;  and  E.  C.  Stowell,  The  Diplomacy 
of  the  War  of  1914,  Vol.  I  (191 5).  The  German  version  of  the  diplomacy 
that  led  up  to  the  conflict  has  been  ably  presented  by  H.  F.  Helmolt, 
Die  geheime  Vorgeschichte  des  Weltkrieges  (1914) ;  Paul  Rohrbach,  Ger- 
many's Isolation,  Eng.  trans,  by  P.  H.  Phillipson  of  the  original  German 
work,  Der  Krieg  und  die  deutsche  Politik  (1914) ;  H.  Frobenius,  Germany's 
Hour  of  Destiny  (1914) ;  and  Edmund  von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of 
View  (191 5)  and  What  Germany  Wants  (1914).  A  striking  indictment  of  the 
German  government  purports  to  have  been  written  by  a  German:  the 
volume  was  originally  published  in  Switzerland  with  the  title,  J' accuse:  von 
einem  Deutschen,  and  has  since  been  translated  into  French  and  into  English. 
The  best  general  statement  of  the  German  position  is  Deutschland  und  der 
Weltkrieg  (191 5),  containing  contributions  from  the  pens  of  such  well-known 
German  scholars  as  Otto  Hintze,  Friedrich  Meinecke,  Hermann  Oncken,  and 
Hermann  Schumacher :  excepting  one  chapter,  it  has  been  translated  into 
English  by  W.  W.  Whitelock  under  the  title  of  Modern  Germany  in  relation 
to  the  Great  War  (1916).  On  the  English  side:  E.  P.  Barker  and  other 
members  of  the  Oxford  Faculty  of  Modern  History,  Why  We  Are  at  War : 
Great  Britain's  Case  (1914) ;  H.  A.  L.  Fisher,  The  War,  its  Causes  and  its 
Issues  (1914) ;  Ramsay  Muir,  Britain's  Case  against  Germany  (1914).  For 
opposing  views  of  the  German  invasion  of  Belgium,  consult  Alexander  Fuehr, 
The  Neutrality  of  Belgium  (191 5),  and  Charles  Sarolea,  How  Belgium  Saved 
Europe  (191 5). 

General  Histories  of  the  War.    Pretentious  continued  histories  of  the 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


723 


war  and  monumental  collections  of  war-material  have  already  begun  to 
make  their  appearance.  Of  those  published  in  the  United  States,  probably 
the  best-known  are  the  (New  York)  Times  Current  History  of  the  War,  a 
heterogeneous  collection,  published  in  monthly  installments,  containing 
many  valuable  historical  documents  as  well  as  a  number  of  unimportant 
articles;  F.  H.  Simonds,  The  Great  War  (1914  sqq),  an  analytical  interpre- 
tation, rather  than  a  detailed  narrative,  of  the  war's  most  significant  events ; 
and  G.  H.  Allen  and  H.  C.  Whitehead,  The  Great  War  (191 5  sqq.).  In 
England,  the  leading  newspapers  are  publishing  weekly  and  fortnightly 
"  histories  "  of  the  war :  the  best  are  the  Manchester  Guardian  History  of 
the  War  (fortnightly)  and  the  (London)  Times  History  of  the  War  (weekly). 
F.  A.  Mumby  (editor).  The  Great  World  War  (191 5  sqq.),  gives  a  concise 
discussion  of  the  principal  features  of  the  conflict ;  Hilaire  Belloc,  General 
Sketch  of  the  European  War  (191 5  sqq.),  is  characterized  by  illuminating, 
but  frequently  too  optimistic,  analyses  of  geographical  and  numerical 
factors  in  favor  of  the  Entente  Powers ;  one  of  the  clearest  and  most  accu- 
rate narratives  yet  written  is  John  Buchan,  Nelson's  History  of  the  War 
(191 5  sqq.).  One  of  the  leading  French  serial  histories  of  the  war  is  edited 
by  Gabriel  Hanotaux,  Histoire  illustree  de  la  guerre  de  IQ14;  but  at  present 
the  most  valuable  French  work  is  the  official  Guerre  de  IQ14:  documents 
oficielles,  textes  legislatifs  et  reglementaires  (1914  sqq).  Of  the  many  ex- 
cellent German  works  mention  should  be  made  of  C.  H.  Baer,  Der  Vdlker- 
krieg,  eine  Chronik  der  Ereignisse  seit  dem  i  Juli  igi4  (191 5  sqq.),  and 
H,  F.  Helmolt,  Der  Weltkrieg  in  Bildern  and  Dokumenten.  The  (London) 
Daily  Chronicle  and  the  (London)  Daily  Telegraph  have  each  published 
dozens  of  pocket-edition  books  on  war-topics;  and  many  eminent  British 
scholars  have  contributed  monographs  to  the  Oxford  Pamphlets,  criticizing 
the  policy  and  impugning  the  motives  of  the  German  government.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Deutsche  Kriegschriften  {German  War  Pamphlets),  the  Poli- 
tische  Flugschriften  (Political  Pamphlets) ,  Zwischen  Krieg  und  Frieden  (191 5 
sqq.),  and  the  Deutsche  Vortrdge  hamhurgischer  Professor eii  (i 914),  in  a  con- 
troversial spirit,  lay  the  burden  of  guilt  upon  the  Entente  Powers,  especially 
on  Great  Britain.  Useful  for  French  opinions  and  contentions  are  two  exten- 
sive series  of  similarly  controversial  pamphlets :  Pages  d'histoire  (pub.  by 
Ber^er-Levrault,  Paris) ;  and  Pages  actuelles  (pub.  by  Bloud  &  Gay,  Paris). 

Special  Aspects  of  the  War.  On  Socialism  and  the  war :  W.  E.  Walling, 
The  Socialists  and  the  War  (191 5),  authoritative  and  useful;  H.  G.  Wells, 
The  War  and  Socialism  (19 14).  On  nationalism  in  the  war :  A.  J.  Toynbee, 
Nationality  and  the  War  (1915);  and  for  a  broader  survey,  J.  H.  Rose, 
Nationality  in  Modern  History  (1916).  On  Catholicism  and  the  war :  Alfred 
Baudrillart  (editor).  La  guerre  allemande  ct  le  catholicisme  (191 5) ;  Gabriel 
Langlois,  Lt  clerge,  les  catholiques,  et  la  guerre  (191 5) ;  Alfred  Loisy,  The 
War  and  Religion,  Eng.  trans,  by  Arthur  Galton  (191 5),  anti-clerical  in 
tone.  For  Russia's  part  in  the  war,  from  the  standpoint  of  a  Russian  Social 
Democrat,  an  ex-member  of  the  Duma,  see  Gregoire  Alexinsky,  La  Russie 
et  la  guerre  (191 5),  Eng.  trans,  by  Bernard  Miall. 


724  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  EUROPE 


AIDS  IN  LINKING  CURRENT  NEWS  WITH  MODERN  HISTORY 

Annual  Historical  Surveys.  Beginning  in  September,  1916,  the  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  which  has  long  published  a  "  Record  of  Political  Events  " 
semi-annually,  will  publish  such  record  annually  as  a  separate  supplement : 
procurable  at  moderate  expense,  this  Record  of  Political  Events  promises 
to  provide  American  students  with  convenient  little  summaries  of  the  chief 
political  events  throughout  the  world,  country  by  country,  and  thereby  to 
furnish  a  valuable  means  of  supplementing  such  histories  as  the  foregoing 
and  of  keeping  them  up-to-date.  More  exhaustive  American  annuals, 
useful  for  reference,  are  the  encyclopedic  International  Year  Book,  ed.  by 
F.  M.  Colby  ( 1 899-1 902),  continued  under  the  same  editorship  since  1907 
as  The  New  International  Year  Book;  and  The  American  Year  Book:  a 
Record  of  Events  and  Progress,  ed.  by  S.  N.  D.  North  (1910  sqq.).  The 
Annual  Register  is  an  annual  resume  of  political  happenings,  which  has 
been  appearing  in  England  since  1758,  half  the  space  in  each  of  the 
rather  large  volumes  being  devoted  to  Great  Britain  and  the  other  half 
to  "  Foreign  and  Colonial  History."  What  corresponds  to  The  Annual 
Register  for  France  is  the  Annuaire  historique  universel  (181 8-1 861),  con- 
tinued by  Uannee  politique,  pub.  by  Andre  Lebon  (1874-1905),  and  La  vie 
politique  dans  les  deux  mondes,  ed.  by  Achille  Viallate  (1906  sqq.).  Similar 
German  works  of  recognized  value :  Europdischer  Geschichtskalender,  ed. 
by  H.  K.  L.  Schulthess  (1861-1884)  and  continued  since  1885  by  other 
editors;  Das  Staatsarchiv :  Sammlung  der  offiziellen  Aktenstucke  zur  Ge~ 
schichte  der  Gegenwart  (1861  sqq.),  ed.  by  Alfred  Klauhold  (1872-1890), 
now  ed.  by  Gustav  Roloff ;  Jahrhuch  des  offentlichen  Rechts  der  Gegenwart, 
ed.  by  Georg  Jellinek,  Paul  Laband,  and  Robert  Piloty  (1907  sqq.).  There 
is  also  an  admirable  Austro-Hungarian  work  of  a  semi-official  character, 
published  monthly  and  edited  by  Karl  Neisser,  Politische  und  Volkswirt- 
schaftliche  Chronik  (191 2  sqq). 

Special  Reference  Annuals.  The  Statesman's  Year  Book,  since  1864,  a 
statistical  and  descriptive  annual  of  the  countries  of  the  world;  HazeWs 
Annual,  since  1886,  containing  lists  of  principal  officials  in  all  countries, 
together  with  brief  reviews  of  main  political  events  and  much  miscellaneous 
information;  Joseph  Whitaker,  An  Almanack  "containing  an  account  of 
the  astronomical  and  other  phenomena  .  .  .  information  respecting  the 
government,  finances,  population,  commerce,  and  general  statistics  of  the 
British  Empire,"  since  1868;  Almanach  de  Gotha:  annuaire  genialogique, 
diplomatique,  et  statistique,  a  famous  work  issued  annually  since  18 18  and 
valuable  for  relationships  of  royalty  and  of  great  noble  families ;  The  Year 
Book  of  Social  Progress,  published  in  London  since  191 2,  a  summary  of 
recent  legislation,  official  reports,  and  voluntary  effort,  with  regard  to  the 
welfare  of  the  people ;  Annuaire  de  la  legislation  du  travail,  an  annual  digest 
of  social  legislation  in  all  countries,  pub.  by  the  Belgian  Office  of  Labor  since 
1897.  The  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  published  annually  since  181 2, 
constitute  a  store-house  of  information  concerning  international  relations 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 


725 


and  the  general  history  of  Europe.  See  also  the  various  other  year-books 
cited  in  the  bibliographies  appended  to  Chapters  XXVII-XXIX,  above. 

Other  Current  Publications.  The  London  Times  publishes  extremely 
valuable  and  convenient  monthly  and  yearly  indices ;  and  from  American 
newspapers  is  gathered  the  material  which  is  summarized,  arranged  in 
alphabetical  order,  and  published  in  the  recently  established  monthly  and 
cumulative  Information.  A  moderately  sized  library  of  recent  history 
might  well  include  files  of  the  following  periodicals :  American  —  New 
Republic,  Independent,  Survey,  Current  Events,  America,  Review  of  Reviews^ 
North  American,  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  New  Review, 
Pan-American  Magazine;  British  —  London  Times  (weekly),  Westminster 
Gazette  (weekly),  Spectator,  Nation,  Tablet,  Fortnightly,  Contemporary, 
Nineteenth  Century,  Westminster,  Edinburgh  Review,  Quarterly  Review, 
National  Review,  Near  East,  Far  East,  Russian  Review,  Dublin  Review, 
Hibbert  Journal;  French  —  Journal  des  dibats  (weekly).  Revue  politique 
et  parlementaire,  Le  Correspondant,  Revue  de  Paris,  Revue  bleu;  Belgian  — 
Rev^ue  de  droit  internationel  et  de  Ugislation  comparie;  Italian  —  Rivista 
d^ Italia;  German  —  Das  Echo,  Frankfurter  Zeitung  (weekly),  Preussische 
Jahrbiicher,  Zeitschrift  fur  Vdlkerrecht  und  Bundesstaatsrecht.  The  best 
libraries  contain,  likewise,  hundreds  of  volumes  of  stenographic  reports  of 
the  proceedings  of  parliamentary  bodies  throughout  the  world,  which,  while 
altogether  too  voluminous  for  ordinary  use,  are  indispensable  aids  to  the 
mature  and  painstaking  scholar  in  studying  particular  governmental  ac- 
tions in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries. 


APPENDIX 


RULERS  OF  THE  CHIEF  EUROPEAN  STATES  SINCE 
THE  OPENING  OF  THE  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY 

Austria-Hungary 

{Archdukes  of  Austria  since  1453;  Kings  of  Hungary  and  Bohemia 
since  1526;  Emperors  of  Austria  since  1804)" 


Maximilian  I,  1 493-1 519 
Charles  I  {V  as  Holy  Roman 

Emperor),  15 19-1520 
Ferdinand  I,  1 520-1 564 
Maximilian  II,  1 564-1 576 
Rudolph  V  (//  as  Holy  Roman 

Emperor),  1 576-161 2 
Matthias,  1612-1619 
Ferdinand  II,  1619-1637 
Ferdinand  III,  1637-1657 
Leopold  I,  1 6 58-1 705 
Joseph  I,  1705-17 1 1 

Belgium 

Leopold  I,  1831-1865 
Leopold  II,  1 865-1909 

Bulgaria 
Alexander,  Prince,  1879-1886 


Denmark 

John,  1481-1513 
Christian  II,  1513-1523 
Frederick  I,  1 523-1 533 
Christian  III,  1 533-1 559 
Frederick  II,  1 559-1 588 
Christian  IV,  1588-1648 
Frederick  III,  1648-1670 


Charles  II  {VI  as  Holy  Roman 
Emperor,  III  as  King  of 
Hungary),  1711-1740 

Maria  Theresa,  1 740-1 780 

Joseph  II,  1 780-1 790 

Leopold  II,  1 790-1 792 

Francis  I  (//  as  Holy  Roman 
Emperor),  1792-183  5 

Ferdinand  I  {V  of  Hungary), 
1835-1848 

Francis  Joseph,  1848-1916 

Charles  I  (IV  of  Hungary),  1916- 


Albert,  1909- 


Ferdinand  I,  Prince,  1887-1909, 
King,  1909- 


Christian  V,  1 670-1 699 
,    Frederick  IV,  1 699-1 730 
Christian  VI,  1 730-1 746 
Frederick  V,  1 746-1 766 
Christian  VII,  1 766-1 808 
Frederick  VI,  1808-1839 
Christian  VIII,  1839-1848 


727 


728 


APPENDIX 


DENMARK  —  Continued 
Frederick  VII,  1848-1863 
Christian  IX,  1 863-1906 

France 

Louis  XI,  1461-1483 

Charles  VIII,  1483-1498 

Louis  XII,  1498-1515 

Francis  I,  151 5-1 547 

Henry  II,  1 547-1 559 

Francis  II,  1 559-1 560 

Charles  IX,  1 560-1 574 

Henry  III,  1 574-1 589 

Henry  IV,  1 589-1610 

Louis  XIII,  1610-1643 

Louis  XIV,  1643-1715 

Louis  XV,  1715-1774 

Louis  XVI,  1774-1792 

The  First  Republic,  1/Q2-1804 
The  Convention,  1 792-1 795 
The  Directory,  1 795-1 799 
The  Consulate  (Napoleon  Bo- 
naparte   as   First  Consul), 
I 799-1804 

Napoleon    I,    Emperor    of  the 
French,  1804-18 14 

Louis  XVIII,  1814-1824 

Charles  X,  18 24-1 830 

Louis  Philippe,  1 830-1 848 

German  Empire 
William  I,  1871-1888 
Frederick  III,  1888 

Great  Britain 
Sovereigns  of  England^  1485-1707 
Henry  VII,  1485-1509 
Henry  VIII,  1 509-1 547 
Edward  \1,  1 547-1 553 
Mary  I,  1553-1558 
Elizabeth,  1 558-1603 
James  I  {VI  of  Scotland),  1603- 
1625 

Charles  I,  162 5-1649 

The  Commonwealth,  1 649-1 660 

(Oliver  Cromwell) 
Charles  II,  1660-1685 


Frederick  VIII,  1906-1912 
Christian  X,  191 2- 

The  Secofid  Republic,  1848-1852 

(Louis  Napoleon  as  President) 
Napoleon   III,   Emperor   of  the 

French,  185 2-1 870 
The  Third  Republic,  1870- 
Government  of  National  Defense, 

1870-1871 
Adolphe  Thiers,  President,  187 1- 

1873 

Marshal  MacMahon,  President, 

1873-1879 
Jules  Grevy,  President,  1879-1887 
F.  Sadi  Carnot,  President,  1887- 

1894 

Casimir  Perier,  President,  1894- 
1895 

Felix  Faure,  President,  1895-1899 
£mile  Loubet,  President,  1899- 
1906 

Armand     Fallieres,  President, 

I 906-19 13 
Raymond    Poincare,  President, 

1913- 


WiUiam  II,  1888- 


Sovereigns  of  Scotland,  1488-1707 
James  IV,  1488-15 13 
James  V,  15 13-1542 
Mary,  1 542-1 567 
James  VT,   1 567-1625   (/  of 

England,  1603-162  5) 
[Succession    as    in  England, 
1 603-1 707] 


APPENDIX 


729 


Great  Britain  —  Continued 

James  II  {VII  of  Scotland), 

168 5-1688 
William   III   and   Mary  II, 

1689-1694 
William  III,  1694-1702 
Anne,    1702-17 14    {Queen  of 

Great  Britain  after  1707) 

Sovereigns  of  Great  Britain,  lyoy-iSoi 

Anne,  1707-17 14  George  III,  1760-1820  {King 

George  I,  17 14-17 27               .  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 

George  II,  17 27-1 760  after  1800) 

Sovereigns  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  1801- 
George  III,  1801-1820  Victoria,  1837-1901 

George  IV,  1820-1830  Edward  VII,  1901-1910 

William  IV,  1830-1837  George  V,  1910- 

Chief  Ministers  in  Great  Britain  since  1721 
Sir  Robert  Walpole,  1721-1742 
John  Lord  Carteret  (Earl  Granville),  1 742-1 743 
Henry  Pelham,  1743-17  53 

Thomas  Pelham,  Duke  of  Newcastle,  17  54-1 7  56 

William  Cavendish,  Duke  of  Devonshire,  1756-1757 

Duke  of  Newcastle,  17  56-1 761  (William  Pitt,  Secretary  of  State) 

John  Stewart,  Earl  of  Bute,  1 762-1 763 

George  Grenville,  1 763-1 765 

Charles  Wentworth-Watson,  Marquess  of  Rockingham,  1766 
Augustus  Fitzroy,  Duke  of  Grafton,  1 766-1 769 
Frederick  Lord  North  (Earl  of  Guildford),  17 70-1 78 2 
Marquess  of  Rockingham,  1782 

William  Petty,  Earl  of  Shelburne  (Marquess of  Lansdowne),  1782-1783 
William  Bentinck,  Duke  of  Portland,  1783 
William  Pitt,  1 783-1801 

Henry  Addington  (Viscount  Sidmouth),  1801-1804 
William  Pitt,  1804-1806 

William  Lord  Grenville,  1 806-1 807  (Charles  James  Fox,  Foreign 

Secretary) 
Duke  of  Portland,  1 807-1 809 
Spencer  Perceval,  1809-1812 

Robert  Banks  Jenkinson,  Earl  of  Liverpool,  181 2-1827 
George  Canning,  1827 

Frederick  John  Robinson,  Viscount  Goderich  (Earl  of  Ripon),  1827 

Arthur  Wellesley,  Duke  of  Wellington,  1827-1830 

Earl  Grey,  1830-1834 

William  Lamb,  Viscount  Melbourne,  1834 


730 


APPENDIX 


Great  Britain  —  Continued 
Sir  Robert  Pcd,  1834-183 5 
Viscount  Melbourne,  1835-1841 
Sir  Robert  Peel,  1 841 -1846 
Lord  John  Russell  (Earl  Russell),  1846-1852 
Edward  Stanley,  Earl  of  Derby,  1852 
George  Hamilton-Gordon,  Earl  of  Aberdeen,  1852-1855 
Henry  J.  Temple,  Viscount  Palmerston,  1855-1858 
Earl  of  Derby,  18  58- 18  59 
Viscount  Palmerston,  1859-1865 
Earl  Russell,  1865-1866 
Earl  of  Derby,  1 866-1 868 
William  Ewart  Gladstone,  1 868-1 874 
Benjamin  Disraeli  (Earl  of  Beaconsfield),  1874-1880 
W.  E.  Gladstone,  1880-1885 
Robert  Cecil  (Marquess  of  Salisbury),  1885-1886 
W.  E.  Gladstone,  1886 
Marquess  of  Salisbury,  1 886-1892 
W.  E.  Gladstone,  1892-1894 

Archibald  P.  Primrose  (Earl  of  Rosebery),  1 894-1 895 

Marquess  of  Salisbury,  1895-1902 

Arthur  James  Balfour,  1902-1905 

Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman,  1905-1908 

Herbert  Henry  Asquith,  1908- 

Greece 


Otto  I,  1833-1862 
George  I,  1863-1913 

Holy  Roman  Empire 
Maximilian  I,  1493-1519 
Charles  V,  1519-1558 
Ferdinand  I,  1558-1564 
Maximilian  II,  1 564-1 576 
Rudolph  II,  1576-1612 
Matthias,  1612-1619 
Ferdinand  II,  16 19-163  7 
Ferdinand  III,  163 7-1657 

Hungary  (see  Austria-Hungary) 
Italy 
Kings  of  Sardinia 

Victor  Amadeus  II,  17 20-1 730 
Charles  Emmanuel  III,  1730- 
1773 

Victor  Amadeus  III,  1 773-1 796 
Charles  Emmanuel  IV,  1796- 
1802 


Constantine  I,  1913- 


Leopold  I,  1 658-1 705 
Joseph  I,  1705-1711 
Charles  VI,  1711-1740 
Charles  VII,  1 742-1 745 
Francis  I,  1 745-1 765 
Joseph  II,  1 765-1 790 
Leopold  II,  1 790-1 792 
Francis  II,  1 792-1806 


Victor  Emmanuel  I,  1802-182 1 
Charles  Felix,  1821-1831 
Charles  Albert,  1 831-1849 
Victor  Emmanuel   II,  1849- 

1878  {as  King  of  Italy  after 

1861) 


APPENDIX 


731 


Italy — Continued 

Kings  of  Italy 

Victor  Emmanuel  II,  1861-1878 
Humbert,  1878-1900 

Montenegro 

Danilo    (Prince-Bishop),  1696- 
1735 

Sava  and  Vasilije,  1735-1782 
Peter  I,  1 782-1830 

Netherlands 

William  the  Silent,  1581-1584 
Maurice,  Stadholder,  1 584-1625 
Frederick     Henry,  Stadholder, 

1625-1647 
William  II,  Stadholder,  1647-1650 
John  De  Witt,  Grand  Pensionary, 

1653-1672 
William  III,  Stadholder,  1672- 

1702  {King  of  England  and 

Scotland,  168Q-1702) 
John    William    Friso,  Nominal 

Stadholder,  1 702-1 711 

Norway 

Same  Sovereigns  as  in  Denmark, 

1 450-1 8 14 
Christian  Frederick,  18 14 

Poland 

John  I  Albert,  1492-1501 
Alexander,  1 501-1506 
Sigismund  I,  1 506-1 548 
Sigismund  II,  1548-157 2 
Henry    of    Valois,     1 573-1 574 

{Henry  III  of  France) 
Stephen     Bithory,     157  5-1 586 

{Prince  of  Transylvania) 
Sigismund  HI  Vasa,  1 587-1632 
Ladislaus  IV,  163  2- 1648 
John  II  Casimir,  1648-1668 
Michael  Wisniowiecki,  1669-1673 


Victor  Emmanuel  III,  1900- 


Peter  II,  1830-1851 
Danilo  I,  Prince,  1851-1860 
Nicholas  I,  Prince,  1860- 
{as  King  since  1910) 


William  IV,  Nominal  Stadholder, 
1711-1747,  Hereditary  Stad- 
holder, I 747-1 7 51 

William  V,  Hereditary  Stadholder, 
1751-1795 

The  Batavian  Republic,  1 795-1806 

Louis  Bonaparte,  King,  1806-1810 

Napoleon  I,  Emperor  of  the 
French,  1810-1813 

William  I,  King,  1813^1840 

William  II,  1840- 1849 

William  III,  1 849-1 890 

Wilhelmina,  1890- 

Same  Sovereigns  as  in  Sweden, 

1814-1905 
Haakon  VII,  1905- 


John  III  Sobieski,  16 74- 1696 
Augustus  n,  1697-1704  {Elector 

of  Saxony) 
Stanislaus  Leszczynski,  1 704-1 709 
Augustus  II  {restored),  1 709-1 733 
Stanislaus  Leszczynski  {restored), 

1733-1734 
Augustus  III,  1 734-1 763  {Elector 

of  Saxony) 
Stanislaus  II  Poniatowski,  1764- 

1795 


732 


APPENDIX 


The  Popes 

Alexander  VI  (Rodrigo  Borgia), 

1492-1503 
Pius  III  (Francesco  Todeschini), 

1 503 

Julius  II  ((iiulio  della  Rovere), 

1503-1513 
Leo  X  (Giovanni  de'  Medici), 

1513-1521 
Adrian  VI  (Adrian  Boycrs),  1522- 

1523 

Clement  VII  (Giulio  de'  Medici), 

1523-1534 
Paul  III  (Alessandro  Farnese), 

1 534-1 549 
Julius  III  (Giovanni  del  Monte), 

1550-1555 
Marcellus  II  (Marcello  Cervini), 

1555 

Paul  IV  (Giovanni  Caraffa),  1555- 
1559 

Pius  IV  (Gian-Angelo  Medici), 

1559-1565 
Pius  V  (Michele  Ghislieri),  1566- 

1572 

Gregory  XIII  (Ugo  Buoncom- 

pagno),  1572-1585 
Sixtus  V  (Felix  Peretti) ,  1 58  5-1 590 
Urban  VII  (Giambattista  Cas- 

tagna),  1590 
Gregory  XIV  (Niccolo  Sfondrato), 

1590-1591 
Innocent  IX  (Gian-Antonio  Fac- 

chinetto),  1591 
Clement   VIII    (Ippolito  Aldo- 

brandini),  1 592-1605 
Leo  XI  (Alessandro  de'  Medici), 

1605 

Paul  V  (Camillo  Borghese),  1605- 
1621 

Gregory  XV  (Alessandro  Ludo- 

visi),  1621-1623 
Urban  VIII  (Maffeo  Barberini), 

1623-1644 
Innocent  X  (Giambattista  Pam- 

mi),  1644-1655 


Alexander   VII    (Fabio  Chigi), 

1655-1667 
Clement  IX  (Giulio  Rospigliosi), 

1667-1669 
Clement    X    (Giambattista  Al- 

tieri),  1670-1676 
Innocent  XI    (Benedetto  Ode- 

scalchi),  1676-1689 
Alexander    VIII    (Pietro  Otto- 

buoni),  1689-1691 
Innocent  XII   (Antonio  Pigna- 

tclli),  1691-1700 
Clement  XI  (Gianfrancesco  Al- 

bano),  1700-1721 
Innocent    XIII  (Michelangelo 

Conti),  1721-1724 
Benedict  XIII   (Pietro  Orsini), 

1724-1730 
Clement  XII  (Lorenzo  Corsini), 

1730-1740 
Benedict  XIV  (Prosper  Lamber- 

tini),  1740-1758 
Clement  XIII  (Carlo  Rezzonico), 

I 7 58-1 769 
Clement  XIV   (Giovanni  Gan- 

ganelli),  1769-17  74 
Pius  VI  (Giovan-Angelo  Braschi), 

1775-1799 
Pius  VII  (Gregorio  Chiaramonte), 

1800-1823 
Leo  XII  (Annibale  della  Genga), 

1823-1829 
Pius  VIII  (Francesco  X.  Cas- 

tiglione),  18  29-1 830 
Gregory  XVI  (Mauro  Capellari), 

1831-1846 
Pius  IX  (Count  Giovanni  Mastai- 

Ferretti),  1846-1878 
Leo  XIII  (Joachim  Pecci),  1878- 

1903 

Pius  X  (Giuseppe  Sarto),  1903- 
1914 

Benedict    XV    (Giacomo  della 
Chicsa),  1914-  '^-z-  2- 


APPENDIX 


733 


Portugal 

Emmanuel  (Manoel)  1, 1495-1521 

John  III,  1521-1557 

Sebastian,  1 557-1 578 

Henry,  1 578-1 580 

Same  Sovereigns  as  in  Spain, 
1 580-1 640 

John  IV,  1640-1656 

Alfonso  VI,  1656-1667 

Pedro  II,  1667-1706 

John  V,  1 706-1 7  50 

Joseph,  1 7 50-1 77 7 

Maria  I  and  Pedro  III,  1 777-1 786 
.  Maria  I,  1786-1816 

John  VI,  1816-1826 

Prussia 
Electors  of  Brandenburg 
Joachim  I,  1499-153 5 
Joachim  II,  1535-1571 
John  George,  1 571-1598 
Joachim  Frederick,  1 598-1608 
John  Sigismund,  1608-1619 
George  William,  1619-1640 
Frederick  William,  1 640-1 688 
Frederick  III,  1 688-1 701  {as 

Frederick  I,  King  of  Prussia, 

1701-1713) 

Rumania 

Charles  I,  Prince,  1 866-1 881, 
King,  1881-1914 

Russia 

Ivan  III,  1462-1505 
,    BasU  IV,  1505-1533 

Ivan  IV,  1 533-1 584 

Theodore,  1 584-1 598 

Boris  Godunoff,  1 598-1605 

Michael,  1613-1645 

Alexius,  1645-1676 

Theodore  II,  1676-1682 

Ivan  V  and  Peter  I,  1682-1689 

Peter  I,  1689-1725 

Catherine  I,  1725-1727 

Peter  II,  1727-1730 


Pedro  IV,  1826   (7  of  Brazil, 

1826-1831) 
Maria  II,  1826-1828 
Miguel,  1828-1834 
Maria  II,  1834-1853 
Pedro  V,  1853-1861 
Luiz  I,  1861-1889 
Carlos,  1 889-1 908 
Manoel  II,  1908-1910 
The  Republic,  1910- 
Manoel  Arriaga,  President,  191 1- 

1915 

Bernardino  Machado,  President, 
1915- 

Kings  of  Prussia 

Frederick  I,  1 701-17 13 
Frederick  William  I,  17 13-1740 
Frederick  II,  1 740-1 786 
Frederick  William  II,  1786- 
1797 

Frederick  William  III,  1797- 
1840 

Frederick  William  IV,  1840- 
1861 

WilUam  I,  1861-1888 
Frederick  III,  1888 
William  II,  1888- 

Ferdinand  I,  1914- 


Anna,  1 730-1 740 
Ivan  VI,  1 740-1 741 
Elizabeth,  1 741-1762 
Peter  III,  1762 
Catherine  II,  1 762-1 796 
Paul,  1 796-1801 
Alexander  I,  1801-1825 
Nicholas  I,  1825-1855 
Alexander  II,  1855-1881 
Alexander  III,  1881-1894 
Nicholas  II,  1894- 


734 


APPENDIX 


Serbia 

Karageorge,  Prince,  1804-18 13 
Milosh,  Prince,  18 17-1839 
Milan,  Prince,  1839 
Michael,  Prince,  1839-1842 
Alexander  I.  Prince,  1842-1859 

Spain 

Ferdinand   and  Isabella,  1479- 
1504 

Ferdinand  and  Philip  I,  1 504-1 506 
Ferdinand  and  Charles  I,  1506- 
1516 

Charles  I   {V  of  Holy  Roman 

Empire),  alone,  1 516-1556 
Philip  II,  1 556-1 598 
Philip  III,  1^98-1621 
Philip  IV,  1621-1665 
Charles  II,  166 5-1 700 
Philip  V,  1 700-1 746  *' 

Sweden 

Same  Sovereigns  as  in  Denmark, 

1470-1523 
Gustavus  I  Vasa,  1 523-1 560 
Eric  XIV,  1560-1568 
John  III,  1 568-1 592 
Sigismund,  1 592-1604 
Charles  IX,  1604-1611 
Gustavus  II  Adolphus,  1611-1632 
Christina,  163  2-1654 
Charles  X,  1654-1660 
Charles  XI,  1 660-1 697 
Charles  XII,  1697-1718 

Turkey 

Mohammed  II,  1451-1481 

Bayezid  II,  1481-1512 

Selim  I,  1 51 2-1 520 

Suleiman  II,  "the  Magnificent," 

1 5 20-1 566 
Selim  II,  1 566-1 574 
Murad  III,  1 574-1595 
Mohammed  III,  1 595-1603 
Ahmed  I,  1603-16 17 
Mustapha  I,  1617-1618 


Michael,  Prince,  1860-1868 
Milan,  Prince,  1868- 188 2,  King, 

1882-1889 
Alexander,  1889-1903 
Peter  I,  1903- 


Ferdinand  VI,  1746-17 59 
Charles  III,  17 59-1 788 
Charles  IV,  1 788-1808 
Joseph  Bonaparte,  1808-1813 
Ferdinand  VII,  1813-1833 
Isabella  II,  1833-1868 
Revolutionary  Governfnent,  1868- 
1870 

Amadeo  of  Savoy,  1870-1873 
The  Republic,  1873-1875 
Alphonso  XII,  1875-1885 
Alphonso  XIII,  1886- 


Ulrica  Eleonora,  17 18-17  20 
Frederick  I,  17 20-1 751 
Adolphus  Frederick,  1751-1771 
Gustavus  III,  1771-1792 
Gustavus  IV,  1 792-1809 
Charles  XIII,  1809-1818 
Charles  XIV,  18 18-1844 
Oscar  I,  1844-1859 
Charles  XV,  1859-1872 
Oscar  II,  1 87 2-1907 
Gustavus  V,  1907- 


Othman  II,  1618-1623 
Murad  IV,  1623-1640 
Ibrahim,  1640- 1648 
Mohammed  IV,  1648-1687 
Suleiman  III,  1687-1691 
Ahmed  II,  1691-1695 
Mustapha  II,  169  5-1 703 
Ahmed  III,  1 703-1 730 
Mahmud  I,  1730-17 54 
Othman  III,  17 54-1 7 57 


APPENDIX 


Turkey  —  Continued 

Mustapha  III,  17 57-1 773 
Abdul  Hamid  I,  1 773-1 789 
Selim  III,  1 789-1807 
Mustapha  IV,  1 807-1 808 
Mahmud  II,  1 808-1 839 


Abdul  Medjid,  1 839-1 861 
Abdul  Aziz,  1861-1876 
Murad  V,  1876 
Abdul  Hamid  II,  1876-1909 
Mohammed  V,  1909- 


INDEX 


—  Figures  1  and  2  in  bold-faced  type  refer  to  Volumes  I  and  II  respectively.) 


(Note. 

"A-B-C"  Powers,  2,  610-611. 
Abd-el-Kader,  2,  513,  617. 
Abdul  Hamid  II,  of  Turkey,  2,  504,  523-527. 
Abjuration,  (Dutch)  Act  of,  1,  g6. 
Absolutism.    {See  Divine  Right.) 
Abyssinia,  2,  615,  632-633,  636. 
Academy,  French,  1,  195,  240,  418. 
Academy  of  Science,  Berlin,  1,  42^3. 
Acadia,  1,  301,  307-309. 
Act  of  Supremacy  (English),  1,  153. 
Act  of  Union  with  Ireland  (British),  1,  431 ; 
2,  29,  323. 

Act  of  Union  with  Scotland  (English),  1,  289, 
430. 

Action  Libirale,  2,  364,  432. 
Aden,  2,  593,  596. 
Adrar,  2,  636. 

Adrianople,  treaty  of  (1829),  2,  49,  500; 
capture  of,  by  Russians  (1878),  504; 
capture  of,  by  Bulgars  (1913),  530;  recov- 
ery of,  by  Turks  (1913),  532,  533. 

Afghanistan,  2,  591,  595,  666. 

Africa,  prior  to  nineteenth  century,  1,  50-51, 
59,  302,  2,  614-616;  in  nineteenth  and 
twentieth  centuries,  2,  616-637,  638-639, 
650-653,  658,  659,  660-662. 

Afrikander  Bond,  2,  651. 

"  Agadir  Incident,"  2,  625,  705-706. 

Agassiz,  J.  L.,  2,  234  n. 

Agriculture,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  28-36, 
68-70;  in  seventeenth  century  (French), 
210-211,  239;  in  eighteenth  century,  395- 
399;  and  the  Industrial  Revolution,  2, 
75-76,  215-216;  in  nineteenth  century,  in 
Austria-Hungary,  42,  434 ;  in  France,  93, 
346;  in  Great  Britain,  34,  317-318;  in 
India,  670-671;  in  Ireland,  321-322;  in 
Italy,  375  ;  in  Latin  America,  611-612  ;  in 
Russia,  465,  474;  in  Spain,  382,  383-384; 
and  Socialism,  264. 

Ahmad  Mirza,  shah  of  Persia,  2,  589. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Peace  of  (1668),  1,  244; 
(1748),  311,  357;  Congress  of  (1818),  2, 
13,  17. 

"Alabama  Claims,"  arbitration  of,  2,  685. 


Alais,  edict  of  (1629),  1,  214. 

Alaska,  acquired  by  United  States,  2,  603; 

boundary  dispute,  685. 
Albania,  2,  496;   erected  as  a  principality, 

528,  534;  and  Italy,  708. 
Albany  Congress  (1754),  1,  326. 
Albert  I,  of  Belgium,  2,  392. 
Alberta,  2,  646. 
Albigensians,  1,  123. 
Albuquerque,  1,  55. 
Alcabala,  1,  57,  90. 
Aldine  Press,  1,  179. 
Alexander  I,  of  Bulgaria,  2,  522. 
Alexander  I,  of  Russia,  1,  537-539,  540,  556, 

558-560, 562, 566-567  ;  2, 4-6, 10-13,  23-24, 

38-40,  47-48,  213,  465,  468,  501,  679,  686. 
Alexander  II,  of  Russia,  2,  452-460,  461,  468, 

470,  476,  485,  503,  695,  697. 
Alexander  III,  of  Russia,  2,  460-466,  470- 

473,  475,  697,  698. 
Alexander  I,  of  Serbia,  2,  520,  706. 
Alexander  VI,  Pope,  1,  16,  55. 
Alexander  John,  of  Rumania,  2,  502-503. 
Alexandria,  1,  46,  114. 
Algeciras,  Congress  of  (1906),  2,  704. 
Algeria,  French,  2,  160,  513,  617-618,  629. 
Alphonso  XII,  of  Spain,  2,  381-382. 
Alphonso  XIII,  of  Spain,  2,  382-383. 
Alsace,  1,  227,  228,  357  ;  2,  200-203,  332,  399, 

412,  418-419,  421,  426,  551,  688,  701. 
Alva,  duke  of,  1,  93,  94. 
Amadeo,  of  Spain,  2,  379-380. 
Amalfi,  1,  44. 

Ambassadors,  first  sent  regularly  by  Venice, 
1,  17,  231. 

America,  discovery  of,  1,  18,  53-54 ;  coloniza- 
tion of,  55-57,  59-60,  87,  300-301 ;  in 
nineteenth  century,  2,  25-27,  600-614. 
{See  Canada;  Latin  America;  United 
States;  etc.) 

American  Independence,  War  of,  1,  332-337 

Amiens,  treaty  of  (1802),  1,  527,  536. 

Amsterdam,  1,  95,  96. 

Anabaptists,  1,  134-135,  145,  148  n.  {Su 
Baptists.) 


VOL.  IJ  — 3B 


737 


738 


INDEX 


Anarchism,  2,  256,  257,  265-271,  276, 

Anarchistic  Socialists,  in  Russia,  2,  458-45^. 

Ancicn  Rfnime,  1,  ch.  xiii,  xiv. 

Anglican  Church  (Anglicanism),  in  sixteenth 
century,  1,  148-156,  172-173;  and  John 
Knox,  146-147;  and  James  I,  267-26H; 
and  Charles  I,  273-274;  and  Cromwell, 
280;  and  James  II,  287  ;  and  Queen  Anne, 
290;  in  eighteenth  century,  410;  in  nine- 
teenth century,  2,  29,  33,  244-245,  253, 
288,  306,  320. 

Anglo-Kgyptian  Sudan.    {See  Sudan.) 

Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  2,  585,  700,  703. 

Angola,  2,  386  n.,  616,  625.  {See  Portuguese 
West  Africa.) 

Angouleme,  duke  of,  2,  24. 

Annam,  2,  160,  565,  568-569,  570,  593. 

Anne,  of  Great  Britain,  1,  252,  289,  290. 

Anthony,  of  Navarre,  1,  102. 

Anti-Clericalism,  2,  223-230,  240^241,  251- 
252.    {See  Clericalism.) 

Anti-Corn-Law  League,  2,  92,  iii  n. 

Anti-Militarism.    {See  Pacifism.) 

Anti-Semitism.    {See  Jews.) 

Antioch,  1,  114. 

Antiquity  oj  Man,  2,  234. 

Antwerp,  1,  66,  93,  95,  96;  2,  54,  390,  392. 

Apprentice.    {See  Gild,  Craft.) 

Aquinas,  Thomas,  1,  118,  159;  2,  247. 

Arabia,  1,  46,  123;  2,  535,  596. 

Arabi  Pasha,  2,  627,  661. 

Arabs,  1,  46,  123,  176;  2,  513,  596,  615. 

Aragon,  1,  8,  9,  76,  90,  91.    {See  Spain.) 

Arbitration,  International,  2,  685. 

Architecture,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  186- 
187. 

Ardahan,  2,  506. 

Argentina,  2,  25,  606,  610,  611. 

Arians,  1,  123. 

Ariosto,  1,  194. 

Aristotle,  1,  176,  200. 

Arkwright,  Sir  Richard,  2,  69,  70,  71,  78,  214, 
215. 

Armada,  Spanish,  1,  100,  262,  304. 

Armed  Neutrality  of  the  North  (1780),  1, 

334;  (1800),  526,  527. 
Armenia,  2,  490,  505,  506,  524,  525,  526. 
Armies.    {See  Militarism.) 
Amdt,  1,  557. 

Arras,  treaty  of  (1579),  1,  95. 
Arriaga,  Manoel,  Portuguese  president,  2, 
388. 

Art,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  185-192,  202 ; 

French,  in  seventeenth  century,  237-238. 
Artificers  (English),  Statute  of,  2,  82. 
Artois,  count  of.  {See  Charles  X,  of  France.) 
Ashley,  Lord,  2,   115.    {See  Shaftesbury, 

earl  of.) 


Asia,  Europcanization  of,  2,  560-599.  {See 

China,  India,  Japan,  Persia,  etc.) 
Asiento,  1,  309,  312, 

A.s(juith,  II.  H.,  2,  280.  290,  295,  306,  309, 

310,  312,  325,  715- 
Assam,  2,  663,  665,  670  n. 
Assembly,  Legislative  (1791-1792),  1,  494- 

501. 

Assembly,  National  Constituent  (1789-1791), 

1.  473-474.  476-486,  494,  503.  512,  513; 
(1848),  2,  122,  266;  (1871-1875),  33I-34S- 

Assembly  of  Notables  (1787),  1,  460. 
Assinnats,  1,  483,  513,  514. 
Associations  Act  (French,  1901),  2,  350,  357- 
358. 

Assuan  Dam,  2,  661. 
Astrolabe,  1,  51. 
Astrology,  1,  197. 

Astronomy,  1,  197-199,  415-416,  417-418; 

2,  231,  248. 

Augsburg,  confession  of,  1,  136,  139,  146; 

diet  of,  136 ;  religious  peace  of  (1555),  136, 

220,  227  ;  War  of  the  League  of,  247-249, 

289,  306-307. 
"August  Days"  (1789),  1,  480-481. 
Augustenburg,  Frederick,  duke  of,  2, 186,  189. 
Augustus  II,  of  Saxony  and  Poland,  1,  377. 
Augustus  III,  of  Saxony  and  Poland,  1,  385. 
Ausgleich,  Austro-Hungarian  (1867),  2,  195, 

427-428,  429-430. 
Austerlitz,  battle  of,  1,  538-539,  546,  554, 

573;  anniversary  of,  2,  156. 
Australia,  discovery  and  early  settlement  of, 

1,  340 ;  in  nineteenth  century,  2,  642,  645, 

646-649. 

Austria,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  13,  76,  163; 
in  seventeenth  century,  2197-229;  in  eight- 
eenth century,  344-345,  444-448;  and 
Napoleon,  554-555,  559-56o;  and  Con- 
gress of  Vienna,  2,  9;  under  Mettemich, 
13,  41-42;  Revolution  of  1 848-1 849  in, 
123,  126-135,  137-139,  144;  and  Italian 
unification,  55,  163-175  ;  and  German  uni- 
fication, 180-202;  since  1867,426-433. 
{See  Austria-Hungary,  Dual  Monarchy  of ; 
Habsburg  Family ;  Holy  Roman  Empire.) 

Austria-Hungary,  Dual  Monarchy  of,  since 
1867,  2,  426-435,  449-450;  and  the  Con- 
cert of  Europe,  680,  681,  682;  and  Ger- 
many, 404,  424,  431,  652-697,  703,  713, 
717;  and  Italy,  373,  377,  431,  696;  Balkan 
policy  of,  490-491,  501,  505-507,  520,  521, 
526,  531,  536,  688,  707-713;  and  the  War 
of  the  Nations,  710-714,  716-717. 

Austrian  Netherlands.  {See  Netherlands, 
Austrian.) 

Austrian  Succession,  War  of,  1,  311,  316, 
355-357,  456. 


INDEX 


739 


Autocracy,  in  Russia,  2,  461-469. 
Avignon,  1,  121. 
Azores,  1,  51 ;  2,  616. 
Azov,  1,  379,  386. 
Aztec  Indians,  1,  56. 

Babeuf,  1,  513 ;  2,  254. 
"Babylonian  Captivity,"  1,  121,  132. 
Bacon,  Francis  (Lord),  1,  162,  196-197,  200, 
415- 

Bacon,  Roger  (Friar),  1,  200;  2,  75. 
Baden,  1,  135,  146,  542 ;  2,  96,  131,  139,  141, 

192,  202,  399,  403. 
Baffin,  1,  60. 

Bagdad  railway,  2,  422,  537,  706. 
Bahamas,  1,  302  ;  2,  657. 
Bakunin,  Mikhail,  2,  256,  269-270,  459. 
"Balance  of  Power,"  1,  75,  80,  97,  244,  250; 

2,  697-710. 
Balboa,  1,  54. 
Balearic  Islands,  1,  106. 
Balkan  Alliance  (1912),  2,  527. 
Balkans,  religion  and  nationality  in,  2,  493- 

498;  in  nineteenth  century,  424,  469,  472, 

490-539,  681,  682,  683,  69s,  697,  706-713. 
Balkan  Wars  (1912-1913),  2,  431,  517,  528- 

539,  540-542,  708,  709. 
Ballot  Act,  British  (1872),  2,  285,  287. 
Balmaceda,  Jose,  2,  611. 
Baltimore,  Lord,  1,  300. 
Baluchistan,  2,  592,  666,  670  n. 
Bank  Act,  German  (1875),  2,  405' 
Banking,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  66. 
Bank  of  France,  1,  529;  2,  16. 
Banquets,  political,  in  France,  2,  1 19-120. 
Baptists,  1,  148  n.,  167,  411;   2,  244,  557. 

{See  Anabaptists.) 
Barbados,  1,  302  ;  2,  657. 
Barbary  pirates,  2,  513-514. 
"Barebone's  Parliament,"  1,  279. 
Barrios,  Rufino,  2,  608. 
Barry,  Madame  du,  1,  457. 
Barton,  Clara,  2,  681. 

Basel,  council  of,  1,  116;  treaty  of  (1795),  1, 
506. 

Bastille,  1,  457  ;  destruction  of,  475-476,  478. 
Basutoland,  2,  626,  658. 
Batavian  Republic,  1,  506,  534. 
Batoum,  2,  506. 

"Battle  of  the  Nations,"  1,  558,  564;  2,  5. 

"Battle  of  Saints,"  1,  335,  336. 

Bavaria,  1,  162,  220-222,  228,  352-353,  538, 
53Q,  542,  555  ;  2,  96, 125,  131,  141, 142,  180, 
192,  196,  202,  399,  400,  403,  407-408,  420  n. 

Bazaine,  Marshal,  2,  200,  201. 

3eachv  Head,  1,  307. 

B^aconsiield  earl  of.  {See  Disraeli,  Benjamin.) 
i<oaton  Cardiial,  1,  146. 


Beauhamais,  Eugene,  1,  534,  541. 

Beauharnais,  Hortense,  1,  541 ;  2,  150-15 1. 

Beauharnais,  Josephine,  1,  514,  555. 

Bebel,  August,  2,  262. 

Beccaria,  1,  421,  424-425,  465. 

Bechuanaland,  2,  626,  660. 

"Bed  of  Justice,"  1,  217-218. 

"Beggars"  of  Netherlands,  1,  92,  94. 

Belgium,  and  Congress  of  Vienna,  2,  7 ; 
independence  of,  53-55,  117;  and  Napo- 
leon III,  196;  domestic  history  of,  389- 
392,  396;  in  Africa,  619-620,  623,  636;  in 
War  of  the  Nations,  709,  715,  717.  (For 
history  prior  to  nineteenth  century,  see 
Netherlands.) 

Belgrade,  1,  80. 

Benedetti,  Count,  2,  198. 

Benedict  XV,  Pope,  2,  372. 

Benedictines,  1,  115. 

"Benevolences,"  1,  5. 

Bengal,  1,  315 ;  2,  663,  664,  670  n. 

Bennett,  J.  G.,  2,  619. 

Bentham,  Jeremy,  2,  108-109. 

Bentinck,  Lord  William,  2,  667. 

Beresford,  Lord,  2,  27. 

Berg,  1,  543. 

Bering  Sea,  controversy  concerning,  2,  685. 
Berlin,  1,  347,  349 ;   captured  by  Russians, 

360 ;  occupied  by  French,  539. 
Berlin,  Congress  and  Treaty  of  (1878),  2, 

506-509,  510,  517,  519,  681,  695,  706; 

Conference  of  (1884),  619,  622-623. 
Berhn  Decree  (1806),  1,  548. 
Berlin,  University  of,  1,  557. 
Bermuda,  2,  302  n. ;  2,  659. 
Bern  Conventions  (1883,  1887),  2,  683. 
Bernadotte,  Marshal.    {See  Charles  XIV,  of 

Sweden.) 
Bernhardi,  2,  690  n. 

Bessarabia,  2,  467,  491,  495,  502,  503,  505, 
506,  517,  518,  536. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  2,  420,  425,  705,  715. 

Bhutan,  2,  565,  569-570,  592,  595,  665. 

Biarritz,  interview  at,  2,  189,  196. 

Bible,  and  CathoHc  Church,  1,  159;  Eras- 
mus and,  129,  183;  first  printed,  179; 
French  translation  of,  143  ;  German  trans- 
lations of,  133 ;  King  James  version  of, 
195;  Luther's  translation  of,  195,  353; 
and  Protestantism,  129,  165;  Vulgate, 
160;  and  "higher  criticism,"  2,  234-235, 
239-240,  241-243,  247,  251. 

Bill  of  Rights,  1,  288,  482  ;  2,  iii,  291. 

Bismarck,  Otto  von,  and  German  unification, 
2,  183-206;  as  chancellor  of  German  Em- 
pire, 229,  253,  404-416,  419,  421 ;  and  Ger- 
man colonialism,  551,  621;  foreign  policy 
of,  457,  503,  505-506,  689,  692-697,  701. 


740 


INDEX 


Bismarck  ArchipclaRo,  2,  412,  5Q4. 

"Black  Hundreds,"  in  Russia,  2,  481,  482. 

Blackstonc,  2,  29. 

Blake,  Admiral,  1,  304. 

Blanc,  I^uis,  2,  87-  88,  119,  120,  121,  123, 

IS3,  255,  256. 
Blanco,  A.  G.,  2,  609. 
Blenheim,  battle  of,  1,  253. 
Bloc,  in  French  ixjlitics,  2,  357,  360-361,  365- 

367  ;  in  (lerman  politics,  424. 
Blucher,  1,  564.  565,  S70-57i- 
Boccaccio,  1,  194. 
Boers,  2,  616-617,  650-653. 
Boer  War,  2,  559,  645,  652,  657,  699-700; 

and  British  i)olitics,  304-305. 
Bohemia,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  76,  87,  162  ; 

in  seventeenth  century,  221 ;  in  nineteenth 

century,  2,  126,  127,  128,  134,  428,  433. 

{See  Austria-Hungary ;  Habsburg  Family ; 

Holy  Roman  Empire.) 
Bokhara,  2,  590. 
Bolcyn,  Anne,  1,  98,  151-152. 
Bolivar,  Simon,  2,  607. 
Bolivia,  2,  606,  609-610. 
Bombay,  1,  303  ;  2,  665,  670  n. 
Bonaparte  Family,  genealogy  of,  1,  577. 
Bonaparte,  Jerome,  1,  534,  541,  543,  549,  564. 
Bonaparte,  Joseph,  1,  534,  541,  549,  SS2-553. 

557,  56s,  576;  2,  20. 
Bonaparte,  Louis,  1,  534,  549,  550;  2,  150. 
Bonaparte,  Louis  Napoleon.    {See  Nap>oleon 

in.) 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon.    {See  Napoleon  I.) 

Boniface,  Saint,  2,  556. 

Bordeaux,  Compact  of  (187 1),  2,  332. 

Borden,  Sir  Robert,  2,  656. 

Borgia,  Cesare,  1,  16. 

Borneo,  British,  2,  593,  594,  659-660;  Dutch, 
439,  593- 

Borodino,  battle  of,  1,  561. 

Bosnia-Herzegovina,  2,  431,  506,  508-509, 
526,  695,  707. 

Bossuet,  1,  235-236,  237,  263,  535. 

"Boston  Massacre,"  1,  330. 

"Boston  Tea  Party,"  1,  331. 

Botany  Bay,  1,  340. 

Botha,  General  Louis,  2,  653. 

Bothwell,  earl  of,  1,  99. 

Bougainville,  Louis  de,  1,  417. 

Boulanger,  General,  2,  352-354,  365,  697. 

Boulton,  Matthew,  2,  73. 

Bourbon  Family,  origin  of,  1,  77,  102-105  ; 
genealogy  of,  108,  258;  struggle  of,  with 
Habsburgs,  218-232,  249-256,  35^357, 
542;  alliance  of,  with  Habsburgs,  358; 
restoration  of,  in  France,  2,  14-20;  in 
Spain,  20-26,  380.  {See  France;  Spain; 
Two  Sicilies.) 


Bourgeoisie,  or  Midflle  Class,  1,  69 ;  and  Cal- 
vinism, loi,  144,  146,  148;  and  Puritan 
Revolution  in  England,  269^-270,  275,  292  - 
293;  in  France  under  Henry  IV,  211  ;  in 
France  under  Louis  XIV,  238;  decline  of, 
in  (icrmany  in  seventeenth  century,  343 ; 
general  rise  of,  in  eighteenth  century,  393- 
394,  402-403,  426,  449;  and  French  Revo- 
lution, 464,  467-469,  471,  489-490,  505, 
510,  512,  513,  518;  and  Najxjleon  I,  533, 
537  ;  and  Indu.strial  Revolution,  2,  78-79  ; 
and  Revolutions  of  1830,  50,  51,  52,  53,  57 ; 
and  Revolutions  of  1848,  11 6-1 17,  120, 
1 21-122,  124,  128,  133,  137;  in  France 
under  Napoleon  III,  159-160;  general 
supremacy  of,  in  nineteenth  century,  88- 
97,  213-223,  550-554- 

Bourges,  Pragmatic  Sanction  of,  1,  121. 

"Boxer"  Insurrection  in  China,  2,  574-575. 

Boyer,  J.  P.,  2,  608. 

Boyne,  battle  of  the,  1,  288  n.,  307;  2,  323. 

Braddock,  General,  1,  313. 

Braga,  Theophilo,  Portuguese  president,  2, 

388. 

Braganza  Family,  1,  91.    {See  Portugal.) 
Brand,  John,  2,  651. 

Brandenburg,  1,  12,  224,  225,  228,  245,  254, 

347-350-  Prussia.) 
Brazil,  1, 54, 55, 59, 551 ;  2, 27-28, 606, 610-61 1. 
Breitenfeld,  battle  of,  1,  226. 
Bremen,  2,  125,  132,  399,  412.    {See  Hanse.) 
Briand,  Aristide,  2,  253,  358,  360,  365,  367. 
Bright,  John,  2,  92,  283-284,  299,  300,  548. 
Brissot,  1,  498,  503,  509. 
British  Columbia,  2,  646. 
British  East  Africa,  2,  628. 
British  Empire,  in  nineteenth  century,  2, 

640-678. 

Brittany,  1,  6,  451  n.,  488;  2,  363. 

"Broad  Church"  (Anglican),  2,  245. 

Broglie,  duke  of,  2,  342,  344-345- 

"Brook  Farm,"  2,  87. 

Brumaire,  eighteenth  of,  1,  517. 

Bruno,  Giordano,  1,  199  n. 

Brunswick,  2,  55,  96,  399,  418  n. 

Brunswick,  duke  of,  1,  499-501,  539. 

Bucharest,  1,  387;  treaty  of  (1812),  559; 
treaty  of  (1913),  2,  533- 

Buckingham,  duke  of,  1,  271,  272. 

Budapest,  1,  81. 

Buffon,  1,  417. 

Buisson,  Ferdinand,  2,  352. 

Bukowina,  2,  427,  428,  490,  495,  518,  536. 

Bulgaria  (Bulgars),  in  1500, 1,  23;  national- 
ism of,  2,  495,  497,  498 ;  autonomy  of,  504- 
505,  507;  independence  of,  508,  521-523; 
in  Balkan  Wars  (1912-1913),  528-5331 
534,  536;  in  War  of  the  Nations,  717. 


INDEX 


741 


Bulls,  Papal,  1,  ii6  n. 

Billow,  Bemhard  (Prince)  von,  2,  420,  421, 

423-425,  705. 
Bundesrat,  German,  2,  191,  397-402,  405. 
Bundschuhe,  1,  134. 
Burgoyne,  General,  1,  333. 
Burgundy,  county  of  (Franche  Comt6),  1,  87, 

246;  duchy  of,  6,  20,  77,  78,  79. 
Burke,  Edmund,  1,  339,  495 ;  2,  29. 
Burma,  2,  564,  565,  569,  592,  665,  670  n. 
Burschenschafl,  2,  43. 
Bute,  Lord,  1,  292,  327. 
Byron,  Lord,  2,  32  n.,  33,  48. 

Cabinet  (British),  rise  of,  1,  290,  435-436; 

in  nineteenth  century,  2,  294-295, 
Cabot,  John,  1,  5,  54,  59,  262,  300. 
Cabral,  1,  54,  55. 

"Cadets,"  Russian  political  party,  2,  481, 
482,  483. 

Cadiz,  sack  of,  by  English,  1,  100;  mutiny 
at  (1819),  2,  22;  capture  of,  by  French 
(1823),  24. 

Cahiers,  1,  470,  486. 

Caillaux,  2,  365,  367. 

Calais,  lost  to  England,  1,  80  n.,  98,  102. 

Calculus,  1,  416. 

Calcutta,  1,  316;  2,  664,  669. 

Calendar,  French  Revolutionary,  1,  510, 
534. 

CaUcut,  1,  51. 

California,  1,  56;  2,  602. 

Calmar,  Union  of,  1,  21. 

Calonne,  1,  459,  460. 

Calvin,  1,  129,  141-142,  172,  194,  408;  2, 
224,  241,  244. 

Calvinism,  rise  of,  1,  139-148;  in  England, 
156,  268;  in  Holland,  92,  95;  in  Scotland, 
99,  146 ;  in  France,  (see  Huguenots) ;  and 
Thirty  Years'  War,  220,  229 ;  in  eighteenth 
century,  410,  411,  413;  and  Huxley,  2, 
239. 

Cambodia,  2,  160,  565,  568-569,  593. 
Cambrai,  League  of  (1508),  1,  18;  Peace  of 

(1529),  79. 
Camoens,  1,  195. 

Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  Henry,  2,  306. 
Campo  Formio,  treaty  of  (1797),  1,  515,  516, 

526,  537. 
Campos,  Marshal,  2,  380,  382. 
Canada,  in  eighteenth  century,  1,  301,  312- 

315,  317,  325-326,  337;     in  nineteenth 

century,  2,  552-553,  642,  643-646. 
Canary  Islands,  2,  385,  636. 
Canning,  George,  1,  548,  553 ;  2,  37,  46,  47, 

54,  112-113. 
Canon  Law,  1,  116. 
Canovas  del  Castillo,  2,  380-382,  384. 


Cape  Colony,  British,  2,  616,  621,  626,  645. 

650-652. 
Capet,  Hugh,  1,  6. 

Capitalism,  2,  68,  77-97,  554,  673-674.  {See 
Bourgeoisie;  Commerce;  Industry.) 

Capitation,  1,  454-455. 

Caprivi,  G.  L.  von,  2,  420,  424. 

Carbonari,  2,  22,  45,  151,  169. 

Cardinals,  1,  113-114. 

Carey,  William,  2,  557. 

CarUsts,  and  Carlist  Wars,  2,  379,  380,  381, 
384. 

Carlos  I,  of  Portugal,  2,  387. 

Carlos,  Don,  of  Spain,  2,  379. 

Carlsbad  Decrees  (1819),  2,  44,  410. 

Carlstadt,  1,  135. 

Carlyle,  Thomas,  2,  112. 

Carmen  Sylva,  of  Rumania,  2,  518  n.,  534. 

Carnatic,  1,  316-317;  2,  665. 

Carnegie,  Andrew,  2,  684. 

Carnot,  in  French  Revolution,  1,  503,  505, 

506,  507,  543. 
Camot,  Sadi,  French  president,  2,  353. 
Caroline,  Queen,  of  Great  Britain,  2,  37. 
Caroline  Islands,  2,  383,  422,  594. 
Carranza,  Venustiano,  2,  613. 
Carrier,  1,  508. 

Carson,  Sir  Edward,  2,  325-326. 

Cartier,  1,  54,  60,  300. 

Cartwright,  Edmund,  2,  69,  71,  72. 

Casablanca,  "Affair  of,"  2,  705. 

Castelar,  Emilio,  2,  380. 

Castile,  1,  8,  9,  75,  90,  91  •    {See  Spain.) 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  1,  548 ;  2,  6, 12,  30, 31, 33, 

37,  46. 
Castro,  Cipriano,  2,  609. 
Cateau-Cambr^sis,  treaty  of  (1559),  1,  79- 

80,  p8,  105. 
Cathedral,  1,  114. 

Catherine  of  Aragon,  1,  5,  151,  152,  154. 
Catherine  of  Braganza,  1,  303. 
Catherine  de'  Medici,  of  France,  1,  101-104, 
197. 

Catherine  II  (the  Great),  of  Russia,  1,  334, 
361,  379-388,  419,  443,  495;  2,  38,  465, 
491,  501. 

Catholic  Church,  defined,  1,  113,  117-118; 
in  1500,  1 1 2-1 24,  170;  abuses  in,  127-128; 
reformation  of,  156-164;  and  the  Protest- 
ant Revolt,  124-169;  in  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries  —  in  England,  79, 
98,  148-156,  267-269,  273,  280,  282-287, 
289;  in  France,  104  105,  141-142,  144- 
145;  in  Holy  Roman  Empire,  11,  84-86, 
131-136,  220-229,  346;  in  Netherlands, 
92-95,  145-146;  in  Scandinavia,  137-139; 
in  Scotland,  146-147  ;  in  Spain,  88-90,  97, 
100-101 ;    in  Switzerland,  139-141 ;  —  in 


742 


INDEX 


eighteenth  century,  406-410;  and  French 
Revolution,  483-484,  506,  521  ;  and  Naixj- 
leon  I,  52g,  53 1 ,  550 ;  in  Km  of  Metternich, 
2,  3;  in  nineteenth  century  —  general, 
223-230,  239-241,  245-252;  in  (Jreat 
Britain,  33,  103,  104,  227,  320;  in  France, 
iiS-iiQ,  154-15S.  ISS,  159-160,  351-361; 
in  Italy,  163-175,  370-372,  376;  in  Spain, 
227,  381,  384-385;  in  Portugal,  388;  in 
Belgium,  390-391  ;  in  Germany,  406-409; 
in  Austria,  227,  432  ;  in  Holland,  227,  440; 
in  Far  East,  561,  577,  586;  -  -  and  art,  1, 
185,  190-191  ;  and  l)anking,  65-66;  and 
colonization,  1,  61, 2,  556-557  ;  and  culture, 
1,  176;  and  humanism,  184;  and  inter- 
national law,  1,  231,  2,  679;  and  national- 
ism, 1,  120-122,  125,2,  226,  229-230;  and 
society,  medieval,  1,  28,  35 ;  and  society, 
nineteenth-century,  2,  246-252. 

"Catholic  League,"  in  Thirty  Years'  War,  1, 
222,  224,  352. 

"Catholics,  Old,"  2,  229,  407-408. 

Cato  Street  Conspiracy,  2,  36. 

Caucasia,  2,  50,  467. 

Cavaignac,  Godefroi,  2,  52. 

Cavaignac,  Louis,  2,  122,  123,  154  n.,  156. 

"Cavaliers,"  1,  275,  280. 

Cavendish,  Henry,  1,  417. 

Cavendish,  Thomas,  1,  60. 

Cavour,  2,  166-174,  368,  369,  370,  371,  372. 

Celebes,  1,  55,  59;  2,  593. 

Center  Party,  in  Germany,  2,  406-409,  411, 
413,  417.  418,  424,  425,  426,  432. 

Cervantes,  1,  106,  195. 

Ceuta,  2,  385. 

Ceylon,  1,  55,  59,  576;  2,  7,  658. 
Chamberlain,  Joseph,  2,  300-304,  305,  475, 

551,  654,  655,  699. 
"Chambers  of  Reunion,"  1,  247. 
Chambord,  count  of,  2,  52,  116,  338-339. 
Champlain,  1,  211. 
Champlain,  Lake,  1,  308,  310,  313. 
Chancellor,  1,  60. 

Chandanagar,  1,  304,  316,  319;  2,  593. 
"  Charcoal  Burners,"  2,  18.    {See  Carbonari.) 
Charlemagne,  1,  11,  16. 
Charles,  Archduke  (Austrian  General),  1, 
554- 

Charles  V,  Emperor  (Charles  I,  of  Spain), 

1,  7,  58,  60,  74-87.  91,  133,  145,  152,  161, 

163,  190,  197  ;  2,  198. 
Charles  VI,  Emperor  (Archduke  Charles  of 

Austria),  1,  252-253,  344-346,  353,  355- 
Charles  VII,  Emperor  (Elector  of  Bavaria), 

1.  355,  357- 
Charles  (the  Bold),  of  Burgundy,  1,  13,  20. 
Charles  I,  of  England,  1,  191,  270-276,  296- 

297- 


Charles  II,  of  England,  1,  245,  277,  281-286, 

297.  303,  435- 

Charles,  Prince  (Young  Pretender),  of  Eng- 
land, 1,  291. 

(!harles  VII,  of  France,  1,  121. 

Charles  VIII,  of  France,  1,  6,  7,  19,  183,  186. 

Charles  IX,  of  France,  1,  loi. 

Charles  X,  of  France  (count  of  Artois),  1, 
467,  487,  488,  491 ;  2,  19-20,  29,  50-52, 
93,  94,  116,  117,  120,  151,  155,  336,  338, 
617. 

Charles  I,  of  Portugal.  (See  Carlos  I,  of 
Portugal.) 

Charles  I,  of  Rumania,  2,  518. 

Charles  I,  of  Spain.  {See  Charles  V,  Em- 
peror.) 

Charles  II,  of  Spain,  1,  243,  249-251. 

Charles  III,  of  Spain,  1,  444. 

Charles  IV,  of  Spain,  1,  506,  551-552,  576. 

Charles  XI,  of  Sweden,  1,  376  n. 

Charles  XII,  of  Sweden,  1,  376-379. 

Charles  XIII,  of  Sweden,  1,  541. 

Charles  XIV,  of  Sweden  (Marshal  Berna- 

dotte),  1,  541,  560,  564,  565,  575;  2,  46, 

443-444- 

Charles  Albert,  of  Sardinia,  2,  46,  124,  130, 

140,  165,  167. 
Charles  Felix,  of  Sardinia,  2,  46. 
Charter,  French  Royal,  of  1814,  1,  567-568; 

2,  16,  38,  51,  143. 
Chartism  (Chartists),  2,  110-112,  124,  154, 

278,  287,  298-299. 
Chateaubriand,  2,  118. 
Chateauroux,  duchess  of,  1,  457. 
Chaumont,  treaty  of  (1814),  1,  566;  2,  11. 
Chauvin,  1,  327  n. 
Chemistry,  1,  417;  2,  231. 
Child  labor,  2,  80,  81,  115,  250,  309,  349,  374. 
Children  Act  (British,  1908),  2,  312. 
Chile,  2,  25,  606,  609,  611. 
China,  2,  560-576,  582-585,  597-598. 
Chino-Japanese  War,  2,  565-566,  583. 
Chosen,  2,  585.    {See  Korea.) 
Christian  II,  of  Denmark  and  Norway,  1,  137. 
Christian  III,  of  Denmark  and  Norway,  1, 

137- 

Christian  IV,  of  Denmark  and  Norway,  1, 
223. 

Christian  IX,  of  Denmark,  2,  187,  442,  443, 
515- 

Christian  X,  of  Denmark,  2,  443. 
Christianity,  and  democracy,  2,  loi ;  and 

industry,  84,  87  ;    and  politics,  223-230. 

{See  Anglican  Church ;  Catholic  Church ; 

Orthodox  Church;   Protestantism;  etc.) 
Christina,  regent  of 'Spain,  2,  379. 
Church  and  State,  in  sixteenth  century,  1, 

112,  120-122,  167-169;  in  eighteenth  cen- 


INDEX 


743 


tury,  406-407 ;  in  nineteenth  century,  2, 
222 ;  in  Belgium,  389-392  ;  in  France,  358- 
360,393-394;  in  Italy,  371-372;  in  Portu- 
gal, 388;  in  Russia,  464;  in  Spain,  381, 
384-385. 

Church  Missionary  Society,  Anglican,  2, 
557,  558. 

Church  of  England.    {See  AngUcan  Church.) 

Church  of  Ireland.  {See  Anglican  Church.) 

Churchill,  Winston,  2,  305,  311,  317. 

Cisalpine  RepubUc,  1,  516,  534. 

Cities,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  36-43,  48-49, 
69 ;  in  eighteenth  century,  399-402  ;  in 
nineteenth  century,  2,  76,  88-97,  4i7- 

City-States,  1,  14-20,  24. 

"Civil  Constitution  of  the  Clergy,"  1,  484. 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  (1850),  2,  604  n. 

Clemenceau,  2,  365,  367. 

Clement  VII,  Pope,  1,  79,  152,  158. 

Clergy,  Regular,  1,  114-115;  Secular,  114. 

Clericalism  and  Anti-Clericalism,  2,  222-230, 
241-242,  245-246,  251-252;  in  Austria, 
432 ;  in  Belgium,  390-391 ;  in  Second 
French  Empire,  160,  169,  175-176,  178; 
in  Third  French  Republic,  342,  344,  345, 
348,  351-352,  354-355,  357-361,  364-366; 
in  Germany,  407-409;  in  Italy,  168,  370- 
373,  376;  in  Latin  America,  177,  608,  609, 
611,  612  ;  in  Portugal,  388;  in  Spain,  379, 
380,  381,  384-385. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  American  president,  2, 
603  n. 

Cleves,  1,  348. 

CUve,  Robert,  1,  316-317,  338,  359;  2,  664, 
666  n. 

Cobbett,  William,  2,  33,  35,  no. 
Cobden,  Richard,  2,  92-93,  548. 
Cochin-China,  2,  160,  568-569,  593. 
Code  Napoleon,  1,  530,  543,  574;  2,  16,  17, 
42,  351. 

Colbert,  1,  237-241,  305,  306,  400-401 ;  2,  81. 

Colet,  John,  1,  149. 

Coligny,  Admiral  de,  1,  103. 

College  de  France,  1,  183,  194. 

Colombia,  2,  25,  26,  604-605,  607,  609. 

Colonization,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  55-61, 
70-72;  in  seventeenth  century,  211,  240, 
268-270,  299-306;  in  eighteenth  century, 
250-251,  306-319,  324-327  ;  and  Napoleon, 
532,  567  n.,  575-576;  in  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, 2,  160,  347-348,  373-374,  38s,  392, 
412-413,  422,  467-468,  547-678. 

Columbus,  1,  9,  53-56,  72. 

Combes,  Emile,  2,  358,  365,  367. 

Commerce,  as  a  factor  in  modern  society,  1, 
xix-xx,  27;  before  1500,  17-18,  43-49;  in 
sixteenth  century,  52,  56,  59,  62-69;  in 
eighteenth  century,  399,  401-403 ;  British, 


before  1800,  loo-ioi,  250-251,  261,  262, 
269-270,  277-278,  280,  292,  309,  310,  318, 
322-331,  338,  341;  French,  before  1800, 
211,  239;  and  Russian  expansion,  374; 
and  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  536,  546-551, 
576 ;  and  Metternich,  2,  42  ;  and  the  Span- 
ish colonies,  26 ;  and  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution, 68,  75-77,  88-97,  220;  Austro- 
Hungarian,  since  1867,  430;  British,  since 
1800,  280,  301-302,  304,  306,  672-675; 
Dutch,  441 ;  French,  280,  346-348 ;  Ger- 
man, 95-96,  405,  412,  416-417,  422  ;  Greek, 
516;  ItaUan,  374;  Japanese,  581-582 ; 
Russian,  473-475;  Scandinavian,  442, 
444;  Spanish,  383;  Swiss,  438;  and  the 
"new  imperialism,"  552-554.  {See  Mer- 
cantilism ;  Free  Trade.) 

Commercial  Revolution,  1,  62-69;  2,  215. 

Common  Prayer,  Book  of,  1,  154-155,  195. 

Commons,  House  of.  {See  Parliament, 
EngUsh.) 

Commonwealth,  British,  1,  276-279. 
Commonwealth  of  Australia  Act  (British), 
2,  647-648. 

Commune  of  Paris,  during  French  Revolu- 
tion, 1,  475;  insurrection  of,  in  1871,  2, 
333-335,  342,  363. 

Communism.    {See  Socialism.) 

Communist  Manifesto,  2,  257-260. 

Compass,  1,  50. 

Compte  Rendu,  of  Necker,  1,  459  n. 

"Concert  of  Europe,"  2,  47,  679-682. 

Concordat,  of  1801  (French),  1,  529;  2,  16, 
342,  359;  of  1817  (Prussian),  408;  of  1851 
(Spanish),  227,  229  n.,  381;  of  1855  (Aus- 
trian), 227,  229. 

Cond^,  Henry,  prince  of,  1,  102. 

Conde,  Louis  II,  prince  of,  1,  218,  228-230, 
237,  241.  249. 

Condorcet,  1,  498,  503,  511. 

Condottieri,  1,  17. 

Confederation,  American  Articles  of,  1,  332, 
336. 

Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  1,  542-543,  549, 

560,  563,  564. 
Confession,  1,  119. 
Confirmation,  1,  118,  166. 
Congo  Free  State  (Belgian  Congo),  2,  615, 

619-620. 

Congo,  French,  2,  624,  630,  706.  {See  French 
Equatorial  Africa ;  Gabun.) 

Congregational  Church,  1,  411. 

"Conservative,"  2,  1-2. 

Conservative  Party,  in  Germany,  2,  184,  193, 
406,  409,  411,  417,  420,  423,  424,  425;  in 
Great  Britain,  107-108,  277-326. 

Constance,  Council  of,  1,  116,  132;  2,  229. 

Constantine  I,  of  Greece,  2,  510,  517,  707. 


744 


INDEX 


Constantinc  XT,  Gracco-Roman  Emperor,  1, 

52,  368  n. ;  2,  517. 
Constantinc,  Grand  Duke  (Russian),  2,  40, 
^  S6. 

Constantinuiilc,  capture  of,  by  Turks,  1,  52  ; 
treaty  of  (1913),  2,  533. 

Constituent  Assembly.  {See  Assembly,  Na- 
tional Constituent.) 

Constitution,  Australian  (1900),  2,  647-648; 
Austrian  (184H),  132-134,  138,  141  ; 
Austrian  (1861),  igs,  428;  Austrian  (1867), 
428,  431-432;  Bavarian,  42,  131,  403; 
Belgian,  389,  390;  British,  1,  264-265, 
279,  282,  292,  296,  432,  2,  108,  112,  290- 
297,  328;  Canadian,  643;  Danish,  144, 
442-443;  Dutch,  144,  439-440;  Finnish, 
478,  486;  French  (1791),  1,  485-486,  530; 
French,  of  Year  III  (1795),  502,  510-512; 
French,  of  Year  VIII  (1800),  525-526,  528  ; 
French  (1814),  1,  567-568,  2,  16,  38,  51, 
143;  French  (1830),  2,  53  ;  French  (1848), 
123;  French  (1852),  156-158,  175  ;  French 

(1870)  ,  179;  French  (1875),  338,  340-342  ; 
German  (1848-1849),  132,  135-136,  141- 
142;    German  (1867),  191-192;  German 

(1871)  ,  397-402,  403;  Greek,  515;  Hun- 
garian, 127,  128,  133,  140-141,  429  ;  ItaUan, 
370,  372  ;  Japanese,  581  ;  Norwegian,  445- 
446;  Polish,  38,  56;  Portuguese,  386,  388; 
Prussian,  143;  projects  of  a  Russian,  1, 
443.  2,  39,  40;  Sardinian,  130,  167,  370; 
Serbian,  520;  Spanish  (181 2),  1,  557-558, 
2,  20,  22-23;  Spanish  (1837),  379!  Span- 
ish (1876),  381 ;  Swedish,  444;  Swiss,  136, 
437;  Turkish,  523,  525,  527;  of  United 
States,  1,  336,  422,  485,  2,  123,  648. 

Consubstantiation,  1,  166. 

Consulate,  French,  1,  517,  523-534. 

Continental  Congress,  American,  1,  331-332. 

"  Continental  System,"  1,  546-549. 

Conventicle  Act,  1,  285. 

Convention,  National  (French),  of  1792- 

1795,  1,  501-512,  514,  524,  530,  544- 
"Convention  Parliament,"  1,  281. 
Cook,  Captain  James,  1,  340,  417. 
Copenhagen,  battle  of,  1,  527,  546,  549. 
'  "Copernican  System,"  1,  198-199. 
Copernicus,  1,  198,  415. 
Corday,  Charlotte,  1,  492  n. 
Cordelier  Club,  1,  491,  492. 
Corneille,  1,  237. 

Corn  Laws  (British),  2,  32,  34,  91-93,  iii, 

113,  279,  283,  644. 
Comwallis,  Lord,  1,  334,  339 ;  2,  664. 
Corporation  Act  (British),  1,  285  ;  repeal  of, 

2,  103. 

Corresponding  Societies  Act  (British),  2,  30. 
Corsica,  1,  457  n.,  524. 


Cortes,  of  Portugal,  1,8;  2,  386,  388. 
Cortes,  of  Spain,  1,  9,  89-90,  558;  2,  »o,  27. 

24,  381. 
Cortcz,  Hernando,  1,  56. 
Corvie,  1,  31,  398. 
Cossacks,  1,  367  ;  2,  467,  587. 
Costa  Rica,  2,  607,  608. 
Coster,  Lourens,  1,  1 79. 
Cotton  Inventions,  2,  69-71. 
"Council  of  Blood,"  1,  93. 
Council  of  Empire,  in  Russia,  2,  38,  480. 
Council  of  Regency,  in  Holy  Roman  Empire, 

1.  83-85. 

"Council  of  Troubles,"  1,  93. 

Councils,  Church,  1,  115-116.    {See  Trent, 

Council  of ;  Vatican  Council.) 
Coup  d'Hat  (179Q).  1.  517,  523,  525;  (1851), 

2,  156,  157. 
Courland,  2,  467. 

Courts,  ecclesiastical,  1,  121. 
Covenant,  Scotch,  1,  273-274;    Ulster,  2, 
325-326. 

Cracow,  1,  361,  377;  2,  57  n.,  126-127,  129, 
427. 

Cranmer,  1,  129,  152,  154,  155,  195;  2,  224. 
Crete,  1,  106;  2,  509-510. 
Crimea,  2,  491. 

Crimean  War,  2,  162-163,  i97i  453>  456,  502. 

Crispi,  Francesco,  2,  373. 

Croatia-Slavonia,  2,  127,  427,  428,  429,  434, 

536,  711- 
Cromer,  earl  of,  2,  661. 
Crompton,  Samuel,  2,  69,  70. 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  1,  64,  230,  274,  276-281, 

297;  2,  320,  322-323. 
Cromwell,  Richard,  1,  281. 
Crown  Point,  1,  309,  313. 
Crusades,  commercial  importance  of,  1,  44. 
Cuba,  1,  56,  315 ;  2,  380-383,  603,  604,  607. 
Curasao,  2,  439,  593  n.,  607. 
Curia,  Roman,  1,  114,  116,  121,  126-128,  407. 
Custozza,  battle  of,  2,  137. 
Cuza,  Prince.     {See  Alexander  John,  of 

Rumania.) 
Cyprus,  1,  106;  2,  507,  659. 
Cyrenaica,  2,  633.    (5ee  Libya;  Tripoli.) 
Czechs,  2,  126,  127,  427.    {See  Bohemia.) 

Dahomey,  2,  629-630. 

Daimios,  in  Japan,  2,  578. 

Dalai  Lama,  2,  565. 

Dalhousie,  Lord,  2,  665,  667. 

Dante,  1,  15,  181,  194. 

Danton,  1,  491-494,  498,  500-501,  503,  509. 

Dardanelles,  1,  387. 

Damley,  1,  99. 

Darwin,  Charles,  2,  235-238,  241,  244,  247, 
251,  260,  458,  690, 


INDEX 


745 


Davis,  1,  54,  6o. 

Deik,  Francis,  2,  195. 

Deccan,  2,  663,  665. 

Decembrist  Revolt,  2,  40,  452. 

Declaration  of  Independence  (United  States), 
1,  332,  482. 

"Declaration  of  Indulgence,"  1,  285,  287. 

Declaration  of  Rights  of  Man  (French),  1, 
482;  2,  83. 

Declaratory  Act,  1,  330. 

Decretals,  1,  115  n. 

D'Estournelles  de  Constant,  2,  684. 

"Defender  of  the  Faith,"  1,  151. 

Deism,  1,  413-414,  420,  429. 

Delcasse,  Theophile,  2,  358,  701-704. 

Delegations,  Austro-Hungarian,  2,  428. 

Delescluze,  2,  342,  343  n. 

Delhi,  2,  668,  669  n.,  670  n. 

Demarcation,  papal  bull  of,  1,  55,  116. 

Democracy,  idea  of,  1,  xx,  465,  2,  100-102 ; 
and  French  Revolution,  1,  518;  and  Na- 
poleon I,  573-574;  and  the  Industrial 
Revolution,  2,  88-97  ;  in  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, 102-148,  205,  221 ;  and  nationalism, 
65,  149;  and  Catholicism,  249;  and  na- 
tional imp)erialism,  559-560;  in  Switzer- 
land, 437-438. 

Denmark,  in  1500,  1,  21 ;  Protestant  Revolt 
in,  137;  in  Thirty  Years'  War,  223-224; 
and  Charles  XII  of  Sweden,  376-377 ; 
and  "Armed  Neutrality  of  North,"  334, 
526-527  ;  and  Napoleon  I,  548-549 ;  loss  of 
Norway,  564 ;  in  nineteenth  century,  2,  8, 
186-187,  442-443,  601  n.,  607,  618  n.,  642  n. 

Depretis,  Agostino,  2,  372-373. 

Dervishes,  2,  628. 

Descartes,  1,  197,  200-201,  415. 

Deschanel,  Paul,  2,  365. 

Desmoulins,  Camille,  1,  474,  492,  509. 

Despotism,  Benevolent  or  Enlightened,  1, 
440-448,  462. 

Devolution,  War  of,  1,  243-244. 

DeWitt,  John,  1,  245. 

Diaz,  Bartholomew,  1,  51. 

Diaz,  Denis,  1,  51. 

Diaz,  Porfirio,  2,  612. 

Dickens,  Charles,  2,  no. 

Diderot,  1,  380,  419,  421,  443. 

Diet,  of  Germanic  Confederation,  2,  8-9, 
44,  132,  142-143,  187,  189-190. 

Diet,  of  Holy  Roman  Empire,  1,  12,  83,  228, 
342,  541-542.  {See  Speyer,  Diets  of; 
Worms,  Diets  of.) 

Diocese,  1,  114. 

"Diplomatic  Revolution,"  1,  359. 
"Direct  Action,"  2,  269,  271. 
Directory,  French,  1,  512-517,  543. 
Discoveries.    {See  Exploration.) 


Dispensations,  ecclesiastical,  1,  126. 
Disraeli,  Benjamin  (earl  of  Beaconsfield), 

2,  279,  281-285,  299,  301,  319,  327-328, 

505,  506,  551,  627. 
Dissenters,  1,  156,  279,  284-285;  2,  33,  103. 
Divine  Right,  theory  of,  1,  235-236,  263-264, 

287,  292,  433,  440,  448,  465,  468,  473 ;  2, 

50,  57,  67,  415,  416,  453. 
Dobrudja,  2,  505,  506,  517,  532-533- 
Dogma,  1,  118;  2,  224-225. 
"Domestic  System,"  in  industry,  1,  42;  2, 

69,  77-73. 

Dominican  Republic.    {See  Santo  Domingo.) 

Dominicans,  1,  115;  2,  556. 

Dominion  of  Canada,  2,  645-646. 

Dominion  of  New  Zealand,  2,  649-650. 

Donatello,  1,  187. 

Doria,  Andrea,  1,  18. 

Dover,  treaty  of  (1670),  1,  284. 

Draga,  queen  of  Serbia,  2,  520. 

Drake,  1,  60. 

Dra vidians,  2,  663. 

Dreyfus,  Alfred,  2,  355-356,  365- 

Drumont,  Edouard,  2,  354-355. 

Dual  Alliance  (Franco-Russian),  2,  421,  472, 

474,  698-699. 
Dual  Control  of  Egypt,  2,  627,  661. 
Dual  Monarchy.    {See  Austria-Hungary.) 
Duma,  Russian,  1,  373  ;  2,  457-458,  479, 480- 

486. 

Dumouriez,  1,  498,  501,  504,  509. 

Dunkirk,  1,  230,  280. 

Dupanloup,  Bishop,  2,  171,  228. 

Dupleix,  1,  310-312,  315-316. 

Duquesne,  Fort,  1,  313,  314. 

Durbar,  Indian,  2,  670. 

Diirer,  1,  190-191. 

Durham,  Lord,  2,  643-644. 

Dutch.    {See  Netherlands.) 

Dutch  Reformed  Church,  1,  145. 

Dutch  War  of  Louis  XIV,  1,  244-246,  349. 

East  Africa,  British,  2,  623,  628 ;  German, 
412,  623,  634-635;  Portuguese,  616,  625. 

East  Africa  Company,  British,  2,  558. 

Eastern  Rumelia,  2,  507,  508. 

East  India  Company,  Dutch,  1,  64,  73,  401, 
2,  593;  English,  1,  60,  64-65,  71,  73,  303, 
330,  337,  339,  401,  2,  664-669;  French,  1, 
64,  73,  401. 

"Ecclesiastical  Reservation,"  1,  136,  220. 

Eck,  Johann,  1,  132. 

Ecuador,  2,  607,  609. 

Education,  and  Calvin,  1,  143 ;  and  Jesuits, 
162;  and  Rousseau,  424;  in  Prussia,  441, 
557,  2,  408;  spread  of,  in  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, 102,  221-222,  259;  in  France,  1, 
530-531,2,  18,95,  351-352,  357-358;  in 


746 


INDEX 


Great  Britain,  3,  114,  2<)q,  312,  314-31S; 

in  Italy,  360;  in  Spain,  384;  in  Portugal, 

386;    in  Belgium,  3gi  ;    in  Austria,  432; 

in  Switzerland,  437;   in  Holland,  440;  in 

Russia,  457-458,  462,  464. 
Edward,  I-'ort,  1,  313. 
Edward  I,  of  England,  1,  265. 
Edward  VI,  of  England,  1,  147,  154,  262. 
Edward  VII,  of  England,  2,  291  n.,  702,  729. 
Egmont,  count  of,  1,  93. 
Egypt,  1,  515-516;  2,  511-512,  617,  626-628, 

660-662. 

Elba,  Napoleon  at,  1,  566,  568-570. 
Elector,  Great.    {See  Frederick  William,  of 

Brandenburg.)  , 
Electricity,  1,  416-417;  2,  74,  231,  232. 
Elgin,  Lord,  2,  644. 

Elizabeth,  of  England,  1,  96,  98-99,  105, 
148,  155,  162,  173,  262-263,  267;  2,  82, 
320. 

Elizabeth,  of  Russia,  1,  358,  360. 
Emancipation,  edict  of  (Prussian),  1,  556 ; 

(Russian),  2,  454-455. 
Emerson,  2,  84. 

Emigration  in  Recent  Times,  and  imperial- 
ism, 2,  555;  German,  417;  Hungarian, 
434;  Irish,  321;  Italian,  375-376;  Portu- 
guese, 386;  of  Russian  and  Polish  Jews, 
,  472;  Spanish,  378;  Swedish,  446. 

Emigres,  1,  487,  494,  499,  507;  2,  19-20, 
51- 

Empire.  {See  Austria;  British  Empire; 
France;  Germany;  Holy  Roman  Empire; 
Russia ;  etc.) 

Employers'  Liability,  2,  312, 413.  (5ce  Work- 
men's Compensation.) 

Ems  Dispatch,  2,  198-199. 

Enclosures.  {See  Inclosures.) 

Encyclopedia,  1,  458. 

Engels,  Friedrich,  2,  256,  257. 

Enghien,  ducd',  1,  533. 

England,  in  1500,  1,  3-6;  in  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, 17,  97-101,  147-156;  in  seventeenth 
century,  261-293,  295-296;  and  wars  of 
Louis  XIV,  244-245,  248,  254;  in  eight- 
eenth century,  289-293,  298,  430-440,  461- 
462 ;  and  French  Revolution,  469,  470, 
494-495.  504,  506,  507,  515,  521;  and 
early  colonization,  59-60,  300-305 ;  colo- 
nial struggle  with  France,  306-321 ;  colo- 
nial policy  in  eighteenth  century,  322-331 ; 
loss  of  American  colonies,  332-337;  ex- 
tent of  empire  in  1800,  337-340,  430-431  n. 
(For  history  in  nineteenth  century,  see 
United  Kingdom ;  also  see  Great  Britain ; 
Ireland;  Scotland.) 

"EnUghtened  Despots,"  1,  495. 

Enknte  Cordiale,  2,  702. 


Enver  Bey,  2,  525,  528. 

Episcopal  Church.    {See  Anglican  Church.) 

Erasmus,  1,  129,  149,  157,  183-184,  190,  193, 

201. 
Eritrea,  2,  632. 

Estates-General,  of  France,  1,  7,  102,  144, 

212,  469-470;    (1614),  211;    decline  of, 

213,  235;  and  French  Revolution,  460- 
461,  469-474- 

Estcrhazy,  Major  d',  2,  356. 

Esthonia,  1,  374,  376,  378;  2,  467. 

Eucharist,  Holy,  1,  119. 

Eugene  of  Savoy,  Prince,  1,  253,  308. 

Eugenie,  Empress,  2,  158,  180,  200. 

Kx  cathedra,  2,  228. 

Exclusion  Bill,  1,  285. 

Exploration,  1,  xix-xx,  49-54,  70-72,  33^^- 

341,  417;  2,  220,  615-616,  618-619. 
Extreme  Unction,  1,  119. 

Fabian  Society,  2,  303. 

Factory  Acts,  British,  2,  115,  309. 

Factory  System,  1,  35 ;  2,  68,  70,  77-88,  loi, 

214,  216-217,  368,  369,  456. 
Falkland  Islands,  2,  659. 
"Falk  Laws,"  2,  408. 
"Family  Compact,"  1,  360. 

Far  East,  imperial  rivalries  in,  592-596,  597, 
603. 

"Farming  the  Taxes,"  1,  238. 
Farnese,  Alexander  (duke  of  Parma),  1,  95, 
100. 

Fashoda  Incident,  2,  624,  700  n.,  701. 
Febronius  (Febronianism),  1,  409. 
February  Revolution  (1848),  2,  120,  153-154. 
Federated  Malay  States,  2,  592-593. 
Feminism,  2,  683. 
Fenians,  2,  323. 

Ferdinand,  of  Aragon,  1,  5,  8,  9,  13,  16,  24, 

74,  188. 

Ferdinand  I,  of  Austria,  2,  126,  138. 
Ferdinand  I,  of  Bulgaria,  2,  522,  523,  532. 
Ferdinand  I,  Emperor,  1,  76,  81,  87. 
Ferdinand  II,  Emperor,  1,  221-224. 
Ferdinand  VII,  of  Spain,  1,  551,  568,  576; 

2,  20-21,  24-26,  46,  378-379- 
Ferdinand  I,  of  the  Two  Sicihes,  1,  571  n. ; 

2,  44-45- 

Ferdinand  II,  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  2,  173. 

Ferrer,  Francisco,  2,  384. 

Ferry,  Jules,  2,  352. 

"Ferry  Laws,"  2,  352. 

FeuiUants,  1,  497. 

Fichte,  1,  557. 

Finland,  1,  540 ;  2,  8,  10,  38,  443,  468,  473. 

478,  486-487. 
First  Coalition,  during  French  Revolution,  1, 

506,  515- 


INDEX 


747 


Fisher,  Andrew,  8,  649. 
Fisher,  John,  1,  153. 
Five-mile  Act,  1,  285. 

Flanders  and  Flemish,  1,  95.  {See  Nether- 
lands.) 

Fleury,  Cardinal,  1,  255-256,  456. 
Florence,  city-state  of,  1,  18,  47,  79.  {See 

Tuscany.) 
Florence,  council  of,  1,  116. 
Florida,  1,  56,  317,  336;  2,  25,  602. 
Fly-shuttle,  2,  69-70. 

Fontainebleau,  Decree,  1,  548;     treaty  of 

(1814),  1,  566,  568. 
Formosa,  2,  565,  570,  583. 
Fortschrittspartei,  2,  185.    {See  Progressive 

Party,  German.) 
Fouch^,  1,  532,  544;  2,  16,  17. 
Fourier,  2,  87,  88,  119,  254, 
Fox,  Charles  James,  1,  438,  546 ;  2,  29,  109. 
Fox,  George,  1,  411. 

France,  in  1500, 1,  6-7 ;  in  sixteenth  century, 
18,  96,  loi-ios,  no,  141-142,  144-145, 
163 ;  in  seventeenth  century,  209-249, 
258-260;  in  eighteenth  century,  249-256, 
449-461,  463;  and  colonial  struggle  with 
England,  299-321,  334-336;  in  the  Revo- 
lution, 464-522;  vmder  consulate,  523- 
533  ;  under  First  Empire,  534-581 ;  imder 
the  Restoration,  2,  14-20,  27,  50-52,  59; 
under  the  July  Monarchy,  52-53,  93-95, 
1 16-120,  146;  under  Second  Republic, 
120-123,  146,  153-157:  under  Second 
Empire,  150-210;  under  Third  Republic, 
331-367,  392-395  ;  international  relations 
of,  in  Europe  since  1871,  377,  404,  421, 
424,  463,  680,  682,  692-697 ;  and  the  Near 
East,  499,  501,  502,  512-514,  537  ;  colonies 
of,  160,  347-348,  394;  in  the  Far  East, 
562-563,  566-567,  568-569,  575,  576,  578, 
579,  581,  593;  in  Africa,  617,  619,  620, 
623-624,  625,  628,  629-632. 

Franche  Comt6, 1,  87.    {See  Burgundy.) 

Francis  I,  Emperor  of  Austria.  {See  Francis 
II,  Emperor.) 

Francis  I,  Emperor  (of  Holy  Roman  Empire), 
1,  357. 

Francis  II,  Emperor,  1,  499,  537,  538,  542, 

554-555;  2,  4,  5,  12. 
Francis  I,  of  France,  1,  7,  60,  75-80,  84,  loi- 

102,  141-142,  183,  186,  188,  189,  190,  194, 

197,  242,  542. 
Francis  II,  of  France,  1,  99,  loi. 
Francis  II,  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  2,  173. 
Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  of  Austria^  2, 

435,  538,  710-711. 
Francis  Joseph,  of  Austria-Hungary,  2,  138, 

140,  142,  172,  177,  194,  197,  205,  427-428, 

433-435,  505,  526,  695,  710. 


Francis  of  Assisi,  Saint,  1,  115. 
Francis  Xavier,  Saint,  2,  556,  577. 
Franciscans,  1,  50,  115;  2,  556. 
Franco,  Joao,  2,  387. 

Franco-German  War,  2,  196-202,  209-210, 

261,  343,  379  n.,  421,  503,  691. 
Frankfort,  2,  96,  132,  191 ;  treaty  of  (1871), 

201,  332. 

Frankfort  Assembly  (1848-1849),  2,  132, 
135-136,  141-142,  180,  184.  {See  Diet,  of 
Germanic  Confederation.) 

FrankUn,  Benjamin,  1,  326,  333,  416. 

Frederick,  elector  palatine  of  Rhine,  1,  220, 
222,  229. 

Frederick,  of  Augustenburg,  2,  186,  189. 
Frederick  I,  of  Denmark  and  Norway,  1,  137. 
Frederick  VII,  of  Denmark,  2,  187. 
Frederick  VIII,  of  Denmark,  2,  443. 
Frederick  II  (the  Great),  of  Prussia,  1,  313, 

351,  354-362,  364-365,  380  n.,  385,  387, 

419,  441-445,  496,  555 ;  2,  181. 
Frederick  III,  of  Prussia  (German  Emperor), 

2,  200,  414. 
Frederick  William  (the  Great  Elector),  of 

Brandenburg,  1,  348-349. 
Frederick  William  I,  of  Prussia,  1,  350-351, 

44i-_ 

Frederick  William  II,  of  Prussia,  1,  448,  496, 
499,  543. 

Frederick  William  III,  of  Prussia,  1,  538-539, 

555,  562 ;  2,  5-6,  8,  24,  43. 
Frederick  William  IV,  of  Prussia,  2,  125,  132, 

141-143,  181,  184,  401. 
Freemasons,  2,  22,  395. 
Free-tenantry,  rise  of,  1,  31. 
Free  Trade,  2,  82-86,  89,  91-93,  280,  298, 

304,  306,  411,  441,  548. 
French  and  Indian  War,  1,  312-319,  325,  326, 

333,  359- 

French  Equatorial  Africa,  2,  617,  625.  {See 

Congo,  French;  Gabun.) 
French  West  Africa,  2,  617,  624,  629-632. 
Friars,  1,  115. 
Friedland,  battle  of,  1,  539. 
Friends,  Society  of,  1,  411.    {See  Quakers.) 
Frobisher,  1,  54,  60. 
Fronde,  1,  217-218. 
Frontenac,  1,  325. 
Fulton,  Robert,  2,  69,  73. 

Gabelle,  1,  398,  455- 

Gabun,  2,  617,  630.    {See  Congo,  French; 

rrench  Equatorial  Africa.) 
Galicia  annexed  by  Austria,  1,  361 ;  and 

Napoleon,  555;    in  Austria,  2,  126-127, 

428. 

Galileo,  1,  199,  415. 
Ga|vani,  1,  416. 


748 


INDEX 


(lama,  Vasco  da,  1,  51-52.  55.  72,  195,  303- 
(lamhctta,  2,  aoo,  201,  331,  342-345.  365- 
(lamhia,  2,  628,  658,  660. 
(Iap6n,  2,  479. 

Garil)al<li,  2,  166,  168,  172,  173,  174,  373, 
376. 

Gastcin,  convention  of  (1865),  2,  187,  189. 
Geneva,  1,  142-143,  147;    convention  of 

(1864),  2,  681. 
Genoa,  1,  18,  47,  106,  534;  2,  8,  i73-i75- 
George  I,  of  Great  Britain,  1,  289-291,  326, 

354.  436. 

George  II,  of  Great  Britain,  1,  291-292,  311 

n.,  354,  436. 
George  III,  of  Great  Britain,  1,  326-328,  330, 

436-439;  2,  30-31.  32,  70. 
George  IV,  of  Great  Britain  (Prince  Regent), 

2,  12,  30-37,  104- 
George  V,  of  Great  Britain,  2,  291,  670. 
George  I,  of  Greece,  2,  503,  515,  517. 
George,  Henry,  2,  304. 
Georgia,  1,  311. 

German  East  Africa,  2,  412,  622,  623,  634- 
635- 

German  Empire.    {See  Germany.) 

Germanic  Confederation,  2,  8-g,  42,  125,  132, 
142,  180-181,  185-192. 

German  Southwest  Africa,  2,  412,  621-622, 
623,  634,  635- 

Germany,  early  nationalism  in,  1,  81-84; 
after  Thirty  Years'  War,  229;  in  eight- 
eenth century,  342-362  ;  and  Napoleon, 
541-543 ;  and  Mettemich,  2,  8-9,  42-44, 
55  ;  and  Industrial  Revolution,  95-97  ;  in 
Revolution  of  1848-1849,  123,  125-126, 
131-132,  139,  141-144;  political  unifica- 
tion of,  180-202,  208-209;  under  the  Em- 
pire, 202-203,  212,  397-426,  447-449; 
relations  of,  with.  European  Powers  since 
1870,  202-203,  373,  377,  382,  383,  392, 
431,  462,  469,  506,  517-518,  537,  680,  682, 
691-710 ;  in  War  of  the  Nations,  710-717  ; 
and  the  "new  imperialism,"  412-413,  421- 
422,  551,  553,  575,  576,  581,  594,  620,  621- 
623,  624-625,  633-636.  {See  Austria; 
Germanic  Confederation ;  Habsburg 
Family;  Hohenzollem  Family;  Holy 
Roman  Empire;  North  German  Confed- 
eration; Prussia;  etc.) 

Ghent,  Pacification  of  (1576),  1,  94. 

GhibeUines,  1,  15. 

Ghiberd,  1,  187. 

Gibraltar,  1,  253,  308,  309,  334;  2,  658,  659. 
Gilbert,  1,  59. 

Gilds,  Craft,  1,  40-42,  70,  262,  399-400,  2, 

68,  78,  84;  Merchant,  1,  37-40,  70. 
Gin,  Cotton,  2,  71. 

Girondists,  1,  497-498,  502-503,  509;  2,  119. 


Gladstone,  2,  229-230,  279-286,  298-301, 

302,  319-324,  548,  651. 
"Glorious  Revolution,"  1,  286-288,  3o6-3»7, 

466. 

Gneisenau,  1,  556. 
Goa,  1,  55;  2,  386  n. 
Godoy,  1,  551. 

Godwin,  William,  2,  32-33,  265. 

Goethe,  1,  443. 

Gold  Coast,  2,  617,  629,  658, 

Golden  Fleece,  1,  20,  86. 

Good  Hope,  Cape  of,  1,  51.    (See  Africa; 

South  Africa.) 
"Good  Works,"  1,  131. 
Gordon,  Charles  George,  2,  573. 
Goremykin,  2,  482,  486. 
Gorky,  Maxim,  2,  477. 

Government  of  Ireland  Act.    {See  Home 

Rule,  Irish.) 
"Government  ownership,"  2,  255. 
Granada,  1,  8,  9,  75,  91. 
Grand  Alliance,  1,  252. 
"Grand  Design,"  1,  210. 
"Grand  Monarch."    {See  Louis  XIV,  of 

France.) 
"Grand  Remonstrance,"  1,  275. 
Grasse,  Count  de,  1,  335. 
Gratian,  1,  116. 
Gravelotte,  battle  of,  2,  200. 
Gravitation,  1,  416. 

Great  Britain,  1,  289,  430,  2,  28-29.  {See 
British  Empire;  England;  United  King- 
dom.) 

Great  Elector.  {See  Frederick  William,  of 
Brandenburg.) 

"Great  Protestation,"  1,  267. 

"Great  RebeUion,"  1,  274-281. 

"  Great  War,"  of  1914.  {See  War  of  the  Na- 
tions.) 

Greece  (Greeks,  Hellenes),  1,  23,  386;  2, 
47-50,  62,  452,  495-496,  497,  499,  507-508, 
509-510,  515-517,  528-536,  681,  682,  717. 

Greek  Church.    {See  Orthodox  Church.) 

Greek,  study  of,  1,  182-183,  193. 

Greenland,  1,  21 ;  2,  442  n.,  601  n, 

Gregory  XV,  Pope,  2,  556. 

Gregory  XVI,  Pope,  2,  55. 

Grenada,  1,  317. 

GrenviUe,  1,  327-329. 

GrevT,  Jules,  2,  345,  352. 

Grey,  Earl,  2,  105-106,  114. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  2,  621,  705,  715. 

Grotius,  1,  232. 

Guadeloupe,  1,  302 ;  2,  607. 

Guam,  2,  382,  603. 

Guatemala,  2,  607,  608. 

Guelfs  (Guelphs),  1,  15;  German  political 
party,  2,  418. 


INDEX 


749 


Guesde,  Jules,  2,  364,  367. 
Guiana,  1,  59  n. ;  2,  549,  607. 
Guilds.    {See  Gilds.) 
Guillotine,  1,  508. 

Guinea,  1,  302  n. ;  2,  616,  629,  630,  631,  636. 
Guise  Family,  1,  102-105,  108. 
Guizot,  2,  94-95,  117,  118,  119,  120,  257. 
Gustavus  I  (Vasa),  of  Sweden,  1,  137-138, 
224. 

Gustavus  II  (Adolphus),  of  Sweden,  1,  224- 

226,  374. 
Gustavus  III,  of  Sweden,  1,  444. 
Gustavus  IV,  of  Sweden,  1,  540. 
Gustavus  V,  of  Sweden,  2,  446. 
Gutenberg,  Johan,  1,  179. 

Haakon  VII,  of  Norway,  2,  445. 

Habeas  Corpus  Act,  1,  285,  432;  2,  35,  291. 

Habsburg  Family,  origin  of,  1,  13  ;  genealogy 
of,  107 ;  in  sixteenth  century,  20,  24,  76, 
79>  87,  95,  109,  163  ;  dominions  of,  in  1600, 
219 ;  humiliation  of,  in  Thirty  Years'  War, 
229-230;  in  eighteenth  century,  344-347, 
363-364 ;  rivalry  of,  with  Bourbon  Family, 
213,  217-232,  242-256,  355-357;  aUiance 
of,  with  Bourbon  family,  358-359,  459; 
rivalry  of,  with  HohenzoUern  Family,  347- 
362  ;  and  French  Revolution,  495-496,  499  ; 
and  Napoleon,  542,  555;  in  nineteenth 
century,  see  Austria-Hungary;  Francis 
Joseph. 

Hague,  1,  96 ;  peace  conferences  (1899, 1907), 

2,  686-687  ;  Tribunal,  686. 
Hainan,  2,  565,  567,  569. 
Haiti,  1,  56,  532 ;  2,  604,  606,  608. 
Haller,  Albrecht  von,  1,  417. 
Hamburg,  2,  125,  132,  399,  412. 
Hampden,  John,  1,  272-274. 
Hanover,  1,  354,  356,  358,  360,  534,  543 ;  2, 

55,  96,  125,  131,  141,  191,  409,  418. 
Hanoverian  Family,  1,  289;   genealogy  of, 

295. 

Hanse  (Hanseatic  League),  1,  49,  62,  70,  83, 

343.  (See  Bremen,  Hamburg,  Liibeck.) 
Hapsburg.    (See  Habsburg.) 
Hardenberg,  1,  555,  556;  2,  6. 
Hardie,  Keir,  2,  303,  306. 
Hargreaves,  James,  2,  69,  70,  113. 
Harris,  Townsend,  2,  578. 
Hastings,  marquess  of,  2,  665,  666,  667. 
Hastings,  Warren,  1,  339 ;  2,  664. 
Haussmann,  Baron,  2,  159. 
Hawaii,  2,  603. 
Hawke,  1,  315. 
Hawkins,  1,  60,  67. 
Haynau,  General,  2,  140. 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  (1901),  2,  604  n. 
Hegel,  2,  256,  259. 


Heine,  2,  256. 

Helgesen,  1,  138,  184. 

Heligoland,  2,  420,  423,  623. 

Henry  II,  of  England,  2,  322. 

Henry  III,  of  England,  1,  266. 

Henry  VII,  of  England,  1,  4-6,  24,  54,  150, 

188,  262  ;  2,  322. 
Henry  VIII,  of  England,  1,  6,  75,  79,  84,  86, 

98,  110,  147,  150-154,  262,  410;  2,  291, 

320,  322. 

Henry  II,  of  France,  1,  79,  101-103,  242. 
Henry  III,  of  France,  1,  loi,  104-105. 
Henry  IV,  of  France  (Henry  of  Navarre),  1, 

104-105,  144,  209-211,  214,  232-233,  242, 

305,  542. 

"Henry  V,"  of  France.    {See  Chambord, 

count  of.) 
Henry,  duke  of  Guise,  1,  104-105. 
Henry  (the  Navigator),  Prince,  of  Portugal, 

1,  8,  51,  72. 
Heresy,  1,  123,  136,  407,  408. 
"Heriot,"  1,  31. 
Herzegovina.    {See  Bosnia.) 
Hesse-Cassel,  2,  43,  55,  131,  191. 
Hesse-Darmstadt,  2,  192,  202,  399. 
Hetairia  Philike,  2,  48. 
Heureaux,  Ulises,  2,  608. 
Hideyoshi,  of  Japan,  2,  577. 
Hierarchy,  of  CathoUc  Church,  1,  113. 
"High  Church"  (Anglican),  1,  166;  2,  244- 

245- 

High  Commission,  Court  of,  1,  156,  274.  , 

"Higher  Criticism,"  2,  239-240. 

Hindustan,  2,  663.    {See  India.) 

Hobbes,  1,  196. 

Hofmann,  Melchior,  1,  135  n. 

Hohenlinden,  battle  of,  1,  526. 

Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst,  2,  420,  421,  423. 

HohenzoUern  Family,  origin'  of,  1,  347 ; 
genealogy  of,  363 ;  electors  of  Branden- 
burg, 229,  347-349;  kings  of  Prussia,  254, 
349-352;  rivalry  of,  with  Habsburg 
Family,  354-362  ;  emperors  of  Germany,  2, 
202,397,415-416.  (S'ee  Germany ;  Prus- 
sia.) 

HohenzoUem-Sigmaringen  Family,  2,  198, 
379,  518,  707- 

Holland.    {See  Netherlands,  Dutch.) 

Holstein.    {See  Schleswig-Holstein.) 

Holy 'Alliance,  2,  11-12,  38,  40,  679-680. 

Holy  League,  1,  17. 

Holy  Orders,  1,  119,  166. 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  in  1500,  1,  10-14,  i5» 
17,  21,  24;  in  sixteenth  century,  75-771 
79,  81-86,  87,  102,  117;  and  rise  of  Luther- 
anism,  133-136 ;  and  Thirty  Years'  Waf^ 
220-229;  and  international  law,  .231,2, 
679;    and  Louis  XIV,  of  France,  1,24^, 


750 


INDEX 


247,  253-254  ;  in  ciRhtccnth  century,  342- 

346;    Napwicon  and  dissolution  of,  515, 

537.  541-54.5 ;  2,  3.  8. 
Holy  Synod  (Russian),  1,  372;  2,  461,  464. 
Home  Rule,  Irish,  2,  288,  290,  295,  300-301, 

303,  319-326. 
Honduras,  2,  607,  608;  British,  607,  658. 
Hongkonf,',  2,  571,  593,  658. 
Hooker,  Richard,  1,  196. 
Horn,  count  of,  1,  93. 

Housing  and  Town  Planning  Act,  British,  2, 
317. 

Hubertusburg,  treaty  of  (1763),  1,  360. 

Hudson,  Henry,  1,  54,  59. 

Hudson's  Bay,  1,  300,  309,  401 ;  2,  646. 

Hucrta,  Victoriano,  2,  613. 

Hugo,  Victor,  2,  48,  156. 

Huguenots,  1,  101-105,  143,  144-145,  209, 
213-214,  241-242,  271,  306,  349,  408. 

Humanism,  1,  180-184,  193,  201. 

Humbert,  of  Italy,  2,  373. 

Humboldt,  Alexander  von,  2,  6,  233,  240. 

Humboldt,  VVilhclm  von,  1,  557  ;  2,  233  n. 

"Hundred  Days,"  1,  569-570;  2,  7,  16. 

Hundred  Years'  War,  1,  4,  6,  150. 

"Hundred  Years'  War,  Second,"  1,  248. 

Hungary,  in  1500,  1,  23  ;  accession  of  Habs- 
burgs  to,  76;  and  Turks,  80-81,  87,  106, 
383,  2,  490-491 ;  and  religion,  1,  162  ;  and 
Maria  Theresa,  355-356;  and  Joseph  II, 
447  ;  and  Metternich  and  the  insurrection 
,  of  1848-1849,  2,  127-128,  130,  133,  135, 
137-139,  140-141,  453;  since  i860,  195, 
427-431,  433-435-  (See  Austria-Hun- 
gary.) 

Hunter,  John,  1,  417. 

Hus,  John,  1,  123,  128,  129,  132. 

Huskisson,  William,  2,  37,  11 2-1 13. 

Hussein  ben       2,  513-514. 

Hutten,  Ulrich  von,  1,  84-85,  128-129. 

Huxley,  Thomas,  2,  238-239,  244,  690. 

Hyder  Ali,  1,  335  ;  2,  664. 

Hyderabad,  2,  663,  665. 

Ibrahim  Pasha,  2,  49,  511. 
Ibsen,  2,  268  n. 

Iceland,  1,  21 ;  2,  442,  443,  642  n. 

Ifni,  2,  385,  625,  636. 

Ignatius  Loyola,  Saint,  1,  160-161,  174. 

Illyrian  Pro\-inces,  1,  555,  564. 

Immaculate  Conception,  dogma  of,  2,  241. 

Imperialism,  in  nineteenth  and  twentieth 

centuries,  2,  220,  263-264,  547-678.  (See 

Colonization.) 
Inclosures,  1,  32  ;  2,  31,  81. 
independent  Labor  Party,  in  Great  Britain, 

2,  303. 

Independents  (English)  1, 148, 156,  275-280. 


Index,  ecclesiastical,  1,  160. 

India,  medieval  trade  with,  1,  43-47 ;  in 
seventeenth  century,  302-304,  321 ;  Portu- 
guese in,  51-53,  55 ;  Dutch  in,  59,  64; 
Trench  in,  240,  303-304,  310,  311,  315" 
319;  English  in,  60,  64-65,  303,  311,  316- 
31Q,  337-339;  in  nineteenth  century,  S, 
662-675,  677-678. 

Indian  Councils  Act  (1909),  2,  669-670. 

Indians,  American,  1,  56,  61,  67,  306,  307, 
308,  312-314;  2,  600-602,  605-606,  Ooih- 
610,  61 1-613,  641. 

"  Individualism,"  2,  83. 

Indo-China,  2,  565,  568-569,  593. 

Indulgences,  ecclesiastical,  1,  131,  159. 

Industrial  Revolution,  1,  318,  412,  576; 
general,  2,  57,  67-82,  88-90,  97-99,  100- 
102,  214-215,  222;  in  Australia,  648-649; 
in  Austria,  128-129,  429-430;  in  Belgium, 
390;  in  Canada,  646;  in  China,  571-572; 
in  France,  93-95.  121,  158-159,  347;  in 
Germany,  95-97,  126,  403,  416-417;  in 
Great  Britain,  33-35,  90-93,  115-1x6, 
673-675  ;  in  India,  670-672  ;  in  Italy,  167, 
368-369,374;  in  Japan,  581-582;  in  Latin 
America,  613-614;  in  Russia,  460,473- 
476 ;  in  Spain,  383-384 ;  in  Sweden,  444, 
446 ;  in  Switzerland,  438 ;  in  United  States, 
602-603;  and  imperialism,  550,  673-675; 
and  internationalism,  682-683 ;  and  in- 
dividualism (laisser-faire),  82-86,  99  ;  and 
Catholicism,  249-250,  253;  and  Socialism, 
86-88,  99,  119,  253-257,  258-260;  and 
Anarchism,  265-266. 

Industry,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  40-42,  67- 
68,  69 ;  in  eighteenth  century,  399-403, 
425-426 ;  in  nineteenth  century,  see  Indus- 
trial Revolution.  (Also,  see  Mercantil- 
ism.) 

Infallibility,  Papal,  2,  228-229,  241,  407. 
Ingria,  1,  374,  376,  378;  2,  467. 
Innocent  IV,  Pope,  2,  561. 
Inquisition,  ecclesiastical,  1,  90,  92,  145,  160, 

443,  552;  2,  21. 
Institutes,  Calvin's,  1,  142,  194. 
"Instrument  of  Government,"  1,  279. 
Insurance,  workingmen's,  2,  159,  222,  313- 

314,  350,  374,  384,  413-414,  432,  437-438, 

446,  649-650. 
Intendants,  in  France,  1,  215-216,  450,  482, 

528;  2,  337. 
Intercursus  Magnus,  1,  5,  262. 
Interest,  1,  65-66. 

Internationalism,  in  nineteenth  century,  2, 

682-691,  719-720. 
International  Law.   (See  Law,  International.) 
International  Workingmen's  Association,  of 

Marx,  2.  258,  261,  262,  269,  333. 


INDEX 


751 


"Intolerable  Acts,"  1,  33I• 
Inventions,  mechanical,  2,  69-75,  97~98. 

Ionian  Islands,  1,  18,  515;  2,  503. 

Ireland,  1,  3,  162,  163-164,  249,  275,  277, 
288  n.,  335,  337,  410-41 1,  431 ;  2,  103-104, 
319-326,  330. 

Iron  industry,  2,  73. 

Irredentism,  Italian,  2,  377. 

Isabella,  of  Castile,  1,  8-10,  53,  74. 

Isabella  II,  of  Spain,  2,  198,379, 380,  381,  385. 

Islam,  2,  492.  {See  Mohammedanism; 
Turkey ;  etc.) 

Ismail,  of  Egypt,  2,  627. 

Italy,  in  1500, 1,  14-19 ;  medieval  commerce 
of,  44-48,  62  ;  sixteenth-century  culture  of, 
186-194 ;  religion  in,  163  ;  scene  of  conflict 
between  Francis  I  and  Charles  V,  77-80; 
and  Napoleon  I,  514-515,  526-527,  534, 
575 ;  in  Era  of  Metternich,  2,  8,  9-10,  44- 
46,  55-56;  and  the  Revolution  of  1848- 
1849,  123-125,  129-131,  136-137,  139-141, 
144,  148;  political  unification  of,  163-175, 
189,  190,  194,  197,  207-208;  kingdom  of, 
since  1870,  367-378,  395 ;  international 
relations  of,  since  1870,  404,  407,  431,  537, 

681,  682,  692-694,  696-697,  703,  708,  714, 
716;  national  imperialism  of,  514,  528, 
620,  624,  632-633. 

Ivan  II  (Asen),  of  Bulgaria,  2,  498. 
Ivan  III  (the  Great),  of  Russia,  1,  22,  366, 
368,  369. 

Ivan  IV  (the  Terrible),  of  Russia,  1,  22  n. ; 

2,  588. 
Ivory  Coast,  2,  630. 

Jacobins  (French),  1,  491,  493,  497-498,  503, 

508,  524,  533- 
Jacobites  (British),  1,  252,  288  n.,  289,  291. 
Jains,  2,  663. 
Jamaica,  1,  280;  2,  658. 
James  I,  of  England  (James  VI,  of  Scotland), 

1,  99,  200,  222,  263-264,  267-270,  272,  274, 

296-  297,  300. 

James  II,  of  England  (James  VII,  of  Scot- 
land), 1,  248,  249,  252,  282,  286-288,  291, 

297-  298,  307,  308;  2,  292. 

James  (III,  of  England,  VIII,  of  Scotland), 
"Old  Pretender,"  1,  289  n.,  291,  308. 

James  IV,  of  Scotland,  1,  6. 

James  V,  of  Scotland,  1,  146. 

James  VI,  of  Scotland.  {See  James  I,  of 
England.) 

"Jameson  Raid,"  2,  651-652. 

Janissaries,  1,  385  ;  2,  492,  513. 

Jansenism,  1,  408. 

Janssen,  Cornelius,  1,  408. 

Japan,  2,  575,  576,  577-586,  598,  680,  681, 

682,  689,  716-717, 


Jaures,  Jean,  2,  358,  364,  366. 
Java,  1,  55,  59 ;  2,  439,  593. 
Jellachich,  Count  von,  2,  135,  137,  138. 
Jena,  battle  of,  1,  539,  546,  555,  562. 
Jenghiz  Khan,  1,  22  n. 
Jenkinson,  1,  60. 

Jenkins's  Ear,  War  of,  1,  3 10-3 11,  356. 

Jenner,  Edward,  1,  417. 

"Jenny,"  Spinning,  2,  70. 

Jerusalem,  1,  114. 

Jesus  of  Nazareth,  1,  113. 

Jesus,  Society  of  (Jesuits),  1,  98,  160-162, 

173-174,  306,  408-410,  443,  445;  2,  19, 

21,  168,  357,  381,  408,  436,  556,  577. 
Jews,  1,  123;  2,  354-357,  411  n.,  417  n.,  432 

n.,  471-472,  478,  481,  485,  487,  517-518. 
Joanna,  of  Castile,  1,  74. 
John  III  (Sobieski),  of  Poland,  1,  383;  2, 

490. 

John  II,  of  Portugal,  1,  51. 

John  VI,  of  Portugal,  2,  27-28. 

John,  Archduke,  of  Austria,  2,  135-136. 

John,  Don,  of  Austria,  1,  94,  106. 

John  George,  of  Saxony,  1,  222. 

Jones,  Inigo,  1,  187. 

Jonson,  1,  196. 

Joseph  II,  Emperor,  1,  444,  445-448,  495; 
2,  501. 

Joseph  I,  of  Portugal,  1,  444. 

Josephine,  French  Empress,  1,  514,  555. 

Jourdan,  1,  506,  514. 

Journeymen.    {See  Gilds,  Craft.) 

Juarez,  Benito,  2,  177-178,  612. 

Julius  II,  Pope,  1,  16,  151,  182,  189,  190. 

"July  Monarchy,"  2,  94-95,  1 16-120. 

"July  Ordinances,"  2,  52. 

"July  Revolution"  (1830),  2,  52-53,  152. 

"June  Days"  (1848),  2,  122-123,  i37,  i44» 

153-154- 
Junkerthum,  2,  183. 
"Justification  by  Faith,"  1,  131. 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal,  2,  191,  423. 
Kaiser  Wilhelms  Land,  2,  412,  594,  647  n. 
Kamerun,  2,  412,  622,  623,  633-634,  635. 
Karageorge,  of  Serbia,  2,  49  n.,  499,  520. 
Karelia,  1,  374,  376,  378. 
Karlowitz,  treaty  of  (1699),  1,  345  n.,  383; 

2,  491. 
Kars,  2,  506. 
Kashmir,  2,  663,  666. 
Kaunitz,  1,  358;  2,  4. 
Kay,  John,  2,  69-70. 
Keble,  John,  2,  244. 
Kepler,  1,  199. 
Khiva,  2,  590. 

Kiamil  Pasha,  2,  525,  526,  530. 
Kiao-chau,  2,  422,  558,  567,  594,  716. 


752 


INDEX 


Kiel,  annexed  by  Prussia,  2,  187,  iqi  ;  treaty 

of  (1814),  1,  564. 
"King  OcofKc's  War,"  1,  311,  357. 
KinKslcy,  CharK-s,  2,  88  n.,  112. 
"King  William's  War,"  1,  307. 
Kii)ling,  Rudyard,  2,  Oyg. 
Kishinev,  massacre  of,  2,  472. 
Kitchener,  Lord,  2,  652,  661,  662. 
Knights  Hospitalers  of  St.  John  and  Malta, 

1,  IIS- 

Knights  Templars,  1,  115. 
"Knights'  War,"  1,  85. 
Knox,  John,  1,  129,  146-147. 
Kokovtscv,  2,  485. 
Kbniggratz,  battle  of,  2,  190. 
Koran,  1,  123. 

Korea,  2,  564,  565-568,  570-571,  582-585, 

587-588. 
Kosciuszko,  1,  388. 

Kossuth,  Louis,  2,  128,  130,  137,  139,  141, 
195- 

Kotzebue,  2,  39,  43. 

Kreuzzeitung,  2,  184. 

Kropotkin,  Prince,  2,  268  n. 

Kublai  Khan,  1,  50;  2,  561. 

Kuchuk  Kainarji,  treaty  of  (1774),  1,  386; 

2,  491,  502. 
Kuldja,  2,  564,  570. 
Kultiirkampf,  2,  407-409,  693. 
Kuroki,  General,  2,  584. 
Kushk,  2,  591. 

Kutusov,  General,  1,  560-561. 
Kutzo-Vlachs,  2,  518.    {See  Rumans.) 
Kwang-chow  Wan,  2,  567,  569,  571,  593. 
Kwang-su,  of  China,  2,  573-574. 

Labor  Exchange  Act,  British,  2,  313. 
Labor  Party,  in  Great  Britain,  2,  302-303, 

305-306,  307-316. 
Ladrones,  2,  594. 

Lafayette,  1,  334,  460,  472,  475,  476,  477, 

480,  491,  497,  501,  571 ;  %  iQ,  52. 
Laffitte,  2,  52,  117. 
La  Fontaine,  1,  237. 
La  Hogue,  1,  307. 

Laibach,  Congress  of  (i82i),2,  13,  45,  47. 
Laisser-faire,  1,  338,  425,  458;  2,  82,  88,  105, 

113,  252-253,  268,  281,  282,  300,  305,  411, 

547,  548,  645. 
La  Marmora,  General,  2,  171. 
Lamartine,  2,  118,  119,  154  n.,  226. 
Lamennais,  2,  1 19. 
Land  Acts,  Irish,  2,  321-324. 
Land  Reform  in  Great  Britain,  projects  of, 

2,  303-304.  317-319,  329-330;  in  France, 

see  Peasantry,  in  French  Revolution. 
Landtag,  Prussian,  2,  126,  143. 
Laos,  2,  593. 


La  Rorhcllc,  siege  of,  1,  214. 

La  Salle,  1,  300,  301. 

Las  Casas,  Hartulom6  de,  1,  61,  67. 

Las  Cases,  Mar(iuis  de,  1,  592. 

Lassalle,  Ferdinand,  2,  261-262,  410. 

Latin  .America,  2,  605-614,  (jiy-6i%. 

Laud,  1,  273,  274. 

Lauenburg,  2,  186,  187. 

Laurier,  Sir  Wilfrid,  2,  656. 

Lausanne,  treaty  of  (191 2),  2,  528.  {Ses 

Ouchy,  treaty  of.) 
Lavoisier,  1,  417. 

Law,  Canon,  1,  116;  International,  1,  230- 
232  ;  2,  10,  679-683, 68s,  687-688 ;  Natural, 
1,  420 ;  2,  83,  231. 

Law,  John,  1,  255-256. 

League  of  Cambrai  (1508),  1,  18. 

Leclerc,  General,  1,  532. 

Ledru-RoUin,  2,  123,  154  n. 

"Left,"  in  Eurof)can  politics,  2,  363;  Fed- 
eration of  the;  (French  political  party),  367  ; 
Italian,  372-373- 

Legion  of  Honor,  2,  16. 

Legislative  Assembly.  (See  Assembly,  Leg- 
islative.) 

"Legitimacy,"  1,  567  ;  2,  6-7,  8,  9,  13,  46,  48, 
49,  53- 

Legitimists.  in  France,  2,  94,  116,  338. 
Leibnitz,  1,  416. 

Leipzig,  battle  of,  1,  564;  disputation  at, 
132. 

Leo  X,  Pope,  1,  79,  127-128,  151,  158,  182, 
183,  190. 

Leo  XIII,  Pope,  2,  244  n.,  246-251,  253,  354, 

364,  372. 
Leon,  Ponce  de,  1,  56. 

Leopold  I,  Emperor,  1,  245,  247,  250,  252, 
349- 

Leopold  II,  Emperor,  1,  495,  496,  499,  543. 
Leopold  I,  of  Belgium,  2,  54,  389. 
Leopold  II,  of  Belgium,  2,  389,  392,  619-620, 
622,  624. 

Leopold,  Prince,  of  HohenzoUem-Sigmarin- 

gen,  2,  198,  379- 
Lepanto,  battle  of,  1,  106,  383. 
Lessing,  1,  443. 

Leszczynski,  Stanislaus,  1,  256,  377. 

Lettrcs  de  cachet,  1,  457. 

Lexington,  battle  of,  1,  332. 

Liao-yang,  battle  of,  2,  584. 

Liberalism,  2,  1-2,  13,  46-56;  and  Catholi- 
cism, 226-228,  249. 

Liberal  Monarchists  (French),  2,  2>ii-Z2>^,  ' 
338-340. 

Liberal  Party  (British),  2,  107-108,  279-290, 
298-307. 

Liberal  Unionist  Party,  British,  2,  300- 
303. 


INDEX 


753 


Liberals  (Austrian),  2,  127-129,  432; 
(French),  15,  17,  18,  116-117,  119-120, 
175-176,  179;  (German),  125-126,  181- 
186,  193,  256;  (Italian),  124-125;  (Rus- 
sian), 452,  460,  475-481  ;■  (Spanish),  21-24, 
379,  380,  382. 

Liberation,  War  of,  1,  556,  562-566 ;  2,  43. 

"Liberators,"  in  Russia,  2,  477-478. 

Liberia,  2,  636-637. 

Liberum  Veto,  1,  382,  385. 

Libya,  2,  633.    (5e«  Cyrenaica ;  Tripoli.) 

Liebknecht,  Wilhelm,  2,  262. 

Ligurian  Republic.    {See  Genoa.) 

Lindet,  1,  505. 

Linnaeus,  1,  417. 

Literature,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  193-196; 

in  Age  of  Louis  XIV,  237-238. 
Lithuania,  2,  466.    {See  Poland.) 
Liukiu  Islands,  2,  565,  570. 
Liverpool,  Lord,  2,  112. 
Livingstone,  David,  2,  618-619. 
Livonia,  1,  374,  376,  378;  2,  467. 
Li  Yuan-hung,  Chinese  President,  2,  576. 
Lloyd  George,  David,  2,  289,  304,  305,  306, 

311,  313,  317-319- 
Locke,  1,  418-419. 
Locomotive,  2,  73-74. 
Lollards,  1,  123. 

Lombardy,  1,  66;  2,  44,  130,  131,  136,  163, 

170-172. 
Lomenie  de  Brienne,  1,  460. 
London,  government  of,  2,  297  ;  Conference 

of  (1852),  186-187;  Conference  of  (1867), 

196;  Conference  of  (187 1 ),  204;  treaty  of 

(1827),  49;  treaty  of  (1867),  196;  treaty 

of  (1913),  510,  530-53i»  682. 
Long  Parliament,  1,  274-281. 
Loom,  Power,  2,  71. 
Lopez,  Francisco,  2,  610. 
Lords,  House  of.    {See  Parliament,  English.) 
"Lords  of  the  Congregation,"  1,  147. 
Lorraine,  1,  230,  245-246,  249,  256,  457  n. ; 

2,  200-203,  332,  412,  418-419,  421,  426, 

551,  688,  701. 
Loubet,  Emile,  2,  356,  358. 
Louis  I,  of  Bavaria,  2,  130,  131. 
Louis  XI,  of  France,  1,  6,  20,  77,  211. 
Louis  XII,  of  France,  1,  7,  17,  i8,  77,  183, 

186,  188,  189,  190. 
Louis  XIII,  of  France,  1,  191,  211-216,  217, 

219,  270. 

Louis  XIV,  of  France,  1,  191,  195,  216-218, 
230,  235-255,  258-260,  263,  284,  289,  290, 
301,  304-308,  343,  349,  371,  375,  408-409, 
418,  454,  456,  466,  468,  503,  506,  528,  529, 
535,  542,  565,  572  ;  2,  77,  202,  617. 

Louis  XV,  of  France,  1,  255-256,  315,  358- 
359,  415,  449,  456-458,  466,  468. 


Louis  XVI,  of  France,  1,  425,  458-461,  466, 
469-478,  487-488,  496-504,  511,  512,  536, 
567;  2,  16,  19,  53- 

Louis  XVII,  of  France,  1,  511,  567. 

Louis  XVIII,  of  France  (count  of  Provence), 
1,  467,  488,  567-569,  571 ;  2,  5,  15-19,  38, 

42,  87,  336. 

Louis  Philippe,  of  France,  2,  52-53,  54,  55, 
56,  94-95,  116-120,  123,  151-153,  155,  336, 
338,  346,  617,  629. 

Louisburg,  1,  309,  311-314,  326. 

Louisiana,  1,  301,  317,  336,  532 ;  2,  549  n, 

Louvois,  1,  237,  240-241. 

"Low  Church"  (Anglican),  1,  166;  2,  245. 

Lowe,  Sir  Hudson,  1,  572. 

Lowther,  Sir  James,  1,  435,  439. 

Loyola,  Ignatius,  1,  1 60-161,  174. 

Liibeck,  2,  125,  132,  399,  412.    {See  Hanse.) 

Liibeck,  peace  of  (1629),  1,  224. 

Lucca,  2,  124  n,  163  n. 

Luddite  riots,  2,  34-35. 

Liideritz,  2,  621. 

Lueger,  Karl,  2,  432. 

Luiz  I,  of  Portugal,  2,  386. 

Luneville,  treaty  of  (1801),  1,  527,  537,  541. 

Luther,  Martin,  1,  84-85,  129-136,  142,  158, 
161,  166,  184,  195,  342,  353,  170-171 ;  2, 

43,  224,  241,  244. 

Lutheranism,  1,  84-86,  130-140,  164-169, 

220-229,  412 ;  2,  184,  420. 
Lutter,  battle  of,  1,  223. 
Liitzen,  battle  of (1632),  1,  226;  (1813),  563. 
Luxemburg,  1,  247,  249 ;  2,  96,  196,  441-442, 

715- 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  2,  233-234. 

Macao,  2,  386  n.,  561,  571. 
Macaulay,  Lord,  2,  105. 
Macdonald,  Ramsay,  2,  303. 
Macdonald,  Sir  John,  2,  646. 
Macedonia,  2,  507,  527,  528,  529,  531-536, 
538. 

Machiavelli,  1,  14  n.,  88,  194,  231. 
Machinery,  development  of,  2,  67-78. 
M'CuUoch,  J.  R.,2,  217. 
MacMahon,  Marshal,  2,  160,  171,  199-200, 

323  n.,  339-340,  342,  344-345- 
Madagascar,  1,  240,  302;  2,  617,  623,  629, 

632. 

Madeira,  1,  51 ;  2,  616. 
Madero,  Francisco,  2,  612-613. 
Madras,  1,  303,  304,  311,  317;  2,  670  n. 
Magdeburg,  1,  225,  228,  348. 
Magellan,  1,  54. 
Magenta,  battle  of,  2,  171. 
Magna  Carta,  1,  264,  266,  282,  432,  482;  2, 
III,  291. 

Magyars,  Hungarians.    (See  Hungary.) 


VOL.  II  —  3  c 


754 


INDEX 


Mahmud  II,  of  Turkey,  2,  512. 

Miihralta  C'oiifcdcT.icy,  2,  60.^-664,  665, 

Main/.,  archbishopric  of,  1,  12,  131;  Com- 
iiiittcc,  2,  44. 

Maistri!,  Joseph  dc,  2,  118. 

Majul)a  Hill,  battle  of,  2,  651. 

Malacca,  1,  SS,  5Q ;  2,  593- 

Malatesta,  Enrico,  2,  268  n. 

Malay  States,  2,  660.  {See  Straits  Settle- 
ments.) 

Mali)laciuet,  battle  of,  1,  253. 
Malta,  1,  80,  106,  575;  2,  7,  658-659 
Malthus,  T.  R.,  2,  83,  235,  236,  555- 
Mamelukes,  2,  511. 
"Manchester  Massacre,"  2,  36. 
Manchuria,  2,  564,  566-568,  583,  585,  587- 
588. 

Manitoba,  2,  646. 

Manocl  II,  of  Portugal,  2,  387. 

Manorial  System,  in  1500, 1,  29-36 ;  in  eight- 
eenth century,  395-399. 

Manufacturing.  {See  Domestic  System; 
Factory  System;  Gilds;  Industry;  Mer- 
cantilism.) 

Marat,  1,  491-494,  498,  509,  510,  517. 

"March  Days"  (1848),  2,  130-133. 

Marengo,  battle  of,  1,  526,  546. 

Margaret  of  Parma,  1,  92. 

Marianne  Islands,  2,  422,  594. 

Maria  Christina,  of  Spain,  2,  382-383. 

Maria  Louisa,  1,  555,  566. 

Maria  II,  of  Portugal,  2,  28,  385-386. 

Maria  Theresa,  of  Austria,  1,  346-347,  351- 
352,  355-362,  387,  443-445,  459- 

Maria  Theresa,  of  France,  1,  230,  243. 

Marie  Antoinette,  1,  459,  467,  476-478,  487- 
488,  495-496,  499,  508,  510. 

Marie  de'  Medici.    {See  Medici,  Marie  de'.) 

Marignano,  battle  of,  1,  77. 

Marlborough,  1,  253,  308. 

Marlowe,  1,  196. 

Marriage.    {See  Matrimony.) 

Marseillaise,  1,  499,  505,  544;  2,  120,  698. 

Marshall  Islands,  2,  412,  594. 

Marston  Moor,  battle  of,  1,  276. 

Martinique,  1,  302 ;  2,  607. 

Marx,  Karl,  2,  255-265,  266,  268,  269,  331, 
333,  410,  477. 

Mary,  of  Burgundy,  1,  13,  74. 

Mary  (Tudor),  of  England,  1,  86,  98,  147, 
154-155,  190. 

Mary  II,  of  England,  1,  287-289. 

Mary  (Stuart),  Queen  of  Scots,  1,  98-99,  103, 
108,  147. 

Mass,  in  Catholic  Church,  1,  119,  154,  155. 
Massachusetts,  1,  300,  331. 
Masulipatam,  1,  317. 
Matrimony,  1,  119. 


Matthias,  Emperor,  1,  221. 
Matthias  Huiiyadi,  of  Hungary,  1,  23. 
Maunditvillf,  Sir  John,  1,  45  n. 
Mauritius,  1,  567  n.,  575  ;  2,  7,  628,  629,658. 
Maximilian  I,  Emix.'r<jr,  1,  13,  20,  74,  190. 
Maximilian  1,  of  Bavaria,  1,  220,  222,  228, 
352. 

Maximilian  II,  of  Bavaria,  2,  131. 
Maximilian,  of  Mexico,  2,  177-178,  612. 
"May  laws,"  2,  408-409. 
Mazarin,   Cardinal,   1,   216-218,  229-230, 

232-233,  235,  238,  242,  542. 
Mazzini,  2,  124,  139,  166,  173,  227,  376,  575. 
Mecklenburg,  2,  132,  399,  403. 
Medici  Family,  1,  18-19,  25,  79,  158,  187- 

189. 

Medici,  Catherine  de',  1,  101-104,  197. 
Medici,  Lorenzo  de',  1,  19,  127,  182. 
Medici,  Marie  de',  1,  191,  211-212,  215. 
Medicine,  1,  175-176,  417;  2,  231,  232. 
Mehemet  Ali,  2,  117,  51 1-5 12,  617,  627. 
Melancthon,  1,  136. 
Mendel,  Gregor,  248-249. 
Mendicants,  1,  115. 
Menelek,  of  Abyssinia,  2,  632-633. 
Mentana,  battle  of,  2,  174  n. 
Mercantilism,  1,  63-64,  239-240,  322-324, 

338,  351,  400-401 ;  2,  42,  81-82,  547-548, 

552,  644. 
"Merchant  Adventurers,"  1,  262. 
Merchant  Gild.    {See  Gild,  Merchant.) 
Merv,  2,  591. 
Metayers,  1,  32. 

Methodists,  1,  148,  412;  2,  244. 
Methodius,  Saint,  2,  556. 
Methuen  Treaty  (1703),  1,  252,  289,  550. 
Metric  System,  1,  511. 

Mettemich,  Prince,  2,  3-6,  9-14,  18,  21,  23, 
25,  28,  29,  39-50,  54-59,  61-62,  123,  125, 
129-131,  132,  133,  166-167,  181,  194,  212, 
410. 

Metz,  1,  79,  102,  228;  2,  200,  201. 

Mexico,  1,  56,  74;  2,  25-26,  160,  176-178, 
195,  602,  604,  611,  612-613. 

Michael  (Romanov),  of  Russia,  1,  369. 

Michelangelo,  1,  186-189. 

Middle  Class.    {See  Bourgeoisie.) 

Miguel,  Dom,  of  Portugal,  2,  27,  28,  385. 

Milan,  1,  7,  16,  17,  74,  77-79,  87,  253,  516. 
{See  Lombardy.) 

Milan  Decree,  1,  548. 

Milan  I,  of  Serbia,  2,  519-520. 

Militarism,  2,  221,  684,  685,  688-691,  709, 
720;  (French),  161-163,  196-198,  335- 
336,  345,  366-367;  (German),  182-183, 
185-186,  192,  405-406,  413,  414,  416,  422- 
423,425;  (Italian),  372, 373;  (Russian), 
458. 


INDEX 


755 


Millerand,  2,  365,  367. 
Milosh  (Obrenovich),  of  Serbia,  2,  49  n.,  499, 
519- 

Milton,  1,  195,  196. 

Milyuk6v,  2,  477,  481,  484. 

Minimum  wage,  in  Great  Britain,  2,  310-311. 

"Ministerial  Responsibility,"  British,  2,  295  ; 

French,  361-362. 
Minorca,  1,  309,  313,  334,  336. 
Mir  Jafir,  1,  317. 
Mir,  Russian,  2,  454-455,  469. 
Mirabeau,  1,  471-474,  487,  491-493,  543. 
Missionaries,  Christian,  1,  61,  115,  162;  2, 

556-559,  561,  563,  567,  577,  586,  618,  620. 
Mississippi,  1,  56,  309,  312,  317. 
Mistery,  1,  40  n. 
Mobile,  1,  310. 

Modena,  2,  8,  124,  136-137,  171,  172. 
Moderate  Royalists,  French,  2,  17-20. 
Modernism,  in  Catholic  Church,  2,  250-251. 
Mogul,  1,  302,  315  ;  2,  663-664,  668. 
Mohacs,  battle  of,  1,  81. 
Mohammed  Ali  Mirza,  of  Persia,  2,  589. 
Mohammed  II,  of  Turkey,  1,  52. 
Mohammed  V,  of  Turkey,  2,  527. 
Mohammedanism,  1,123,1 70.  {See  Turkey.) 
Moldavia,  1,  386;    2,  502-503.    {See  Ru- 
mania.) 
Moliere,  1,  237. 

Moltke,  Hellmuth  von,  2,  182,  196,  200,  695. 

Moluccas.    {See  Spice  Islands.) 

Monastic  Orders,  1,  114-115,  154,  406,  484; 

2,  168,  357,  371,  384,  388,  436,  556. 
Monck,  General,  1,  281. 
Money,  1,  66. 

Mongolia,  2,  564,  568,  587,  588. 

Mongols,  1,  22,  52,  368;     2,  467.  {See 

Tatars.) 
Monmouth,  duke  of,  1,  286. 
Monroe  Doctrine,  2,  25-26,  178,  603-604. 
Montcalm,  1,  314,  315. 
Montenegro,  1,  23  ;  2,  212,  377,  499,  504-505, 

506,  507,  521,  528-529,  530-533,  534,  536, 

537,  708,  716,  717- 
Montesquieu,  1,  421-422,  485  ;  2,  29. 
Montezuma,  1,  56. 
Montfort,  Simon  de,  1,  265. 
Montreal,  1,  314,  315. 
Montt,  Admiral,  2,  611. 
Moors,  1,  7,  8.    (See  Morocco.) 
Moravia,  1,  76  n. ;  2,  126,  127,  427,  428. 
More,  Sir  Thomas,  1,  150,  153,  157,  183-184, 

195,  201-202. 
Morea,  1,  80;  2,  511.    {See  Greece.) 
Moreau,  1,  506,  514,  526. 
Moriscos,  1,  91. 

Morocco,  2,  381-382,  385,  425,  554,  624-625, 
630,  631,  636,  704-706. 


Moscow,  1,  21,  368,  369,  379,  561. 
Mountainists,  1,  503. 

Mozambique,  2,  386  n.,  616,  625.  {See  Por- 
tuguese East  Africa.) 

Mukden,  battle  of  (1905),  2,  584,  704. 

"Mule,  Spinning,"  2,  70. 

Mun,  Albert  (Comte)  de,  2,  364. 

Municipal  Corporations  Act,  British,  2,  91, 
113,  288,  291. 

Miinzer,  Thomas,  1,  134  n. 

Murat,  Joachim,  1,  552,  564,  571  n. 

Murillo,  1,  191,  195. 

Murshidabad,  1,  317. 

Muscovy,  1,  21-22,  366.    {See  Russia.) 

Music,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  192. 

Mutiny  Act,  1,  288. 

Mutsuhito,  of  Japan,  2,  580,  585. 

Mysore,  1,  339 ;  2,  664. 

Nabob.    {See  Nawab.) 
Nachtigal,  2,  622. 
Nanking,  treaty  of  (1842),  2,  562. 
Nantes,  Edict  of,  1,  144,  209,  214,  241,  349, 
408. 

Naples,  1,  7,  9, 16,  74,  76-79,  253,  256,  444  n., 
516,  534,  541,  552,  571  n.;  2,  45,  129. 
{See  Italy ;  Two  Sicilies.) 

Napoleon  I,  emperor  of  the  French,  1,  510, 
511,  514-517,  523-581,  319;  2,  2-3,  4,  5,  8, 
9,  15-16,  26,  38,  150,  152,  181,  336,  378, 
385,  437,  491,  511,  617,  626,  715. 

Napoleon  II  (duke  of  Reichstadt,  king  of 
Rome,  "L'Aiglon"),  1,  555,  571;  2,  150 
n.,  157  n. 

Napoleon  III,  emperor  of  the  French,  1,  573  ; 

2,  123,  150-163,  169-172,  174-180,  185, 

188-189,  195-207,  266,  331,  334,  336,  338, 

342,  346,  351,  715. 
Napoleonic  Code.    {See  Code  Napoleon.) 
"Napoleonic  Legend,"  1,  572-573 ;  2,  151- 

152. 

Narva,  battle  of,  1,  377. 
Nasi,  2,  369. 
Nassau,  2,  96,  131,  191. 
Natal,  2,  616,  626,  645,  650-652. 
National  Assembly.    {See  Assembly.) 
National    Convention.    {See  Convention, 
National.) 

National  Defense,  Government  of,  2,  200- 

201,  331-332. 
National  Guard,  in  French  Revolution,  1, 

475,  477- 

National  Liberal  Party,  in  Germany,  2,  193, 
406,  407,  411,  417,  420,  421,  424. 

"National  Workshops,"  2,  121,  255. 

Nationalism,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  3-10, 
14-15  n.,  24,  81-84,  89-90;  and  the  Prot- 
estant Revolt,  i2<>-i22,  125,  167;  and 


7S6 


INDEX 


commerce,  63 ;  and  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, 518;  and  Napoleon,  545,  575;  and 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  2,  9-10;  and 
democracy,  65,  149;  and  Catholicism, 
164-165,  226;  growth  of,  in  nineteenth 
century,  149-206,  213,  218;  and  the  "new 
imperialism,"  220,  559;  in  Austria-Hun- 
gary, 126,  427,  433-434;  in  the  Balkans, 
494-498,  535-536;  in  Germany,  125;  in 
Italy,  124,  377  ;  in  Russia,  460,  465,  470- 
471,478;  in  Turkey,  527. 

Nationalists,  Irish,  2,  305,  307,  323-326. 

Nations,  VV^ar  of.    {Sec  War  of  the  Nations.) 

"Natural  Boundaries,"  doctrine  of,  1,  80, 
242,  243. 

"Natural  Selection,"  theory  of,  2,  236-237. 
Navarino,  battle  of,  2,  49. 
Navarre,  1,  8,  76,  77,  102,  105. 
Navigation  Acts,  1,  277,  304,  323-324.  325, 

328,  338,  401  ;  repeal  of,  2,  548. 
Nawab,  1,  303  ;  2,  663. 
Near  East,  Question  of,  1,  386-387 ;  2,  490- 

542,  688,  706-713. 
Necker,  1,  458-4S9,  474,  475- 
Nelson,  1,  516,  527,  538. 
Nepal,  2,  565,  569-570,  592,  595.  665. 
Nepotism,  1,  127. 
Nesselrode,  2,  6. 

Netherlands,  Austrian  (Belgian),  1,  95,  253, 
344-346.  355,  357,  446-447,  496,  504,  515- 
(See  Belgium.) 

Netherlands,  Dutch  (Holland ;  Seven  United 
Provinces),  1,  57-59,  95-97.  loi.  i45,  227, 
229,  232,  243-249,  254,  290,  299,  306-307, 
334,  337,  356^358,  516,  534.  550,  564,  576- 
577.  (For  history  since  1815,  see  Nether- 
lands or  Low  Countries,  kingdom  of.) 

Netherlands  (or  Low  Countries),  1,  19-20, 
25,  49,  57-58,  74,  75,  77-79,  86-89,  9i-^7, 
III,  135,  14s,  162;  kingdom  of,  1,  564,  2, 
7-8,  53-55,  144,  196,  439-442,  451,  549, 
577,  578,  579,  593-594,  616-617,  633- 

Netherlands,  Spanish  (Belgian),  1,  91-95, 
162,  219,  227-228,  242-244,  253.  {See 
Netherlands,  Austrian;  Belgium.) 

New  Amsterdam,  1,  59. 

New  Brunswick,  2,  644,  645. 

New  Caledonia,  2,  160,  593  n. 

Newcastle,  duke  of,  2,  279. 

Newcomen,  Thomas,  2,  72. 

New  England,  1,  148,  300-301,  307,  325-326. 

Newfoundland,  1,  300,  309;  2,  642,  645,  646, 
647,  653. 

New  France,  1,  301,  305,  312. 

New  Guinea,  British,  2,  593,  648  n. ;  Dutch, 
439,  593;  German,  412,  594;  Portuguese, 
1,  55,  59- 

New  Lanark,  2,  86-87. 


Newman,  Cardinal,  2,  244, 

"New  M(xlel,"  1,  287. 

New  Netherland,  1,  59,  60,  301. 

New  Orleans,  1,  310. 

New  South  Wales,  2,  645,  647 ,  649. 

New  Spain,  1,  60. 

Newspapers,  1,  437-438;  2,  74,  loa. 
Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  1,  415-416,  418,  421 ;  % 

231. 

"New  Tories,"  1,  439, 

New  York,  1,  59,  301  n.,  325. 

New  Zealand,  2,  642,  649-650. 

Ney,  Marshal,  1,  562,  569;  2,  16. 

Niagara,  Fort,  1,  310,  313,  314. 

Nicaragua,  2,  604,  607,  608. 

Nice,  2,  166,  170,  172. 

Nicholas  I,  of  Montenegro,  2,  521. 

Nicholas  I,  of  Russia,  2,  40-41,  49,  50,  54, 

56,  140,  142,  162,  452-453,  457,  460,  468, 

470,  501-502. 
Nicholas  II,  of  Russia,  2,  466,  472,  473,  475, 

479,  482,  486-487,  686,  698. 
Nietzsche,  2,  268  n. 
Nigeria,  2,  623,  629,  658,  660. 
Nihilists,  Russian,  2,  458,  462. 
Nijmwegen,  treaty  of  (1678),  1,  246. 
Nile,  battle  of,  1,  527,  546. 
Nobel,  Alfred,  2,  684. 

Nobility,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  28-34,  90, 
loi ;  French,  in  seventeenth  century,  214- 
215,  237,  239;  in  eighteenth  century,  403- 
405,  464;  in  French  Revolution,  469,  472, 
479-481,  518;  in  nineteenth  century,  2, 
215-216. 

Noblesse  de  la  robe,  1,  238,  453. 

Nogi,  General,  2,  584. 

Non-Conformists,  1,  156 ;  2,  306. 

Non-juring  clergy,  1,  484  n.,  488. 

North,  Lord,  1,  292,  330,  436. 

North  America.    {See  America.) 

North  America  Act,  British,  2,  645-646. 

North  German  Confederation,  2,  1 91-193, 
404. 

North  West  Frontier  Pro\dnce,  of  India,  2, 

663,  666,  670  n. 
Northwest  Passage,  1,  60. 
Norway,  1,  21,  137,  378,  564;  2,  8,  442,  443- 

445- 

Notables,  Assembly  of,  1,  460. 
Nova  Scotia,  1,  309 ;  2,  644,  645-646. 
Novgorod,  1,  47,  49,  369. 
Nyasaland,  2,  626,  660. 
Nystad,  treaty  of  (1721),  1,  378,  381. 

"Oath  of  the  Tennis  Court,"  1,  473. 
Obreno^■ich  Family,  2,  49  n.,  499,  519-520, 
706-707. 

O'Connell,  Daniel,  2,  37,  103-104,  226,  323. 


INDEX 


757 


O'Connor,  Feargus,  2,  iii,  112. 
"October  Manifesto,"  2,  480. 
Octobrists,  in  Russia,  2,  481,  484. 
Octroi,  1,  39. 

Oglethorpe,  James,  1,  311. 
Ohio  Company,  1,  312. 
Oku,  General,  2,  584. 

Old-age  Pensions,  2,  313,  350,  413.  {See 

Insurance,  Workingmen's.) 
"Old  Believers,"  2,  466. 
"  Old  Catholics,"  2,  229,  407-408. 
Oldenburg,  2,  399. 

"Old  Pretender."    {See  James  III,  of  Eng- 
land.) 
OUivier,  2,  179. 
Oman,  2,  595,  596. 
Ontario,  2,  643-645. 
Opium  War,  2,  562. 

Orange  Family.    {See  William,  of  Orange.) 
Orange  River  Free  State  (Orange  River 

Colony),  2,  626,  645,  650-652. 
"Orders  in  Council,"  1,  548. 
Ordination,  1,  119,  166. 
Orissa,  2,  664,  665,  670  n. 
Orleanists,  2,  179,  338,  344. 
Orleans,  duke  of   (Louis  Philippe).  {See 

Louis  Philippe,  of  France ;  Paris,  count  of.) 
Orleans,  duke  of  (Philippe  Egalit6),  1,  503, 

508. 

Orleans,  duke  of  (Regent  of  France),  1,  255- 

256,  456.. 
Orsini,  2,  170. 

Orthodox  Church,  1,  122  ;  2,  493 ;  in  Russia, 

1,  21-22, 368,  372-373, 380-382,2, 466-468. 
Oscar  II,  of  Sweden,  2,  445. 

Osman  Pasha,  2,  504. 

Oswego,  1,  314. 

Otis,  James,  1,  329. 

Otto  I,  of  Greece,  2,  50,  499,  515. 

Ottoman  Empire.    {See  Turkey.) 

Ottoman  Turks.    {See  Turkey.) 

Oudenarde,  battle  of,  1,  253. 

Owen,  Robert,  2,  86-87,  88,  no,  254,  257. 

"Oxford  Movement,"  in  nineteenth  century, 

2,  244-245. 

Oxford  Reformers,  in  sixteenth  century,  1, 
149. 

Oyama,  Marshal,  2,  584. 
Ozanam,  2,  118. 

Pacifism,  1,  210,  411-412  ;  2,  683-687,  719- 
720. 

"Padlock  Bill,"  Spanish,  2,  384. 

Paine,  Thomas,  1,  495,  503 ;  2,  32. 

Painting,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  188-192. 

Palatinate,  in  Thirty  Years'  War,  1,  220,  222, 
228-229,  352;  War  of  the,  247-249;  in 
nineteenth  century,  2,  139,  141,  196. 


Palestrina,  1,  192. 
Pallium,  1,  117,  126. 
Palmerston,  2,  54,  281,  283. 
Panama,  1,  54 ;  2,  109,  604-605,  607. 
Panjdeh,  2,  591. 

Pan-Slavism,  2,  134-135.  465-471,  474,  475, 
485-487,  488-489,  537,  709,  711  n. 

Papacy.    {See  Pope.) 

Papal  Guarantees,  law  of,  2,  371. 

Papal  States,  1,  16,  78-79,  406  n.,  550;  2, 
7,  55,  131,  136,  139,  155,  163-164,  171,  172, 
174,  175,  204,  230. 

Paper,  invention  of,  1,  178. 

Papin,  Denys,  2,  72. 

Papua,  2,  648  n. 

Paraguay,  2,  606,  610. 

Paris,  and  the  Fronde,  1,  218 ;  and  the  French 
Revolution,  467,  474-478,  487-488,  490- 
493,  498,  501,  506,  508,  510,  513;  com- 
mune of  (1789-1794),  475-476,  500; 
beautification  of,  under  Napoleon  I,  532 ; 
beautification  of,  under  Napoleon  III, 
2,  159;  surrender  of  (1814),  1,  566;  siege 
of  (i870-i87i),2,  201 ;  commune  of  (1871), 
333-335  ;  capital  of  Third  French  Repub- 
lic, 345  ;  local  government  of,  337  ;  Con- 
gress of  (1856),  169 ;  Declaration  of  (1856), 
680-681;  peace  of  (1763),  1,  317;  peace 
of  (1783),  335,  336 ;  treaty  of  (1814),  567 ; 
treaty  of  (1815),  2,  11;  treaty  of  (1856), 
163,  502,  505. 

Paris,  covmt  of,  2,  120,  179  n.,  338-339. 

Parish,  1,  114. 

Parlements,  French,  1,  217-218,  450,  452-453, 
458,  460-461. 

Parliament  Act,  British  (191 1),  2,  289-290, 
291,  295,  325- 

Parliament,  English  (British),  origin  of,  1, 
265-266;  under  the  Tudors,  4,  5,  152-156, 
261-263,  266-267  ;  contest  with  Stuarts, 
267-288;  in  eighteenth  century,  289-293, 
■323,  327-329,  337,  403,  430-439;  in  nine- 
teenth century,  2,  29-30,  34,  36,  90-91, 
103-107,  110-113,  278,  284-290,  292-296, 
316. 

Parliament,  French.  {See  Estates- General ; 
France,  under  Third  Republic.) 

Parliament,  German.  {See  Bundesrat; 
Diet;  Reichstag.) 

Parliament,  in  Netherlands.  {See  States- 
General.) 

Parliament,  Irish,  1,  431 ;  2,  322-323. 
Parliament,  Italian,  2,  174,  370. 
Parliament,  Portuguese.    {See  Cortes.) 
ParUament,  Russian.    {See  Duma.) 
Parliament,  Spanish.    {See  Cortes.) 
Parma,  1,  566;  2,  8,  124,  136-137,  171,  172 
Parma,  duke  of  (Alexander  Farnese),  1,  95- 


7S8 


INDEX 


I'iirma,  Margaret,  duchess  of,  1,  02. 

I'arnell,  Charles  Stewart,  2,  ,^24. 

Parthenoi)flean  Republic.    {See  Naples.) 

Pascal,  1,  408. 

Pascendi,  encyclical,  2,  251. 

Pasteur,  Louis,  2,  24.S. 

Patriarchate,  1,  114. 

Patrick,  Saint,  2,  556. 

Patrimony  of  St.  Peter.    {See  Papal  States.) 

Patriotism.    {See  Nationalism.) 

Paul  I,  of  Russia,  1,  537. 

Paul  III,  Pope,  1,  158,  ig8. 

Paul,  Saint,  2,  556. 

Pavia,  siege  of,  1,  78. 

Peasantry,  in  si.xteenth  century,  1,  29-36; 
and  Protestant  Revolt  in  Germany,  133- 
134,  169;  French,  and  Richelieu,  215;  and 
Colbert,  239 ;  in  eighteenth  century,  395- 
399,  405  ;  in  French  Revolution,  469,  472, 
479,  480,  488,  489,  518;  and  Napwleon  I, 
533 ;  in  Prussia,  556 ;  in  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, 2,  2,  IS,  216,  321,  453-455-  {See 
Agriculture;  Serfdom.) 

Peasants'  Revolt,  in  Germany,  1,  133-135. 

Pedro  I,  of  Brazil,  2,  27,  28. 

Pedro  II,  of  Brazil,  2,  610. 

Pedro  IV,  of  Portugal,  2,  28,  386. 

Pedro  V,  of  Portugal,  2,  387. 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  2,  37,  92-93,  104,  108,  112, 
113,  IIS,  279- 

Peixoto,  Brazilian  president,  2,  611. 

Pelew  Islands,  2,  422,  594. 

Pemba,  2,  623,  660. 

Penance,  1,  118-119. 

Peninsular  War,  1,  551-554.  557-558,  565; 
2,  21. 

Pennsylvania,  1,  301,  411. 

Pepperell,  William,  1,  311. 

Perr>',  Commodore,  2,  578. 

Persia,  2,  588-592,  599. 

Peru,  1,  56;  2,  606,  609. 

Peterloo.    {See  ''Manchester  Massacre.") 

Peter  I  (the  Great),  of  Russia,  1,  369-374, 

376-379;  2,  465. 
Peter  III,  of  Russia,  1,  360,  380. 
Peter  I,  of  Serbia,  2,  520-521,  707. 
Peter,  Saint,  1,  113;  2,  228-229. 
"Peter's  Pence,"  1,  1x7,  407. 
Petition  of  Right,  1,  271-272,  282,  288;  2, 

291. 

Petrarch,  1,  15,  180-182,  193,  194,  201. 
Petrograd  (St.  Petersburg),  1,  379;  2,  467, 
471  n. 

Philip  IV  (the  Fair),  of  France,  1,  469. 

Philip  I,  of  Spain,  1,  13,  74. 

Philip  II,  of  Spain,  1,  55-58,  86-107,  155, 

163,  187,  190,  261,  303,  572. 
Philip  III,  of  Spain,  1,  96. 


Philip  IV,  of  Spain,  1,  226,  230,  243. 
I'hilip  V,  of  Si)ain  (Philip  of  Anjou),  1,  250- 
253,  256  n. 

Philippines,  1,  54,  58,  315,  317 ;  2,  382,  595, 

603. 

Philosophes,  1,  419. 
Pichegru,  1,  506,  514,  533. 
Picquart,  2,  356-357. 

Piedmont,  1,  534,  568;    2,  7,  163-164  n. 

(.S'ec  Sardinia ;  Savoy.) 
"Pilgrimage  of  Grace,"  1,  153. 
Pilgrims,  1,  300. 
Pillnitz,  Declaration  of,  1,  496. 
Pitt,  William  (Earl  of  Chatham),  1,  292,  314, 

327,  360,  321. 
Pitt,  William  (the  younger),  1,  438-439,  516, 

537-538,  546 ;  2,  28,  643,  666. 
Pius  V,  Pope,  1,  106. 

Pius  VII,  Pope,  1,  529,  533,  550,  568;  2,  3, 
7,  12. 

Pius  IX,  Pope,  2,  124,  130,  139,  15s,  164,  165, 
168,  170,  171,  174,  204,  226-230,  233,  246, 
249,  250,  344,  371-372,  407. 

Pius  X,  Pope,  1,  117;  2,  251,  358,  359,  372. 

Pizarro,  1,  56. 

Place,  Francis,  2,  106,  109,  1x3  n. 
Plain  (French  political  group),  1,  503. 
Plassey,  battle  of,  1,  317  ;  2,  664. 
Plebiscite,  1,  526,  533;  2,  156,  172,  179. 
Plehve,  2,  462,  465,  472,  473,  474,  476,  477, 

478,  479,  482,  485- 
Plevna,  siege  of,  2,  504,  5x8. 
Plombi^res,  2,  170. 

Plural  Voting  Bill,  British,  2,  290,  293  n., 
306. 

Pobedonostsev,  2,  461-462,  465,  472,  476, 

477,  480. 
Pogroms,  2,  472. 

Poincar^,  Raymond,  French  President,  2, 
367. 

Poland,  in  1500,  1,  22;  religion  of,  162-164, 
381-382 ;  personal  union  of,  with  Saxony, 
353  ;  and  Sweden,  225,  376-377  ;  and  Tur- 
key, 383  ;  and  Prussia,  348,  361,  506;  and 
Russia,  367,  369,  385-388;  in  eighteenth 
century,  381-383,  390;  partitions  of,  361, 
387-388;  grand-duchy  of  Warsaw,  540, 
541,  559,  563,  564;  constitutional  kingdom 
under  Russian  tsar,  2,  6-7,  38;  revolt  of 
(1831),  56-57,  117,  151,  453;  revolt  of 
(1863),  176,  188,  456-457,  468,  694;  Rus- 
sian, since  1863,  468,  470,  474  n.,  478,479, 
481,  483,  485,  487  ;  Austrian,  since  18x5,  7, 
126-127,  129,  176,  427-428,  433;  Pnis- 
sian,  since  1815,  7,  176,  181,  419,  426. 

Pole,  Cardinal,  1,  155. 

Polignac,  2,  51. 

Polish  Election,  War  of,  1,  256,  456. 


INDEX 


759 


PoUtiques,  1,  104-105, 
Polo,  Marco,  1,  50;  2,  561. 
Poltava,  battle  of,  1,  377. 
Pomerania,  1,  228,  348,  374,  376,  378,  564; 
2,  8. 

Pompadour,  Madame  de,  1,  358,  457,  459. 
Pondicherry,  1,  304,  310,  311,  317,  319;  2, 
593- 

Poniatowski,  Stanislaus,  1,  385,  388,  495. 

Poor  Law,  British  (1834),  2,  114,  212. 

Pope  (and  Papacy),  claims  and  rights  of,  1, 
113-117,  122,  IS9,  166,  169-170,  409; 
infallibility  of,  2,  228-229;  temporal  rule 
of,  1,  16-18,  78-79,  106,  406  n.,  550,  2,  7, 
163-164,  171-175,  204,  230;  and  Protes- 
tant Revolt,  1,  124-156 ;  and  French  Rev- 
olution, 484;  and  Napoleon,  529,  533, 
550;  and  nineteenth-century  "Liberalism," 
2,  227-330,  249;  patronage  of  art  and 
learning  by,  1,  183,  189-190,  2,  246-249; 
and  sodal  reform,  249-250;  and  Modern- 
ism, 251.    (See  Catholic  Church.) 

"Popish  Plot,"  1,  285. 

Port  Arthur,  2,  566,  567,  568,  583,  584,  585, 
588. 

Port  Jackson,  1,  340. 
Port  Royal,  1,  307,  308. 
Porte,  Sublime,  2,  491. 
Portsmouth,  Treaty  of  (1905),  2,  474  n.,  568, 
58s. 

Portugal,  in  1500,  1,  7-10;  and  early  explo- 
ration, 51-52  ;  commercial  importance  of, 
in  sixteenth  century,  53,  55 ;  religion  in, 
163;  annexed  by  Spain,  55-56,  89-91; 
independence  reestablished,  228;  begin- 
ning of  close  relation  with  England,  252; 
in  eighteenth  century,  444 ;  and  Napoleon, 
550-553;  in  nineteenth  and  twentieth 
centuries,  2,  26-28,  385-389.  3Q5-396,  717 
'n. ;  colonial  empire  of,  386  n.,  548-549, 
561,  562,  571,  577,  615-616,  619,  625,  636. 

Portuguese  East  Africa  (Mozambique),  2, 
386  n.,  616,  625,  636. 

Portuguese  West  Africa  (Angola),  2,  386  n., 
616,  625,  636. 

Posen,  2,  419. 

Postal  reform,  British,  2,  114. 
Pragmatic  Sanction  of  Bourges,  1,  121. 
Pragmatic  Sanction  of  Emperor  Charles  VI, 

1.  346,  353,  356. 
Prague,  insurrection  in  (1618),  1,  221-222; 

insurrection  in  (1848),  2,  134;   treaty  of 

(1635),  1,226-227;  treaty  of  (1866), 2, 190. 
Predestination,  1,  165-166. 
Prefects,  French,  1,  528;  2,  336-338. 
Presbyterians,  1,  143,  263,  273-276,  280,  284- 

285,  411 ;  2,  244.    (See  Calvinism.) 
Presqu'  Isle,  Fort,  1,  312. 


Pressburg,  treaty  of  (1805),  1,  S38-539' 

"Prester  John,"  1,  51. 

Pretoria,  convention  of  (1881),  2,  651  n. 

Pride's  Purge,  1,  276. 

Priesthood,  Christian,  1,  119. 

Priestley,  1,  411,  417. 

Prince  Edward  Island,  2,  644-645,  646. 

Prince  Imperial,  2,  180, 

Prince   Regent,   of   Great   Britain.  (See 

George  IV.) 
Princeton,  battle  of,  1,  333. 
Printing,  1,  177-180,  202;  2,  74. 
Priors,  1,  114. 

Prison  reform,  2,  109,  113,  115. 

Privy  Council  (English,  British),  1,  290,  432; 

2,  294,  654. 
Progressist  Party,  in  France,  2,  365,  367. 
Progressive  Party,  in  Germany,  2,  x 85-1 86, 

193,  406,  407,  410,  417,  418,  426. 
Proletarians,  Industrial.    (5ee  Workingmea.) 
Propaganda,  Congregation  of  the,  2,  556. 
Protectorate,  British,  1,  279-281. 
Protestant,  origin  of  name,  1,  136. 
Protestantism,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  124- 

174;  in  eighteenth  century,  410-413;  in 

nineteenth  century,  2,  234-225,  241-245. 
Proudhon,  2,  119,  153,  256,  257,  265-268, 

269,  333- 
Provence,  1,  6,  451  n. 

Provence,  count  of.  (See  Louis  XVIII,  of 
France.) 

"Provisions  of  Oxford,"  1,  265. 

Prussia,  1,  348  n. ;  rise  of,  347-352,  440-443 ; 
a  kingdom,  254,  350;  conflict  of,  with 
Austria  in  eighteenth  century,  354-362; 
and  French  Revolution,  506;  Napoleon 
and  regeneration  of,  538-542,  S55-S57»  s6o, 
562-566,  570-571,  575;  in  era  of  Metter- 
nich,  2,  6,  7,  8,  11,  43,  680;  and  ZoUverein, 
96;  in  Revolution  of  1848-1849,  131,  132, 
139,  141-144;  and  German  unification, 
162,  180-202,  457 ;  a  state  of  the  German 
Empire,  397,  399,  400-403,  408,  419.  (See 
Brandenburg ;  Germany ;  Hohenzollern 
Family.) 

"Ptolemaic  System,"  1,  197-198. 

Public  Safety,  Committee  of,  1,  507-508. 

Puerto  Rico,  1,  56 ;  2,  382,  603. 

Punjab,  2,  591,  663,  665,  670  n.,  67?. 

Puritanism,  1,  143,  148,  268-269,  273-382, 
284-385,  300. 

Pusey,  Edward,  2,  244. 

Pym,  John,  1,  274. 

Pyrenees,  Peace  of  the  (1659),  1,  230,  343, 
Hi- 

Quadruple  Alliance  (1815),  2,  13-14,  23.  37» 
47. 


760 


INDEX 


Quakers,  1,  156,  301,  411,  437 ;  2,  244,  283. 

Quanta  cura,  encyclical,  2,  227. 

Quebec,  1,  301,  307,  314-315,  in,  33i,  337  ; 

2,  643,  644,  645. 
Quebec  Act,  1,  331,  337 ;  2,  643. 
Queen  Anne's  War,  1,  252,  308. 
Queensland,  2,  645,  647,  649. 
Quesnay,  1,  425. 
Quiben)n  Bay,  battle  of,  1,  315. 
Quintuple  Alliance  (1818),  2,  13  n. 
Quintuple  Kntcnte  (1915),  2,  717. 

Rabelais,  1,  194. 
Racine,  1,  237. 

Radetzky,  General,  2,  131,  137,  140. 

Radicals,  British,  2,  32-33,  108-110. 

Radicals,  French,  2,  365-367. 

Radical  Socialists,  French,  2,  365-367. 

Railways,  2,  73-74,  96,  129,  159,  167,  214- 
215,  346,  369,  372-373,  383,  390,  405,  437, 
473-474,  516,  525,  567,  571,  581,  590,  591- 
592,  622,  646,  648,  706,  709-710. 

Raja,  1,  303  ;  2,  663. 

Rajputana,  2,  665. 

Raleigh,  1,  59. 

Rallies,  2,  354- 

Ramillies,  battle  of,  1,  253. 

Raphael,  1,  186,  189-190. 

Rationalism,  Eighteenth-Century,  1,  418- 
426,  429. 

Rebellion,  Canadian  (1837),  2,  643. 

Rebellion,  Great,  1,  275-281. 

Red  Cross,  2,  681. 

Redmond,  John,  2,  324,  326. 

"Red  Sunday,"  2,  479. 

Reform  Act,  British  (1832),  2,  90,  93,  104- 

107,  III,  113,  279,  289,  291;  (1867),  284- 

285;  (1884),  286-287. 
Reformation,  1,129.    (5ee  Protestantism.) 
Reformation,  Catholic,  1,  156-164. 
Reformed  Church,  1,  143.    {See  Calvinism.) 
Regulating  Act,  of  India,  2,  666. 
Reichsbank,  2,  405. 

Reichsdeputationshauptschluss,  1,  541-542. 

Reichsrat,  Austrian,  2,  428-429. 

Reichstadt,  duke  of.    {See  Napoleon  11.) 

Reichstag,  Austrian,  2,  134. 

Reichstag,  German,  2,  191,  397-402,  406,  410. 

Reichsverweser,  2,  136. 

Rembrandt,  1,  191-192. 

Renan,  2,  239-240,  244. 

Republicanism,  in  China,  2,  575-576;  in 
France,  52,  94,  116-117,  120-123,  179  {see 
France,  under  First,  Second,  and  Third 
Republics) ;  in  Germany,  139,  141 ;  in 
Greece,  499;  in  Hungary,  138-139,  140; 
in  Italy,  i39-r4o,  164,  166,  173,  376;  in 
Norway,  445 ;  in  Portugal,  386,  387,  388- 


389;    in  Spain,  380,  384.    {See  Liberia; 
Switzerland;      United   States;   and  th« 
several  Latin-American  countries.) 
Requesens,  1,  94. 

Rerum  twvarum,  encyclical,  2,  249-250. 

Restitution,  Edict  of,  1,  224. 

Restoration,  English,  1,  281-287;  French, 

2,  14-20;  Spanish,  2,  20-24,  380. 
Revolution,  American,  1,  322,  332-337,  340- 

341,  431,  436,  459-460;  2,  642-643. 
Revolution,  Chinese,  2,  576. 
Revolution,  Commercial,  1,  62-69;  2,  215. 
Revolution,  English,  of  1688  (1689),  1,  286- 

293,  297-298,  248. 
Revolution,  French  (i 789-1 799),  1,  332,  424, 

439,  443,  464-522  ;  2,  i,  loi,  104,  150,  213, 

217,  222-223,  225,  551 ;  French  (1830),  2, 

50-53,  94;  French  (1848),  1 19-123. 
Revolution,  Greek,  2,  47-50,  499. 
Revolution,  Industrial,  2,  67-82,  88-go,  97- 

99,  100-102,  214-215,  222.  _ 
Revolution,  Japanese,  2,  579-580. 
Revolution,  Latin-American,  2,  25-28,  606. 
Revolution  of  1830,  general,  2,  50-57. 
Revolution  of  1848-1849,  general,  2,  116- 

148. 

Revolution,  Persian,  2,  589-590. 
Revolution,  Portuguese  Republican,  2,  588- 
389. 

Revolution,  Religious,  in  sixteenth  century, 

1,  124-174. 
Revolution,  Russian,  2,  479-485,  489. 
Revolution,  Spanish,  of  1868,  2,  379. 
Revolution,  Turkish,  of  1908-1969,  2,  525- 

527- 

Revolutionary  Tribunal,  1,  508,  511. 

Rhine,  Confederation  of.  {See  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine.) 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  2,  621,  625,  699. 

Rhodesia,  2,  623,  626,  659-660. 

Ricardo,  David,  2,  217. 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  1,  212-216,  219,  225- 
228,  232-233,  235,  238,  242,  304,  306  n., 
528,  542,  565 ;  2,  337.  _  ^ 

"  Right,"  in  EuroF)ean  politics,  2, 363  ;  French, 
363,  36s;  Italian,  372.  {See  Bill  of 
Rights ;  Petition  of  Rights.) 

Rights  of  Man,  Declaration  of  (French),  1, 
482. 

Rio  de  Oro,  2,  385,  636. 

Rio  Mimi,  2,  385,  636. 

Risorgimento,  Italian,  2,  124,  136,  167. 

Rivet  Law,  2,  335. 

Robbia,  Luca  della,  1,  187, 

Roberts,  Lord,  2,  652. 

Robespierre,  1,  491,  493-494,  498,  503,  507 

509,  511,  S14,  517. 
Rochelle.    {See  La  Rochelle.) 


INDEX 


761 


Rochester,  John  Fisher,  bishop  of ,  1,  153- 
Rockingham,  1,  330. 
Rocroi,  battle  of,  1,  228. 
Rodney,  1,  228,  335. 
Roland,  Madame,  1,  498,  508. 
Romagna,  2,  171,  172. 
Roman    Catholic  Church.    {See  Catholic 
Church.) 

Romanov  Family,  1,  369,  389.    {See  Russia.) 

Rome,  as  ecclesiastical  center,  1,  113,  114; 
sack  of,  78 ;  as  capital  of  Italy,  2,  175,  204, 
371;  bishop  of,  5ee  Pope.  (Also  5ee  Papal 
States.) 

Roon,  Albrecht  von,  2,  182,  183. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  2,  686. 

Roses,  Wars  of  the,  1,  4. 

Rossbach,  battle  of,  1,  359, 

"Rotten  Boroughs,"  1,  434-435. 

"Roundheads,"  1,  275. 

Rousseau,  1,  421-424,  445,  465,  490,  493,; 

503.  : 

Roussillon,  1,  230. 

Royal  Council,  French,  1,  44^451. 

Royal  Society,  EngHsh,  1,  418.  ' 

Rubens,  1,  191. 

Rudolph  I,  Emperor,  1,  13.  ! 

Rudolph  II,  Emperor,  1,  221.  : 

Rumania  (Rumanians,  Rumans,  Vlachs),  1,' 
23,  345,  383 ;  2,  50,  163,  169,  212,  431,  467,1 
495,  497,  498,  500,  502-503,  504-505,  507, ' 
517-519,  532-533,  534,  536,  706-707,  717.  : 

Rumelia,  Eastern,  2,  507,  508. 

Rump  Parliament,  1,  276-279,  281.  ! 

Russell,  Lord  John,  2,  105,  no,  281,  283.  ' 

Russia,  in  1500, 1,  21-22,  25  ;  in  seventeenth' 
and  eighteenth  centuries,  358-361,  366- 
390,  443;  and  Napoleon  I,  526,  537-541, 
558^567,  575  ;  domestic  affairs  of,  in  nine-; 
teenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  2,  7,  8, 
37-41,  56-57,  61,  176,  452-489;  and  Con-' 
cert  of  Europe,  10-14,  23,  140,  679-680,' 
682,  686;  and  the  Near  East,  48-50,  162- 
163,  431,  491,  493,  499-506,  520,  522,  531, 
536-537,  538-539,  706-711 ;  in  Asia,  565,' 

566-  568,  575,  576,  578,  583-585,  586-592, J 
599;  and  France,  162-163,  188,  197,  469,- 
694,  698-703 ;  and  Germany,  188,  197,' 
404,  421,  424,  469,  692,  694-698,  704,  707- 
708 ;  and  War  of  the  Nations,  7 1 1-7 14,  717. 

Russo-Japanese  War,  2,  472,  474  n.,  478, 

567-  568,  583-585,  588,  599,  702.  ! 
Russo-Turkish  War  (1828-1829),  2,  500,^ 

(1877-1878),  503-50S,  695. 
Sabotage,  2,  271. 

Sacraments,  1,  11 8-1 19,  165-167. 
Sadowa,  battle  of,  2,  190,  202. 
Sagasta,  2,  382,  384. 
Saint-Simon,  2,  87,  88,  119,  354. 


Sakhalin,  2,  585,  587. 
Sahsbury,  2,  301,  322,  699. 
Salonica,  2,  516,  517,  529,  533. 
Salvador,  2,  607,  608. 
Samoa,  2,  422,  594,  603,  685. 
Sand,  Karl,  2,  43. 

Sand  River  Convention  (1852),  2,  651. 
Sans-Culoites,  1,  510. 

San  Stefano,  treaty  of  (1878),  2,  504-505, 
507- 

Santa  Cruz,  Andres,  2,  609. 

Santa  Maria,  Chilean  President,  2,  611. 

Santo  Domingo,  2,  604,  6o6,  607,  608. 

Saratoga,  battle  of,  1,  333.  ,  , 

Sardinia  (Piedmont,  Savoy),  1,  19,  76,  142, 
252,  254,  356,  505,  514,  534,  568;  2,  8,  44- 
45,  46,  124,  130-131,  136-137,  140,  163- 
174.    (5ee  Italy.) 

Saskatchewan,  2,  646. 

Savery,  James,  2,  72. 

Savoy,  acquired  by  France,  2,  172.  {See 

Sardinia.) 
Saxe,  Marshal,  1,  357. 
Saxe-Weimar,  2,  43,  399. 
Saxony,  1,  12,  130,  132,  225,  227,  353,  356, 

358-359,  540,  564-565,  568 ;  2,  6,  8,  55,  g6, 

125,^  131,  139,  141,  399,  400,  403. 
Scandinavian  Countries,  1,  21 ;  2,  442-446. 

(5ee  Denmark;  Norway;  Sweden.) 
Scharnhorst,  1,  556.  .    , . 

Scheldt,  closure  of  the,  1,  95.  •    • » 

Schleswig-Holstein,  2,  136,  186-188,  189- 

191,  418,  426,  442. 
Schwarzenberg,  FeUx,  Prince  von,  2,  138, 

140,  142,  143. 
Schwarzenberg,  Karl  Philipp,  Prince  von,  1, 

564,  565,  570. 
Science,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  196-203 ; 

in  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries, 

414-419,  429;    in  nineteenth  century,  2, 

222,  230-244,  247-249,  273-274. 
Scotland,  1,  6,  79,  146-147,  289,  430.  {See 

England ;  United  Kingdom.) 
Sculpture,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  187-188. 
Scutari,  capture  of,  by  Montenegrins,  2,  53Q- 

Sea  of  Japan,  battle  of,  2,  584. 
Second  Chinese  War,  2,  562-563. 
Second  Coalition,  1,  516,  526,  532, 
Secret  Police,  Russian,  2,  457. 
Security,  Committee  of  General,  1,  508. 
Sedan,  battle  of,  2,  200,  202,  203, 
Seditious  Meetings  Act,  British,  2,  30. 
See,  ecclesiastical,  1,  114. 
Semitism  and  Anti-Semitism.     {See  Jews.) 
Senegal,  1,  240,  302,  317  n.,  336;  2,  617,  629, 
630,  631. 

Separation  Law,  French  (1905),  2,  3S9- 


762 


INDEX 


Separatists,  1,  411.    {See  Independents.) 

Sepoy  Mutiny,  2,  667-668. 

September  Mas.sacres,  1,  501. 

"Septennate,"  in  Germany,  2,  406. 

Serbia  (Serbs),  1,  23,  345  ;  2,  4Q  n.,  134,  377, 
431,  434-435.  4»7,  4yi,  4y4-49S,  4^6-497, 
498,  4Q9.  S04-505,  507,  519-521,  528-533, 
534.  536-537,  538-539.  682,  706-708,  710- 
713,  717- 

Serfdom,  in  sixteenth  century,  1,  30-31,  32- 
36,  134-135;  in  eighteenth  century,  396- 
399  ;  in  Russia,  443  ;  in  Austria,  445,  447, 
448  n. ;  abolition  of,  in  France,  470,  480- 
481,  528,  530;  .abolition  of,  in  Naix)leonic 
States,  543,  552;  abolition  of,  in  Prussia, 
556;  abolition  of,  in  Austria,  2,  128-129, 
134,  141 ;  abolition  of,  in  Russia,  39,  453- 
455;  abolition  of,  in  Japan,  580-581; 
abolition  of,  in  Rumania,  518. 

Serge,  Grand-Duke,  of  Russia,  2,  479. 

Serrano,  Marshal,  2,  380. 

Servetus,  1,  143. 

Settlement,  Act  of  (English),  1,  289  n. 
Sevastojx)!,  siege  of,  2,  162. 
Seven  Weeks'  War,  2,  174,  187-191,  426. 
Seven  Years'  War,  1,  312-319,  359-361,  385, 

457,  459;  2,  664. 
Sevign6,  Madame  de,  1,  237. 
Seychelles  Islands,  2,  628. 
Sforza  Family,  1,  17,  77,  78,  188. 
Shaftesbury,  earl  of,  2,   115,   282.  (See 

Ashley,  Lord.) 
Shakespeare,  1,  196. 
Shelley,  2,  32  n..  33. 
Shevket  Pasha,  2,  526. 
Shimonoseki,  treaty  of  (1895),  2,  566. 
"Ship  Money,"  1,  272-273,  274 
Shoguns,  Japanese,  2,  578-580. 
"Short  Ballot,"  2,  337- 
Short  Parliament,  1,  274. 
Shuster,  Morgan  W.,  2,  590. 
Siam,  2,  565,  569,  593,  595. 
Siberia,  1,  367-368,  373;   2,  464,  467-468, 

483,  567,  586-592,  599. 
Sicilian  Vesp>ers,  1,  16. 

Sicily,  1,  16,  76,  87,  106,  254.    {See  Naples; 

Two  Sicilies.) 
Sickingen,  Franz  von,  1,  84-85. 
Sierra  Leone,  2,  617,  628-629,  658,  660. 
Sieyis,  1,  471-473,  49i,  503,  525- 
Sikhs,  2,  663. 

Silesia,  1,  355,  357,  3S9-361,  442. 
Simeon,  of  Bulgaria,  2,  498, 
Simony,  1,  127. 
Sind,  2,  663,  665. 
Sin-kiang,  2,  564,  565,  592. 
Six  Acts,  2,  36. 
Six  Articles,  1,  153. 


Slavery  (and  Slave-trade),  1,  56,  60,  61,  67, 
71-72,  412,  437,  532;  2,  10,  29,  IIS,  386^ 
618. 

Slavs,  1,  21.    {See  Pan-Slavism;  Russia; 

etc.) 

Small  Holdings  and  Allotments  Act,  8,  318. 
Smith,  Adam,  1,  338,  421,  425-426;  2,  82, 

91,  258,  547. 
Smolensk,  capture  of,  by  Napoleon,  1,  561. 
Sobieski,  John,  1,  383 ;  2,  490. 
Social  Democratic  Alliance,  2,  269. 
Social  Democratic  Federation  (British),  2, 

303. 

Social  Democratic  Party  (German),  2,  410. 

{See  Socialism,  in  Germany.) 
Social  Democratic  Party  (Russian),  2,  477, 

480,  483. 

Socialism,  in  nineteenth  century,  general,  2, 
86-88,  99,  223,  253-265,  275-276;  Uto- 
pian, 86-88,  254-255,  256;  Marxian,  255- 
265  ;  Reformist,  263-265  ;  Christian  (Eng- 
lish), 88  n.,  (Austrian),  432;  and  Anarch- 
ism, 267,  269,  271 ;  and  Catholicism,  249, 
262-263,  264;  and  internationalism,  197, 
261,  263,  683  ;  in  Austria,  432  ;  in  Belgium, 
391;  in  France,  119-123,  152-15S,  i54. 
179,  331,  333-335,  343,  349,  363-364;  in 
Germany,  261-262,  409,  410-41X,  415,  416, 
418,  424,  425,  426;  in  Great  Britain,  303, 
308,  311 ;  in  Italy,  370,  373,  376;  in  Rus- 
sia, 459,  477-478,  479,  480,  483;  in 
Spain,  384 ;  in  Sweden,  446. 

Social  legislation  (and  reform),  in  nineteenth 
century,  2,  222,  252-253,  271-273;  in 
Australia,  648-649;  in  Austria,  432;  in 
Belgium,  391-392;  in  France,  159,  349- 
350;  in  Germany,  413-414;  in  Great 
Britain,  307-319;  in  Italy,  374;  in  New 
Zealand,  650;  in  Russia,  475-476;  in 
Spain,  384;  in  Sweden,  446;  in  Switzer- 
land, 437-438. 

Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the  Faith,  2, 
557. 

Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the  Gospel  in 
Foreign  Parts,  2,  557. 

"Solemn  League  and  Covenant,"  1,  275,  285. 

Solferino,  battle  of,  2,  171. 

Somaliland,  British,  2,  628,  660;  French, 
632 ;  Italian,  632. 

Sonderbund,  2,  129-130. 

South  Africa,  Union  of,  2,  626,  642,  650-653. 

South  African  Republic,  2,651.  (See  Trans- 
vaal.) 

South  America.      {See   America ;  Latin 

America.) 
South  Australia,  2,  645,  647,  649. 
Spain,  in  1500, 1,  7-10 ;  in  sixteenth  century, 

17,  18,  74-76,  87-91,  106,  109;  colonial 


INDEX 


763 


empire  of,  49,  53-58, 61,  299, 308-309, 310- 
312,  315,  317,  334-336,  532,  576;  religion 
in,  163,  408,  552 ;  in  eighteenth  century, 
350,  444;  and  England,  60,  97-101,  269- 
370,  308-309,  310-312,  31S,  317,  334-336, 
576;  and  France,  75,  97, 104-105,  227-228, 
329-230,  242-254,  315,  317,  334-336,  495, 
505,  506;  and  Netherlands,  58-59,  91-97, 
229;  and  Portugal,  55-56,  90-91,  228; 
and  Napoleon,  532,  550-554,  557-558,  568, 
576;  Bourbon  Restoration  in,  2,  20-26, 
60;  loss  of  American  colonies  of,  1,  576,  2, 
21,  25-26,  383,  548,  601,  603,  604;  domes- 
tic history  of,  since  1850, 177, 198,  227,  229, 
378-385,  395-396;  African  colonies  of, 
620,  636. 

Spanish-American  War,  2,  383,  603,  604. 

"Spanish  Fury,"  1,  58,  94. 

Spanish  Succession,  War  of,  1,  249-254,  257, 

389,  308-309,  346,  349,  352-353,  359. 
Spencer,  Herbert,  2,  238,  244,  690. 
Spenser,  Edmund,  1,  195. 
Speyer,  Diets  of,  1,  130,  135-136. 
Spice  Islands,  1,  45,  55,  59;  2,  439,  593-594- 
Spinning.    {See  Inventions.) 
St,  Bartholomew's  Day,  Massacre  of,  1,  103- 

104. 

St.  Benedict,  1,  115. 
St.  Boniface,  2,  556. 
St.  Dominic,  1,  115. 
St.  Francis  of  Assisi,  1,  115. 
St.  Francis  Xavier,  2,  556,  577. 
St.  Helena,  1,  571-573;  2,  152- 
St.  Ignatius  Loyola,  1,  160-161,  174, 
St.  Just,  1,  503,  507,  509. 
St.  Lucia,  1,  567  n.,  575. 
St.  Methodius,  2,  556. 
St.  Patrick,  2,  556. 
St.  Paul,  2,  556. 
St.  Peter,  1,  113;  2,  228-229. 
St.  Petersburg,  1,  379 ;  2,  471  n.    {Set  Petro- 
grad.) 

St.  Vincent  de  Paul,  Society  of,  2,  118. 
Stadion,  Count,  1,  554. 
Stambolov,  Stefan,  2,  522-523. 
Stamp  Act,  1,  328-330. 
Stamp  Act  Congress,  1,  329. 
StanislavLS  I  (Leszczynski),  of  Poland,  1,  256, 
377. 

Stanislaus  II  (Poniatowski),  of  Poland,  1, 

385,  388,  495. 
Stanley,  Henry  M.,  2,  619. 
Star  Chamber,  Court  of,  1,  5,  274. 
States-General,  of  Netherlands,  1,  30,  g^-gj ; 

2,  440. 

Slatuto,  of  Sardinia,  2,  1 34. 

Steamboat,  2,  73. 

Steam  Engine,  2,  72-731  74- 


Stein,  Baron  vom,  1,  555-556,  562 ;  2,  6,  8. 

38. 

Stephen  I  (St.  Stephen),  of  Hungary,  1,  33. 
Stephen  (the  Great),  of  Moldavia,  2,  498. 
Stephen  Dushan,  of  Serbia,  2,  498. 
Stephenson,  George,  2,  69,  74. 
Stockhohn,  treaties  of  (1719-1720),  1,  378. 
Stolypin,  Peter,  2,  482,  483,  484,  485,  486. 
Storch,  Nicholas,  1,  134  n. 
Strafford,  1,  274. 

Straits  Settlements,  1,  340;  2,  593. 
Strassburg,  1,  247,  249,  499 ;  2,  201. 
Streltsi,  1,  370-371. 

Stuart  Family,  1, 146,  263-264,  382-383,  289, 
294,  300. 

Sudan,  2,  623-624,  627-628,  662,  700. 
Suez  Canal,  2,  299,  551,  627,  661. 
Suffrage,  2,  221. 

Suffrage,  Woman,  2,  221,  307,  443,  445,  446, 

486,  650. 
Suffren,  1,  335. 

Suleiman  II  (the  Magnificent),  of  Turkey, 
1,  80-81,  106,  383,  384- 

Sully,  1,  2 10-2 1 1,  235,  238. 

Sumatra,  1,  45,  55,  59 ;  2,  439,  593. 

Sun  Yat-sen,  2,  575-576. 

Suraj-ud-Dowlah,  1,  316-317. 

Surinam,  2,  439,  549.    {See  Guiana.) 

Suspects,  Law  of,  1,  508. 

Swaziland,  2,  626,  658. 

Sweden,  in  1500,  1,  21 ;  religious  revolution 
in,  137-139;  and  Thirty  Years'  War,  224- 
228;  and  Louis  XIV,  244-245;  in  Great 
Northern  War,  374-379,  390 ;  and  Napo- 
leon, 537,  540-541,  559,  564;  in  nineteenth 
century,  2,  8,  9,  442,  443-446,  451. 

Switzerland,  1,  11,  139-141,  143,  229,  516, 
564;  2,  7,  55  n.,  129-130,  136,  435-439» 
450-451. 

SyUabus  of  Errors,  papal  (1864),  2,  337-328, 
241,  407. 

Syndicalism,  2,  370-371,  276,  363,  377,  384, 
653- 

Tahiti,  2,  593  n. 

Tailk,  1,  339,  397,  45i,  454-455- 
T'ai-p'ing  Rebellion,  2,  573- 
Talien-wan,  2,  567. 

TaUeyrand,  1,  533,  544,  553,  5^7 ;  2,  4,  5,  0, 

17- 

Tangier,  2,  625. 
Tanjore,  2,  665. 

Tariff,  in  nineteenth  century,  2,  220;  and  the 
"new  imperialism,"  552-553;  Austro- 
Hungarian,  430 ;  British,  repeal  of,  89,  91- 
93 ;  British,  agitation  for  restoration  of, 
303,  654-655  ;  Canadian,  646 ;  French, 
34<^347»  553;  Germau,  96,  4"-4i2,  420, 


764 


INDEX 


424  ;  Italian,  374;  Russian,  475;  Spanish, 
381-382;  Swedish,  446;  Swiss,  438. 

Tasmania,  2,  593,  645,  O47. 

Tasso,  1,  n).\. 

Tatars,  1,  368  ;  2,  491,  495.    {See  Mongols.) 

Taxation,  in  nineteenth  century,  2,  220; 
reform  of,  in  Great  Britain,  280,  306,  316- 
317;  oppressive,  in  Italy,  369;  oppressive, 
in  Portugal,  386. 

Taylor,  Jeremy,  1,  196. 

Telegraph,  2,  74. 

Telephone,  2,  74. 

Telescope,  1,  199. 

Terror,  Reign  of,  1,  507-509. 

Terror,  White,  2,  16-17. 

Terrorism,  in  Russia,  2,  459,  462. 

Test  Act,  repeal  of,  2,  103. 

Tetzcl,  1,  131. 

Teutonic  Knights,  1,  115,  348  n. 
Tewfik,  2,  627. 
Texas,  1,  56 ;  2,  602. 
Theebaw,  of  Burma,  2,  569. 
Theology,  1,  118. 

Thermidorian  Reaction,  1,  509,  511. 
Theses,  Niriety-five,  of  Luther,  1,  131-132. 
Thessaly,  2,  508. 

Thiers,  2,  52,  94,  117,  118,  156,  201,  331-332, 

334-335,  339,  343- 
Third  CoaUtion,  1,  537-540,  542. 
Third  Estate,  1,  211,  238,  403,  470-474. 
Third  French  Republic.    {See  France,  under 

Third  RepubUc.) 
"Third  Section,"  Russian,  2,  457-458. 
Thirty-nine  Articles,  1,  155,  166,  410. 
Thirty  Years'  War,  1,  97,  146,  218-234,  243, 

342-343,  345,  348,  352. 
Three  Emperors'  League,  2,  695,  697. 
Three-field  System  of  Agriculture,  1,  33. 
Three  Henries,  War  of  the,  1,  104-105. 
Tibet,  2,  564-565,  569-570,  57i,  665-666. 
Ticonderoga,  Fort,  1,  313,  314. 
Tientsin,  treaties  of  (1858,  i860),  2,  563. 
Tilly,  1,  222,  223,  225-226. 
Tilsit,  treaty  of  (1807),  1,  539-541,  549,  555,, 

558,  559;  2,  501. 
Timbuctu,  2,  615. 
Timor,  2,  386  n. 
Tippoo,  2,  664. 
Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  2,  423. 
Tithe,  1,  35,  397,  411,  480;  2,  326. 
Titian,  1,  190. 

Tobago,  1,  336,  567  n.,  575 ;  2,  7,  607. 
Togo,  Admiral,  2,  583,  584- 
Togoland,  2,  412,  622,  633,  635. 
Toleration  Act  (English),  1,  289,  410;  2, 
103. 

Tolstoy,  Count,  2,  268  n.,  684. 
Tonkin,  2,  564,  568-569,  593. 


Tories,  1,  286-288,  291-292,  328,  332,  4361 
439;  2,  28-37,  297-298. 

Toul,  1,  79,  228. 

Toulon,  1,  524,  531. 

Toussaint  L'Ouvcrture,  1,  533. 

Towns.    {See  Cities.) 

Townshend  Acts,  1,  331. 

Tractarians,  2,  244  n. 

Trade.    {See  Commerce.) 

Trade  Boards  Act,  British,  2,  310. 

Trade  Unions,  general,  2,  84-85,  222,  253, 
264,  265,  276;  and  Socialism,  264,  418;  and 
Anarchism  (SyndicaUsm),  270-271;  and 
Catholicism,  250;  Australasian,  649,  650; 
British,  84-85,  89,  113,  278,  302-303,  315- 
316,  329;  French,  85,  159,  350;  German, 
418 ;  Italian,  374. 

Trafalgar,  battle  of,  1,  534,  538,  546. 

Transubstantiation,  1,  119,  166. 

Transvaal,  2,  617,  626,  645,  650-652. 

Transylvania,  1,  345,  383;  2,  127,  137,  139, 
141,  427,  428,  429,  433-434,  495,  518,  536, 
538. 

Treasonable  Practices  Act,  British,  2, 
30. 

Trebizond,  1,  52. 

Trent,  Council  of,  1,  90,  158-160,  190. 

Trenton,  battle  of,  1,  333. 

Trepoff,  General,  2,  479,  480. 

Trevithick,  Richard,  2,  73-74. 

Triennial  Act,  1,  275. 

Triple  AlUance  (1668),  1,  244. 

Triple  Alliance  (1882),  2,  373,  404,  431,  696- 

697,  699,  703,  714,  716. 
Triple  Entente  (1907),  2,  702-717. 
Tripoli,  2,  528,  633.    {See  Libya.) 
Tripolitan  War.    {See  Turco-Italian  War.) 
Troppau,  Congress  of,  2,  13,  3^40,  45 ; 

Protocol  of,  13-14. 
"Troublous  Times,"  in  Russia,  1,  369. 
Tudor  Family,  1,  4-6, 109, 150-156,  261-263, 

300. 

Tugendbund,  1,  557 ;  2,  43. 

Tunis,  2,  513-514,  524,  629,  696. 

Turco-Italian  War,  2,  374,  514,  528,  708. 

Turenne,  1,  228-229,  237,  241,  246,  249. 

Turgeniev,  Ivan,  2,  458  n. 

Turgot,  1,  425,  458;  2,  82,  547. 

Turin,  treaty  of  (i860),  2,  172. 

Turkestan,  2,  564,  590-592. 

Turkey,  in  1 500, 1,  23,  26 ;  in  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, 76,  79,  80-81,  87,  106,  III ;  in  seven- 
teenth century,  247,  345,  369-370,  383 ; 
in  eighteenth  century,  383-387,  390,  2, 

490-  491 :  and  Napoleon,  1,  540,  559,  2, 
491 ;  gradual  dismemberment  of,  in  nine- 
teenth and  twentieth  centuries,  47-50, 

491-  5i4i    523-535.    536-542.  681-^82: 


INDEX 


765 


under  German  influence,  422,  424,  431, 

703,  706-707,  708,  716,  717. 
Tuscany,  1,  19,  444;  2,  8,  124,  136-137,  139, 

171,172.    (5e<j  Florence ;  Italy.) 
Twelve  Articles,  1,  134. 
Two  Sicilies,  1,  16,  87,  256,  344-345,  516,  534, 

571;    2,  7,  44,  45,  136,  173-174-  {See 

Italy;  Naples;  Sicily.) 
Tyrol,  1,  135,  344,  447,  539,  554-555,  564;  2, 

428. 

Tzu-hsi,  Empress,  of  China,  2,  573-574, 
575- 

Uganda,  2,  623,  628,  660. 

Ulm,  battle  of,  1,  538. 

Ulster,  2,  320,  322,  325-326. 

Ultramontanism,  1,  409. 

Ultra- Royalists,  French,  2,  15,  16,  18-19,  5°, 

SI,  ISO. 
Umbria,  2,  174. 

Unemployment,  2,  80,  121,  126,  313-314. 
Uniformity,  Act  of,  1,  284. 
Unigenitus,  1,  409. 

Union,  Act  of,  with  Ireland  (British),  1,  431 ; 
2,  29,  323. 

Union,  Act  of,  with  Scotland  (English),  1, 
289,  430. 

Unionist  Party,  in  Great  Britain,  2,  300-302, 

305,  306,  307,  325-326. 
Union  of  South  Africa.    {See  South  Africa, 

Union  of.) 
Unions,  Trade.    {See  Trade  Unions.) 
Unitarians,  1,  411. 

United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land, in  nineteenth  century,  domestic 
history  of  (1800-1850),  2,  28-37,  60-61, 
90-93,  99,  102-116;  domestic  history  of 
(since  1850),  277-330;  industrial  revolu- 
tion in,  68-86;  government  and  political 
parties  in,  290-319,  328-329 ;  and  Congress 
of  Vienna,  6,  7 ;  and  Concert  of  Europe,; 
II,  12,  28-29,  46-47,  680-682;  and  Latin 
America,  23,  25-26,  27 ;  and  Greek  inde- 
pendence, 49,  499;  and  Belgium,  54-55, 
196,  693,  715  ;  and  France,  49,  50,  117,  162- 
163,  J76,  177,  196-197,  624,  694,  700,  702- 
703,  704-706;  and  Germany,  185,  188, 
196-197,  404,  420,  424,  693-694,  699-707; 
and  Italy,  167,  168,  169,  377,  694;  and 
Russia,  49,  so,  162-163,  501-503,  505-507, 
694,  700,  702-703,  706-707 ;  in  the  Near 
East,  499,  501-503,  505-507,  508,  512,  537, 
538;  in  the  Far  East,  561,  562-563,  567, 
569-571,  575,  576,  578,  579,  585,  592; 
colonial  empire  of,  640-678;  in  War  of 
the  Nations,  714-715,  717.  {See  British 
Empire;  England;  Great  Britain;  Ire- 
land; Scotland.) 


United  Provinces,  1,  95.  {See  Netherlands, 
Dutch.) 

United  States  of  America,  1,  336;  2,  25-26, 
176,  178,  282,  323,  382-383,  575,  578,  579, 
585,  594-595,  602-605,  611,  636-637,  680, 
685,  686-687. 

Upsala,  archbishop  of,  1,  138. 

Uruguay,  2,  607,  610. 

Usury,  1,  65-66. 

Utilitarians,  2,  108-109. 

"Utopian"  Socialism,  2,  86-88,  254-255,  256. 

Utrecht,  Peace  of  (1713-1714),  1,  253-254, 
308-309,  344,  349,  356;  Union  of  (1579), 
95- 

Valmy,  1,  501,  504;  2,  53. 

Valois  Family,  1,  108. 

Vanderbilt,  Cornehus,  2,  608. 

Van  Dyck,  1,  191. 

Varennes,  Flight  to,  1,  487-488. 

Vasco  da  Gama,  1,  51-52,  55,  72,  I95,  303' 

Vatican  Council,  2,  228-230,  241. 

Vauban,  1,  237,  241,  247. 

Vega,  Lope  de,  1,  195. 

Velasquez,  1,  191,  195. 

Venango,  Fort,  1,  313. 

Vendee,  La,  1,  488,  494,  504,  506,  508. 

Venezelos,  Eleutherios,  2,  510,  516-517. 

Venezuela,  2,  603  n.,  607,  609. 

Venice  (Venetia),  1,  16-17,  44,  46-49,  52-53, 
62,  78,  80,  106,  231,  383,  515,  539,  564;  2, 
8,  44,  124,  130,  131,  136,  137,  163,  170-172, 
174- 

Verdun,  1,  79,  228,  501. 

Vergniaud,  1,  498,  503,  509. 

Verona,  Congress  of,  2,  13,  23,  46,  47. 

Verrazano,  1,  54,  60,  300. 

Versailles,  1,  237,  476-478;  treaty  of  (1783), 

335-337 ;  and  the  Paris  Commune  (1871), 

2,  332-334,  345- 
Vervins,  treaty  of  (1598),  1,  105,  209- 
Vespucci,  Amerigo,  1,  54. 
Viborg  Manifesto,  2,  483,  484. 
Victor  Emmanuel  I,  of  Sardinia,  1,  568 ;  2, 

44-45,  46. 

Victor  Emmanuel  II,  of  Sardinia  (Italy),  2, 

140,  165-168,  170-174,  197,  204,  373,  379. 
Victor  Emmanuel  III,  of  Italy,  2,  373. 
Victoria,  2,  645,  647,  649. 
Victoria,  of  Great  Britain,  2,  277,  291  n., 

655,  669,  729. 
Vienna,  Congress  of  (1814-1815),  1,  568,  570 ; 

2,  5-14,  38,  53,  163,  180,  188,  213,  438,  439 ; 

treaty  of  (1864),  187 ;  siege  of,  by  Turks, 

1,  81,  383,  2,  490. 
Villa,  Francisco,  2,  613. 
Villafranca,  truce  of  (1859),  2,  172. 
Vinci,  Leonardo  da,  1,  188-189. 


766 


INDEX 


Vin^tiime,  1,  454-455- 

Virthow,  Rudulf,  2,  185  n. 

Virgiiiiii,  1,  300. 

Visconti  Family ,  1,  17,  187. 

Vittoria,  battle  of,  1,  565. 

Vlachs,  1,  23;  2,  495.    {See  Rumania.) 

Viviani,  Ren6,  2,  365,  367. 

Volta,  1,  417. 

Voltaire,  1,  355,  380,  419-421,  443,  458,  465 ; 

2,  29. 
Vorparlament,  2,  132. 
Voyages.    (See  Exploration.) 
Vulgate,  1,  160. 

Wadai,  2,  624,  631. 
Wagram,  battle  of,  1,  554,  573 ;  2,  4. 
Waldeck-Rousseau,  2,  358  n. 
Wales,  1,  3,  430;  2,  306. 
Walker,  William,  2,  608. 
Wallace,  Alfred  Russel,  2,   235-237,  238, 
304- 

Wallachia,  1,  386;  2,  502-503.  (5«e  Ru- 
mania.) 

Wallenstein,  1,  199,  223-226,  234. 
Walloon,  1,  19,  95. 

Walpole,  Sir  Robert,  1,  391-293,  311,  324, 

435-436. 
Wandewash,  1,  317. 

War  of  the  Nations,  2,  203,  206,  295  n.,  319, 
326,  367,  377-378,  385,  392,  425-426,  431, 
435,  441-442,  487,  534,  538-539,  657, 
710-717,  721-724- 

Warsaw  Decree,  1,  548. 

Warsaw,  grand-duchy  of.    {See  Poland.) 

W^artburg  Festival,  2,  43.  ^ 

Washington,  George,  1,  313,  332,  333,  334, 
336. 

"Water-frame,"  2,  70. 

Waterloo,  battle  of,  1,  558,  570;  2,  6,  15,  30, 

105,  106. 
Watt,  James,  2,  69,  72-73,  74. 
Weaving.    {See  Inventions.) 
Wei-hai-wei,  2,  566,  567,  571,  593. 
W'ellesley,  marquess  of,  2,  664. 
Wellington,  Arthur  Wellesley,  duke  of,  1, 

553,  557,  565,  570;  2,  6,  20,  21,  30,  31,  33, 

105-106,  III,  112,  154,  664. 
Welsh  Disestablishment  Bill,  2,  390,  306. 
Wentworth,  Thomas,  1,  274. 
W'esley,  John,  1,  412. 
Western  Australia,  2,  645,  647. 
West  Indies,  1,  302 ;     2,  657-658.  {See 

America.) 

Westphalia,  kingdom  of,  1,  534,  543,  564; 
Peace  of  (1648),  97,  228-229,  231,  246, 
348,  352. 

WTiigs,  1,  385-292,  327-328,  330,  435-439; 
2,  297-398. 


"White  Terror,"  2,  16-17. 

Whitman,  Walt,  2,  268  n. 

Whitney,  Kli,  2,  69,  71. 

Wilherforce,  William,  2,  115. 

Wilhelmina,  of  Netherlands  (Holland),  t, 

440,  441,  686. 
Wilkes,  John,  1,  437  ;  2,  109. 
William  III,  of  England,  1,  248-249,  251, 

287-290,  307,  308,  432.    {See  William  III, 

of  Orange.) 
William  IV,  of  Great  Britain,  2,  106,  729. 
William  I,  of  Netherlands  (Holland),  2,  54, 

55,  439- 

William  II,  of  Netherlands  (Holland),  2,  439. 
William  III,  of  Netherlands  (Holland),  2, 
440,  441. 

WilUara  I  (the  Silent),  of  Orange,  1,  93-94, 
96. 

William  HI,  of  Orange,  1    345,  348-349. 

{See  WilUam  III,  of  England.) 
William  I,  of  Prussia  (German  Emperor),  2, 

181-185,  198-199,  303,  203,  404,  413,  414, 

689,  695. 

William  II,  of  Prussia  (German  Emperor),  S, 

414-426,  699,  706,  707. 
William  Henry,  Fort,  1,  313,  314. 
WiUiams,  Roger,  1,  307. 
Willoughby,  1,  60. 

Windischgiatz,  Prince,  2,  134,  137,  138,  139. 

Wireless  telegraphy,  2,  74. 

Witte,  Serge  de,  2,  474-476,  480,  482. 

Wittenberg,  Luther  at,  1,  130-131. 

Wolfe,  1,  314-315- 

WoUstonecraft,  Mary,  2,  33  n. 

Wolsey,  Cardinal,  1,  151. 

Woman  Suffrage.    {See  Suffrage,  Woman.) 

Workingmen,  in  nineteenth  and  twentieth 
centuries,  2,  78-88,  216-217,  222,  249-250, 
252-254,  258-263,  265,  270-271;  British, 
34-35,  282,  298-319;  French,  120-121, 
153,  156,  158-159,  333-335,  349-350,  363- 
367  ;  German,  409,  410,  411,  413,  414,  418; 
Italian,  369,  374 ;  Belgian,  391-392- 

Workingmen's  Compensation,  in  France,  2, 
350;  in  Great  Britain,  3 11-312.  (5e« 
Insurance,  workingmen's.) 

Worms,  Diets  of,  1,  13-14,  83,  85,  133. 

Wren,  Sir  Christopher,  1,  187. 

Wiirttemberg,  1,  146,  538,  539,  543;  2,  135, 
131,  141,  142,  189,  192,  202,  399,  400,  403. 

Wycliffe,  1,  123,  129. 

Yorck,  General,  1,  562. 
Yorktown,  battle  of,  1,  334. 
Yoshinobu,  shogun  of  Japan,  2,  580. 
"Yoimg  China,"  2,  575. 
"Yovmg  Ireland,"  2,  333. 
"Young  Italy,"  2,  139- 


INDEX 


767 


"Young  Pretender."    {See  Charles,  Prince, 

of  England.) 
"Young  Turks,"  2,  525-527.  530- 
Ypsilanti,  Prince  Alexander,  2,  47. 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  Chinese  President,  2,  573, 

576. 

Zanzibar,  2,  623,  660. 


Zemstvos,  2,  453,  455-456,  479,  480,  481. 

Zola,  Emile,  2,  268  n.,  356. 

Zolherein,  project  of,  in  sixteenth  century,  1, 

83 ;  in  nineteenth  century,  2,  96,  125,  181, 

188,  411. 
Zungaria,  2,  564. 

Zurich,  1,  140;  treaty  of  (1859),  2,  172. 
Zwingli,  1,  129,  139-140,  142,  172. 


Printed  in  tbe  United  States  of  America. 


-J 


